FIRST TRIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WATCH COMMITTEE DECEMBER 1950 - NOVEMBER 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000700070047-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: November 4, 1953
• Content Type: REQ

Approved For Releas
4 November 1953
FIRST TRIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
WATCH COMMITTEE
December 1950 - November 195S
L AUTHORITY FOR THE WATCH COMMITTEE
A. Authority. The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in the
meeting o 'T ece'mber 1950 decided that. the Joint Intelligence Indications
Committee (JI1C) should thereafter function as the Watch Committee Of the
IAC. Terms of Reference for the Watch. Committee, which had been
ci:~rculated to the IAC members by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army, under date of 20 December 1950, were approved
without change by the IAC in the meeting of 28 December 1950 (Appendix A).
The. subsequent rescission by the JIC of its action of 8 August 1950 in
creating the JIIC was purely administrative formality since all members
of the JIG had been present and assenting as members of the IAC when the
latter converted the JIIC into the Watch Committee..
The mission of the Watch Committee, according to the Terms of
Reference, is to collect, evaluate, analyze, and report indications of
Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action,
B. Historical Back4 round. The Joint Intelligence Indications. Com-
mittee., which was converted into the Watch Committee by the 7 December
1950 action of the IAO, originated as a G-2 Intelligence Indications File
Committee. Representatives of Navy and Air Force intelligence liad been
full participants in the activities of the latter Committee for several months,
when on 8 August 1950 the Joint Intelligence Committee decided that there-
after the Intelligence Indications. File Committee would function as the,
Joint Intelligence Indications Committee (TIIC). The JIC at the same time
invited representatives of CIA, State, and FBI to participate in the meetings,.
which they did thenceforth. This evolution from a G-2 committee into an
IAG committee explains why the chairmanship, the secretariat, and the
place of the meeting have been in G-2. The personnel. of the secretariat
initially were furnished entirely by the Army but since January 1952 the
secretariat has been staffed by personnel from CIA, Navy and Air Force
as well as Army.
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IT. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF TIIE
WATCH COMMITTEE
A. Organization. The Watch Committee consists of the Committee
itself and a full-time Secretariat which furnishes the Committee with the
necessary staff and secretarial support,
1, The Watch Committee consists of representatives of all the
members of the IAC. The Army representative, the Deputy Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, has also been the Chairman, In accordance with a
provision of the Terms of Reference, which was intended to provide the
Watch Committee meetings with the necessary expert opinion from the
numerous fields of intelligence specialization, each agency is represented
by as many individuals at Watch Committee meetings as the agency con-
siders necessary for adequate analysis of the indications under consideration.
Each agency, however, designates a senior representative who acts as the
spokesman for his agency on decisions relating to substantive intelligence
and on administrative matters, The Watch Committee representation has
been noteworthy both for its stature and lengthy tenure. The high level in
their own respective agencies of the Watch Committee's senior representa-
tives and their service on the Committee for long periods have been con-
ducive to both effectiveness and continuity in the Committee's operations.
2. The Secretariat consists of five persons from CIA, Army,
Navy and Air Force, The Secretariat Chief is an Army lieutenant colonel,
The Secretariat is located in the area of G2/DA, and is organized so as to
carry out its functions of
(a) collecting and filing indications cards,
(b) making the necessary preparations for regular and
special meetings,
(c) preparing the drafts and coordinating the review of
Watch Committee reports, and
(d) providing necessary secretarial assistance to the
Watch Committee.
. B. Procedures. The procedures of the Watch Committee are
organized around its threefold mission of collecting, evaluating and
analyzing, and reporting indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of
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hostile action.. The Watch Committee in session is naturally the focal
point of all the operational procedures of the Committee and its Secretariat,
But since the Watch Committee does not and cannot direct the collection
and dissemination of indications by the participating agencies, especially
with. respect to the commands and other US Government installations outside
t ashington, the procedures of the Committee have been designed to act as
a stimulus -and guide to the early warning activities of US intelligence
agencies throughout the world. Appendix B is a diagram of the operational
procedures of the Committee.
1. The collection activities of the V latch Committee as such.
are confined to bringing together in the Secretariat the indications available
in Washington. However, the participating members of the Committee,
acting in their individual capacity, systematically screen indications out of
their incoming flow of information for delivery to the Watch Committee
Secretariat. The Secretariat assists this process of screening out indi-
cations by the individual agencies, as well as it can, by screening practi-
cally all the pertinent intelligence messages and reports received in
Washington. The Secretariat upon receiving a possible indication requests
tentative evaluation and analysis from the agency in whose field of dominant
interest the indication lies. The individual members of the W tch Committee
also follow a policy of keeping their respective collection facilities in the
field continually informed as to the standing and special requirements for
indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action. The special
requirements may manifest themselves initially either in Watch Committee
meetings or in the Watch activities of the participating agencies.
2. The Watch Committee's procedures for the evaluation and
analysis of hostilities indications involve a preliminary and tentative
analysis of each indication by the most qualified member agency. The final
evaluation and analysis are by the Watch Committee itself, but naturally,
since the initial or tentative evaluation and analysis are by the principal
specialists in the particular field of intelligence concerned, the first
analysis is as a rule the last. In actual practice, there are usually three
phases through which indications pass in the course of evaluation and
analysis. The first is the evaluation and analysis of the desk specialist; the,
second is consideration of the indication by the affected intelligence agency
itself; and the third and last is the evaluation and analysis by the Watch
Committee :in session,
Theoretically; the mechanics of the evaluation and analysis
procedures are as follows. The indication is tentatively evaluated and
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analyzed by the agency of dominant interest, and an indications card is
forwarded to the Watch Committee Secretariat. The latter, the day before
a scheduled meeting, prepares a tentative check list of indications which
appear deserving of consideration by the Watch Committee and circulates
the list to the member agencies for comment and recommended changes'
The check list, with any coordinated changes, then. becomes the agenda for
the Watch Committee meeting. The custom has grown up in nearly all the
member agencies of holding preliminary meetings for the purpose of
crystallizing individual agency opinion on the current indications, individually
and. collectively. Thus, it can probably be said truly, that at the meeting
of the Watch Committee, all the intelligence resources of the Federal
Government are brought to bear concertedly on the problem of evaluating
and analyzing current and past indications of Soviet-Communist intentions
of hostile action. In actual practice, the theory of this procedure is not
always observed with respect to the first step of transmitting a tentative
analysis. of indications to the Secretariat, The participating agencies have
shown an increasing tendency to defer sending the indications cards to the
Secretariat until either the day before or the day of the meeting. Frequently,
the verbal. analysis of the indication at the Watch Committee meeting itself
is the only specific comment the Secretariat ' is able to garner,.
3. The reporting of hostilities indications by the Watch Com-
mittee has been chiefly through the reports of its meetings. These reports,
which are the basis of a wide range of oral and written intelligence reports
by the participating agencies, are reproduced by G-2/DA for delivery to
the Watch Committee members who carry out the further distribution within
their own respective agencies. From a total of 113 copies in December 1950,
the distribution has grown to 225 copies currently, The present type, paper
and format are much superior to those in use at the end of 1950. Impetus
to the improvement came initially from word that former President Truman
had complained of difficulty in reading the report. The reports of the
meetings are prepared by the Watch Committee Secretariat from the indi-
cations cards, written statements by the agency concerned of the analysis
of indications delivered orally at the meetings, and remarks recorded by
the secretary during the meeting. The conclusions are always carefully
worded and agreed to at the meetings. The weekly meetings are customarily
held: on Wednesday morning. Draft copies of the report are distributed to
the participating agencies around ten o'clock the following morning, Each
agency receives as many copies of the draft as desired, so that there will
be a minimum of time consumed in review by all those concerned. Con-
currence or recommended changes are telephoned by the individual agencies
to the Secretariat by 1200 hours, An effort is made by the Secretariat to
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lete the coordination of the recommended changes by 1400 hours.
m
co
p
Most of the changes are of a minor editorial nature, but occasionally a
recommended change presents a real test of the Secretariat's coordinating
.skill. Incidentally, it is an interesting fact that a split opinion, which is
authorized by the Terms of Reference in order not to delay the distribution
.of the report, has never yet appeared in a Watch Committee Report. When
all the changes have been consolidated by the Secretariat, the draft of the
report is reviewed finally by the Chairman of the Committee to affirm that
everyone's views as he understands them are correctly presented. The
draft is then prepared for reproduction, and is ready for distribution to the
member agencies early Friday morning, less than 48 hours after the meeting
began at 1000 hours on Wednesday.
The distribution of the draft report Thursday morning, ? with the
revision completed shortly thereafter, makes it possible for high level US
planners and policy makers in Washington and throughout the world to
receive the gist of the report even before its publication. Several of the
participating agencies, for example, brief their key figures on the contents
of the report either on Thursday or early Friday morning. The 7INTSUM,
the Joint Intelligence weekly cable to major US commands and installations
worldwide, which is dispatched every Thursday carries a summary of the
Watch Committee Report of the previous day's meeting.
TII. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
WATCH CO TTTEE
The Watch Committee's mission of collecting, evaluating, analyzing,
and reporting indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action
has been carried out to a very large extent through the organizations of the
member agencies. This was to be expected since the thinking behind the
Committee's creation visualized that the Committee would be largely the
motivating and guiding force for a worldwide intelligence warning system
operating through the coordinated efforts of all US intelligence agencies.
A. As indicated above in the description of collection procedures,
the Watch Committee in carrying out that part of its mission relating to the
collection of hostilities indications has through the participating members,
exerted a strong influence upon the worldwide collection activities of US
intelligence agencies. The individual members have exerted this influence
through both communications and personal visits to the field. It should
also be borne in mind that the Committee's operations, particularly as
reflected in its weekly and special reports, have tended to focus attention
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t necessit of an adequate early intelligence warning system.
n
h
The objectives of the Watch Committee are, naturally, the successful
accomplishment of its mission of collecting, evaluating, and analyzing
indications. of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action for the purpose
of providing adequate early intelligence warning in the event any such attack
should actually ever materialize. The effectiveness with which the Watch
Committee is organized and operating for the accomplishment of its
IV. MAJOR PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES
e urge
J
on t
Increasing recognition of this necessity has, in turn, acted as a stimulus
to systematic efforts by US field agencies to collect indications of Soviet-
Communist preparations for an attack.
The assembly or collection of indications by the Watch Committee
Secretariat has included periodic analytical summaries of indications by
similar committees in the principal US commands overseas. The weekly
report of the analysis of hostilities indications is also received
regularly by the Watch Committee Secretariat for distribution to the
Committee members.
B. The Watch Committee's progress in evaluating and analyzing
hostilities indications is embodied in the reports of the weekly meetings.
Since 1 January 1952 an index to the contents of the Watch Committee
Reports has been published semi-annually. In addition to meeting once a
week since its establishment as an IAC Committee, the Watch Committee
held five emergency meetings in 1951, and one in 1952.. There is an SOP
for the summoning of the Watch Committee in an emergency, and upon call
the Committee can be quickly assembled at any time.
C. The Watch Committee responsibility for reporting indications
of hostile action has been accomplished by means of the reports of the
meetings. Since further reporting to the organizations of the Watch Com-
mittee members is the responsibility of the individual members, the re-
porting responsibility of the. Watch Committee ends with the delivery of the
report to the member agencies. However, the Watch Committee has made
every effort to prepare the report in such form and by such procedures as
would facilitate the rapid and efficient distribution of the main points and
conclusions of the Watch Committee discussions..
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mission can only be finally demonstrated with the Occurrence of such an
attack. * The problems of the Watch Committee are accordingly identical
with its objective as set forth in its mission. Hence, the problems of the
Watch Committee aside from the continuing analysis and reporting of
current indications involve a diligent and ceaseless search for those methods
of indications collection, analysis and reporting which will insure an optimum
chance of successful detection of an impending attack. .
Search. for solutions to these problems have recently included a visit
of the Watch Committee on 21-22 August 1953 to the Air Defense and Army
Anti-Aircraft Commands at Colorado Springs at the Commands' invitation,
a recommendation on 15 September 1953 by the Chairman of the Watch
Committee to the IAC that a Watch Committee Indications Center be estab-
lished as the nerve center of a worldwide intelligence early warning system,
and the creation by the IAC on 6 October 1953 of a committee to examine
the Watch Committee's over-all organization and operations to determine
whether they can be improved.
A. The problem of maximum efficiency in the worldwide collection
of hostilities indications involves:
1. the determination of the actions which would presumably
precede a Soviet. Communist attack,
2. the establishment of intelligence capabilities for the
collection of indications of the necessary preliminaries to an attack, and
3. the establishment of thoroughly coordinated and tested pro-
cedures which will insure prompt and efficient transmission and processing
of collected indications at all stages from collection in the. field to analysis
by the Watch Committee in Washington.
* To date, of course, there has been no attack, and therefore no opportunity
to test the effectiveness of the US intelligence early warning system which
centers in the Watch Committee of the IAC. The invasian of South Korea by
the Communists cannot be regarded as such a test, since the Watch Com-
mittee at the time of the invasion was not organized and operating as at
present. The Communists invasion of South Korea demonstrated the vital
need of an intelligence early warning system.
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B. There is general agreement that techniques and procedures for
evaluating and analyzing indications should be carefully planned, and that
fully as important as the determination of the most effective techniques .
and procedures for processing, maintaining, and interpreting indications
is the wholehearted collaboration of all the participating agencies in
adhering to the prescribed procedures.
C. In the area of reporting, there appears to be the vitally important
problem of insuring that in the event of an actually impending attack the
Watch Committee deliberations will be communicated with an irreducible
loss of time to the IAC and the JCS. The reporting mission of the Watch
Committee also requires the establishment of direct liaison between the
Watch Committee and command warning systems.
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