BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 26, 1957
• Content Type: PAPER

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26 August 1957
BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Oeatlemea,
Our object in this presentation is to outline for you intelligence
of critical value to major national intelligence objectives which we
anticipate will result from the coverage of certain Soviet targets within
the range of U?Z aircraft. Whereas we are vitally interested in acquiring
precise target information for the application of our strategic weapons,
this is not one of the critical objectives of this briefing.
We propose to attempt to define for you the unique role which -..
AQUATONEStype photography plays in the production of National Intel??
ligence estimates, which provide the basis for important decisions
affecting the National security. All of the principal targets we will
discuss fall into those strengths that have been determined by the
National Intelligence Community to be the most significant in the Soviet
ability to strike at the United States.
These are: The Soviet guided missile system, the Soviet long
range bomber force, and Soviet nuclear energy production system.
Our present intelligence on all of these critical Soviet capabilities
still contains major areas of ignorance. A significant quantity of our
existing information on these strengths is fragmentary, and, consequently,
our present estimates, in some cases, admit to significant margins of
error,
US defense plans, and budgets to support them, involve vast sums
of money and allocation of effort, and, admittedly, are at present based
on information having these significant margins of error. Accordingly,
such plans and budgets can be materially affected by reducing the margins
of error. And we feel that in the AQUATONE system we have an important
tool in reducing these errors.
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In the critical field of Soviet guided missiles development, we
find some of our major intelligence gaps. Until ten days ago, we had
no direct observation of any part of the Soviet
We have had no inform.
mation regarding launching pads, erection and handling equipment,
guidance installation and equipment, test stands, fuel storage, and
other associated launching devices, Data on these items are essential
for any firm statement as to the size, type, and pay load of missiles,
guidance systems, and types of engines used for propulsion. This
admitted undramatic type of information is vital for the production of,
precise estimates of present and potential Soviet missile capabilities.
Now, at TYURA TAM, we have photographed and can study in
detail a relatively new range still under construction and thus far reliably
The overcast on the far oblique in
this display obscures our ability to identify what is -probably the actual
launching area..with its associated equipment, ande-owconceivablye9a actual
long-range missiles. There is, however, convincing information on the
range support elements. We intend to go back if possible to clarify the
launching site at TYURA TAM. It is our expectation that comparable
coverage of KAPUSTIN TAR. would be extraordinarily rewarding in
establishing for the first time a set of basic data against which further---
intelligence coverage from all sources could lead us to improve signifi.
cantly our estimates on the state of GM development in the Soviet Union.
This photograph on TYURA TAM leads some experts to suspect that the
Soviet is two years ahead of our current estimate of their progress,
WAP,
There are other significant targets in the Soviet missiles system
that also probably will enable no to increase the value of Soviet missile
estimates as a basis for National policy and planning.
R.ecoverage of the enigmatic installation at MOZHAYSK might
enable us properly to determine its function..and a clear picture of the
similar installation at VALDAI probably would facilitate this determination.
In the Soviet nuclear energy system we find equally significant
gaps in hard fact information. Until days ago, we had never obtained
comprehensive information on a single component of the system. Now we
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force, our gaps in information do not loom as large as the gaps in our
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knowledge of its missile system and nuclear energy production. However,
certain gaps do exist and are significant, Except for this photograph of
the Moscow/Fill aircraft factory, the only known producer of BISON jet
heavy bombers, we have never obtained comprehensive information on
any component of the Soviet long range bomber production system. From
other sources of information, we have, however, been able to locate
principal components of this system and to estimate production. However,
actual photography of the Soviet bomber factories at VORONEZH,. KUYBYSHEV,
KAZAN, and IRKUTSK would enable us to measure production capabilities,
both actual and potential, with a degree of precision not now obtainable.
Our knowledge of the true stature of the Soviet heavy bomber force
has been limited by not only lack of precise information on production
facilities but equally by the lack of first hand comprehensive and exact
observation of the home bases of this force. Photography of the BISON
base at SARATOV/ENGELS and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber bases
at CHEPELEVKA and BELAYA TSERKOV in the KIEV area would enable
us to ascertain far more precisely than now is possible the size and
deployment of its heavy bomber force and thereby open the way to the
production of capability estimates regarding this force that would be more
valuable than those possible at present,
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Photography of these bases, together with-other home bases of
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the medium bomber components of the Soviet longwrange bomber force, USA
would permit us to prepare more precise estimates of the nuclear deliv. y
capability of this force than we now c
The point must not be overlooked that valuable intelligence byproducts
also can be anticipated as a result of the coverage of the primary systems
we have discussed. Route photography can be expected to yield significant
details of other Soviet air installations, transportation systems, industrial
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facilities, and other economic and military targets which could be of a USA
significance only slightly less than the information we anticipate on primary
objectives, One of the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be
e exercise of the
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knowledge can only result in a firmer basis for Na anal plans and decisions
that involve consideration of the Soviet capability to resist our own strategic
1oDeration$]
It would be remiss to contend that even completely satisfactory 25X1
photography of all of the installations we have mentioned would completely USA
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eliminate all of our areas of uncertainty in existing estimates of these
critical Soviet strengths, However, it can be said that satisfactory
photography of these installations would provide new information of a
quality and quantity not now obtainable from any other source on these
primary targets. This information? properly exploited, would enable
us, first, to establish the degree of validity of our existing estimates
and, second, to refine, and probably expand, these estimates on the
basis of a larger, more factual, and more complete body of information 25X1 D
bearing on the specific strengths concerned,
existing and potential. And we feel it is axiomatic that
given these higher quality estimates national planners and policies to
counter the preemptive and resistive strength of the Soviet Union can
be formulated on a more positive, more efficient, more economical,
and more timely basis than now is possible,
JOHN E, B E
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