PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL) USSR (1 JANUARY - 30 APRIL 1959)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 30, 1959
• Content Type: REQ

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PRL (Guide No. 164)
Copy N? 219
PERIODIC REQUIREMtNTS LIST (PRL)
USSR
(1 JANUARY 30 APRIL 1959)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
USSR
January - April 1959
1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's) are prepared by the
Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. Coordination with the Department
of State was initiated in 1958 and now includes the PRL,'s for the
USSR, the European Satellites and Yugoslavia, Near East/Africa, Far
East and Latin America. Coordination on these areas resulted in the
inclusion of current intelligence requirements from the Intelligence
and Regional Bureaus of the State Department along with those contributed
by the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence, Research and Reports and
Scientific Intelligence.
2e Every month a Periodic Requirements List is published on one
or more of the major world areas, (a) Western Europe; (b) Latin America;
(c) USSR; (d) European Satellites and Yugoslavia; (e) Far East; and
f) Near East/Africa. Each List is revised every four months.
3e Each Periodic Requirements List is designed to point up the
information required for current intelligence coverage of significant
developments during the time period covered by the PRL. For the
benefit of certain collectors who may not have access to background
information, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of
the requirements.
4. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of
all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total,
present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single
collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a
capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guidance
for current intelligence reporting.
5. To facilitate and possibly expand the, use of the PRL all items
contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the
following` classifications- SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN QS/NOFORN),
CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN)9 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(OUO),, and UNCLASSIFIED (U)0
6. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed
as Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que
Building, Code 143, Extension 2181;
Distribution (ICD), Department of State,
or bo Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and
Chief, Requiremtts Branch, OCI
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PRL (Guide Noe 164)
January - April 1959
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
FOREWORD
USSR
I
INTERNAL
1
II
FOREIGN POLICY
9
III
IV
V
ECONOMIC
MILITARY
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
SOVIET BLOC
I POLITICAL
II ECONOMIC
III MILITARY
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January 1959 - 30 April 1959)
I. INTERNAL
A. Party and Government
1. A Party Congress has been called for January 1959.
An obvious reason is to secure highest formal party approval for
the new seven-year plan as early as possible in the plan period.
Are there other reasons for calling a Congress a year earlier than
required by party statutes? The Congress was designated "extra-
ordinary" or "irregular." Is there any significance to this other
than indicating a Congress with a.restricted or special agenda?
Why wasn't a "regular" Congress with a normal agenda to be held
in the following year? Will the forthcoming Congress confine it-
self to its published agenda (discussion of the seven-year plan)?
If not, what other questions will be discussed? Wii1 the. Congress
elect a new Central Committee? Will any changes be made in the
party Presidium or Secretariat? (U)
2. Are there currently any signs of discord or con-
flict within the Presidium and Secretariat of the CPSU? Who among
the members of these bodies has the greatest influence with Khru-
shchev? Are any of Khrushchev's lieutenants attempting to build
personal followings of friends and proteges to strengthen their
political positions vis-a-vis their colleagues. (U)
3. Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee occur at
irregular intervals and are seldom announced in advance. Report
indications of forthcoming plenums, as well as all information
about the business of such meetings and the role of the Central
Committee in policy making? (U)
4. B. N. Ponomarev, Yu. V. Andropov, V. N. Malin,
and A. L. Orlov have been identified as heads of departments in
the Central Committee apparatus. What are the titles and functions
of the departments they head? What are the responsibilities of
the Administrative Department currently headed by A. S. Zheltov?
Who are the organizational heads of the Machine Building, Trans-
port and Communications and Trade, :Finance and Planning Organs
Departments? (U)
5. The November 1958 plenum of the CPSU Central
Committee added former Premier Bulganin to the "anti-party
group" of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. It has since been
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January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
I. INTERNAL (Continued)
A. Party and Government (Continued)
reported that Bulganin has been removed from the Central Commit-
tee. C>sln this report be confirmed? What are the reasons for
further ssteps against Bulganin at this time? (U)
6. Since December 1957 six of the nine industrial min
istrieswhich remained after the industrial reorganization have
been transformed into state committees--the state committees for
chemistry, shipbuilding, radio-technology, defense, aviation, and
grain products. Information on their functions and :responsibili-
ties is desired. (C)
7. The 104 Regional Economic Councils (Sovnarkhozy)
have now been in operation more than a year and their role in. the
Soviet System is beginning to take shape.
a. How serious are the various`, problems of
"localism," i.e., failure to fulfill inter-regional deliveries,
diversion of funds to projects of local interest,,Ietc? (U)
b. What are the relationships between Gosplan
and theSovnarkhozy and the regional government and party organs?
(U)
c. Are there indications of further steps to
decentralize the operation of industry? (U)
8. A collective farm conference to revise the
Kolkhozstatutes is scheduled to take place some time "early in
1959." :tA-hen exactly will the conference take place and what
changes in collective farm organization are to be enacted? (U)
9. A selected few collective farms are experiment-
ing with a guaranteed annual wage for its members of lieu of the
labor-day- payment. Information is desired on the implementation
of this System and reaction to it at official levels and among
the peasantry. (U)
10. What is the Soviet view of the Chinese Communist
commune nnovement? (U) Any information pertaining to discussion
of this development within the USSR is desired. (U)
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January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
1. INTERNAL (Continued
A. Party and Government (Continued)
11. We are very interested in:
a. The exact nature of the "Party Instructions-to
the Soviet Army and Navy" issued in 1957 and. of the recent revisions
thereof; (U)
b. The reason (s) behind the change in title of
the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense to. Chief
Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and whether this
indicates a change in the subordination of the directorate. (U)
C. The organization of the political organs of
the Soviet Army and Navy, first referred to in, the Soviet mili-
tary newspapers on November 5, 1958. (U)
d. The impact and significance of t. ;f recej.
policy that not only shall the military commander be. politica,a.':
trained, but that the political officer receive military training.
(U)
B. SECURITY
1. Concerning the jurisdiction of the KGB and the
MVD and their domestic and foreign activities, the following are
of particular interest:
a. Indications of KGB coordination and/or con-
trol of satellite security services; (U) `
the USSR; (U)
b. KGB operations and responsibilities inside
c. Jurisdictional subordination and personnel
strength of the civil police (militsiya) and the internal troops;
personnel strength of the border troops; (U)
d. Evidence of involvement of the secret police
in political machinations or top policy decisions; (U)
e. Indications that the KGB is being strengthened
or weakened, whether numerically, in terms of operating potential,
or in terms of jurisdiction and responsibility; (U)
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January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
INTERNAL (Continued)
B. Security (Continued)
1. f, The identities of top and second echelon of-
ficials; assigned to the central KGB in Moscow; e.g., the names of
deputy chairmen and other top officials, (U)
g. Evidence that the relative status of the MVD
and KGB;has changed in recent months. (U) Has a separate foreign
intelligence organization, like the KI, been established? (S)
2. The system of controls which are exercised over
the travel and movement of Soviet citizens is an important indicator
of the Internal situation in the USSR. Information of this nature
would be of great value. (U)
3, The draft all-union "basic principles" of crimi-
nal lawand of criminal procedure were published for "preliminary
discussion" in June, 1958. Information is needed which indicates:
a. The issues being discussed;
b. The date of the consideration of these "basic
principles" by the USSR Supreme Soviet;
c. The drafting and enactment of Union Republic
Codes of criminal law and of criminal procedure.
4. A number of measures: adopted recently are designed
to reduce in various ways the incidence of social evils and petty
crime, particularly drunkeness, "hooliganism," and speculation.
Information is desired on the causes of such phenomena, their
prevalence, and the effectiveness of the measures taken to over-
come then. (U)
5. Opportunities to observe tensions between various
national groups and mistreatment of minorities have grown as So-
viet political controls have become somewhat loosened. There are
continuing reports of nationalistic sentiments in various areas,
discrimination against Jews, and anti-Semitic feelings. These
subjects bear further watching to determine whether the regime
is making any progress in its proposed efforts to correct viola-
tions`of "Leninist" nationality policy committed under Stalin.
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January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
I. INTERNAL (Continued)
B. Security (Continued)
5. a, Are any new measures being taken to reduce
tensions between Russians and local inhabitants in minority areas?
(U)
b, Is there any evidence of a change in the re-
gime attitude towards manifestations of national sentiment among
minority groups? (U)
c> A process of Russification of minority cultures
has been taking place for many years, attested to by various eco-
nomic as well as political factors. To what extent is coercion
part of this process? (U)
6, The proposals for the reorganization of the educa-
tional system on 16 November 1958 include a provision that in
minority areas, parents should be allowed to choose individually
whether their children will attend Russian-language or minority
language schools. Study of the alternate language would then be,
undertaken voluntarily only by those children who felt they could
carry the extra work load in their studies, (U)
ae How is this provision being received in the
minority areas? (C)
b, Are parents concerned at having to choose for
their children between knowledge of the mother tongue and future
professional advantages in knowing Russian? (U)
?, Soviet domestic propaganda has paid increasing
attention to antireligious themes in recent months, apparently
because of signs of increased religious interest or influence
among segments of the population. The propaganda has been direct-
ed mainly against Protestant denominations, such as Baptists
and Seventh Day Adventists, but has also included attacks against
the Moslem religions, the second largest in terms of believers
in the USSR. At the same time, the regime portrays itself as
granting complete religious freedom to believers, (U) Informa-
tion is needed which indicates:
propaganda; (U)
ao The extent and expansion of anti-religious
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
1. INTERNAL (Continued)
B. Security (Continued)
7. b. The social segments and geographical areas where
religious interest may be increasing; (U)
c. The changes in religious doctrines intr9duced by
church authorities to make more acceptable to Soviet citizens; (U)
8. A nationwide census will be taken in the USSR in
January.' Are there expressions of concern on the part of Jews on
other minority groups regarding questions on nationality contained
in the census form? (U)
C. Intellectual Expression and Education
1. Controls on literatures, art and other forms of
intellectual expression have continued tight in 1958. There is evi-
dence, however, that many intellectuals still oppose, if only pas-
sively, present controls. For example, the "big" names in Soviet
literature were conspicuously silent during the public recrimina-
tions against Pasternak in October 19580 (U)
a, What are the attitudes of individual intellectu-
al and cultural figures toward the Party's cultural policy? (U)
b. Is the opposition of intellectuals crystallized
against specific elements of control such as freedom to travel or
censorship of foreign literature? (U)
co What are the regimes methods of reaching and
persuading intellectuals to recant and reforms? (U)
d, In what social sectors did the Pasternak af-
fair arouse interest and what were the reactions? (U)
e, What types of Soviet citizens have actually,
read Dr. 'Zhivagaand what are their reactions? (U)
2. Although intellectual disaffection among university
students has evidently abated considerably since the late 1956-early
1957 period, the increase in foreign students visiting the USSR
under exchange agreements and the continued insistence on ideological
conformity may combine to produce new manifestations of intransigence
and rebellion. Information on the current state of mind among young
Soviet intellectuals is desired. (U)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
I. INTERNAL (Continued)
C. Intellectual Expression and. Education (Continued)
3. Under the proposed reorganization of the Soviet
school system published 16 November 1958 and scheduled to take
place over. a ,period;.of four: to five. years beginning in the fall of
1959, the much publicized goal of universal education has been
dropped in favor of universal 8-year education. The vast major-
ity of 16 and 15 year olds will go into production work upon com-
pletion of the 8-year general school. Adolescents with the will
and stamina cancontinue.their education in evening or correspond
ence courses and those that last out the course can eventually go
on to higher educational institutions. Special, schools are planned
for children "gifted" in the arts or sciences. Graduates of these
schools willgo straight into higher educational institutions with-
out being detoured into.,production. Boarding-schools will be re-
tained on both an 8 and'an 11-year basis but will' include greatly
increased polytechnical training. (U)
a. How are these proposals being received by:the
public? (U)
b,. Is opposition or approval centered in any
identifiable social sector? (U)
c. What changes in the social studies and hu-
manities curricula are planned?' (U)
d. At what age and by what methods will "gifted"
students be selected for the proposed special schools? (U) Is
there any indication of these, special schools becoming the preserve
of a special group or social sector? (U)
4. The regime cited as justification for the.reorgani-
zation of education the distaste shown by many of the younger gen-
eration for manual labor and the "difficulties" experienced in
finding jobs for secondary school graduates? (U) Information is
needed which indicates:
a. Any additional concerns which prompted these
changes. (U)
b. Amplification of the "difficulties" cited by
the regime in finding jobs for secondary school graduates. (U)
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January 1959 -, April 1959
USSR (Continued)
I. ]INTERNAL (Continued)
C. Intellectual Expression and Education (Continued)
4. c.. Any further light on Soviet youth's attitude
toward manual labor. (U)
5. There have been several references in the Soviet
press in recent months to difficulties experienced in persuading
management in industry to accept as workers minors whose right to
special working conditions is protected by law. The proposed educa-
tional reorganization suggests that this problem.will be complicated
by additional provisions for time off from work for individuals who
work and study, either in the form of a shorter work-day or of a
three-da* work week. (U)
a. What adjustments in industry are being, made to
absorb these minors? (U)
b. What is the reaction of industrial management
to these :problems? (U)
6. The educational reorganization:, proposals also in-
clude changes in higher educational institutions. Students are to
combine work and study for the first two to three years of their
courses,and it has been recommended that qualified professionals in
industry and agriculture be released part-time from their jobs to
teach while teachers are periodically to leave their iteaching to work
in the "national economy." (U)
a. What are the reactions of students and teachers
to these proposals? (U)
b. What are the detailed arrangements for "com-
bining work and study" by students and for the exchanges of personnel
between industry and agriculture and higher educational institutions?
(U)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
II. Foreign Policy
A. General
1. Any indication of Soviet intentions to take uni-
lateral steps such as troop reductions in Europe. (U).-
2. Soviet moves to extend assistance in the atomic.
energy field to non-Communist states, particularly in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, and the reactions and attitudes of prospective
recipient countries. (U)
3. Behavior of Sovieto'and Eastern Europe personnel at
the UN, particularly questions or remarks concerning disarmament,
"atoms for peace," and the membership issue. (U)
4. Similarities or divergencies noted in Soviet and
Communist China propaganda, behavior at international meetings, and
general attitudes toward the US. (U)
5. Information that the USSR is seeking to establish
diplomatic relations, negotiate trade agreements, or establish infor-
mational or permanent trade representation with additional countries.(U)
6. Soviet interest or activity of any type in the Art tic
and Antarctic, particularly Soviet reaction to US proposals for an
international administrative arrangement for Antarctica. (C)
7. Any amplification of the Soviet. "'peaceful economic
competition" program or evidence of price cutting on capital goods,
with special interest in evidence of intra-bloc competition or
collaboration on bids for development projects in underdeveloped areas.
(U)
8.
Evidence of Soviet economic pressure upon Finland,
Austria, the
the USSR.
UAR,
(U)
Afghanistan, or other countries with close ties to
9. Soviet approaches to Socialist parties abroad
including proposals for contacts and invitations to Moscow. (U)
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PRL (Guide No, ' 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Cont inued )
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
B. Western Europe
1, Information on Soviet bloc security measures to
strengthen the Warsaw Pact or carry out other measures threatened to
counter West German rearmament including the building of missile
bases in the satellites. (U)
2, Any reports of Soviet pressure on Poland to support
Soviet foreign policy and to adopt more orthodox measures in domestic
policy. (C)
1 3. Changes in Soviet terms for a German settlement and
indicatioosa of changes in tactics on the German question, particularly
revisions in Soviet relations with East Gbrmany, (U)
4, All developments regarding the sealing off of?Wes?t
Berlin from East Berlin, closing the East-West German border, Soviet
moves to alter the juridical position of the three Western powers in
Berlin and harassments of Allied and West German rail, highway, or air
access to 'Rest Berlin. (U)
5. Evidence of increasing Soviet efforts to draw
Scandinavian countries away from their present Western orientation
toward a more neutral course with closer ties with the USSR. Indica-
tions of Soviet attempts at a Baltic Neutrality (Security) Pact. (U)
6. Indications of continuing party contacts between
the bloc Countries and Yugoslavia. Any sign of a breakdown in
state relations or economic boycotts between the bloc countries and
Yugoslavia. Resumption of anti-Yugoslav broadcasts beamed to Yugoslavia.
Reports of Soviet attempts to isolate Yugoslavia further from the
satellites;,, Information on the previous history of Soviet-Yugoslav
relation and the factors that led to the break. (U)
7. Evidence of Soviet approaches to the I)e Gaulle
government; for political agreements or economic arragnements (either
trade or aad). Soviet offers to France for assistance in solving the
Algerian problem, Soviet instructions to the French Communist Party
concerning the latter?s policy toward De Gaulle. (U)
8, Soviet proposals for European security schemes in-
cluding the Rapacki plan ,and Soviet tactics in advancing these plans. (U)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
B. Western Europe (Continued)
9. Reports of Soviet instructions to West European
Communist parties and the latters' tactics in the campaign to prevent
the building of missile bases there. (U)
10. Overtures to Italy, particularly proposals concern-
ing Italy's inclusion in an "atom-free zone" or possible participation
of Italy in any new summit conference. (U)
11. Soviet overtures to Spain, parti?ularly proposals
for trade expansion. (U)
C. Asia-Africa
1. Indications of modification of the "peaceful coexis-
tence" policy toward Asian neutrals, or of Soviet disillusionment
with the political results of the policy. (U)
2. Information on the status of relations between
Moscow and Peiping, particularly with reference to the question of
primacy of interest in Far Eastern Satellite matters. Material cover-
ing the relations of the USSR and Communist China with North Korea,
Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Any
evidence that the USSR does, or does not, desire to promote Communist
Chinas relations with non-Communist Asian countries, and efforts to
secure more widespread recognition of/and admission of Communist China
to the United Nations. (C)
3. Indications that the USSR is discussing on a bilateral
basis terms for an Arab-Isreli settlement with the countries concerned.
(U)
4. Evidence of Soviet support for certain personalities
or factions in Communist China. (U)
5. Japan -
a. Evidence of Sino-Soviet tactical or policy coordi-
nation to discredit the Kishi government on trade, nuclear or fishery
issues--a campaign which began prior to the Japanese elections in May. (U)
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USSR (Continued)
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
C. Asia-Africa
5. b, Soviet-Japanese official negotiations for the
second annual trade agreement now 'going on in Moscow. (U)
c. Efforts by Soviet officials to impress the
Japanese with the possibility of extensive trade expansion and
Japanese participation In the economic development of Siberia. (C)
d. Soviet proposals and expected negotiations for
a cultural agreement with Japan. (U)
e. New or revised Soviet proposals for a civil air:
agreement which might be expected to meet previous Japanese objections.(U)
f. Evidence that the USSR might allow fishing rights
to the Japanese in hitherto restricted areas of the.Kuri.ls, as'hinted
by a Soviet Far Eastern Service broadcast to Japan on 26. September. (C).
6. Indonesia -
economic and
new moves to
a. Evidence of Soviet intentions to fulfill the
technical assistpnce agreement with Indonesia, or of
counter recent improvements in US-Indonesian relations. (U)
b. Evidence of direct and/or increased Soviet con
tacts with the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) or of bloc propaganda
or other moves calculated to discredit Sukarno or Indonesian military
leaders. TO
c. Expansion of Soviet scientific or cultural
activities ooor exchanges. (C)
d, Evidence of additional arms supplies to Indonesia
by any Communist state. (S).
7. Progress in the :implementation of Soviet technical
assistance program in Ceylon, projects under consideration, and any
efforts of i:5;oviet officials to influence Ceylonese long-range planning.
1 'S. Evidence of overt Soviet encouragement or political
support for the CPI and particularly for the Communist Government of
Kerala implying or stating criticism of the internal policies of the
Indian Government, (C)
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(1 January 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
C. Asia-Africa
9. Progress in negotiations with Nepal to implement
Soviet offers of economic assistance, especially in the field of civil
aviation. (C)
10. Pakistan-
a. Soviet efforts to stimulate Soviet-Pakistani
trade through direct overtures to private interests.
b. Soviet efforts to develop economic and cultural
contacts in East Pakistan. (C)
c. Soviet efforts designed to foment domestic opposi-
tion to Pakistani-US defense ties. (C)
11. Travel of Soviet personnel in Kashmir, and attempts
to develop direct contact with Kashmiri groups and individuals. (S)
12. Afghanistan
a. Progress in implementation of Soviet economic
projects, particularly the Salang Pass road, improvement of the
port of Q~zii Qala, and oil exploitation around Sar-i-Pul. (U)
b. Details on the Soviet military assistance program:
equipment supplied; role of Sov\ist military instructors and advisers;
tactical exercises involving use of Soviet weapons. (S)
C. Information on the possible establishment of a
second Afghan airline and the projected Soviet role therein. (S)
13. Iran -
a. Progress on surveys for joint Soviet-Iranian
development of Araks, Atrek, and Tedzhen rivers. (U)
b. Developments in negotiations for a civil air
(U)
agreement.
c. Implementation of Soviet-Iranian transit agreement.
(U).
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USSR. (Coastinued)
II. :Foreign Policy (Continued)
Asia-Africa (Continued)
d. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Iranian
business interests .designed to step up Soviet-Iranian trade. `(U)
e. Details of Soviet economic pressure on Iran. (C)
14, Contracts of .Soviet officials with private Turkish
business interest designed to Step up Soviet-Turkish trade or to sell
Soviet factories and machinery. (U)
15. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Israeli
businessmen pointed'toward a resumption of trade. (U)
16. UAR
a. Implementation of Soviet-UAR economic projects,
including, in particular, details of negotiations on the first rhasse
of the Aswan High Dam. (U)
b. Details concerning the establishment of regular
commercial; air service between Moscow and Cairo (U) and of negotiations
to buy late) model Soviet passenger aircraft for Misrair.
(S)
II c, Details of any evidence of Syrian Communist Party
relations ?arith Soviet officials. (S)
17. Greece -
a. Soviet approaches to Cypriot leaders.. (U)
b. Soviet approaches to private Greek firms
designed to push sales of Soviet goods in Greece. (U)
c. Attempts by Soviet officials to keep alive the
nuclear scare in connection with NATO bases in Greece. (C)
;18. Arabian Peninsula -
a. Any attempt by bloc officials to establish dip;o-
matic, ecopomic, or cultural contacts, either formally or informally,
with Saudi ! Elrabia. (U)
b. Developments in the implementation of bloc'economic
and military assistance programs in Yemen, and the movements of bloc
personnel to and within Yemen. (S)
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(1 January 30 April 1959)
USSR (CONTINUED)
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
C. Asia-Africa (Continued)
c. Efforts to influence internal developments or
Yemeni foreign policy on the part of Soviet officials or technicians (S)
d. Attempts to develop Soviet-Yemeni cultural relations.
(U)
19. Efforts to develop regular. Soviet-Sudanese economic
relations,especially any Soviet effort to influence Sudanese policy
through ruanipulation of its cotton purchases. (C)
20. Efforts of Soviet officials to establish direct contact
with Libyan officials and commercial interests with a view toward estab-
lishing regular economic and cultural relations. (U)
.21. Iraq -
a. Soviet efforts to negotiate a civil air agree-
ment with Iraq. (S)
b. Special iaterpst in Soviet efforts to establish
commercial or cultural centers other. than in Baghdad. (S)
c. Evidence of Soviet equipment and military
advisers in Iraq, and information on the relations of such personnel.,
as well as UAR military training advisory personnel, with Iraqi offi-
cials.
d. Details of any evidence of Iraq Communist Party
relations with Soviet officials. (S)
e. Details of any evidence of Kurdish relations with
Soviet officials. (S)
22. Morocco
a. Any Soviet activities directed against the
maintenance of US bases in Morocco. (S)
b. Any bloc offers of economic aid, arms, etc, to
Morocco. (S)
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USSR (Continued) January - April 1959
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
Moroccan
C. Asia-Africa (Continued)
22. Morocco (Continued)
c. Any information on relations between USSR and
Communist parties and other parties and groups. (S)
23. Tunisia
Tunisia. (5)
a. Any bloc offers of.arms, economic aid, etc. to
Any Soviet or bloc activities to undermine Bourguiba.'sr
c. Relations between USSR and Tunisian Communist party
and other political parties and groupings. (C)
24. Algeria
a. Any Soviet or bloc activities to cooperate with
and support. the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) and its...pro..
visional ' government . (S)
b. Any evidence of bloc military support, arms,
advisers, etc. to the FLN. (S)
C. Any Soviet or bloc activities connected with
the Algeriah CP or other groupings. (5)
25. Libya
a. Any bloc offers of arms and economic aid. (S)
b. Any bloc activities directed against the US
base in Libya or the Libyan regime. (S;)
26.. Sudan,
a. Soviet attitude toward the new regime: bloc offers
of support and approval, or, conversely, any bloc activities to under-
mine the regime. (S)
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USSR (Continued) January - April 1959
II. Foreign Policy (Continued)
C. Asia-Africa (Continued)
27. Africa South of the Sahara
a. Bloc support of regimes in Ghana, Guinea and
Liberia; including offers of arms and economic aid, and conversely any
Soviet efforts to undermine any of these regimes.` (S)
b. Soviet support, overt or covert, to movements for
independence or "national liberations' in British, French, Belgian,
or Portuguese colonies, trusteeships; particularly Soviet attitude
to Cameroon independence movement. (C)
c. Activities of Soviet or Bloc fishing vessels off
West Africa, particularly the ports of call and shore activities of the
personnel. (U)
28. Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea
a. Soviet or bloc attitude and actions in regard to
Ethiopian-Somali and Ethiopian-Eritrean relations. (S)
b. Offers of assistance to above countries or groups.
(U)
c. Sign of increase in Soviet propaganda or subversive
activity in area. (S) `
D. Latin America
1. Any indications of Soviet efforts to promote neutralism
in Latin America and any reference to the area as a possible "peace
zone."
2. Any approaches to Latin American nations for establish-
ment or reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
3. Any implementation of Soviet willingness to extend
economic aid to the area.
4. Any evidence of Soviet contacts with or instructions to
Latin American Communist Parties.
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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. ECONOMIC
A. Policy, Planning, and Theory
1. Soviet General Economic Policy
The 21st Party Congress is scheduled to convene
in late January 1959 primarily to discuss the Seven Year Plan for
Economic Development (1959-65). Although the basic theses of the
plan have been announced, further details may become available dur-
ing the pre-Congress regional Party meetings scheduled for mid-Jan-
uary, during the Party Congress, or in later discussions following
the Party Congress. Additional insight into Soviet agricultural
policy may be gathered during this period, possibly as a result of
discussions stemming from the. Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for
22 December 1958 to discuss agricultural matters. (U)
2. National Economic Planning
Any information on changes in the technique of in-
vestment planning is desired in light of recent mention of possible
changes and the census of fixed capital, scheduled for January 1959
by the Central. Statistical Administration, which will involve the re-
valuation of installed plant and equipment throughout the Soviet econ-
omy. (U) .
With the completion of the first full Soviet fiscal
year of operation after the industrial reorganization, and with the
start of.the Seven Year Plan, some institutional realignments may be
initiated. In addition, Soviet comments about the operation of the
new organization should be reported. (U)
Recent Soviet criticisms of the functioning of the
economy have centered about weaknesses in technical innovation. Any
indications of attempts to encourage progress in this field should
be reported. (U)
Economic Theory
The recent revision of the Soviet Political Econ-
omy Textbook may induce renewed theoretical discussions on the role
of prices, criteria of investment, and the use of value measures of
economic performance and efficiency in the Soviet economy. Such dis-
cussions should be reported because they sometimes foreshadow changes
in practice. (U)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III,. Economic (Continued)
B. Military Expenditures
With the announcement of the Soviet budget for 1959
and particularly the allocation for defense, close attention should
be given to statements and discussions which will help to interpret
what effect the defense allocation will have on military programs.
Following are questions that require clarification.
ad Are these signfifleant items of procurement, or
military activities that are not covered by the defense allocation
in the Soviet budget? Is military production financed by direct al-
locat.ion to industry through other parts of the budget? (U)
b. Do the military procure at prices substantially,
lower than other sectors of the economy--ie0, is military production
subsidized from funds other than defense allocation? Is military
procurement exempt from specific taxes or charges? (U)'
C. Foreign Economic Aid
10 Soviet Aid to Bulgaria :
On 19 July 1958 the USSR extended to Bulgaria an
industrial credit of unknown value. What are the value, repayment
period, and interest rate of this credit? (OUO)
20 Soviet Aid to East Germany
Recently the USSR extended to East Germany credits
for the development of the East German chemical industry. Informa-
tion from unofficial sources indicates that a Soviet credit of $108
million was extended to East Germany on 25 December 1957. No offi-
cial announcements of this credit have been received in this office
to date.. (OUO)
In February 1958 the USSR granted to East Germany
a long-term loan valued. at $135 million for the development of the
GDR's chemical industry. Collaboration between the USSR and East
Germany on the development of the chemical industry was again re-
iterated in a communiqud announcing the conclusion of the GDR-USSR
protocol, 7 July 1958,,on reciprocal deliveries through 1965. Although
no definite amount was given, the sum of "several hundred million
rubles? was mentioned at the 5th SED Party Congress on 11 July 19580
In August 1958 it was reported that an additional Soviet credit valued
at $2705 million had been extended to East Germany. (OUO)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
2. Soviet Aid to East Germany (continued)
a. Is there any evidence supporting the report of a
Soviet credit to East Germany in December 1957? If so, what are, the
date, the utilization period, and repayment terms? (OUO),
b. Has the USSR agreed. to a total amount to be in-
vested in the East German chemical industry? If so, what are the
total amount, utilization period, and repayment terms? (OUO)
c. Are the above mentioned credits an allocation of
the total amount to be invested by the USSR in the East German chemi-
cal industry? (OUO)
d. What is the date of the agreement granting a $27.5
million Soviet credit to East-Germany? (OUO)
e, What are the utilization periods and repayment
terms of both the $135 million and $27.5 million credits? (OUO)
3. Soviet Aid to Hungary:
In December 1957 the USSR extended an industrial credit
valued at $75 million to Hungary to be.' utilized during the period
1958-63. In 1958 two Soviet credits were granted to Hungary. The
first one, reported in September 1958, amounted to $5 million for the
development of Hungary's aluminum industry; the second credit amount-
ing to $27.5 million for the development of a nitrogen artificial
fertilizer plant was concluded on 5 November 1958. The November 1958
agreement contained two additional provisions relating to Soviet aid
in Hungary. One was concerned with technical assistance in the con-
struction and enlargement of a series of factories and.the-other was
concerned with a credit for the development of the Hungarian. oil in-
dustry. (OUO)
a. Are the Soviet credits valued at $5 million and
$27.5 million an allocation of the December 1957 credit extended to
Hungary? (OUO)
b. What is the date of the $5 million credit extended
to Hungary by the USSR? (OUO)
c. What are the utilization periods and repayment
terms of both credits mentioned in paragraph (a) above? (OUO)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III? Economic (Continued)
3. Soviet Aid to Hungary (continued)
d. What are the amounts, utilization periods and re-
paymentterms of the technical assistance and credit for the Hun-
garian oil industry contained in the November 1958 agreement? (OUO)
e. Are they an allocation of the December 1957
credit? (OUO)
4. Soviet Aid to Iraq:
Under the unsettled conditions prevailing in Iraq
since the revolution, It is likely that the Soviets will follow their
established pattern of economic penetration by making various offers
of economic, technical, and military assistance.
a. Evidence is desired about any negotiations for
arms shipment and technical assistance such as terms and conditions
of paym4cnt, prices, and quantities.
b. Evidence is desired about the presence in the coun-
try of O"loviet personnel who might be technical advisors.
5. Soviet Aid to Tunisia:
There are indications that Tunisia is dissatisfied by
US and British hesitance in concluding contracts for military aid,
and may be considering acceptance of Soviet (or Czech) offers in
this field.
a. Evidence is desired about the presence in the coun-
try of Soviet personnel who might be technical advisors.
D. Wages and Labor
1. Since 1956 the USSR has been carrying out a major
reform q:f' the industrial wage and salary structure and a gradual re-
duction'of the work-week. These reforms have been proceeding in-
dustry lt;y-'industry and plant by plant. The new Seven Year Plan calls
for the completion of the wage reform and the transition to a general
40-hourwwrorkweek by the end of 1962. Information is desired concern-
ing- (] ) the reaction of the workers to the wage reform (2) the ef-
fects of the wage reform on average earnings, production, and pro-
ductivity in individual plants and industries (3) the effects of the
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III, Economic (Continued)
D. Wages and Labor (continued)
reduction in hours on production, productivity, employment, and
production costs in individual plants and industries (4) the extent
to which additional housewives are being drawn into the labor force
as a result of the shorter workweek. (U)
2. The press has recently reported the formation of
a number of "Communist Youth Brigades? which seem to resemble the
Stakhanovite brigades of the 1930's. Information is desired on the
purposes and activities of these new brigades. (U)
3. During the past several years the USSR has been
permitting various collective farms to experiment with a system of
cash wages and guaranteed earnings for the kolkhozniki. Information
is desired concerning the effects of the new system on production,
productivity, labor requirements, and average earnings of workers on
the experimenting farms. Is there evidence that the government is
planning a general extension of the system? (U)
4. Is the reorganization in agriculture causing any
surplus of agricultural labor which may become available for indus-
try? Are there any recent changes in the policy of transferring
workers between agriculture and industry? (C)
E. Aircraft Production and Deployment
10 Soviet Heavy Bombers:
(1) The BISON four-engine jet heavy bomber was
first displayed in Moscow in 1954 and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomb-
er in 1955. Combined production of the two aircraft is estimated
to be only about 140-150 aircraft as of mid-1958. Production of the
BEAR is believed to have ceased by early 1957 and production of the
BISON currently appears virtually to have ceased. Information is
needed on possible continued production, movements and. introduction
into units of these aircraft. (2) A number of reports of varying re-
liability indicate that the Soviets may be developing a new high-
performance heavy bomber. Attention should be directed to unusual
technical characteristics, especially the propulsion system. Infor-
mation is needed on production, testing, movement and introduction
into operational units. (S)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)
2. Soviet Twin-engine Jet Medium Bomber:
BADGER - Still. being introduced. into=operational
units. Information is needed as to whether these BADGERS represent
new or modified aircraft and, particularly, if they appear to be modi-
fied as;tanker aircraft. Information also needed on introduction in-
to units other than those of the Long Range Air Force. (S)
3. Light Bombers:
Information is needed on possible
production and
introducj?t:ion into units of new-type light bombers including BLOWLAMP
and BACKPIN.
4. All Weather Interceptor:
It is considered probable that the Soviets are en-
gaged in some stage of production activity on a new all-weather'inter,
ceptor. ?Phis aircraft, probably designed the YAK-27, has been report-
ed since; 1.956 but has not been sighted by western observers. Infor-
mation is, needed on series or prototype production of this aircraft
and its introduction into units. (S)
5. New Attack Aircraft:
Foreign visitors to the 1956 Air Show were also
shown a static display of aircraft which included two new attack air-
craft, bath described as very crude in appearance. A twin-jet ground
attack aircraf t, since designated BRAWNY, was described as similar to
but largor than the USAF B-26, with slightly swept wings and four-
inch rockets mounted under each wing. (S)
6. New Supersonic Fighters:
Two new families of fighters, including both swept-
wing and delta-wing aircraft were displayed in the 1956 Air Show. .
Since that date none of these aircraft have been sighted by western
observers.
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (continued)
E. Aircraft Production and Deployment(continued)
6. New Supersonic Fighters (continued)
ao The smaller delta-wing with pointed wing tips
was designated Fishbed A and the clipped wing version of the same air-
craft, Fishbed B. These aircraft were characterized by extensive use
of wing fences. The swept-wing version of this fighter, designated
Faceplate, has no wing fences,
b. The larger, more advanced, delta-wing fighter,
designated Fishpot had no wing fences visible. The swept-wing ver-
sion of this aircraft, designated Fitter, has two wing fences on each
wing.
c. There is no firm information concerning which
of these aircraft the Soviets intend to mass produce. Information on
Soviet production intentions, testing, actual production of these air-
craft, and their introduction into units is needed. (S)
70 Other Fighters:
The first line Soviet fighters Fresco (MIG-17),
and Farmer (MIG-19) are being phased out of production. Accurate in-
formation on the phase out of production of these jet fighters is
needed,
8. New Transports:
(1) CAMP - A twin-turboprop assault transport,
designated CAMP (AN-8), was displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Although
it has not appeared in numbers since then, a model of an AN-8 with a
different fuselage was on display at the Brussel's World Fair. Infor-
mation is needed which will clarify which model may be going into pro-
duction. Information also is needed on actual production and intro-
duction into service. (2) CAMEL - the twin-jet CAMEL has been in
service on Aeroflot lines since 1956 and also now flies on interna-
tional routes. Information is needed on the number now in service
with Aeroflot and with the military. Information also is needed on
production of this aircraft. (3) CAT - at least three different ver-
sions of the CAT (AN-10) have been reported since this aircraft first
was displayed at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957. The AN-10A
reportedly is an 100 passenger version and the AN-16 is a 130 passen-
ger version. Information is needed on production and introduction
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(1. January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
E. Aircraft Production and Deployment.(continued)
8. New Transports (continued)
into service. (4) COOKER (TU-110) - this four-engine jet transport
has beer derived from the older twin-engine jet CAMEL. Although
first displayed to the public at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1.957,
the aircraft has not been seen in numbers. Information is needed on
possible production and introduction into service (5) COOT (IL-18)-
this four-engine turboprop transport was displayed for the first time
at Moscc,w/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957 and is believed currently to
be in se:r?ies.production. Information is needed on possible variants
of the aircraft, production, and introduction into service with Aero-
flot or the military. (6) CLEAT - the existence of the CLEAT (TU
114) fita3t was confirmed by photos in the Soviet press on 3 November
1957.. The aircraft, a very large four-engine turboprop, apparently
has been derived from the BEAR heavy bomber. Two versions, the TU-
114 andthe TU-114D, have been shown since November 1957. The latter
aircraft in appearance is very similar to the BEAR and apparently has
a small passenger capacity. The TU-114, although probably derived
from the BEAR, has a larger fuselage and can carry from 120 to 220
passengers. Information is needed on possible production of one or
more ofthese models and on introduction into service. (7) CLOD (AN
14) - tb:is short haul, twin-engine piston transport completed its ,
first test flight in March 1958 and is believed to be scheduled for
series production. Information is needed on production and:introduc-
tion into service. (S)
9. Helicopters:
Information is needed on the production site of
the Hook (MI-6) helicopter which was first observed in late 1957.
Information is also desired on the production site of the small KA-
18 (HOG), which the Soviets have stated will enter mass.production
at an early date.
Intelligence concerning production of the Horse
(YAK-25) remains obscure. Only a few of these helicopters have been
observed since it was first sighted in the 1955 Air Show. Informa-
tion concerning both production and the production site of these
helicopters is needed. (C)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)
10. Aerial Refueling:
Information is needed on Soviet development of
aerial refueling techniques and equipment, including the: development
of new tanker aircraft and/or the modification of known aircraft,s,uch
as the BISON, BADGER, and the BEAR for tanker use. (S)
11. Unidentified Aircraft:
In June 1958 an unidentified aircraft of double
delta configuration was seen flying near Ramenskoye Airfield. The
aircraft was moving very rapidly and, although no engines were seen,
the sound seemed to be that of a standard jet engine. The size of
the aircraft was estimated tentatively to be slightly smaller than
that of BACKFIN. Further description of the aircraft is needed. In-
formation also is needed on testing, possible production, and intro-
duction into units. (S)
F. Light Industries
Increase in Specific Commodities:
Khrushchev, in introducing the Seven Year Plan (1959-
65), promised the people an increasing standard of living and called
for expanded programs in production of a number of commodities. The
Seven Year Plan for light industry requires that production increase
at an annual rate of 6 percent. The increase over the past seven
years, however, as claimed by Soviet officials, was 8.7 percent.
Thus the output of light industry will increase at a slower rate
through 1965. Commodities singled out for particular expansion are
(1) artificial and synthetic fiber, (2) leather footwear, (3) knit-
wear, (4) children's clothing, and (5) furniture. Any evidence of
the implementation of this policy is needed. In addition, informa-
tion is desired on investment, labor force, and construction of new
plants. (U)
G. Metalforming Industries
The Seven Year Plan (1959-65) revels plan for the
construction of 75 to 80 new major specialized shops and plants for
the production of castings, forgings, and stampings. Location, ca-
pacity, and breakdown by speciality of these shops and plants are
desired. (U)
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USSR (Continued)
III.' Economic (Continued)
H. Nonferrous Metals production
1. Aluminum
According to.the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet produc-
tion of aluminum in 1965 will be 2.8 times that of 1958. In the
Sixth Five Year Plan it was stated that 20% of the planned increase
for that period would accrue from better organization of production
and more efficient utilization of existing production capacity, and
that capacity for the production of crude aluminum would increase by
approximately 2.7 times. Data of this type on the source of new
supply for the Seven-Year Plan was not given. (C)
A breakdown of the sources of the planned increase
in aluminum output during 1959-1965 is desired, i.e,, what portion-
of the increase will be obtained through the expansion of-existing
facilities, from plants under construction, or from plants which are
planned for construction during this period. (C)
2. Copper
According to the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet produc-
tion of copper in 1956 will be 1.9 times that of 1958. It was
stated in the Sixth Five-Year Plan that 42% of the planned increase
for that period would be obtained from better organization of produc-
tion and more efficient utilization of existing production capacity,
and that capacity for the production of copper would Increase by ap-
proximately 1.5 times. Data of this type on the source of new sup-
ply for the Seven-Year Plan was not given, (C)
A breakdown of the sources of the planned increase
in aluminum output during 1959-1965 is desired, i.e., what portion
of the increase will be obtained through the expansion of existing
facilities, from plants now under construction, or from plants which
are planned for construction during this period. (C)
1. Ferrous Metals and Alloys Production
1. Current information on Soviet planned and actual
productions and use of alloying materials and of alloy steels is in-
creasinglty important in view of their relationship to Soviet atomic
energy, missile, and other weapons programs. (U)
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USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
I. Ferrous Metals and Alloys Production (Continued)
2. Information is desired. concerning current produc-
tion of nickel, molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, chromite, vanadium,
and ferroalloys. (U)
3. Information on the production and distribution of
all alloy steels of the following types: low alloy constructional,
bal.lbearing, tool, electrical, magnetic, stainless, and iron-based
super alloys. The same information is desired for nickel, cobalt,
molybdenum, chrome, or tungsten based super alloys for cermets and
other hard alloys. (U)
J. Petroluem, Natural Gas Production
1. Petroleum:
a. Since September 1957.there have been reported
plans to build an oil pipeline from the Ural-Volga area near
Kuibyshev.to the.-major Baltic Sea oil terminal at Klaipeda now under
construction.: Confirmation of such pipeline plans are desired and
negotiations with Free World companies to build, or aid in building,
such.a..pipeline should be reported.
2. Natural Gas:
a. In 1957 a new gas discovery was reported in
Usbek near Bukhara. Announced plans for gas lines to be built from
this area,to areas of consumption indicate this may be a major
natural gas discovery. Report the number and locations of wells
drilled in this area and the results of production tests thereon. (U)
K. Power Production
Electric and Nuclear Plants:
1. At Geneva the Soviets reported a large nuclear
power plant, with a projected capacity of 600,000 kilowatts, "some-
where in Siberia." What is the exact location of this power plant?
At what thermal power levels is it operating? Describe the generat-
ing equipment and how it is planned to reach full capacity. Give any
information on plutonium production from the reactors and on costs
of construction or operation.
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
K. Power Production (Continued)
Electric and Nuclear Plants (Continued)
2. The US electic power delegation in the USSR in
August wOs told that the nuclear power plant near Moscow was " a hole
in the ground," yet Yermelyanov at Geneva at the same time did not
mention tt;he plant. Is the Moscow nuclear power plant, really under
construction? If so, where? Give details of construction, projected
operation, and costs.
L. Materials for Atomic Energy and Missiles
1. Chemicals:
a. Information is desired relating to production,
trade, shipment, and consumption of the following chemicals and chem-
ical raw materials which have importance in the Soviet atomic energy
and missile programs: fluorspar, hydrofluoric acid and flourine,
lithium ores and compounds, metallic calcium and calcium chloride,
boron ores and compounds, hydrazine, and hydrogen peroxide.
b. Information is desired on the types of chemi-
cal fuels and oxidizers that are used in Soviet missiles - particular-
ly in the Soviet ICBM and earth satellite type missiles.
.2. Reactor Graphite:
Reactor grade graphite for use as moderator in
atomic piles in the USSR is a commodity of active intelligence in-
terest.. Is there any evidence that this commodity is considered to
be in critical or short supply, and is there any special emphasis ap-
parent in regard to the manufacture of it? (S)
M. Agriculture
1. The 1958 agricultural production probably will'be
at a record level.. (C) Information is desired concerning the pro-
duction and utilization of these agricultural products. (U)
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(I January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
M. Agriculture (Continued)
2. As a follow-up of the MTS reorganization, the
procurement and pricing system for agricultural products has been
revised, (U) How is the new system functioning? (U) What are the
prices being used this year and what effect has the bumper harvest
had on the level of prices? (U) Are-'.increased procurements of agri-
cultural products in 1958 solely the result of good harvests, or has
the change in the procurement - pricing system had an effect? (U)
3. The seven-year plan (1959-65) makes reference to a
proposal."to make better use of highly fertile land in the zone of
s.ta,ble,rainfall.? in the European USSR (U). Does this imply the ini-
tiation of a specific program to accomplish this end (e.g. a program
similar in scope to the new lands program), or is the proposal pur-
posely only in vague, general terms with no particular large scale
program being planned? (U)
4. The seven-year plan makes reference to the neces-
ssity of`achieving increased labor productivity in agriculture (U).
Do the Soviets expect to reduce the Soviet agricultural labor force
substantially in the near future? (U)
5. The Order of Lenin award was presented to Lysenko
on, his 60th birthday in October. At a conference of geneticists in
Montreal in August 1958 only pro-Lysenko scientists were in attend-
ance. These events again raise questions concerning the status of
Lysenko and his theories in the USSR at the present time. (U) What
effect does Lysenko or his group have over (a) agricultural scien-
tific research, (b) the application of scientific findings to general
practice in Soviet agriculture? (U)
N.: Construction Industry
1. New Rail Lines:
Recent information indicates 9,000 kilometers of
new railroad lines will be built in the 1959-65 period. (U) Informa-
tion is desired: on plans for any new line construction not included
in the.;original Sixth Five Year Plan. (U)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III.; Economic (Continued)
2, Guided Missile Sites:
-Any reports of the construction of guided missile
launching~jenstallations or site descriptions would be of great
value. IFormation needed includes: construction details, overall
plans, coal,truction organizations, and material inputs.
0> Telecommunications,
One of the most current and promising telecommunica-
tions developments in the Soviet Union has been in the field of tro-
pospheric and ionospheric scattering techniques. The ,perfection of
such techniques, which permit the propagation of ultra-high frequen-
cy (UHF) radio waves between stations located from about 200 to 1,500
miles apart, would enable theSoviet'Union'to establish a much needed
network o~ relatively secure, reliable, and, in the case of tropo-
spheric shatter, high capacity facilities for either civil or mili-
tary use, Open source materials report the establishment. thus far of
only two experimental circuits, one a tropospheric scatter circuit
between Frunze and Prezheval?sk, and the other an ionospheric scatter
circuit between Leningrad and Murmansk. Additional information, how-
ever, indicates that there are a number of other scatter circuits
operational in the USSR. (S) Information is desired concerning the
terminals' 4nd routes, of ionospheric' and tropospheric scatter cir-
cuits--experimental, operational, or planned--their capacities, and
their civil or military organizational subordination. (S)
Guided Missile Production and Deployment
i. Recent information indicates that possibly a new-
type surface-to=air missile is being phased into the Moscow SAM de-
fense system. Any confirmatory evidence of the possible production
and/or deployment of this new weapon is urgently needed.
2. Recently, information has become available indi-
cating that there are 10 new assembly and/or storage type buildings
at a Moscow SAM site (MINW-1) which are similar to two new buildings
located at the Istra missile' support area. This information is the
first evidence of possible "on-site" storage or assembly of missile
at -a.ny of the Moscow sites. Any information indicating completion
or construction of similar storage or assembly areas at other Moscow
SAM sites is urgently needed, (S)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
III. Economic (Continued)
Q. East-West Trade
1. The Soviet firm Ingosstrakh reportedly is expand-
ing its insurance and reinsurance operations in Western Europe. Re-
cent reports state that the premiums charged by Ingosstrakh and
Ingosstrakh-backed Free World agencies are so low that they are be-
lieved to be non-profitable.
Ingosstrakh.
a. Provide the names of Free World firms backed by
b. What:-rates are charged by Ingosstrakh and the
Ingosstrakh-backed firms?
c. Provide information that may explain the motiva-
tion for charging rates considerably below established premiums.
d. Provide information that may confirm or deny the
use of the insurance business for commercial or industrial-espio-
nage purposes.
e. Provide information linking these insurance activ-
ities with illicit East-West trade. (C)
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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
( 1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
IV. Military
A. Missiles
(See also USSR - Military,, Section C.- Army, Tactical
Missiles. USSR - Economic, Section P - Guided Missile
Pro- dncton; and USSR - Scientific, Sect on C - Guided
rdissilesT-
1. Information is urgently needed on the production,
testing, operational use, and technical characteristics of guided
missiles in all categories: surface-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-
to-surface and air-to-air. (S)
2. Surface-to-Air Types
a. Information on the air defense missile sites in
the,-Moscow area including construction, training, and operational
employment, and indications of. alert. (S)
b. A more flexible type of SAM system is expected
to.be deployed.at major target cities, possibly utilizing missiles of
'the. type appearing in the Moscow 1957 parade. (S)
Existence of defensive missile sites have been reported since 1956 at
Leningrad and Baku. Report any evidence of existing missile defense
facilities or related construction at these, or other areas likely to
be defended. (5)
d. Second generation surface-to-air missiles were
observed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow parade. Report evidence of
deployment of.this missile into the Moscow SAM system. (S)
.3. Air-to-Surface Types
a. The USSR is believed to be engaging in a
comprehensive: development program for air-to-surface missiles including
cruise-types. Report evidence of testing, training and operational
deployment of this category of missiles. (S)
4. Surface-to-Surface Types
a. Short-range surface-to-surface missiles. (S)
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January -? April 1959
USSR (Continued)
IV. Military (Continued)
A. Missiles (Continued)
b, Information on longer range surface-to-surface
types is also a priority requirement, (S)
5. Air-to-Air Types
a. The USSR has a military requirement for air-to-
air missiles, although little is known about their state of development.
Information, on the development, testing, training and operational use of
such missiles is::urgently needed. (S)
B. Air
See also 'USSR-Economic, Section E - Aircraft Production.,
and Deployment)
1. Soviet Space Research Program: (a) The Soviet Union
is'known to ; beengaged in a well-planned, high priority space flight
program, although little is known about the locations of the development
and test facilities engaged in this program or the experimental vehicles
themselves,; It is accepted that the USSR will soon attempt the launching
and recovery, of a large animal-bearing artificial earth satellite as a
progress ive; step 'in `the `Soviet' space research program, Any 'information
regarding stnc:h preparations or intentions is very valuable. (b) Inform-
ation concerning the research and development, testing and configuration
of any`Soviet manned high-altitude research vehicles is,urgently needed. (S)
2. Automation in Air Defense: It is believed: that the
USSR has un4erway a program o eve op an automatic air defense system
similar in concept to portions of the US SAGE system. Any information
on such operational facilities as control points, lines of communication,
and equipment likely to be associated with such a system, together with
any ideas on Soviet doctrine for its employment would be of value, (S)
3. Air Defense for Key Target Areas: The USSR has assigned
a compositeof conventional an a rcra orces, gh.ter aircraft and in
the case ofat least Moscow, a surface-to-air missile coaiple c to defend
critical target areas. Continued surveillance of these areas for signs
of exercising the equipment, or alerting personnel would be of value.
Any information on how the Soviets intend to employ defensive weapons is
of extreme importance. (S)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
January April 1959)
USSR
IV.. Military (Continued)
C. Army
1. Tactical missile's
a. There is a great need for any information on
missile units.,.What are their size, organization, subordination,
eq'ui.pment, and role in the parent organization? (S).,
b. Are surface-to-air missile units being assigned
to tactical.:units ? How are they integrated into the local air defense
plan of the parent unit? Describe their organization and equipment. (S)
c. Are medium and, long range rocket and missile units
,attached to forward armies during the offensive? How are these missile-
units grouped (by battalion, regiment, or division)? What tactical and/
or strategicmissiona are., assigned to this type unit? (S)
d. Have IRBM bases been established in satellite
areas? ~ : Have plans ' .been made and areas ' surveyed for the employment of
mobile IRBM launchers in Satellite areas? (S)
2. Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O & E's)
,a. How do:current.(T/O & BAs) differ from previous
tables` for. similar. units? How ,many types of divisions are there in
currentT/O & EQs? Do plans exist for additional types of divisions or
will some of. the current types of divisions be abolished? (S)
b. Is the, tank regiment in the various divisions
identical? Is the motorized rifle regiment in the various divisions
identical in organization and equipment? (S)
c. What air units (both fixed and rotary wing).'are
organic t6 the various divisions? (S)
d. Has the breakthrough artillery division been
abolished or replaced by rocket and missile units? (S)
Equipment
a. Tanks, assault guns, and tracked vehicles
(1) Has a new miniature or light tank been
developed or placed in production? (S)
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January ?- April 1959
USSR (Continued)
IV. Military (Continued)
C. Army (Continued)
(2) Has the T-54' tank been redesigned with a
new type turret and increased frontal armor? What modifications have
been made to the original production model? How is. the T-54 tank
prepared for deep-water fording? Describe the infa-red equipment
provided with this tank. (S)
(3) Has a larger gun been placed on the PT-76
tank? What other changes have been made in the basic amphibious tank? (S)
(4) What type assault guns are currently in
production? Has the T-54 chassis been adapted as an assault gun
carriage? Are assault guns, being phased out in favor of heavy tanks? (S)
(5) Is there a new amphibious personnel and
equipment carrier larger than the K-61? (S)
(6) To what extent have tracked prime-movers
replaced wheeled vehicles? (S)
b., Arti llery
(1) Has the new large self-propelled cannon
(approx. 300:mm) been Introduced into operation units? Describe the
recbi-l mechanist: axed loading apparatus of each of these pieces. What
is the range for the various types of shells for this weapon? (S)
(2) To what extent has the M-1955 203 mm
gun-howitzer been introduced into operational units? (S)
(3) Has an antiaircraft gun larger than then
dual 57 mm been mounted on:a tracked prime-mover? Describe the off-
carriage radar for the self-p:^opelled antiaircraft weapons. (S)
I c . Small arms
(1) Is a new family of small arms currently
under development to replace the post-war weapons currently in the
hands of trpops? (S)
developed? (S)
(2) Are new recoiless rifles currently being
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USSR (Continued)
IV, Military (Continued)
C. Army (Continued)
4. Political training
PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959
a. Has the amount of political trainingfor.
enlisted men and officers been increased in the past two years?
How are., these periods.. of training. scheduled? ,Who conducts this
training: and who, is :'required, :to &t teed? (s
b, At what levels of organization is there a
deputy commander for political affairs? What is his status relative
to the commander? Are many former political deputies now commanding
units? Are commanders attending special courses to qualify them as
political deputies? (S)
c, At what levels of organization do military
councils exist? What is their function and membership? (S)
d, Describe the party organization in units below
division. What is the relationship between the political deputy and
the party secretary? What is the relationship between the military
party organization and the local civilian party organization? (S)
e, Is the Main Political Administration directly
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense? What is its relationship to
the central committee? (S)
D. Navy
7, Submarine construction developments: The "Z" "W" and
"Q"-class submarine construction programs have ends -. A new class, the
"F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is
probable that other new submarine construction programs are also under-
way in other areas of the USSR. (S)
Information on new submarine construction projects in the USSR is
urgently required. This information should include details of numbers
of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems. (S)
8. Possible Guided Missile Cruisers: There are indications
that the Sverdlov cru ser program has come to an end. Several of the
last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished
state in the Leningrad area. There is speculation that work on these
ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations
are available. Information concerning the future of these ships is
desired, (S)
10. Naval weapons and s,h.ps to non-bloc nations:
The USSR has transferred a number of warships and naval weapons to non-
bloc natj'ons. (S)
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January - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
IV. Military (Continued)
Navy (Continued)
Information on further transfers of this nature are of
interest. "(S)-
11., Scrapping or Mothballin., of Warshi s:' The USSR has
scrapped some ships and apparently placed some sma Ships in mothballs.
(S) Further information on this subject is desired. (C)
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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
USSR (Continued)
V. Scientific and Technical
A. General
1.- Russian scientists have made tremendous advances
which. are emphasized by their 'spectacular success in nuclear and
space projects. These scientific and technical.advances have
provided Russia with definite scientific and technical advantages,
and new arms and propaganda for advancing Russian international
Communism. These tremendous effort's are representative of the
Russian bid for supremacy in all fields of science and technology
including the, less spectacular basic science fields. (C)
a.` Information on new Russian goals,, progress,
success and failure is desired. (U)
b. Specific information.as to the intensity of
political, economic: and military,support to basic and applied ,science
in the U?SFt would be,, most useful, particularly when expressed in
terms of organizations., funds, human and material resources, and
success or failure of projects. (C)
c. Information is desired on the competence of
scientific andtechnical,manpower and assignments broken down by field
of specialization.in basic and applied science and for specific
ministries and subordinate institutes., (U)
d. Specific or general information is desired on
projects, planned or under study, and the success of failure" of each
undertaking .(U)
e. Any reference to changes in Soviet scientific
and technical policies or plans is desired. (U)
f,- Evidence of increased Soviet emphasis on,the
application of'scientific and technical assets to develop new or
unique methods of aggression, new or improved weapons and new or
Improved weapons and new or improved defensive measures. (C)
g. Evidence of increased efforts to raise scienti-
fic and technical standards within the USSR to provide capabilities
for continued advances in the basic and applied sciences and thereby
the potential for scientific and technical productivity. (C)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
V. Scientific and Technical(Continued)
A. General (Continued)
h. Data on increased scientific and technical
spending above levels previously planned. (C)
i. Information is desired on major changes or
advances (breakthrough) in fields of priority scientific interest. (C)
Details of changes in Soviet plans or current
Soviet scientific and technical aid programs to Free World nations.(C)
k. Any details of specific scientific and technical
projects of the new Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), particularly those
assigned to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Medium Machine
Building (AE ministry). (C)
13. Atoms for Peaceful Uses
1. The U.S., U.K. and USSR are meeting in Geneva to
try to ' dr..1w--up' a'? treaty which would provide for a discontinuance of
nuclear weapon tests and establish a control system to insure that''
members. do not violate the agreement. (U)
a. Information is desired on the official Soviet
position and attitude regarding the Discontinuance of the Nuclear
Weapon Tests at Geneva, particularly indications of any rigitity or
flexibility of their bargaining position and concessions or compromises
they may be willing to make in the face of Western pressure. (S)
b. What are the Soviet popular attitude and
sympathies toward the Soviet official position at the conference.
' C. Guided Missiles
1. Recent observation of a modified surface-to-air
missile was reported during September-October 1958. (S)
a. Report any evidence of deployment concept of
this missile in the USSR: (S)
b. What are its technical characteristics and
associated'equipment? (S)
25X1X10 25X1X1
~2, Evidence has been obtained indicating that
was engaged in the Soviet SAM ancilliary equipment
production and research. (S) (NOFORN)
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January - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
V. Scientific and Technical (Continued)
C. Guided Missiles (Continued)
Has this Plant continued in the missile support
equipment.,program? If so, what.is their present contribution; who are
the associated suppliers and consumers? (S) (NOFORN)
Scientific and Technical Assistance Program
1. ,There is considerable exchange of delegations and
specialists of countries.of the Middle and Far East and other under-
developed areas in Africa and South America with those of. the USSR.
a. What medical personnel from underdeveloped areas
.have currently visited the USSR: name, title or position, purpose of
visit, date, length of stay? (C)
b.-.What Soviet personnel have recently visited non-
Communist-.underdeveloped areas? Name, title or position, purpose of
visit, date,. length of. stay? (C).
.2. The USSR. has in the past provided hospitals, equip-
ment, medicinals,, technical assistance and money for medical aid in
.underdeveloped areas.. (C),
a. What kind of assistance is being currently
provided or planned by the USSR and for which non-Communist countries? (C)
b.. There have been occasional references in
Meditsinski Rabotnik-about Soviet aid. In what ways is Soviet medical
aid -o non-Communist areas publicized? Is there much publicity about
this aid or is it soft-pedaled within the USSR.
3. The USSR is encouraging underdeveloped areas to send
students for training in medical: specialties. .(U)
a. What countries are . sending. students to the USSR?
Number known to be present? Course of study? (C)
b. Is.there evidence that these students are being
subjected to Communist indoctrination? (S)
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January - April 1959
USSR (Continued)
V. Scientific and Technical (Continued)
E. Unconventional Warfare
,1. It is a truism that the objectives of an international
conflict st-ould determine the conduct of the conflict. The Soviet
objective in the "cold-war" is a mposition of their political phil-
osophy upon the rest of the world, and this objective is determining
their conduct of the conflict. Research and development in the science
of euthenics is as vital to the conduct of a political war as research
and development would be to an all out physical conflict. Failure to
consider this factor may prove disasterous in that it is conceivable that
the Soviet; objective could be achieved without the employment of physical
war. (U)
2. Since the 20th Party Congress it has been evident that
the Soviets--satisfied with their standing in physical weaponry and
geographic 'positioning but dubious about the reliability of Soviet and
satellite populations--- have launched upon a large-scale program in
euthenics. A11 aspects of this science aimed at the improvement of Soviet,
society (abod the disintegration of Western societies) are being exploited,
including the social and biological sciences, behavioral science,
cybernetics, ethology, pedogogy, etc. Khrushchev's speech at the 21st
Party Congress probably will concretize this program. In order to
anticipate Soviet actions at the sociapolitical level, elaboration on the
following points of Khrushchev's speech is required: (U)
a. What are the "new questions of tremendous
theoretical and practical significance" that the social scientists of
the USSR are working on? (U)
b. What is the anticipated nature of the "generalized
laws of social development" which are facing Soviet social scientists in
the building of Communism? (U)
c. What is'the nature of the "emergency new, hither-
to unknown :Laws of social development and new forms of relations between
people." How are they being elaborated? (U)
d. How does Khrushchev propose to bring about the
transformation of.society in which "man himself changes.... forming the new
man...of the new Soviet internation;,?. society?" (U)
e, How specifically is the "boarding school" idea
which by l965 will embrace "not less that 2.5 million men.*." Linked with
the upbringing of the new, communist man of tomorrow?" Is a "Brave New
World" type of society the desired end? (U)
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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC
A., Soviet-Satellite Relationship
The primary Soviet objectives stressed at the Moscow con-
ference of world Communist leaders in November 1957 and reiterated by
Khrushchev in speeches at the Bulgarian and East German party con-
gresses in June' and July 1958 were to reassert the USSR's leadership
of the Communist.Bloc and to reinforce bloc unity. Recent Soviet moves
designed to achieve these objectives have included the formation of an
international Communist theoretical journal which began publication in
the fall of 1958, and a vigorous campaign against 'revisionism' as
exemplified particularly by. the, program issued by the Yugoslav Party
Congress in April 1958. The last few months have found the Chinese,
Bulgarian, and Albanian Communists leading in the attack on` Tito, al-
though formal State relations are still maintained between the Yugoslav
regime and all members of the Bloc. There. are still some divergencies
within the bloc, the most evident of which relate to the determination
of Polish. Party First Secretary Gomulka to maintain a degree of inde-
pendence, especially in dealing with Polish internal policies. The
formal State-Party visit of Gomulka to the . Soviet. Union culminated in
a joint Polish-Soviet statement on November 10, 1958 which clearly
allied Poland with Soviet foreign policy objectives but did not appear
to have affected Polish internal autonomy. At the close of 1958 all
of the European Satellites were firmly ranked behind the Soviet Union's
proposal to alter the quadripartite status of Berlin,
1.. Evidence that the USSR is implementing new policies
permitting one or another of the Satellites greater responsibilities
for internal policies. (U)=
2. Evidence that Moscow, in order to regain firmer con-
trol over the direction of bloc affairs, is undertaking a more direct
role in international Satellite affairs. (U)
3. Evidence of Soviet plans to further reduce its
troops strength in the Satellites, or conversely, has no plans along this
line whatsoever. (U)
4. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a
given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U)
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(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
1. Political (continued)
A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship (continued)
5. Evidence that Satellite regimes, possibly encouraged
by any new diegree of freedom that lessens direct Soviet control, are
reverting to the traditional hostilities that have long afflicted the'
area,
6. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the Warsaw
Pact, what arole is played by the Satellite representatives in these
organizations? Are they rubber stamps or are they in fact permitted
to take an active part in the organizations activities, particularly
in the discussion and formulation of policies? (U)
7. What is the organizational structure of the new theor-
etical.journal? What degree of influence do the various Satellite
countries eacerc ise. on editorial policy.and how? (U)
8.. Communist Party Stability
la Factionalism within the Satellite parties--brought
into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalin
:Lzation,camp~aign--remains a serious problem for the Satellite leaders.
We need evidence of the growth, or continuation, of this factionalism
within Satellite parties or between parties. (U)
a. Report evidence of disaffection or reluctance
among party leaders and members to go along with new party or bloc
directives.; :Report evidence of moderate elements' efforts to force
greater liberalization than the regime leaders and/or Moscow desire. (U)
b. Identify the leaders and groups and outline the
arguments each side puts up to justity its position. (U)
c. Report evidence of Moscow's concurrence in or
disapproval of specific Satellite changes in policy. (U)
d. What are the specific reasons for dismissal of
Satellite officials? Is factionalism involved? (U)
2. What has been the effect on the Eastern European Com-
munist Parties of the Soveit campaign against Yugoslavia? We are par-
ticularly ii terested in any evidence of a change in the :Leadership
of the Satellite Parties as a result of too close connections with Tito.
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
1. Pblitical (Continued)
B. Communist Party Stability (Continued)
Evidence of the existence of party ties and relations between
the Yugoslav Party and the Satellite Communist Parties. Evidence
of deliberate Satellite efforts to reduce Party contact with Yugo-
slavia to a minimum as well as evidence of efforts to reduce govern-
menta l (including economic )?t`ies with Yugoslavia. (U)
3. What effect is Poland's national Communist govern-
ment having on the other Satellites? Of particular interest would be
any evidence of Satellite efforts to undermine or otherwise weaken the
Gomulka regime. (U)
4. To what extent has Khrushchev's assumption of the
Soviet premiership affected the doctrine of "collective leadership" in
the Satellites? Is there collectivity in the leadership in reaching
decisions, or"is there one man rule? Is the method of decision-making
a reversion to the-pre-June 1953 period or was no change ever apparent? (U)
C. Communist Party Organization
There are great gaps in our knowledge of the setup within
the cehtral organization of Satellite Communist parties. Gaining a
clear.: picture of?thw whole central structure and oprations of the
party is of obvious importance. (S)
1. What reorganizations and personnel shifts are planned
in the central,-structure and why? What reorganizations have been
carried out but not publicized? (U)
Government
All Satellites now operate on a government setup in which
the premier and depZty premiers constitute an inner cabinet on the
highest level of government. (C) To what degree do they actually
operate as an inner cabinet and what is their effectiveness and juris-
diction? (U)
1. What are the given ministries controlled by each
deputy premier? What is his relationship to the ministries under his
jurisdiction? Report any concrete examples of policy control over
ministries. (U)
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PRL (Guide No, 164)
(1 January -- 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
Political (Continued)
D. Government (Continued.):
2. To what extent do the premier and his deputies conr-
stitute an.actual. organization. (i.e., regular meetings,. a secretariat,
etc.)? (lJ e~
3. Evidence of plans to decentralize government. structure.
Is reorganization proceeding along the lines recently adopted by the
'USSR? ( U!)
E+.i Security and Resistance
1. What are the existing relationships between and among
Soviet and Satellite.sacurity. services? Is there an overall inter-
Satellite security organization? (U)
2. What overt. and covert resistance is there evidence of?,
How-is overt discontent.manifested (i.e.., strikes, spontaneous demon-
strations, etc.)? Dates, places, and size of groups involved. (U)
3. As a result of the Hungarian and Polish developments
the previous, ,relaxation of security measures has, been called to a halt
and in s.ome.inst:atnces,reversed. Report instances of relaxation or the
adoption o reversion to.prev.ious hard internal security policies. (U)
F. Popular Attitudes
This type of information should be reported either on a
national or.regional basis. Listed below are general categories with
some representative examples? (U)
1. Attitudes toward government economic policies - How
have farmers. reacted to softened de very quoas Workers to new
norms , wage-'scales , work-time , etc . ? (U)
Lion, (U)
3. West German rearmament- Do the people accept the govern-
ment line on the dangers of West German rearmament? What is the attitude
toward Khrushchev'.s proposal to create. an.international free city of
Berlin? Has fear of war among the population increased? What is the-
popular view of current negotiations for banning nuclear weapon tests?(U)
4. What is the present attitude of the former left so-
cial democrats and non-Communist collaborationists? How do they view
their pos tion a resul ~3$A~~0212aad Hungary
and the RjaS iftfigse 0e 'i
2, Attitude toward western powers and hopes of libera-
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
1. Political (Continued
F. Popular Attitudes (Continued)
5. What is the attitude toward the establishment of a
military commune system in China? Is this.regarded as a model for
emulation by other Communist regimes? Does the popular attitude differ
from the official attitude on this question? (U)
G. Treatment of Minorities
National minorities within the Satellites present the
governments with continuing and insoluble problems. Policies toward
them are of continuing interest. (U)
1. Report any observable changes in official policy to-
ward national minorities since the Hungarian and Polish events. (U)
2. What is the present status of local Jewish Communities?
What is the current opinion of government and party policies and their
attitude toward Zionism, emigration, and Israel? (U)
3. Statistics on numbers of minority groups--particularly
Jews--remaining in the Satellites. (U)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April.1959)
SOVIET BLOC
II. Economic
A. Importing and Exporting
1.. Copper
In August 1958 COCOM removed the embargo against the
export to the Soviet Bloc of copper in all forms. Prior to this, forms
other than bare wire (6 mm and under) were embargoed. It is possible
that the Bloc in general, and the USSR in particular, might shift pur-
chases of copper .from semimanufactured wire. to the less expensive
primary forms, e.g., cathodes,'wirebars, ingots, etc. (C) Information
is desired which might indicate any significant change in the form and
volume of copper imported by the Bloc from the Free World. (U)
2. Tin
Sales of significant quantities of tin by the USSR
to the Free World during the past three years have contributed to a
growing surplus of tin on the world market. The International Tin
Council has been attempting to reduce this surplus and to stabilize
,the world price. The-USSR as a potential seller of large quantities
of tin-is capable of defeating--as indicated in recent months--these
efforts, if not perhaps of actually disrupting the entire marketing
structure. (U)
a. Soviet intentions to sell tin or not to sell tin
should be reported. (U)
b. As much background information as possible, in-
cluding Soviet tin output, imports of tin from Ghana, planned expan-
sion, etc., should be reported. (U)
Coal ~a nd Coke
In`1958, the USSR increased its exports of coal and coke
to`the European Satellites to compensate for the decrease in Polish ex-
ports. -There have been scattered reports of trade agreements between
the USSR and Satellite countries in which the USSR has committed itself
to supply'substantial exports of coal and coke for periods of from 3
to 5 years. Details of these agreements are needed. (OUO)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued
II. ECONOMIC (Continued)
B. Civil Defense Activities
The development of civil defense in the Soviet Bloc has
been highlighted by city and area alerts in last two years. (C)
1. Report all civil air alerts or instructions. (C)
2. Identify fully organizations and personnel in
operative '7oles. '(C)
3. Describe or obtain photographs of all equipment
used--personal, individual,'.tools,.vehicles.and communications, (C)
4_ Ascertain whether population moved to shelter
was -evacuated,, or did not. participate.
5.' Smoke, blackout or camouflage measures. (C)
1. In connection with intra-Bloc coordination and spec-
ialization, p1annxng, through CEMA, information is required on specific
measures' a'f'fecting the electronics ,industries. Information on coordina-
tion ofelectronic component production for.intra-Bloc trade is desira-'
ble, as is ;information on.specialization in the assembly of end items. (U)
2. Recent information'indicates that within the Warsaw
Pact structure, military production planning takes place, and decisions
are. made to allocate production of_specific types of military electronic
equipments ito individual countries as primary Bloc producers. Further
information is desired on these production allocations, with details
on types and quantities of equipment involved. (S)
D Agricultural Production
1. Agricultural production for 1958 varies from good in
the northern Satellites (East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) to
poor in the southern Satellites (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania).
(C) Informaation is desired concerning the' follwoing for each Satellite
with special. emphasis on the southern areas.
procurements?
a.
(C)
What effect has the 1958 harvest had on government
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
II. Economic (Continued)
D. Agricultrial Production (Continued)
b. Any evidence that the USSR has refused to honor
in full requests for foodstuffs by the Satellites. (C)
c. Reports, including rumors, that a food shortage
exists in any of the southern Satellites. (C)
The 'Satellites'have indicated that they are developing
fifteen year'plans for, agriculture--Poland has released some data. (C)
Informationi'is desired on the exact goals set up for individual crops,
livestock products, investments, fertilizers, machinery, etc., for
each Satellite. (C)
E. Petroleum Production
Plans have been mentioned concerning construction of a
pipeline'from the USSR (Baku region) to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany in order to supply large amounts of crude oil to these
countries. Details are desired on the size and capacity of the pipe-
line, the proposed routes, the estimated dates of the completion to
each country,'aad'the suppliers of the pipe. (U)
F. Electric Power Systems
There are preliminary plans under the sponsorship of
CEMA, to integrate the European Satellite countries with an inter-
connected electric power system. The possibility also exists for
international exchange of power between Western European countries
and Bloc areas. (C) Give details of current plans for the develop-
ment of a new high voltage (over 200 kilovolts) transmission system
in the 'European Satellites? ( C) Describe CEMA efforts in this field.
(C)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January -- 30 April .1959)
SOVIET BLOC
III. Military
A. Combined Soyiet`Blon Military Activity
1. The Warsaw Pact
a. How ..is the headquarters of the Pact . in Moscow
organized? What are the staff sections of the headquarters? How
many Satellite.. officers are assigned to the staff in Moscow? What
are theik positions?
b. Are there regional headquarters for the Pact?'
Where are they located? Who commands them?
mpined r ense a function of the
?
unified command? How is coordination accomplished in this field?
a. Is comb.ned tra J.ning now being scheduled?
On what scale are these maneuversto be executed? What is the role
of each participant? Were officers of, other Satellites present as
observers?
b.. Row, frequently are- eombineed. command post ex-
ercises ((::PX) held? What area the scal~e? a.nd, scope of these exercises?
c.How many officers from each of the Satellites
have been trained. inthe USSR? At what schools is this training
given? How many are currently enrolled? Are special courses arranged
for Satellite officers?
3. Advisory Groups
a. How many Soviet personnel are there in the
Advisory Group in each of the Satellites? What function do they
perform a1: the Ministry of Defense level?
b. At what levels in the chain of command are
advisory personnel assigned? What is their relationship to local
commanders?
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PRI, (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)
SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
III. Military (Continued)
A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity (Continued)
4. Soviet Equipment in Satellites
a. What efforts have been made to coordinate
armament production in the Bloc? What role is Czechoslovakia play-
ing in armament development?
b. What post-war models of equipment are scheduled
to be delivered to the Satellites? Does antiaircraft armament have
priority over other types?
c. What naval vessels are scheduled to be turned
over~`tb the Satellites (particularly Poland and East Germany)?
d. What aircraft are scheduled to be turned over
to the Satellites in the near future?
5. Reduction in Strengths_:
Was the reduction of 119,000 announced on 27 May
1958 carried out? Which service (Army, Navy or Air Force) was most
affected by the reduction?
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