PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL) EASTERN EUROPE (1 SEPTEMBER - 31 DECEMBER 1959)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 31, 1959
• Content Type: REQ

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OCI 4592/59
PRIG (Guide No. 164)
cope N? 253
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)
EASTERN EU60PE
(1 SEPTEMBER - ~1 DECEMBER 1959)
OFFICE OF CURRENT iNTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOT RELEASABLE TO F C N NATIONALS
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
September-December 1959
1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's), which are prepared
by the office of Current Intelligence in CIA, are designed to point
up the information required for current intelligence coverage of
significant developments during the 4-month time period covered by
each PRL.
2. Coordination with the Department of State includes the
PRL;'s for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) Eastern Europe,
(c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin
America, As a result, the PRL's include current intelligence re-
quirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State
Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelli-
gence (OCI), Research and Reports (ORR) and Scientific Intelligence
(OSI). In addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies
noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Esti-
mates-(NIE's) approved by the US Intelligence Board (USIB)--the
principal governing body for US intelligence, comprised of the. heads
of all US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of the Director,
of Central Intelligence (DCI).
3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of
all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Listss,may., in total,
present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any
single collection facility. However, to the extent that the
collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will
provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting. For
those collectors who may not have access to background information,
explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the require-
ments.
4. To facilitate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, all
items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one
of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN
(S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN),
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).
5. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed
to:
a. Acting Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019
Que Building, Code 163, Extension 2181;
or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distri-
bution (ICD), Department of State. 25X1A9a
Actin Chief, Requirements Branch,
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
September December 1959
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Table of Contents
EASTERN EUROPE:
ALBANIA
BULGARIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
EAST GERMANY
HUNGARY
POLAND
RUMANIA
YUGOSLAVIA
SOVIET BLOC AFFAIRS:
I POLITICAL
II ECONOMIC
III MILITARY
IV SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
PAGE
i
iii
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(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 September - 31 December 1959)
ALBANIA
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Communist Party and Governmental Activities
The Albanian Workers Party, led by Enver Hoxha, con-
tinues to follow hard-line policies without evoking any noticeable
internal party opposition. The party leadership and general policy
line appears to have been approved by Soviet Premier Khrushchev during
his first visit to Albania from 25 May to 4 June 1959. Khrushchev
probably told the Albanians that increased efforts should be devoted
to building up the country. Although the marginal improvement in
living conditions has probably given the regime some degree of popular
support, the party stands ready as always to meet any popular opposi-
tion with strict, repressive measures. (C)
a. According to some refugee reports, some degree of
dissidence continues to exist within the party's ranks, despite the
repressive measures exercised against alleged Titoists in recent years.
Does Titoism in any form in fact exist within the party? Is there any
dissidence, not connected with Titoism, in the party? Is there any
disagreement over economic policies? (C)
b. In a 24 June 1959 speech in Gjirokaster, Hoxha at-
tacked both "old" and "young" intellectuals, claiming the former re-
tained "old petit-bourgeoise tendencies" and "opportunistic and re-
visionist tendencies." The latter, apparently, do not care what
happens to the state. How widespread is this attitude, and precisely
in what questions or fields of endeavor (e.g., social, political or
economic) does the bourgeoise attitude of the intellectuals clash
with Communist policy? Among what segments of the Albanian "intelli-
gentsia" is this attitude found? Why? What punitive measures are
being taken? (C)
c. Before anti-Yugoslav polemics receded prior to
Khrushchev's visit, there were a number of trials of alleged Yugoslav
spies. Among the "spies" were two Roman Catholic priests. There have
been subsequent reports that several Catholic clergymen have been im-
prisoned. Is there any evidence that other Catholic clergymen have
been arrested in addition to the two? Has the regime launched an
anti-Catholic drive recently? (C)
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(Guide No, 164)
Septetbei?? ' December 1959
ALBANIA (C~)ntinued)
A. IN1] RNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
1, do What is being done, or scheduled in the near future,
in the matter of eliminating bureaucracy? Of decentralizing the eco-
nomic and/or political structure? What is the degree of corruption
practiced by civil servants? What is the extent of loyalty to the
Communist government of civil servants? Report on the success or lack
of success ,n implementing the decree making compulsory 30 days of
:Labor a year for Albanian officials? (C)
e. Detailed information is desired on the day-to-day
operation of the governmental system, including the organizational
setup of they various ministries? What is the relationship between
the central; organs in Tirana and the corresponding organs on the local
level? (C)'
f. Although Albania has not decreed a "leap forward" or
a formal speed-up, as have other Satellites, plans for economic develop-
ment over the next few years call for a significant advance. Are there
any evidences that the regime is intensifying political repressions
concurrent with raising economic goals? Does the regime anticipate
expanding the role of the trade unions? (C)
2, Soviet Control and Security
ao Does the USSR allow Albania less autonomy for making
internal deb,isions than it does to other Satellites? Has the degree
of Moscow control changed significantly in the last year? Have there
been any changes in the composition or responsibilities of the Soviet
advisors? (C)
b, How is Soviet control effected and which personalities
are directly involved? Does the Soviet Embassy play a substantial
part? Is Soviet Ambassador Ivanov exerting a stronger influence in
Albania thabb his predecessor, Krylov? (U)
c. Information is needed on the various security and
police orgar-s, including border guards: precise organizational setup
of the Directorates of State Security, including charts, leading per-
sonnel and total strength, liaison among each other and with the mili-
tary forces:. (U)
d, What is the attitude of the people toward security
police and )then organs of repression? (U)
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(Guide No. 164)
September - December 1959
ALBANIA (Continued)
A. INTERNAL, AFFAIRS (Continued)
2. e. What areas of resistance exist within the country?
How is resistance manifested, and is it of real concern to the regime?
(U)
3. Popular Attitudes
a. Is there any evidence that Albania intends to reorgan-
ize its school system along "polytechnical" lines similar to the Soviet
educational program? If changes are contemplated in the school system,
what is the reaction of the educators, parents, students? What is the
reaction of urban as contrasted to rural populations? (C)
b. Do the Albanians feel they are being exploited by the
USSR economically or politically ? What is the real feeling about Soviet
control in'general? What is the popular reaction to the economic speed-
up? What is the popular reaction to statements that Soviet missile
bases may be installed in Albania? To what extent has the regime suc-
ceeded in obtaining popular support for its anti-Yugoslav campaign?
To what extent is this support, if it exists, based on traditional
animosities toward the Yugoslav people? To what extent has the re-
gime's ideological position influenced popular support? (C)
c. What is the popular conception of the US? Is there
any popular sentiment for establishing relations with the US govern-
ment? What is the attitude manifested toward repatriates returning
from the US? (C)
d. Did Khrushchev's visit influence popular attitudes
toward the regime in any way? Toward the USSR? Toward Italy,
Yugoslavia, or Greece? (C)
e. On 27 April 1959, the government announced a series
of price cuts, and an increase in the agricultural delivery prices.
Taken together, both moves have improved the living standards of the
farming population and may have the effect of encouraging greater
agricultural production. To what extent have these moves influenced
popular opinion? To what extent have they stimulated increased pro-
duction? (C)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Although Tirana and Ankara agreed to resume diplomatic
relations in June 1958, it was not until 26 June 1959 that Turkish
Minister-designate Hasan Nurelgin arrived in Tirana. Since Albania
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(Guide No, 164)
September - December 1959
ALBANIA (Continued)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
does not have relations with Greece and since Yugoslavia has with-
drawn its head-of-mission, Turkey is thus the only non-Bloc Balkan
country with which Albania has "normal" relations. Any information
about Nure7Lgin's treatment, the treatment of his mission, and the
treatment afforded the Albanian mission in Ankara, is desired. (C)
2,, Since mid-Ju,ne 1959, Albania's anti-Yugoslav attacks
have revived, although they have not attained the high intensity of
attacks pr~.or to Khrushchev's visit. What is the extent of harass-
ment of Yugoslav diplomats in Tirana? Will Tirana revive the practice
of attackifg Tito personally? Any information concerning the appre-
hension, trial, and disposition of alleged Yugoslav spies is of
interest. Also we would like information on any border incidents, (C)
3 Relations with Greece--not official since World War II and
never very'(cordial--deteriorated during the past few months. There
was a border incident on 30 March 1959, and the imminent installation
of NATO missile bases in Greece has strained matters further. The
trial of Manolis Glezos has also occasioned bitter Albanian comment,
Will low-level agreements--such as, the agreement to exchange the
remains ofsoldiers who fell in World War II-continue to be reached?
Does Tirana plan an approach to Athens for bettering relations in ac-
cordance with the spirit of its propaganda statements about reaching
a Balkan accord? What will Tirana do in the way of pressuring Greece
to attend a Balkan conference? Will Tirana let the propaganda drive
abate? (C)
4 What is the current attitude of the regime toward re-
suming relations with the US? (C)
C. MILITARY
1, The USSR has apparently established a submarine base in
Vlone Bay,; Reports indicate the existence of substantial military
construction on Sazan (Saseno) Island. (S)
a. Information on the existence, extent and purpose of
this work would be very useful. (S)
b. Information on the deployment of additional Soviet
units to Vl:one Bay and the plans for operations from this base are
required. (S)
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(Guide No. 164)
September - December 1959
ALBANIA (Continued)
MILITARY (Continued)
1. c. Information-on the installation of defensive equip-
ment, such as SAM sites, would also be helpful. (S)
2. Information concerning current military construction at
Vione, Skrapari, and Breshen is requested. (C)
3. Reports of Soviet missile bases in Albania have been re-
ceived. (S) Information is needed on any activity in regard to mis-
siles such as:
a.
Description of missile objects observed;
(C)
(S)
b.
Destination and/or direction of movement of objects;
c.
Date and location of sightings. (S)
4. Information is needed on the number of Soviet and/or
Satellite military advisers and whether there has been an increase or
decrease in recent months. (U)
5. Continuing information on morale and reliability of the
armed forces is needed. (U)
6. Information is needed on the structure, equipment, strength
of composition of the armed forces is needed. Have new T/O and E's
been instituted recently? (C)
D. ECONOMIC
1. Allegedly the 1960 goal to have 70% of the arable land
in collectives and 15% in simple type cooperatives for a total of
85% had not been fulfilled as of June 1959. At this time there was
reported to be 76.2% of the arable land in the collective sector.
Little effort has apparently been made to extend the collectivized
area during the past 6 months, especially for the simple type co-
operatives. (C)
a. What factors influenced the regime to slow down
during 1959? (C)
b. Also, why has the consolidation or merging of col-
lectives been halted--a policy opposite of that being followed by
other Satellites? (C)
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(Guide No. 164)
September - December 1959
ALBANIA (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
2. Chrome Ore Iron - Nickel Ore. Annual iron-nickel ore
production: is expected to reach , ons by 1960 and 500,000 tons
by 1965. Czechoslovakia, in addition to furnishing aid for develop-
ment of these mines, currently imports the ore and processes it for
nickel content. The planned construction of a nickel recovery plant
in Slovakia, by 1962 indicates that the Albanians will probably con-
tinue to export the raw ore without domestic processing. Production
of chrome pre is also expected to reach 500,000 tons by 1965. (OUO)
I-nformatioh is needed on the following:
a. Albanian intentions concerning the construction of
a processing plant for either chrome ore or iron-nickel ore. (C)
b. Actual or planned investments in chrome ore and iron-
nickel ore mining by Albania; investments in iron-nickel mining by
Czechoslovakia. (C)
c. Accurate current estimates of reserves of chrome
ore; of iron.-nickel ore. (C)
3.
Soviet
Credits. In early July 1959 it was announced that
Albania
had
received
another Soviet credit, valued at 300 million
rubles,
"t<
finance
the construction of industrial and other projects,"
a. Report additional details, e.g., time period during
which credit will be drawn on, repayment terms, projects involved, etc.
(U)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 September - 31 December 1959)
BULGARIA
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
The Bulgarian regime is currently immersed in efforts to"
step up enthusiasm to meet the 1959 economic targets of the "leap."
Despite these efforts of the past few months, widespread opposition
to the program continues to exist, apparently reaching the highest
ranks of the party. The most significant development of the period
under consideration was the central committee plenum of 9 'July 1959,
which disclosed that the regime was seriously concerned with the
status of the "leap" in the fields of construction; industry, labor
payments, internal trade, and livestock production. Plenums have
been scheduled monthly from October 1959, through February,1960, at
which these areas of concern will be discussed. An editorial in
the June 1959 issue of the party's theoretical monthly Novo Vreme
strongly condemned continuing opposition to the program, hint g
that several trusted party members may be cracking under the strains
imposed by the high targets. (C)
1. Party Problems
a. What is the extent of "disagreement" within the
top party and governmental ranks over the "leap?" Is there dis-
agreement between the central committee and the politburo, or within
one or the other bodies? What are the attitudes and loyalties of
the party rank-and-file? (C)
b. To what extent are the following an explanation
for the disagreement? Personal intrigue? Old political alignments?
Belief in the infeasibility of the program? Excessive physical and/
or mental strain on the apparatchiki charged with carrying out the
program? Basically, is internal disagreement one of policy (extent
and direction of the "leap") or of personality, or of both? (C)
c. What individuals are involved in the disagreements?
Will any or all of them be purged in the near future? Was Georgi
Tsankov's failure to put in a public appearance from the 5 April 1959
elections up to the time the delegation to Poland returned on 2 July
1959 related to the disagreements? (C)
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
September - December 1959
BULGARIA (Continued)
A. INt:E RNAt APPAIRS (Continued)
1, d. To what extent do the current disagreements, if
they do exist, reflect differences of opinion concerning Communist
China's "leap?" Is there any pressure in the party leadership to
expand the "leap?" Is there pressure to incorporate more "Chinese"
features? (C)
Z. Political Power
a, What are the current comparative standings of Vulko
Chervenkov,Dimitur Ganev, Anton Yugov, and Todor Zhivkov? How does
the 6 May 1959 appointment of Chervenkov to head the new State
Scientific Council affect his position? To what extent would a
failure to sheet the "leap" goals for 1959 affect Zhivkov's leadership
of the party? What is Zhivkov's current relationship with Khrushchev
and/or othei Soviet leaders? What is his relationship with Chervenkov?
(C)
b, We desire all information relating to the current
status of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. We are also in-
terested inany changes in the functions and status of the Fatherland
Front d (C)
3.1 Soviet Delegation to Bulgaria
In view of the evidences of disagreements within the
Bulgarian party, the Soviet delegation -- which may be led by Khrush-
chev -- is likely to play an instrumental role in settling internal
Bulgarian conflicts. TABS announced acceptance of the Bulgarian
invitation chn 16 March 1959 but declined to state who would be on
the delegation or when it would visit Bulgaria. There is evidence
the Bulgarians expected Khrushchev to stop off on his return from
Albania in June 1959, but he visited Budapest instead. There is
current speculation that the visit will occur over the 9 September
1959 holiday, although no official announcement has yet been made.
Concerning the role which the delegation could play in Bulgarian
politics, it would be useful to know any details on the following: (S)
a, What have been Moscow's attitudes toward the leap
forward and the reorganizations? (C)
b. To what extent has it supported these programs? (C)
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September - December 1959
BULGARIA (Continued)
INTERNAL AFFAIRS' (Continued)
3. c. Has there been any discernable change in their
attitudes since the leap was formulated in November 1958? (C)
d. To what degree would the Soviets permit a purge of
the ranks of the BCP? (C)
4. Education
The 3 July 1959 extraordinary session of the National
Assembly passed into law an educational reform bill largely patterned
on a draft proposal of the April 1959 BCP central committee plenum
and on the proposals made by Zhivkov to the Youth Union congress in
December 1958. Modeled on the polytechnical reforms made in the USSR
this last year, the Bulgarian reform will not be completed until 1964
or 1965 and will require a considerable expansion of physical facili-
ties. (C)
a. What has been the popular reaction to the reform?
In particular, how have parents and students greeted the reforms?
Is there any difference in reaction between the countryside and the
towns and cities? (C)
b. What has been the reaction of regional (Okrug) party
and governmental committees, who will bear the brunt of the expansion
program? (C)
5. Soviet Control and Security
a. What are the channels of Soviet political control of
Bulgaria? Who in the USSR exercises supervisory authority for that
country? (U)
(i) Is there any difference in the Soviet attitude
toward Bulgaria than toward the other Satellites? (U)
(ii) Can any Bulgarian personalities be identified
with specific Soviet personalities? Which Bulgarians, if any, act as
liaison between the Soviets and the Bulgarians? (U)
Sofia? (U)
(iii) What is the role of the Soviet Ambassador in
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
September - December 1959
BULGARIA (Continued)
A. INF'ERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
5.; a. (iv) What is Chervenkov's current status vis-a-vis
the Kremlin? (U)
b. TASS announced on 16 March 1959 that a Soviet party-
governmentl, delegation would visit Bulgaria although no date was
mentioned. Because there have been rumors of Soviet dissatisfaction
with features of Bulgaria's "leap'", it is possible that this dele-
gation maybe of unusual interest. In connection with their visit
the followi:aag would be of interest: (U)
visit? (U)
(i) Which collective farms did the delegation
(ii) What leaders were detailed to escort the dele-
gation arotxid Bulgaria? (U)
(iii) What Soviet criticisms, if any, were voiced
about Zhivkov's theses or about other developments in Bulgaria? (U)
(iv) What statements, if any, were made by the dele-
gation members about Bulgaria's position vis-a-vis other Satellites
in the mat'Gler of "building socialism?" (U)
c? Information is desired on the security apparatus--
its organi a,tion and functions, and its relationship with the party
and the USSR, . (U)
6,, Popular Attitudes
ao What is the popular attitude toward increased pres-
sures generated by the "leap forward?" Is there any resistance or
sabotage to increased production norms? Any and all details are de-
sired. (C)
(1) What is the popular attitude toward the ad-
ministrativlee reorganization initiated partly as a means to eliminate
bureaucracy? (U)
(ii) Is there any truth in rumors of food shortages
approaching famine in some areas and cities? (C)
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September - December 1959
BULGARIA (Continued)
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
6. b. How is the mass "voluntary" labor program regarded
by the people? What means have been devised to evade conscription
on "voluntary" labor teams? How is the projected expansion of youth
labor brigades working out in practice? (U)
c. Is the popular attitude one of optimism or pessimism
toward the targeted production hikes for 1959-61-65 called for by
Zhivkov? What is the popular conception of the standard of living
in the USSR? In other Satellites? In West Europe? In the US? (U)
d. Is the regime still dissatisfied with the attitudes
of the youth? If so, what steps is the regime taking to try to
remedy this situation? (C)
e. What has been the reaction of the population to the
reestablishment of US-Bulgarian relations? (U)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. During his visit to Albania in May-June 1959, Soviet
Premier Khrushchev again raised the issue of calling a Balkan con-
ference to create a denuclearized Balkan and Adriatic zone and
possibly to conclude pacts of nonaggression between the Satellite
and non-Satellite countries of the area. (U)
a. What new concessions to Greece over the question of
reparations due Greece is Sofia prepared to make in the hope of
bringing Greece to the conference table? (C)
b. Comment on a change or anticipated tactical adjust-
ment in Soviet and Bulgarian plans for a Balkan "Free Zone"? What
has been the reaction to Khrushchev's statements that missile bases
may be set up in Bulgaria should Italy and Greece persist in their
determination to set up NATO bases on their territory? (C)
2. What are the attitudes of the party leaders toward Tito
as a person and toward what he symbolizes? Of the party rank-and-
file? Among the populace? nted on to support Gomulka, in a showdown with his op-
ponents? 'or what reasons do people support or oppose Gomulka? (C)
ghat is the popular reaction to the cxltural exchange
d
t
program betweenthe United States and Poland? To the work being done
in Poland by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations? To the Polish
language aIt)nthly Amer, ka now being distributed in Poland? What was
the popularYeaeton -Insofar as friendship with the United States is
nd? (C)
l
P
'
a
o
s visit to
concerned 1Q `i ce President Nixon
Relations with Other Satellites
Po ish liberalization, especially in the areas of agri-
cL the`' "relative freedom of speech, press, and religion is
a
lt
r
ure
cu
regarded byr.manp of the Satellite governments as setting a bad example.
(C)
a* (1) Information is needed regarding.any changes in
relations [tbetween Poland and each of the other Satellites.
+ (2) Criticism of Polish policies by party and
governmen leaders in the other Satellites and any pressures brought
to bear"o Poland to conform to the standard pattern should be re-
ported. 1)
(3) What effect did Vice President'Nixon?s August
1959 visit to'Poland have on relations with the other Satellite coun
tries? (')
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
POLAND (Continued)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
1. b. Particular attention should be given to any evidence
of changes or new developments in Polish relations with the parties
and governments of East Germany, Communist China, and Hungary. (C)
c. Recent unconfirmed reports state that Poland is
acting as a go-between in an attempt to patch up the differences
between the USSR and Yugoslavia, presumably at the Soviet Union's
behest. Report any information concerning Poland's own relations
with Yugoslavia and any evidence that Poland is trying to bring about
a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. (C)
d. Were any significant foreign policy discussions held
during Khrushchev's July 1959 visit to Poland? What decisions were
reached? (U)
e. In most respects Gomulka appears to have lined up
with Khrushchev on foreign policy and Bloc affairs, while he continues
to work for better relations with the West--especially with the US.
Report any evidence, of shifts or deviations from this policy alignment.
Report any evidence of Polish independence or initiative in foreign
policy matters whether it differs from or conforms to the Soviet line.
2. Polish Stature in the International Community
Poland showed a greater tendency to further its own
foreign policy objectives in an attempt to increase its stature in
the non-Communist world following Gomulka's return to power in October
1956. Information is needed on specific actions taken by the Poles
aimed at achieving this objective. Include such matters as official
and unofficial trips by leading Polish party and government officials
or statements by Polish or foreign leaders which might throw light on
this subject. What was the effect of Vice President Nixon's visit
to Poland in August 1959 on Poland's prestige outside the Bloc? (C)
3. The Oder-Neisse Line
The inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's
permanent Western border is a cardinal point of all the Bloc countries'
position on the` question of Polish-German relations. Gomulka and
other Polish leaders apparently are convinced that continued close
relations with the USSR and adherence to the Warsaw Pact are the best
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September - December 1959
POLAND (CQntinued)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
guarantees: :for the stability of Poland's present borders. Khrushchev,
during his ,July 1959 tour of Poland, repeatedly played on the deeply
ingrained fear of Germany and of a possible future attempt to change
the Oder-NrPisse line. He assured the Poles that any future East-West
agreement must guarantee that Poland would retain the Western Terri-
tories. (C)
i,. a. Do any responsible Poles fear that Poland may again
be the vic't'im of partition if this should further Soviet ambitions?
(C)
Poland obviously would like a Western guarantee of
b
.
the Oder-Neisse line, including a guarantee by West Germany. Would
Poland be willing to consider any territorial adjustments as a means
of reaching; a final settlement of its Western frontier? (C)
j c. Were there any private discussions on foreign affairs
during Khrishchev's visit to Poland? What effects will the visit have
on future polish policy in the following areas: Bloc foreign affairs;
Polish relations with the West; Berlin; a separate peace treaty with
East Germany? Did Khrushchev make any specific requests of Gomulka
or assign any specific areas of responsibility in foreign affairs to
Poland? (C)
9. Polish-West German relations
What was the effect of the reported West German offer to
conclude non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia? (C)
a. Would Poland be willing to sign such a pact if it
did not ircc:].ude recognition of the Oder-Neisse line? (C)
b. What is behind the strong denunciations of the German
Federal Republic by Gomulka and other Poles? (C)
c. Report any evidence of moves by West Germany or
Poland aic4ed at closer relations--either full diplomatic relations or
somethingishort of it, such as, an exchange of trade missions? (C)
C. MILITARY
Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missiles in
Poland? iC)
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September - December 1959
POLAND (Continued)
C. MILITARY (Continued)
2. How much anti-Soviet sentiment is there in the Armed
Forces? Are there many incidents between the Soviet Forces in Poland
and the Polish Armed Forces? (C)
3. Have Soviet advisers been assigned to Polish units?
How many? (C)
4. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? Was a
large-scale command post exercise held this year? (C)
5. Have the tables of organization and equipment been re-
vamped recently? (C)
6. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What
is the break-down by service? (C)
D. ECONOMIC
1. In late June 1959 a new plan was announced for widely
using agricultural circles to increase agricultural production while
simultaneously laying the foundation for future collectivization.
Large grants are to be made to these circles for their joint purchase
and use of farm machinery, and for their common investment and effort
in promoting land improvement and farm building construction. These
grants will be financed by the state's profit on compulsory deliveries,
now to be extended through 1965, and placed into an Agricultural
Development Fund. (U)
a. What is the initial peasant reaction to this plan?
(U)
b. Will industry be able to provide the extra machinery
called for by the plan? (U)
c. How does the USSR feel about this plan? (U)
2. USSR - Poland Economic Agreements. In July 1959 Khrush-
chev headed a delegation visiting. Warsaw. There is much interest in
knowing if any economic agreements were reached between the two
governments during this visit. (S)
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September - December 1959
POLAND (Continued)
D. 'ECONOMIC (Continued)
3. Bloc Trade. During the last quarter of 1959 Poland will.
be negotiating Its trade agreements with Bloc countries? Report any
signific*nt developments such as credits or provisions for major
changes in the value or commodity composition of trade. (C)
4. Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves. Polish planners have
announced the necessity of increasing reserves of gold and foreign ex-
change. What progress is being made in so doing? (;)
5. Chemical Equipment from West. Polan(i, a.. other coun-
tries ofthe ino- ov et Bloc, is pacing an increasing emphasis on
the development and growth of its chemical industry. To accomplish
this end; Poland is attempting to procure chemical equipment, plants,
and techlp,ology from Western countries. (C)
Information is desired on Polish efforts and successes
in procuting chemical equipment, plants and technology from the West,
giving value, type, capacity, and country. (C)
6. Strategic Imports from West. Poland has been increasing
her imports o strategic: materials from the West. Substantial quan-
tities of these materials are obtained on the basis of Polish commit-
ments to'utilize the goods for domestic civilian purposes. (OUO)
i
a. Provide any evidence that Polish imports of strategic
materials from the West are being re-exported or diverted to military
enduses.1 (C)
7. Ferroalloys. Poland plans to increase its production of
electric furnace steel from approximately 400,000 tons in 1959 to
980,000 tons in 1965 and to 1.3 million tons in 1975. To accomplish
these goals, the production of ferroalloys will have to be increased.
Some infQ':rmation is available on the Ferrostopow Ferroalloy Plant at
Laziska Gorne, but no information is available on the Siechnice Ferro-
alloy Pl4:rit at Siechnice. For each of these plants: How many and
what sizo furnaces are presently in operation? Are these plants to be
expanded? What is the present production of the various kinds of
ferroailqys and what is the planned expansion? Does Poland plan to
build new plants for the production of ferroalloys? (C)
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September - December 1959
POLAND (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
8. Oil Pipeline. In connection with the projected USSR-
European Satellite crude oil pipeline, Poland is planning to build
a refinery at Plock. A recent report said crude oil would come
from the Malopolska oilfields in what used to be Polish territory,
while another line would be built from Plock to Kaliningrad to carry
refined products. (C)
a. Information on the cost and planned date of completion
of this refinery would be useful. (C)
b. Information on the route of the pipeline(s) would be
very valuable. (C)
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Eastern Europe
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 September - 31 December 1959)
A. INTERNAL, AFFAIRS
1. Factionalism and Party Discipline: Reports con-
cerning fact ona sm in e uman an Workers (Communist) par-
ty (RWP) have been fewer in the last quarter, and all indica-
tions point to the continued preponderance of Ghe?rghe Ghe-
orghiu-Dej as firm leader of the party. No major shakeups
in party organization or personnel structure have taken place
in the last quarter, and presumably the RWP has busied itself
with preparations for its third congress, scheduled for later
in 1959, perhapsCin December. On the other hand, the ques-
tion of party discipline remains open, and there are no signs
of_dimunition of the widespread dissatisfaction and apathy
wh'1ch.i s been manifested among the lower levels of the RWP.
Man-y local party organizations and officials continue to be
;.severely criticized, and some have been punished, for forma-
listic approaches to their work. Bureaucratic behavior and
a lackadaisical dissatisfaction with the way in which its
political and economic policies are being implemented suggest
that the problem of party discipline remains as serious as it
was in the past. (S)
a. If factionalism exists, it would probably have
flared up at the 13-14 July 1959 Central Committee plenum,dur-
ing which Gheorghiu-Dej after a stress on the "successes" of
the 1955-1960 economic plan, announced dramatic wage increases,
reduced income taxes, and increases in pensions, as well as
cuts in the prices on 2,600 unspecified items, to take effect
on 1 August 1959. These measures, if implemented, are de-
signed to mitigate adverse public reaction to political re-
pressions and the increased pace of economic expansion. Re-
ports of the meeting are scanty. Were there any other reports
presented at the plenum, particularly on the internal political
situation, or the coming party congress? Was there any evidence
of factionalism at the plenum, such as, adverse comment, or
strong reaction to the economic step-up and political repres-
sions, or th'e proposed wage increases, and other ameliorations?
Were there any protests over the increased wage and pension
expenditures on the grounds that such funds will probably have
to be taken from the funds previously allocated under the 1959
budget and thus will result in some hinderences to the current
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
].. a. economic step-up program? Was there any objec-
tion to he ideological and practical pressures which will be
necessary to increase labor productivity in order to make up at
least pant of the funds necessary for the wage increases? (C)
b. Any information on the exact date or agenda for
the forthcoming party congress would be of highest importance.
Indications on how the Rumanians plan to complete the building
of socialism by 1956 which will undoubtedly be the major topic
at the congress will also be of great interest. (C)
C. Is there a locus of resistance to party direc-.
tives,or my indication that anti-party sentiments tend to pola-
rize around specific issues? Are there any indications of a par-
ty clean:-up at lower levels in anticipation of the congress? Have
local party members and aparatchiks received new incentive and
stimulation by the party vs goal to complete the building of so-
cialism by 1965? What is their reaction to the tremendous ef-
fort it will take on their part? Has there their traditional
apathy d:lled them from stimulation over the relative nearness
of a lon~-standing goal? (C)
Party Organization: What are the specific areas of
responsii i:li y w n the Po tburo of the Rumanian *6brkers'
Party? What are the executive offices or departments within
the central committee? Who are their chiefs? What areas do
each of the Central Committee secretaries supervise? How were
their duties reshuffled after the removal of Iosif Chisinevschi,
in view of the fact that his position as secretary was left
vacant? Has there been any reorganization of the party appara-
tus on low levels in preparation for the congress? How has the
addition of a party organized placed in charge of each collec-.
tive farm affected party organization in the countryside? (C)
3. Soviet Control and Security
a. In 1956 Gheorghiu-Dej was quoted as having stated
that Khru,=.shchev's behavior had confused many people. What are
the feelings of the Rumanian leaders toward Khrushchev? How did
they react. to Khrushchev's statement in Poland on 21 July 1959
that the Central Committee of the CPSU realizes that the Polish
party cannot exactly follow Soviet practice in building socialism?
Do they A i.nd applications of this statement useful for Rumania. (C)
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
(C) 3. b. How is Soviet control exercised over Rumania?
c. Have any changes resulted from the withdrawal
of Soviet-troops? (C)
d. Are any basic changes foreseen in Soviet-Ru-
manian control mechanisms at local and national levels? Do So-
viet advisors still control the production of uranium, gold and
silver? (C)
e. What relationship exists between top Rumanian
leaders and the top Soviet-Party leaders? What is the role of
the Soviet Ambassador? (C)
4. Internal Discipline: On 21 July 1958 strong modifi-
cations of the penal code were promulgated. A further revision
of the penal code and a limited amnesty were announced, on 21
January 1959 and a decree on "preventive control" of state
property and institutions was made public on 1 February. Since
mid-1958, the regime has made widespread arrests for both polit-
ical and economic reasons. The campaign appears to be motivated
primarily by a desire to improve internal discipline in prepara-
tion for the campaign to complete the building of socialism by
1965 and to remove corrupt and unreliable elements. The US lega-
tion recently reported that the widespread arrests and trials
have spread terror, among certain segments of the population. (C)
a. What other considerations prompted the regime
to undertake a "clean-up" campaign at this time? (C)
b. In which geographical areas, minority and pro-
fessional groups, or social strata have such arrests taken place?
(C)
c. Are juridical proceedings involved, or have these
cases been resolved by administrative methods? (C)
d, There are indications of renewed activity of the
"people',s courts" operating in factories and other socialized in-
stitutions, to protect against dishonesty, waste, theft and in-
efficiency. Are there any indications that their powers are to
be expanded to include the passing of prison sentences? Are the
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
A. il~NLTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
4. d. "people's courts" really functioning as the re-
gime would like them to, or are they merely another "paper or-
ganizationc-" with no real significance? (C)
5. Religion: Rumanian Orthodox Patriarch Justinian
.Marina is reposedly pessimistic over the future of the church
in Rumania. The Patriarch reportedly has an "assistant" as-
signed to him by the regime as his "boss" on many church mat-
ters and is said merely to sign church decrees issued by his
aide. Justinian has voiced concern over property belonging to
the monasteries, which he claimed the regime has been working
to nationalize since 1958. There have been reports that a large
number of clergymen of all denominations were arrested in the
latter half of 1958 and that the head of the Lutheran Church in
Orasul Stalin (Brasov) was allegedly executed at that time for
treason. Other reports stated that Justinian himself was under
house arrest and that his personal secretary and physician were
apprehended. A show trial of two Catholic priests was held
around the and of'1958 and rabbis have been reportedly arrested
in Bucharest during the past spring. (S)
a. Why is the regime conducting a campaign against
religion at this time? What is the situation of the monasteries?
Has thero been a real effort to nationalize their properties? (C)
b. Are there indications that any of the various
churches have been encouraging resistence to the regime? Which
ones? ( )
c. Are there any indications that Patriarch Justin-
ian is to be replaced? Was the Lutheran Church leader indeed ex-
ecuted i>" Orasul Stalin? (C)
6. Exodus of Jews: From May 1958 to March,1959 approxi-
mately lt,000 Jews emigrated from Rumania to Israel. In response
to Arab pressure, the regime denied a "large-scale" exodus from
Rumania On 25 February 1959 and stated that the Jews who were
leaving *ere being permitted to go for "humanitarian reasons."
From that time on, the number of imigrants decreased sharply.
There are approximately 14,500 visaed Jews in Rumania without
employment, housing or regular personal identification papers.
Only l32,:immigrants have arrived in Israel from Rumania since
March 1959. In all, only 550 visas have been received for re-
validati'n by the Israeli Legation in Bucharest since March,and
since 23 June 1959 even this small flow has ceased. (C)
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September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
A. Internal Affairs (Continued)
6. a. Is this a temporary or permanent halt? What
prompted the regime to halt the exodus at this time? (C)
b. Have there been consultations between Moscow
and Bucharest on this subject? What was the main reason for
the beginning of the exodus? (C)
c. Immediate information on any resumption of the
exodus is desired. (C)
7. Minority Policies: The Rumanian regime announced
the amalgams on or the yai" (Hungarian) and the "Babes"
(Rumanian) universities in Cluj on 3 July 1959. The new uni-
versity is designed to "struggle to eliminate national isola-
tion" and contribute to the spread of a Rumanian national iden-
tity. In addition. several Magyar institutions, such as,theaters
and cultural centers have been either closed or amalgamated.
Hungarian secondary schools will reportedly be amalgamated with
their Rumanian counterparts. Rumors of the expulsion of "un-
reliable" Hungarian university students and of suicides among
p(c)fessors opposed to the amalgamation have also been reported.
a. How much further does the regime intend to inte-
grate the Magyar minority into Rumanian life? What are the next
steps to be taken? (C)
b. What are the real reasons behind these moves? (C)
8. Local Government: During May 1957 top party leaders
led by First Secretary eorghiu-Dej and Premier Chivu Stoica
visited the Black Sea Coast, the Ploesti area, and the city of
Craiova. After visiting various economic enterprises and con-
struction sites, they made concrete suggestions and criticisms
of the local scenes and of the efforts made by local party and
government officials to fulfill their plans. Concurrently, Ru-
manian press organs began a campaign of criticism of the local
People's Councils calling for an end to laxity and formalism,
strongly suggesting that decisions should be followed through to
their successful implementation. On 21 April 1959 Petre Costache
was removed as Minister of Problems on Local Organs of State Ad-
ministration, and to this day no successor has been announced.
(C)
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A. I1''PERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
September - December 1959
Eastern Europe
PRL (Guide No. 164)
8 a. Why were these top level visits made in the midst
of a large flurry of important visiting Chinese and Korean dele-
gations? (C)
b. Do the visits, coupled with the other facts
above, su ;gest any change in the status of the people's councils?
(C)
c. Is Rumania preparing to emulate more closely So-
viet-styli) decentralization of governmental affairs? Will the
local cou:icils be held solely responsible for economic failures
within thEJr areas? (C)
9'. Popular Attitudes:
a. Continued reporting is needed on morale in gen-
eral, and on public opinion regarding international events, re-
gime tightening, the proposed new economic plan, and the general
domestic ituation. (U)
b. Recently, Gheorghiu-Dej and other regime spokes-
man have indicated that socialization of agriculture has been
most successful in the Constanta, Calati, Timisoara, and Craiova
regions, bwhile important success had been achieved in the Iasi,
Bucharest? Orasul Stalin, Oradea, Suceava and Hungarian Autono-
mous regions. (C)
(1) Has the continued collectivization campaign
stimulated any disturbances among Rumanian peasants? Is there
particular discontent in certain areas? What methods are being
used to induce peasants to join cooperatives and collectives?
What motivated the recent amalgamation of certain collectives in
Rumania? Soviet influence? Chinese influence? Bulgarian influence?
(C)
(2) What has been peasant reaction to the March
29, 1959, decree calling for the virtual expropriation of all ag-
ricultural land not farmed by owners (particularly that of kulaks),
land left uncultivated, land not included in official land-regis-
ters? Has expropriation begun? Under terms of a decree now in
preparation which virtually provides for a leasing arrangement,
how much are peasant owners given for the land they lose? In
terms of the new decree, what is the distinction between a "middle
peasant" k Lnd a "kulak?" (C)
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September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
9. P. Are there indications that the regime's current
campaign against ideological backsliding, petty thievery, em-
bezzlement, bureaucratism and official corruption may have height-
ened anti-Communist sentiment among party, military, diplomatic,
academic or church groups? Are popular grievances chiefly eco-
nomic or political in nature? (C)
d. What is the. effect of the Jewish emigration on
the Rumanian people? Is it merely accepted or popularly support-
ed? Do Rumanians feel that the country is gaining or losing by
it? Has the exodus aroused any particular sentiment among various
levels of society, party, or other groups? What is the feeling of
the Jews still: in Rumania? Do. they look to the future with confi-
dence? Do they wish to emigrate? How does the Rumanian populace
feel about those Jews who remained? (C)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. What are Rumania's relations with the Warsaw Pact
organization? What results have occurred from the various meet-
ings of the Political Consultative Committee of the Pact? Are
there any indications which tend to confirm or deny the rumors
which report the transfer of the Warsaw Pact Headquarters to
Bucharest--specifically in the old Ministry of Internal Affairs
building? (S)
2. What are the real attitudes of the Rumanian leaders
toward Poland and Gomulka? Politburo member Petre Borila spoke
cordially about Rumanian-Polish relations at the Third Congress
of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party in March 1959,
while attacking "revisionist" Yugoslavia. The Polish National
Day celebration in Bucharest on 22 July 1959 were attended by a
total of eight regular and alternate politburo members, and num-
erous articles and editorials stressed Rumanian-Polish coopera-
tion within the Soviet camp. (C)
a. What are the real attitudes toward Yugoslavia
and Tito? Do the lengthy and disparaging references references
to Yugoslavia in Gheorghiu-Dej?s report of 6 March 1959 on the
21st Congress of the Soviet Party indicate Dressure put on Gheor-
ghiu-Dej at the Soviet Party Congress? Has Gheorghiu-Dej?s po-
sition been compromised by his admittedly warm relations with
Tito and the Yugoslavs in the past? (C)
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September December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
3. Following Khrushchev's visit to Albania in :late May
and ear1~l-June 1959, the Rumanians again renewed their proposals
of an atom free zone in the Balkan-Andriatic area, and a request
of a guarantee of such an agreement by the "great powers." The
Soviet Union followed with identical notes to Italy, France,
Britain,; the US, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Turkey, Rumania,
and Bulg4ria restating this proposal. This was the first in-
volvement of the Western "Big Three" nations in this proposal.
Since then, Rumanian propaganda, as well as that of the entire
Soviet Bloc has pushed the idea vehemently, particularly toward
Greece aid Italy. (C)
a. What were the reasons for these actions at this
time? Domes the initiation of the soviet note mean that Rumania
has been; :removed as a front for the USSR in Balkan affairs. If
so, why 'as this done? (C)
4. What is Rumania's role in Bloc penetration efforts
against jainderdeveloped or so-called "neutralist" nations? (C)
a, How is this mission accompolished? (C)
C. MILITARY
1. What elements of the Soviet forces in Rumania have
not been 'withdrawn to the USSR? Where did those who were with-
drawn go?' Are some former Soviet officers with ethenic Rumanian
backgrounds now integrated into the Rumanian armed forces? (S)
2, Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missile equip-
ment in Etumania? Details. (S)
3. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What
is the break-down by service? (S)
~. Information is needed on the level of training being
conducted by the Armed Forces. (S)
a. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? (S)
year? (r.)
Was a large-scale command post exercise held this
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September - December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
C. MILITARY (Continued)
5. Have the tables of organization and equipment been
revamped within the past two years? How do they compare with
Soviet -T/O and E's? (S)
D. ECONOMIC
1. The government, in a move obviously designed,to in-
crease the collective sector by reducing the influence~of the
kulak element, decreed in March 1959 thgt all land worked by
hired labor, sharecropped or rented, land of uncertain owner
ship, and uncultivated could be incorporated into the State_
sector. As a result of this decree how much land has been taken
by the state? (OUO)
2. The number of meat animals and meat products has
been declining since 1955. Major factors influencing this de-
cline are collectivization, lagging fodder production, and un-
favorable prices paid for livestock products. Are there any
indications that the regime may try to increase meat produc-
tion by temporarily halting collectivization and/or revamping
their marketing and pricing systems for livestock products?
(OUO)
3. USSR - Rumanian Credits. The USSR indicated in 1958
that it would extend a new credit to Rumania. So far no announce-
ment has been made that such a credit actually has been extended.
Information on the existence of such a new loan, including terms,
is desired.
4. Credits from West. Rumania has recently been suc-
cessful in obtaining long-term private credits from Western
sources. Information on endeavors to obtain additional loans
is desired.
5. New Plans and Goals. Currently there are some in-
dications that Rumania may abandon the Second Five-Year Plan
(1956-60) in favor of the Six-Year Plan (1960-1965) (U)
a. Give any information which tends to confirm these
b. Give any production goals for 1965 announced for
the ferrous metallurgical industry. (U)
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September -- December 1959
RUMANIA (Continued)
D . ECONOMIC (Continued)
6. Chemical E ui ment from West. Rumania is attempting
to develop a petrochem calindustry. However, it is a relative-
ly small producer of chemical equipment and must depend upon out-
side souses of supply. (C)
Information is desired on Rumanian efforts and suc-
cesses ii procuring chemical equipment, plants, and technology
from the West, giving value, type, capacity, and country. (C)
E. MEDICAL
O]rt 6 June 1959 the Iraq health minister received the
Rumanian ambassador to discuss the exchange of doctors between
the two cIciuntries. (U)
1. Was an agreement made concerning the exchange of
physicians, between the two countries? If so, how many physicians
are involved and what are their assignments? (U)
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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 September - 31 December 1959)
YUGOSLAVIA
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Party and Government
There has been no significant change in the Yugoslav Bloc
dispute since the promulgation of the Yugoslav party program in April
1958, although there was a temporary abatement in polemical' exchanges
concurrent with Soviet Premier Khrushchev's late May-early June 1959
visit to Albania and Hungary. Despite limited state and commercial
ties, the Yugoslav party, however, continues to be isolated,, for all
practical purposes, from the Communist world. (C)
a. What evidence is there regarding a pro-Soviet
faction within the party? Within the army? How has it reacted
to recent events, and has its size, influence or composition been
altered? Have there been any recent defections? What has the regime
done to tighten party loyalty? (U)
(1) What evidence is there that the stability of
the leadership of the Yugoslav party has been affected by the
developments with the Soviet Union? What leadership problems confront
the Yugoslav party? Who are the major contenders for top posts and
what support do they have? Have personal maneuvering and strivings
at the upper levels threatened the stability of the party? What
would be the impact on the party if Tito stepped down from some of
his positions in favor of younger men? What is the regime's plan
regarding the succession to Tito following his death? What evidence
is there regarding a deterioration in the state of Tito's health? (U)
(2) To what extent have the supporters of leading
contenders crystallized into factions? What alliances possibly
exist between the leading contenders and their supporters, and what is
their common denominator--nationality, religious background, geo-
graphical location, economics? Do the factions or alliances at their
present stage presage the form they will take in the event of a split
and struggle for power in the leadership after Tito becomes incapaci-
tated or dies? (S)
(3) Are there any factional differences within the
Yugoslav party over questions of economic decentralization or agri-
cultural policy (particularly policy toward private peasants and
socialization of agriculture)? Has factionalism resulted or been
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PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
A. l[NTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 1959
. Party and Government (Continued)
a. (3) (Continued)
exacerbatbd over questions of what to do in the realm of de-
centralizLtion in'view of the Bloc's attacks on Yugoslavia's
internal 'system? If so, what has been the position of the top
leaders during the process? (U)
b. The question of Milovan Djilas' imprisonment
continues to be of interest because it limits the possibility of
the Yugoslav party's developing closer relations with the Western
Socialist' parties. (S)
(1) Has there been any change in DJi.las' status?
What is the current status of any support forililas both within and
outside the party? Has the regime's treatment of Djilas done much
to reassure the more doctrinaire Communists about the future course
of the patty's development? What impact has "The New Class" had on
the Yugoslav party? Is there any evidence that the Yugoslav party
is doing some second thinking about Djilas and his ideas now that its
dispute with the Bloc appears irrevocable? How is this thinking
manifested? What is the current state of Djilas' imprisonment? (U)
(2) To what extent are the currently admitted
difficulties concerning party apathy and failure to appeal to youth
increased'by the influence of Djilas and "Djilasism?" (U)
(3) What is the current status of Dedijer? (U)
c. Tito has claimed a successful solution of the
"national .ties" problem, a problem which historically has stood
in the way of Yugoslavia's union and development, nevertheless,
indications are that the problem, although somewhat reduced, continues
and possibly is increasing. (C)
(1) In what areas and how severe is the "nationalities
problem?"' Specify among what ethnic groups it exists, toward what
other groups animosities are directed, and if feelings vary by
economic, =social, and age groups. (U)
(2) What are the regime's efforts in mitigating the
problem? Mow effective are these? (U)
(3) How effective have been the Albanian and
Bulgarian attempts to rekindle separatist feeling among the
Macedonians and Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia? Can illustrative
incidenet be cited? Is there any evidence of Hungarian activity
in the Vojvodina? What countermeasures has Belgrade taken? (U)
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Eastern Europe
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 1959
1. Party and Government (Continued)
c. (4) In the event of Tito's death how will the
"nationalities" problem be affected? Will it be intensified? (U)
(5) How much do religious differences and government
policy toward the various religions tend to intensify the "nationali-
ties problem? (U)
d. Church and state:
(1) Do top church leaders give any indication that
closer relations are possible with the regime? If so, what do they
consider as essential to reach a compromise? Which prelates of the
Roman Catholic Church favor improvement of relations with the regime?
What has the regime's reaction been to the 1 July 1959 message of Pope
John XXIII to Cardinal Stepinac which told the Cardinal that it was
"better to suffer than to commit injustice? How will this message
effect the regime's relations with the Vatican? (U)
(2) The Serbian Patriarch German made a tour of
the Mediterranean patriarchs during April and May 1959 and was
well-received. Has the success of German's trip resulted in any
improvement in relations between the Serbian Church and the regime?
Is the regime apt to reply on other Church leaders as goodwill
ambassadors? (c)
(3) How has the establishment of the seimi-autonomous
Macedonian orthpdox Church--a move designed to get Macedonian support
for Tito--been received by both Macedonian and Serb clergy and
laymen? (C)
2. Popular Attitudes
a. Most of the relevant reports conclude that the
majority of the Yugoslav people oppose Communism and certain of its
policies. President Tito, however, appears to have considerable
personal popularity as a national symbol, and the continuation of
the regime's dispute with Moscow apparently helps its position
vis-a-vis the public. The illegal emigration of Yugoslav nationals
has shown a sharp decline this year. (S)
(1) What is the extent of anti-Communist feeling?
How much does the intensity and extent vary by economic groups? By
social groups? By nationality? By religious belief? What is the
nature of these feelings? Specify when possible which policies
receive the greatest criticism. Is popular dislike for the regime
likely to increase if internal reforms are not pressed forward? (U)
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PNL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
A. 11a'TERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 59
21. Popular Attitudes (Continued)
a. (2) Is such dissidence as exists directed against
the centrajl government, the party structure or against local
officials and party functionaries? In view of the persistent rumors
that Kard~l.j and Rankovic are to assume increasing responsibilities
as the aging Tito prepares for the future, what is the respective
popularityt of these men? (U)
(3) Are existing anti-regime attitude3 of a passive
complacent nature, or are they manifested in overt actions? What
indications are there of spontaneous outbreaks or organized resistance
movements; necessitating police countermeasures? Have there been any
recent overt expressions of popular discontent over regime actions
such as recent property nationalizations? Over recent price increases
on some beOE;ic items? (U)
b. Opinion on Foreign Relations:
(1) How does the average Yugoslav feel about the
regime's relations with the USSR? To what degree does popular
opinion dqt;ermine the course of Yugoslav foreign policy? Is there
much popu];&r enthusiasm for improved relations with Greece? Italy? (C),
(2) How much popular support does the regime garner
from its anrntiBloc stand and to what degree is its stand taken to
obtain popular support?' What are the attitudes toward the US, its
policies,;and intentions? Is the public aware of US assistance and,
if so, what; is the impact of this aid on popular feeliag? Does
Tito's prcpfessed policy of independence and alliance with. unattached
states asjIndia, Burma, and Egypt arouse much public response? (C)
(3) Would the regime receive popular support under
the following circumstances: Combined Soviet-Satellite attack?
Soviet supported Satellite attack? Yugoslav attack on Albania
Yugoslav 4upport of military effort in any other part of the world?
(Differentiate between economic and social groups whenever possible
in discussing such questions.) (C)
B. i,0REIGN AFFAIRS
There has been a continuing trend toward a more neutral
line in foreign policy, and Belgrade is trying to promote closer
relationship with the "neutral" countries and a more active role
for this group in international affairs, although Yugoslavia tends
to take positions similar to those of the USSR on most foreign policy
issues. in its current dispute with the Bloc, Belgrade has continued
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Eastern Europe
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (continued) September-December 1959
1. (Continued)
to charge misrepresentation and falsification of Yugoslavia's aims
and policies. Formal state relations, however, are still maintained;
although relations with Albania and Red China are particularly
strained. Intergovernmental contacts are fairly minimal, but
mutual trade has increased within the past year. (C)
a. We are interested in all information pertaining to
any contacts between the Yugoslav party and Communist parties of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. We are likewise interested in contacts between
semi-official party delegations, such as those of the Socialist Alliance
of.Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), and trade union delegations.
Were the Yugoslavs in any way apprised of the inner workings of the
21st Soviet Party Congress? Other Bloc Party Congresses such as the
Polish and Bulgarian? In what areas is the Bloc unable to isolate
the Yugoslav party? (U)
b. The Yugoslavs maintain that Khrushchev is being
forced closer to their "revisionist" concepts both by internal and
external developments, and that there are more differences within
the Bloc in economic policy than between Yugoslavia and the USSR. (C)
(1) What is current Yugoslav appraisal of internal
developments in the USSR? (C)
(2) Do the Yugoslavs consider that they have any
friends in the higher echelons of the Russian party? (C)
c. We are interested in all Yugoslav information on
Soviet-Satellite relations. (U)
(1) Any comments on Belgrade's views concerning
the extent to which internal developments and external pressure from
the Chinese Communists effect Soviet determination of the policies of
international Communism. (C)
(2) How do the Yugoslavs evaluate the present state
of internal Soviet Bloc relations, both over-all, and.country by
country? (U)
(3) What do they think funamental Soviet aims and
motivations are with respect to these relations? (U)
(4) How do they foresee Soviet-Polish relations? (U)
(5) Do they foresee any developments in other.
Satellites which will cause a radical change in Soviet policy with
such a country? (U)
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{ Eastern Europe
B. 1kO'REIGNAFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 1959
7 . ci . We are likewise interested in all information perti-
nent to Yu~;oslav bilateral relations with each Satellite, including
any non-public ne otiations. (U)
(1) Although ideological differences prevent any
effective rapprochement, what efforts are being expended by either
side to imliprove state relations? have the official attitudes
modified as a result of recent negotiations which may lead to
improved state relations particularly with the USSR? (U)
(2) What is the Yugoslav attitude toward the internal
events in Bach country? How much do they attribute any changes going
on in the rR~ttellites to direct Soviet intervention? Specifically,
report on the status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary? Comment on
any "statue" of Kadar and the minds of the Yugoslavs. (U)
(3) How much do they attribute to their own
example? to their own influence and actions directly in the
satellites'? (U)
(4) Yugoslav-Chinese Communist relations are
currently In a state of virtual suspension. Communist China is a
frequent target for criticism in the Yugoslav press, particularly
the commun' system and Red China's lagging economic development.
Does Belgr de hope for any improvement or is it content with the
current status of relations? What are Yugoslav views concerning
Communist China's current and future role in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
especially in ideology? How responsible do they hold Peiping for
the dispute with the Bloc? What are Yugoslav views on the status
of Tibet? On the treatment of the Tibetan populace? (U)
e. Has there been any change in the number of Bloc
personnel in Yugoslavia as a result of their current differences?
How are sucjh people regarded by the Yugoslav populace? What official
treatment do they receive from the Yugoslav regime? Have Bloc personnel
maintained espionage contacts with Yugoslavs? Were there any pertinent
revelations' from the recent trials of Albanian spies? (U)
f. Belgrade has no diplomatic relations with Bonn because
Belgrade is:not willing to agree to a change in its present diplo-
matic relationship with Pankow. Under which circumstances would
Belgrade be. 'willing to change its policies in this sector? (U)
g. What is Yugoslav opinion on the Soviet intent to
establish m ;ssile bases in Albania? In other Satellites? (C)
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Eastern Europe
B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 1959
2. Because of Yugoslavia's ideological isolation from the
Bloc, Belgrade has attempted to improve its standing with the West.
Blanket condemnation of all Western efforts toward lessening world
tensions has been abandoned in favor of criticism of both East and
West, although each sometimes receives Belgrade's mid approval.
For example, Belgrade viewed both Khrushchev's proposal for;an
atom free zone in the Balkans and Nixon's visit to Moscow, as well
as the prospective Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange visits, as
constructive contributions to lessening world tensions. (U)
a. To measure cooperation with the West, it would be
particularly useful to know the degree of cooperation shown Western
officials or Western-sponsored undertakings. (U)
(1) Has there been any noticeable change in
official contacts? (U)
b. Yugoslavia has shown a renewed interest in strength-
ening and expanding its ties with the Western Socialist parties.
Vice President Edvard Kardelj, for example, made an early summer (1959)
tour of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Yugoslav efforts, however, will
be frustrated by the continued detention of several old socialists
for anti-regime activities. What concessions will Belgrade be willing
to make towards free expression in order to improve relations with
European socialists? What is the likelihood of amnesty for the
Socialist leaders imprisoned in February 1958? (U)
c. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic'.s June 1`959 visit
to Athens and the signing of twelve bilateral agreements is indicative
of Yugoslavia's desire to maintain its strong ties with Greece. (U)
(1) What is being done to preserve and develop
military relations with the Greeks? (U)
(2) While Yugoslavia has expressed disinterest
in reviving the military provisions of the Balkan Pact are there
any concrete actions it has taken to implement the economic and
cultural features of the Balkan Pact? (U)
(3) Does Yugoslavia have any desire to expand
its relations with Turkey? (U)
d. How do Yugoslav officials view their improving
relations with Italy?' (U)
e. Yugoslav attacks on the Austrian and Italian
governments for their failure to curb so-called fascist and
revanchist organizations reflect concern over discrimination-against
Yugoslav minorities. What other reasons, if any, are behind Yugoslav
sensitivity to action by these two neighbors? (U)
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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued) PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
B. iFOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued) September-December 1959
2 f, During July and August 1959 a large 'Yugoslav economic
and cultural delegation toured Latin America. What future does
Yugoslavia see for trade, economic and cultural cooperation and trade
with Latij;rt America? (U)
13'. The Uncomitted Nations:
a. We are interested in all information commenting on
Yugoslavia's increased ties and influence with the uncommitted Asian
and African nations. (U)
(1) Has it encouraged any others of these nations
to resist' association, either political or economic, with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc? If so, why?
(2) Comment specifically on relations with Egypt's
Nasir and; Iraq's Qasim. (U)
b. What is Nehru's present attitude towards Tito? How
much stock does he now place in Tito's views on developments in
Eastern Europe and the USSR? (U)
c. What are the views of leading Yogoslav officials
on the prospects and desires for a grouping of such States into
some form: of "third force," even if not so named? How much do the
Yugoslavs'-think they could exercise leadership over such a group? (U)
d. Does the regime harbor any concern over Soviet
aspiratiofs in the "uncommitted" areas? What evidence is there
to show t at Yugoslav activities are connected (or opposed) to
Soviet activities in those areas, particularly in Ethiopia? (U)
e. What plans does Belgrade have for further, more
formal recognition of, and cooperation, with the FLN-sponsored
Provisional Government of Algeria? (U)
C. ]LLITARY
l? Are the Yugoslavs seeking arms from foreign sources?
If so, whore? (C)
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Cc tem?jcr--:December 1959
YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
C. MILITARY (Continued)
2. In view of the heterogenous origins of Yugoslav
materiel, how well is this equipment maintained? (C)
3. Current indication of Yugoslav preparations to reorganize
its ground forces. (U)
4. Any recent data on:
a. The organization of Defense Ministry headquarters; (U)
b. The activity of leading military personalities. (U)
c. The activities of the recently established People:?s
Army Council for Scientific Work. (U)
5. Any significant changes in the strength and disposition
of the armed forces? (U)
6. Yugoslavia's air defense capability is currently regarded
as poor. (S) Any efforts being made to improve it? (S)
7. Current information on levels of training, particularly
on atomic-biological-chemical warfare training. (C)
8. Current civil defense measures and training. (C)
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September - December 1959
YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
D. I&CONOMIC
I* The Yugoslav economy is unique in that it represents a
complicated composite of certain structures of Western capitalism,
Soviet Communism and an independent form self-proclaimed, as Yugoslav
"socialism?" The Yugoslavs are apparently experimenting with ideas
hoping to hit upon a combination suitable to their problems and ob-
jectives,' (U)
a. What actual freedom of action is allowed individual
enterprises under the government's decentralization program? To what
extent ale the workers councils involved in the actual running of the
enterprises and has the worker's attitude towards the regime changed
as a resent of their establishment? How has the decentralization
program affected production and the ultimate standard of living? Has
any competition between firms developed? To what extent is the regime
justified in complaining about "localism?" Has decentralization
allowed local enterprises profit at the expense of the country as a
whole? What was the purpose of establishing a Common Reserve Fund
for industry, mining and construction? Has it prevented the elimina-
tion of uneconomical enterprises? (U)
2. Yugoslavia's agricultural system remains little changed
since the peasants were allowed to leave the agricultural collectives
in 1953. Vice President Kardelj recently reaffirmed that, while
socialization is still its objective the regime does not intend to
use administrative pressure to achieve it. At this stage, Belgrade
is satisfied to encourage contractual arrangements between the private
peasants;---who farm over 90 percent of the land--for buying their seed
and marketing their product through the cooperatives, In this way,
it hopes to modernize significantly Yugoslav agriculture and to allay
peasant :Fears about socialization. The regime is making investment
funds available to the private peasants and is using this year's all
time record results, especially in wheat and rye production, as proof
of the PPtperiority of its socialist system. (C)
a. How did the peasants react to Kardelj's agricultural
thesis?! I)id they feel reassured because he pledged there would be no
regime pressure to join collectives, or did they become apprehensive
over the desire for eventual socialization? How do the peasants like
the idea of intensified cooperation between themselves and the General
Agricultural Cooperatives? (C)
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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
2. b, To what degree was the record harvest the result of
current regime policy? Are there any indications that it will change?
Will investment in the private sector be curtailed? Will it be
broadened? (C)
c. Could the increase in peasant expenditures for in-
vestment on private holdings in 1958 as compared with previous years
reflect increased peasant confidence in his future as an independent
producer? Will this investment continue to grow? (C)
d. Is the regime's policy leading to a breakdown of
traditional peasant concepts, such as, producing primarily for private
consumption? Is there more interest in associating with the coopera-
tives because of the advantages to be derived from planting their
better seed and using their machinery? How successful is the regime
with the cooperatives? Are they becoming a more significant factor
in rural life? (C)
e. Has the record crop in 1959 created any serious
problems for the regime, such as, limited storage facilities, transport
deficiencies, inflationary pressures caused by increased peasant pur-
chasing power? (C)
3. Some evidence of the re-establishment of somewhat greater
central control over the Yugoslav economy has been observed. Joint
commissions under the Federal Executive Council and National Assembly
have been set up to undertake extensive studies of the economy and
have made recommendations for improvements, The Federal Chambers
(Trade, Agriculture, etc.) have been given increased authority. More
recently the Secretariats for Finance and Trade have been granted
greater administrative powers. Nevertheless, the economic responsi-
bilities of the local units of government and enterprises have con-
tinued to expand as administrative functions have been pushed further
down the hierarchy. The National Bank's tight control over financial
matters has been somewhat relaxed as many of its functions in the
field of foreign trade and investments have been given over to
specialized banks established to service these fields. (U)
a. How have local groups, such as, workers' councils
and people's committees, reacted to centralization moves? How will
it affect popular attitudes toward the regime? Have communes arouse
any real popular enthusiasm? (U)
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YUGOSLAVIA, (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
b. What are the private views of officials toward the
whole pro ram of the economic structure and how it should be or-
ganized? ts the prevailing view one favoring centralization or
decentralization? (U)
c. How rigid is the economic control exercised by such
organizations as the National Bank, the Communist Party apparatus it-
self, etch.? (C)
d. Condemnation of economic excesses and the demand for
a more active role for trade unions in protecting the workers' in-
terests h.s continued. Vukmanovic-Tempo was named to take over the
unions inian effort to strengthen their role. What evidence is there
regarding!the regime's true intent to strengthen their role? Is this
development, in fact, an initial step in the curtailment of the
activities; of workers' councils? (U)
e. On 30
June
1959 the Federal Executive Council adopted
a new bill relating to
the
financing of housing construction. Under
the provisions of this
bill
part of the contribution formerly paid by
the various enterprises
to
the general housing fund will be paid di-
rectly to the workers in the form of increased wages. The workers'
rents are; to be raised by a proportionate amount. The idea behind
this move' 'may be to provide more funds for direct payment of rents
and maintenance and to encourage less expensive and quicker con-
structionof new dwellings, especially by the workers themselves. (u;)
(1) What has been the public reaction to this bill':
Are there; any indications that the workers will attempt to save thy:
increase .n wages instead of paying higher rents? (U)
(2) How has this new bill effected housing con-
struction? Has any appreciable number of workers been encouraged
to build ictwellings with their own resources as a result of this bill
(U)
The dispute with the Bloc has jeopardized Yugoslavia's
economic relations with some members of the Bloc. Despite curtail-
ment in B7.oc credits, aid in developing nuclear research facilities
apparently will continue. Belgrade has signed 1960 trade agreements
with Bloc:members. Belgrade has also indicated that the Bloc is not
exporting!all the commodities it wishes to receive, and is not ac-
cepting gpods which it has in the past and for which Belgrade has no
alternate; markets, (C)
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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
4. as How serious is the deterioration of trade with the
Bloc? Does it actually expect that the 1960 trade agreements will be
kept? We are interested in receiving any information on the details
of the trade negotiations and unpublicized aspects of the agreements.
How well are the new trade agreements being implemented? Give any,
examples of keeping the letter of the agreements but violating fair
trade practices. (C)
b, Is the regime particularly worried about the economic
integration now going on in the Bloc under CEMA auspices? Are the
Yugoslavs attempting to multilaterialize their trading arrangements
with the Eastern Bloc countries (with or without other non-Bloc coun-
tries)? What is the significance of the longer-term trade agreements
recently signed with East Germany and Hungary? (U)
c. What evidence is there that Soviet Bloc technicians
related to industrial developments are still in Yugoslavia? Have the
Yugoslavs tended to limit the numbers of such? How many and what
types of such technicians have arrived? Are their activities limited
or placed under surveillance in any way? Are Yugoslav technicians
still going to the Bloc? (U)
de Give any evidence of Yugoslav shipment of Soviet
Bloc war material to Near Eastern or other non-Bloc countries. (C)
e, We are interested in Yugoslav actions designed to
increase the usage of Rijeka as a transshipment port for Bloc trade,
What will the eventual capacity be upon completion of the current
expansion project there? What is the status on the development of
the Koper-Capodistria port development scheme? (U)
f. For several years Yugoslavia has been attempting to
conclude negotiations for the development of its Majdanpek copper
area. An agreement was concluded with the French firm COMPADEC for
a $40,000,000 credit. What is the current status of this project?
Is there any mining activity currently under way at this location? (C)
g. Credit talks with Czechoslovakia in early July 1959
were broken off by the Yugoslavs because of Czech refusal to negotiate.
What are the results of Yugoslav-USSR talks in July 1959 in Belgrade
regarding Soviet credits suspended in 1958? What further moves will
be made by Yugoslavia to replace developmental loans canceled by the
Bloc? Will Belgrade attempt to renegotiate US credits, no longer
needed to import wheat--a result of the record 1959 harvest? (U)
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
The most recent Yugoslav Quarterly Debt Statement cover-
ing the first quarter of 1959 (TOICA A-116, 7/27/59) indicates con-
tinued utilization of the Soviet $110 million investment credit and
the Czech; $50 million investment credit during the first quarter of
1959. Haw is this continued utilization explained in view of the
terminatilon of these credits before January 1, 1959? (C)
6. Yugoslavia has recently announced the development of an
oilfield near Sisak, Croatia which will reportedly raise Croatian
oil production -to nearly 1,000,000 tons of crude oil per year within
the next few years. (U)
a. What is the state of the development of this field?
What pipeline facilities or other transportation systems are to be
provided? How will the oil be refined? (U)
b. What role will the oil produced at this field play
in the Yugoslav economy? What types of oil products will the Yugo-
slavs manufacture from this new oil source? What customers will be
sought to purchase these petroleum products? (U)
T. For the second time in less than a year, a Yugoslav end-
use certificate, or a forgery of same, appears to have been used in
an attempted diversion of strategic goods to the Bloc. The last in-
stance in'olved 10,000 tons of Turkish boracite. US export licensing
officials and members of several COCOM delegations have expressed
great conern over the possibility that Yugoslavia may be used as a
transshi.prient point for the diversion of embargoed goods to the Soviet
Bloc. It;:is, generally speaking, impossible to conduct effective end-
use check* in Yugoslavia. As a result, Free World licensing officials
are frost*ated in their attempt to establish the bona fides of
questionable transactions. (S)
a. Provide any indication that strategic Free World
goods arebeing transshipped to the Bloc via Yugoslavia. Provide
examples 4i' transshipments with details. (S)
b. Determine the techniques used to avoid Yugoslav trans-
shipment gontrols. Ascertain the volume and type of goods being trans-
shipped. (S)
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
D. ECONOMIC (Continued)
8. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951 (Battle Act), US aid may be terminated if recipient coun-
tries export specified strategic materials to the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Yugoslav export statistics show large quantities of cable and wire
being exported to the Bloc. It is possible that some of these exports
may be embargoed communication cable. (S)
a, Identify the wire and cable being exported to the
Bloc. Provide all available details which may aid in identifying the
cable. (S)
bn Report any other Yugoslav exports of strategic
materials to the Soviet Bloc. (S)
E. SCIENTIFIC
Information on the amount of scientific research and its
place on the national science in Yugoslavia is limited and sketchy.
There is a small, but active chemical industry for which some re-
search and development is performed. Information is therefore needed
to determine the scientific capabilities and level of technology
within Yugoslavia. (C)
1. To what extent does the Yugoslavian Government appreciate
that economic advance through industrial expansion depends on scienti-
fic research? (C)
2, What emphasis, encouragement, and annual financial sup-
port does the government give to science? (OUO)
3. What is the overall national organ for the direction and
control of science, its subordination, organization and other missions?
(OUO)
4. To what extent in terms of scientific manpower and an-
nual expenditure does industry conduct scientific research in its
own facilities, and to what extent and in what manner does industry
support research outside its own laboratories? (OUO)
5, What amounts and what kinds of research and development
are conducted by the higher educational institutions, the academies
of science, the research institutes, and industrial enterprise. (OUO)
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Eastern Europe
September - December 1959
YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)
E. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)
6. To what extent and in what manner is the exchange of
scientific information, within the country and with foreign countries,
implemented and how applied? (OUO)
17. To what extent does native scientific research and de-
velopment depend on foreign assistance? (OUO)
!8. How large numerically is the annual output of graduates
and post-graduates in each of the natural sciences? (OLJO)
9. Which sciences are receiving heavy emphasis in the higher
educatiodal training program and in the recruitment of qualified
scientists for current research activity? (OUO)
.0. What specific research projects in the basic sciences
(Chemist?y, Physics, Mathematics, Geology, Geophysics, Seismology,
gravimetky, geodesy, geomagnetism, meteorology, and oceanography)
are bein investigated? Name the scientists engaged and give his
affiliation. (OUO)
11. What is the economic and social position of scientists
and engineers? (OUO)
121. What relationship exists between the current need for
and availability of trained scientists and engineers in Yugoslavia?
Are there fields in which shortages or surpluses exist? (OUO)
As of February 1959 there were 15 Yugoslav physicians in
Ethiopia In Addis Ababa Yugoslav physicians are on the staff of the!
Imperial Military Hospital, St. Paul Hospital and Rav Desta Hospital.
Yugoslav medical personnel are also attached to the Haile Selassie
Hospital; a hospital in Jima and Dessye. (QUO)
1. Have additional Yugoslav medical personnel been employed
by Ethiopia? (C)
What other medical aid or trade including technical as-
sistance'lias Yugoslavia provided for Iraq. (C)
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EASTERN EUROPE
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 September - 31 December 1959)
SOVIET BLOC
I. POLITICAL
A. Soviet-Satellite Relations
Soviet efforts since the fall of 1956 to reassert the
USSR's unquestioned leadership of the Communist Bloc and to reinforce
Bloc unity have by now attained at least the minimum success desired
by Moscow. The stability of the individual regimes has been shored
up and strengthened to the point that a sequence of events such as
occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956 is not likely to develop at
the movement. Soviet Premier Khrushchev indicated in Poland in
July, 1959, that he is following a pragmatic approach in Eastern
Europe, which permits him to support simultaneously such diverse
Communist leaders as the moderate Gomulka and the over-zealous
Zhivkov. Soviet support, however, is contingent upon a Satellite
regime's ability to maintain order, willingness to conform to an
ideological line acceptable to the Kremlin, and efforts to further
Soviet foreign policy objectives. (C)
Although Tito has long been read out of the Communist
Bloc and the Yugoslavs have been at least ostensibly isolated
ideologically, Moscow has also made efforts not to disrupt state
relations unnecessarily in order not to incur the unfavorable
propaganda effects which resulted when the campaign was carried to
much greater lengths during the 1948-53 period. With the application
of political and limited economic pressure on the Yugoslavs, however,
the Bloc campaign has necessarily spilled over into the state sphere,
and certain Bloc members (i.e., China, Albania, Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia) continue to exchange polemics with Belgrade. Relations
have been "frozen" with China and Albania, but neither the Bloc
countries nor Yugoslavia appear to desire to initiate a complete
break in relations. Moreover, most of the Bloc countries continue
to maintain at least trade ties with Belgrade. (C)
Within the Bloc, the most glaring divergency continues
to be Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka's determination, reaffirmed
at the March 1959 Polish Party Congress, to proceed toward sociali-
zation at a slower pace and to maintain a degree Of independence,
especially in dealing with Polish internal policies, a policy now
publicly endorsed by Khrushchev. (C)
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SOVIET BLOC (CONTINUED) PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
I. POLITICAL (Continued) September-December 1959
A. Soviet-Satellite Relations (Continued)
Despite the improved stability of the Bloc, regimes,
there are number of recent developments which are likely to
exacerbate' political tensions within many of these countries. The
theses forthe Soviet Seven Year Plan and Khrushchev's speech to the
21st Soviet, Party Congress both reveal a new surge forward, based on
the promis, that the Soviet Union has reached a new stage of Commu-
nist develppment--that of "all-out building of a Communist society."
The impetus of this surge has already been reflected in the Satellites,
especially in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but more recently in
Hungary, where Kadar's regime shows signs of abandoning its previously
moderate approach to internal economic problems. This new surge is
likely to Exacerbate popular hostility to the regimes, becoming a
source of !serious internal party disputes in some of the Satellites,
particularly Bulgaria and Hungary. Furthermore, the fact that
Poland is demonstrably not playing its part in this campaign may be the
source of new frictions within the Bloc. (C)
1. Evidence of pressure by the Bloc on Poland to
greater conformity. (U)
2. Evidence of internal difficulties caused by a
step-up in the pace of "building socialism." (U)
3. Evidence that the USSR continues to permit one or
another ofi the Satellites some autonomy in internal policies. Is
there any evidence that the continued tension over Berlin is having
any effect on the degree of autonomy permitted various Satellites? (U)
4. Evidence of Soviet plans to reduce further its
troop strength in the Satellites, or conversely that the USSR has
no plans along this line whatsoever. (U)
5. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a
given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U)
6. Evidence that the Satellite regimes are reverting
in any way to the traditional hostilities that have ;loan y; afflicted
the area. (U)
7. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the
Warsaw Pagt, what role is played by the Satellite representatives
in these Organizations? Are they rubber stamps, or are they in fact
permitted to take an active part in the organization's activities,
particularly in the discussion and formulation of policies? (U)
8. What is the organizational structure of the new theo-
recti-cal Journal? What degree of influence do the various Satellite
countries'' exercise on editorial policy and how? (U)
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Eastern Europe
1. POLITICAL (Continued) September-December 1959
B. Communist: Party Stability
1. Factionalism within the Satellite parties--brought
into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalini-
zation campaign--remains a problem for the Satellite leaders. It
may be exacerbated further by the new "surge" forward in the Bloc.
We need evidence of growth, continuation or discrimination, of this
factionalism within Satellite parties or between parties. (U)
a. Report` evidence of disaffection or reluctance
among party leaders and members to go along with new party or Bloc
directives. Report evidence of moderate elements' efforts to force
greater liberalization than the regime leaders and/or Moscow desire,
or efforts of conservative elements to improve stricter policies. (U)
b. Report effect on morale of party (and government)
bureaucrats of major internal or external events, purges, rehabilita-
tions, Geneva Conference, U.S.-USSR exchanges of visits, etc. (C)
c. Identify the leaders and groups and outline
the arguments each side puts up to justify its position. (U)
d. Report evidence of Moscow's concurrence in,
or disapproval of, specific Satellite changes in policy. (U)
e. What are the specific reasons for dismissal of
Satellite officials? For recantations of prominent persons formerly
purged? Is factionalism involved? (U)
2. What has been the effect on the Eastern European
Communist Parties of the Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia? We are
particularly interested in any differences of opinion among the
Satellites regarding Tito and in any evidence of a change in the
leadership of the Satellite parties as a result of too close connections
with Tito. Evidence of the existence of party ties and relations
between the Yugoslav Party and the Satellite Communist Parties.
Evidence of deliberate Satellite efforts to reduce Party contact
with Yugoslavia to a minimum as well as evidence of efforts to reduce
governmental (including economic) ties with Yugoslavia. (U)
3, What effect is Poland's national Communist govern-
ment, publicly endorsed by Khrushchev, having on the other Satellites?
Of particular interest would be any evidence of Satellite efforts to
undermine or otherwise weaken the Gomulka regime. (U)
4. What effect is Khrushchev's remarks in Poland
denigrating communes having in the Satellite parties? (U)
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SOVIET BLOC (Continued) PRL (Guide No. 164)
I, POLITICAL (Continued) Eastern Europe
September-December 1959
B. Communist Party Stability (Continued)
5. To what extent has Khrushchev's assumption of the
Soviet prremiership affected the doctrine of "collective leadership"
in the Satellites? Is there collectivity in the leadership in
reaching decisions, or is there. one-man rule? Is the method of
decision-making a reversion to the pre-June 1953 period or was no
change ever apparent? (U)
6. Has Khrushchev's designation of Kozlov as his
successorhad any effect on Satellite parties? (S)
C. Communist Party Organization
There are great gaps in our knowledge of the setup
within th6 central organization of Satellite Communist parties.
Gaining ..clear picture of the whole central structure and operations
of the party is of obvious importance, (S)
1, What reorganizations and personnel shifts are planned
in the central structure and why? What reorganizations have been
carried out but not publicized? (U)
2. What is the structure and function of the central
organization? We are especially interested in the relation of the
foreign section to other Communist parties and the relations of
sections ~o appropriate ministries in the government. What is the
position Of the central party organization in the process of policy-
making an1l government administration? (U)
Government
1. Some Satellites now operate on a government setup
in which Ole premier and deputy premiers constitute an "inner
cabinet" On the highest level of government. To what degree do
they actually operate as an inner cabinet, and what is their
effectiveness and jurisdiction? (U)
2. Have the announced intentions of some Satellites to
strengthen the local councils been implemented? (C)
3. What are the given ministries controlled by each
deputy pr6miier? What is his relationship to the ministries under his
jurisdiction? Report any concrete examples of policy control over
ministries, (U)
4. To what extent do the premier and his deputies
constitute' an actual organization (i.e., regular meetings, a
secretariat, etc.)? (U)
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SOVIET BLOC (Continued)
I. POLITICAL (Continued)
D. Government (Continued)
PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
September-December 1959
5. Evidence of plans to decentralize government
structure. Is reorganization proceeding along the lines recently
adopted by the USSR? What has been effect of such reorganizations
on regime's effectiveness; on internal party factionalism? (U)
E. Security and Resistance
1. What are the existing relationships between and
among Soviet and Satellite security services? Is there an overall
inter-Satellite security organization? (U)
2. What overt and covert-resistance is there evidence
of? How is overt discontent manifested (i.e., strikes, spontaneous
demonstrations, etc.)? Dates, places, size of groups involved, and
how settled by the regime. (U)
3. Report instances of relaxation of, or reversion to,
previous h
d i
t
ar
n
ernal security policies. (U)
4. Is there evidence within any Satellite of key groups
cooperating to resist regime policies such as workers with intellect-
uals, students, journalists, peasants, etc.? (U)
F. Popular Attitudes
This type of information should be reported either on
a national or a regional basis. Listed below are general categories
with some representative examples. (U)
1. Is there any sign of an increase in the people's
acceptance of the system and the regime brought on, for example, by
better living conditions? Or is there a decrease occasioned by such
things as increased secularization measures? To what extent are the
people influenced by Soviet boasts of growing strength? (C)
2, Attitudes toward government economic policies--How
have farmers reacted to renewed collectivization drives? Workers
to new norms, wage-scales, and the general increase in the economic
tempo, work-time, etc.? (U)
3. Attitude toward Western powers and hopes of
liberation. (U)
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SOVIET BLO C (Continued) PRL (Guide No. 164)
Eastern Europe
I. POLITICPL (Continued) September-December 1959
F. F,,ipular Attitudes (Continued)