REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND ASSETS OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000600030035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORT

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Index
REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND ASSETS
OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
I.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE SURVEY
Page
1
5
6
Part 1
Part
Part 3
Identification of Intelligence Needs
Related Needs of Other Agencies
Organizational Arrangements
Part 4
USIA Assets
11
U.
HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED
12
III.
APPENDICES
Tab A
List of Intelligence Publications and
Recommended Distribution
14
Tab B
Functions of the Proposed USIA Intelligence
Organization
17
Tab C
Letter, Director of Central Intellgence, to
Director, USIA
22
Tab D. ? ?
Letter, Director, USIA, to Director of
Central Intelligence
23
Tab E
Terms of Reference for USIA's Intelligence
Needs
24
Tab F
"Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs,"
IA C-D- 82
26
Tab G
List of Persons Consulted
27
Tab H
Basic Documents Considered by the Survey
Team
32
Tab I
Case Study on Thailand
33
Annex A: Psychological Offensive
for Thailand
35
Annex B: Intelligence Annex to Psycho-
logical Offensive for Thailand. . .
43
Annex C: List of Intelligence Products
Relating to Thailand
51
State De4a. review completed
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ivisor III. APPENDICES (Continued) Rtge
%sr
'goriv
Tab J Case Study on India 58
Annex A: Intelligence Annex for a
Psychological Program for
India 59
Annex B: List of Intelligence Products
Relating to India 64
Annex C: List of Research Projects
Relating to India 75
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I. WHAT THE SURVEY TEAM CONCLUDES AND RECOMMENDS
?
(The conclusions and recommendations in the fou parts which
follow are based directly on the Terms of Reference, Tab E,
Which are quoted in their entirety herein.)
Part 1
Intelligence Needs
IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS
1. Problem: To identify the types of intelligence and intelligence
information required to meet the U.S. Information Agency's
essential needs.
2. Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included the question:
"What are the U.S. Information Agencyts essential intelligence needs
to support its policy, programs, field and media operations, evalu-
ation and training?" Each of these six major functional areas of
USIA will need, in varying degrees, intelligence of the types listed
below. In the case of USIA's evaluation of its program, it has
been found by the Survey to be especially necessary to distinguish
between the function of making evaluation judgments and the
function of providing intelligence essential to such judgments.
3. Conclusions:
a. The types of intelligence and intelligence information required
to meet USIA's essential needs have been identified as set
forth in paragraph c below.
(These types deal solely with foreign intelligence or intelli-
gence information and do not deal with USIA's needs for
."Americana, " i.e., domestic information on the U.S.)
b. The required intelligence is not now adequate in character,
and particularly in quantity, to meet the needs.
c. USIA has essential needs for the following types of intelligence
and intelligence information:
1) Selected segments of societies: selected classes,
groups, organizations (public and private), and their
leadership, present and potential.
a) Size, composition, ideologies and attitudes, predis-
positions,'alid reactions tot (1) the :Uttited States, the
USSR and other countries of:greatst significance and
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Intelligence Needs
%or Conclusions (continued)
'toy
their basic policies, (2) critical foreign and internal problems.
b) The patterns of influence among groups, organizations,
and leaders (including the government); specifically, who
is influential, on whom, how, and how much.
2) Media Research and Analysis:
a) Communications habits and types of media in the country
(press, publications, radio, motion pictures, TV).
b) Organizational aspects of each medium, including location,
key personnel, .finance, distribution and exhibition outlets, and
a description of the facilities of the media.
c) The political orientation of the media.
d) The content of the communications output by the media.
e) Location, size and type of audience receiving the output
of the media.
f) The reactions of the audience to the media, and why.
3) Foreign Propaganda, both friendly and unfriendly, including
exchange of persons or cultural exchange.
a) Facilities and personnel.
b) Program content and plans.
c) Estimates of probable courses of foreign propaganda.
d) Analyses of foreign propaganda vulnerabilities.
4) Impact of factors affecting public opinion and attitudes and the
net impact of such factors on the people of a country. Such
factors would include historical attitudes of a people, and the
Influence of current domestic and foreign official and unofficial
activities.
5) Descriptive Detail, that is, unclassified or declassified intelli-
gence information to supplement the content of USIA media with
items of local interest in order to make the output appear more
Interesting and more authoritative, particularly in denied areas.
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Intelligence Needs
Conclusions (continued)
6) International Communism:
a) International organizations, personalities, programs,
fiscal support, methods and success or failure of operations.
b) Local applications, including counterespionage infor-
mation, with emphasis on communications facilities.
d. It is recognized that intelligence and intelligence information perti-
nent to the needs described above can usefully be provided USIA
in the following three basic forms of intelligence, which are
normally used for production for other purposes:
1) Intelligence Estimates, including National Intelligence
Estimates (intelligence covering the broad aspects of
national policy and national security) and estimates of
probable developments, capabilities and intentions re-
garding specific countries or areas.
2) Basic Intelligence, including National Intelligence Surveys,
that is, factual intelligence which results from the colla-
tion of encyclopedic information of a more or less
permanent or static nature and general interest which, as
a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined
to be the best available.
3) Current Intelligence, that is, spot information or intelli-
gence of all types and forms of immediate interest and
value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by
them usually without the delays incident to complete
evaluation or interpretation.
4) Intellipndi Reports ?n Specialited Subjects
e. USIA needs certain intelligence publications currently produced
A by the IAC agencies. A list of such publications, with recom-
? mended distribution, is attached at Tab A.
f. No elements of USIA, especially Field and Media operations,
should be sent masses of intelligence. Rather,- annotated bibliog-
raphies of available finished intelligence (e.g., Annex C to Tab I,
Annex B to Tab J) should be made available to the media and the
field for their review and selection of those items which they wish
to have made available for their review and possible retention.
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Part 1
Intelligence Needs
4. Recommendations
a. That the Director of USIA approve the statement of
"Types of Intelligence and Intelligence Information Required
to Meet USIA's Essential Needs" (Conclusion 3c, pp. 1-3) as the
basis for requesting intelligenc,-. and intelligence information
for USIA.
b. That the IAC agencies approve Conclusion 3c as the basis
for providing intelligence and intelligence information needed
by USIA. (Action: DCI, with appropriate JAG members.)
c. That the IAC approve the recommended distribution of
National Intelligence (Tab A). (Action: DCI and the IAC.)
d. That CIA and State approve the recommended distribution
of certain of their intelligence publications (Tab A). (Action:
DCI, State/Special Assistant, Intelligence.)
e. That USIA arrange directly with the military intelligence
agencies for receipt of certain of their intelligence publications.
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Part Z
Related Needs of
Other Agencies
RELATED NEEDS OF OTHER AGENCIES
1. Problem: To determine the extent to which the types of intelligence
ommorarlaramp
and intelligence information required to meet the essential needs of
USIA are related to the essential needs of other US programs.
Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included the original
specific question: "Is the intelligence and intelligence information
required to support a covert psychological warfare program and the
US Information Agency program so similar that it could be provided
most efficiently by a single organization? If so, where should that
organization be?" It has become clear in the course of the Survey
that this question is too limited and should be inclusive, as is the
statement of the problem above, of other related US pregrams. (The
relationship of foreign propaganda analysis to other intelligence sup-
port is being studied separately from this survey.)
3. Conclusions:
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a. The types of intelligence and intelligence information identified
as required to meet the essential needs of USIA are substantially
those required to meet the needs of CLA/DDP (except for detailed
"operational intelligence" and "CE information," which should be
provided by DDP), the Public Affairs Staff of the State Department,
and to a lesser extent (because of requirements bearing upon anprny
military personnel, which should be met by the military intelligence
agencies) the "psywar" programs of the Armed Services.
b. Therefore, to the extent that these types of intelligence and intel-
ligence information meet-the needs of agencies with related missions1
the*c agencies .should be served in the main by a single organization
(See Part 3). To assure the provision of intelligence and to supple-
'Mint the service provided by the central organization, USIA should
have its own intelligence unit. That unit is recommended below, see
Part 3 and Tab B.
4. RecoMmendations:
That the appropriate IAC members approve conclusions 3a and b above
as a basis for providing intelligence support to meet the related needs
of other agencies. (Action DCI with appropriate IAC members.)
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Part 3
Organizational
Arrangements
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. Problem: To recommend the organizational arrangements, and
sources and magnitude of funds, required to provide
the US Information Agency wit/inch essential intelli-
gence and intelligence information as can be obtained
and which can be made available.
2. Discussion: Consideration a this problem has included the following
questions:
a. Are the present mechanismsand the interdepart-
mental arrangements adequately responsive to the U.S.
Information Agency's essential needs?
b. What present facilities and resources in the Gov-
ernment not now utilized by or made available to the U.S.
Information Agency could be more effectively utilized
by the U.S. Information Agency in order to satisfy its
intelligence needs?
c. If the U.S. Information Agency needs an intelli-
gence staff, what should be the order of magnitude of
such a staff?
d. Should the U.S. Information Agency be a member
of the IAC?
e. Are revisions required in NSC Intelligence Direc-
tives?
f. What security arrangements are required to meet
solutions to the above problems, and in particular, how
can the needs of the U.S. Information Agency for de-
classification of pertinent intelligence best be achieved?
3. Conclusions
a. The intelligence required for USIA activities does not differ in
kind from the intelligence required to support the political, econo-
mic, and military activities of the government. USIA does, however,
require the intelligence identified in Part 1, paragraph 3 above, with
an emphasis, a detail, and a form not normally required in intelli-
gence produced for other purposes.
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,Organizational
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b. In the main, provision of the types of intelligence and intelligence
information required to meet the essential needs of USIA has been the
primary responsibility of the Department of State, which has utilized
its own resources and those resources supported or coutributed by
other agencies, as established in NSCID-3. Production by State has,
of course, been supplemented by productionby other intelligence units
maintained by agencies with related needs.
c. The total available intelligence of the types required by USIA
and similar comsumers has been inadequate in character, and particularly
in quantity, to meet the needs of these consumers. This inadequacy has
been most marked with respect to basic intelligence and special reports
based thereon (as distinguished from intelligence estimates and current
intelligence.) Therefore the production of basic intelligence in the fields
set forth in Part I 3.c above should be increased, along with that of
special reports based substantially thereon. The USIA should also be
given wider access to intelligence estimates and to current intelligence
as recommended in Part I 4.d above to meet its needs for these forms
of intelligence.
d. On the basis of the allocation of responsibilities within the Intelli-
gence Community presently set forth in NSCID...3, the Department of
State should continue to provide the major part of the intelligence required
by the USIA, and by other consumers with similar needs. If it is to dis-
charge this function, its production of intelligence should be increased
mainly by an expansion of the NIS both topically and in depth of detail,
'particularly to include increased and more adequate intelligence on
"International Communism."
e. To meet its remaining needs, the USIA should have an intelligence
organization designed to ensure that full use is made of the resources of
the intelligence community and to be responsive to those USIA needs
Which cannot be met by the community. The recommended functions and
110 for a USIA intelligetitt organization are set forth at Tab B and
Annex A thereto. "Intelligence" means ;foreign intelligence in this survey.
Nevertheless, USIA may find it desirable to include in the proposed USIA
intelligence organization the function of providing "Americana," i.e.,
domestic information on the U.S.
f. In drawing a definite line between the State Department's function of
providing basic intelligence and special reports and that of the USIA 's
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intelligence organization, the basic principle should be to ensure the
fullest use of the Department of State's analytical staff and to avoid
any duplication by the new USIA organization. Accordingly, the State
Department should continue to produce such special reports and analyses
required by USIA and similar consumers as can efficiently be turned
out by the Department's analytical staff without competing with its
basic responsibilities or its ability to meet the State Department's own
specialized needs. In general terms the analytical functions of the
proposed USIA intelligence organization should be limited to: (a) the
tailoring of basic intelligence to its special needs, and (b) the per-
formance of analyses which by reason of some special circumstances
cannot efficiently and conveniently be performed elsewhere in the
intelligence community.
g. The Survey has found it especially necessary to distinguish between
the function of making evaluation judgments and that of providing the
intelligence essential to such judgments (see Part 1, paragraph 2 above),
and has concluded it would not be desirable to place the responsibility
for making evaluation judgments on the USIA 's programs within the
USIA intelligence organization. That responsibility properly should be
integrated with the executive functions of the Agency or discharged by
a separate staff.
h. USIA operations in the field (USIS) require intelligence support;
in addition to such support as can be provided from Washington, some
local support can be provided. The needs for such support and the
possibilities of meeting those needs locally vary preathr
and programs. I
j. USIA should not become a member of the LAC at this time because:
(1) It is not believed that the contribution which USIA could make
to National Intelligence Estimates is one which would be sufficiently
different from the contributions of the present LAC members.
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(2) The interagency arrangements recommended by this report
can be effected without USIA membership on the IAC.
(3) Whenever matters within the purview of USIA are to be
discussed by the IAC, the DCI can invite USIA participation, as
provided in NSCID-1. (Similar USIA representation should be
obtained by the IAC subcommittees on basic intelligence defectors,
and foreign language publications.)
lc. The question of IAC membership should be reexamined after a
sufficient amount of time has passed for the implementation of this
report.
1. No revisions in the DISCIDs are required to enable the intelligence
needs of the USIA and similar consumers to be adequately met as
proposed in this Survey, that is in a manner which reflects the present
allocation of responsibilities as among the various agencies that make
up the intelligence community.
m. To obtain the intelligence and intelligence information required
to meet its essential needs, the USIA should make such adjustments as
are necessary in its security standards for personnel and handling of
information.
Recommendations:
a. That the Department of State, as the appropriate agency under
NSCID-3, expand and redirect the resources of its intelligence
organization so as to accomplish the additional production, princi-
pally under the NIS program, recommended above. This will require
the use for these purposes of additional funds and personnel over and
above those now available in the Department of State or elsewhere.
Eventually the ad i
might amount tol br possibly even more. Because of pro-
ble rns of re?ruitment and production planning, however, only
to and 30 to 40 additional slots over and above those originally
budgeted will be required for these purposes in the Fiscal Year 1955.
Except insofar as these resources can be made available by the curtail-
ment of other activities in the Department of State's intelligence
organization or elsewhere, the necessary funds should be provided
by the Central Intelligence Agency through the NIS program pending
a reexamination of the method of financing that program.
utlay required under the NIS program
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b. That USIA establish an intelligence organization, separate from
the Department of State, with functions and organizatior, as set forth
in Tab B and Annex A to Tab B, and with funds provided by USIA's
regular appropriations. Until a sufficient amount of time has passed
for the implementation of this report the organization should have a
T/O of an order of magnitude of 70 to 90 positions.
c. That the following organizations now under the administration
of USIA be abolished: CPI, VOA Library & Research, Photo and
IPS Libraries, and that part of IEV which has been engaged inthe
collection and production of intelligence. The slots and money thus
freed will be enough to meet a T/O of the order of magnitude described
above.
d. That USIA be invited to participate in pertinent activities of the
LAC subcommittees on basic intelligence, defectors, and foreign
language publications. (Action: DCI, with Chairmen of the NIS,
IDC, and FLP subcommittees.)
f. That USIA inform the intelligence agencies as to USIA !s present
security practices in order to assure safe handling of classified
intelligence and information,and make such adjustments as may be
necessary to insure the necessary freedom of exchange and discussion.
(Action; Director, USIA, in consultation with each intelligence agenc y.)
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USIA ASSETS
I. Problem: To recommend measures to insure that such
1.1.1.111.0?01r1MMIO
?
intelligence or Intelligence information produced or collected by the
U.S. Information Agency is made available to the IAC agencies.
2. Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included
the questions: "Is there any important intelligence available uniquely
to the U.S. ,Information Agency which is not known to the intelligence
community? Is there likely to be any such under new arrangements?"
3. Conclusions:
a. USIS missions are in a position to add, significantly
to the collection of intelligence information for USIA and
related consumers.
b. Requirements upon USIS missions for such collection
Should be carefully drawn, levied in moderation, and coordinated
in Washington by USIA with the Department of State.
c. In the field USIS reporting should be coordinated
with reporting by other sections of the Embassy.
d. USIA should screen and disseminate its intelligence
and intelligence information to U.S. agencies concerned.
e. USIA may well develop information collecting
techniques useful to related programs and to intelligence. Such
information and techniques should be made available to U.S.
agencies concerned.
4. Re commendations:
a. That USIS reporting be conducted under the direction
of the USIA intelligence organization in coordination with die
State Department.
b. That such reporting bi coordinated ill the field
by the Chief of the U.S. Mission, as is his responsibility
generally.
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II HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED
1. By an exchange of letters in April 1954 (Tabs C and D) the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the United
States Information Agency agreed that the former should conduct
a survey of USIA's intelligence needs and assets and submit
recommendations on how those needs should be met and those
assets used. The terms of reference for the Survey
Tab E.
are at
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2. The DCI appointed, as Director
the Survey,
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning
and
Coordination.
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3. To accomplish his assignment,
established
his survey team which devoted the
major part of
its time to the
conduct of the survey during the eight weeks which then ensued.
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4. The IAC Agencies were invited to participate
(Tab F,
USIA, the Operations
IAC-D-82). In addition, requested
Coordinating Board, and DDP/CIA to designate an
official in their
25X1A
respective areas on whom the Survey could call for assistance
and advice, and who would be in a position to arrange for interviews
and conferences with their officials who had an interest in the
problems faced by the Survey.
5. The following are the officials who were thus appointed:
USIA
OCB
DDP/CIA
IAC/State:
Army:
Navy:
AF:
Mr. Henry Loomis
Dr. Horace S. Craig
Mr. Fisher Howe
Mr. Yaro J. Skalnik
Lt. Comdr. A. Christopher
Major Thomas B. Johnson
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Captain P. C. Staley, USN
AEC: Dr? Charles Reichardt
FBI: Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz
6. As may be observed from the records of interviews and
conferences, Mr. Loomis, Mr. Howe, Mr. Craig and
were invited to attend as observers as many Survey meetings as
possible, since the solutions to the problems would require
primarily the understanding and cooperation of the most interested
agencies represented by these officials. They were of course,
free to ask questions and to enter into the discussions.
25X1A
7. In conducting its investigation to determine the needs for
intelligence,on the part of USIA, the Survey Team initially sought
to understand as fully as possible the functions of the various
components of USIA, to discern what they considered were their
needs, and to help them articulate needs previously only.vaguely
phrased.
8. The Survey Team interviewed or held conferences with
over 100 individuals from all components of USIA/Washington,
VOA/New York (where two days were spent), the Department
of State (Public Affairs Staff, Political desks, Intelligence area),
Operations Coordinating Board (staff), CIA/DDP, P.A0s, USIS
Missions in Europe (Ten days to ,cover London, Paris, Vienna,
Munich) and in Latin America (Ten days to cover Rio, Trinidad,
and Mexico City.) (See Tab G.)
9. The Survey Team reviewed examples of both raw and finished
intelligence in this field, as well as documents bearing upon the
organizational aspects of this problem. A Selection of the latter
is listed at Tab H,
10. In order to relate the statement of need to specific USIA
operations, Thailand and India were selected as case studies.
Memoranda explaining these studies, with their conclusions, are
submitted separately (see Tabs land ).
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TAB
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List of Intelligence Publications and Recommended Distribution
Note: Access to the intelligence publications listed
below should be provided to each official,
though this need not necessarily mean the dis-
tribution of a separate copy to each.
The dissemination recommended in this list is
subject to USIA?. meeting the originating agency's
security standards for handling of classified
material. It is also subject to whatever controls
over dissemination and use of intelligence and
information are imposed by the originating
agency and, in the case of National Intelligence,
the IAC.
A. National
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs and SNIES)
Dissemination:
Washington: Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director.
Area and Deputy Area Directors, Chief
and Area Chiefs of IOP, II, Chiefs and
Deputy Chiefs of Media.
Field:
Based upon area through the Department
and Ambassador to the PAO and Deputy
PAO. The standard letter from
Mr. Armstrong to the Chiefs of Mission
which transmits national estimates
should be revised to include reference
of the estimate to and solicitation of
comment from the PAO.,
National Intelllgce Surveys (NIS.)
Dissemination:
Washington: Should be readily available to all mem-
bers of USIA except administrative
employees.
Field: Should be readily available to PAO staff,
according to area, except foreign nationals.
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B. CIA
OCI Daily (Secret)
Dissemination:
Washington
Only:
Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director
Area & Deputy Area Directors, Chief
and Area Chiefs of IOP, I I, Chiefs and
Deputy Chiefs of Media.
OCI Weekly (Secret)
Dissemination:
Washington:
Same as OCI Daily
Field: FAQ staffs, except foreign nationals.
CIA Library Reports (Bibliographies of selected books,
pamphlets, or intelligence documents)
Dissemination:
Washington
_022IyL
I I -- for use in levying requirements
based upon the statement of USIA's
essential intelligence needs and to
prepare appropriate annotated bibliog-
raphies for USIA.
Intelligence Publications Index
Dissemination:
Same as CIA Library Reports.
FDD Publications
Dissemination:
Washington: Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director,
II, IOP, and the area and media staffs.
Field: To PAO staffs.
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C. State D1partrnent
Daily Summary (Secret) (daily)
Current Foreign Relations (weekly)
Psychological Intelligence Digest (biweekly)
Soviet Affairs (monthly)
International Communism (monthly)
Dissemination:
Washington: Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director,
Area and Deputy Area Directors, IOP,
LI, Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Media.
Field:
To PAO staffs except foreign nationals.
These publications are already avail-
able to the missions,
D. Other Intelli ence Publications Produced b the IAC and A encies
Such other intelligence publications as are provided to USIA
against the statement of USIA's essential intelligence needs
should be disseminated according to needs.
i6
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TAB B
FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED USIA INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
-4?????111111.111?00?????????
I. Major Functions
A. Assure the provision to USIA of the intelligence or intelligence
information required to support its planning, execution, and
review of operations.
B. Maintain liaison with the intelligence collection and production
offices of the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies and
other agencies of the Government, as necessary, to represent
USIA's interests in intelligence collection and production.
Acquire through established channels intelligence information
reports, publications, and documents as required to support
the operations of USIA. Analyze this material to ensure
dissemination to appropriate desks for immediate application
to USIA plans, programs and projects being developed.
C. Coordinate within USIA and with PIRS/State and other agencies,
USIA's interests in external research projects. Keep currently
informed Of, provide a central source of information on, and
assess the capabilities of external research projects of current
or potential interest to USIA. Arrange for contract research
when any intelligence support requirement can best be satisfied
outside the Government.
D. Conduct original research and prepare evaluated reports in
support of USIA programs when requirements cannot be satisfied
by OIR/State, elsewhere within the Government, or by external
research.
E. Provicie such library and reference faxilities neceseary for USIA
Operations as cannot be provided by utilization of existing facil?
itiea of other agencies.
F. In carrying out the above, the USIA Intelligence Qrsanization
should consult directly with USIA components an.d keep advised
of and arrange for the satisfaction of intelligence support
requirements.
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Tab B
II. Functions of Components
A. Intelligence Acquisition and Dissemination Division
1. Establishes and coordinates programs to make available
to USIA intelligence produced and information collected
by IAC and non-IAC agencies of the United States
Government.
2. Accepts and coordinates specific and long-range require-
ments from elements of USIA and other agencies for
Intelligence support; satisfies these requirements by:
a. Identification, location, and procurement of exist-
ing intelligence;
b. Analysis and dissemination of incoming intelligence
materials;
c. Requesting the production of new intelligence by
? IAC research, foreign and domestic field collection,
or National Estimate preparation;
d. Levying requirements for collection on USLS missions
and other agencies.
3. Maintains continuing liaison with IAC agencies' research
and support activities in order to be advised of and
coordinate with all intelligence programs of interest and
possible benefit to USIA..
4. Serves as the control point for dissemination, use, and
declassification requests for intelligence materials
required to meet USIA's needs.
B. External Research Division
1 Develops, defines, and coordinates USIA requirements
which are suitable for external research action; negotiates
with request ors and contractor to relate requirements to
the contractor's resources.
2. Monitors the research programs of quasi-governmental
and private institutions, foundations, and individuals to
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ensure that USIA requirements are included within the
scope of proposed projects whenever feasible, and that
research products of interest to USIA are rnade4vai1able,
upon completion, to appropriate USIA elements.
1
Maintains continuing liaison with the OCB staff, Office of
Intelligence Research, Department of State; Department
'of Defense; CIA; and any other Government agency wit*
external research activities of interest to USIA.
C. Research Division
1. Receives and analyzes specific requests from 'elements
of USIA for intelligence support requiring original re-
search or the c011ation of research data.
2. Consults directly with, requesting offices to determine
their specific needs; advises on intelligence suppbrt
capabilities and on the progress of research.
3. Determines which phases of required research can be
accomplished by other United States Government
agencies, or by external contract; coordinates such
research through the appropriate components of USIA.
4. Conducts original research and produces evaluated
reports in accordance with intelligence support research
requirements which cannot be answered by OIR/State,
elsewhere within the Government or by external research,
. Assists other branches of the division in locating unusual
intelligence support materials (especially foreign
language documents) pertaining to special areas or
subjects.
. Maintains awarenens of developing situationi en an
area, 'world-widep ',and :.functional basis in order to
anticipate intelligence sport needs of USIA.
15; Zoilorary Division
1. Pro-v.44s such libraiyk
;sad refeences facilities no.-
. ? ?
cessitry for USIA operations as oinnot be provi'ded. by
utilisation of wasting library facilities of other agencies.
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Tab B
2. Maintains liaison with other existing libraries
to assure that their services are made available
to USIA whenever possible, thus avoiding dupli-
cation of existing available library services.
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To03 B
-Annex A
Organizational Chart for- Pr_crsed USIA Iotellience Organization
Director
Deputy Director
F
______
,
t
Intelligence
Acquiaition &
-Dissemination
Division
(II/AD)
..10/?????????????????????....
External
Reaearcb.
Diviei OM
(II/ER),
,1
Researcba
Division
(II/R)
. . _ ... .
Library
Vivision
(II/)
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CONFIDENTIAL Tab C
22 April 1954
Mr. Theodore C. Streibert
Directdr,
United States Information Agency
Washington 25, D. C
Dear Mr. Streibert:
As you know, there have been several recent
informal discussions between USIA and CIA officials regarding
USIA's essential intelligence needs. Your representatives
have proposed that I appoint an officer to conduct a survey
which would identify those needs and recommend measures to
meet them.
In response to this request I have appointed
my Special Assistant for Planning and
Coordination, to direct such a survey. It is my understanding
that the terms of reference attached are agreeable to the Depart-
ment df State as well as to CIA. If they are also in accord with
your thinking, then the survey can begin promptly.
You will note that these terms of reference include
questions of mutual interest to the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee agencies. Consequently, I will inform the IAC of this
survey and ask each member to designate an official who can
work with and with Mr. James C. Reber, whom
has requested to carry the main burden of this task.
Sincerely yours,
/a/
ALLEN W. DULLES
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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR April 23, 1954
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1A
25X1A
Dear Mr. Dulles:
? Thank you for your letter of April 22 in which you agree
that a survey of the essential intelligence needs of the U. S.
Information Agency should be conducted under your auspices. I
am pleased that you have appointed your Special Assistant,
as director of the survey.
The terms of reference which were attached to your letter
are entirely satisfactory to me., I believe that when the
questions outlined in the survey" have been answered we should
be in a position to know clearly what is needed and how best to go
about meeting those needs. I, too, am interested that any con-
tribution which this Agency can make to the intelligence effort
of the Government should be made. I recognize the interest of
other Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies in this matter,
and welcome their participation as you deem appropriate.
I have requested the officials of this Agency to assist
in any possible way.
Sinceerely yours,
/5/
Theodore C. Streibert
Director
Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D.C. -2 3 -
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Terms of Reference for
U, S. Information Agency's Intelligence Needs
1. In view of the U.S. Information Agency's mission and
functions, as stated in the U.S. Information and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948, as amended; in the President's Message
to the Congress of 1 June 1953, and in NSC 165/1, 24 October
1953, the survey shall:
a. Identify the types of intelligence and intelligence
Information required to meet the U.S. Information
Agency's essential needs.
b. Recommend the organizational arrangements,
and sources and magnitude of funds, required to provide
the U.S. Information Agency with such essential intelli-
gence and intelligence information as can be obtained
and which can be made available.
c. Recommend measures to insure that such in-
telligence or intelligence information produced or col-
lected by the U.S. Information Agency is made available
to the IAC agencies.
In conducting the survey, the related needs of all intelligence
agencies for similar intelligence and intelligence information
should be taken into account, as well as the resources both in
Washington and in the field.
2. Among specific problems to be included in the survey are:
1) What are the U.S. Information Agency's essential
intelligence needs to support its policy, programs, field
and media operations, evaluation and training?
2) Are the present mechanisms and interdepartmental
arrangements adequately responsive to the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency's essential needs?
3) What present facilities and resources in the Gov-
ernment not now utilized by or made available to the U.S.
Information Agency could be more effectively utilized by
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the U.S. Information Agency in order to satisfy its intelligence needs?
4) Is there any important intelligence available uniquely to the
U. S. Information Agency which is not known to the intelligence
community? Is there likely to be any such under new arrangements?
5) Is the intelligence and intelligence information required to
support a covert psychological warfare program and the U.S.
Information Agency program so similar that it could be provided
most efficiently by a single organization? If so, where should that
organization be?
6) If the U.S. Information Agency needs an intelligence
staff, what should be the order of magnitude of such a staff?
IAC?
7) Should the U.S. Information Agency be a member of the
8) Are revisions required in NSC Intelligence Directives?
9) What security arrangements are required to meet solutions
to the above problems, and in particular, how can the needs of the
U. S. Information Agency for declassification of pertinent intelli-
gence best be achieved?
Cd4lbENnAL
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23 April 1954
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Survey of U.S. Information Agencx's Intelligence Needs
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, on request of the
Director of the U. S. Information Agency, and with the full support
of the Department of State, has agreed to appoint an officer, to
conduct a survey of the U. S. Information Agency's essential intelli-
gence needs. It is recognized that the U. S. Information Agency,
In view of its recently acquired independent status, has a need for
intelligence in order to fulfill its overseas information mission.
Likewise, the U. S. Information Agency can probably provide
resources useful to the Intelligence community.
2. There is attached at Tab A the Terms of Reference for
this survey, which will be conducted under the direction'of
Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and
Coordination.
3. It will be of undoubted assistance to the successful conclu-
sion of this survey to have the advice of the IAC members and
such information as they may have which bears on this question.
Moreover, many IAC agencies have related needs for intelligence
in support of propaganda and psychological warfare and an interest
In the effects of any proposed arrangements on the respective
agencies. Hence it would be appreciated if each IAC member would
notify the undersigned as to a representative with whom
designee may work.
aecretary
IAC.D-82
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? USIA SURVEY
List of Persons Consulted
? USIA
Theodore C. Streibert
Abbot Washburn
Henry Loomis
IOP
IRI
IBS
Andrew H. Berding
William S. Peterson
Ralph Hilton
Robert W. Ehrman
Leonard Ware
Robert C. Hickok
Robert Delaney
D. Elton Trueblood
Bernard Wiesman
Antonio A. Micocci
Lewis M. Nixon
Louis T.. Olorn
Edward F. Lethen, Jr.
John M. Vebber
Leo Lowenthal
Robert A. Bauer
Alexander Barmine
John Armitage
Spencer M. King
Christopher Squire
Gerald F. Dooher
John Nalley
H. Roth Newpher
Vestel Lott
Barry Zorthian
Dorothy Crook
Robert Mayer
Joseph C. Walsh
Director
Deputy Director
SA /Director
Assistant Director
Far Eastern Division
Chief, American Republics Division
Chief Near East Division
Near East Division
Chief, European Division
? Soviet Orbit Division
Religious Advisor
Labor Advisor
Chief
Acting Chief, Research and Evaluation
Chief, Intelligence
Former Acting Assistant Director
Program Manager
Former Director, .Evaluation Staff
Chief, European Division
Chief, Russian Branch
European Division
Chief, East Europe Branch
East Europe, Czechoslovak Service
Chief, Near East, South Asia and Africa Div.'
Far East Division
Chief, Research and Library Branch
Chief, Central Program Services Division
Chief, News Branch
Chief, Talks and Features Branch
Talks and Features Branch
Chief, Security
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Tab G
IPS
ICS
IMS
Harlan Logan
John A. Hutchison
Herbert P. McGushin
Leo J. Pinkus
John E. Dineen
Franklin L. Burdette
Richard A. Humphrey
Franklin B. Steiner
Andrew W. Smith, Jr.
Turner 3. Shelton
Charles M. Noone
Area Directors
William Clark
Frank Gram
" Ned E. Nordness
Charles K. Moffly
Saxton Bradford
Chief
Deputy Chief.
Chief Editorial Division
Chief General Service Branch
Chief, Special Materials Section
Chief
Deputy Chief
Chief, Translation Branch
Chief
Deputy Chief
Chief
Assistant Director for American Republics
Deputy Assistant Director American
Republics
Assistant-Director for Europe
Deputy Assistant Director for Europe
Assistant Director for Far East
Interviewed in Washington--Private Personnel
Lloyd Free
Princeton Research Center
Interviewed in Washington--Field Personnel
Eugene J. Rachlis
Daniel E. Moore
Lawrence S. Morris
European Service Center
' Chief Provincial Officer,, Thailand
Chief Cultural Affairs Officer, Paris
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- CONFIDENTIAL Tab G
Nrse Field Personnel-Continued
Laurence P. Dalcher
William D. Killea
Stefan P. Muusing
William J. Handley
Emily E. Krueger
State
Fisher Howe
Allan Evans
Jesse M. MacKnight
CIA
Walter K. Schwinn
Sidney Buford
George A. Pope
Fred Shipman
Kenneth P. Landon
Evron Kirkpatrick
OC
Dr. Horace Craig
Wallace Irwin
Neilson C. Debevoise
Charles Taquey
Army
? Col. Edward S. Berry
Yaro J. Skalnik
JIC
Captain P. C. Staley
Chief Information Officer, Austria (Vienna)
PAO, Guadalajara,
Director of Amerika Haus (Berlin)
Deputy PAO, New Delhi
Planning and Evaluation Officer, New Delhi
Deputy Special Assistant Intelligence
Director, OIR
Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary-
Public Affairs
Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary-
Public Affairs
Director, OLI
Acting Chief, IAD/OLI
Assistant Chief for Records/DC
Officer in Charge Thai and Malayan Affairs,
PSA
Deputy Director, OIR, for Psychological
Intelligence
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Nilo,'?Navy
Lt. Comdr., A. Christopher
? 25X1A
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Major Thomas B. Johnson
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Basic Documents Considered by the Survey Team*
1. U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948,
as amended.
2. President's Message to the Congress of 1 June 1953, transmitting
Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953.
3. NSC 165/1, 24 October 1953.
4. Report to the President by the President's Committee on International
Information Activities, 30 June 195.5'.
5.
6.
7. Intelligence Support for Psychological Operations
21 June 1951.
8. Intelligence Requirements on the IIA
9. Requests for CPI Services, 12 February 1954.
10. Biographic Sketches of Senior CPI Personnel, 6 January 1954.
11. (USIA) Staffing Pattern and Grades, 5 January 1954.
12. CIA Materials Desired on a Continuing Basis by USIA, 6 January 1954.
13. Criteria for Organization of USIS Field Posts, 16 February 1954.
14. (USIA) Operating Responsibilities and Relationships, 19 February 1954.
15. Current Program, CPI: A Survey of CPI Services in Support of UA.
21 October 1952.
16. Schramm Committee Report: A Program of Research and Evaluation
for II.A, 15 June 1953.
17. OIR Planning for a PW Country Handbook Project, 2 June 1953.
* The above list does not include substantive intelligence reports which
were examined generally by the survey team and examined in detail during
the caslpsptpc..dvieecrFc:a Ffelitgalyie6351dgiVp
ret641)2175brAtt0400030035-3
April, May 1953.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Cas4y on Thailand
Purpose:
1. To examine in some detail the relation of intelli-
gence to a USIA country program.
The Study Itself:
2. 'Phase 1: A briefing of the Thailand program was
given by the AID/FE, Mr. Saxton Bradford, to representatives
of USIA components (ZOP, IRI, CPI, ICS, IMS? IPS), State
Department personnel (PSA, P, OZR), and CIA (OCI, ONE,
DDP, and the Survey Team.).
? Ph,.. 2: The Survey TOam submitted to the fore-
going perseitiel a copy of the "Paychological Offensive for
Thailand" (February 9, 1954) and the USIA-approved
?coutatry plan for Thailand (which is attached hereto as
Annex A). The Survey Team noted in its covering memoran-
dum intelligence materials which it had examined and found
relevant to such a program, including at least nine *sections
of the NIS on Thailand, and the available National Estimate
(SE-45), and intelligence monographs on various subjects.
3. OIR and CPI submitted lists of intelligence products
relating to Thailand. These are attached at Annex C. These
studies have been arranged in keeping wit& the "Staterneat af
Types of Intelligence Needed for USIA."
4. Phase 3: On the basis of the meeting, and subse-
quent to it, there was prepared a list of intelligence questions
derived from an examina.tion of the Thailand psychological
offensive plan. Such questions, if answered, would (a) confirm
or cast doubt upon the assumptions underlying the program and
(b) meet operational requirements c.f the program itself. These
questions were disseminated to the original list of people with
the request that they amend, delete or add such questions as
would make this list more pertinent to the "Plan." This list,
at finally amended, is set forth at Annex B.
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5. Because of the limited time available for the survey,
it was not possible to request existing intelligence facilities
of the Government to set about answering these questions for
the survey. However, those participating are satisfied that
these are the questions on Thailand which intelligence should
answer. Collection requirements as necessary should be
levied on the field.
Conclusions:
1. That the Department of State should proceed to
answer these intelligence questions insof r as extensive
basic, essential materials on Thailand already available will
permit. When necessary to the answering of these questions,
intelligence information requirements should be levied on the
field. (It does not appears at least in the case of Thailand,
that the intelligence needs are sufficiently different from the
regular mission of OIR/State to warrant the establishment of
a USIA intelligence organization to produce finished intelli-
gence to meet all of these needs.)
2. That these intelligence questions should have been
formulated and answered prior to or at least simultaneous
with the "Psychological Offensive. "
3. That such intelligence questions as developed should
be used as a pattern for guiding intelligence production on
other countries, with adjustments required to allow for the
differences between Thailand and such countries. For example,
this has been done in the case of India (See Tab J, Annex A).
Only in this way is it believed that intelligence can know with
sufficient precision what it is that USIA planners, media and
field people want and need, and set forth preparing an
"Intelligence Annex" for USIA country plans.
4. That the USIS offices in Thailand should report to
Washington any intelligence information derived from
operating the "Psychological Offensive" in Thailand. (Such
reporting should, of course, be coordinated at the post with
other mission reportings.)
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?
PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE :F
I. Mission of USISt
To strengthen the will and 'ability of the people -0i Tioilartd to
(1) actively resist Communist infiltration, subversion and political
pressures and (2) strongly support the nation'. armed forces in case
of armed aggression by external Communist f?orc**
II. Strategy;
A. This mission is to be accomplished *aye (I) through
the immediate launching of a psychological offeneive against Coinmtaaism;
(2) through the day-to-day factual reporting and objectlytk,klUirPsellitifbil
of U.S. policy through press, radio and the distribution of official pith.
iications; and (3) by long-range cultural media including exchange of
persons, libraries and reading rooms, a language .institute, and other
activities designed to promote understanding and appreciation at the U.S.
--its people, culture and way of life.
Each of the three will be used to cosn'plernitit th* atis*ril s longer-
rang. cultural activities will 'be donitucted. in ouch a.stay at to...further
. shorter-range psychological objectives to tht groetett-eXtent fat eible.
Conversely, no short range activities will he,.%soderttakon;Whieh are. incon-
sistent with longer-rams, tigoala'.
B. Every effort will be made to assist the ;Thai Ortraeiltirt6 Int VO
develop a strong, efficient information organiitatiasZcapahle...of effective
operations. USIS will work, to the greatest extent possible, with and
through this organization and Other indigenotti'agentia?...ieeders, outlets
and normal channels Of contact., .(Th. Tbtt 00er/relent hat 00 informa-
tion agency at present, the than its PAblic itehtliont -Office,; the mein
purpose of which is to keep the present govitnMeett:ist
C. At the outset, USS work with'tha Thaicgovernottat
Comittittes appointed and chaired by the Pliittlit iiiinieter on Matters of
polity and piaratintand (2) existure the possibility of worielnalstils the
? wel Development Sward on program materials .aari operatione.
The National Develop/smelt Il!onard include, the paiutiefr011ett
Ministry and hal a special infarinetiett 8(.0V:ea-with whiCh !MS will
work closely. NUS operateaitis the,provinftet,74* slatia -?114110
sent out from linnghsh, cap gt, **du qtte341144: EP.z1Farri!..::".104"
of the country for aperiod of Moe* 'Month** rt,40*-7..,11esiefe,..tionsna
,
r ,
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Annex A
distribute seeds to farmers, medicines to the sick and information
materials to the public at large. USIS plans to strengthen NDB and
use it as one of the agencies for reaching Thai target groups. Chinese
groups will be reached through other indigenous agencies, such as
Chinese Chambers of Commerce.
D. USIS will meticulously avoid conveying the impression either
to Government officials or to the public at large, that the primary
responsibility for mounting the proposed psychological offensive rests
on the shoulders of the United States. On the contrary, we must
create the feeling that we are working with and supporting the Thai
Government and the Thai people in their all-out effort to preserve
this country's independence in the face of the current Communist threat.
In short, both sides, from the very outset, should consider our rela-
tions as an active partnership for the purpose of preserving the inde-
pendence and cultural integrity of this country.
E. The USIS program will be closely coordinated with, reinforce,
and in turn be reinforced by, the United States political, economic
and military programs in Thailand.
F. The following specific objectives will serve as a guide in
determining program themes and content:
1. To convince the Thai people that the Communists con-
sider Thailand a rich prize and that without cou.nter-effort on
their part they willfall under the ruthless yoke of Red China
imperialism.
2. To make clear to the people that Communism threatens
the things they cherish most dearly: their beloved King, the
Buddhist Church? their ancient tradition of independence,
individual ownership of land and material possessions, freedom
to chose their own way of life.
3. To expose the methods and techniques used by the
Communists in the conquest of other countries?their deceit
and trickery in pretending to be for ''the people" at the outset
but eventually imposing a complete and ruthless foreign
domination (with special reference to China, Korea, and Indo-
'china).
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4. To destroy any belief that may exist in the invinci-
bility of the enemy.
5. To build up a sense of pride in and loyalty toward their
native land--its unique position in SEA, its historic freedom
from foreign rule, its rich natural resources, its distinguished
role among the Free Nations of the world, its armed forces and
the important contribution they have made in defending the
freedom of Korea.
6. To convince the Thai people that the U.S. is determined
to assist them, to the extent of its resources, to resist the
threat of Communist aggression (coordinate with JUSMAG program).
7. To establish confidence in the ability and determination
of the U.S. and the Free World to stop Communism in its tracks
whenever and wherever it attempts further aggression. (Coordi-
nate with JUSMAG and UN programs,.)
8. To impress upon tile leaders and educated classes of
Thailand the value anr- the economic and military
programs being conducted for the oenefit of their country by the
United States. (Coordinate with STEM and JUSMAG.)
9. To demonstrate to the low-income groups our interest
in improving the health and welfare of the Thai people. (Coordi-
nate with STEM program.)
10. To convince the Chinese and other minority groups that
their future welfare and advancement depend on a stable, inde-
pendent Thailand; that while their present situation has limitations
and handicaps, they are far better off than they would be under
the Communist yoke.
11. To assist the Embassy and other US agencies in the task
of persuading Thai government leaders of the necessity for adopting
policies toward Chinese in Thailand which would hasten their
voluntary assimilation into the Thai nation.
G. Propaganda cannot operate effectively in a vacuum, guided by
general moral convictions. As a basis for realistic planning and effective
tactical operations, USIS will prepare a factual estimate of the situation.
This will furnish essential information on such matters as the following:
strength and location of the enemy, plans of the enemy and methods and
materials he is currently using, most vulnerable target groups,
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Annex A
attitudes, interests and aspirations of the typical member of each target
group and most effective channels, media and themes for reaching and
influencing each such group.
H. In light of the foregoing data, specific tactical operations will
be planned and carried out through indigenous agencies with materials
designed to exert maximum effect on specific target groups.
I. Most program materials (films, publications, radio programs,
etc.) will be planned and produced either locally or at RPC Manila.
Maximum use will be made of indigenous advisers to ensure most
effective program materials. Continous assessment of program results
will be used to progressively increase program effectiveness.
J. To arouse, develop, guide and assist provincial leaders and
agencies in a nation-wide resistance offensive and to serve as distribu-
tion points for its own materiae, USIS will open and operate five pro-
vincial centers, one in the North, two in the Northeast, one in the Central
Area and one in the Southern peninsula. Each center will be manned by
an American and operate two or more sub-centers (manned by local
personnel) and at least two mobile units to reach the more sparsely popu-
lated areas. Every effort will be made to establish several active
psychological resistance units in each provincial area.
K. The program will be conducted with sufficient flexibility to meet
new and unexpected developments as revealed by intelligence sources.
The headquarters staff will be organized and will operate in a way to
ensure maximum mobility of USIS manpower. Plans will be prepared
and kept current for the immediate expansion of production facilities to
meet emergency needs.
2221a.li_oagE
Operations will be conducted on three broad fronts--government,
low income populace and special target groups. Each one is to be
approached initially with separate types of material and with distribu-
tion methods appropriate to its particular characteristics.
Operations ultimately will be carried on simultaneously on all
three fronts, recognizing that to obtain the cooperation of the low-level
groups it is necessary to have support and assistance of the government
while at the same time, full government support cannot be expected
without developing favorable public opinion on the part of the low-income
groups which comprise such a large percentage of the total population.
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In the same way, development of special materials for special
target audiences should aid in successful operations on the other two
fronts and should be more effective as the result of attitudes created
within the government and the low-level groups. These fronts will
be approached as follows:
A. Government Front.
I. This will be the first new operation of USIS Bangkok and
will involve the thorough indoctrination of all government officers and
employees. The object will be to (1) convince the government of the
seriousness of the Communist threat and (2) enlist the government's
wholehearted support and active assistance in operations on the other
two fronts.
2. Specific target groups will be (1) government officials,
employees, teachers and members of the armed forces in Bangkok and
(2) government officials, employees, teachers and members of the
armed forces in the provinces.
3. Media to be used will include speakers and discussion
leaders, pamphlets, posters, films and visual aids (charts, diagrams,
etc., for the use of speakers).
4. The plan of action will be prepared by the USIS staff and
submitted to the Prime Minister's committee for approval.
5. Program materials will be produced with the guidance of
Thai advisers.
6. The program will be carried out by Thai leaders and
cadres trained and guided by USIS.
7. A photographic record will be kept of the various program
activities and every effort will be made to assess the impact of pro-
gram materials and methods on the attitudes toward Communism of
each target group.
B. The Low-Income Front.
1. Operations will be expanded as rapidly as feasible to
include low-income groups (farmers, laborers and industrial workers)
in critical areas such as the Northeast. Here the problem will be
the immunization of such groups to ensure their resistance to the
germs of Communism if and when they first appear.
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Nee
Nal Amphurs, and village headmen to reach the low-level audience
in provincial areas.
"ger
3. Material interpreting U.S. policies will, be distributed
through independent mechanisms to be developed by USIS.
C. Special Targets Front
Tab I
Annex A
1. As soon as the estimate of the situation has been completed,
and other high-priority target groups identified (such as segments of
the Chinese population, Buddhist priests and newspaper men), operations
will be still further expanded to provide specific programs to exert
maximum effect upon the membership of such groups.
2. Preliminary attitude surveys will be made of these groups
to determine most effective themes and media to utilize in each case
and as a basis for assessing program results.
3. NDB and other indigenous agencies will be used to the extent
possible in reaching these specific groups, in addition to the present
direct methods, such as the Wireless Bulletin, radio programs,
publication distribution, film distribution, and exchange of persons.
IV. Tactical Plan for Operation G-1*
A. Objectives
1. To convince the personnel of the Thai Government of the
seriousness of the Communist threat to their country, their. Govern-
ment, their religion, and their way of life.
2. To enlist their wholehearted support and active assistance
in carrying out the psychological offensive at the lower governmental
levels and among the people outside the Government.
B. Target Groups
1. The officers and employees of the 13 Thai Ministries
located in Bangkok: Agriculture, Communications, Cooperative
*G-1: First operation involving Government personnel in Bangkok.
(G-2: Will be second operation involving Government personnel in
provinces.)
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Affairs, Culture, Defense, Economic Affairs, Education, Finance,
Now
Foreign Affairs, Industry, Public Health, Justice, and Interior.
2. The officers and employees in the Lord Mayor's municipal
staff.
C. The Program
1. An outstanding leader in each Ministry will be appointed
by the Minister.
2. These 13 top leaders will be given an intensive indoctrina-
tion in Communism as a world-wide revolutionary movement
inspired and controlled by Moscow. This indoctrination will be
carried out by a top-flight training officer from the U.S. It will be
based on authentic evidence taken from original Communist sources.
3. The 13 leaders will then return to their respective Ministries
and present to all officers and employees the substance of the indoc-
trination lectures (USIS will supply charts and other visual aids to
make these talks as effective as possible). The purpose of these
lectures will be to lay a solid foundation in fact, so that subsequent
talks and program materials, designed to stress the more localized
threat, will be given the serious consideration they warrant and not
be skeptically derided as fanciful propagandas.
4. The leaders will next arrange for four additional speakers
who will deal specifically with the Communist threat to Thailand, as
follows:
A Police Officer, who will give the inside CID story as it
relates to current Communist efforts to infiltrate and
subvert the Thai people.
A Viet Mirth Renegade, who will describe his disillusion-
ment with the Communists and how much better the Thai
way of life is; also, the current Viet Minh threat to
Thailand's northern borders.
A Buddhist Priest.who will describe the Communist threat
to their religion, their priests, and their holy ways. (Using
Ho Chi Minh's statement that Buddhism is an enemy of the
people.)
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A Thai Army Officer who has served in Korea, who will
describe the Communists intentions to conquer the free
countries, one by one, and with arms, if necessary; the
atrocities in Korea as a coldly calculated part of the
Communist pattern of action; the eagerness of North
Koreans to escape the Communists and return to freedom
when given the opportunity during the prisoner exchange.
5. During the foregoing lecture period, the leaders will form
one or more permanent cadres in each Ministry to organize discussion
groups, arrange for subsequent speakers, distribute anti-Communist
materials, and show anti-Communist films. (USIS will help train
the cadres and supply printed materials and films.)
6, Exhibit boards, with poster and picture materials, will
be placed in all Government office buildings at strategic locations.
(USIS will, service these boards.)
7. The lecture course in each Ministry wilt open with a
recorded message from the King. The National flag and the King's
picture will be displayed in each meeting place.
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TAB
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Annex B
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE FOR THAILAND
Intelligence required to assist in the formulation and execution of a
psychological program
(The number and letters in the parentheses are keyed to the "Psycho-
logical Offensive for Thailand", Annex A to Tab I),
a
STAGE 1 - STRATEGY
SELECTION
Why pick this country?
A. Is Thailand in danger of communist attack by force?
B. Are the communists attempting or likely to attempt to hitb'frett
Thailand? ?
.1. 4
C. Do the Thai* have will and capacity to resist attadk3by force or
subversion? t
D. Can Thai will and capacity be increased?
;i
E. How does Thailand compare in above respects with major hlteirria-
tive targets ?
F. Are Thailand people providing an example and leadership to other
peoples and governmeats of the area.?
STAGE 11 - PLANNING
OBJECTIVES
What do we wish to accomplish?
?
(11) A. What is the peteettel oi the Thai to develop greater will and
capacity to retie* illtommuoist infiltration, subversion, and
.poUtitalpres.*ut
I. What factors in Thailaud;ciltitribute to such will and capa-
city?
(r5) \I a. What is the content othe thationalist idea in Thailand?
(1) Do Thais profess a superiority in culture, skill,
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(2) How do they regard other countries and foreigners, r-
especially China and the Soviet?
(F2)
(Fit)
(3) Are they nationally proud, and of what?
b. Do the Thai cherish deeply certain elements of national
life?
(1) Would these include King, independence, property,
and way of life?
(2) Others?
c. Are the Thai working towards goals of economic and
social development?
, (1) How much have they done and planned on their own?
(2) Do cultural factors affect Thai attitudes towirde
deVelopment?
(F9) (3) How strongly do' the masses desire improvement
of material conditions?
(F10)
2. What factors tend to weaken Tha4 will and capacity to resist
communism?
a. Are there minorities with insecurities and unsatisfied
aspirations?
(1) Do the external connections of sorne minorities
'contribute to their dissidence -- e.g., Vietnamese.
Chinese?
(F11) (2) Is Thai official policy unable to handle minority
problem.?.
(Fl) (F1)
(F2)
b. Are these aspects of Thai culture and society that
diminish will and capacity?
3. Do the Thai understand the threat of communism?
a. Do they think the communists regard Thsilanalte.aPrich
prize?
b. Do they think the communists threaten their cherished
ideals and ways ? (See lb above).
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(F3)
(F4)
c. Do they see through the communist claim to be "for the
people"?
(I) What understanding have the/ of China, Korea:
Indochina?
d. Do they think of communism as invincible?
e. What do they think of the Thai Autonomous State?
f. Is their view of communism distorted by other claims
and connotations, e.g., that communism favors rapid
growth of national power, or economic development?
4. What are the attitudes of Thai towards the U.S.?
(F6) a. Do the Thai think the U.S. will determinedly support
them?
(l) Is there any impediment in fear of imperialism?
(2) Do they consider U.S. has both power and will?
(3) How do they regard U.S. culture, "materialism,"
manners?
(FI) b. What confidence do they have in U.S. and Western will
and capacity to stop communist aggression?
(1) What view do they have of U.S. leadership and
Free World cohesion?
(F8-9)
(2) What do they think about collective security organ-
ization for S.E. Apia?
c. Do the Thai respect the U.S. tradition of material im-
provement?
4. 'Do major segments of Thai society differ in respect of
the a.bove attitudes?
5. What aspects or activities of communism will affect the
Thai?
(FI) t, Do the cormlnunists regard Thantisidas a rich prize?
(1) Have they said so?
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(F2)
(F3)
(F3)
(F4)
(F 7)
(2) Does this conclus OT1 flow from their general
policy?
(3) Have they said the contrary?
b. What is communist attitude and practise toward
Buddhism?
c. What have been communist methods of suppressing
"the people".?
d. Has communism imposed itself in Asia as a "foreign"
domination?
e. In what ways has communism been shown to be
defeatable?
f. Have the communists shown intentions for further
aggression?
(12) B. What is the prospect for increasing Thai will and capaoity to
support the armed forces in case of attack?
(F8) 1. What is the attitude of the Thai towards military action?
a. How do they regard the army?
b. Have they experience or tradition of natioaal action?
(1) Practise in use of weapons?
(2) Guerrilla warfare?
(q)
I;
VIAGE at-PROGRAMMING
APPROACH
What have we to workowith?
What are the capabilities and intentions of the communists?
. What is communist strength in Thailand?
a. Size, distribution and influence of Party?
? Cliakacier and indoctrination of leaders?
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S00750A00060003002i5ex
2. How do communists go about their business?
a. Targets and degree of infiltration?
Command over communications?
Degree and character of external support?
(1) Quantity id broadiasalling and content thereof ?
(2)
Personal and organizational connections ?
3. What will the communists do next?
a. Indications of intended change or build-up of activity?
4. What target-groups might be most vulnerable to communists?
B. What aspects or activities of communism will affedt the Thai?
(Fl) a. Do the communists regard Thailand as a rich prize?
(1) Have they said so?
(2) Have they said the contrary?
(3) Does the conclusion flow from their general policy?
(F2) b. What is communist attitude and practise towardiraddhism?
(F3) c. What have been communist methods of suppressing "the
people"?
(F 3) d. Has communism imposed itself in Asia as a, "foreign!'
domination?
C. What elements in Thailand are susceptible to US inflionraej,
1. What target groups are most influential in determining
national action in Thailand?
no Which. groups at the present time?
b. Which groups may gain influence in the near future?
c. Are there groups which may cause trouble" /
d. What groups influence mass opinion?
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Annex B
2. How susceptible are these groups severally to VS- influence?
(G) D. What are the means available for communication in Thailand?
1. What are the formal media? (Radio, films, press, bolas,
other printed materials)
o Number, character and geographical distribution of
units.
b. Target group distribution of each medium.
.c. Reception -- literacy, radio receivers movie houses.
d. Overlap in various media audiences.
2. What are the informal channels of communication?
a. What persons are spreaders of information and opinion?
b. Organisational networks: government, religious, labor,
social, etc.
c. Focuses of exchange: markets, festivals. e
What are production facilities?
a. Pre ow.
b. Movie studios.
c. Radio.
C.
STAGE IV - OPERATING
ACTION
What shall we do?
What are strengths ani weakness* of communist influecein
each of the (perhaps selected) infiltrated groups?
1. In respect of leader.?
a. Which leaders are relatively convinced and unapproach-
able?
. Which leaders are susceptible, by rea'Son of rivalry,
weakness, skeletons in the closet?
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Annex B
2. In respect of membership satisfaction?
a. What are communist policies in the grt!up?
b. What elements do these policies satisfy?.
? What elements do these policies fail to satisfy?
. What objectives might compete with communist policies?
3. In respect of competing groups?
What groups do or might compete with the communist
outfits for the same clientele?
B. What are the esisceptibilities of selected other, target groups?
I. In respect of leaders?
(B)
a. In what ways do individual leaders appear susceptible
to influence?
In respect of membership?
a. What does the group desire?
b. 'How does it go ibeut, or propose, to get there?
3. In respect of orientation?
a. How does the group see itself in the national or social
picture?
b. How much and how does the group appreciate even wider
issues? ( Communism, East-West, colonialism.) -
.144
4. In respect of group thinking?
'a. What are the stereotypes current?
b. What ideals do they intend to serve?
S. In respect of communications?
a. Are there formal media?
b. Who is in control of production facilities and how
susceptible to influence?
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? How are group opinions funned and influenced?
d. What "rituals" shape and crystallize group thinking?
e. What kinds of information do the member* expect to
receive through eack formal or informal medium?
f. What are the sources of the information relayed thrOugh
these media?
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Tab I , Annex
List of Intelligence Products Relating to Thailand
January 1952 through May, 1954
with selected items 1950-1951
(These products were prepared by OIR/State and the
Office of the Coordinator for Psychological Intelligence)
NOTE: Each project is listed only once under its primary de-
scription though it may, in addition, meet specific requirements
under other categories.
I. A. Segments of Society
1) The status of organised labor in Southeast Asia:
Thailand. April 3, 1950. Restricted. (01R-5181.3)
2) Education in Thailand. March 9, 1950. Restricted.
(DRF-IP-314).
3) Political opportunities for Chinese Communists in
Thailand. August 21. 1950. Secret. (01R-5151)
4) Totalitarian aspects of political parties in Indo-
china, British Malaysia, and Thailand.
October 23, 1950. Confidential. (DRF-212)
5) Data on ethnic groups for use in psychological warfare:
Thailand. March 7, 1951. Restricted. (Contribution
to CS5. 12)
6) Overseas Chinese as a propaganda target group:
Thailand. August 70 1951. Confidential. (Contri-
bution to P-area study)
Labor organization in Thailand. August 290 1951.
Secret. (DRF-DR-241)
8) Buddhist institutions in Thailand and their intelli-
gence aspect. August 20, 1952. Secret. (IR-5625.9S-IX)
9) Impact of the presence of US personnel in certain Far
Eastern countries: Thailand. November 28, 1952.
Confidential. (Contribution to S/P paper)
10) Non-Communist political opposition in Thailand.
April 30, 1953. Secret. (IR-6253)
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Annex C
11) The position of Overseas Chinese communities in the
various countries of Southeast Asia: Thailand.
February 19, 1954. Confidential. (DRF-SP-39)
12) U.S. Problems among Overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia: Thailand. September 29, 1953.
13) Southeast Asian receptivity to higher moral and
religious content in the international information
program. May 7, 1953.
14) The problem of education of Overseas Chinese.
January 4, 1954. Secret (IR-6506)
B. Communications Media
1) Notes on cultural and political factors relevant to
problems of visual propaganda media in Thailand.
August 21, 1950. (Memorandum)
2) Analysis of the press in Thailand. September 1, 1950.
Confidential. (bIB.-5340)
3) Newspapers which might be quoted by FBIS.
May 18, 1951. Restricted. (Contribution to IP-423)
4) Data on newspapers and periodicals in Thailand.
July 31, 1952. Confidential. (CPI request)
C. Foreign Propaganda
1. Facilities
1) Government of Thailand not enforcing restrictions on
Communist propaganda. (IB-1135)
2) Thai Government continues to tolerate local Communist-
front activity. September 23, 1952. Confidential. (IB-1232)
3) Communist propaganda activities in Thailand. October
14, 1952. Secret. (Memorandum to IIA)
2. Content
1) Communists charge US assistance to Chinese Nationalist
troops in Southeast Asia. January 11, 1952. Secret. (IB-1086)
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Annex C
2) Thai Communists move to identify Party with major
popular issues. October 24, 1952. Confidential.
(IB-1000. 500)
3) Reaction papers: Thailand. 1952, 1953, 1954.
4) Communist and Anti-Communist propaganda in Southeast
Asia: Thailand during 1953. May 11, 1954. (CPI-SP33)
5) Political Complexion of Chinese Language Newspapers
in Southeast Asia. November 28, 1952.
6) Chinese Communist propaganda concerning Thailand.
May 20, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6308)
D. Public Opinion
1) See particularly items under Current Intelligence below--
ILC. 1. a.
2) Developments significant for propaganda: Thailand.
Weekly, 1952. 1953, 1954. (IR-5550.xx)
3) CPI weekly briefings: Thailand. 1953.
4) Preliminary assessment of Asian attitudes toward the
Indochinese Conflict. December 7, 1953. (CPI-SP 24)
E. Descriptive Details
(This type of information is frequently furnished to USIA
through telephonic contacts rather in format reports.)
1) Official holidays, 1950: Thailand, January 1951.
(Memorandum)
2) Major holidays celebrated in Southeast Asia: Thailand.
May 30, 1951. (CS5.43)
F. World Communism
1) Developments in world Communism: Thailand,
1952, 1953, 1954. Secret. (Contributions to IR-5650)
2) Southeast Asian Communists at Social Welfare Con-
ferences: Thailand. October 13, 1952. Confidential.
(DRF contribution to CPI paper)
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Annex C
F. World Communism (continued)
3) Indications of Communist activity in Thailand.
December 9, 1952. Secret (IB-1297)
4) Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the
Communist Party, Thailand. February 1953. Secret.
(IR-6165.6)
5) Assessment of Communist strength in Southeast Asia.
January 29, 1954.
II. Intelligence for More General Purposes
A. Estimates
1) Communist capabilities and intentions in Asia.
April 1, 1952. Secret. (DRF contribution and NIE 47)
2) Consequences of a Korean truce: Thailand. April 1953.
Secret. (DRF contribution and 1E-52)
3) Thailandge ability to withstand communist pressures
or attacks. May 24, 1953. Secret. (DRF contribution
and SE-45.)
4) Communist courses of action in Asia through mid-1955:
Thailand. September 24, 1953. Secret. (DRF contri-
bution and NIE- 9 8)
5) Present and prospective capabilities of non-communist
Asia: Thailand. October 1, 1953. Secret. (DRF-SP-21)
6) Thai reaction to Viet Mirth victory in Indochina.
November 30, 1953. Secret (DRF-SP-30)
7) Probable Thai policy following loss of Indochina to
communist control. April 15, 1954. Secret. (DRF-SP-43)
8) The foreign economic impact of a US business decline.
May 10, 1954. For Official Use Only. (DRF contribu-
tion and 1E-65)
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B. Basic Intelligence
1) National Intelligence Survey: Thailand
a) Political
Section 50 -- Introduction
51 -- The Constitutional System
52 -- Structure of the Government
53 -- Political Dynamics
54 -- Public Order and Safety
55 -- National Policies
57 -- Subversive
58 -- Propaganda
59 -- Biographies of Key Personalities
b) Economic
Section 60 -- Introduction
64 -- Manufacturing and Construction
65 -- Trade and Finance
61 - Agriculture and Food (nearly complete)
62 ? Fuels and Power (nearly complete)
63 -- Minerals and Metals (nearly complete)
c) Sociological
Section 40 -- Introduction
41 -- Population
42 -- Characteristics of the People
43 ? Religions Education, and Pal/lc
Information
44 ? Manpower
46 ? Public Welfare
2) Reports
a) Political
(1) The Viet Minh Invasion of Laos and the Threat
to Thailand: a background report. May 15, 1953.
Secret. (IR-6311)
(2) The Thai Autonomous Region in Yunnan (Sibsong
Panna). July 3, 1953. Secret (IR-6318)
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b) Economic Annex C
Institutional Impediments to Private US Investments
in Southeast Asia: Thailand. March 6, 1952.
Restricted. (IR-5819)
(2) Factors affecting climate for US investment in
mineral development abroad: Thailand. May 14, 1951.
Confidential. (Contribution to IR-5905.3)
(3) Asian rice prospects for 1961: Thailand. August 1952.
Restricted. (IR-5940)
(4) Government expenditures on economic and social
services in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand. April 15, 1953. Restricted. (IR-6152)
(5) Economic conditions and short-term economic
prospects in Japan and Southeast Asia: Thailand.
July 16, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6345)
(6) Contemplated expenditures by the Thai Government
on economic developments projects. August 12, 1953.
Restricted. (Memorandum)
(7) Foreign Trade Developments in South and Southeast
Asia, 1950-52. August 25, 1953. Unclassified.
(Contribution to IR-6349)
(8) Bilateral agreements in international trade.
April 22, 1954. Unclassified. (Contribution to
IR-6110R1)
C. Current Intelligence
1) Reports
a) Political
(1) The new constitution and political prospects in
Thailand. March 13, 1952. Secret. (IB-1121)
(2)
Mounting political tension in Thailand. September 4,
1952. Secret. (IR-6006)
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(3) The government of Thailand may be moving toward
neutralism. September 4, 1952. Confidential (IB-1000.487)
(4) Thai government arrests opposition elements.
November 20, 1952. Confidential. (IB-1279)
(5)
Prospects of Thai-Cambodian-Laotian alliance.
January 19, 1954. Confidential. (IB-1548)
(6) Chinese irregular forces in Burma. February 15, 1954.
Secret. (IR-6507)
b. Economic
(1) Possible effects of lower sterling rates in Thailand.
April 10, 1952. Confidential. (IR-5861)
(2) British-Thai rice negotiations. October 29, 1952.
Confidential. (IR-6050)
(3) Deterioration in Thailand's trade and balance of
payments position in 1952 and 1953 prospects.
July 14, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6241)
(4) Thailand's trade prospects for 1953 continue to
deteriorate. October 9, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6445)
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Ta.b J
Case Study on India
? 1.. Because of the presence in Washington of the
Deputy PAO from New Delhi, Mr. William Handley, the
Survey Team sought to obtain as much insight as possible
into the field needs in India and capabilities and points of
view with regard to intelligence.
2. On the basis of discussions with Mr. Handley, other
USIA personnel, and intelligence officers, the following con-
clusions were reached:
a. That a bibliographical statement of the existing
intelligence. production relevant to the types of intelli-
gence needed by USIA should be sent to the field for the
selection of those items which would be of greatest
likely use.
b. In the development of an operational plan for
India, an intelligence annex should be developed,
based upon the findings in the Thailand case study
and adapted to meet the peculiar needs of India. The
terms of reference for such an annex are attached at
Annex A hereto.
C. That there were possibilities for PAO reporting
but that requirements for such reporting should be
carefully drawn, levied in moderation, and fulfilled
in full cooperation with the Embassy.
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Annex A
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROGRAM FOR INDIA
Intelligence questions which should be considered and answered
selectively to assist the formulation and execution of a psychological
program.
(The four "Stages" represent a time-sequence; the questions thus
frequently overlap, but need to be answered with increasing detail as
the operation progresses from the problem of deciding upon the country
target?Stage 1 - to the problem of deciding upon the group or in-
dividual target--Stage 3 - and the selection of themes and actions--
Stage 4.)
STAGE 1 - STRATEGY
SELECTION
Why pick this country?
A. Is India in danger of communist attack by force?
B. Are the communists attempting or likely to attempt to subvert
India?
C. Does India have will and capacity to resist attack by force or
subversion?
D. Can India will and capacity be increased?
E. What attitudes does India display towards the Cold War?
F. In what direction are these attitudes likely to develop?\
. Are there means whereby these attitudes can be changed favorably
to the West?
H. Does India provide an example and leadership to other peoples and
governments?
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I. How does India compare in above respects with major alternative
targets?
SECTION II - PLANNING
OBJECTIVES
What do we wish to accomplish?
A. What are the attitudes of the government and people of India
towards the East-West conflict?
1. How do they view present global East-West Tension?
a. Do they see it resulting from a conflict of principle, a
desire for power, aggres sive tendencies, fear of aggres-
sion, or from other forces?
b. What possible developments of the situation do they fear
and what do they think the actual course of developments
is likely to be?
c. Where do they think their own interests lie in the sit-
uation?
2. DA Indians understand the threat of communism?
a. Do Indians think the communists intend to take over their
country?
b. What confidence have the Indians that they can resist com-
munism ?
c. Do Indians think that communism threatens their ideals,
aspirations and way of life?
d. To what extent do Indians see through communist profes-
sions, such as beininfor the people," and communist
misrepresentations of the West?
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? v. Is the Indian view of communism distorted by expectations
that it might be potentially beneficial to them, as offer-
ing speedy solutions for social and economic problems and
enabling India to develop into a strong and powerful nation?
f, ? Do they think, or tend to think, of communism as the wave
of the future, or invincible?
g, What knowledge and understanding have Indians of communist
history, with special regard to the treatment of satellites?
3. What do the Indian& think of.the West?
a. How do Indians assess Western objectives, intentions
and capabilities towards the Communist bloc countries?
? What do Indians think of collective security measures
involving association with the West?
c. Does concern over political and economic imperialism color
Indians' attitudes toward the West?
4. What do they think of the US?
. What identities and differences of interest do they see
between themselves and the US?
. What view do they have of US leadership in the Free
WOrld?
c. How do they react to US foreign policy generally?
4. Do they admire or condemn particular aspects of US
cultuie as they see it? e.g., liberty, "materialism."
e. What other factors contribute to the present state of Indo-
US relations?
5. What other attitudes condition their view of the East-West
tension?
a. ?Do difftrences -amid disputed with other nations of the
area affect the Indian attitude toward the US and the
West? (e.g., thp Kashmir and canal waters disputes
with Pakistan.)
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b. What influence do ideological, moral or religious
concepts have on the Indian attitude toward the East-
West conflict?
B. What factors contribute to shape, strengthen, or weaken these
attitudes?
1. What is the content of the nationalist idea and sentiment in
India?
a. How strong is the Indian sense of national unity? What
factors tend to promote or hinder the growth of Indian
national consciousness?
b. Have Indians a pride in their nation, its history and
achievements? To which features of these do they
point with pride?
c. How do Indians look upon themselves and their culture
in comparison with the people and cultures of other
countries?
d. How do Indians regard other countries and their nationals,
especially the USSR and China, Europe and the US?
e. Do Indians cherish deeply certain elements of their
national life?
(1) Would these include? democracy, independence,
religion, property and way of life?
(2) Others?
f. Are the Indians working towards goals of economic and
social development?
(1) How much have they done, and planned on their own?
(2) Do cultural factors affect Indian attitudes towards
development?
(3) How strongly do the masses desire improvement of
material conditions?
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g.
Have the Indians a vigorous traditon of political conscious-
ness and activity?
(1) Is the government apparatus now or potentially capable
of controlling communist pressure?
(2) What circumstances do or might arouse in the Indian
people intense feeling on political questions?
h. Are there minority problems?
(1) Do the minorities suffer from insecurities and un-
satisfied aspirations?
(2) How does the majority look upon the minorities?
(3) What are official policies towards minorities?
(4) Is the government capable of applying these policies
or of obtaining satisfactory solutions?
i. Are there other aspects of Indian culture and society
which influence Indian attitudes towards the East-West
conflict?
C. Do Significant segments of Indian society hold views and attitudes
which differ from those discussed above?
D. Do any particular factors affect Indian attitudes towards using of
force to resist aggression?
1. How do they regard the army and military service?
2. Have they experience or tradition of military action?
a. Practise in use of weapons?
b. Guerrilla warfare?
3. Are there cultural, ideological, or religious factors which
condition Indian combativeness or martial spirit?
STAGES III, IV
as for Thailand
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Annex B
List of Intelligence Products Relating to India
January 1952 through, May 1954,
with selected items 1950-1951
(These products were prepared by OIR/State and the Office
of the Coordinator for Psychological Intelligence)
NOTE: Each project is listed only once under its primary description,
though it may, in addition, meet specific requirements under
other categories.
I. A. Segments of Society
1) Data on Ethnic Groups: India. September 14, 1951.
Restricted. (Contribution to CS-5.12).
2) Major Religions of India. December 11, 1951. Restricted.
(IR 5668).
3) Some Aspects of Religion in India. October 31, 1951.
Confidential. (IR 5684).
4) Labor Organizations in India. January 3, 1952. Confi-
dential. (IR 5525).
5) Organization and Influence of Buddhist Institutions in the
World Today: India. January 23, 1952. Secret. Con-
tribution to IR 5625.3).
6) Developments in the Asian Socialist Movement. September
10, 1952. Confidential. (Contribution to IR. 5731).
7) Minority Problems in the Near East and South Asia.
October 21, 1952. Confidential (SP 243).
8) Data on Organized Labor in India. October 24, 1952.
Unclassified. (SP 245).
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9) Distribution of Occupation of India's Gainfully Employed
December 9, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 257)
10) Nehru's Attitudes Toward Communism, the Soviet Union,
and Communist China. July 24, 1953. Secret. (IR 6269).
11) Background Information on Panchatantra 12/53.
12) Material Supporting USIA Activities in India in Dealing with
Issue of U.S. Military Aid To India 1/54.
13) Analysis of Nehru Statements On Communism 12/53.
14) U. S. Doctors In India 12/53.
15) Activities of ?U Missionaries in India 2/54.
16) Indian Attitudes Towards the US 11/53.
17) Background Information on French Enclaves In India 4/54.
18) Forthcoming Election In Trvancore-Cochin 11/53.
19) Background Data On South Asia 11/53.
20) Estimates of the Reactions Of Indians To the Failure of the
U.S. to Ratify the Geneva Convention and of U.S. Lead rs to
Condemn the Use of BW. 7/52.
21) Estimated Reactions to Increased UN Bombing Activity in Korea
8/52,
22) Extent of Resentment In India Toward Living Standards of
Americans in India 4/52.
23) Linguistic Self Determination InplIndia 12/52.
24) Recently Constituted State Governments In India 4/52.
25) Comparison of Indian and U.S. Voting Behavior 1 /52
26) Bibliography of Basic PW materials an ocumen s
27) ? Anti-westernism In India 5/51.
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28) Indian Attitudes Toward India's Current International Role
9/53.
29) Moral and Religious Content In the IIA Program: India 5/53.
30) Indian Misconceptions of the U.S. 5/53.
31) Survey of Foreign Including Indian Attitudes Toward U.S.
Economic Policies 8/51.
B. Communications Media
1) Channels of Public Information in India. March 17. 1952.
Confidential. (IR 5551).
2) Circulation of Indian Newspapers 2/54.
3) Chinese Radio Broadcasts to South Asia 2/54,
4) Background Information On Times of India 12/53.
5) Possible Improvement of U. S. Collection Efforts On the Communist
"Book Program" in South Asia 2/54.
6) Background Information On theAll India Radio 1/54.
7) List of Publications Sponsored By Communist Press in New
Delhi 1/53.
8) Information On the Bombay Free Press Journal 4/52.
C. Foreign Propaganda
1. Program Content and Plans
1) Soviet and Chinese Economic and Cultural Moves in India,
January 1947-July 1952. July 26, 1 952. Confidential.
(Contribution to IR 5972),
2) The Nature of Communist Social Welfare Propaganda in
India. November 1952. Restricted. (Memorandum).
3) Communist Make Large-Seale Effort to Involve India Intel-
lectuals and Culture in "Peace Campaign." March 17, 1952.
Restricted. (IB 1123).
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4) Communist Books in India and Pakistan. January 22, 1952.
Restricted. (SP 180).
5) Quotations Indicating the Importance Communist Attached
to India. February 21, 1952. Unclassified (SP 393).
6) Quotation from the 'Program of the Communist Inter-
nationa. " June 27, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 222).
7) Communist Penetration of Indian Motion Pictures Industry
and Indian Music. October 7, 1952. Confidential. (SP 238).
8) Extent to Which Communist-Line Press in India Plays Up
the Issue of Racial Discrimination in the US. March 15,
1954. Secret. (Memorandum).
9) Information On Western Commercial Advertising and
Communist Controlled or Communist Front Newspapers
3/53,
10) Effects of the BW Campaign In India 11/52.
11) Soviet Cultural Activities In and Exchange of Visitors
With India 8/51.
12) Communist Propaganda In India. 6/51.
D. Public Opinion
1) See items under Current Intelligence below-1.C.1.a
2) Developments Significant for Propaganda: India. Weekly,
1951, 1952, 1953, 1954. (IR 5550.xx).
3) Reports on reactions to bacteriological warfare campaign,
Eisenhower election, President's atomic energy proposal,
Geneva Conference, etc.
4) South Asian Attitudes Toward the West. June 27, 1951.
Restricted. (OIR 5372).
5) Indian Newspaper Comments on Treatment of Negroes in the
US. November 24, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 253).
6) Indian Press Comments on Secretary Dulles, May 13, 1953.
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7) Indian Reactions to Dulles-Eisenhower Foreign Policy State-
ment 12/53.
8) Intelligence To Support Advertising Campaign In India 12/53.
9) Indian Comment on Forthcoming Berlin Conference 1/54.
10) Analysis of Christian Science Monitor Article on Communism
in India 1/54.
11) Analysis of IBS Memo on Communism in India 1/54.
12) Pro-US Statements made by Indian and Pakistani Leaders
12/53.
13) Indian Reactions to Secretary Dulles' Speech of March 29, 1954.
14) Indian Reactions to H-Bomb Tests and Related Developments
4/54,
15) Conference of South Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon 4/54.
16) Indian Opinion on the Geneva Conference 4/54.
17) Indian Reaction to Nehru's Statement Refusing to Permit
Overflight of India 4/54.
18) Indian Reactions to US Atrocity Charges in the UN 11/53.
19) Indian Reactions to Developments in Iran 11/53.
20) F reign Opinion Concerning American Comics 5/54.
21) Reactions to the Moscow Economic Conference and of the
Returning Delegates 4/52.
22) Reactions to the Japanese Peace Treaty 4/52.
23) Indian Reactions to Ambassador Dean's Efforts at Panmunjon
10/53.
24) Foreign Opinion on the Geneva Conference (Serial) 4/54.
25) 'Indian Opinion on the Soviet Peace Tactic and on President
Eisenhower's April 16 Speech 4/53.
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26) World Opinion on Soviet Possession of the H-Bomb 9/53-
27) World Press Reactions to the Seventh G.A.: India 10/52.
28) Miscellaneous other reactiors reports to Stalin Death,
Eisenhower Victory, Korean Armistice Negotiations, etc.
29) Foreign Reaction to the Question of Grain Shipments from
the US toIndia.
E. Descriptive Details
(This type of information is usually furnished to USIA by
telephone, rather than in formal reports.)
1) Holidays Celebrated in Countries of the Near East, South
Asia, and Africa. January 24, 1951. Unclassified (DRN-IP 258)
2) American Support for Indian Independence. November 17, 1952.
Unclassified. (SP 251).
F. World Communism
1) The Extent of Communist Penetration in India. March 8, 1951
Secret. (OIR 5373)
Llevelopments in World Communism: India. 1951, 1 52, 1953,
1954. Secret (Contributions to 5650).
3) Analysis of Communist Propaganda: India. May 30, 1952.
Secret. (IR5714.1).
4) The World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.
1953, 1954. Unclassified. (Contribution to IR 4489)?
5) Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the Communist
Party, India. January 1953. Secret (IR 6165.11).
6) Indian Communist Activities Since the Elections. In progress.
Secret. (IR 6399).
7) Material on Soviet fntentions in India 2/54.
8) Communist Effort in India in 1953.
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9) Recent Communist Propaganda in India 11/52.
10) Information on Calcutta Communist Conference 2 5
11) Evaluation and Analysis of New Delhi ric, urnent "(vmf
Party: Facts and Fiction" 4/53.
12) Information on Communist Activity in Ina 1 0 / 52,
II. Intelli ence For More General Purposes
,????????. se?Rem 2MOCIM 40, e
A. Estimates
1) Trade With the Soviet Bloc?South Asia. March 31, 952.
Secret. (Contribution to NIE 59).
Consequences of Communist Control Over the Indian
subcontinent. April 30, 1952. Secret. (Contributic n to
NIE 61).
3) Probable Developments in South Asia. March 6, 19S3.
Secret. (NIE 79).
4) Foreign Economic Conditions and Trends. September
24, 1953. Restricted. (Contribution to TE-53).
5) Communi7t Courses of Action In Asia Through '1:4 1955.
October 14, 1953. Secret. (Contribtuion to NIE-01).
6) Soviet Bloc Capabilities for Economic Warfare.
Oct ober 1,1953. Secret (Contribution to NIE-100
7) The Vulnerability of Non-Communist East Asian Con:Aries
to Communist Pressure, 1953-55, November 16, 1953.
Secret (Contribution to IR 6465).
B. Basic Intelligence
1) National Intelligence Survey: India.
a) Political
Section 50 ? Introduction (almost competed)
51 -- The Constitutional System
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Section 52
53
54
55
57
58
39
Economic
Structure of the Government
Political Dynamics
Public Order and Safety
National Policies
Subversive
Propaganda
Biographise of Key Personalities
Section 60 -- Introduction
61 ? Agriculture and Food
62 ? Fuels and Power
63 ? Minerals and Metals
64 ? Manufacturing and Construction
65 -- Trade and Finance
c) Sociological
Section 40 -- Introduction
41 ? Population
42 -- Characteristics of the People
43 -- Religion, Education and Public Information
44 -- Manpower
46 Public Welfare
2) Reports
a) Political
(1) India's Position in the East-West Conflict.
May 24, 1951. Secret (OIR 5526).
(2) India's First General Elections and Their Results..
June 19, 1952. Confidential. (IR 5552).
(3) Problems of Refugee Rehabilitation and Plebiscite
in the States of Jammu and Kashmir. December
23, 1952. Restricted. (IR 5750).
(4) The indo-Pakistan Canal Water Rights Dispute.
Jane 30, 1953. Secret. (IR 5649).
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(5) Factors Affecting Political Stability in India.
Secret. In progress. (1R5782.4).
(6) The Linguistic States Problem in India. In progress.
Confidential. (IR 0596).
b. Economic
(1) The Food Problem of India. September 25, 1950.
Confidential. (OIR 5262).
(2) Major Development Projects in South Asia: India. October
12, 1950. Confidential, OIR 5350.
(3) The Agrarian Problem of India. February 19, 1951.
Restricted. (OIR 5354).
(4) India: Geographic, Social, Political and Economic Conditions.
October 31, 1950. Restricted. (OIR 5371).
(5) Land Reform in India. November 10, 1950. Confidential.
(OIR 5390).
(6) South Asian Trade Relations with the Soviet Bloc and China.
June 11, 1951. Secret. (OIR 5458).
(7) Availability of Strategic and Essential Commodities in South
Asia. August 7, 1951. Secret. (OIR 5527).
(8) Political and Economic Factors in Foreign Countries Affecting
the Development of Their Raw Materials for Export. June 12.
1951. Confidential. (Contribution to OIR 5553).
(9) Economic Conditions in Kashmir. November 9, 1951.
Restricted. (IR 5622).
(10) Current Status of India's Food Supply. December 14, 1951.
Restricted. (IR 5669).
(11) South Asia Data Book. 1952 (IR 5623), 1953 (IR 6310).
(12) Opportunities for Private Investment TCA Countries as
Indicated by IBRD and Ex-dm Bank Mission Reports. November
1952. (Contribution to IR. 6087).
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(13) Partition Debt of Pakistan to India. March 12, 1932.
Unclassified. (SP 198).
(14) Grant and Loan Assistance Given to India by US and
International Agencies, July 1947-June 1952.
July 24, 1952. Unclassified. (SP US).
c) Sociological
(1) Cows and Monkeys in India. March 26, 1952.
Restricted. (SP 200).
(2) Birth Control in India: Prospects for Alleviating the
Problem of Over-Population. January 20, 1954.
Confidential. (IR 6268).
C. Current Intelligence
1) Reports
a) Political
(1) Deviationism in the Communist Party of India.
January 17, 1930. Secret (OIR 5143).
(2) Suggestions of Bad Feeling Between the Chinese
Communist and Indian Communist Parties. March
31, 1950. Secret (OIR 5221).
(3) Soviet Intervention in Kashmir Dispute.
January 31, 1952. Secret. (IR 5781).
(4) Results of the Indian Elections. March 24, 1952.
Unclassified. (IR 5853).
(5) Congress Party Government Ousted in One Indian
State, Possibly Threatened in Two Others. April
29, 1952. Restricted. (IB 1152).
(6) Indo-Pakistan Relations Worsened by Political Upset
in Kashmir. August 13, 1953. Secret. (Ili 1473).
(7) Nehru-Ali Communique on Kashmir Indicates Little
Progress. August 25, 1953. Secret. (I13 1480)
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Annex
(8) Communist Fail to Win Control of Andhra. India's Newest
State. October 6, 1953. Confidential. (IB 1498).
(9) The Forthcoming General Election in Travancore-Cochin.
November 23, 1953, Secret (SP 308).
(10) Analysis of Christian Science Monitor Article by Gurdon
Graham on Communism in India. January 20, 1954.
Confidential. ( SP 312)
(11) Indian Communists Face Test of Strength in Travancore-
Cochin Elections. February 19, 1954. Secret (IB 1559)
(12) Kashmir Constituent Assembly Ratifies the States Accession
to India. February 26, 1954. Secret. (IB 1564).
(13) Nehru. Presses for Control of French Enclaves in India.
April 14, 1954. Secret. (IB 1596).
(14) Colombo Conference: Five Asian Nations Offer Advice to
Powers at Genevi. May 12, 1954. Secret. (IB 1616).
b. Economic
(1) Possible Utilization of Certain Indian Resources for Far
Eastern Development. February bs 1952. Confidential.
(IR 5725).
(2) New Indian-Pakistani Trade Agreement May Restore Normal
Trade. April 8, 1953. Confidential (IB 1383).
(3) The Problem of Land Reform in India. January 1952.
Confidential, (SP 172).
(4) Foxeign Economic Conditions and Trends in Africa. Near
East, and South Asia. July I, 1953. Restricted.
(Contribution to SP 290).
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Annex C
LIST OF RESEARCH PROJECTS GATHERED IN INDIA RELATING
TO USIA's PROGRAM FOR INDIA
(These Projects were conducted under the guidance of the
former Evaluation unit in USIA)
1. Selected Sefiments of Societies
a. Size, Composition, Ideologies & Attitudes toward US, USSR, etc.
IEV.IND.26
IE V. IND. 27
IE V. IND. 28
IEV. IND. 31
IE V. IND. 33
IE V. IND. 36
IvV.IND.47r1
IE V. IND. 47.Z
IE V. IND. 47-3
Questions Raised by Indians about American Women,
12/17/52
Some Clarification of the word, "Americana",
12/19/52
Survey of USIS Local Staff Opinion, 12/23/52
Results Of Bombay Press Survey Conducted by
Asian Press Service, 8/30/51
Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material
by English-Language Press - July 1951, 9/29/51
Opinion Poll Among USIS Local Staff in India 9/53
Communication of. Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages -Part I -
Channels of Communications, 5/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
Communications and the Background of Opinion
in the Village, 5/54
USIS Indian Staff Opinion Study - A Quarterly
Mail Survey
b. Patterns of Influence among Grouzs
IEV. IND. 9
IEV.IND.47-1
USIS Output and the Industrial Worker Audience,
5/5/53
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I -
Channels of Communications, 5/54
** Not yet received.
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IE V. IND. 47-2
IE V. IND. 47-3
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
Communications and the Background of Opinion
in the Village, 5/54
Study of Operation of USIA Outpost Hyderabad
2. Media Research and Analysis
a. Types of Media in the Country
IE V. IND. 3
IE V. IND. 29
Ir V. IND. 45
IE V. IND. 47-1
IE V. IND. 47-2
IEV. IND. 47-3
IEV. IND. 48
Pilot Study (Prepared for Guidance in Formulating
a Content Analysis of Certain Foreign
Newspapers with a View to Assessing the
Efficacy of the USIS Program) 5/16/52
Theme Analysis of the Anti-American Line
Demonstrated in Two Books in India, 1/12/53
.The Image of America and Americans as Presented
in the Communist-Line Press in India: An
Analysis of Crossroads and Blitz, 1/20/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I
Channels of Communications, 5/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
Communications and the Background of Opinion
in the Village, 5/54
The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis of
the Indian Press, 2/9/54
b. Organizational Aspects of Each Medium
IEV. IND. 5
IE V. IND. 7
** Not yet received.
Evaluation of Some Operating Problems in the
Placement of Expendable Libraries, 3/16/53
An Administrative Study of the U.S. Educational
Foundation in New Delhi, 4/27/53
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Annex C
IE V. IND. 38
IE V. IND. 48
IEV. IND. 49
d. Content of the
Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program in
India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53
The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis
of the Indian Press, 2/9/54
Evaluation Study: Miniature Library Study,
2/12/54
Communications Output by the Media
IEV. IND. 3
IEV. IND.
IE V. IND. 10
IEV. IND. 11
IE V. IND. 22
LEV. IND. 30
IEV.IND.33
IEV.IND.42
IE V. IND. 44
IEV. IND. 45
IE V. IND. 48
IEV. P.11
Pilot Study (Prepared for Guidance in Formulating
a Content Analysis of Certain Foreign News-
papers with a View to Assessing the Efficacy
of the USIS Program), 5/16/52
Report on the Administration of Pictures for the
Film Attitude Survey, 5/21/53
Public Attitudes Toward the Community Projects
Program: Kothipur, Naglapathak Village
Study, 10/7/52
The Image of America and Other Foreign Countries
as Presented in Tektbooks, 7/53
Fulbright Students in India 1951-1952, 10/8/52
Qualitative Analysis of Osage of USIS Material
by English-Language Press, June 1951, 8/9/51
Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material by
English-Language Press, July 1951. 9/29/51
Report on the Evaluation of the Ou.ality and
Effectiveness of the Translations of the
USIS India, 12/53
Information Analysis for New Delhi - An Analysis
of Content: Middle East Bulletin Input...
New Delhi Post Output, 5/15/53
The Image of America and Americans as Presented
in the Communist-Line Press in India: An
Analysis of Crossroads and Blitz, 1/20/54
The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis of
the Indian Press, 2/9/54
Analysis of Wireless Bulletin Input and Post
Output for New Delhi, Athens, Mexico, Hong
Kong, 5/1/53
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e. Location and Type of Audience Receiving Media Output
IEV.IND. 13 A Readership Study of the English Language
Edition of the American Reporter, 9/10/52
IEV.IND. 14 A Readei ship Study of the Hindi Edition of the
American Reporter, 9/18/52
IEV. IND. 15 A Readership Study of the Tamil Edition of the
American Reporter, 10/15/52
IEV.IND. 16 A Readership Study of the Malayalam Edition of
the American Reporter, 10/28/52
IEV.IND. 17 A Readership Study of the American Reporter
Telugu Edition, 11/3/52
IEV.IND.18 A Readership Study of the Bengali, Gujerati and
Marathi Edition of the American Reporter,
10/24/52
IEV. IND. 21 Library Study, 1/13/53
IEV. IND . 24 Effectiveness of the USIS Auditorium, Calcutta,
2/4/53
IEV.IND.37 The Voice of America Audience in India as
Measured by those Who Received the VOA
Newsletter, 8/53
IEV. IND. 38 Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program
in India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53
IEV.IND.39 Study of the Placements of Miniature Libraries
Throughout India, 1/13/53
IE V. IND. 47-1 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I,
Channels of Communications, 4/54
IEV.IND.47-2 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
Public Opinion in Lucknow, 4/54
IF V. IND. 47-3 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
Communications and the Background of Opinion
in the Village, 4/54
** Analysis & Elimination of Duplication in USIA
Distribution List
f. Audience Reactions to Media and Why
IEV.IND. 1
IE V. IND. 2
Some Preferences of Indian Radio Listeners, 2/53
Fan Mail Received by the American Reporter
in India, 1/52
**Not yet received.
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Annex C
IEV. IND. 5
IE V. IND. 7
IE V. IND. 10
IE V. IND. 12
IEV.IND.13
1r V. IND. 14
IE V. IND. 15
IE V. IND. 16
IEV.IND.17
IE V. IND. 18
XE V. IND. 19
IEV. IND. 20
IE V. IND. 21
IE V. IND. 22
IE V. IND. 23
IE V. IND. 24
IEV.IND.25
IE V. IND. 28
IE V . IND. 31
IE V. IND. 33
IEV.IND.35
IEV.IND.38
.IEV. IND,. 40
IEV.IND.41
LEV. IND. 42
Evaluation of Some Operating Problems in the
Placement of Expendable Libraries, 3/16/53
An Administrative Study of the U.S. Educational
Foundation in New Delhi, 4/27/53
Public Attitudes Towards the Community Projects
Program: Kothipur, , Naglapathak Village
Studies, 10/7/52
The American Reporter - Staff Paper, 3/27/52
A Readership Study of the English Language
Edition of the American Reporter, 9/10/52
A Readership Study of the Hindi Edition of the
American Reporter, 9/18/52
A Readership Study of the Tamil Edition of the
American Reporter, 10/15/52
A Readership Study of the Malayalam Edition of
the American Reporter, 10/28/52
A Readership Study of the American Reporter
Telugu Edition, 11/3/52
A Readership Study of the Bengali, Gujerati and
Marathi Editions of the American Reporter,
11/24/52
American Reporter: Survey of Mail from Readers
12/28/51
Evaluation of Exhibits in India, 11/7/52
Library Study, 1/13/53
Fulbright Students in India 1951-1952, 10/8/52
Film Evaluation Report, 1/30/53
Effectiveness of the USIS Auditorium, Calcutta,
2/4/53
Delhi Public Opinion Study, 10/22/52
Survey of USIS Local Staff Opinion, 12/23/52
Results of Bombay Press Survey Conducted by
Asian Press Service, 8/30/51
Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material by
English-Language Press, July 1951, 9/29/51
New Delhi Film Evaluation Study, 8/4/53
Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program in
India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53
USIA New Delhi, Incoming Mail Analysis Chart,
8/18/53
Opinion Poll Among USIS Local Staff in India,
9/24153
Report on the Evaluation of the Quality and
Effectiveness of the Translations of the USIS
in India, 12/53
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IE V. IND. 43
IE V. IND. 44
IE V. IND. 46
IE V. IND. 49
IE V. P. 11
**Not yet received.
A Study of Exchange of Persons, 12/53
Information Analysis for New Delhi - An Analysis
of Content: Middle East Bulletin input...New
Delhi post output, 4/15/53
An Analysis of the Incoming Mail Received at the
Delhi Post Addressed to the "Question and
Answer" Column of American Reporter, 2/5/54
Evaluation Study: Miniature Library Study, 2/12/54
Analysis of Wireless Bulletin Input and Post
Output, 4/1/53
Survey of School and University Preference for
Maps
Mail Survey of Labor Audience Reading Taste of
a Sample of Readers of "The American Labor
Review"
VOA Audience Taeite Study with Program Analyzer
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