WEST POINT SEMINAR ON GAMING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 14, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

oved IreIease 2001/07/18 : CIA-RDP62-00634A00010 03
ernoranefUM ? UNITED STAT,
008-5_
S UOYERNMEN
25X1A9a
PolcOvits
on GI
meek in New York I asked
&rah OcOncil'about the
'gjorlingielltfbrmettme
n gaming was not held an o
Instead it the Conference *n the 500
Security Policy, held at the United:
June .17-49, under the auspices of t
Security Policy Research of the Soot
Council, an afternoon session was devo
as a,"media of instruoticn." Tnis see
Paul !Nitze, featured a discussion le
RAKE), 'whttoktiscuesed the oxperieno
In develsoOng gaming technique lA in n
attach an off-the-record summary
the conference.
0
tee WY I
on National
Ce Research
to gaming techniquts
ton, chaired by
Hans Speier or
the RAND Corpoiatiolt
eautrity
p cacti/1gs If
Speier's observations were largely, seed on his article
4.4 Politics unCer the ti e ot"Some Observations on
1:laf7laming." The main theme 4ye1oped by,Speler was
aut gaming is not a sUbstitute for,but g supplement ?.0.,
.1Ytical technique and a usefulteaching. : RAND
eriencc -End1oa-717adr ti poli-VrcaLti,,gaming hould not i::re
4 to predict behavior, but 4,rather tO,determine low ,
VI 8,XIMUTti--1-111-7e?C f --errirfi 0 Ai data andepecialized akills
using on a pri-ableii. The sessjnjlso ? ------'' '
4 ,Cluettkow orrTcallifiig ' exercises44,iL)Orthweeterri held for
?Xs/dilates and junior exeoutivelik'Varrier R. lichillIng
4. gaming exercise at Columbia Which . ewhasi zed a sense
pressure of time in making, pol4t*Teti decisions and the
t' that many problems cannot be, satisfactorily solved.; 'and
coin Bloomfield_ and Norman .PadelfOrd who ,di BMWS ed two
I.T. games focused on the Berlin_..,.00.:01i. 'rrie ? essential
erence Vet wee.q Ilia -10150---grere?", ,ar: NortIlwestern e74;:teri en .e
noted: the f I rs tgifc tk, iiciara_ajUll appreciation olf*
Complexity and d(rnam4a 01111Q4 t -Politics throucl
-.playing , whi le t:h,:-.. lezumse: waft ,w?re cbnc.'ed witt-!. con-
ng to8 tuden t 3 t: f..! t T!T,!iy %ndustruOu 0 r interne ti.ona,:
tics. Poi witt4 mune '
r r r 0,n! r,?? riotinsvou otrenwent No .
,
r
40 ClaSS
NAP 1 ' ri .r."`:?" 4 '4' ;'F q?44"4'612,4p. ci*HoDECLAS;2,1 e] ED
TO:
1.=
kith: __1411,_ 131,. 77
By
iRelease 2001I07/8 CIA-IRDP62-00634A000100030008-5-
ease 2001/07128 : CIA-RDP62-00634AQ001000SOWSIti?12 ,P=
lease 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
PROGRAM
nce sessions held in Thayer Hall, United States Military
6 30 ,pos?
00 p.w.
JUNO 18
a sh-12:00
3200 Pau
Luncheon, Hotel Thayer
Treditioftal ins.: a New Po1i Field
,
Chairs=
H. Field Haviland, Jr.? Brookings Initituttur
Diecussion Leaders
willies' r. ft.Pox, Coluabia University
Charles ditch, HAND Collimation
Corirentatore
Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research ,;oruicil
Norris Janowitz, University of Michigan
rattlE Knorr, Princeton University
louts Morton, office of the Chief of Military
Departunnt of the Army
Dinner, Hotel Thayer
Renewal. of Discussion
Discussion Leader
Harold D. Lasevell Yale University
Courses on National Security Policy: Spellslized
.4)unw3? siain!E!
Chairman
Col, G. Am Lincoln,
Discussion Leaders
Lt, Col. As A. Jordn
United Statee Military Acadary
Jr., United Stats Miii aIF
Acadery
Barry L. Coles, Ohio StAtte University
iiohn )1, Rowland, Dartsaruth
Coserentators
Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., University of C orr a.
Pentair/
williaar Emerson, /ale lkdvaraity
(41, Weeiey 4. Posver, United States kir Fol
C
Luncaeon, botti Mayer
411,
'f4111Ftw ?
Approved !Reiese 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
'
,
2130,;';,5'
r ;
Friday, June 19
9115 a,m.-12s00
12130 p.m.
Gaming Tecnniques as Media of Instruction
chairman
Paul h. Nitre, Foreign Service Educational
Foundation
Disoussion Leader
Hans Speier, RAND Corporation
Commentators
Harold Guetzkow Northwestern I3niversity
Warner It. Schilling, Columbia University
Reception, Ballroom, Hotel 'Thayer
,
Dinner, Hotel Thayer '
No conference session scheduled
Assimilation of Nation4_3ectiriqr_ Problem
^ ???..111.????
into Es7,atlished Courses in the Social Scienct a
Chairms1
John 11. liasland, Dartmouth College
Discussior Leaders
Holbert N. Carroll, Univeraity of Pittsburg"
emne 1. Huntington, Columbia University
Artau-- mithier , Harvard University
Luncheon, Hotel Thayer
:::1144q
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
I 1ST CI PARTICIPANTS
Willard F. Barber, Foreign Service Institute, repartrent Of State
Lt. Victor Basiuk, U.S. Naval War College
:Boss N. Berkes? School of International RelatiOnelliniversitrO
-.California
?
-..Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr.', Institute of Internitionel.Studiea,?Universi
of California Berkeley ?
Lincoln P. Bloomlield,,Center for International Studies, MissaChwitts
Institute of Technology
,Alastair Buchan, Institute for Strategic Studies, London
William N. Capron, Department of Economics, Stanford University
Lt. Col. John W. Carley, Department of Political Science,OC.S.,Air Force
Academy
,Holbert N. Carroll, Department of Political Science UnivSiSitioff Pittehurgh
-..Marry L. Coles, Department of History, Ohl() State University
'Stetson Conn, Office of the Chief of Mary History, Department of the krIty
Robert H. Connery, Departmeet lf Politieal Science, Duke University
Matthew Cullen, Ford Foundation
Boyden Dangerfield? Associate Provost and Dean of Administration, Univertity
of Illinois
William Emerson, Department of History, Yale University
William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, ,Jolumbia Uriversit7
Capt. Robert Gard, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. MilitarylA(adeMy'
Alfred Goldberg, Air University Historical Liaison Off1ce1 leparteent of
'
the Air Force
Fred Greene, Department of Political Scieice? William College
Major Abbott C. Greenleaf, Depaa-tment of Social Sciences, U.S. Military
Academy
Harold Ouetzkows Department of Political sciences Northwestern University
:-Paul I. Hammond Department of Political Science, YaIS University
H. Field Havilad, Jr.- Brookings Institution -
Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council
J,Roger Hilsman? Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress
Charles Hitch, RAND Corporation
Malcolm W. Hoag, RAND Corporation
Capt.. Edwin B. -Hooper, U.S. Naval War College
..Samuel P. Huntington, Institute of Wer and Peace Studies, Columbia UniverdAv
Mbrris Janowitz, Department of Sociology, University. of Michigan
V. W. Jeffries, Department of English, History And Government, U.S.,Naval
- Acadery
1*. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Department of Social Sciences, U.S. illitar?
Academy
Charles P. Kindleberger, Department of Econamicaand:Social Scieno,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
,Yilliant.,R.'Kintner, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University .1f
Pennsylvania
-laaus.:Knorr Center of International Studies. Princeton University
Harold B. L:sswell, Law School, Yale University
CaPtfiFrancia V. Laurent, Law School, University of Wisconsin
Col.-0.4. Lincoln, Departnent of Social Sciences, U.S. Military JI.alemy
Gene2,11: Lyons, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
William V. Marvel, Carnegio Gorporatien of New York
John W. Masland, Departm,m of lovernment, Dartmouth College
?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
1_1,7
Willard F. Bartxr, Foreign Servic:e Inltt:! Department of State
Lt. Victor Basiuk, U.S. Naval War Colo
Ross N. Berkes, School of International Relations, University of Southern
California
Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Institute of International Studies, University
of California Berkeley
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
Alastair Buchan, Institute for Strategic Stuaies, London
William :M. Capron, Department of Economics, Stanford University
Lt. Col. John W. Carley, Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force
Acadery
Holbert N. Carroll, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
Harry L. Coles, Department of History, Ohio State University
Stetson Conn, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Arty
Robert H. Connery, Department of Political Science, Duke University
Matthew Cullen, Ford Foundation
Boyden Dangerfield, Associate Provost and Dean of Administration, University
of Illinois
William, Emerson, Department of History, Yale University
William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Capt. Robert Gard, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
Alfred Goldberg, Air University Historical Liaison Office, Department of
the Air Force
Fred Greene, Department of Political Science, Williams College
Major Abbott C. Greenleaf, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military
Medway
Harold ?uptake'', Department of Political Science, Northieetern University
Paul T. Hammond, Department of Political Science, Yale University
N. Field Midland, Jr. Brookings Institution
Piadletem, Herring, Social Science Research Council
Meer Hilsman, Legislative Reference Servioe, Library of Congress
Charles Hitch, RAND Corporation
Naloola W. Hoag RAND Corporation
Capt. won B. eoper, U.S. Naval War College
$ernial P. Huntington, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Nbrris Janovits, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan
W. W. Jeffries, Department of English, History and Government, U.S. Naval
Assam
It. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military
Acadwir
Charles P. lindleberger, Department of Economics and 3ocial Science,
Nessachusetts Institnte of Technology
William R. -Kintner, Foreign Palm Researth Institute, University of
Penniylvania
Klaus Knorr, Center of International Studies, Princeton University
Harold D. Lassmell, law Sdhool, Yale University
Cwt. travois W. Laurent, Law School, University of Wisconsin
Col. 0. A. Lincoln, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Medea,'
Dens M. Icons, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
WillisoW. Marvel, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Johibt. Mesland, Department of Goverraent, Dartmouth Collage
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
a
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army
Paul H. Nita. Foreign Service Educational Foundation
Robert J. Nordstrom, Committee on Defense 4tudies, Ohio State University
Raymond O. O'Connor, Department of History, Stanford University
Charles P. O'Donnell, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State
Norman J. Padelford, Department of Economics and Social Science, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall Research Foundation
It. Col. Wesley W. Poem', Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force
Academy
Laurence I. Ream, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
Harry Hove Ransom? Defines Studies Program, Harvard University
Swett' 3. Redford, Department of Political Science, University of Texas
Vincent P. Rook, U.S. Office of Civilian Defense Mobilisation
Col. SW L. Boggy, National War College
Thomas C. Rebelling, RAND Corporation
Warner R. Schilling, Department of Public Lme and Government, Columbia
University
Nina Rimier, RAND Corporation
George A. Steiner, Graduate School of Business Administration, University
of California los Angeles
Kenneth W. Tho ion, Rockefeller Foundation
It. Col. Jiro Tolman*, Columbia University ,
Peal P. Tan Riper, Graduate School of Business mad Public Administration,
Cornell University
NajOr Gen. !Wert J. Wood, Deputy Chief of Research end Development, Depart-
soot of tbe &Mr
Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
SUMMARY OF FROCEEDIMS
Afternoon Session, June 17
Traditional Disciplines and a New Policy Field
Panel Chairman, H. Field Havilank Jr.
The Chairmen of the panel reminded the conference that historically
there has ban a deep interest in military affairs. Problems of war an'
defense are :major eoncorn in former psri?dirhiatory, although this
concern dwindled in the years prior to the First and Second World Wars.
Today, however, we must become interested in the problems of security.
There is a kind of Ulcerative behind our discussions.
William T. Poms
Mr. Pox observed that the conference would be directed toward the
problems involved in the development, of a new field of research and
teadbing activity. Today we would be asking Mby we are thus concerned
and
*at the future looks like; tomorrow vs would look at the ithrodustion
of this field into teething and research programs.
Dere are three patterns of civil-military relations *lob are some-
*at distinct frescos another. There is, first, the tradition that is
reeled in Inglieb.pepeaking countries mhere civilian perspectives on mili-
tary affairs have been based on the experience of relatively low levels
of posootine mobilisation. This contrasts Odth the seeped pattern,
ehleh is found on the Swope= continent 'doers there has historically
balsa relatively high level of peacetime mobilisation. The third pat.
ten is found in those thentrles there governmental succession is Moldy
dspemdmmt oaths oontrol of military polar.
In the Inglith.speaking countries civi34. have pr.liy bee
atharaed with the antra tba_eili
MUM of
the aduAtary aorriosa during psaceti made this possible wee ?
as and r on foraeo-in.
Was._ Is this re spy revolved around the prob.
30,0 et stamping fleets for elienple, the establishment of the World
hese libeedatima eerly lathe century and the terms of Andros Carnegiele
Will ootabliabiag the C11111011 lindoummt for latormatioeal Peso* refloated
liale tied of hope and ietoroot. .tlbore that. was on interest in the W-
W1 of rare it was is the battles tempt or in the Upset of war on
?
This treed of interest in the Anglo-Sanon Gawkiest Mbould be eel.
treated with the emsdate of the Committee 0114 'Miami Security Policy
Imam& amd the name for bolding this sooderemme. The problem of
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
civilian control is still one of concern tut there are other issues: the
problem of achielving_s2uetent_civil cou1/1; the problem ofigaining
maximsecuritv at minimum cost in terms of values and resources;
studying military history from the viewpoint of the development of policy
and the decision-making process.
During the last decade there has been a rediscovery of the dual
nature of civil-military relations, an awareness of both the internal and
external threats to a free society. Pendleton Herring's book, The Impact
of War, for example, demonstrated that defense was possible wit:En a
Ninaiatic framework; whereas Harold Lasswellle National Security and
Individual Freedom demonstrated that democracy was possib while Mend-
Wir?Turse ve8.
The study of national security policy as it has evolved, has two main
ports. First, there are the problems of American government: how to in..
prove the skills and attitudes of policy makers; how to organise govern,.
sent to work toward a concert of judgment; how to get the "right answers"
accepted as policy; and how to develop public understanding in this comp
plioatod area. Behind these questions is an understanding that military
polio, lies in an area between the objectives of foreign policy and the
means of economic resources.
The second part lies in the field of international relations. It
includes three basic changes in the structure of international politics.
Met, there is the Chan's in the special insular condition of the Anglo-
American countries. from this a new time factor has developed. No longer
is it possible to moWise after a crisis, nor to maintain a low level of
peacetime fon,.A mectoild change relates to whai.:11a1tSr
mar Zof general war (and beyond this, to the need to beep
or pbic for any potential opponent).- A third basic abaft,
in .the stricture of international relations comes from the change in the
status of ifro-Asian natioms, now sebleots rather than objects of inter-
tonal polities.
These changes have forced the United States to undertake a high level
of peacetime setdlisation, a deep commitment to allies, and an extensive
proven of economic and military assistance. All three of these under-
takings are evident in the relations of the United States with Xurope and
proace complex problems for study. These problems might be considered
to fall into four major categories: the problem of standardisation; the
prolasma of determining what is a fair share of the total obligation; that
aditerng a balance of 'Woe within the alliance; that of decision
main& .
Owed the prOblen of the Western alliance are those that develop
OWed"Ammsloan relations with the rest of the free world. ,These night
seprolod into three major categorises relationehip of foreign
40010mis aid to American national security; tie problem of dealing with
or a drift toward Alliance with the Communist powers; and the
pumblost of balancing the merits of local strength against a/reliance on
atilit power.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
Beyond the external problems that the Unitee States has to face in
relation to the Western alliance, to the rest of the free world, and to
the Communist powers, there are the complex issues that develop out of the
interrelationship of foreign and domestic policies. The complexity and
scope of these problems emphasize the need for defining the field of
national security and developing a theory. This must be done, moreover,
While resisting the demands put on sCholars by policy makers in the pur-
suit of answers to short-term problems.
General Discussion
The qmestion was raised as to the wisdom of looking at Anglo.Smerican
traditions in national minority as an entity. It was pointed out that
aring the 'evolutionary period Americans were as realistic about these
problems as they have been unrealistic at other times and that a similar
diversity is true *en one studies the British experience.
Is responses it was suggested that during the letter half of the 19th
sestury the hit* experience paralleled the American experience ilium,
WS. There gee little coordination between the Army and Wavy, Britt*
unitary organisation bore little relationship to the European political
Situation, and there vas a low level of peacetime mobilisation. Moreover,
U late as the lows there ges sharp opposition in Britain to the crea-
tion or a general staff. Only the conduct of the Boer War brought pres-
sures for whinge just as the criticism of the conduct of the Spanish-
American War laid the foundation for the Boot reforms in 1903. While it
is tree that British insularity broke down before that of the United
States, there continued to be a reliance on the navy as a means of defense
beyond the territory of the Isles themselves.
A good deal of isterest was directed toward the problem of seserity
and the military in developing areas. It gee suggested that research gee
seeded to isolate the conditions =der *Loh it is possible totters
aseerity gitbdut the security forces themselves begloming a threat to
liternal institutions. Came studies of masa conditions inabetheast
ASIA and Latin Marisa ere eaefUls but it was also suggested that a
theoretic analysis of these situations was also greatly seeded.
Charles 'Mkt
In dramimg attention to the relationship of somataa as a traditional
discipline to the isms@ of national security Pala', Mre 'Utah mated that
at moot very little research and writing are being dome by economists
in this field. The Winking of notional security policy within the setting
of 000110111411 is therefore gads difficult VI the lack of pedagogical.
asterials.
Follcmisegboth World Wars there was some interest shown by economists
in a sorrow set of problems generally involving mobilisation and economic
stabiliestbmsmeaures and controls. These kinds of studies, however, are
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
? ?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
no longer particularly relevant in view of the changes in the technology of
mar. There is a new set of problems which revolves around the necessity of
maintaining large and competent forces-in-being both as a deterrent to mar
and 441 a rommiremtnt for waging war should it break out.
This is not to soy that this threat of amtual annihilation has 070..,
pistoly outmoded the possibility of general war. The problems of genertl
oar, limited war, and cold war, are all very mach with as. One factor
that is esmstmet to all these Prdblems is the need for a continual state
of mobilisation. Another common factor that mot be understood is that
eemmemiste cannot solve their part of the problem in isolation because of
the integral relatiemship of economic, political, social, and Rilitary
Theft are for practical parpooes, two general definitions of
eseasaice. Owl first relates economics to the mower and emphasises the
study of institutions and troupe sock as marketa sad oonsumers. A seoond
difimitien, one that is particularly apOioable to problem of 1111thM1111
need* relates esomoodos to seconced... Man this second definition
of eessealse the speaker suted ? nabor of areas When **monists stillet
hl seateibete to the re sties of problem is altional emeriti, 70111/1
(1) WA ma be dear ea the analysis sad sisasermat of *email*
file W. trier to the mesa situation a good deal of atteatioa
sma
to sesamis poteadiel. The idea of ~lel ii. loner rel.
elest. Ileverthelsest the esperlame of memedeto in this area est be
eletal to the proses* peobleas of seeking to detentes at kind of mom&
eteemaghis lapertest sad hew it can be masured? nue eve other Imetime
theee the espiNfillate at emandato mad be valashIss leish is the sliptfi..
Nos at the lassean in the &Mot national pest as empored to that of
the TIMM Mates, What is the seleveate ofbooposa latepratine to
Delipees emeista streepth la tens of notioadl someitel
ans et amens is the rolatias of Ionge debase balgets
eseasiors Mato ter enepls. are theIlIaati.ee a de-
aspeellitasse is team at tea policies* that are laplisetteas
tdese eat at tie tree aarbett Dna Um. prowl eve
oessom Asa sedi a amp bite et the autism% ,
eloasitststo esatribato mewering these pmetteas, there is
to*ilk that a seed deal et meant* theory will ham to be re? ?
ender to be mopletaly pertinent to the looms involved.
that teeters ase laralved Is detendalai the aim if the salami
lesesett Desserees. eine* help es ashieve obsolete security* lib
bey relstim meat*. lihat is this level of selativite Am INS-
rier passotgeses as mareise of Mond toward *1* eemeale them ma
?
*on ars also eastions larolving the vie sad mespeassi at *
Mame. The Departased Doha* is like a Imps nopmp thed
Wilds people sat asterials bed products* a esmalibr fee Wish *we
astm.ft Despite this bade differmee betimes *Anse and ladastriel
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
expenditures a good deal of economic theory can help meet the problems of
efficiency and management in the defense budget if it la adapted to the
issues involved. Mich recent writing by political scientists has assumed
that there is basic conflict between military doctrine and economic pres-
sures. Most of this thinking stems from the need to make strategic deci-
sions on the basis of the use of the defense budget. If, homever, the
basic problem of the else of the military budget is decided upon, then
from that point on there need be no conflict boteeen econosic and military
capabilities.
(5) A Stood deal of economic theory is also applicable to the develop-
ment of Institutional arransesents designed to promote officieng. In the
economy this is dons by seeking to improve the emvironment within ubida
institutions operate. Por example, antitrust tedhniques are designed to
improve motet situations so that they night operate to the fullest adven..
tap of the 'bole *mina,. In the area of national security policy similar
selstionehips might mall be determined. Mews for exenple, can budget and
seseemlins Winslow' be improved? Icor nigbt it bp yeesible to move from
*inking in terms of maximising budsets to asking the meet of bedsets? ?
(6) Problems involving military research and dentlepment, perticelariy
in re/stdon to research and developmest in other areas of the ecosopy, is
(nether wee there ecomosints might profitaWleber.
- (7) The experisoce of economists mould also be pertinent to prObisme
involving military logistics.
(I) A sod deal of economic theory is spplisible to the peablon of
ndltty Scoria it possible to tale best adoemAsee of a divi-
sion of labor within as elliamest- Of differential oast footers? A good
ad of thit*bg already av043able in theories of inteesetiohal ,se
trade riglit be pet to use in this reepeet?
01 The tailties of eesarida warfare of serlier seriede are gslings me
lr relavont to problem of netienel IhnertIteless, *ors ass
etill rime problems of seencodo competition, of denial of zeseseeess _sad
St stitiom for neutrals Mire* sane ot eserenio old program alotl
-. relowat to the sold new.
(10) se ere also seceonio losses involved is the problem at die-
sesenent maths limitation et.meepeas. What arrengemente GOO be mods that
gill be mmteilAr sevemeagiees to all partici? A geed deal of essessis
*eery to, in fast, divebed to this kind of problem.
(11) Despite the redisel *segos that military techmelegy has mods es
cow setioneer226 yrehlens oUsebillostiee are still ingertant elder perti-
solar sentimpacios.
?
(12) finally, the feebler of *toil deibase twelve a "violet ?
OlOosotO 1SOODO, insleding the need for dispersing indmstrial sepeoNtr,
rebuilding economic enterprises after Wok, end restoring the himd et
emonsiestiaa that is neoeseary vitbAn ea laterdependent *censer Shoed
it be disrepted by alto*.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
I
d For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RPP62-00634A000100030008-5
H, weummary, it was suggested that this variety' ofAssues involved
problems of strategy as well as lower-level problems to which
ectniieie could profitably contribute their experience and skills.
Mr.'Janouitz-em;hasized the contribution that sociologists might 'make
to the Solution, to national security problems ii three areas:
^ A
A ,?;
!![
(l) More work needs to be done on a conc.* of.professionalizatiols
particularly with respect to military officers". Although e-tood deal of
material is available on the development of the *military profession, it
is neceseary to be dautioua in projecting pasilbehavior into the future.
'Therelle'alSt a need to look at the problems involved in competing pro- ,
fessional demands on available talent, on the rate of turnover within the
military profession, profession, and the pertinency of these trends to the problem of,
creatimity within the military profession itself. A question which might
;milt* asked is: what will be he make-up ofithe military profession in
years when selective service
er av
e spea.,r
pa . 0. ough pr.. ? mo y 00 or more studies are be---&-i?leono,
: .
' changes in the rmdi?Th%'f-NeUT,T6Wtcalpe.t4o.tr-ree are v
-
military profession.
(2) Also, little work is being done in 'analyzing differences in formal
and informal organization among the military. j The problem involves recog-
nizing the gap that can exist between formal and informal organizations and
the tensions that are exerted is a result of such differences. This has
sharp relevancy and application to limited wAr'esitustions. Here differ-
ences within'i command structure can have gnat impact on important deci-
siont-thit! have to be made on the spot without referral to higheriauthoritY?
,
, (3) There is, finally; .,4itudi of s change, in utiCh a good
deal more work is being done, icularly lation to area study ,
programs. Here the relation ger military anAnstrument of social
change is being examined. 101154, however Sibleeto consider this area
of study in a larger world sense sand exa itiry and economic aid
programs as instruments of social Change.
Klaus Knorr'
MrKnorr commented Oh Mr. Hitchla:111.
? ,
study by economists. He was impressed with
noted both that it could have been longer.
been done. There are fascinating problems'
t. subjects suggested for---
e'length of the list, but
,that little research had
feconomists to Audi: the
impact of defense on the market; the impact of changing technologies;
the absence of market Choice and the substitntion,of government regulations
for free choice. There are also the many prObleme involved in studying the
rate of economic growth of the Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly because of
the pressures that this growth will perrdt the bloc to exert in world
politics.
4 Approved For Release 2P01/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100,008-5
11
Considering the urgent nature of these questions, there might be
several explanations why so little work was being done by economists in
this area. Sone of these reasons could be deduced from the nature of the
issues that need studyi
1. Many of the issues can be undertaken with available conceptual
tools and on the basis of nonclassified documentation that is readily
available.
2. A nuMber of issues, however, cannot be_atudied without access to
classified data or in inner knowledge of the operations. Such issues,
for example, fall within the category of achieving efficiency in using
and managing defense resources.
3. A nuriber of the issues cannot be tackled through the use of tradi-
tional concepts but require conceptual innovation.
4. As was pointed out earlier, almost all the issues are more_ than
economic issues and therefore require a joint approach in cooperation with
other disciplines.
5. Finally, there is a whole range of issues such as problems of
grand strategy, in which eco mists ma
but are as we .4 s s pped as others to de
not have w a..
e basic factors invo
ved.
In summary, therefore, many economists have been reluctant to engage
in work in the area of national security policy because of the need for
conceptual innovation or the need for classified information or personal
and close knowledge of the operations. Yet even where these particular
differences have not been important, the fact remains that national
security has simply not been a concern of economists just as it has not
been a concern of society in general. Indeed, it might be said that more
teaching in this area is needed to stimulate more research just as more
research is needed to provide the tools for teaching.
Louis Morton:
The speaker referred to a remark made at the conference* sponsored by
the Committee in 1557 that the advent of the nuclear age made all of
military history prior to 1945 irrelevintlto present problems. While this
Aobservation was questionable, it did illustrate the kind of problem that
historians face in the national security !area. There is great reluctance
on the part of historians to move into the, ield and even those who do
begin to work on military history have the -Problem of finding issues for
study that are, in fact, relevant to present conditions. This problem can
* "Report on the Conference on National Security Policy: Problems of
- Research andTeach ." (Dartmouth College, June 24-26, 19571 ITEMS,
Sept. 1957, pp. 29-32.
sem Approved For Release 2001/0
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
be solved, however. There are historical examples of deterrents in a study
of British sea power, and also examples that relate the ratiOnality of
Aeciaion making to the conditions under which war has brokenf ut in the
t.
But even if a historian does enter the field and does find a
'Mhich he thinks bears great relevancy to present problems, he -must
face the problem of classified information. This problem is partici
difficult for one whoes work must of necessity be based'on the record.
-Evening Session, Wednesday, June 17, 1959
Renewal of Discussion
Pendleton Herring:
Mr. Herring suggested that there were two seta of conditions tor
developing a new policy field. First, particular attention has to be
given to focus and definition. Second, consideration has to be given to
the matter of content, to sources that are available, and to appropriate
methods. Concentrating principally on the matter of focus, he noted that
national security is literally everywhere. But rather than making the task
easier, the pervasiveness of the subject made the problem of focus more
difficult. In the past the focus was generally on peace and the methods of
settling disputes through peaceful an rather than war. Today the problem
of security is integral to society itself. Yet there is a paradoxin the
situation. When we talk about security we are not7!only talking about
military power. A myriad of factors k.re involved
eempetit4on_and economic aid. But beyond this, seen when military power
is thought to be the "trui7Orcard," we have come te',Oituation where it in
aleoat play ojr and usemilitariforce.., --------,
The complexity of the security problem.emchasiaes the need to avoid a
narrow view of the subject field. Essential to the very understanding of;.
the nature of the security problem is an aeknowledgmentAhat it goes far
beyond a consideration of military problens. And yet because there is
disagreement as to the scope and limits of the subject area, the role of
the scholar becores more important.
Security policy is dynamic and feels thtimpacof constant shifts in
domestic and international environment. he individual investigator
has to challenge the vested interests in thitkind of situation, to seek
ipukthe .real security problem that is at isaues'an?O deal in what is
essentially an unorthodox area of investigitioni often by using unorthodox
eethodology. However true it is that action must often be taken on an
interdisciplinary basis, it is essentially the role of the individual
'scholar to get to the core of the problem and keep us constantly aware of ?
, what the true issue is.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A00010003.8-5
Harold D. Lasswell:
Mr. Lasswell suggested a gap between the summary of research questions
and the present state of the discipline thus far discussed, and the prob-
lems of teaching. What is this gap?
While there are different methods of thinking about problems and their
solutions, there are several points involved in the process and these
points might well be related to the problems involved in thinking through
issues of national security:
1. Goal values: Thus far there had been no discussion of ulli4s_Klying
priiplea. It seemed at Es as though the _goalirto ba achieved were
coIiIi1y unoerstood. Is this the case?
2. Trends: While there has been some discussion of historical
developments, there has been little discassionThittrse
of peat events in relation to goal values.
3. Scientific analysis Here we are concerned with the conditions
affecting the variables in the problems we seek to solve. The two main
speakers during the afternoon session formulated areas where scientific
investigation could be undertaken. 'Yet here, too, there was an assumption
rather than an assertion that scholars should be involved in the totality
of the problems under study.
h. Projections: Here we are concerned with what is likeli to happen.
in terms of preferred goals. Here, too, assumptions rather than assertions
have been made on the probable future sequence of events.
5. Alternatives: It may be considered that the function of those
engaged in research in this area is to acce and aid national securthr
policies. If this is so, it is only oni rune nt one tha
the oals of natio li to It does not, however,
exhaust the task of the research scholar Who at also presint alternatives
to national policy.
The problem of alternatives forces us ..te'atkia good Meny questions.
Illustrative of these are: How is, it possible for a disunited world to
become united through voluntary means? Hee can elites in the Unitia-Statis
and in the Soviet Union take meszurea to delimit current tensions? Uhat
are the conditions under whiaisaaiiiOns might be entertained by ,
the Soviet elite?
It might well be asked whether American universities now provide the
environment within which these broader problems of security that go beyond
the national concern, can be investigated. :Have universities tended to
dismiss their unifying responsibility that comes from a common intellectual
frame of reference? If they have, this coon reference may now come from
the element of violence in our society and the problems that it poses for
all.
S
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
General Discussion
During the discussion considerable attentiu
of focus. It was suggested by several thatr the subject area seem so vague and unformuli
sunteachable." Several expressed concern wit
definition so far beyond the problems of dere
human activity and made it difficult to handle,
teaching.
to the problem
)thiaa far made
appeared to be
the security
'oovered all of
T, of raiearth and
To the contention that the Soviet threat was thekWto the focus,
the response was made that even without the Soviet-thriiikthe impact of
new technology on the structure of international politiO0' isbeereo
forceful as to open new areas of investigation beyond thopscoversdi*
the traditional disciplines. 1
The difficulties in defining the focus of the subject area were
related to the problems involved in getting more scholars interested in
research and teaching in the area. One realistic suggestion was that more
scholars would be willing to work in the field if the demand curve were .
"moved farther to the right." There was, as another speaker suggested, a
reciprocal relationship between an increase in interest and the movement
of the demand curve. With more interest in the problems of national
security, the demand would be greater. There via general concurrence that
there was no lack of student interest in problems of national security.,
Morning Session, June 18
Courses on National Security Policy
Panel Chairman: Colonel George A. Lincoln
The Chairman opened the discussion of teaching in national security,
policy. Three particular teething experiences were to be presented within
a general framework of eight points suggested by the Chairman:
1. Objective
2. Contents
3. Methods
h. Materials
5. Targets
6. Teachers
7. Future?stability and lonmity
8. Curriculum
Lieutenant Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr.:
The cadets at West Point are college students with three fifths of
their curriculum devoted to courses in the sciences and mathematics and
two fifths to courses in social studies and the humanities. There are
?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5 15
? several unique features of the West Point program. Generally there is an
k:? attempt to keep classes small,: from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 15.
The class periods are generally'longer than those in other institutions,
lasting 80 minutes with a good deal of stress being placed on the daily
? preparation for class-section work.
In the courses on international relations and national defense con-
siderable use is made of visual aids and of the technique of role playing.
Because the curriculum at the Academy is generally prescribed and few
electives are offered, the background of students is well known and is
generally uniform when they enter the courses under discussion here.
The two courses particularly pertinent to the subject are.. under
discussion are (1) the Economics of National Security, and (2) National
Security Problems. The first is compulsory for all cadets; the second
is an elective. In both courses, however, the principal objective is to
stimulate interest in the subject matter. There is not time to offer the
cadets a full understanding of the material involved. Most of them will,
it is anticipated, take up these same subjects when they enter the War
College. But in the twenty-year interval between their Academy experience
and their War College participation, it is hoped that they can be en-
couraged to read and think about national security issues in their broa&
est perspective.
The course in the Economics of National Security was described.
In 3 introductory lessons there is an attempt to discuss the need for a
balance between military and economic strength and to analyze the basic
problems of economic mobilization. This is followed by 5 lessons generally
devoted to the organization of mobilization machinery through an analysis
of the budget process and the experiences of the Second World War and the
Korean conflict. The following 8 lessons are devoted to a study of key
resources, including transportation, manpower, and materials, and involve
an examination of the problems of diverting repourcef to defense purposes.
The course concludes with 2 lessons devoted tethe iapact of technology
and the organization of research and development, and a final lesson .
relating all these problems to strategic issues.
The course on National Security PrObleme'builde on the earlier course.
After a general introduction, considerable time is allowed for a study of
the organization of the Defense Department and, the National Security
Council. This is followed by a block of studies devoted to strategic con-
cepts, including deterrence, containment, liberation, and fortress America.
This, in turn, is followed by a study of regiOnal security organizations,
and then of the role of collective security a implemented through the
United Nations. The course ends with a discOssion of the cold war,
including problems of psychological and ?nomic warfare and the nature
of the ideological struggle.
As in other Academy offerings, both courses are taught by dividing
the cadets into small groups. Visual aids, case studies, and guest
lecturers are used extensively. For the course in the Economics of
National Security, a special text prepared by Colonel Lincoln and his
1
11, ver
4Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
16
associates is used. For the smaller class in National Security Problems,
selected readings are assigned in a number of books written during the
:-.list five years, which are placed on reserve.
-
InAiddition, students are encouraged but not obliged, to write book
12',reviews'and to keep a clipping file on the basis of which they may later
write AM analysis of the particular issue they have been following.
Beyond the courses, cadets are encouraged to write their senior research
items in the field of national security policy.
Berry L. Coles:
The Ohio State University program of defense studies is supported by
fUnds provided under the terms of the Mershon grant to promote and encour-
age efforts in civilian-military training. From this point of view, Ohio
State has all the problems of other institutions but one: funds.
A University committee was appointed to develop a program, and its report
to the president in 1957 suggested a four fold programu
1. The Mershon Institute of Advanced Studies
2. a national security policy seminar
3. A program of special conferences lathe national security area
4. A program of scholarships and fellowships.
The first suggestion has not been approved but the last three have,
and projects have been undertaken in all three areas. Among these have
been the pilot project to experiment with civilians teaching in the AFRUTC
program, a seminar in military history instruction for the Arpy ROTC, con-
ferences during the past academic year on logistics, aggression, and
civil-military relations, and the first appointment of Mershon scholar-
ships and fellowships.
The national security seminar is attended by seniors and graduate
students, including those who hold Mershon scholarships and fellowships.
They come from a variety of disciplines, extending beyond the social
sciences to the physical sciences and into graduate programs such ealaw.
The content of the seminar is worked out 1714 faculty committee, and the
principal discussions are led by guest lecturers each week. Generally
speaking, the seminar surveys the threats to the United States and the
free world, the response to these threats and the organisation of efforts
to impaement this response.
,
3,
In the Ohio State experience great benO`it Was derived from reliance
on guest speakers. The members of the seminar prepare for the discussion
by reading literature either written by the speaker or involving the sob.
ject that he will discuss. The formal seminar is followed by informal
social meetings where faculty and students have opportunity to continue
discussion of the subject. There are also weaknesses in an over-reliance
on guests, for it may lead to fragmentation of the subject matter, a lack
.of depth and of continuity in its development, and repetition of back- .
Around material from week to week. It has been decided therefore in the
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
future to 'Make less use of guest speakers and to have more presentations
by members of the seminar.
With; regard to content and materials, the general frame of reference
ot ZiOlirOacMibg national security from a challenge-response basis has
perhaps lid.thiveeminar into too many different fields. The need for a
'*arper focus has become clear. Similarly, while there has been in recent
years no lack of material, muds has been found to be highly specialised
and difficult to relate to the subject matter. Here, too, focus is a
distinct problem, and if a special journal in the field were established
it sight help to define the area of interest and develop bibliographic
"Control."
Through its seminar, the Ohio State coneittee has also hoped to arouse
such interest in national security that the area may come to be related to
courses in the traditional disciplines. Nevertheless, in awarding research
support, it is thought that emphasis should be on individual projects
rather than on cooperative efforts. The committee is very much aware of
the danger of becoming overly concerned with present problems. Universities
are not equipped to solve these problems and should not attempt to organize
themselves to do this job. Their task is to educate the decision makers of
the future.
17
John.Nr. Maslands
Mr. Masland described the Dartnouth seminar in national security
policy as for seniors in an undergraduate liberal arts college. Originally
the 'miner grew out of the research interests of members of the Department
of Government, who sought to relate these interests to their teaching.
They did not wish to limit students to the problems of military education,
but to give, them a broader view of national security policy. Beyond this,
the seminar also stems from an effort to stimulate in students an awareness
of the possibilities of public service careers and an understanding of
problems of public policy.
The focus of the seminar has been on military affairs as related to
other fields, such as constituttoml law and international relations.
Since the seminar has originated, it has been found that students now come
into the class better prepared to cope with the problems presented. This ?
may well be an indication of the increasing interest and concern within
our society about problese involved in national security policy. Moreover,
there has been an increasing proliferation of materials that can be used so
it is now possible to be selective about assignments.
During the recent academic year, the seminar opened with a critique.
of the new book by Walter Hillis and Harvey C. Mansfield, ARMS AND THE
STATE. These followed an analysis of strategic concepts and a study of
the problems of defense organization. This year a good deal of attention
was given to the sociology of the military. Through the participation of
members of the staff of the American Universities Field Service, it was
possible to devote time to the role of the military in other countries,
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
18
particularly Latin.Arerica and th? l,;ost. The seminar this year for
the first time included a discussion of science and public policy, parti-
cularly as it related to the national a(:ourity area.
Although several guests conducted meetings of the seminar, the prin-
cipal work of presenting and discussing problems lay with the students,
mho presented papers after analyzing particular areas in which they were
interested. For the past several years it has also been possible for one
or two menbers of the seminar to continue an interest in the area by
participating in the summar internship program conducted in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
Lieutenant Colonel Wesley W. Posvar:
A course in defense policies was offered at the Air Academy this year
for the first time, on an experimental basis, as a prescribed course in
the senior year for all cadets. While it is similar in concept to the
course in National Security Problems at West Point, cadets at the Air
Academy are exposed to more courses in the social sciences prior to the
defense atudy.
Unlike civilian institutions, the service academies have as students
men whose professions will involve nearly all of them in the defense area.
The objectives of academy programs are therefore different. There is no
need for "saleerandhip. There is, however, a sense of mission involved
in the course and a sense of urgency in imnressing the cadets with the peed
to understand the problem involved. There is no need to spend too me0h
tins on factual details except as a means toward shaping attitudes and
approach. For example, it is thought that cadets should come out of the
course with some skepticism about accepting a rigid definition of roles
and missions. There is also a need to impress the cadets with the relation-
ship of natidnal values to national sec...,rity.' Finally, a basic objective
of the course is to encourage the cadet to understand that his educataw-i.
is only beginning and that there is a need for contineing pelf-education ?
in this broad field in which be is to become a practitioner.: ,
During the course of teaching the defense program during the last year
there has been an increasing awareness at thei4ir.Aca4emy, as-elseMberei
of the need for a sharper focus. The course is concerned, first, with ths-.
institutional machinery for formulating poliay4nd,*4eoond, with the basic
IAMB and substance of policy making in a world setting. On the basis of
the first yearva experience, there is a trend toward the second
area ratherthan the first. If this is donOi&Will he important that'the?
problems in the first area not be neglected.They can be studied in other
courses, and if this can be worked out, the defense course will develop '
into a study of substantive problems.
One observation made by many cadets at the Air Acad.siy might be
significant. They seemed to understand thatthe defense course offered
them an opportunity to examine their profession in relation to the broader
issues of national security and, indeed, in relation to society as a whole.
From this point of view, the course is of significant influence in the
development of a sense of profeasionalisn among the cadets.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
19
Thomas C. Blaisdell:
The course in national security problems at the University of
California, Berkeley, is different from those thus far described. It
originated largely as part of an interest in government operations rather
than in security p se. Despite this different* tbe topics for student
papers and the used in the course are similar t9 those described
elsewhere. While there has been an attempt to stimulate general interest
in the subject area, the students who have enrolled in the noires have
generally been those already converted, including retired Army officers,
ROTC instructors, and veterans of the Korean War. Yeti, in addition, a
nuMber of young men and women have enrolled simply because they are
intensely curious about new problems and new Challenges for study and
research.
In developing the course it has been becoming increasingly clear that
materials and experiences coming out of the Second World War are no longer
applicable to the issues that need study. It would seem that a deep re-
assessment is needed to relate problems to the future. For example, in the
area of manpower a good deal of thought needs to be given to the allocation
of scientific and technical talent throughout our society, with eaphasis
on the portion that needs to be allocated to defense segments. This pro-
jection into the future is the most important problem faced in courses in
national security policy.
William Emerson:
Ht. Emerson suggested that there were two main requirements for good
teachings the availability of original sources, and well-establiahed
points of view set down in secondary sources. If these two requirements
are available, students can make intellectual decisions within the area of
study and then go further into the problems in accordance with their
,interests. When these requirements are available, the seminar type of
course is possible since the students have the means to provide most of ?
the presentation and stimulation. In the national security area, however,
these requirements of original sources and well-established points of view
are not really available. Here it is important that the teacher do'most
of the work, and therefore the lecture method as opposed to the seminar
method would seem most appropriate.
What seems to have happened is that pitional security seminars have
been established as capstones for Which no preparttion or foundation really
exists. Advanced seminars might be possible. on special prObleso in the
national security area. But it was suggested that the preparation might ?
have to come from courses in existing fields within which national security
problems complemented the issues traditionally studied and analyzed.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
20
General Discussion
The discussion included observations on the variety of methods being
used, the degree of background needed by the students, and the variety of
student interests. It was, for example, pointed out that at Harvard the
.defense studies seminar is attended by ndergraduates, graduates, and
students in the professional schools, and that among this group can be
found military officers as well as civilians.
The interdisciplinary nature of the subject area 624 particularly
emphasized. This aspect of national security policy,. it was suggested,
provides a source of difficulty as one notes the general covrartmentali-
zation that exists in colleges and universities. Where the task force
approach is used in teaching (as, for example, at Ohio State), questions
arise as to where the program belongs, Mhat the emphasis should be, and
what issues are the most important for disdussion. It was noted that the
Harvard defense seminar will next year become a regular offering of the
Department of Government, with members of other departeenta assisting on
a personal, ad hoc basis.
The variety of approach and participation in courses on national
security policy perhaps emphasized again the problems involved in develop-
ing a focus and definition of the subject area.
Afternoon Session, June 18
Gaming Techniques as Media of Instruction
Hans,Speier:
Mr. Speier discussed the experiences at the 'RAND Corporation in
developing gaming techniques in national security policy. His observe"
tions were largely based on his forthcoming article (with Herbert
Ooldhamer) in World Politics under the title "Some Observations an
Political Gamiiii:ff-
Gamdng is not a substitute for, but is a supplement to analytical
technique; moreover, it adds smother tool to teaching.;:
When RAND was beginning its work in this area, antecedents were found
in experiments carried on prior to the Second World War by the German
General Staff, and by high Japanese authorities. Research has also in-
dicated that the Soviets may well be using this technique as a method of
predictive research.
The RAND game was designed to simulate the complexities of the inter-
national situation. Three elements were involved: (1) there were govern.
nents represented by individual players; (2) "nature" was represented by
an individual or team for the purpose of manipulating all factors not
under the control of particular governments; (3) a group of umpires 664
organized.
PP
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
Under the rules of the gene, r.1.1 teams but the United States were to
be guided by predictive behavior, that is, vhat they thought the goverhnent
they represented would do under certain conditions. The United States
team, however, was to be guided by optimum behavior in order that it would
not be inhibited by restrictions stemming from a knowledge of the nature
of the United States government, its operations, and procedures. The major
function of the umpires was to question the plausibility of moves. The
individual players could, however, challenge the judgment of the umpires
in order to maximize discussion and analysis and derive analytical experi-
ence in the process.
Altogether, the RAND Corporation organised four games, the last two
of which lasted one month each. The last game, moreover, was highly or-
ganised on a full-time basis and included the use of special consultants,
a large secretariat, the preparation of a scenario, and the developeent of
strategy papers by each team. The focus of the gave was on the American-
Soviet tensions in Western Europe.
In playing the game, six major considerations were taken into account:
1. An effort was made to minimize fornality in order to maximize the
freedom of action on theart---afeyere.
2. It was important that the incompleteness and incorrectness of informa-
tion available to goverrucentsywd-rerelir.
3. eqatIngsnff factors had to be taken into account.
14- Plausibility had to be insured.
5. A najor effort was to be made to clarify isetrais.d during the course
of the game by general discussion, by restricting the :lubber of teams,
and by seeking highly competent membera to pirticipate.
6. The need to explore alternate strategies was emphasised.
The RAND game offered the staff an appreciation of the difficulties of
prediction. Political gaming should not be designed to predict behavior
but rather to determine haw to make the maximum use of empirical data and
specialised skills in focusing on a problem. Indeed, it should help to
stimulate discussion and joint analysis of the issues by specialists in a
number of disciplines.
Political gaming can, however, also supplement historical experience
as a test for assumptions over and above self-questioning. By their own
inventiveness, players provide an insight into the need for contingency
planning. At the same time, they clarify issues for research and open up
new erase that might not otherwise have been.exposed.
As an educational device, gaming provides three major advantages:
1. It offers a lively setting for students and gives new interest to facts
and principles.
pprove
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
22
2. /t provides an overview of a political situation and by emphasizing the
many dimensions of a problem offers valuable training in politics.
3, It offers new insights in the pressures and uncertainties of the policy
smking process.
The speaker eephasised the range of variables that might be employed
In gaming. Situations might be real or might be devised to itiaelate new
insights that would be lost were the gave involved in a situation resem-
bling reality. Tempo, scope, and participation night also be adjusted to
enrich the experience. The use of foreign specialists is also a posit.
bility. Finally, parallel games might be played to offer comparative
experience for analysis.
Herold Guetzkow:
Mr. Guetakow discussed gaming as employed at Northwestern both for
undergraduates and junior executive policy-makers. He suggested that
simulation is actually involved_in lectures and seminars where operational
situations are pre'ited through verbalisation. Mt-whore gaming tech-
niques such as that described are used at the undergraduate level, a good
deal of structure and formalization is needed because of a lack of com-
petence 4Di experience on the part of the players.
Students engaged in simulation exercises have been encouraged to
analyse actions taken in an effort to understand the underlying processes
involved. By using an abstract model rather than an actual situation, the
analysis of process is transferable to any number of situations. The
technique has offered students the opportunity to sense the importance and
liveliness of the foreign policy process.
Warner R. &haling:
A gaming exercise carried out at Columbia University differed from
the RAND game in three ways: (1) all states mere represented; (2) an
attempt was made to simulate the total problems of the world and not a
, particular issue; ()) force was not ruled out as an alternative.
The game was set up so that events took place about a year ahead of
the date of playing. As in the RAND game there was an attempt to insure
that information available to states would be incomplete and incorrect..,
The scenario was so devised that each state had a nuiber of Alternative
strategies and also had a number of small side-pribleme-to deal with.
.The same game was played at Massachusetts Instittte of Technology and
Vest Point as well, in order to see if there were eqy advantages to be
had by comparing the behavior of the plovers.
Some of the conclusions that might be drawn from the Columbia experi-
ence follows
iekpproved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5 23
1. The players found how difficult but necessary it is to make Choices on
the basis of inadequate information.
2. The players very quickly acquired a sense of:the:pressure of tine and
events as they act on policy makers.
3. States have a lack of complete control over events.
4. There are great difficulties in trying to adhere to a fixed strategy.
5. Nam problems cannot be satisfactorily solved.
6. There is a need for good organization and negotiating techniques if any
attempt is to be made to find a consensus. '
The Columbia experience showed that the students playing the game had
definite images of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Accidental
events and-fortuitous timing proved to be important, and the players will-
ing to take a risk had a clear advantage over others. Throughout the
exercise, there seemed to be an unwritten understanding among the players
that war between the great powers would not break out. They were, never-
theless quite ready to accept the intrusion of coups, revolutions, and
assassinations.
The speaker enphasized the need for the instruttor to conduct himself
so as to avoid inhibitions among the players arising from the instructor-
student relationship. It is also important to understand that the behavior
of the individual players often has a greater importance than the behavior
of the states they are representing. The idea of playing the same game at.
three, institutions offered interesting comparisons for the students,
although it did not Been to add much to the game itself.
Lincoln Bloomfield:
? Two games had been played at M.I.T. during the peat year. The firat
was a game played by senior professionals, and the second was a student'
exercise, both drawing on the RAND experience. In general, the speaker
suggested that there were three U308 to gaining, (1) as a teaching device,
with role-playing comprising the essential wawa the exercise; (2) as
a training device for junior foreign service officers, with role playing
only ameans to an end; (3) as a device for pradictive research.
As a result of the experience, the speaker suggested that the
technique was a great success as a teaching device. The United Nations -
had proved to be a good setting for the game since a maximum nunber of ?
people could be used. There had proved to be an advantage in having a
single focus; upon which all players would ooncentrate. The speaker also
suggested that more be done to explore the relations between war games and
: political exercises. For planning and research purposes, it night be pro-
fitable to have a policy planning staff, a single thinker, and a gave, all
working simultaneously on the same issue.
?
?
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5?
Norman Padelford:
,
W.:Padelford described two <. gamesObe4itst played entirely
undergraduates in *Lich the Berlieirliikeal'bronght into the ?
UNjimmithe sebbnd, an'intercollegiate gameinchOlelkheliWorisis was
brought before a foreign 'ministers meeting.. lIeSoffered seeeral obserws0
Lions on the basis of theme experienoess
14 It is.benefitial to devote a relatively lont-paried *the game In
order to allow students to read themeelvevinto tbi situation.
,
2. The length of the gime involves, of course, the problam*Iirmudh time
the instructional staff can devote to working with.the "to:lents.
3. The choice of the problem is important sinci-the issuitinvolved must'
be plausible to the student.
4. Ground rules for the gane must be well spelled out end understood before
the game starts.
5. Good facilities for playing are important in exciting interest in the
students and suggesting to them that they are involved in something
important.
6. It is useful to bring in outside umpires of some authority and prestige.
74 It is also helpful to have each team draw up a preliminary estimate-sof
the situatiOn =dhow it will develop.
8. Apostmortem gives meaning to the time and effort the students.gave to
the game and allows them a Chance to see the total exercise in per-
spective.
9. There can also be value in applying the lagoons derived in the game to.
later class sessions.
General Discussion
The essential difference between the RAND game and the Northwestern
experience wes noted. The first gave the players a. full appreciation of
the complexity and dynamics of international politics through role playing.
The second was not concerned so much with role plying as with seeking to
get across the theory and structure of international politics.
Several possibilities for future gaming were suggested. One vas to
try to set up a gave where advantages for one side do not necessarily mean
disadvantages for another. Another possibility is to apply the gaming
technique to past history with the one irportant stipulation that states -
were not to behave as they actually did.
-Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
In summary, there peeped to be general agreement that gaming was an
:exciting teething device although it could be overdone. It was also
pointed out that the reel objective of the RAND,game was toclarify issues._
While a?variety of game can be used, the type depends on the objectives.
It is cliar from the variety of experiences described thatAt'is possiblY"
'A:otiodifY.thwtechnique,to suit a nuMber of situations and objectives.. '
: ? -
,
Morning Session. June 19
Assimilation of National Security Problems into established Courses in the
Social Sciences
Samuel P. Huntington:
There are four methods whereby national security policy could be
incorporated into the established curriculum. In each case two elements
ere involved: the focus of the course; and the content and material of
the course.
There is,, first of all, the case of a cial seminar in national
security, such as the Dartmouth seminar describedbWflasland. Here
both the focus and the content of the course are wholly devoted to national
security problems.
The second method is the offering of a new course related to other
courses in the established department. Here the major focus will be on
national_seand_q_matters altho is. o.sr:, . 1.! -4' n
to other situations. The content and materiala of the course, however,
will be devoted to national security matters as related to other situations,
either because of the interdependence of the elements or for purposes of
comparison.
A third method is the integration of a national security segment into
establiShed courses both in focus and in content. This is a particular
problem in relation to basic courses in American government, economics, and
international relations. The problem is to set aside several class sessions
devoted to national security problems. In this respect one of the greatest
obstacles stems from the absence of national security coverage in basic
texts, particularly for American government courses.
A fourth method is the integration of national security materials to
enrich a course where the focus is not particularly on national security.
This would be true, for example, in a course in public administration .
where instances of interservice rivalry provide some of the most exciting
illustrations of bureaucratic in-fighting.
Holbert N. Carroll:
0'.
Hr. Carroll described the basic American government course at the
I Ili
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62-00634A000100030008-5
26
University of Pittsburgh and how national security matters have been in-
skid in development. The course runs forrtyp_eamesters. During the
semester' it covers the inst ? ns and
the second the co ?.ra Chan* Amerioan democracy
spoesps to se challenges.
National security matters have largely been included during the second
semesterrin,two principal sectors:
(1), One meek is largely devoted to the
nology A good deal of attention is Wto the problem of
pub ic policy, Which is consideredAmportant becawe sem of
the students taking the course are majoring in endirieering and will not
spend auch.time in the social science departments as they go on.
(2) A period of four weeks is devoted to protasis of national
security policy. Attention is given to the changes in the world situation
that have lid to the new role of the United States.. The special problems
of this role are studied. An effort is being made to have as many students
'as possible Choose a topic from this section of the course on uhidh to
write their research paper.
11?
During these segments of the course, students are being exposed to
government documents, congressional hearings, and professional journals
that they might not otherwise look into.. It baa already been found that
national security topics first, studied in this government course are now
being used by the students as a basis for research projects in other
00WW.
William )1. Capron:
While examples trim the national security field sty be used in courses
in economics, the focus of such courses was not necessarily national
security EIE se. The primary task in economics counsels to teach theory.
To do this, :apples are necessary and important but the examples them-
selves, whichever field they Cover, are not the focus. Th. speaker mg.
posted COWL144,1Milibioh examples gom the national security field are
particularly relevant. These include international economics, economic
development, economic history, and public finance.
It is true that national security matters are now being omitted in
economics courses fbr beginners. There is littlibeing said, fir example,
on the impact of the defense budget on the economy or the implications of
trends in the Soviet economy. The economist is not sure as yet 'hat he has
to say about these problems and that particular relevance they have to
teaching the theory of economics.
At the graduate level, too, the en;hasis is on training good theorists
and not apecialists in particular economic problems. This doss not mean
that more and more theses may not and should not be written about national
security problems, but such a Shift in attention need not requite a radical
or basic change in the general program of studies for graduate economists*
Approved or Release 2001/07/28 : CIA IDP82-00634A0001t1 030008-5
Genstal Discussion
27
The generel discussion to al e extent reverted to the problem of
focus+ Poi participant suggested at question of survival vas at
the,core of the subject area; ano that the issue of fora was at its
center. Still another participant siaggesied that the real problem was
developing a theory of power that flti reality; another insisted that no .
single value theory was valid. -
I. ?ex suggested in conclupion that there skepattern implicit in
the three dire of discussion, Which he would attesct to nikelicits--
(1) The conferUirlukiTifertr-dUaiiiii-iiii-changing-ionditions--ia
military technology and in world politics--offered increased threats to
the relatively unchanged values associated with our democratic mey-allife.
The etholarli responsibility is to define these Changed oonditions and
specify the consequences of pursuing alternative policies suggested to met
the new threats, thus clarifying the Choice and increasing the rationality
of the process of choosing. The research agenda of political scientists,
economists, and academic intellectuals generally mere discussed in turn, -
(2) The conferees then turned to discuss more specifically and 111
Pester detail the teaching.problem in special oourses lathe field of
national security policy. Questions of scope and method, focus and sub.
stance mere discussed in the light of descriptions of courses and seminars
now being taught and disitinctive teaching experiments, particularly
political gaming and idmulatrn.
4(
. (3) Finally, national security was discussed as.a problem as broad as
society itself and therefore one to be dealt with by assimilating relevant
materials into amide variety of traditional courses. There is a need for
historically rooted analysis, for trend projection, and for theoretical
exercises to enable the policy-oriented student to transcend his own
country and the events of the moment so that he amuse* the system as a
? mhole and state the oonditions under Whidh pea?, and stability for the
? mho)" ystem night be increased and the territorial power struggle trans.
formed..