(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000700050005-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 12, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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IZ May 1955
The achievements of the Office of Intelligence Coordination can be divided
into the following general categories:
. Regularization of certain IAC practices and the IAC structure
Z. Intelligence publications
3. Advice on and the negotiation of NSCIDs and DCIDs
4. Resolution of jurisdictional problems among agencies regarding intel-
gence activities and stimulating cooperative action to meet urgent intelligence
3. Relations of services of common concern to the rest of the corn
and provision of guidance to those services
6. Support for DDP and psychological warfare
THE IAC;
ty
activity of the IAC, as far as its meetings are concerned, has
been in consideration and approval of National Intelligence ' Estimates. It is in-
teresting to note that General Smith among his first actions in 1950 was to insist
onal Intelligence Estimates should be reviewed by the LAC chiefs in
meeting. More than any single thing the use of the IAC for approval of estimates
furthered the development of an intelligence community. The weekly meetings of
the intelligence chiefs for this purpose, the necessity for give and take, General
happy sense of balance in recognizing the other's responsibility while
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seeing clearly his own -- all of these things provided a new basis and method
for cooperation. The example of the LAC table as one should expect had its
greatest effect upon those who sat in the back row and who witnessed the proceed-
ings. In the main these were the estimates officers in the various agencies. This
no doubt accounts in considerable measure for the fact that ONE and the Board
of Estimates have been outstanding in carrying out their responsibilities for inter-
agency coordination at the sub-LAC Level.
However, it would be nAslsadintg to assese that the IAGis function in coordi-
nation was confined to estimating. A review of the IAC documents will show that
halt are non-estimate in character and deal rather with intelligence activities. It
secretary and in part as coordinator, made its primary contribution in
at least two ways; g'irst in the careful review of eon-estimate papers going to the
IAC and snaking suggestions to action offices for the clear presentation of problems
and solutions; and second, in tbat? on frequent occasion the coordination responsi-
bility o
Director's
where the Office of Intelligence Coordination, through its mission
gsncy probls
as assigned to OIC, not as secretary but as the
pat assistant for coordination of federal into
ligence activities.
A list of those of the problems which fail into the latter category is as follows:
Dissemination of National Intelligence
IAG Progress Reports to the NSC
Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods
Controls over Dissemination and Use of Intelligence
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matter out of their hands. The capabilities of the CIA officers to exercise leader-
ship role in such problems have gradually developed over the several years.
OIG's detachment from direct responsibility on the one hand and its opportunity to
observe the attitudes and philosophy of the DCI at IAC meetings on the other hand,
at times prompted solutions which appeared to the CIA offices to be a surrender of
to do AS, much as possible toward the solution of the problem rather than taking
x *reign Language Publications
Budgeting Analysis of Intelligence Programs
Publicity of Intelligence Activity
Biological Warfare
Survey of Psy War Intelligence Needs and Assets
In carrying
ese coordinating assignments as weei
ears which were
~ndled as IAG problems it wasOIC practice to work closely with the offices in
the Agency having the greatest interest and responsibility and to urge those oBces
DCI T
Accordingly, OIC not infrequently appeared to the
much in the direction of the interests and rights of the other agencies
recognition of interests whether CIA's or others'. However
at the Agency's e*pense although OIC preferred to consider this aspect as
provided more
acceptability for the propositions which the Agency sponsored in negotiation
the other agencies. In certain cases this disagreement was ameliorated by extended
discussions over a period of time. In other instances it provoked the offices to
circumvent OIC. This is particularly true of the Office of Current Intelligence
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which
USCIB matters as well as others preferred to and in fact
directly with the DCI. DDCI or subsequent to its establishment, the Office of the
DDL This is also true but less so with regard to the Office of Scientific Intelli-
Greatest cooperation was achieved with O RR, 00 and OCD. While there
hould be called in to play a role and (b) the security and other devices available
were no great difficulties with ONE, OIC made relatively little contribution to
ONE's coordinating role simply because theydid it so well.
As far as 11 is concerned (formerly OSO) OIC made practically no contribu-
tion because (aI the top authorities did not for whatever reason prefer that OIC
e sufficient permit them to handle their problems as they desired. Ex-
ceptions to this were in the field of requirements and subsequently in the field of
:ligence support for clandestine operations, and, at the request of the ODC
OIC assisted in the agreed activities problem. In the case of requirements this
is explained bythe fact that FI was frustrated in its own handling of that problem.
In the case of intelligence support it was due to (a) that the office established in
DDP for intelligence support was based ona plan drawn up by OIC, at the request
of DDP, (b) that its leadership was drawn from the DDI area and (c) that leader-
ship fully agreed with the OIC proposal and the methodology which it recommended.
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