(Classified)PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL) FAR EAST(1OCTOBER 1959 - 31 JANUARY 1960)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1960
• Content Type: LIST

OCI 4900/59
Approved For Release 2000/0 P62-00328A000200170001-6 /Z
n
PRL (Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)
FAR EAT
(1 OCTOBER 1959-31 JANUARY 1960)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2 -; IYP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20 DP62-00328A000200170001-6
PRL (Guide No. 164)
Far East
October 1959-January 1960'
1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's), which are prepared
by the Office of Current Intelligence in CIA, are designed to point
up the information required for current intelligence coverage of
significant developments during the 4-month time period covered by
each PRL.
2. Coordination with the Department of.State includes the PRL's
for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) Eastern Europe,
(c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin
America. As a result, the PRL's include current intelligence
requirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State
Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelli-
gence (OCI), Research and Reports (ORR) and Scientific Intelligence
(OSI). 'In'addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies
noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Esti-
mates (NIE's) approved by the US Intelligence Board (USIB)--the
principal governing body for US intelligence, comprised ofthe
heads of all US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of
all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total,
present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any
single collection facility. However, to the extent that the
collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will
provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting.
For those collectors who may not have access to background infor-
mation, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of
the requirements.
4. To facilitiate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, all
items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one
of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN),
CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).
5. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed
a. Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que
Building, Code 163, Extension 2181;
or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and
Distribution (ICD), Department of State.
25X1A9a
Acting Chief, Requirements Branch,
OCI /CIA
Approved For Release 2000/0812'2": CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 25X6A
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/Q8/@2x (DIA RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
The Ne Win regime has announced to Parliament that elections will
be held in the last week of January or the first week of February 1960.
There is every indication that the elections will be held on schedule
and that the army and Ne Win plan to exercise behind-the-scenes control
over a parliamentary government formed by the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein faction
of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the expected winner of
the elections. Of prime interest, therefore, during the next four
months will be the election campaign, particularly information suggest-
ing the probable outcome of the elections. Also of importance will be
information on the impact of the Laotian crisis, the Sino-Indian border
clashes, and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchanges on the direction of
Burmese foreign policy.
A. Political - Internal
1. Ne Win's intentions. As the increasingly unquestioned
boss of Burma's military esta ishment, the intentions of General Ne
Win continue to be of prime importance. Of interest will be information
on the degree to which Ne Win will permit the army to rig the elections
in favor of the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein faction; the criteria by which he
will judge the performance of the expected Ba Swe government in the
light of his reported promise to permit the military to resume control
should Ba Swe founder; the degree to which he will personally interest
himself in governmental affairs once he steps down as premier; and his
sympathies as regards'the various political parties. Information on
his attitude toward the US in general and toward US military forces
and military policy in particular, is desired. (C)
2. Relationship between Ne Win and the "political colonels".
Any evidence of serious divergency of views or goals? Any evidence
the "political colonels" intend to leave the army to pursue openly
political careers at the head of an army-favored party? (C)
3. Relationships among political leaders: Relationships
between U Nu and Ba Swe. Re a ions hips between U Nu and Kyaw Nyein.
Relationships between Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. Relationships between
We Win and each of the forementioned leaders. Possibility of recon-
ciliation among foregoing three leaders or between U Nu and either
of the other two. Attitude and intentions of Dr. E. Maung. Transfers
-5-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 li
I
Approved For Release ,30p0%08I2~ CIA-RDP62-00328AO06200170001-6
Far East RL
(Gu de No, 164)
October 1 59--January 1960
BURMA:! A.
Continued)
Political - Internal (Continued)
of aI.ae?;:fiance by ;major politicians from one AFPF] faction to the other.
Names, and attitudes of second echelon leaders who gave promise of
rising in the hierarchy of the two factions. Factions leaders of
politically significant groups, such as ethnic m:.norit'es and ]Labor
union.-' (C)
4o Political Groups: The regional and local membership
strength and degree of popular support for the two AFP~L factions
and the above-ground Communist elements. Description Of the internal
organ:~zation of the two AFPFL factions and the N1 F on the centra:L,
regioa1 and local levels. (C)
! 5 . Com 'unistso Over-all strategic plaits of ommunists in
Burmt Evidenceo emphasis upon above-ground voting and propaganda
tact tes or upon underground military insurgent taLctics, Direct:; :Link
ings 1~ettween underground Communists and above-ground Communist and
pro-C;Ommunist political groups. Evidence of friction between under-
ground and above-'ground. Communist plans to inf.ltrat either AFPFiL
factt(9n? Evidence of direct relationship between either above-'ground
or uhder-ground Communists and Soviet or CPR dip].omati missions,
Evalttion concerning relative influence of Soviet or PR mission in
suchtactics. Biographic information concerning Commu ist and Com-l
muni$irs--front leaders. (C)
6. Minority Groups: Attitudes and intentions of minority)
groups in politics operations. Degree of Army i.nfluenIce upon
minoipty groups. Indications of dissatisfaction among minority groups
whichlcould lead to secession or insurgency. Evidencelof collaboration
.
amonmi.nority groups in combined opposition to central governments';
Barg i! nln?; tactics and objectives of minority groups in dealings with
oppos ng; AFPFL factions. Degree of popular support forj various politi-
cal fFact:iLons purporting to represent minority groups. Evidence of
relationships between minority groups and Communists or Communist-
fron organizations. Evidence of relationships betweea~ minority
groups (political; and insurgent) and foreign agents, Identity and
geogrE phJLc information concerning foreign agents working with, or in
close contact with, minority groups. Prospects for a negotiated
settlement of the. Karen rebellion. Information On the Shan dissident
grout said to be operating in Kengtung State, (C)
-6-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2008/Q$/I2r QIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
BURMA (Continued)
A. Political - Internal (Continued)
7. Pacification: Ability of military establishment to sup-
press armed insurrection. Pressures upon government to ameliorate
anti-insurgent policy. Source of such pressures. Counter pressures
to maintain firm anti-insurgent policy. Source of counter pressures.
Effectiveness of psychological warfare activities. Indoctrination
of and control over insurgent groups after their surrender. Evidence
that surrendering insurgents are using "Trojan Horse" tactics for
subversive infiltrations. (C)
8. Chinese Nationalist Guerrillas: Strength, disposition,
and activity. Evidence of continued support from Taipei, Thailand,
or elsewhere. Degree of GRC control over their activities. Recruit-
ing activity among refugee tribesmen in border area. Evidence of
collaboration with other non-Communist insurgent groups. Relation-
ships between Nationalists and Burmese military authorities. Smuggling,
banditry, and narcotics operations. Collaboration with authorities or
other elements in Thailand and Laos. (C)
9. Chinese Community: General evaluation of political atti=-
tude. Chinese Communist activity. KMT activity. Non-Communist but
non-KMT activity. Loan operations of Chinese Communist banks. In-
fluence and channels of influence of CPR Embassy. CPR pressure on
Burmese authorities with respect to Chinese community. Restrictions
placed by GUB on anti-Communist organizations and activities within
the Chinese community. Efforts to GUB to control illicit immigration
from across China border. (C)
10. Labor: Impact of political split upon Burma trade union
movement. Degree of factionalization and relative strengths of emerg-
ing unions in support of both AFPFL factions or professing to be poli-
tically independent. Evidence of Communist infiltrations in trade
union movement. Tendencies towards violence in attaining trade union
objectives. Current ideological and political trends as they may of--
fect relations with either ICFTU or WFTU. (C)
11. Police; Nature, degree, and effect of Army control over
police force. General orientation of senior police officials. Rela-
tionship between police and political groups. Police attitudes toward
assistance received from US; police attitudes toward assistance re-
ceived from UK. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 20P0~0 /q TCIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East :PR:i,
(Guide No. 164)
October 1,959-January 1960
BURMA (Continued:)
A. Political - Internal (Continued)
1.3. Students, Political. activity by students. Communist
infiltration of university faculties and higher educ::Ltional institu
tions;? Student training in Russia or European Satellites. Studenti
training in CPR. Government efforts to control Communist activity
among students. Effectiveness of US student exchan.g,_% and Fulbrightl
programs. (C)
Religious Groups: To what extent have the local Com-
muni6ts penetrated religious organizations, particul;;Lr.ly the Buddis
clergy? What means have they used, how effective ha;_; the penetrati n
been a and what are the outward manifestations of this .penetration, lif
any, ;within each country? What is the Communist in.f Luonce in the
Islamic, Hindu and Christian communities? How is it exercised, and
how is it manifested? (C)
Foreign Affairs
1. Effects of the bord,E'r dispute and other sources of
friction between Burma and Sino=Soviet Bloc, as well as of the recut
Tibetan crisis, on relative bias of Burma's neutral fo:r?eign policy.
(C)
~3. Burmese attitude toward association witki neighboring
countrz?ies in regional organizations, especially SEAT.). (C)
,3. Burma's attitude toward the conflict between the Arab
world and the West.
a. Between the Arab world and Isarel. (CC)
41. Indications of attempts by Burma to hel:2 otherneutral
states in Southeast Asia--like Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia--to pro
by tAe lessons it has learned in its relations with.ihina. (C)
ist
fit
5. Burma's policy toward the two Vietnams. Any :indications
of atrend toward; closer relations with South Vietnam. (C)
(C)
6. Burma's attitude toward another Asian-Afr:ic'an conference.
a. Any indications it is prepared to suggest an e arlyl
meeti4ng. (C)
Approved For Release 2000788/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200Q;I0$/21t CQPTRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959=January 1960
BURMA (Continued)
B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)
7. Information on attitudes of the Ne Win government toward
US military and economic assistance. (C).
8. Burma's reactions to growing Communist strength in Laos.
(C)
9. Relations between-
a. Burma and India. (C)
b. Burma and.Japan. (C)
c. Burma and UK. (C)
d. Burma and Pakistan. (C)
C. Economic
1. Progress in economic development plans. Impact of army.
regime on scope, content and direction of development. (C)
2. Degree of foreign participation (i.e., Japan, UK, Com-
munist countries, and international agencies) in Burmese economic
development. (C)
3. Evaluation of Sino -Soviet economic aid and technical
assistance to Burma, including information concerning the negotiation,
initiation, and progress of specific economic projects by Bloc coun-
tries, the financing of such projects, and technicians engaged in
their implementation. (C)
4. Pressures which might force the Burmese toward closer
economic ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc. (C)
5. Dumping of capital or consumer goods by Sino'Soviet Bloc.
6. Terms of credit provided by Sino-Soviet trading entities
in trade and commercial transactions. (C)
7. Any information on the activities of Chinese Communist
banks in Burma. (C)
-9-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For ReIease 2 000/088/22 :CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East 1)RI
(Guide No. :L64)
October 1959-January 1060
BURMA Continued)
. Soviet Bloc Medical Assistance
The USSR will build and equip a 200-bed hospital among other,
projects, as a gift in exchange for a gift of corresponding quantity
of rice. Construction has begun on the hospital. (1J)
1. Have other Soviet contributions or medical aid been
presented to Burma? (C)
2. How is Soviet or Satellite medical aid 1..Iropagandized?
How effective is the propaganda? (C)
3. Any medical facilities, equipment, and -upplies recent
provided? (C)
46. What Soviet or Satellite medical personnLel have been in
Burma recently? (C)
5. What Burmese medical personnel have recently visited tie
USSR or Satellites? Have Burmese received medical t:i-aln:ing or treat
ment in the USSR or Satellites? (C)
-10--
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2006/0942F(1ATRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
FAR EAST PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
CAMBODIA
A. Political
1. The latest pro-Western swing in Cambodia's pendulum-
like neutrality policy under the leadership of Crown Prince Sihan-
ouk, may take on more significance than have previous such moves.
Sihanouk, already shaken by Communist Chinese repression in Tibet,
is seriously concerned over the Communist insurgency in neighbor-
ing Laos; India's border troubles with Communist China is an addi-
tional factor. While these developments thus far have not dis-
lodged Sihanouk's official subscription to a policy of neutrality,
there are indications he is beginning to take a more realistic at-
titude toward the danger of Communist subversion. Continuing in-
formation is needed on Sihanouk's foreign policy views and his at-
titudes toward the Free World, Sino-Soviet and neutral blocs. In-
formation concerning domestic actions taken by Sihanouk which
might either encourage or discourage Communist influence in Cam-
bodia is of particular importance. Information on the views of
influential Cambodians on this overall subject is desired, par
,ticularly any signs of dissatisfaction with the government's neu-
trality policy and accommodation with the Communist bloc. (C)
2. Information on general security conditions through-
out Cambodia, particularly in the Laotian and South Vietnamese
border regions. Is there any evidence of clandestine Vietnamese
Communist activity in these border areas? (C)
3. Cambodian - South Vietnamese relations have im-
proved following Sihanouk's visit to Saigon in early August,
but many obstacles remain to real rapport. Information on en-
suing negotiations between the two countries on mutual problems
such as border security, financial settlement, etc is desired.
Any indication that relations may again become strained. (C)
4. Information on the identity, loyalty, orientation
and influence of Sihanouk's close advisors - Cambodian and
French. Any indication of dissatisfaction on the part of po-
litical and military leaders with Sihanouk's leadership and
policies. Evidence of residual sympathy for the anti-Sihanouk
stand taken by the late General Dap Chhuon. What is the extent
and impact of anti-Sihanouk propaganda issued by expatriates Sam
Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh via pamphlets, clandestine "Radio Free
Cambodia," or other means? Any evidence of South'Vietnamese or
Thai support of anti-Sihanouk elements inside or outside of Cam-
bodia. (S)
-11-
Approved For Release 200C(0?/2 jC 4 tDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Me A
 Approved For Release,
,32(0WO/2h2.CIA-RDP62-00328AO00200170001-6
FAR EAS' PRL
(Guide No. :164)
October 1959-January 1P60
CAMBODIA (Continued)
A. Political
5. What is the nature and extent of Communist influence
in the Cambodian Information Ministry? Has the newly-created com-
mittee to supervise publications? headed by Deputy Premier Nhiek
Tioulong, been effective in curtailing Communist influence in the
nation's, press and other information media? Indicate dominant
personnel of the Ministry of Information, their affiliations and
degree of independent initiative. Information is desired on Com-
munist.efforts and success at infiltrating other parts of the gov-
ernment, the armed forces, youth and religious groups. .(S)
6. What is the nature and effectiveness of Sino-Soviet
bloc propaganda efforts in Cambodia? In this connection,, informa-
tion :ijs. desired on Chinese Communist aid to Cambodia in the field
of radio broadcasting, including such details as Chinese radio
technicians sent to Cambodia and training of Cambodians in China.
(C)
7'. Vietnamese Communist clandestine activit:i.ees,, organi
zation and strength in Cambodia. Is there any evidence of Commi.u-
nist 'employment of dissident Vietnamese elements residing in Cam-
bodia for activities directed against the Diem government in South
Vietnam? Any evidence that Vietnamese Communists are recruiting
racial Cambodians residing in South Vietnam for their subversive
organization in Cambodia? (C)
S. Political attitudes and activities of Cambodia's
Overseas Chinese and Vietnamese communities. (C)
a. Information on efforts by Peiping, Hanoi, Taipei
and Saigon to advance their respective interests in these groups..
(C)
b. Activities of anti-Diem groups in Cambodia. (C)
c. What organizations or institutions have been dle--
veloped in the Chinese community---either by the Cambodian, govern-
ment or the Chinese themselves--to discharge the administrative
functions formerly handled by the congregation system? :Informa-
tion is desired on Communist act`lvities in this connection. (C)
Approved For Releases2 ;0WJ0 /%2 TCIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000 122 :1 . DP62-00328A000200170001-6
FAR EAST PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
CAMBODIA (Continued)
A. Political (Continued)
9. Stability in Cambodia is hampered by the considerable
dissension which exists within the government and within the rul-
ing Sangkum party. Any faltering in the governmental machinery is
injurious to Cambodia's efforts to effect a viable neutrality in
the face of Communist propaganda and subversion. (C)
a. Indications of friction between the national as-
sembly and the executive branch. (C)
b. Indications of friction between old-time members
of the Sangkum and the newer "converts," particularly from the
Communist Pracheachon party. (C)
c. Information on the various political cliques in
the government, and the behind-the-scenes role played by the Royal
Palace in Cambodian politics. (C)
10. Application of Sihanouk's "Khmer Socialism" designed-
to reduce class distinctions in Cambodia. (C)
a. Information on Sihanouk's campaign to dignify
manual labor. Attitude of officials and of the public toward new
regulations requiring civil servants and students to engage in
agricultural or industrial activities for set periods each year.
(C)
11. Current strength and activities of non-Sangkum par-
ties, especially the Democratic and Communist Pracheachon organi-
zations. (C)
a. Pracheachon party connections with Communist bloc
representatives in Cambodia. (C)
b. Information on Son Ngoc Thanh's activities and
his connections with the Democratic party. (C)
c. How successful have been Pracheachon efforts to
infiltrate the Sangkum? (C)
12. In regard to religion and religious groups: (C)
a. What evidence is there that religion per se acts
as an obstacle to the spread of Communism or, on the other hand,
that it serves as a vehicle for the spread of Communism? (C)
-13-
Approved For Release 200O LO
2~ :RC~Q-tDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20pq40 /2 ,CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
FAR EAST PILL
(Guide No. 164)
October 19 5i9 -January 1960
CAMBODIA (Continued)
Political (Continued)
12. b. Repercussions among Cambodian Buddhist groups of
Chinese Communist repression in Tibet, including any indication of
dissatisfaction with the government's policy of close friendship
toward Peiping. (C)
13. Current organization, effectiveness, and loyalty of
potentially important Cambodian associations, such as the Royal
Khmer Socialist Youth and the General Association of Civil Serv-
ants. (C)
14. What is the nature and extent of anti-American senti-1
ment in Cambodia? (C)
B. Military
1. Sihanouk has spoken of the need to retrench the Cam-
bodian army, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare training and a
trained. reserve. Information on possible implementation of this
policy is desired. (C)
2. Any indication of Cambodia turning to the Communist
bloc for military aid. (C)
(C)
3. Attitude of the Cambodian military toward US MAAG.
4. Current organization and effectiveness of the Cam-
bodian armed forces, police and other para-military organizations.
The patterns of loyalty in the Cambodian Army and the nature of
political involvement of its officers. (C)
C. Foreign Affairs
1. Expansion of Cambodian political contacts with other
nations,, particularly Communist bloc nations. (C)
2. Information on all aspects of Cambodia's relations
with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. (C)
3. Developments in Cambodian-French political, mili-
tary and cultural relations. Information on the political att:i-
tudes, activities and influence of French representatives in Cam-
bodia. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200Qj011/ R(AA!RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
FAR EAST PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
CAMBODIA (Continued)
D. Economic
1. Implementation of Chinese Communist and other bloc
economic and technical aid programs in Cambodia, e.g., types of
projects undertaken, number of technicians being sent to Cambodia,
progress of projects, local reactions to the programs, etc. (C)
2. Details of Cambodian trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc
and the effects of this trade on Cambodia's traditional economic
relations with the West. (C)
3. Information on Cambodia's five-year economic develop-
ment plan. (C)
4. Cambodia's economic plans for use of the new deep-
water port at Sihanoukville and connecting road to Phnom Pehh. (C)
5. Indications of Cambodia entering into an air agree-
ment with Communist China. (C)
Approved For Release 2000t08A22 :,CI -DP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/98g2c: qL -I ,DP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959-31 January 1960)
COMMUNIST CHINA
A. Political - Internal
The domestic scene in China has been dominated by a
long period of reassessment of the "giant leap forward" and the
communes, and a serious reduction in the scope of these programs.
In the field of foreign relations the Peiping regime hopes to con-
tinue the support received from the Soviet Bloc--especially from
the USSR--and to attain wider diplomatic recognition, membership
in the UN, and the annexation of Taiwan. (C) We are interested inz
1. All information about the revised "leap forward" and
commune programs; the campaign against "rightist opportunism;"
the existence of cliques within the CCP favoring a harsh or moderate
economic policy. (C)
2. Sessions of the Party Congress, Central Committee,
Politburo, or Standing Committee. (C)
3. Prominence or lapse into obscurity, of:. Mao Tse-tung,
Liu Shao ---chi , Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao,--p ? ing , Chen Yun, and other
prominent members of the CCP politburo.and CC. (C)
4. Any recent changes in government and party personnel
at the national, provincial and local levels. .(U)
5. Indications of organized or unorganized popular re-?
sistance to the Peiping regime, Evidence of peasant unrest and
unrest among minority groups throughout China. (C)
6. Information on expression of resentment, particularly
among the intelligentsia, against thought control and lack of
academic freedom in Communist China. (C)
7. Current data on education and literacy, including pro
gress in literacy drives, shifts in educational policies, expansion
of facilities and enrollments, quality of technical educations and
scientific research activities. (C)
8. Attitude toward Nationalist China of disaffected persons
and groups in Communist China.,. (C) .
-17-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Releases2000/088/2E2 :CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRIG
(Guide No. :164)
October 1.959-January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
A. Political - Internal (Continued)
9. Any evidence of the effect, if any, of Chinese Nationalist
propaganda on the mainland? (C)
10. Intensification or initiation of large scale propaganda
campaigns. (C)
B. Foreign Affairs
1. Evidence of Chinese Communist efforts to subvert the
Chinese Nationalist Government or to negotiate with the Nationalists
for the "liberation" of Taiwan or to induce individual defections.
(C)
2. Any recent changes in propaganda treatment of US? (U)
a. Chinese Communist views on Sino=American ambassadorial
talks in Warsaw. (U)
3. Data revealing the depth of Communist China's identifi-
cation with the world Communist movement and its disposition to
follow orthodox Communist doctrine as opposed to a more "Chinese"
way of doing things. (C)
a. Claims of theoretical originality for Mao Tse--tung.
b. Views on "peaceful competition" with US and on "re-
laxation of tensions" between East and West "camps."
4,. Current Sino-Soviet relations and activities. (C)
a. Evidences of unity of purpose in world and Communist
Bloc affairs. (C)
b. Possible areas of friction. (C)
c. Chinese views on Soviet relations with the US-
particularly in regard to summit talks and Eisenhower-Khrushchev
exchange. (C)
5. Chinese Communist efforts to make diplomatic, economic
and subversive penetrations in: (C)
Approved For Release 200a)b$/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/98,2 : cIg-IFDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959?-January 1950
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)
5. a. South and Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia,
Japan and Korea. (C)
b. The Middle East and Africa. (C)
c. Latin America. (C)
6. Extent of Chinese Communist influence on other Communist
parties. (C)
a. Latin America. (C)
b. South and Southeast Asia. (C)
c. Soviet satellites. (C)
d. USA. (C)
7. Indications of Communist intentions regarding Japan,
including "people?s diplomacy," resumption of talks relating to
trade, or other issues. (C)
a. Use of Sohyo and Japanese Communist Party in anti
Kishi and anti-US efforts. (C)
8. Chinese Communist intentions in regard to Hong Kong
and Macao. (C)
a. Efforts to force local fishermen into Communes. (C)
b. Other moves to harass the Hong Kong and Macao Govern-
ment. (C)
9. Chinese Communists attitude toward South Asia--particular-
ly India---and Southeast Asia-.-particularly Burma and Malaya-Singapore,
(C)
a.
Border negotiations with neighboring states.
(C)
b.
Border violations by Chinese Communist troops.
(C)
c. Evidence of any change in Peiping's view of the
uncommitted countries. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release ?50~0/08p~ : QIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
COMMUNIsr CHINA (Continued)
B. :Foreign Affairs (Continued)
10. Peiping's attitude towards Laos, particularly any evidence
that it will covertly supply Communist forces inside the country. (C)
11. Any evidence of expanded Chinese Communist activity in
the Paracels, (C)
1:2. Efforts to stem refugee flow. (C)
Military
.1, Evidence-negative as well as positive--of specific
Sino-Soviet agreements on Soviet commitments to China's defense in
event of expanded hostilities---particularly in regard to the Taiwan
Straits area. (S)
2. What is the extent of Soviet participation in Chinese
military affairs and operations particularly near the Taiwan Straits
area? (C)
a. Supply of various types of aircraft, naval vessels,
and weapons. (C)
:3. Condition of airfields and reports of new airfield con-
struction. (C)
4. Any new evidence in regard to Chinese Communist plans
or intentions concerning Taiwan and the off-shore islands. (C)
a. Duration of shelling of Quemoy complex? (C)
:i. Introduction of new equipment of all types, particularly
missiles of any type. (C)
6., Evidence of CW and BW activity and doctrine. (C)
7. An expanded militia is reportedly one of the features of
the new communes that are being organized in rural areas. How are
these units formed? What is their relationship to the regular mili-
tary services of the country? What part do they play in internal
security? How are they armed and equipped? (S)
Approved For Release 2000 Q8/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/0E8/~22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959=January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
C. Military (Continued)
8. Any evidence of friction between army and people, army
and party and among elements within the army? (C)
9. Peiping?s view of nuclear weapons, including the nature
of any discussions, agreements or understandings with the USSR. Chi-
nese Communist attitude towards test suspensions.
10. Chinese Communist attitude towards international dis,-,
cussions of disarmament.
11.' Evidence of any shift away from emphasis on Soviet mili-
tary doctrine in favor of a "revolutionary" strategy more in keeping
with Communist China?s military history.
12. Morale of Chinese troops. QC)
13. Personnel shifts in the high command, with appropriate
biographic information where available. (C)
14. Any information of military production, including the
manufacture of arms, ammunition and military equipment. (C)
15. Battle tactics of all components. (C)
D. Scientific
1. Biology
a. Because of the importance of the food situation to
Communist China, it has become increasingly necessary to follow
developments in the supporting biological and agricultural sciences
of China. Thus, information is needed on which to base estimates
as to quality, status of, and trends in the biological and agricultural
research and as to the impact such research will have on Chinese food
potential. (C)
(1) Identification and bibliographic information of
biological and agricultural research personnel. (U)
Q2) Identification of biological and agricultural
research institutes and facilities. (U)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 1CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D. Scientific (Continued)
1. a. (3) Information as to biological and agricultural
research plans, programs, and objectives. (U)
2. Chemistry and Metallurgy
a. Communist China is attempting to establish chemical
and metallurgical industries to take care of the needs of an expand-
ing economy. To accomplish this end, a broad basic and applied re-
search effort is needed. This is still in the early stages. It is
our hope to be able to follow the accomplishments of this program
to enable a projection to be made of what to expect in the future
from Communist China. (C)
(1) What is the organization for basic research in
chemistry and metallurgy? For applied research. (C)
(2) What are the current research projects and recent
accomplishments in these fields? What are the plans or goals? (C)
(3) Describe the research facilities. Are any of
these being expanded? (C)
(4) Data on research personnel is desired - their
current affiliation and the nature of their research. (C)
(5) What is the coordination between Soviet and
Chinese research efforts? (C)
Electronics
a. The Chinese Communist claim to be developing and
manufacturing military electronics equipment such as radars, radio
communication equipment for jet airplanes, and navigational units. (C)
(1) The prompt reporting of all data on. military
electronics equipment is required. Particularly valuable would be
direct observation of such equipment by a competent individual? (C)
b. In electronics, the Chinese envisage self-sufficiency
in technical equipment within 5 years, and at their present rate of
progress, are likely to achieve this for a variety of essential
electronics components, materials and apparatus. Within 8 years they
Approved For Release?OE 0~0R/2 -CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200p/~812R: 914-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959=January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D, Scientific (Continued)
3. b, (Continued)
expect to be capable of independent design and research, and probably
will attain this status for most important areas in electronics.
They are currently believed capable of adapting many relatively
sophisticated electronic devices of foreign design to their needs, (C)
(1) Information is desired regarding the nature of
the Chinese electronics program, including organization, facilities,
policy and plans in the research and development of electronic de-
vices. (C)
c. Data on Chinese personnel concerned with electronics
research and development are required, (C) (In all cases, the
characters or equivalent standard telegraphic code numbers for
Chinese names should be given.)
(1) Information is desired on
tions and the nature of their research work,
their
(C)
present affilia-
and personnel?
Q2)
(C)
What are their contacts with Soviet organizations
(3)
What is their educational and scientific back-
ground? . (C)
4. Guided Missiles
ao Observation stations for tracking Soviet artificial
satellites have been established in Canton, Peiping, Nanking, Lanchov,
Kumming and Lhasa. The Soviets have furnished observation equipment
for these stations, (U)
(1) Information is desired on the establishment of
new tracking stations in other locations in Communist China. (U)
Q2) Information is desired on contacts between these
stations and the Soviets which could indicate plans for future
satellite launchings. (S)
-23-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000//08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328AO00200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October. 1959=January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D. Scientific (Continued)
5. Astronomy, Upper Atmosphere and Space
a. The Communist Chinese have been cooperating with the
USSR in :radio astronomical expeditions and have recently reported the
construction of their first radio telescope. (S)
(1) Information is desired on their activities in
this field, particularly as they might relate to the Soviet upper
atmosphe:rre and space program. (S)
b. The Communist Chinese have claimed that they will
place into orbit an artificial earth satellite. (S)
(1) Information is desired on any activities relating
to this subject. (S)
6. Terrestrial Geophysics
a. Soviet and East German geophysicists have been asso-
ciated with the construction and. operation of severa]. Communist
Chinese geomagnetic and seismological observatories. Military de-
tection research is suspected at the Canton station, for example.
(1) Information. needed from all Communist Chinese
geophysical stations includes: name, location, specific research
activity and any known or suspected applications, the, description,
make and use of geophysical instruments, biographic and specialized
activity information on personnel and visitors. (OUO)
b. Soviet and Chinese gravimeterists have conducted
gravity surveys in China of value to cartography, geodesy, missile
guidance, and mineral prospecting. Copies of the data itself probably
will never be released, but would be very valuable if available. (S)
(1) In any case information is needed on all gravity
surveys made in China including areas and places surveyed; number,
size, and make-up of survey parties; detailed description of the
instruments used; methods by which data is processed, or transmitted,
where it is sent and how it is reduced and used; biographic informa-
tion on all scientific or technical personnel, including visitors.
(OUO)
Approved For Release 206-&69/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000J0@/Z2 R CJArRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D, Scientific (Continued)
6. c. Several years ago Communist China and Hungarian earth
current, or geo-electricity, experts cooperated in making simultaneous
earth current measurements. The Soviets have also done a great deal
of earth current research.
(1) Information is needed on Chinese earth current
research at Peiping and at any other Communist Chinese stations, co--
operation or joint-efforts with foreign scientists and institutions,
known or suspected applications of this research, detailed description
of the instruments used, and biographic information on personnel and
foreign visitors. (OUO)
7. Meteorology
a. Current information indicates the Chinese Communists
have been very active in weather modification experiments. They have
been seeding clouds with dry ice and other agents to increase rain-
fall. (OUO)
(1) Continuing information is required on Communist
Chinese weather modification experiments and activities. (OUO)
b. The Chinese Communists have indicated their intention
to utilize computers for weather forecasting as they become available.
(OUO)
(1) Information is desired on their activities in
this field. Information is also desired on location of the computer
and personnel involved in the program. (OUO)
8. Oceanography
a. The Sino-Soviet Bloc countries bordering on the
Pacific Ocean have undertaken a program of joint oceanographic sur-
veys. (OUO)
(1) Any information about these surveys is desired,
(OUO)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release ?0Y0%Q82J :T IA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959==January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D. Scientific (Continued)
9. Nuclear Ener
a. The Chinese nuclear energy program entered an active
phase when the 6-10 MW research reactor supplied by the USSR came
into operation in mid-1958 at the Institute of Atomic Energy in
Peking. Other nuclear energy research centers are reported to be at
Wuhan, T:Lentain, Hsi-An, Canton, and Shanghai. Very little informa-
tion is available on any aspect of the Chinese nuclear energy program.
(S)
(1) Where are the Chinese centers for nuclear energy
research---exact locations and site layouts? What information is
available on the number of persons employed, names of leading per-
sonnel, equipment in operation or under construction and major re- -
search efforts at each research center? (OUO)
(2) What is the extent of the exploitation (pros-
pecting, mining and refining) of domestic supplies of nuiclear :raw
materials; such as, uranium, thorium, zirconium, and beryllium? (OUO)
(3) What is the extent of production of heavy water
and nuclear pure graphite? (OUO)
(4) What is the extent of Soviet and Satellite
assistance in the Chinese nuclear energy program-personnel, train-
ing, supply of equipment, and in the exploitation of raw materials?
(OUO)
(5) What are the plans for the use of nuclear energy
in a weapons program? Are there any plans for the Chinese to ac-
quire nuclear weapons from the USSR? What nuclear weapons testing
and storage sites have been planned or constructed? What is the
extent of nuclear weapons training given to Chinese troops? (C)
10, Scientific and
Technical Manpower and Education
a, A new graduate degree program got underway in
1956 and a new policy of sending only graduate students for train-
ing in the Soviet Union was announced in mid-1957, both programs
aimed at increasing the number of scientists. Since the Fall of
1957 nothing has been said about these programs by the Communists,
In June 1958, there was an announcement of the establishment of a
new University of Science and Technology, A February 1959 Communist
announcement indicated that only 5,500 Chinese students were studying
Approved For Release 26-0%1158/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000I98i2~ : R -, DP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
D. Scientific (Continued)
in the Soviet Union. This number is far fewer than would be expected
from the quotas set up in the First Five-Year plan and indicates that
the rate of sending new students to the Soviet Union was reduced from
about 2,000 per year to less than 200 per year for the years 1957 and
1958. Information is needed on the graduate training program and on
training in the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries. (C)
(1) Has the quality of undergraduate training been a
major hindrance to the expansion of the graduate training program? (C)
(2) Was the new University of Science and Technology
established because the regular universities and colleges had failed
to prepare students adequately for graduate work? (C)
(3) Has the expansion of the graduate program in
China been temporarily postponed pending the improvement of under-
graduate preparation? (C)
(4) Is the great change in the rate of sending stu-
dents to the Soviet Union a result of the new policy. of sending only
graduate students? (C)
(5) Is the new policy ending the dispatch of under-
graduate students to the Soviet Union the consequence of 1) an effort
to conserve foreign exchange, 2) a reluctance on the part of the
Soviet Union to accept large numbers of Chinese students, 3) some
political reason such as possibly a Chinese Communist desire to avoid
exposing undergraduates to the somewhat more liberal atmosphere of
Soviet universities, or 4) for some other reason? (C)
(6) Is there any indication of the Soviet Union at-
tempting to hold back the expansion of the number of well=--trained
Chinese scientists? (C)
11. Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the
hina - October 1959
Peoples Republic of China":-
a. Because of the particular importance attached by the
Chinese Communists to this anniversary, extra ordinary preparations
for the celebration are already underway, As has been the case in
past anniversaries of various kinds, part of the celebration will
almost certainly consist of a massive display of the results of
Chinese research, development, and production efforts. (C)
(1) Any information that may be available on Com-
munist Chinese scientific advances is desired, particularly on
fotc~e` St R6 ~d'969 O~b10g - ntTA 68A01001 70001-6
-27-
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
E. Economic October 1.959-January 1960
1. General
a. Agricultural and industrial targets for the
Chinese Communist Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) were fitst
made public at the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956. Many
of the goals for 1962 were claimed to have been surpassed in the
great "leap forward" effort of 1958, but because of the drive to
achieve higher physical output at almost any costs, it is, believed
that plans and the planning system were thrown into disorder.
Skepticism about their claims for 1958 and their goals for 1959
were Justified by the Central Committee communique of 26 August 1959,
in which figures for the 1958 production of several important
agricultural and industrial commodities were lowered, and. the four
main targets of grain, cotton, steel, and coal for 1959 were cut
back. To improve our understanding of current economic activity in
Communist China we would like to obtain information on the
following:
(1) Further revisions of agricultural and
industrial targets for 1959 and for the Second Five Year Plan as
a whole. (U)
(2) Any evidence that the exaggerated claims for
agricultural production in 1958 have been revised even further.
Any information on the division of the 1958 and 1959 grain figures
into their components - rice, wheat, corn, sweet potatoes, etc. (U)
(3) Any information ofa conflict between a group
in the top leadership urging "Balanced and rational" planning and
a group urging a renewal and intensification of the "leap forward".(U)
b. Developments during the early period of the commune
movement are fairly well known by now, but a new trend is currently
developing -- a decided slackening of control over the daily lives
and activities of the commune members. The recent developments which
indicate an apparent drawing back from the full-blown commune idea
are: a relaxation in the regulations governing membership in
messhalls; the reinstatement of private plots to households; the
return of some livestock to individual care; a reemphasis on sideline
occupations; an increased emphasis on incentive wages; the opening
of limited free markets within communes; and the reported reopening
of "lower level tax offices" to improve the work of collecting rural
taxes. We would like supporting evidence on the above developments--
evidence which does not appear in. the press or periodicals, or over
broadcasts which we normally receive. Attention should be given
both to evidence of deterioration of the structure of the commune;
and to more recent Party reaffirmation of the vital role of the
commune. Have any concessions granted to the peasants been withdrawn?
Have any functions been restored to the communes? (U)
Approved For Release 20008/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20082 a :.Iik-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
E. Economic (Continued) October-1959-January 1960
2. Agriculture
a. During the winter months, the Communists planned
to complete numerous large-scale water conservancy projects
throughout the country. (U)
(U)
(1) What increase in irrigated acreage has resulted?
(2) What effect has the water conservancy effort
had on the land utilization pattern of the country? (U)
(3) What percent of the-grain crops in China by
type were under irrigation in 1959? (U)
b. During the winter months fertilizers were accumulated
for application on spring and summer sown crops. -(U)
accumulated? (U)
(1) How much fertilizer, by type and amount, was
(2) What was the rate of application on the various
spring and summer sown crops? (U)
c. Food shortages were reported in various areas
during 1959. Official sources attribute shortages in urban areas
to lack of transport. Further information is desired on the causes
of shortages, their severity, their duration, and on the measures
taken by the regime to end shortages. (U)
d. To what extent has hog-raising, poultry-raising
and production of vegetables and other subsidiary items reverted
to private management? (U)
e. The Communists have announced plans to double-crop
areas of North China with wheat and rice. What progress was
achieved during 1958 and 1959? (U)
f. During 1959, Communist China has been beset with
various natural calamities, primarily floods and severe droughts.
Although the Communists may be exaggerating to some extent the
seriousness of the weather conditions in order to cover up
agricultural policy mistakes, sufficient information on weather
conditions is available which substantiates to some extent their
occurrence. (U)
-29-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release20P0ff2,CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No.. 164)
E. Economic (Continued) October-1959-January 1960
2, Agriculture (Continued)
f. (1) What has been the extent of crop damage due
to natural calamities in 1959? How -much area affected? What were
the yield losses by crops? (U)
(2) How effective have their irrigation facilities
been, particularly those constructed during the leap--forward period,
in reducing losses? (U)
(3) To what extent have irrigation facilities such
as ponds, catchment basins, reservoirs, etc., which are primarily
dependent upon rainfall, been effective in alleviating drought
conditions? (U)
g. The Chinese Communists have made little mention
of their 1959 cotton crop. The original plan called for a crop of
5 million tons, recently lowered to 2.3 million tons. The unusual
lack of reporting on this crop would tend to raise suspicions as to
the actual condition of the crop. (U)
(1) How much area was planted to cotton in 1959?(U)
(2) Has the cotton crop suffered exceptionally
high losses due to natural calamities in 1959? (U)
h. What is the composition bf miscellaneous grains,
by type and amount, for 1958 and 1959? '(U)
i. Deep-plowing was to have been accomplished on most
of the area sown to winter wheat in the Fall of 1958. What effect
has this had on yields and total production of the wheat crops? (U)
What spring and summer sown crops were grown on deep-plowed land? (U)
J. The quality of published statistics, especially
in agriculture, deteriorated in 1958. The August 1959 communique
of the Central Committee contained sharp downward revisions of the
original :1958 production claims, but some (e.g., grains) still
appear high. In addition, no breakdown was given as to the com-
position of the revised 250 million ton claim for grain. We would
be interested in any further discussions and evaluations of the
1958 claims. (C)
k. Communist announcements of the value of agricultural
and industrial production are now being given in 1957'prices instead
of constant 1952 prices that were reported for the period up through
1957. In evaluating price changes, information on farm procurement
prices and prices for producer goods is of particular importance.
Any current Chinese Communist price lists and specific discussions
of changes in prices for important commodities are important in
arrivinprove Vor ~t Tease M06*Uq GFX-R N1JP 61~ W; A O 6
-30-
 Approved For Release 20018t2 R : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
E. Economic (Continued)
2. Agriculture (Continued)
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959--January 1960
1. Occasional mention is made by Peiping about the
number of women working on farms and the importance of this work.
Any information on this subject, particularly numbers of women
employed, tasks to which they are assigned, whether they work in
teams with men or separately, their pay compared to men, and what
jobs the men are concentrating on now that women have become more
important in farm work is of interest. (U)
M. State farms are still mentioned by Peiping. What
is their present purpose, are their numbers increasing, how many are
there now in each province, what are the plans for their future, what
is their relationship to the communes and local government in general?
Is:there any indication that they may be the forerunner of an
eventual further reorganization of the communes to achieve "owner-
ship by all the people"? (U)
n. What are the developments with respect to farm
production of methane gas for local heating, power, and lighting?(U)
3. Transportation
a. During 1959-60 continued increases in Chinese
railroad traffic performance can probably be achieved only by
sizeable increases in the freight car and locomotive parks, rather
than by much further improvement in operating efficiency, where the
limits appear already to have been reached or exceeded. (S)
(1) What was the total inventory of main line
freight cars and locomotives at the end of 1958, mid-1959, and the
end of 1959? (S)
1959? (S)
(2) How many locomotives were imported during
(3) What was the absolute level of railroad
investment in 1959, and the breakdown of investment among new
line construction, improvement of existing lines, and increase
in the rolling stock park? (S)
b. Although the Chinese have recently released more
data concerning the commodity composition of freight traffic, the
information is not adequate for a completely accurate appraisal of
commodity movements. (C)
Approved For Release 2000s/0E/2~2 : CII -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release, gPW0R/? - CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
E. Economic (Continued)
3. Transportation (Continued)
Far East PRIA
(Guide No. :L64)
October 1.959-January 1960
b. (1) What was:the commodity composition of the
tons originated by the railroads, by motor truck transport, and
by inland and coastal water transport during 1959. (C)
(2) What percentages of the total output of
petroleum products were moved by each form of transport from
refineries or points of import to consumers?(C)
c. The Ministry of Railroads and the provincial or city
railroad bureau began a reorganization in January 1958. (OUO)
(1) What is the present table of organization of
the Ministry of Railroads? (S)
(2) What is the division of responsibility between
the Ministry in Peking and the railroad bureaus for railroad operation
and construction? (C)
(3) In what cities are the railroad bureaus located
and what are the boundaries of each bureau? (C)
d. The Chinese Communists have announced that the
volume of highway freight traffic during the first quarter of 1959
was 73. percent higher than the first quarter of 1958. (OUO)
(1) What was the volume of highway freight traffic
during the first quarter of 1959 in absolute terms? (C)
(2) Has the large percentage increase been
accomplished mainly in the motor truck sector of highway trans-
portation or in the primitive sector (that is, all highway trans-
portation other than motor truck)? (C)
(3) If the primitive sector has accounted for a
large portion of this 73 percent increase, what additional labor
was required? (C)
e, The Chinese Communists realized the tremendous
gains of 1.958 in motor truck transport largely by increased
utilization of trucks. This created a shortage of spare parts. (S)
(1) To what extent has this shortage affected
performance in 1959? (C)
(2) Have the Chinese placed priority on the
construction of additional repair facilities? (C)
-32-
Approved For Releas% 2LQ%0/%8/ 2r CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20%0/R8t22g: Pl4-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
E. Economic (Continued) October 1959-January 1960
3. Transportation (Continued)
f. It appears that 1958 motor truck performance was
near the limit possible with available liquid fuel. (S)
(1) What was the fuel requirement for 1958
performance? (S)
(2) What portion of total performance is
accomplished by non-liquid fuel trucks? (S)
is imported? (S)
(3) What portion of the liquid fuel requirement
g. During 1958, especially during the period from
October to December, the People's Liberation Army supplied 13,000
motor vehicles to the Iron and steel drive. A press announcement
of March 1959 indicated that in 1959 2,480 trucks had been sent to
iron and steel production centers to be used for approximately six
months. (OLIO)
(1) Did this early dispatch of PLA trucks indicate
that truck transport was already experiencing difficulties? (C)
(2) How many PLA trucks were needed during 1959
to assist civilian motor truck transport? (C)
(3) What was the actual contribution of the PLA
trucks in terms of performance during 1958 and 1959? (C)
h. Imports of motor trucks to China showed a large
increase in 1958. (OUO)
(1) Did the Chinese find it necessary to again
import large numbers of trucks during 1959 or did domestic pro-
duction provide the number of vehicles which could be effectively
employed? (C)
i. In late 1958 the formation of a new shipping
organization called the Ocean Transport Bureau was observed. The
concern of this organization in the field of international shipping
indicates that its mission may be the organization of a Chinese
maritime fleet for international shipping. If this is the case,
the international service wobld-probably be initiated by a Chinese-
built ship, the YUEH CHIN (Leap Forward). (S)
(1) Report immediately any indications of the
initiation of an international shipping service under the Chinese
flag. (S)
-33-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 20E00/0R8/2E2:CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East FURL
(Guide No. 1(34)
E. Economic (Continued) October 1959?-January 1960
3. Transportation (Continued)
i. (2) Have any trade agreements negotiated by the
Chinese contained clauses requiring the movement of goods in
Chinese vessels? (S)
(3) Have any efforts to screen maritime personnel
for duty outside the country been noted? (S)
(4) When will the YUEH CHIN be fitted out and ready
to sail? When will the next ship of the same class be 'launched? (C)
(5) Have the purchase of any vessels by the
Chinese since March 1959 been observed? (S)
J. Continuing current information is needed on
international shipping to Communist China, particularly in connection
with the tension in the Taiwan Straits area. Any changes in pattern,
such as a. sharp increase or cessation of tanker movements should be
watched for especially. Chinese Communist port closures should also
be reported promptly. (S)
Iron and Steel
a, The Chinese Communist plan to produce 12 million
tons of crude steel in 1959. At the beginning of 1959, Communist
China lacked sufficient casting, forging, and rolling facilities to
finish 12 million tons of crude steel. As a result, the Chinese
are trying to build or import enough finishing equipment to remedy
the situation. China has not published any official, annual
production figures for steel mill products (rolled steel, forgings,
castings) since 1956, probably because of the imbalance between
crude steel and steel finishing capacity.
(1) Report any information relating; to the
success or failure of Communist China to provide enough finishing
facilities to match its crude steel production. (C)
(2) Report any large rolling mills installed,
planned, or imported. (C)
(3) How much finished steel did Communist China
produce in 1957 and in 1958, and what is the planned production
for 1959? If possible, the figures should be broken down into
three categories: castings, forgings, and rolled steel,. (C)
Approved For ReleaseS2gi0~/0p/j2T CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20%0/98t2: j: c b#-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
E. Economic (Continued) October 1959-January 1960
4. Iron and Steel (Continued)
a. (4) In view of the lowered 1959 steel target of
12 million tons and the reduced claim of 8 million tons of useable
steel produced in 1958, we are interested in:
(a) The list of the 18 "key"-iron and steel
enterprises.
(b) New targets for iron and steel for 1960
and beyond.
5. Telecommunications
a. Available information indicates that construction
has begun on a television Station at Canton. Information is requested
on the status of this station, including an indication of when it
will become operational. (S)
b.. Communist China is probably interested in intro-
ducing tropospheric scatter communications to supplement its meager
telecommunications transmission base. Information is requested
concerning the development and introduction of this advanced
telecommunications technique in the country. (S)
6. Trade
a. Communist China's exports to and imports from the
Free World were increased enormously in 1958, but have fallen off
in recent months. (C)
(1) Report any indications of a reversal in the
decline in Communist China's trade with the Free World.
b. Trade relations between Communist China and Japan
were broken off in mid-1958. Recently, we have received indications
of a thaw in Sino-Japanese relations, but trade on a significant
scale has not been resumed.
(1) Report any indications of a resumption of
Chinese - Japanese trade relations.
c. In the past several years Communist China has
developed large deposits of borax and in 1959 began exporting
substantial quantities to other Bloc countries. Poland is the only
Soviet Bloc country now authorized to obtain boron products from
the Free World under COCOM policy. In order to assess, import
requirements of the Soviet Bloc, particularly of Poland, for borax,
it would be helpful to obtain the following information: (S)
-35-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Re1ease5290W00/ T CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
COMMUNIST CHINA (Continued)
E. Economic (Continued)
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October '1959--January 1960
13. Trade (Continued)
c. (1) How much is Communist China exporting and to
what countries? Provide detailed data on such shipments for 1958
and 1959, including quantities, grades of products, and prices. (S)
d. Recent reporting indicates that',the Chinese are
seeking to purchase from Western European sources various advanced
types of boron compounds with missile fuel application. (C)
(1) Identify Chinese Communist purchasers, end-
users, and any indication of the uses to be made of these commodities
in Communist China. (C)
echnique,s for evading Free World export controls). (C)
(2) Identify possible Western European suppliers
f these boron compounds to Communist China, the quantities
nvolved, methods and dates of proposed shipments (including
Approved For Releaa R0@0V13J24 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/22R CIArRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
HONG KONG and MACAO
1, Any indications that the Chinese. Communists are utilizing
their recently-proclaimed 'territorial waters' to hamper or restrict
access to Hong Kong and/or Macao? (C)
2, Has Hong Kong's decreasing value as an entrepot to Communist
China been offset by the colony's value to Peiping as ,a source of
foreign exchange and as an outlet for Chinese Communist trade abroad?
How do the entrepreneurs of the colony, especially the Chinese, view
their. ability to compete with Communist China in the markets of South
and South East Asia? Are there any thoughts of Hong Kong becoming a
center of manufacture of commodities for consumption on the Mainland
in view of its decreasing value as an entrepot? (C)
3. Details on the current Chinese Communist apparatus in Hong
Kong and Macao (personnel, organization, methods of operation, channels
for direction from the mainland, etc.), (C)
4. Any indications of Chinese Communist or Chinese Nationalist
activities or plans which might lead to disorders within the colonies,
particularly during the October holidays? (C)
5. Changing attitudes of the Hong Kong Chinese and Macaonese
toward Communism, the Chinese Nationalists, and the colonial admin-
istration. (C)
6. How does knowledgeable opinion in Hong Kong government,
financial and business circles estimate the political and financial
future of Hong Kong? (C)
7, To what extent do the Chinese Communists use Hong Kong/Macao
as a channel for covert contact with other Asian Communist movements
or with overseas.Chinese?
a. What is the role of the Hong Kong branch of the Bank
of China in such activity? (S)
8. What is the extent of Communist control over local labor,
press and public relations media,. social organizations, and business
organizations of Hong Kong and Macao? Have the Communists succeeded
in penetrating the local governments and local security forces? If so,
to what extent? Information and evidence of overall Chinese Communist
strategy and tactics regarding Hong Kong and Macao is needed. (S)
Approved For Release 2000/08/Zi tIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 00I2 CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October ]L959-January 1960
HONG KONG and MACAO (Continued)
9. Details and information are needed on the kind, extent and
effectiveness of Chinese Nationalist activity in both colonies. (S)
it. Are the Nationalists running operations into the mainland
from either or both colonies? (S)
b. If so, how successful are such operations? (S)
10. Continuing information is needed on the kind and extent of
anti-subversive measures pursued by the authorities in both colonies.
How effective are such measures? (S)
a. How far are the respective local authorities willing to
go to control internal subversion? (S)
11. To what extent are restrictions on trade with Communist China
being violated in the two colonies? (S)
12. Detailed information is desired concerning the Hong Kong
branch of the Bank of China in promoting trade:
a. Between Hong Kong and the Communist mainland;
b. Between Communist China and Southeast Asia;
c. With other free Asian countries. (S)
13. What measures is the Hong Kong Government taking to control
the activities of the Triad Criminal gangs? (C)
14, Are local security forces capable of preventing large scale
civil disturbances and of controlling such disturbances if once
started? (C)
a? Would the police require military assistance to maintain
civil order in such an event or in the event of a Chinese Communist
military invasion? (C)
15. Information is needed on the capability of the Macao police
and armed forces to maintain internal order, their capability to
prevent, contain, and quell local disturbances. (C)
25X6A
Approved For Release 2004 /22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200482 R :pCI -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959-January 1960
HONG KONG and MACAO (Continued)
17. Any new developments regarding Chinese Nationalist and/or
Chinese Communist representation in Macao? (C)
18. Has the modification of international strategic trade con-
trols accomplished in mid-1958 and consequent adjustments in the UK
trade control structure affected the enforcement activities of (a) the
Hong Kong authorities, or (b) the Consulate General? (S)
19. Any indications of Chinese Communist pressure for the physical
take-over of Macao or Portuguese inclination to relinquish control? (C)
encia Commercial Progresso (ACP) of Hong Kong and Macao
20
,
owner. one the most consistent suppliers of embargoed items to
D
Communist China, taniey HO), has recently been denied US licensing
privileges. The majority of ACP's imports are known to reach Communis
China through such means as: resale to Communist Chinese purchasing
agencies or other firms that immediately resell to China; bribery,
smuggling and falsification of documents. Evidence exists indicating
that the firm will probably continue circumventing US and COCOM export
controls by utilizing "cover" firms or other subterfuges to obtain
strategic commodities for Communist China. (C)
a. Provide information on Agencia Commercial Progresso's
(ACP) procurement of strategic commodities from the West. Identify
contacts or "cover" firms and/or other methods utilized by the firm
to obtain such imports. (C)
b. Report evidences of ACP's transshipment of these commodi-
ties to Communist China, including origin, quantities and description
of the goods, other firms or individuals involved in the transactions,
financial and shipping arrangements, routing, and documentation utilize
(C)
c. Provide information on firms, other than ACP, which are
owned, controlled, or directed by Stanley HO or which operate as af-
filiates or subsidiaries of ACP. (C)
-39-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 20(P/.@8 22t: iCl -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1959)
INDONESIA
The new Indonesian cabinet assumed office in July 1959 under the
revived 1945 constitution which gives a preponderance of power to the
executive branch of government at the expense of the legislative
branch. The new cabinet is under strong army influence. The trio
guiding the government, in order of their power, are President-
Premier Sukarno, Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister General
Nasution, and First Minister Djuanda. The government conducts its
affairs against a background of chaotic economic conditions, quietly
growing Communist strength, and continuing guerrilla warfare in all
major islands. With the exception of the Communists, political
are of minor importance. (C)
A. Political - Military
1. Sukarno
a. Indications of disagreement with General Nasution,
efforts to create dissension in the army or to back particular of-
ficers other than Nasution. (S)
b. Indications of his strong support of the army. (C)
c. Who are Sukarno's principal advisors? What individ-
uals have chief access to palace? Extent to which he solicits opin-
ions and advice. (S)
d. What is the power relationship between Sukarno and
Suryadarma, Air Force Chief of Staff? (S)
e. State of Sukarno's health. Probable successors
should he die or retire. (S)
f. Extent to which Sukarno participates in both day to
day government and in major policy decisions under the new constitu-
tion? To what extent does he initiate policy? (C)
g. Status of his prestige, particularly in Java. (C)
2. Army
a. Extent of power in the cabinet. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 CCAAIR?P62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2Q0W0@/&2 E CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
Octobe'r'1959 - January 1960
INDONESIA (Continued)
A. Political',- ,Military (Continued)
2. Army (Continued)
b. Extent of corruption in the army. (C)
c. Effectiveness of the army-controlled Front for Na-
tional Liberation in controlling Communist activities. (C)
d. Extent of Communist-infiltration in army. (S)
e. Extent of army loyalty to Sukarno and Nasution. (C)
f. Indications that the army has spread itself too thin
and is becoming less effective at its various tasks (i.e., straight
military, administration, economic direction, and anti-Communist ac-
tivity). (C)
Indications of significant army factionalism. (C)
h. Effectiveness of anti-Communist activities. (S)
3. Cabinet and Civil Government
a., Role of three newly appointed government organiza-
tions and their chairmen:
Abdulgani. (C)
(1)
46-member Supreme Advisory Council. under Ruslan
Mohamad Y'amin.
(2)
(C)
77-member National Planning Board under
(3) 5-member BAPEKAN (agency for supervision of
the activities of the state apparatus) under the Sultan of Jogjakarta,
Hamengku Buwono IX. (C)
b. Roles of various cabinet components: 11 full min-
isters; 25 assistant ministers; 7 ex officio ministers. Particular-
ly, are 25 assistant ministers permitted to initiate policy and how
much independence of action do they have? (C)
4. Insecurity
a. Provincial revolt (Sumatra, North Celebes).
Approved For Release 2000/C
08/ 7CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/
/?2c ( If FJP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
INDONESIA (Continued)
A. Political - Military (Continued)
4. Insecurity (Continued)
a. (1) Prospects for and activity toward compromise
or other resolution of provincial revolt. (S)
(2) Highlights of military activity. (C)
(3) Internal rebel policy conflicts, supply ef-
forts, popular support. (C)
b. Darul Islam (Atjeh, West and Central Java, South
Celebes, South Borneo).
(1)
Military highlights.
(C)
(2)
Popular support.
(C)
(3)
Supply efforts.
(C)
5. Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian): Any political or
paramilitary activity directs toward acquisition of West Irian. (C)
B. Communism
1. Details on Communist Party (PKI) strength; present ac-
tivity; evidence of increased growth and influence. (S)
a. Information on or speculation about future plans. (S)
b. Sources of Communist funds. (S)
2. Visits of Indonesian Communists to other countries and
visits of foreign Communists to Indonesia. (S)
3. Indications of existence of Communist armed forces,
their size and activity. (S)
4. Evidence of Communist infiltration of civil government,
army and police, navy and air force. (S)
5. Reliable evidence and indications of direct Communist
influence on President Sukarno. (S)
-43-
Approved For Release 2000709/251 RCfATRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release,;0,0Q0W/22 -TCIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
INDONESIA (Continued)
B. Communism (Continued)
13. Effectiveness of Communist groups within army-con.-
trolled National Liberation Front. (S)
7. Activities of principal Communist front groups: verterans
(PERBEPSI--All Indonesian Union of Former Armed Combatants); labor
SOBSI (All-Indonesian Federation of Workers); youth (Pemuda or PemUda
Rakjat--People's Youth); peasants (BTI--Indonesian Farmers' Front).
(S)
8. Indications of preparations for underground and crypto
activity should army intensify anti-Communist activity. (S)
C. Foreign Relations
Significant developments regarding Indonesia's foreign pol-
icy and diplomatic relations, particularly with: (C)
1.
The Middle Eastern nations. (C)
2.
The US. (C)
3.
The Netherlands.
(C)
4.
The USSR. (C)
5.
Communist China.
(C)
6. Activities of Sino--Soviet bloc embassies and consulates:
Any recent information on movements and contacts of Sino-Soviet bloc
official..:; particularly among the following: government circles, Com-
munist and Communist-front groups, Chinese community, educational
circles. (S)
a. Reaction of Indonesian government to Sino-Soviet
bloc activity. (C)
b. Sino-Soviet exchange and training programs. (C)
c. Any increases in mission strengths and. significant
changes in personnel. (S)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200W1013/22a, MPTRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1059 - January 1960
INDONESIA (Continued)
D. Economic
1. Sino-Soviet Bloc Assistance: Detailed information on
any Sino-Soviet assistance to n onesia. (C)
a. Manner of implementation; number of technicians in-
volved. (C)
2. Labor: Information on activities of SOBSI--Indonesia's
Communist-controlled labor federation; movements and contacts--na-
tional and international--of its leaders. (S)
a. Activities of non-Communist unions. (C)
3. Agriculture: Current agricultural production, trade and
consumption. (C)
4. Government Finance: Central government finance in gen-
eral, including current data on balance of payments, government
loans and advances, revenues and expenditures, and international fi-
nancial transactions involving Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. (C)
5. Stabilization and Development Plans: (U)
a. Information on plans to arrest economic deteriora-
tion, on stabilization measures, and on development programs. In-
clude financial details, notably information on availability of local
currency funds and prospective need for foreign aid. (U)
Approved For Release 2000/O%/22 c (lAAR'bP62-00328A000200170001-6
 25X1 X4
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200(j0jj/Z2 riCjA'RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide Noe 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone's grant of full powers in
January ensured his anti-Communist government of at least a year in
which, unfettered by a legislature that had become increasingly ir-
responsible, to restore popular confidence in the government, Mean-
while, Loas is in a period of political transition in which tradition-
al power relationships based on a system of alliance between repre-
sentatives of a few powerful clans are being successfully challenged
by political movements organized on a broader popular base. (C)
1. The Rally of the Lao People (RLP) : The RLP has suffered
a number of reverses during the past few months; have these develop-
ments accentuated divisive pressures in the RLP? What deputies sup-
port the following party leaders: Phoui Sananikone, Katay, Souvanna
Phouma, Pheng Phongsavan? What steps is the party taking to build a
grass roots organization? Is the party developing "new faces" for
the next campaign? Which deputies, if any, are working to build popu-
lar following in the provinces? Is Phoui's position as party leader
being eroded by his role as national leader? Attitude and motivation
of Pheng Phongsavan; nature of his relationship with left opposition?
(C)
2. The Committee for the Defense of the National Interest
(CDNI): Information!-on the national and provincial organza on--ac-
tivities, size and membership. Relationship between the army and the
CDNI, Does the army dominate CDNI? Are there conflicts of interest
between civilian CDNI-leaders and their army collaboration? Informa-
tion is needed on CDNI sponsored activities such as youth and veterans,
rallies. What is the relative influence within the CDNI of Colonel
Phoumi, General Ouane, Sisouk Na Champassak, Khamphan Panya, Inpeng
Suryadhay, the Colonel Oudone Sananikone. What impact has the CDNI
had on the following groups: Buddhist monkhood, civil servants,
junior army officers, school teachers, minority peoples. (S)
3. Relations between the CDNI and the RLP: The rapid rise to
power of the threatens the privileged posit on of the RLP. Fric-
tion between the two groups has impeded the do=velopment of strong gov-
ernmental action. Information is needed on efforts to find a modus
vivendi between the two groups. Which leaders are opposed to coopera-
tion? What are the relations between provincial and local leaders of
the two parties? Are RLP members transferring to the CDNI? Do CDNI
activists characterize the CDNI as a nonpartisan movement campaigning
for better government or as a political party seeking to elect its own
candidates? (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release /P822E: QIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 January 1960)
LAOS (Continued)
A. Political - Internal
4. The Santiphab: How "deep" is the alliance between the San-
tiphab and t Fie Communist dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)? Is Quinim
Pholsena attempting to re-establish his link with National Union lead-
er Bong S9,ouvannavong? Is the Santiphab winning coverts from the RLP?
(C)
5. The Democrats: What is the relationship between the Demo-
crats and the NLHZ? a role does Colonel Phoumi Nosavan play in the
Democrat party? Are the Democrats losing popular support in Savannak-
het prbv:i.nce? (C)
6. NLHZ - Communist Party: Souphannouvong and part of NLHZ
Central Comm ee are under arrest in Vientiane. Which NLHZ leaders
are now In control of the NLHZ? Has the previously reported split be-
tween nationalist elements (Souphannouvong-Phoumi) and military Commu-
nists (Nouhak-Khamtay-Kaysone) been resolved in favor of the latter?
Has government repression weakened or stiffened the resolve of NLHZ
members? Report on the strength, morale ans social composition of the
NLHZ. To what extent is the NLHZ succeeding ia jXi)ni,n.g converts among
Buddhist monks, army, bureaucracy, and school teachers? NLHZ propa-
ganda themes. Efforts by NLHZ to attract disaffected members of RLP.
Growth of decline in NLHZ membership, patty finances; relations between
NLHZ and Communist directorate; relations between latter and interna-
tional Communism. (S)
B. Political - International
I. To what degree does Laos' recent shift to a more openly
pro-Free World position reflect the opinion of the politically con-
scious minority? (C)
1d. Information on the popular reaction to the threatening
propaganda emanating from Hanoi and Peiping. (OUO)
:3. Expansion of Laos' diplomatic contacts with, other nations,
particularly those of the Communist bloc. Information on any Bloc of-
fers of ;economic aid. (C)
4. Evidence of anti-US feeling. (C)
5, Any significant development in Laotian foreign policy; es-
pecially in relations with France, India, Thailand, South Vietnam. (C)
6. Attitude of Laos towards developments in Cambodia. (C)
-56-
Approved For Release 2P0R/Q8/a2E Q1A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2006/0S/22I (MXRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960)
LAOS (Continued)
7. Any change in Laos' opposition to the reconvening of the
ICC, or retreat from its position that it has fulfilled all the provi-
sions of the Geneva Accords. (S)
(C)
8. Laotian government attitude towards regional cooperation.
C. Social
1. Information on the flow of refugees across the Chinese
Communist border. (C)
2. Attitudes of minority peoples--Meo, Kha, tribal Thai,etc.,
--toward the government. To what extent do they feel the government
is responsive to their problems. (C)
3. Evidence of NLHZ influence among minority peoples. (C)
4. Political activities of Buddhist monks. Evidence of NLHZ
penetration of Buddhist hierarchy. (S)
D. Economic
1. Information on development plans. (C)
2. Government measures to stimulate economic activity and end
recession. (C)
3. Information on central government finance,budget deficit,
level of imports, foreign exchange holdings. (C)
4. Information on rice production. (C)
5. Impact of rural aid--rural self-help program. Information
on the development of the transportation system, FAL roads and air-
fields construction program. (C)
6. What are the economic relationships, if any, between RLP
deputies and CDNI leaders? (S)
E. Military
1. Information on organization, training and capabilities of
Laotian army. Developments affecting the capabilities of the Lao Army
to maintain internal security. (C)
-57-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release q0p/~892E: YIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East FURL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960)
LAOS (Continued)
E. Military (Continued)
:21,. Strength and training functions performed by French Mili-
tary Mission. Effectiveness of joint US-French training program. (C)
(C)
What is the effectiveness and loyalth of the police force.
4. Strength, location and activities of KMT forces in Laos.
How are they supplied? What is the attitude of the Laotian government
toward these troops'. (S)
5, Information on the political views or loyalties of key
military leaders. Is there a politically ambitious group within the
army. How "deep" is the alliance between the army and the CDNI? What
are the attitudes of junior officers towards the CDNI, the NLHZ, the
RLO? What are the degree of pro-NLHZ sentiment among troops? (S)
6. Location of Communist arms caches. Strength and location
of Communist guerrilla bands. How are they supplied? Degree of North
Vietnamese support and direction. Is cooperation of villages volun-
tary or result of intimidation.
7. Information on frontier situation; Laotian efforts to
check flow of refugees from China and-North Vietnam. Communist
strength and activities on borders, developments in disputed areas
on Laotian - North Vietnam border. (C)
8. Effectiveness of FAL civic action program. (C)
Approved For Release A0B/&/2E GTIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200082 g :c~A. DP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE
1, There is considerable interest in the new government of
Singapore. The political outlook of the new assembly members and
cabinet officers is of importance, especially the development of
voting blocs, and the identification of PAP assemblymen with the
moderate or extremist wings of their party. Also, the government's
attitude toward the United States as reflected in private remarks,
public statements, and actions. (C)
2. Malayan Communist Party, Current party strength, organiza-
tions, leadership activity, and policy. Extent and effectiveness of
military effort, Evidence of united front tactics in Malaya and
Singapore. Extent of subversion in the two areas; organizations
and individuals involved; direction by Chinese Communist Party, (S)
3. Chinese Communist Party:: Any evidence of CCP activity in
Singapore or Ma aya; extent an effectiveness. (S)
4. People's Action Part (PAP): Current activities and strength
in Singapore; all groups affiliated with the PAP or directed or in-
fluenced by it; names and biographics of individuals involved in PAP
and its affiliated and influenced organizations. Of particular in-
terest are any efforts to extend its activity into Federation of
Malaya or British Borneo. Also of great interest is any information
concerning pro-Communist moves to gain control of the party and
through it the government. Careful reporting of rivalry between LEE
KUAN YEW and LIM CHIN SIONG and other extreme leftist members of the
PAP is desired, Detailed coverage of PAP views on imprisoned PAP
leaders is desired. (S)
5. The Singapore Peo le's Alliance (SPA). Activities and
strength, ny progress toward deve aping mass support and of de-,
veloping effective opposition to the PAP government. (S)
6, Other Parties in Singapore: Activities and strength of the
Workers' Party, Liberal Socialists, Labor Front and Citizens' Party,
a, Any evidence of renewed far left-wing interest in the
.Workers' Party or Citizens Party? (C)
-59-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Releas -2000/0R8/E2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6 T
Far East PRL
(Guide Noe 1.64)
October 1959=January 1960
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE (Continued) 25X6A
8, Alliance- Any internal difficulties either among Alliance
member orj;,an-'izations or within those organizations? (S)
111. Information on the effect upon the strength of the MCA,
the Chinese component of the Alliance party, of any government policy
which morc? or less directly affects the Chinese population. (C)
b. Activities of the MCA rebels who broke away from the
party in mid-July, Any plan for establishing a new party? Efforts
to establish a link with the PAP, or leading members of it, Efforts
to force ,aL new break between the MCA and the Alliance? Activities
and plans of Lim Chong Eu, (C)
9. Opposition Parties in Malaya: Activities of the Peoples=
Progressive Party, the an-Ma ayan Islamic Party (IMIPP), Labor Party
of Malaya (LPM), and the People's Party (Partai Rakyat)a Evidence
of cooperation of any of these parties with the MCP. Cooperation
between the LPM and the People?s Party in a National Socialist Front
was announced in September 1957? Efforts to develop this coalition
into a merger, looking to coalition with the PMIP. Source of IMIP
financial backing? (C)
a, Activities and plans of opposition members in the Malayan
House of Representatives. (C)
lb, Any evidence that the National Front (a coalition of the
PMIP9 PMU' and Party Negara) or any individual element thereof is as-
suming sufficient strength to threaten UMNO support among the rural
Malays, (C)
10, New Parties- Any serious moves to form new parties in either
Malaya or Singapore, Details of voter registration in the Federation,
particularly racial breakdowns, (C)
ii, Religious Groups: What is the Communist influence in the
Islamic,'Hin u -and Christian communities? How is it exercised, and
how is it manifested? What evidence is there that religion per se
act as an obstacle to the spread of Communism or that they act: as a
vehicle for the spread of Communism? (C)
Approved For Release 2000/0822 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200Q2 R :lC K-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE (Continued)
12, Attitudes of all parties toward Communist peace moves and
united front tactics. (C)
a. Details on the selection, finances, biographic date
and plans of individuals attending Communist-sponsored meetings
abroad. (C)
13, "ny information on arms smuggling into Malaya? (S)
14. Any information of increased direct, or indirect, trade
with the Sino-Soviet bloc or plans to increase trade with the bloc? (C)
15. Any increase in criticism over presence of Commonwealth forces
in Malaya? Any evidence that either the MCP or the government is con-
sidering unilateral action to end the Emergency. Up-to-date data on
budgetary expenditures for internal security. (C)
16. The foreign policy of the Federation: growth of neutralism;
attitude toward the Anglo-Malayan defense treaty; pressures for recog-
nition of Red China; Indonesian influence on Malayan foreign policy.
Malaya/Singapore relations with various Asia-African groups. (C)
17. Any signs of deterioration or improvement of race relations
among Malay, Chinese, and Indian elements of the population? (C)
18. Volume and pattern of illicit barter traffic entering Malaya
and Singapore from disaffected areas of Indonesia. Information con-
cerning activity in Malaya/Singapore to provide military-logistical
support to armed dissident groups in Indonesia. (S)
19, Estimates of Communist and pro-Communist membership in the
Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC) and its component unions. Details
of organized labor's participation in left-wing politics at local and
national levels. Parallel information for the Singapore Trade Union
Congress (STUC). (S)
20. Organization, leadership, strength and activities of Communist
cells in the school system, especially the Chinese middle schools.
Evidence of Communist controls over non-Communist students, signs of
Communist or ultranationalist tendencies among students. (S)
-61-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST.
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
MONGOLIA
A. Political
1. Mongolia has long been regarded as a Soviet satellite. (C)
a. How much evidence is there of a rise in either Chinese
influence or Mongolian nationalism? (C)
2. Current influence, popular prestige, and relative position
in the hierarchy of the following figures: (C)
a.
Y. Tsedenbal
(C)
b.
c.
L. Tsende (C)
TS. Dugursuren
(C)
d.
D. Balzhinian
(C)
f.
S. Sambu (C)
N. Zhagvaral
(C)
g.
D. Molomzhants
(C)
h.
D. Tumur-Ochir
(C)
i.
Genden (C)
3. What has been the fate of those individuals who were
demoted or purged in the 30 March 1959 shakeup?
4. What were the real reasons behind the events of 30 March,
and how firmly based is the present regime's power?
5. Present influence, membership, and leadership of mass
organizations, such as: (C)
a. Mongolian Workers' Union. Mongolian trade unions
Central Council. (C)
-63-
Approved For Release 2008/0 /~2 YIRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
MONGOLIA (Continued)
A. Political (Continued)
5. b. Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. (C)
c. Federation of Mongolian Working Women. (C)
d. The Mongolian Peace Committee. (C)
6. Data is needed regarding the shake-up of November 1958 in
which Tsendenbal resumed leadership of both party and government, (C)
'7. How do Mongols, particularly the professional classes, view
their relations with the Communist bloc and with the non-Communist
world? (C)
83. How deeply do foreign influences pervade Mongolian life?
19. Is there any pan-Mongol sentiment, or a desire for greater
ties with Inner Mongolia? (C)
]t). Are the people basically hostile toward the regime, or do
they take pride in its achievements? (C)
I.J. Is there evidence of groupings within the hierarchy based
on personal loyalties? (C)
12. By what means does the Mongolian People?s Revolutionary
(Communist) Party exert control? (C)
a. How efficient is control? Is there nepotism within
the party? (C)
13. Data regarding Mongolian courts and legal procedures.
Are there any characteristics peculiar to the Mongolian judicial
system? (C)
14. Any recent information on ID cards, travel permits,
curfews, and other restrictions to personal movement? (C)
15. How successful has the government been in resettling
herders? (C)
-64-
Approved For Release 2000/08/2R2 0/08R/2E TCIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S
 Approved For Release 20001P$2a : CIp,\ DP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959=January 1960
MONGOLIA (Continued)
A. Political (Continued)
15. a. How do the herders regard the resettlement program?
Additional data on opposition to it. What percent of herds are actually
left in private herds? (C)
b. Are herders still allowed to bear arms? (C)
c. What bearing do the new administrative divisions have
on the cooperativization? (C)
d. How far has the announced 100% cooperativization of
herders gone in fact? (C)
16. Any recent changes in personnel and organization of
government ministries? (C)
17. Comment on present Mongolian educational facilities: (C)
a. Curriculum and quality of instruction. (C)
b. What percentage of texts are in Mongolian? (C)
c. Have the number of technical schools increased? (C)
18. Any information on the size and functions of the Com-
mission on Science and Education? (C)
19. What is the present role, number, and importance of Soviet
and Chinese advisors in Mongolia? (C)
a.
b.
c.
Are they housed separately? (C)
Do they mix socially with the Mongolians? (C)
Are Chinese laborers employed on state farms?
(C)
d.
Are their salaries paid by Mongolia? (C)
20. To what extent are the Russian and Chinese languages
understood? (C)
21. Any information on the diplomatic community.
-65-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release S2 E00/0R8/2E2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRI,
(Guide No, 1.64)
October 1959-January 1960
MONGOLIA (Continued)
A. Political. (Continued)
22, Data regarding efforts to become a member of or partici-
pate in international organizations and conferences? (C)
B. Economic
1, What is the current economic and financial status of
Mongolia? (C)
2? To what extent is Mongolia dependent on economic support-
a. From Communist China? (C)
b, From the USSR? (C)
3? Has the establishment of communes in Communist China had
any impact? '(C)
4, Have there been any revisions in the current Three=Year
Plan? (C)
Approved For Release 20O% Y8/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R.E T
 Approved For Release 20&2 : ]pFik-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 ? 31 January 1960)
NATIONALIST CHINA
A Political - International
The Chinese Communist threat to the offshore islands continues
to present the Chinese Nationalist Government with difficult problems.
Accordingly, the state of Nationalist morale, degree of political
stability, degree of Communist influence and infiltration, relations
between important factions, attitudes of the native Taiwanese in the
situation9 and the intentions of the government in regard to the
offshore islands crisis are prime intelligence targets. (C)
1, What is the current thinking of the government in regard
to the offshore island problem? Are there any hostile actions being
planned without consultation with US officials? Is there any possi-
bility the Nationalists could be induced to withdraw from the islands
during the foreseeable future? What is the true status of the supply
situation on the offshore islands? What is the significance of the
254capable airfield now under construction on Kinmen? (C)
3, Which senior Nationalist officials tend to be most sym-
pathetic with American policy and cooperative with American officials?
Are there any indications of significant anti-American feeling among
Nationalist officialdom? Is there any evidence indicating that GRC
officials are stirring up anti-American feeling? Is there significant
anti-American feeling on Taiwan? If so, how strong is it? What views
regarding the US are inculcated in KMT members and through the Youth
Corps and the school system, in the youth? (C)
4, Do any Nationalist officials, in private conversations,
indicate a personal willingness to accept a "Two Chinas" solution to
the Taiwan problem? Is there any support for a ceasefire in the
Taiwan Strait? What officials favor reducing the size of the Armed
Forces? If such views are held by any officials, what is the impact,
present or potential, on GRC stability and policy? Are these views
reflected in any groups of the population, and, if so, which? (C)
-67-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release jy/08/22 E: T CIA-RDP62-00328AO00200170001-6
R
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959-January 1960
NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)
B. Political - Internal
1. What new cliques or factions are in the process of
formation within the KMT? What are the strengths of competing cliques
within the party? (C)
2, What is likely to take place in the event of President
Chiang's death? What indications are there that anyone other than
Vice President Chen Cheng will succeed to the presidency? (U)
3, What if any group on Taiwan might attempt to seize power
unconstitutionally at the time of the Gimo's death? (U)
4. What steps are being taken either to liberalize or to
tighten controls over the populace? What measures are being taken to
curb the press? (C)
5. Continuing information is desired upon the relative poli--
tical strengths-of Chen and Chiang Ching-kuo, What effect do President
Chiang's -third--term plans have on relations between Chen Cheng and
Chiang Ching-kuo? Who are.Chiang Ching-kuo's chief supporters in the
Kuomintang; and military? (C)
6, Are there any indications of failing health on the part
of President Chiang, Vice President Chen or Chiang Ching-kuo? (U)
Or. Continuing information is desired on a possible shake-up
within either the Nationalist Government or the KMT. (C)
8. Are there significant indications of graft and corruption
within the Nationalist Government and the KMT? If so, what is the
extent? What is the extent of possible corruption on provincial and
local levels of government? Does awareness of corruption, or sus=
picion that it exists constitute a serious morale factor? How serious
is the problem of corruption within the security services? Is there
corruption in the armed forces? (C)
!31. What are the attitudes toward the administration of young
officers of the armed services? Of low and middle-level officials?
Of member:-, of "opposition" parties? (U)
111), Who are President Chiang's principal advisors? Which
ones are gaining or losing influence? What is the relative degree of
influence. of the following and what are the significant views of each?
(U)
Approved For Release 200098122 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2009IV/~2 R c ArRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959=January 1960
NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)
B. Political - Internal (Continued)
Chang Chun
Chang Tao-fan
Chen Cheng
Chiang Ching-kuo
Chou Chih-jou
Ho Ying-chin
Peng Meng-chi
Mme Chiang Kai-Shek
George K. C. Yeh
Yu Ta-wei
Dr. Hu Shih
Wang Shu-ming ("Tiger" Wang)
Sampson Shen
Wang Shih-Chieh
Huang Shao-ku
Yang Chi-tseng
Tang Tsung
11. More information is needed on the Legislative and Control
Yuans. What efforts are being made to restore discipline in the Legis-
lative and Control Yuans? (U)
12. What is the state of morale of:
a. Nationalist Government and army personnel. Is there
any consistent pattern of differences in morale at various levels?
Of friction among the armed services? (U)
b. The mainland population on Taiwan? (U)
c. The native Taiwanese population? (U)
13. What measures is the Nationalist Government taking to
control Taiwanese political activity? Is their influence in the
government and Kuomintang increasing or decreasing? How concerned
is the GRC, what is KMT policy on this point, and how is it implemented?
What are Taiwanese prospects for election in the 1960 local elections?
Is the government hindering operation of the Kung Lim Pao? What is
Taiwanese reaction to the paper's closing? (C)
14. What is the current attitude of the native Taiwanese to
the regime? Are relations between mainlanders and Taiwanese improving?
What is the attitude of Taiwanese recruits in the service? Is there
opposition to the theme of "return to the mainland"? What is the state
of morale of Taiwanese soldiers on the offshore islands? What specifi-
cally is the attitude of the Taiwanese student elements toward the
regime and what is their potential for future leadership in opposition
activities? What is the attitude of the rural population, and of the
residents of cities outside Taipei, particularly in Tainan, the
traditional center of Taiwanese opposition. What is the general atti-
tude of the Taiwanese in the armed forces? (U)
Approved For Release 2000/08/2- ClA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/08//22 :T CIA-RDP62-00328AO00200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-=January 1960
NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)
B. Political - Internal (Continued)
15. What practical measures have been taken to improve the
internal security situation in Taipei and other cities since 1957?
How well'are the police and other security services now prepared to
cope with sudden outbursts by the civilian population? What is the
status of the pedicab element? Is it a potential threat to order? (C)
16, Will President Chiang Kai-shek run for a third term in
1960? How will the constitutional impediment be circumvented? (U)
17. Information is needed on the position of political offi-
cers in the Armed Services and thr rise or decline of influence of the
KMT and the General Political Department of the Ministry of National
Defense. (C)
113. What is the extent of KMT influence on schools and other
public private institutions? What are the attitudes toward indoctrina-
tion in the San Min Chu I? Is there any feeling in the KMT that the
Three Peoples' Principles ought to be revised or discussed in a more
realistic fashion? (C)
1-9. What is the current status of the Local Self-Government
Study Group? (U)
C. Communist Influence
1, Information is desired on all offers of "negotiations"
of the status of Taiwan made overtly or covertly to individual Chinese
Nationalist leaders, Is there any evidence of instances in which such
offers have received a favorable reception? Have recent developments
increased or decreased receptivity to such offers? (U)
2. What is the scope and extent of Chinese Communist
clandestine activity in Taiwan? (C)
3, Is there any evidence that the Taiwanese as a class or
Taiwanese independence groups are receptive to Communist. overtures? (U)
4. What reception is given on Taiwan to Chinese Communist
propaganda broadcasts? What reception does Chinese Communist propaganda
reeeiv'e`On:tle W -shore islands? By what means does propaganda reach
Taiwan? .(U)
Approved For Release 20001 T22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 20O0/p8 j2?: cl.~-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959=January 1960
NATIONALIST CHINA (Taiwan) (Continued)
C. Communist Influence (Continued)
5. Continuing information is desired on the number of in-
dividuals--civilian and military--defecting to the China mainland. (U)
6. Continuing information is desired on persons arrested
as Communist suspects. (C)
D. Economic
What is the likelihood of a. reactivation of the Central Banks
of China as de facto central bank? Similarly what are the prospects
of the other non-operating banks and the role of each to the other
and to the Bank of Taiwan? Are plans being made to issue currency
in larger denominations? (U)
2. How does the GRC's policy of price stabilization affect
such groups in the economy as government employees and teachers,
farmers, fishermen and city laborers? How do these groups assess
their present living conditions and their immediate future in terms
of real income, promotion prospects, family needs? (U)
-71-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 25X6A
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200008/22 :: C$ATRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
NORTH KOREA
A. Political - Internal
1. What effect did the reported 1957-58 purge of army of-
ficers have on morale and military effectiveness? (C)
2. Comment on degree of influence, popular prestige, and
relative position in hierarchy of following figures: (C)
Kim Il-sung
Nam I1
Yi Chong-ok
Choe Yong-kun
Yim Hae
Han Sol-ya
Kim Il
Yi Hyo-sun
Yi Chu-yon
Pak Chong-ae
Chong Il-yong
Han Sang-tu
Pak Kum-chol
Yi IL-kyong
Kim Ik-sun
Kim Kwang-hyop
Kim Chang-man
Ha Ang-chon
3. Any evidence that the designation of Kim Ii as First
Deputy Premier indicates his selection as Kim Il-sung's heir apparent.
4. Have any new members been added to the Central Committee
to replace individuals purged since August 1956? If so, who? (C)
5. Any information on the removal of Han Sol-ya, Ko Chun-
taek, Kang Yong-chang, Chu Hwang-sop, Ho Song-taek from cabinet
posts in September 1958? (C)
6. Any information on the functioning of North Korean gov-
ernment ministries, including personnel policies and the jurisdiction
of the various ministries? (C)
7. Recent developments within the Korean Labor Party hier-
archy? (C)
a. Any evidence of groupings based on personal loyal-
b. Any evidence of ideological splits? (C)
-?7-
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20,1000 ,12 EC A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
A.
Political - Internal (Continued)
7.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Shifts in personnel and their significance. (C)
Any indications of party discipline and morale. (C)
New techniques of party control over government? (C)
Indications of change in status of "puppet parties."
8. Are there any indications that the Korean Labor Party
believes_; it necessary to adapt standard Soviet doctrine to meet the
particular circumstances of North Korean development? (C)
a. In what aspects of party policy does North Korea
slavishly follow the Soviet Union? (C)
b. Are there indications that the Chinese Communist
Party is looked to as a source of doctrinal guidance--especially
with respect to the establishment of rural communes and small-scale
industrial establishments? If so, is this tendency increasing? (C)
c. What has been the effect of the industrial reorgan-
ization and decentralization moves announced in August 1959? (C)
9. In the reorganization of agricultural cooperatives into
large "amalgamated" units is there mention of indebtedness to Chi-
nese Communist or Soviet experience? Are Chinese communes cited as
models to be emulated. (C)
10. The Kaesong District has received favored treatment in
the past: from the Pyongyang government. What are the observable re-
sults of this treatment? Are there any indications that such treat-
ment is being modified? (C)
11. Any information on capacity, curriculum, and quality of
instruction in North Korean educational institutions? (C)
a. Number of primary and secondary schools? (C)
b. Proportion which provide only part-time instruction?
(C)
c. Extent to which compulsory middle schools education
is enforced? (C)
Approved For Release 2090Lb0W2 A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/220 CIA RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
A. Political - Internal (Continued)
~C)
11. d. Number of technical middle schools and curriculum?
e. University enrollment and subjects emphasized? (C)
f. Where did the professors receive their training? (C)
12. In schools and party groups, what political writings
are discussed? (C)
a. Are Mao Tse-tung's works stressed? (C)
13. Among North Korean students studying abroad what pro-
portion go to Communist China and the Soviet Union? (C)
a. Is there any relationship between their place of
study and the jobs obtained on their return? (C)
b. Is there correlation between.pl.ace of study And
party status or political reliability? (C)
c. Information on activities and numbers of North
Korean students in other bloc countries. (East Germany, Czechos-
lovakia, etc). (C)
14. Any information on plans or activities for increased
subversion, and infiltration in the RKO. (C)
B. Foreign Affairs
1. What measures are being taken to unify Korea? (C)
2. Are there any indications that North Korea is softening
its defiance of UN recommendations regarding elections? (C)
3. Any indications that following the Chinese Communist
troops withdrawal Peiping is actively assisting Pyongyang in muster-
ing support among Afro-Asian nations? (C)
4. Any information on North Korean tactics in attempting
to gain greater international acceptability? (C)
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release OJ /@8j2 : f IA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRIJ
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)
4,. a. Information on the treatment accorded visiting dele-
gations. (C)
b. What methods are employed in North Korea's efforts
to gain non-Bloc recognition? (C)
5. Indications of number, rank, and quality of foreign
a. How long do they remain in Korea? (C)
b. How are their living conditions? (C)
c. Do they mix easily with the local inhabitants? Are
the Soviet more aloof than the Chinese? (C)
?5X1X4 7. What measures have been taken to prepare for the reset-
telement of repatriates from Japan in the event Korean residents in
Japan are allowed to return to North Korea? (C)
a. Are the repatriates receiving preferential treat-
ment? (C)
b. How are they adjusting to life in NIK? (C)
8. Any information on contacts between North and South
Korea? (C)
9. Any information on possible military alliances between
North Korea and China or the Soviet Union. Also relations with
other bloc members. (C)
C. Military
1. North Korean military capabilities, especially in re-
lationship to ROK forces. (C)
a. Changes in size of forces. (C)
Approved For Release 2O0248/22E C IA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/2E2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
C. Military (Continued)
14 b. Introduction of new weapons and equipment. (C)
c. North Korean airforce strength and capabilities and
introduction of new equipment. (C)
2. Is North Korean military doctrine influenced appreciably
by either Soviet or Chinese doctrine? (C)
3. Size of Chinese Communist military force (probably
liaison) remaining in North Korea. (C)
4. Nature of Chinese Communist military assistance with
respect to continuing logistics support. (C)
5. Morale of North Korean troops. (C)
(C)
6. Relationship of Political officer to commanding officer.
7. Personnel shifts in the high command, with appropriate
biographic information where available. (C)
8. Any information of military production including the
manufacture of arms, ammunition, and military equipment. (C)
9. Battle tactics of all components. (C)
D. Economic
1. Communes
a. Recent reports assert that North Korea is in the
process of adopting a commune system similar to that in Communist
China. (C) As of August 1959, however, the Pyongyang regime has
not announced the adoption of communes. We would like to know if
North Korea actually has adopted or.is planning to adopt communes
on a nationwide scale, or if experimentation is being carried out
anywhere. .(U)
2.1 Agriculture
a. North Korea announced plans to increase total grain
production to 5 million tons in 1959, a 1.1'million ton increase over
last year's production. (C)
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20R0/EQT2i :,C4-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PR L
(Guide No,, 164)
October 1959 January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
D. Economic (Continued)
2. a. (1) What was the claimed production for 1959? (U)
(2) What have been the effects of recent irrigation
and flood control efforts on the 1959 crops? What crop losses were
suffered, from drought and flood? tU)
(3) What is the current total irrigated areacin
North Korea, by area under permanent irrigation and that irrigation
where water is not completely controlled? (U)
(4) What is the distribution of irrigated land
among the various crops? (U)
(5) What part of the 1959 sown area was deep-
plowed? To what depths? For which crops? How has this affected
yields? (U)
(6) How have increased seeding rates and close
planting affected crop yields? To what extent and on what crbps
were these agro-techniques practiced? (U)
b. Amalgamation of the agricultural cooperatives in
October 1958 was to pave the way for agricultural mechanization in
North Korea. Plans call for the delivery of 5,600 tractos to the
countryside in 1959.
(1) What is being done to meet this goal? (U)
(2) What part of the 1959 cultivated area was
farmed mechanically? How does this figure compare with that for
1958? (U)
(3) Are these areas producing greater yields than
those-being farmed by traditional methods? If so, how much? (U)
(4) What crops are involved in these mechanized
farming operations? To what degree for each? (U)
c. How much chemical fertilizer was supplied to the
countryside for the 1959 crops? What was the distribution among the
various Crops .and what were the respective rates of application? To
what degree was the chemical fertilizer supply augmented by the ap-
plication of manure, compost and other organic-materials? (U)
-82-
Approved For Release20j@0e0W2j CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200%!0 / 2 a (AApRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
D. Economic (Continued)
2. de Fruits, especially apples and pears, are the major
export of North Korea. Except in some of the northern'mountainous
regions, fruit can be produced anywhere in the country. Plans have
been formulated to greatly increase fruit production within the
coming two or three years, and it has been reported that already in
1959 increased amounts of chemical fertilizer and insecticides have
been made available to fruit farms. (U)
(1) What amounts of these factors of production
have been supplied to fruit farms? How does this compare with pre-
vious years? (U)
(2) What is total fruit production for 1959? How
much of it is to be exported and what is its value in terms of trade?
(U)
ea Taxes-in-kind for grain (including potatoes) were
recently reduced from 22.4 percent to 10 percent and in the future
are to vary between agricultural regions. (U)
(1) Has this reduction been adhered to with respect
to the 1959 crops? (U)
(2) What are the procurement figures for the various
grain and industrial crops? (U)
(3) Has there been a difference in procurement be-
tween the various agricultural regions as scheduled? (U)
(4) How have the current procurement schedules
affected the food ration in North Korea? (U)
3. Transportation
a. The Central Statistics Bureau of the North Korean
Government announced large increases in transport performance during
1958-59. Apparently these increases are being achieved by large in-
creases in inventory of railroad equipment and motor trucks, by im-
provement in operating efficiency and by intensive use of existing
equipment. (C)
Approved For Release MORON :FCl -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20QA/p8 22 : 9Cl#-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East ;PRL
(Guide No, 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
NORTH KOREA (Continued)
D. Economic (Continued)
3. as (1) What is the present inventory of railroad
freight cars, locomotives, motor trucks, and busses, (S)
(2) How many freight cars, locomotives, trucks,
and busses were imported or produced in North Korea during 1959? (C)
(3) Are there indications that the present inven-
tory is being used intensively without proper maintenance? (C)
(4) What was the-average load per loaded freight
car in North Korea during 1959 or during any part of the year? (S)
4. Telecommunications
Television services is not yet available in North Korea.
Information is requested on the possible construction of television
broadcasting facilities in the country in the near future. (S)
5. Iron and Steel
a. During the latter half of 1958 North Korea indicated
that in order to fulfill the growing demand for iron and steel ma-
terial's, and at the same time conserve foreign exchange, the con-
structc+n of local enterprises was to be implemented on a wide scale.
In recent months the North Korean Central News Agency has disclosed
that the construction of local iron and steel plants is being car-
ried out. (U)
(1) What is the anticipated production from the
local plants? What is the quality of the output? (C)
(2) How is the responsibility for administering and
financing of the local plants divided among the Central, Provincial
and County authorities? (C)
(3) Has Communist China aided North Korea in the
development of the local plant program with plans, equipment or
technical personnel? (C)
Approved For Release 280 /0 / 2 E 6A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20RO O8J22 :EC~A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959-31 January 1900)
NORTH VIETNAM
A. Political
North Vietnam's failure to obtain unification elections
in July 1956 and the indefinite postponement of a new Geneva
conference have apparently frustrated Hanoi's short range attempts
to unify Vietnam, although the goal of an all-Communist Vietnam
remains. Any information on North Vietnam's efforts to achieve
unification through possible military action, subversion, economic
warfare, or negotiation remains an important intelligence target. (C)
1. What is the nature and extent of Communist infiltration
and subversive tactics: (C)
a. In South Vietnam? (C)
b. In Laos? How much control does Hanoi exert
over the NLHZ? (C)
c. In Cambodia? (C)
2. What are the leading Lao Dong Party and DRVirgovernme't
offices and personnel'in"North Vietnam concerned with subversion
activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia? (C)
3. How much success is the regime having in subverting
tribal elements in central Vietnam? (C)
a. How effective are the native language broadcasts
which Hanoi beams to the montagnards? (C)
4. Among Hanoi's leaders whose stature appears to be
rising and whose falling? (C)
a. What is the relative stature of Le Duan, Truong
Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Vo Nguyen
Giap. Are there any dark horses? (C)
b. Does Ho Chi Minh still have a firm grasp on the
party and government apparatus? Any information on the state of
his health? '(C)
Approved For Release 200002 2 :RCLA- tDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
NORTH VIETNAM (Continued) Far East PRL
`-" (Guide No. 164)
A. Political (Continued) October 1959-January 1960
5. Information ono (C)
a. Any reorganization of the party or government
hierarchy and the development of factions in the DRY or Lao Dong
party leadership. Is there any indication of a split in the
leadership between civilian and military elements as based on
who worked in the North and who in the South during the war years?(C)
b. Lao Dong Party or DRV government policy. Evidence
of the party's attitude toward international Communism, Titoism,`
revisionism and Chinese modifications of Marxist theory. (C)
c. Indications that the Lao Dong Party intends to.
convoke an all-party congress. Proceedings of such a congress
including?; information on membership in such bodids as the Central
Committee, Politburo and other central organs, (C)
d. Number of party members and procedures for joining
the party, particularly information on numbers currently being
recruited by the party. Is this being done on a regular basis? (C)
15. First hand information on: (C)
a. The functioning of any North Vietnamese Government
-services. The powers and duties of the Scientific :Research Board
is of particular interest. (C)
b. New provincial boundaries and streamlining of
internal administration. What effect will the abolition of
interzone!s ihav'e on government administration? (C)
c. Any evidence, of dissidence or resistance to the
Hanoi regime? How are the intellectuals faring under the Communist
regime? (C)
d. In particular, is there a possibility of serious
dissidence occurring among teachers and journalists? (C)
7'. To what extent have local leaders penetrated the
Buddhist and Roman Catholic clergy? (C)
8. How are the peasants reacting to pressure to join
cooperatives? (C)
9,. Information on the implementation and implications
of the conscription program.
Approved For ReIeases 2009/0$/252T CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20000ly2t2 RC`iRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
NORTH VIETNAM (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
B. Foreign Affairs October 1959-January 1960
1. What is the nature and extent of aid to North Vietnam
from the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries? Any available data or
estimates of quantities of military equipment being sent to North
Vietnam from the Bloc? (C)
2. What is the extent of Chinese Communist and Soviet
influence on Hanoi's affairs? (C)
3. What are North Vietnamese intentions toward Laos? (C)
a. To what extent have they cadred the insurgent
movement in northern Laos? (C)
b. Is there any concrete evidence that DRV regulars
were employed? (C)
c. Was the decision to take a stand on Laos unanimously
arrived at by the leadership, or was there dissension over the issue
in top party ranks? (C)
d. What are the minimum terms on which the Communists
would settle the Laotian issue? (C)
4. Is there any possibility of formal diplomatic relations
with Cambodia? (C)
5. Any information on the development of diplomatic and
economic contacts with non-Orbit countries? (C)
6. What is the attitude of the regime toward the Inter-
national Control Commission? Particularly in regard to Laos? (C)
7. What is the attitude of the regime towards the Overseas
Vietnamese in Thailand, Cambodia and New Caledonia? How do the
Vietnamese in Thailand view repatriation to NVN? What activities
are the DRV representatives in Bangkok taking part in? (C)
C. Military
1. Organization of the Defense Ministry. (C)
2. Nature of Chinese Communist military assistance with
respect to continuing logistics support. (C)
3. Number and position of ChiCom military personnel in
North Vietnamese armed forces. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/089;: CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
NORTH VIETNAM (Continued) Far Zast PRL
(Guide No. 164)
C. Military (Continued) October-1959-January 1960
4. Morale of North Vietnamese troops. (C)
5. Relation of Political officer to Commanding officer. (C)
6. Introduction of new types of weapons and equipment. (C)
7. Any information pertaining to newly organized Air
Force, but; specifically type of training, location of training sites,
types of equipment, and organizational structure. (C)
8. Any information pertaining to North Vietnamese Navy.
Its organization, personnel strength, training, mission, equipment,
etc. (C)
9. Personnel shifts in the: high command with appropriate
biographic information where available. (C)
10. Degree of Soviet influence in NV armed forces and
attitude of North Vietnamese to Soviets. (C)
11. Any information of military production including the
manufacture or arms, ammunition, and military equipment. (C)
12. Battle tactics of all components. (C)
13. Strategic role of North Vietnamese armed forces as
envisagedby NV high command. (C)
D. Economic
1. Agriculture
a. During the first six months of 1959 the speed-up
in agricultural socialization resulted in an increase of from 4 per
cent to almost 20 per cent in the number of peasant families organ-
ized into cooperatives of at least an elementary form. The Three
Year Plan(1958--60) requires that by the end of 1960 all peasants
be organized into cooperatives; the pace of the program, therefore,
will have to be accelerated if this goal is to be met. It is felt.
that any such speed-up in socialization would be resented by the
peasantryand would be met with at least some passive resistance.(U)
(1) What pressures are being used to induce
middleclass peasants to join collectives and how effective are
they? (U)
-88-
Approved For Release J0C80%0T2Z2, : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/0
.L8/a2R QJAfRDP62-00328A000200170001-6
NORTH VIETNAM (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
D. Economic (Continued) October 1959-January 1960
1. Agriculture (Continued)
a. (2) How successful have middle-class peasants been
in resisting pressures to join collectives? What portion of the
peasant population belong to the middle-class? What proportion of
the total farm land is in the hands of: (a) Poor (formerly land-
less peasants) peasants, (b) small peasants, (c) middle-peasants,
(d) rich peasants, and (e) landlord? (U) These are the five
categories of landowners in North Vietnam.
(3) What are the prospects of a full-scale
collectivization campaign in late 1959 or early 1960? Which
class(es) of peasants would be affected most economically by such
a campaign? (U)
(4) How reliable are Communist claims that per
unit production of agricultural commodities on Agricultural
Production Cooperatives and higher type collectives is larger
than on Independent farms? (U)
b. Communist regime propaganda has been replete with
claims of a higher level of food consumption, self-sufficiency in
agricultural production, increased exports of agricultural commodities,
and substantial increases in the yields of almost all crops. (U)
(1) How does, the level of food consumption in
1959 in rural and urban areas compare. with that in 1958?
(Quantitative comparisons if possible) (U)
(2) How does the volume of government-procured
food commodities in 1958/59 compare with that in the previous
year? (U)
(3) What evidences--quantitatively--are there of
increased exports and less imports of agricultural commodities in
1958/59 and 1959/60 compared with 1957/58 and earlier years? (U)
(4) What evidences exist--other than official
claims--that yield and production of crops, especially rice, in
1959, exceeded those in previous years? (U)
(5) How effective has the irrigation system been
in providing adequate water for crops during-the dry season--spring
and early summer--and in minimizing flood damage in the wet season--
late summer and autumn? (U)
-89-
Approved For Release 2002 I : LCI,~-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
NORTH VIETNAM (Continued) Far East FR]L
(Guide No. '164)
D. Economic (Continued) October 1959-January 1960
1. Agriculture (Continued)
c. Although the regime has generally stated that it
does not intend to institute Chinese-style communes now, a recent
Hanoi press-report (as yet unverified) states that a commune-type
establishment has been organized at Xuan Quan in the Red River
Delta for the workers of the Bac Hung Hai irrigation project. We
would like verification of this report, as well as any other
information on similar schemes to establish communes, (U)
2. Trade
a. We particularly need information on the level
of and commodity breakdown of North Vietnam's imports and exports,
as well as on how the DRV's chronic deficit in the balance-of-payments
with other Bloc countries is being financed. Is there any evidence
to support a hypothesis that this deficit is carried, on a continuing
basis, on the books of other-;Bloc nations? Have any of the long-term
credits extended by the bloc countries been used to cover this deficit?
(U)
Transportation
a. There have been recent reports indicating that the
Hanoi--P'ing-hsiang railway is to be converted from meter (3' 3 3/8")
gauge to standard Chinese (4' 8 1/2") gauge. (S)
(1) Is the work now actually in progress? (S)
(2) Has conversion been planned or begun on the
Hanoi--Lao Kay line? (S)
4. Telecommunications
a. Currently, there are no microwave radio relay
facilities in North Vietnam. Information is requested on the the
possible construction of such facilities. (S)
5. Zinc
a. The zinc smelter,at Quang Yen (20-56N; 106-48E)
was severely damaged during World-War II, and we have received no
conclusive reports that it has been rehabilitated. However,
there have been recent indications that the first attempts at reha-
bilitation may now be in progress. Is there any current activity
at the plant? (U)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2009'%8112a glA1RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959-31 January 1960)
to Information is requested on popular reaction to the
Garcia administration, key figures and advisers to the President,
prospects for government integrity and efficiency as a result of
the various investigations now underway, the operation of the PCAFE,
proposals to establish an anti-graft court, and extent of sub-
mission to political and economic (special interest) pressures. (C)
a, Factions in ruling Nacionalista Party and
identification of any strong opposition or challenge to President
Garcia, Possible opposition to Garcia from the armed forces. (C)
b. Plans or moves of Garcia to counteract such opposition;
any indication of a plan by Garcia to make the armed forces his
personal instrument of power. (C)
2. Candidates, maneuvers and prospects in November 1959
senatorial and local elections. (C)
a. Any indications of a revival of an opposition
coalition between Liberals and Progressive or Liberals and grand
Alliance. (C)
bo Indications of irregularities or violence in
conduct of the elections. (C)
3. Role of opposition Vice President Macapagal in
Nacionalista administration, as well' as his role in Liberal
party planning activities and hierarchy. Attempts of various
factions within the Liberal Party to gain control. (C)
4. General character and capability of Congress. Extent
of coordination or conflict between the executives and legislative
branches. (C)
5. Influence on the administration of pressure groups
or special interest groups, such as the sugar;bloc, the Catholic
Church, etc. (C)
6. Role of Philippine public opinion; influence of
press, radio, periodic publications, etc. (U)
Approved For Release 20%0//8 2I : cl4 -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 21000/008//2 T2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
PHILIPPINES (Continued) Far East PILL
.(Guide No. '164)
A. Political - Internal (font' d) Oct. 1959-January 1960
"t. Trends and variants in Philippine nationalism.
Significant manifestations of nationalist sentiment in politics,
commerce,. education, and,..religion. (C)
8. Political developments in the provinces. Provincial
attitudes: toward the central government. -Differences in attitude
toward the central government. Differences in attitude 'between
the urban and rural populace. Activities of opposition parties
in key provinces affecting national political. strengths. (C)
9. Events reflecting religiou.$: influence in politics.
Developmeittts in the controversy over separation of church and
state. Recto's influence on Protestant minority groups in view
of his stand in favor of separation of church and state. (U)
10. Political orientation of minority groups. 'Developments
in the integration of these groups into Philippine national life. (C)
11.. Characteristics and attitudes of the various socio-eco-
nomic groups in Philippine society. (U)
121. Development of chauvinism, neutralism or other
extremist ideas directed against the Western anti-Communist alliance.
Development of"support for the idea of "positive nationalism"--i.e.,
the idea of channeling patriotic energies into the activities of
building'and'improving the nation rather than into chauvinism,
xenophobia, "Asian neutralism", etc. Activities of National
Progress Movement (K11HB) or other nationalist organizations (PLECNA,
LYSEREE, etc.). (C)
B. Communism
1. Communist Party policy, strategy, and tactics (Party
line); Party education and propaganda (S)
2:.
Party structure and leadership; finance; communications,
including
groups.
in
(S)
particular contacts with foreign Communist parties or
(S)
3.
Party membership; strength, composition, capabilities.
4.
Party front organizations and infiltration, including,
a. HMB (Huk) and military activities, (5)
b. Students and youth; peasants; workers. (S)
Approved For Release S 2100S/018/222 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T .
PHILIPPINES (Continued) Par East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
B. Communism (Continued) Oct. 1959-January 1960
4. c. Middle-upper class intelligentsia, including
especially NCP and other chauvinist nationalist groups such as
KMB; tie-in with Cipriano Cid and certain other labor leaders or
with KMP. (S)
d. Effect of Supreme Court. decisions granting bail to
imprisoned Communists.. Activities of released prisoners, if any. (C)
5. Communist espionage and intelligence. (S)
6. Chinese component of the Communist Party: policies,
activities,and membership; relations with Filipino Communists and
with the Communist Party of China. (S)
7. Government anti-Communist measures. In particular
legal prosecution of Communist leaders; status of prominent
Communists under government indictment, effectiveness of 1957 anti-
subversion law and of government agencies.
8. Extent of influence of USSR activities or international
Communist line on CPP propaganda or tactics. (S)
9. What evidence is there that religion per se acts as
an obstacle to the spread of Communism or, on the other hand, that
it acts as a vehidle for the spread of Communism? (C)
10. Communist offers of economic assistance and possible
Philippine interest. (C)
(C)
C. Foreign Relations
1. Attitudes toward. US, including: (C)
a. Reaction to US attitude toward Garcia administration.
bo Reaction to US foreign policy in the Far East. (C)
c. Bases rights and operations. (C)
d. Criticism of US-Philippine defense and trade
arrangements, economic assistance, implementation of agreed credits,
etc., which could weaken Philippine orientation toward US. (C)
2. Alien activities among minority groups. (C)
Approved For Release 2090J08/2R :EC1 -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0812Z: : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R
PHILIPPINES (Continued) Far Fast PRL
(Guide Na. 164)
Oct. 1959-January 1960
B. Communism (Continued)
'3. Interest in, or support for, neutralist policies of
ard SEATO, Asian countries. Attitude tow, Asian-African
cooperation, including extent of cooperation or disillusionment
with either. (S)
4. General relations with other Southeast Asian or Asian
countries in political, economic, cultural, military :field.
Interest in SEA regional cooperation. (C)
5. Desire for trade with, economic aid from, or cultural
contacts with, Sino-Soviet Bloc, Any indications of Philippine or
Soviet--initiated moves in this direction. Any trips to orbit by
Filipinos or attempts to contact Bloc officials in other countries.
(S)
16. Nature of implementation of Japanese reparations
including; any signs of disagreement, discontent, malversation in
handling reparations. Japanese activities in Philippine business.(C)
7. Attitude of Garcia administration toward foreign
investment and foreign assistance in economic development. (C)
a. Indications of capit-A:.'`;? flight by Filipino or
alien business. (C)
b. Prospects for more legislation discriminating
against foreign investors. (C)
D. Economic
1. Effect of Garcia "austerity measure" to stop drain
on exchange reserves. Other plans such as possible changes in
credit policy, peso devaluation, foreign exchange 'tax, etc.
Evidence of intentions to seek foreign loans. (C)
a.. Use of loans or credits made available by US. (C)
2. Outlook for progress in such areas as land and tenure
reform and resettlement, government revenue and expenditures,
agricultural production, industrialization, unemployment. (U)
a. Attitudes of congressmen, businessmen and govern-
ment officials toward thergrams; special interest.
take measures toward the benefit b. Capacity of Philippine economy to sustain economic
development programs. Economic proposals and attitudes of key
officials and members of the National Economic Council, or prominent
businessmen. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/0'M 2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200R/Q/~2 Cl4 RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
PHILIPPINES (Continued) Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
D. Economic (Continued) Oct. 1959-January 1960
2. c. Indications of economic decline, such as
deterioration of major export industries, prices, inflationary symp-
toms, business pessimism, and increase in unemployment. (U)
3. Analysis of economic difficulties created by need
for industrialization. Forecasts of results of production from
industries established to date on dollar expenditures for imports
on domestic price levels. (C)
4. Reports of smuggling, illegal barter, etc. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/2295CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 25X6A
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20g0%Q8g2 :,C -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No, 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
1. Government and popular attitudes toward unification,
government policy, President Rhee, the Liberal Party, corruption
in government, Cho Pyong-ok and Chang Myon. (C)
2. Upon which individuals does President Rhee rely most
heavily in formulating specific policies? To what degree are
Madame Rhee or members of the presidential secretariate successful
in withholding information from President Rhee? On what subjects
is information likely to be withheld? Information is needed on
the role of Madame Rhee and the secretariat in determining govern-
ment policy. What are the ambitions of the new Home Minister Ch'
oe In-yu? What are the chances of his realization of these ambi-
tions? How influential is he in Liberal Party and government
circles? (C)
3. Continuing information is desired on the state of
health of President Rhee, Vice President Chang Myon, Assembly
speaker Yi Ki-pung, and Democratic Party co-leader Cho Pyong-ok, (U)
4e The National Police have been one of President Rhee's
primary instuments of control and have worked closely with the
Liberal Party. Are there any indications that the police may be
wavering In their support of the administration? Are there any
indications that, though supporting the administration, the police
may be attempting to hedge their position by developing friendly
contacts with opposition leaders? (S)
5, Continuing information is needed on the political
status of Liberal Party chief Yi Ki-pung; Liberal intraparty fac-
tional strife. How firm is Yi's position as Rhee's chief political
lieutenant? Who are his main protagonists? Who would be likely
to replace Yi if he were forced to step down as chief of the
Liberal Party and be replaced as Rhee's chief lieutenant? (S)
6, Information is needed on the political plans and activi-
ties of Ho Chong, former mayor of Seoul and one-time assistant to
President Rhee? Are there any indications that Ho is being used by
Yi Ki-pung to negotiate a Liberal-Democratic merger? What would be the
purpose of such a merger? Under what circumstances would such a merg-
er likely occur? What would be its effect on the ROK political scene?
(S)
Approved For Release 2000/087i2" CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2R0R/0/?2- CTIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
PRL - FAR EAST
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
A. Political - Internal
(Continued)
7. Continuing information is needed on the status of
Democratic Party factionalism, maneuvering for the :L960 presiden-
tial nomination. Is the Cho Pyong-ok faction receptive to over-
tures to join the Liberal Party? Information is needed on the re-
lationship between the Cho group and the Liberal Party. (S)
8. Continuing information is needed on Liberal and
Democratic plans and attitudes towards establishing a parliamentary
type of government, abolishing or changing the vice presidency,,
Could the Liberals agree on any such constitutional amendment
that President Rhee would agree to? Would the Democrats be likely
to support such an amendment? (S)
9. Continuing information is needed on administration
plans to, repress the opposition Democratic Party, Democratic plans to
resist such government pressure, indications of possible civil
violence and rioting. What are Rhee's and the Liberal Party's plans
and intentions for retaining power in the face of waning popular
support.? To what extent is the administration willing to resort
to police and strong-arm tactics to retain power, particularly in
regard to the 1960 elections? Are any further suspensions of op-
position and/or independent newspapers contemplated? 'Which ones?
Further information is needed on the role the army might play in
the struggle for power. (C)
10. Continuing information is needed on Democratic election
plans for 1960. How strong is popular support for the Democrats,
in rural areas, in urban areas? What changes in ROE attitudes to-
ward they US, Japan, and North Korea would take place if the Demo-
crats won the presidency? (C)
11. Information is needed on the political status of Yi
Pom-sok possible intentions of staging a political comeback, his
relationship to Won Yong-tok, (C)
12. In the wake of the administration's suppression of the
leftistProgressive Party last year, and the recent execution of
party leader Cho Pong-am, what effect has the administration's ac-
tion had on other leftist factions? (We need detailed information
on leftist groupings and factions, as well as other minor political
parties.and groups, secondary leaders likely to achieve increasing
importance, and biographic information on leftists.) (C)
-102-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200NOW22 itJ4 tDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
A. Political - Internal (Continued)
13, Information is needed on the political orientation of
South Korean students and intelligentsia, student support of the op-
position Democratic Party, student leftist sentiment. What are stu-
dent attitudes toward the United States, Korean unification, Japan?
Has there been any Communist penetration of student circles? If so,
to what extent? (C)
14. Is there any Communist penetration of the ROK Government?
Of the Liberal Party or its affiliated organizations? Of the Demo-
cratic Party? (Indications of shifts in NK targeting agent-types, and
approaches plus indications of increasing vulnerablilities on the part
of the ROK populace are desired). (S)
15, Does the general populace consider, on the basis of
knowledge available to them that they are better off economically,
politically, educationally, etc., than the North Koreans? Does the
general populace still harbor feelings of hatred toward Communist
Koreans? (C)
16, Information is desired concerning the political affilia-
tions and attitudes of military leaders, their reactions to the Na-
tional Security Law, and the possibility that they may intervene if
political instability follows Rhee's death or if there is a threat of
public disorder. (S)
17, Continuing information is desired concerning public re-
action to the National Security and Local Autonomy Laws and to the way
in which they may be utilized by the Rhee Government for political
purposes. (S)
18, To what extent do South Koreans listen to North Korean
broadcasts? (C)
B. Military
The possibility of truce violations by South Korea, includ-
ing a renewal of hostilities, continues as a major intelligence
target. (S)
1. To what extent is the ROK attempting to promote tension
by provoking incidents in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or along the
North Korean coast? (S)
Approved For Release 2000J0$122 :rCkA RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2QpQ 0R/222 ,CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960)
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
B. Military (Continued)
2. What senior military leaders would actually carry out a
"march north" order by President Rhee? Which could be counted upon
to warn American officials of such action and to block execution of
such orders? (S)
3. How firm is ROK Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan's control
of the army? Which of his subordinates oppose him; what opposition
has he outside the Army? If there is a high command shakeup, what
effect is, it likely to have and who will probably replace the current
military chiefs? To what extent is General Song a political general?
How valid are reports that General Song is 'politically iiaive' and can
be counted upon to deliver the military vote for President Rhee in the
1960 election? To what extent will such political activity detract
from the military effectiveness of General Song and the ROK Army? Re-
port on the activities of General Paik Sun-yup. (S)
4. Information is desired on any ROK military negotiations
with Nationalist China or South Vietnam. Do war plans for a "march
north" call for coordinated attacks by ROK and'.-Nationalist -,forces?
What military agreements exist between South Korea and Nationalist
China? What action, if any, would President Rhee be likely to take
should the Chinese Communists invade the Nationalist offshore islands;
attacks Taiwan? In such a situation would Rhee be likely to order a
march nort;h? (S)
5. What is the status of morale in the South Korean Army?
How does the combat effectiveness of the.South Korean Army compare
with that. of Communist forces to the north? Has corruption and po-
litical factionalism lowered the combat capability of the armed
forces? (S)
6. Reactions in ROK army, as well as government and among
individuals, on possible reductions in ROK force levels. (S)
oreign Affairs
1. What is the popular attitude toward unification? In the
campaign for the 1958 assembly',,elections the Democrats opposed Korean!.
unificatioln through unilateral ROK military action and supported UN
supervised, elections in both North and South Korea. What effect has
this had on popular attitudes toward unification? Is there any in-
dication that Rhee might reverse his position and agree to UN super-
vised elections in South Korea? Are there any indications of public
acceptance of reunification based on the neutralism of the Korean
Peninsula? (U)
Approved For Release 2000~M'22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000108122 :iCh4-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960)
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
C. Foreign Affairs (Continued)
2. Continuing information is needed on the status of ROK-
14AaAnese relat Aand the attitudes of responsible Korean official
In particular: new ROK intentions regarding claims, re-
actions to a liberal Japanese fisheries convention, ROK arguments that
Japan has already, in effect, recognized the Rhee line, reaction to
and possible plans to block the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to
North Korea. (S)
3. What are the attitudes of specific Democratic leaders to-
ward Japan? What steps might Chang Myon take toward improving rela-
tions with Japan should he be elevated to the presidency? What is the
general public's attitude toward Japan; also that of students and in-
tellectuals? To what extent is anti-Japanese feeling rooted in the
Korean people and to what extent is it governmentally inspired? (U)
4. What is likely to be South Korea's future role in the
Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APAXL)? In any regional al-
liance? Is there any indication that President Rhee desires closer
relations with Nationalist China or other anti-Communist Asian states?
ROK plans to promote an East Asian security system. (C)
5. Has US military or economic aid generated any hard feel-
ings toward the US as it has in some other countries? (C)
6. Continuing information is needed on the status of the gov-
ernment's plans to secure a status-of-forces agreement. (C)
1. A cross-section of Korean opinion--from officials, bus-
inessmen, and Intellectuals to the man in the street--concerning eco-
nomic developments and difficulties in South Korea are extremely use-
ful in gauging general confidence in the future of the country and the
economy. We are particularly interested in opinions and analyses con-
cerning the effectiveness of U.S. aid, the role of the Korean govern-
ment, the opportunities and prospects for private long-term investment,
suggestions for improvement in these areas, and expectations concerning
the longevity of the U.S. aid program. (U)
2. What conditions do South Korean businessmen believe are
necessary to create a favorable climate for private foreign and do-
mestic investment in productive enterprise? (U)
Approved For Release 2 0(0@/2R2 j c A-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 3020C08A2i : f lA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East P:RL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1958 - January 1960)
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
3. What steps, if any, are being taken by the ROK Government
to promote an export trade? What is the present rice export potential?
How does the ROK plan to purchase rice for export? (C)
4. What is the magnitude of crop disease in South Korea? How
seriously does it affect agricultural production? What measures are
being taken by the South Korean Government and farmers to cope with
it? (U)
5. How does the fertilizer program operate from the view-
point of the individual farmer. From whom does he purchase his ferti-
lizer? Is it available from one or more sources? At what prices? How
much is available at the government price? Is it available in time?
If not in time, why not? Is there a tendency on the part of farmers
to dispense with or limit their use of chemical fertilizers? If so,
why? (U)
6. Do any Koreans have sizable funds invested or deposited
abroad? :'Who? How much? Under what names? How are funds channeled
in and out of these accounts? Government salaries still are not suf-
ficient to provide a living wage. We are interested, consequently,
in the methods whereby such salaries are supplemented. Representative
samples are desired. What is the nature of official corruption? What
is the estimated magnitude of aid funds and supplies lost through
corruption or incompetence? Please provide examples of such loss. (C)
7. What is the current volume of dollar and MPC black market-
ing? What is the government's attitude toward it? For what purposes
are these dollars used? Is there evidence of a drain of dollar cur-
rency from South Korea 'through black market operations? (C)
8. Various reports have referred to the considerable below-
capacity operation of certain key industrial and mining facilities, as
well as the shutdown of certain US-UN aid-financed industrial plants.
What are the reasons for this? Do these plants have sufficient operat-
ing funds to finance day-to-day activities? Has the ROK Government
displayed any concern with these developments? Are Korean technologi-
cal skills sufficient any are they used properly? (C)
9. What are the production figures for plants constructed
with aid funds? Are the products and services being marketed? At
what prices? If not, why? Are these plants reducing South Korean im-
port costs? What is the comparative cost to the consumer of imported
-106-
Approved For Release V%0/p8 2E: QIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 20901=22 :jCI -RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 - January 1960)
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
D. Economic (Continued)
10. (Continued)
commodities and domestically-produced goods in the same line? Is the
quality of domestically-produced goods suitable tc_. South Korean con-
sumer demand? How will the ROKG dispose. of high-cost and less de-
sirable fertilizer from the Chungju plant is competition with cheap
and highly prized imported ammonium sulfate? (U)
11. Unconfirmed reports have referred to large-scale illegal
trade between North and South Korea. What is the volume of such trade?
What goods are exchanged? How? Is there any evidence that US aid
goods, military supplies, or currency are being shipped to North Korea?
Is any of the above information available concerning illegal trade be-
tween Japan and South Korea? Are any figures available on the amount
of rice smuggled to Japan? (S)
12. How has the suspension of trade with Japan affected the
South Korean economy? Industrial production, trading firms, interest
rates, employment, etc.? (U)
13. The suspension also has aggravated an already deterio-
rating price situation in South Korea. What are the basic factors be-
hind the price rise? Is the ROK Government prepared to devalue the
offiical hwan if such becomes necessary under the terms of the August
1955 agreement? What direction can the price level realistically be
expected to take during the next year? Why? How far? (C)
14. There are reports that a concentration of business in-
terests in the hands of a few individuals is taking place in South
Korea. To what extent are the reports true? Number of individual or
corporations involved? Does this trend affect US aid projects? What
are the political and economic implications? (C)
15. Is ROK engaged in organized campaign against private
foreign businessmen? (C)
16. What'is the significance of recent reports concerning
greater independence of the labor movement and its more active role
in protecting the rights of workers in such matters as non-payment of
wages due? (C)
18. W-ich aid-financed commodities or supplies still offer
a lucrative field for the Korean speculator? Why? Examples? (C)
-107-
Approved For Release 20qp/Y8t22R: Pl4-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2R0R/%8/32J CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PR:L-
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959 January 1960)
SOUTH KOREA (Continued)
D. Economic (Continued)
19. What are the reasons for the tardy rehabilitation of
the Soutti Korean fishing industry?
20. What is impact of ICA Community Development Program
in Korea? Is it leading to improved intra- and inter-community
integration? What is the attitude of the communities involved?
Is any improvement in labor productivity or in standards of living
apparent yet? (U)
21. To what extent is there real economic distress in the
ROK, e.g?, Ullong-do, and what is its political significance? (C)
Approved For Release 2?0jQ/Q8/.i2g CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 200QL0?/4 -C f DP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
SOUTH VIETNAM
A. Political - Military
1. Internal security continues to preoccupy the Diem govern-
ment, which fears that the present pattern of sporadic terrorist ac-
tivity in the provinces may be a prelude to widespread Communist vio-
lence. Accordingly, information bearing on the security situation in
Vietnam is a priority target, including the following aspects:
a. Strength, organization, activities and intentions of
the Vietnamese Communist military and political underground. Any in-
dication of Communist plans to initiate anti-American violence or to
foment anti-American sentiment among the masses. (s)
b. Strength and activities of remnant sect forces and
other anti-Diem elements in South Vietnam, such as the Hoa Hao, Binh
Xuyen, and Cao Dai, Evidence of collusion with the local Communist
underground or with anti-Diem elements in Cambodia, (C)
c. Special efforts by the government to counter rural
insecurity, such as mobile tribunals, etc, (C)
2, On a long-range basis, Communist infiltration and sub-
version presents a serious threat to stability in South Vietnam, In-
formation is desired on Communist activities along this line; degree
of success in penetrating'the government, military and labor forces;
efforts to enlist the support of the masses against the central govern-
ment;.and extent and nature of reinforcement, supply, and border cross-
ings from Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, (C)
3, Developments connected with the scheduled holding of na-
tional assembly elections in September, including government efforts
to repress opposition political elements, and possible obstructionist
attempts by the Communist underground. (C)
4. Current data on the organization, membership and activi-
ties of pro--Diem political groups, Of particular interest is the Can
Lao party?s covert efforts to ensure tighter political discipline
throughout the government, Information on factionalism within the
pro-Diem groups, and on the working relationship between Ngo Dinh Can,
(C)
-109-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. :164)
October 1959-January 1960
SOUTH VIETNAM (Continued)
A. 'Political - Military (Continued)
5, Criticism by government officials of Diem's leadership.
The extent and trend of Diem's popularity among the intellectual, ur-
ban and rural groups. What is the extent of the central government's
popular support and effectiveness in the various regions of South Viet-
nam? (C)
6. Composition and activities of anti-Diem parties, groups
and factions in South Vietnam and abroad. (C)
7. Government efforts to control public information, and re-
percussions in the nation's press. Indications of neutralist or pro
North Vietnamese sentiment in the press. (C)
8. Information dealing with the minority problem in the high
plateau region, including government efforts to improve relations with
the Montagnard tribal groups and Communist exploitation of their griev-
ances. (C)
9. Political attitudes and activities of the Overseas Chinese
community. Extent of Chinese Nationalist influence and Chinese Commu-
nist subversion among this group. (C)
10. Development of the Vietnamese armed forces and the imple-
mentation of the government's conscription program. Any indication of
dissatisfaction among the military with the present; government or with
political interference. (C)
11. Developments in the government's intentions and efforts
to increase the effectiveness of the paramilitary Civil Guard and
Self Defense Corps. Information is desired on the current organiza-
tion and activities of these organizations, and of police and special
intelligence bodies. (C)
B. Foreign Affairs
1. Any changes in the government's policy toward the reuni-
fication :issue; indications of willingness to engage in limited poli-
tical or economic contacts with the North Vietnamese authorities, such
as a conference on mutual problems in the Demilitarized Zone. (C)
2. Vietnamese official and popular attitudes toward US aid
and policy. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/0#12- CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 20g01PW3 : LPI\-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
SOUTH VIETNAM (Continued)
B. Foreign Affairs (Continued)
3. South Vietnam's efforts, either overt or covert, to com-
bat pro-Communist or neutralist sentiment in neighboring Cambodia and
Laos. (S)
4. Saigon's psychological warfare plans and propaganda ef-
forts aimed at weakening Communist control in North Vietnam. (C)
5. Activities of the Vietnam International Control Commis-
sion and developments in Vietnam's relationship with this body. (C)
6. Developments in Vietnamese-French political, military,
economic, and cultural relations. (C)
7. Information on the expansion of South Vietnamese political
and economic contacts with other nations, including the Afro -Asian
countries and with international organizations, such as SEATO and the
UN. (C)
C. Economic
1. Developments in Vietnam's efforts to increase agricultural
production and exports and to reduce imports of manufactures. (C)
2. Information on the land development and resettlement
programs, particularly in the high plateau region. (C)
3. Information on the effectiveness of the recently created
Farmers' Associations as a means of increasing security and production,
(C)
4. Information on Vietnam's efforts to develop limited in-
dustry; also on non-US foreign assistance in this field, such as
French, Chinese Nationalist, and Japanese. (C)
5. Progress toward reconstructing Vietnam's highway and rail-
road facilities, and information on the new road building program in
the high plateau region. (C)
D. Scientific
1. Development of an atomic energy program centered at
Dalat. (C)
-111-
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 31 January 1960)
THAILAND
Political - Internal
Marshal Sarit, his health apparently at least temporarily
stabilized, is extremely active in directing his personal attention
to virtually every facet of government administration. At the same
time, however, grumbling within the ruling military group over Sarit's
alleged failure to consult it on policy matters or to take its in-
terest adequately into consideration is increasing. The attitudes
of Sarit's military supporters, particularly any firm indications of
an intent to oust him, will be an important intelligence target during
the next four months, Also of continuing interest are Sarit's plans
in his campaign to revitalize the government administrative structure,
promote economic development, and limit domestic communism. The im-
pact of the Laotian crisis, the Sino-Indian frontier dispute, and the
Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchanges on the degree of resolution of Thai-
land?s anti--Sino-Soviet bloc posture will also be of great interest.
1. Factionalism within ruling clique: Relationships between
Sarit's followers in the coup group will be of vital intelligence in-
terest. In particular, what is the status of relations between Thanom
and Prapat? Is there any evidence that they have quietly worked out
a modus vivendi which would permit them to share power as successors
to Sarit? What other leaders might challenge their positions? In
particular, what chances have the Punnakan brothers to achieve power?
(C)
2. Popular attitudes toward Ruling Clique: Reactions to the
military?s overthrow of the constitution. Any indications that op-
position politicians, most of whom are now stripped of assembly status,
may try to incite the populace, particularly students, into overt pro-
test against the authoritarian regime. (C)
3. The Monarch : Relations between the King and leading
members of military group. Any evidence that the royal family is
secretly egging on potentially disaffected elements in the military
to overthrow Sarit? (C)
4. Corruption: Any evidence that Sarit is seriously follow-
ing through on his stated intention to reduce corruption. Effect on
intra-coup group politics of any Sarit moves to reduce corruption, or
at least to centralize graft to a greater degree. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22C: CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
THAILAND (Continued)
A.; Political a Internal:. (Continued)
5. Communism: Strength and degree of effectiveness as well
as the extent and source of its funds. Evidence of success in rural
areas. Extent of penetration of the press, government and inner cir--
cles of ruling clique. Evidence of contact with Pridi in China or with
his supporters in Thailand. Relations between suspected Chinese Com-,
munist merchants and members of government. Effect on Communist capa?
bilities of "anti-Communist" crackdown following 20 October 1958 "coup,"
(C)
6. "Free Thai" Group: Strength and effectiveness. Contacts
With Pridi, Extent of support for Pridi among government civil ser-
vants. Evidence of moves by ruling clique to propitiate Pridi groups.
Any indications of imminent return of Pridi? If he returned, what role
would the government permit him to play? Extent to which Pridi is an
indoctrinated Communist and degree to which he would act as instrument
of Chinese Communist policy if permitted to come home? If he is not
permitted to return to Thailand, will Pridi seek to leave Communist
China for a third country? If so, will the Communist Chinese permit
him to depart? (C)
7'. Phibun and Phao: Activities and fate of Ph:ibun and Phao
supporters. Ruling group attitudes toward each. Evidence that the
return of either is imminent. (C)
8. Vietnamese Refugees- Extent of Viet Minh influence. Re-
action tosouth Vietnams efforts to "reorient" them. Information on
implementation of recently concluded repatriation agreement with North
Vietnam. (C)
9. Chinese Community: General attitudes toward Peiping and
Taipei. Extent of GRC Embassy and Chinese Communist success in pro-
pagandizing: the Chinese in Thailand. Attitude of the regime toward
the Chinese and the latter's attitude toward the regime. (U)
10'.. Chinese Communist Terrorists from Mala a: Extent to
which they use South Thailand as a base. Re ations between the ter-
rorists and provincial Thai officials and between terrorists and local
Chinese. (U)
11 Malay Minority: Status of Irredentist movement. Evidence
of efforts by Federa ion Consul General in Songkhla to subvert Malays.
Effect on Malays of increasing Communist propaganda effort: in area.
Government'policy toward four southern provinces and its effect on the
minority, {(S)
Approved For Release 2006YG*22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S F r. u z T
 Approved For Release 2000/E 8//2C 2R : E CIA-RDP62-00328AO00200170001-6
S
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
THAILAND (Continued)
B. Foreign Relations
1. Important intelligence targets during the next four months
will be the impact on the Thai Government of the Tibetan revolt, other
manifestations of a more bellicose posture on the part of Communists
and developments in Cambodia, Laos and Burma. (C)
2. What forces are there, both inside and outside the
government, which might tend to impel it.toward neutralism? ((C)
3. Are there any indications of an intent to cease, deceler-
ate, or accelerate unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communists? (C)
4. Evidence of clandestine support for dissident elements
in Laos and Cambodia. (S)
5. Current relations. between Thailand and Cambodia. Extent
of anti=Cambodian feeling among Thai government leaders and the public.
(C)
6. What is the status of Thai efforts to develop regionalism
in Southeast Asia? What are the Thai motives? What is the reaction
of the other Southeast Asian countries? (C)
(OUO)
7. Attitude of the regime toward newly independent Malaya.
8. Thai reaction to activities of army regime in Burma. (C)
9. Evidence of clandestine Thai support for Chinese bandits
and opium smugglers in the Burma, Thai, Lao sector. (C)
(C)
10. Evidence of covert involvement in Shan dissident movement.
C. Economic
1. Any adverse economic trends which might affect the
political situation? (C)
(C)
2. Development plans and attitudes toward American aid. (C)
3. Any plans for a resumption of trade with Communist China?
Approved For Release 2000/08%2 "CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2020108921:iCIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
THAILAND (Continued)
C. Economic (Continued)
4. Rice export prospects. (C)
5. Progress in attracting foreign investment. (U)
D. Soviet Bloc Medical Assistance
1. Have other Soviet or Satellite contributions or medical
aid been:-presented to Thailand recently? (C)
2. How is Soviet or Satellite medical aid propagandized?
How effective is the propaganda? (C)
3. :What Soviet or Satellite medical personnel have'been in
Thailand; recently? (C)
4, What Thai medical personnel have recently visited the
USSR or Satellites? (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 200p/%$/~2R qlA RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 October 1959 - 31 January 1960)
A. Political v Military
The Tibet scene has changed radically as a result of the
revolution. We are interested in all aspects of the revolt and its
aftermath, especially Peiping's new policy for Tibet. (C)
1. The revolt.' (C)
a. Extend of Chinese control following the revolt. (C)
b. Size, disposition and capabilities of remnant
guerrilla forces. (C)
c. Attitude of Tibetans toward the revolt and the rebels.
(C)
2. China's new policy for Tibet. (C)
a. Details of "peaceful" revolution Peiping is pushing
in Tibet. (C)
b. Peasant attitude toward reforms. (C)
Tibet. (C
c. Communist treatment of religious institutions in
d. Introduction of settlers'from China proper. (C)
3. Dalai and Panchen Lamas. (C)
a. Chinese attitude toward exiled Dalai Lama and puppet
Panchen Lama. (C)
b. Tibetan attitude toward Dalai Lama. (C)
c. Tibetan acceptance of Panchen Lama. (C)
d. Relationship between Panchen Lama and Chinese. (C)
4. Sino-Indian relations. (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08%2217 CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release i G0IO81.2I :'IA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
Far East PRL
(Guide No. 164)
October 1959-January 1960
TXy BET (Continued)
A. Political -, Military (Continued)
.4. a. Details of Indian attitudes and activities vis-a-v1
s
Tibet. (C)
b. Details of Peiping's response to Indian attitude. (C)
5. Miscellaneous. (C)
a. Current Soviet activities in Tibet. (C)
b. Morale of Chinese forces in Tibet. (C)
c. Current Chinese Communist party, government and
military'organ:Lzation in Tibet. (C)
revolt. (C)
d. Asian/African reaction to Chinese handling of Tibet
B. Economic
1. Is the economic base of the important monasteries, parti-
cularly land holdings, likely to be affected by "democratic reforms?"
(C)
2. How do the improved supply routes from China affect
Tibet's economy and standard of living? (C)
3. Results of recent geological surveys, with particular
reference to any discoveries of strategic natural resources. (C)
C. Scientific
Any information bearing on the London Daily Express story
earlier this year concerning reported large scale construction of
missile launching pads by the Soviets in Tibet? (C)
Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200170001-6
S E C R E T
 Approved For Release 2000IM&
DP62-00328A000200170001-6
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
REST
SAC
NOT RELEASABLE 1O FOI EIGN NATIONALS
Approved For Release 20W41k-'1 b00328A000200170001-6