JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00453R000100010010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 20, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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82D CONGRESS
2d Session I
EXECUTIVES
1A, B, C, AND D
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER
TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY
IN THE PACIFIC
MESSAGE
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
JANUARY 10, 1952.-Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
FEBRUARY 14, 1952.-Reported favorably. (See Ex. Rept. No. 2, 82d
Congress, 2d session)
MARCH 20, 1952.-Advice and consent of the Senate given to the rati-
fication of Exs. A, B, C, and D. Text of resolution of ratification
of each treaty appears on page 53 of this document
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952
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CONTENTS
President's message transmitting the Japanese Peace Treaty
and other treaties relating to security in the Pacific-------- 1
Reference of the treaties, injunction of secrecy removed from
all. papers----------- ----------- 1
Report of the Secretary of State___________________________ 2.
Comment by Mr. John Foster Dulles ----------------------
Annex No.1---------------------------------------- 17
Annex No. 2---------- - - -------------------------- 22
Annex No.3----------------------------------------- 22
Annex No.4----------------------------------- --
Treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on Sep-
tember 8, 1951 (Executive A, 82d Cong., 2d sess.) -------- 26
Mutual defense treaty between the United States of America
and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington
on August 30, 1951 (Executive B, 82d Cong., 2d sess.) - - _ _ 41
h
e
Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and t
United States of'Am.erica, signed at San Francisco, September
1, 1951 (Executive C, 82d Cong., 2d sess.) -----------------
Security treaty between the United States of America and
Japan, signed at Washington on September 8, 1951 (Execu-
tive D, 82d Cong., 2d sess.)--____--_--_-_---------------
Declarations-relating to Japanese Peace Treaty:
Declaration with respect to certain multilateral inter-
national instruments and certain international organi-
zations----------------------------- ------------- 48
Declaration with respect to Allied war graves, memorials in
Japanese territory _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ 50
Exchange of notes between the Government of the United
States of America and the Japanese Government ---------- 51
Resolutions of ratification------ _-.---__ _------------------ 54
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82D CONGRESS SENATE
2d Session
EXECUTIVE
A, B, C, and D
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
MESSAGE
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES RELATING TO
SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
JANUARY 10, 1952.-The injunction of secrecy was removed from the said treaties
and, together with the message of transmittal, the report by the Secretary
of State and all accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on For-
eign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
TILE W111TE HOUSE, January 10, 1952.
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, I transmit herewith the following treaties :
(1) Treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on Sep-
tember 8, 1951;
(2) Mutual defense treaty between the United States of America
and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington
on August 30, 1951;
(3) Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States of America, signed at San Francisco on Sep-
tember 1, 1951;
"l t j Security treaty between the United States of America an4
Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951.
I transmit also for the information of the Senate a document con-
taining the texts of two declarations made by the Government of
Japan and signed on its behalf at San Francisco on September 8, 1951,
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regarding multilateral instruments and the maintenance of war
graves, cemeteries, and memorials, and the texts of notes exchanged
at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, between the United States and
Japan in which the Japanese Government confirms that after the
entry into force of the treaty of peace it will permit and facilitate the
support in and about Japan of the forces of a member or members of
the United Nations engaged in any United Nations action in the Far
East.
There is further submitted the report made to me by the Secretary
of State regarding the aforesaid treaties and an accompanying letter
of January 7, 1951, with background statements, to the Secretary of
State from my special representative, Mr. John Foster Dulles.
I recommend that the Senate give early favorable consideration to
the treaties submitted herewith and advise and consent to their rati-
fication.
HARRY S. TRUMAN.
(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State, with accom-
panying letter and statements; (2) treaty of peace with Japan; (3)
mutual defense treaty with the Philippines; (4) security treaty with
Australia and New Zealand ; (5) security treaty with Japan ; (6)
document with two declarations by Japan ; (7) texts of notes ex-
changed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951.)
THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
The White House: Washington, January 9, 1952.
I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission
thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the
following treaties :
(1) Treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on
September 8, 1951;
(2) Mutual defense treaty between the United States of America
and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington
on August 30, 1951;
(3) Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States of America, signed at San Francisco on Sep-
tember 1., 1951; and
(4) Security treaty between the United States of America and
Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951.
There is transmitted also a document containing the texts of two
declarations made by the Government of Japan and signed on its be-
half at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. It, is recommended that
this document be submitted to the Senate for its information. One
of the declarations expresses the recognition by Japan of the full force
of presently effective multilateral international instruments to which
Japan was a party on September 1, 1939, and the intention of Japan
to take the necessary steps to become a party to certain specified
multilateral instruments. The other declaration relates to the main-
tenance of war graves, cemeteries, and memorials.
There is further transmitted for the information of the Senate the
texts of notes exchanged at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, be-
tween, the United States and Japan, in which the Japanese Govern-
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ment confirms that if and when the forces of a member or members of
the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the
Far East after the treaty of peace comes into force, Japan will permit
and facilitate the support in and about Japan of the forces engaged
in such United Nations action.
The background and important substantive and interrelating fea-
tures of the afore-mentioned treaties are summarized in statements
which accompany a letter dated January 7, 1952, from Mr. John
Foster Dulles. A copy of that letter with its accompanying state-
ments is enclosed herewith for the information of the Senate in its
consideration of the treaties.
In view of the great importance of these treaties to the maintenance
of peace and security in the Pacific area, it is hoped that they will be
given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.
Respectfully yours,
DEAN ACIIESON.
(Enclosures: (1) Treaty of peace with Japan; (2) mutual defense
treaty with the Philippines; (3) security treaty with Australia and'
New Zealand; (4) security treaty with Japan; (5), document with
two declarations by Japan; (6) texts of notes exchanged at San
Francisco, September 8, 1951; (7) letter of January 7, 1952, from
Mr. Dulles, with accompanying statements.)
OFFICE OF TILE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, January 7, 195g.
The Honorable DEAN AcxESON,
Secretary of State.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY : On October 3, 1951, I reported to the
President that, as his special representative, I had concluded the nego-
tiations which he had asked me to conduct with reference to peace
and security in the Pacific and that these negotiations had resulted in
the following acts :
1. A treaty of peace between Japan and 48 Allied Nations,
including the United States, signed at San Francisco on Sep
tember 8, 1951;
2. A mutual-defense treaty between the Philippine Republic
and the United States, signed at Washington on August 30, 1951;
3. A security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States, signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951;
4. A security treaty between the United States and Japan,
signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951;
5. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State of the
Unitd States and the Prime Minister of Japan, dated September
8, 1951, pledging Japan to permit and facilitate the support, in
and about Japan, of forces engaged in United Nations action in
the Far East.
I further advised the President that I understood that you would,
in due course, transmit to the President the text of the foregoing docu-
ments.
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4 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
I understand that it is your intention now to make such transmittal
to the President with a view to his seeking the advice and consent of
the Senate to the ratification of the treaties above-mentioned (items
1 to 4, above).
In this connection you may find it useful to have the following
statements which I enclose herewith :
1. Statement made by me at the San Francisco Conference on
September 5, 1951, on behalf of the United States. delegation,
summarizing the origins, the development, and the principal sub-
stantive terms of the treaty of peace with Japan which was sub-
sequently signed by 48 Allied Nations (annex 1).
2. Statement summarizing the origins, development, and prin-
cipal terms of the United States-Japan security treaty signed on
September 8, 1951, in San Francisco (annex 2).
3. Statement summarizing the origins, development, and prin-
cipal terms of the security treaty between Australia, New Zea-
land, and the United States, signed at San Francisco on Septem-
ber 1, 1951 (annex 3).
4. Statement summarizing the origins, development, and prin-
cipal terms of the mutual defense treaty between the Philippine
Republic and the United States signed at Washington on August
30, 1951 (annex 4).
The four treaties mentioned are interdependent as more fully ex-
plained in the annexed statements. Together they create a hopeful
basis for future peace and security in the Pacific. They represent the
taking, by the United States, of a major initiative, so far highly suc-
cessful as shown by the fact that it is now joined in by the 47 other
Allied Powers and by Japan, and opposed only by the Soviet bloc.
This initiative, if maintained, can turn back the tide of Soviet com-
munism which in recent years has been relentlessly rising in Asia and
the Pacific. To that end I trust that the Senate will take prompt
action to consent to the ratification of the treaties.
Favorable Senate action should be facilitated by the fact that that
body, particularly through its Foreign Relations Committee and the
Far Eastern Subcommittee thereof, has been kept fully informed
regarding the negotiation of these treaties and, to an unusual degree,
has given advice throughout the negotiating period. Members of the
Far Eastern Subcommittee have participated actively, constructively,
and on a nonpartisan basis in the formulation and conclusion of the
treaties. Eight Senators (four Democrats and four Republicans)
were members of the delegations named by the President to conclude
the treaties, and four Senators (two Democrats and two Republicans)
were plenipotentiary signers of one or another of the treaties on be-
half of the United States.
I am
Respectfully yours,
JOAN FOSTER DULLES.
(Enclosures: Annexes 1-4.)
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ANNEX 1
STATEMENT MADE: AT TILE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER
5, 1951, BY MR. JOHN FOSTER DuLI ss ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION, CONSISTING OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, M.
DULLES SENATORS TOM CONNALLY, ALEXANDER WILEY, JOHN J.
SPARKMAN, H. ALEXANDER SMITH, WALTER F. GEORGE, AND BouRiw
B. III.CKENLOOPER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
AND REPRESENTATIVES JAMES P. RICHARDS AND ROBERT B. CHIPER-
FIELD OF TILE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
TIIE PURPOSE IS PEACE
We have met here for a consecrated purpose. We shall here make
peace. "Blessed are the peacemakers." But the most blessed of this
peace are not those of us who assemble here. The foundation for this
peace was laid by the many who gave up their lives in faith that the
very magnitude of their sacrifice Would compel those who survived
to find and take the way of peace.
We are here to redeem, in some small measure, the vast debt we owe.
That task is not a simple one. Victory usually gives power greater
than should be possessed by those who are moved by the passions
that war engenders. That is a principal reason why war has become
a self-perpetuating institution.
The treaty before us is a step toward breaking the vicious cycle
of war-victory-peace-war. The nations will here make a peace
,of justice, not a peace of vengeance.
THE OCCUPATION PREPARED TIIE WAY
True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by
6 years of Allied occupation. That occupation was calm and pur-
poseful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority
and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was
eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while
mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech,
of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights.
There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully
inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome
here.
The Allied occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam surrender
terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese, peo-
ple. It is now time to end that occupation, and make a peace which
will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.
It IS possible now to make that kind of a peace, to make this a peace
.of reconciliation, because the Japan of today is transformed from the
Japan of yesterday.
The past is not forgotten or excused. Bitterness and distrust re-
main the sentiment of many. That is human. Those who have suf-
fered less have no warrant to set themselves up as moral judges of
those who have suffered more. But the time and the good use to which
it has been put in Japan have somewhat healed the scars of war.
New hopes have gradually displayed old fears. Now, by an effort
of self-control which is perhaps unprecedented in history, the Allies
present to Japan a treaty which shows no trace of angry passion.
94118-52-Ea. A, B, C, and D-2
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That is not merely an act of generosity toward a vanquished foe,
it is an act of enlightened self-interest. For a treaty warped by pas-
sion often becomes a boomerang which, thrown against an enemy,
returns to strike its authors.
For this treaty we are deeply indebted to the man who led the
Allied Powers to victory in the Pacific. After that victory he devoted
51/2 years to service in Japan as supreme commander for the Allied
Powers. As such he showed not only magnanimityy, but strength
without which magnanimity is counted weakness. He provided the
occupation with moral leadership which has been the impulsion for
the kind of peace we make. The present generation and generations
to come owe much to General MacArthur.
ELEVEN MONTHS OF CONFERENCE
In framing the peace, the United States has taker an initiative.
That was plainly our duty.
Some now find it expedient to disparage the role played by the
United States in the Pacific War. None did so in the hour of vic-
tory. Then, by a unanimous Allied act, the United States was given
the exclusive power to name the supreme commander for all the
Allied Powers and to direct the occupation which would prepare
Japan for the peace to come. That Allied act put us in a prepare
uniquely to judge when the Japanese were prepared for peace. It
surely entitled us, indeed it obligated us, to take timely steps to bring
our occupation responsibilities to their normal predestinect end.
We first moved in this matter 4 years ago. In 1947 the United
States proposed a preliminary conference of the governments repre-
sented on the Far Eastern Commission to consider plans for ?a Japa-
nese Peace Treaty. That proposal was blocked by the insistence of
the Soviet Union that the treaty could only be considered by the
Council of Foreign Ministers where the Soviet Union would have veto
power. The Soviet Union continued stubbornly to adhere" to that
position.
Last year the United States decided to abandon the conference
method, which afforded excessive possibilities of obstruction, and to
seek peace through diplomatic processes which no single nation could
thwart. That has been done with the hearty cooperation of most of
the Allies and has resulted in a finished text.
The negotiations began about a year ago when the Allies principally
concerned were gathering to attend the United Nations General As-
sembly in Nev tYork. TTie various delegations principally concerned
had frequent consultations at that time. Then came conferences at
many capitals and many written exchanges of views. A United
States Presidential mission toured the globe, visiting 10 capitals of
countries especially concerned. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was
exploring the problem within the Commonwealth, and its representa-
tive will tell you more of that.
The first round of discussions dealt with the question of w tether it
was time for peace and, if so, what basic principles should be applied.
In this connection the United States outlined seven principles which
it felt ought to govern the framing of the treaty.
We found complete agreement to the urgency of prompt peace
and general agreement as to the basic principles. So, in January of
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this year; the United States undertook to make the first draft of it
text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words.
That draft was circulated last March, and was subjected to intensive
study by over 20 countries. These included not only the Far Eastern
Commission countries, but others which had expressed interest. The
American states were kept informed, as was their due. Mexico had
actively participated in the Pacific War, as had Brazil in the European
War. All had made important political, economic, and moral cot-
tributi ons.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom produced a text of its own, drafted
in the, light of the Commonwealth conferences. Then in June, the
United States and the, United Kingdom combined their parallel efforts
and jointly drafted a text to reconcile and reflect still more fully the
different views that had been developed. This text was circulated
to Allied Powers during the first half of July and was kept open for
further changes until mid-August.
Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though
reluctant, part. We had several conferences with Yakov Malik and
our Governments have exchanged 10 memoranda and drafts.
Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty
can claim authorship of important, parts of the present text. Also
each of these nations can claim the equally honorable distinction of
voluntarily subordinating some special interest so that a broad base
of unity might be found. The Allied Powers have been conducting
what, in effect, is an 11 months' peace conference participated in by
so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace
treaty in all history.
Any who are interested in studying the evolutionary processes which
have been at work can compare our March draft with the present text.
To snake that comparison easy, a parallel-column document has been
prepared for distribution here. It shows how our conference methods
have worked.
The treaty remains, as first agreed, a nonpunitive, nondiscrimina-
tory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality, and oppor-
tunity in the family of nations. But it has been found increasingly
possible to do justice to particular situations without violating these
basic concepts.
I now turn to a consideration of the principal provisions of the text.
The preamble
The preamble is an important part of the treaty. It affords the
Japanese nation the opportunity to record intentions and aspirations
which the whole world welcomes..
Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United
Nations; to conform to the principles of the Charter; to adhere to the
new ideals of human rights and freedoms which have become mn-
planted in the Constitution and Legislation of Japan; and, in public
and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally
accepted fair practices.
If Japan's intentions in these respects are sincere, which we believe,
and if they are pursued with resolution, they will go far to restore good
will between the Japanese and Allied people.
It may be asked why, if that is so, the treaty does not attempt to
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8 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
put the Japanese under legal compulsion in these respects. There
are good reasons for not doing so. Japan, when it applies for mem-
bership in the United Nations, should do so because it wants to be a
member, not because the Allies compelled it. Eighty million people
cannot be compelled from without to respect the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of their fellows. Fair-trade practices cannot
be made a formal obligation when they have not yet been spelled out
in international conventions. In general, treaty obligations should
only be such as can be precisely formulated, so that the parties will
clearly know just what are their rights and what are their duties.
Where applicable conventions exist, Japan will voluntarily adhere to
them, as set out in the declaration appended to the treaty.
Sovereignty restored
Chapter I ends the state of war, with consequent recognition of the
full sovereignty of the Japanese people. Let us note that the sov-
ereignty recognized is the "sovereignty of the Japanese people."
Territory
What is the territory of Japanese sovereignty? Chapter II deals
with that. Japan formally ratifies the territorial provisions of the
Potsdam surrender terms, provisions which, so far as Japan is con-
cerned, were actually carried into effect 6 years ago.
The Potsdam surrender terms constitute the only definition of peace
terms to which, and by which, Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole
are bound. There have been some private understandings between
some Allied Governments; but by these Japan was not bound, nor
were other Allies bound. Therefore, the treaty embodies article 8 of
the surrender terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty should
be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some minor
islands. The renunciations contained in article 2 of chapter II strictly
and scrupulously conform to that surrender term.
Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical name
"Kurile Islands" mentioned in article. 2 (c) includes the Habomai
Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. If,
however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to the
International Court of Justice under article 22.
Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely
delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify pre-
cisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories.
This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised
questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had
either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam surrender terms or deny
peace to Japan while the Allies quarrel about what shall be done
with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly,
the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned,
leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents
other than this treaty.
Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and
southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the
sole administration of the United States.
Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require
Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of
United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should
be restored completely to Japan.
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In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States
felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain resid-
ual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be
brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United
States as administering authority.
You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contem-
plates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may
be detached from enemy states its a result of the Second World War"
(art. 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, deter-
mine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan
while affording the administering authority the possibility of carry-
ing out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that-
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust ter-
ritory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security.
A peace which limits Japanese territory according to the Potsdam
surrender terms, naturally leads one to ask, Can a growing population,
now numbering over 80,000,000, survive on the Japanese home islands?
A clue to the correct answer is the fact that, when Japan had a vast
colonial empire into which the Japanese people could freely emigrate,
few did so. Formosa, a rich, uncrowded land with temperate climate,
attracted, in 55 years, a total Japanese population of about 350,000.
Korea, under Japanese control since 1905, attracted a total Japanese
population of about 650,000. In South Sakhalin there were 350,000
Japanese and in the Kurile Islands about 11,000. Japan's colonies
helped assure Japan access to food and raw materials, but they were
no population outlet. Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at
home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of
the treaty do not establish restraints greater than those which 98 per-
cent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.
Of course growing populations create problems in Japan and else-
where. The Japanese will need to develop the capacity to perform
services which others want, so that in exchange they can buy the food
and raw materials they need. This calls for willingness on the part
of the Japanese people to work hard, to work efficiently, and to work
with creative imagination so that they can anticipate the economic
wants of others. Each of the Allied Powers also has a responsibility.
The surrender terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials"
and "participation in world trade relations." Peoples who are ready
and willing to work and to create what others want, should have the
means to do so. Under such conditions the present territorial status
of Japan is no cause for alarm.
Security
Chapter III deals with security, a problem which has not been,
and never is, automatically solved by victory. By article 5, Japan
undertakes to live peacefully, in accordance with the principles scat
forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that Japan will
promptly become a member of the United Nations. If this were cer-
tain, article 5 would be unnecessary. But, in the past, veto power
has been used to block the admission of nations qualified for member-
ship. So it is prudent to write into the treaty that, as provided by
article 2 (6) of the Charter Japan will settle its international disputes
by peaceful means; will refrain in its international relations from
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JAPANESE PEACE. TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
the threat or use of force; and will give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.
These provisions completely meet the desire which some nations
have expressed that the treaty should bind Japan to peaceful processes
and explicitly prohibit Japan from acting forcibly, alone or in coali-
tion, against any other nation. There can be nothing more sweeping
than the renunciation of offensive force expressed in article 5 (a)
(ii) of the treaty.
In order, however, that this treaty, like the United Nations Charter,
should make it perfectly clear that the prohibition against the use
of force does not deprive Japan of the right of self-defense, subdivi-
sion (c) of article 5 contains a recognition that Japan as a sovereign
nation possesses what article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
refers to as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."
Article 6 of the treaty calls for ending the occupation not later
than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, Japan, as
contemplated by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, may enter
into collective security arrangements, and these might, in part, be
implemented by Allied elements which were in Japan when the treaty
came into force. Accordingly, it seemed useful to make it clear that,
under such circumstances, these elements would not have to be phy-
sically removed from Japan before they could serve as collective
security forces. This would be a burdensome requirement, and a risky
one for it would for a time leave Japan wholly defenseless, in close
proximity to proved aggressors possessed of great military strength.
To avoid that danger, article 6 provides that occupation elements now
in Japanese territory may stay on for Japan's defense, if this is wanted
by Japan.
These remaining military elements would, of course, have charac-
teristics and powers very different from what they had as occupation
forces. They would have only such status in Japan as Japan would
voluntarily have given them.
The security provisions which we have reviewed are necessary if
the treaty of peace is honestly to restore sovereignty to Japan. It has
been suggested that the treaty ought to deny to Japan "the inherent
right of collective self-defense" and permit only a token right of
"individual self-defense."
That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a
fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended, is to give an
empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An
undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace
of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an
independent existence.
It has been suggested that a collective security arrangement with
the United States, such as Japan is considering, would not be a free
act or what the Japanese people really want.
That is not a suggestion which will command credence here. Nearly
two-thirds of the delegations here are from countries which either
have, or are about to have, voluntary association in collective security
arrangements which include the United States. These delegations will
assume, and rightly assume, that the Japanese people are like their
own people, and like most free peoples, in wanting the collective se-
curity which may deter aggression.
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When I was in Japan last February this topic was discussed with
the Japanese for the first time. I then said publicly that Japan, if it
wished, could share collective protection against direct aggression.
In order, however, to make perfectly clear our Government's position
in the matter I had this to say :
That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon
Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish cov-
duct. * * * We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice
must be Japan's own choice.
No person in this room, and I mean that literally, honestly believes
that Japan seeks collective security with the United States because
it is coerced. That is palpably absurd.
As the President of the United States pointed out in his opening
address to us, security in the Pacific area is being developed on a col-
lective basis which, through combination, enables each nation to get
security without making itself into what could be an offensive threat.
That is one way to approach the problem. The other way is to pro-
hibit collective security and to follow the policy of "let each country
defend itself from aggressors as it likes or as best it can." That latter
way, Generalissimo Stalin said, addressing his party on March 10,
1939, means "conniving at aggression." -
Any nation which seeks to deny to Japan the right to collective
security and which insists that Japan must stand alone is, at heart,' a
conniver at, aggression. Those who sign this treaty will not lend them-
selves to that design.
I have expounded the philosophy of the treaty with reference to
security because it is a philosophy which has been challenged. I hope,
however, that the time I have given to this subject will not lead any
delegations to feel that military matters are our principal preoccu-
pation.
Security from armed aggression is a negative asset. Our dedication
is to the positive side of national life and of individual life. Through-
out the Occupation the effort has been to create a climate conducive to
human development. To that end, the United States has made a
tremendous moral investment. President Truman, in his opening
address to us, emphasized the social revolution which has been takitl.g
place in Japan, the sweeping away of militarism, the establishme tt
of universal suffrage, the extensive land reforms, and the rapid growth
of labor unions. Also, we are not ashamed of the fact that it was
under the Occupation that the Japanese people adopted a Constitution
forever barring war as an instrument of their national policy. If,
today, we are compelled to think in terms of a Treaty which will enable
Japan to protect its sovereignty and independence, it is not because
we seek a remilitarized Japan-that we have done everything in our
power to prevent-but because social and economic progress cannot be
achieved in the cold climate of fear.
Japanese prisoners
An outstanding humanitarian feature of the Japanese surrender
was the Allied promise to return Japanese prisoners to their homes.
However, evidence produced before the United Nations General As-
sembly last September indicated that large numbers of. Japanese
soldiers, who had surrendered to the Soviet Union 5 years before,
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12 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
had not yet been repatriated. The United Nations expressed its con-
cern and set up a commission to study this matter. In order to make
clear that the Allied undertaking to Japan survives until it has been
performed, article 9 of the Potsdam surrender terms has been. incor-
porated into the treaty of peace (art. 6 (b) ). We earnestly hope that
it will be fulfilled and tragic anguish be allayed.
Economic matters
Chapter IV deals with trade and commerce. The text is somewhat
technical but the words add up to this : Japan is not subjected toy any
permanent discriminations and disabilities; her economy is unre-
stricted and no limitations whatever are placed upon her right to
trade with each and every country.
The permanent relations between Japan and the Allied Powers,
as regards trading, maritime, and other commercial relations (art. '12) ;
as regards high-seas fishing (art. 9) ; as regards international air
transport (art. 13), are to be negotiated between Japan and Allied
Powers so desiring. Pending the conclusion of such treaties, and for
a 4-year interim period, each Allied' Power will be entitled to most-
favored-nation treatment as regards customs duties, but only on a
basis of reciprocity.
These. are liberal treaty clauses. The fulfillment of the hopes
placed in them will, however, depend on whether Japan lives up to
its intention, proclaimed in the preamble, "to conform to internation-
ally accepted fair practices," and on whether the Allied Powers, by
their domestic legislation, extend to Japan trading possibilities which
are reasonable, having regard to their own domestic requirements.
On these matters a peace treaty can do no more than point the way
to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in
that way. That this treaty does.
Reparations
Reparations is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking.
The present peace is no exception.
On the one hand, there.are claims both vast and just. Japan's ag-
gression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering. Governments
represented here have claims which total many billions of dollars and
China could plausibly claim as much again. One hundred thousand
million dollars would be a modest estimate of the whole.
On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan pres-
ently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the
food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work.
Since the surrender, Japan has been 2 billion dollars short of the
money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to
import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States had made
good that 2-billion-dollar deficit. We accepted that as one of our
occupation responsibilities. But the United States is entitled to look
forward to Japan's becoming economically self-sustaining, so as to
end dependence on us; and it is not disposed, directly or indirectly,
tom Japan's future reparations.
er these circumstances, if the treaty validated, or kept con-
tingently alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan, her ordi-
nary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would
be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit
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JAPANESE PEACE TRE,ATI- AND SECURITY PACTS
which would make them an easy prey to exploitation. Totalitarian
demagogues would surely rise up to promise relief through renewed
aggression with the help of those nearby who, as we have seen in
Korea, are already disposed to be aggressors. The old menace would
appear in aggravated form.
Such a treaty, while promoting unity among aggressors, would
promote disunity among many Allied Powers. There would be bitter
competition for the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of
gold. Already, several countries have approached the United States
with suggestions that their particular claims for reparation should
be favored at the expense of others.
A treaty which on the one hard encouraged division among the non-
aggression states and on the other hand brought recruits to the side
of the aggressive states, would be a treaty which would recklessly1
squander the opportunity of victory. The parties to such a treaty
would expose themselves to new perils greater than those which the-.y
have barely survived.
These conflicting considerations were fully discussed, until there
emerged a solution which gives moral satisfaction to the claims of
justice and which gives material satisfaction to the maximum extent
compatible with political and economic health in the Pacific area.
The treaty recognizes, clearly and unambiguously, that Japan
should pay reparation to the Allied Powers for the damage and suf-
fering caused by it during the war.
It then goes on to dedicate to the implementation of that principle,.
certain assets which Japan does have in surplus and which could be
put to work to help to compensate those nations which suffered the
most from Japan's wartime acts.
Japan has a population not. now fully employed, and it has indus=
trial capacity not now fully employed. Roth of these aspects of un-
employment are caused by lack of raw materials. These, however,
are possessed in goodly measure by the countries which were overrul)
by Japan's armed aggression. If these war-devastated countries send
to Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance?
the Japanese could process them for the creditor countries and by these
services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrange-
ments could cover not merely consumers goods but machinery and
capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed
up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to lessen their de.
pendence on outside industrial power.
This is, in essence, the formula expressed in article 14 (a) 1. It
results from prolonged exchanges of views, particularly with such
countries as the Philippines and Indonesia, which were occupied by
Japanese forces and injured in a way which places on the Allied
Powers as a whole, and on Japan, a very clear duty to seek all mean
of reparation which are realistic.
I am frank to say that the treaty is a, better, fairer treaty than first,
drafted. That results from the proper insistence of some govern-
ments that all possibilities of reparation should be exhaustively ex=
plored. That has been done, and the result is a fresh demonstrations
of the worth of the free processes of free and equal people. Those
processes have here produced a treaty formula which serves the ideal
34115-52-Ex. A, B, C, and D--3
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TREATY AND SECURITY of justice within an economic framework which can benefit all con-
cerned.
In addition to this source of future reparation, the treaty validates
the taking, by Allied Powers, of Japanese property within their
jurisdictions.
By article 16, Japanese property in neutral and ex-enemy countries
is to be transferred to the International Red Cross for the benefit
of former prisoners of war and their families, on the basis of equity,
to make some compensation for undue hardship suffered, often in vio-
lation of the Geneva conventions. The United States, in response to
some Allied inquiries, has indicated that, since its own prisoners of
war have received some indemnification out of proceeds of Japanese
property we seized, we would assume that equity would require first
distribution to those who have had no comparable indemnification.
Allied property within Japan is to be returned. Where this can-
not be done, because of war damage, there will be compensation in
blocked yen in accordance with pending Japanese domestic legislation.
Korea
Article 21 makes special provision for Korea. The Republic of
Korea will not sign the treaty of peace only because Korea was never
at war with Japan. It tragically lost its independence long before
this war began, and did not regain independence of Japan until after
Japan surrendered. Many individual Koreans steadfastly fought
Japan. But they were individuals, not recognized governments.
Nevertheless, Korea has a special claim on Allied consideration, the
more so as it has not yet proved possible for the Allies to achieve their
goal of a Korea which is free and independent. Korea is, unhappily,
only half free and only half independent; and even that fractional
freedom and independence has been cruelly mangled and menaced
by armed aggression from the North.
Most of the Allied Powers have been seeking to make good their
promise of freedom and independence and, as members of the United
Nations, to suppress the aggression of which Korea is the victim. By
this treaty, the Allies will obtain for Korea Japan's formal recogni-
tion of Korea's independence, and Japan's consent to the vesting in
the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese property in
Korea. Korea will also be placed on a parity with the Allied Powers
as regards postwar trading, maritime, fishing, and other commercial
arrangements. Thus the treaty, in many ways, treats Korea like an
Allied Power.
China
The absence of China from this Conference is a matter of deep
regret. Hostilities between Japan and China first began in 1931 and
open warfare began in 1937. China suffered the longest and the
deepest from .Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that
the Sino-Japanese war cannot be formally terminated at this occasion.
Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied
Governments have created a situation such that there is not general
international agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the
right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace.
Some think that one government meets these tests. Some think
another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority
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can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus, the
Allies were faced with hard choices.
They could defer any peace with Japan until they could agree that
there was in China a government possessed of both legitimacy and
authority. It would, however, be wrong, cruel, and stupid to venalize
Japan because there is civil war in China and international disagree-
ment regarding China.
As another approach, each Allied Power could refuse to sign a
treaty of peace with Japan unless a Chinese government of its choice
was cosigner with it. That, we ascertained, would leave Japan at
war with so many Allied Powers that Japan would get only a small
measure of the peace she has earned. Indeed, there is no reason to
believe that Japan, an essential party, would willingly cooperate in a
program leading to that end. To exert compulsion, in this matter,
would create resentment in Japan, and it would activate and ag-
gravate Allied division in the face of a grave world-wide menace which
requires maximum unity.
The remaining choice was for the Allied Powers generally to pro
ceed to conclude peace without any present Chinese cosignature, leav-
ing China and Japan to make their own peace, on terms, however,
which would guarantee full protection of the rights and interests of
China.
That is the choice reflected by the present treaty. By article 26,
China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan, on the same
terms as the present treaty. The victorious Allies, which sign the
treaty, take nothing for themselves that they do not assure equally to
China. Also, by article 21, China, without need of signature, gets
tlxe sweeping renunciation by Japan (art. 10) of all Japan's special
rights and interests in China, in accordance with a formula suggested
by the Republic of China. Also, China receives automatically, and
without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates-
the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty
preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in
this war.
Final clauses
Chapter VII contains clauses which are largely matters of protocol.
Of these, article 23, dealing with ratification, gives those signatories
to the treaty which have been actively concerned with the occupation
a special position, for 9 months, regarding the bringing of the treaty
into force. But after 9 months all of the Allied Powers stand on an
equal footing as regards bringing the treaty into force as between them-
selves and Japan.
GOOD PEACE NOW OR PETER PEACE NEVER
Such, in broad outline, are the main. aspects of the treaty that awaits
our signature.
It contains, no doubt, imperfections. No one is completely satisfied.
But it is a good treaty. It does not contain the seeds of another war,
It is truly a treaty of peace.
We may hear a suggestion that we should not now complete, by
signature, this product of a year's negotiation, but resort to new proce-
dures, with new parties. It may be pretended that thereby we can gain
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16 JAPANESE PEACE. TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
greater unity and more perfection. At first that may sound plausible
and tempting. It may seem to offer the partially dissatisfied a. chance
for great satisfaction.
In some Allied countries there are organized groups which urge that
the treaty could be changed merely to benefit them, leaving everything
else intact. If all of these proposals were to be brought together, it
would be apparent that the cumulative effect would be destructive of
any agreed peace.
Fortunately, there are also in most of the Allied countries those who
see with truer vision. They know that this treaty is good to the point
where it cannot be made better without its becoming worse. Better
words might theoretically be found, but to seek these is to let escape
what is now within our grasp. There come times when to seek the
perfect is to lose the good. This is such a time.
There is greater unity now than we are, apt to find if there is renego-
tiation. The treaty has been painstakingly built by the delicate proc-
esses of diplomacy, helped by an unusual display of self-restraint and
good will. But it is not wise to assume that those qualities will be ever
present and that differences can always be composed.
There is a larger measure of satisfaction now than we can ever get
again. Delay will inevitably set in motion corroding forces and con-
tradictory efforts which will block each other and frustrate the possi-
bilities inherent in a common effort of good will.
In terms of Japan's future, delay would cost a price which makes
petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. The great goals of
victory will have been made unattainable.
It was our common hope that, out of the fiery purge of war there
would rise a new Japan. That was no foolish hope. Japan has a
great culture and tradition which are capable of producing distinc-
tively, but no less authentically, those virtues which all nations and
peoples must possess if there is to be a world-wide commonwealth of
peace.
In order, however, that that potentiality shall become actuality,
Japan needs free political institutions in a climate conducive to their
vigorous growth; social progress; an equal administration. of justice;
an awareness of human dignity; a sense of self-respect; of respect for
others.
Above all, Japan needs the will to live at peace with others as good
neighbors.
All of this is possible if we make peace now. It becomes impossible,
or at best improbable, if Japan's long-deferred hopes are now blasted.
There are in Japan new-born institutions of freedom. But they will
not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.
Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien con-
trol, however benign.
Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in
the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.
Regard' for justice rarely animates those who are subject to such
grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.
Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.
The United States which, since the surrender, has directed the oc-
cupation on behalf of all the Allies, says solemnly to each of the Allies :
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Unless you now give Japan peace and freedom on such honorable
terms as have been negotiated, the situation will rapidly deteriorate.
The surrender terms have served their every legitimate purpose.
Under them "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Govern-
ment to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers." To perpetuate that subjection which has existed
for 6 years, into more years, would be to pervert the occupation into
an instrument of imperialism and colonialism. The United States
wants none of that, and we know that most of you want none of that.
It is time to end the subjection of the Japanese Government to
Allied command. It is time to end the occupation and to recognize
that, henceforth, it is the Japanese people who exercise complete
sovereignty in Japan. It is time to welcome Japan as an equal and
honorable member of the family of nations.
That is what the pending treaty will do.
No nation is bound to sign the treaty. This is no conference that
wields legal compulsion. The only compulsion is the moral com-
pulsion of grave circumstances. They unite to cry aloud : Let us make
peace.
In June 1950 the United States was faced by a dual problem, namely
(1) bringing to Japan a peace which would end the 9-year-old war and
the resultant occupation, then approaching its fifth year, and (2)
doing so on terms which would avoid Japan's becoming a vacuum of
power into which the nearby aggressive power of Soviet communism
would move.
This dual problem was thoroughly discussed at Tokyo in June 1950
by Secretary of Defense Johnson, General MacArthur, General Brad-
ley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. John Foster
Dulles.
At these conferences General MacArthur emphasized the following
basic points :
1. Historically, military occupations have a maximum utility
of from 3 to 5 years. Thereafter the occupation assumes the
character of "colonialism," the occupation forces assume the com-
plexion of entrenched power, and the people under occupation
become restive. In the case of Japan, there would be danger that
bitterness and resentment would dominate the Japanese mind.
2. The Japanese people had faithfully fulfilled the obligations
they assumed under the instrument of surrender and had every.
moral and legal right to the restoration of peace.
3. The Japanese people, in the exercise of their sovereignty,
would presumably welcome the maintenance by the United States
of security forces in Japan, since Japan was itself unarmed and,
since irresponsible militarism existed in close proximity to Japan.
4. The consummation of a peace and security program as sug-
gested would meet the most impelling need of the moment in the
Japan area, namely, the regaining of initiative, without which
there would be a progressive deterioration in our position which,
if long enough extended, would inevitably confront us with a sit
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18 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
uation of general hostility. The Soviet Union, General Mac-
Arthur pointed out, might seize the initiative for peace in which
event the position of the United States would become virtually
irretrievable.
While the conversations between General MacArthur and Mr.
Dulles were still continuing there occurred the armed attack of Com-
munist forces on the Republic of Korea. This attack seemed to have,
as its ultimate objective, the encirclement of Japan by Soviet power
and an increased Soviet opportunity to subject Japan to its domina-
tion and eventual exploitation for aggression.
Following the return to Washington of the Secretary of Defense,
General Bradley, and Mr. Dulles, the problem was further discussed
between the Department of State and the Department of Defense with
the result that on September 8, 1950, the President instructed that the
United States should proceed to explore the possibility of a Japanese
peace settlement which would include security provisions of the gen-
eral character suggested by General MacArthur. The primary re-
sponsibility of negotiation in this matter was placed in the hands of
Mr. Dulles.
In consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, Mr.
Dulles prepared a seven-point statement of general principles, a copy
of which is appended hereto, which contemplated, among other
things, that-
pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements, such as United Nations
assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative
responsibility between Japanese facilities and United States and perhaps other
forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.
At the time of the United Nations General Assembly in New York,
these 7 principles were discussed with representatives of the 12 other
nations which were members of the Far Eastern Commission (includ-
ing the Nationalist Government of China) and also with Indonesia
and Ceylon, nations which were not members of the Far Eastern
Commission because they did not have independent status at the time
of the formation of the Far Eastern Commission, but which were
applicants for membership and regarded as qualified for membership.
The principles were also discussed with representatives of the Re-
public of Korea, a former Japanese colony which, in independence,
was deeply concerned.
The Soviet Union registered strong objection, particularly to the
security principle above referred to and some reservation was indi-
cated by the Government of India. There was, however, a large
measure of acceptance of the seven principles and, in the light of that,
Mr. Dulles was formally designated by the President on January 10,
1951, as his special representative for the purpose of conducting the
negotiations necessary to conclude a peace settlement with Japan and
related security arrangements with Japan and other Pacific countries.
The purpose was not merely to end the war by a prompt and just
]peace but, to use General MacArthur's phrase, "to gain an indispensable
initiative." We sought that Japan should become a vigorous and con-
tributory member of the free world. Further, we sought to strengthen
the fabric of peace in the Pacific by security arrangements with Japan
and other Pacific countries, such as the Philippines, Australia, and
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS
New Zealand, which were part of the Asian offshore island position
in the West Pacific.
In January 1951, Mr. Dulles, representing the President, accom-
panied by Mr. John M. Allison and Mr. Robert Fearey, of the De-
partment of State, Mr. Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the
Army, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, and Col. C. Stanton l3abcock
representing the Department of Defense, and John D. Rockefeller III,
as an educational and cultural adviser, went to Japan as a peace
mission.
On February 2, 1951, with the approval of the President, Mr. Dulles
made a public address in Tokyo, in which he pointed out to the Japa-
nese the dangers of remaining unprotected under the disturbed condi-
tions now existing in the world, emphasized Japanese responsibility
for their own protection-particularly against indirect aggression of
the subversive type-and pointed out the advantages of collective
security. At the same time he stated that if the Japanese wished it
the United States would "sympathetically consider" stationing certain
of its armed forces in and about Japan to assist in Japan's defense.
He emphasized that the arrangement must be entirely voluntary, say-
ing:
That [stationing of United States forces] is not a choice which the United
States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States
is not interested in slavish conduct * * * We are concerned only with the
brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.
Reaction in Japan was highly favorable to this suggestion. Prime
Minister Yoshida, in a public statement on February 11, 1951, said;
The Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of the Japanese people
warmly welcome the Ambassador's invitation to a security. arrangement with
the United States for the protection of unarmed Japan by the stationing of United
States armed forces in and about the country. We realize fully our responsibil-
ity to protect ourselves and defend our own land, and do what we can in thip
respect. When we recover our independence and join the councils of free nation
as an equal member, the substance and scope of the Japanese contribution will
be determined according to the extent of our economic and industrial recovery.
Early in the discussions with the Japanese it became evident that,
the Japanese Government recognized fully the necessity for the main
tenanco in and about Japan of United States armed forces. A tenta-
tive draft of agreement was quickly reached. During the following
months this Tokyo draft was given intensive study both at Tokyo
and at Washington, and it, was finally perfected at San Francisco
just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Peace. This enabled the
security treaty itself to be signed shortly following the signature of
the peace treaty.
The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in
continuous touch with the negotiations and the final result fully met
their specifications as to what was necessary to enable the United
States and Japan to cooperate to maintain international peace and
security in the Japan area.
The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees and
the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees were
consulted and were represented on the United States Delegation
which dealt with this treaty.
The treaty itself is a simple document consisting of a preamble and
four substantive articles. The preamble recites the circumstances
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which have led to the making of the treaty. The basic substantive
article (art. I) grants the United States the right; to dispose land, air,
and sea forces in and about Japan.
The treaty imposes upon the United States no obligations. The
reason for this was pointed out by Mr. Dulles in a statement issued in
Japan on February 12, 1951. He then said that security treaties which
involved commitments by the United States should embody the princi-
ple established by Senate Resolution 239, Eightieth Congress, the
so-called Vandenberg resolution, which calls for "continuous self- _
help and mutual aid" by all the parties 1e, security arrangements joined
in by the United States. Japan did not feel able at the present time
to assume adequate commitments in that respect. However, as set
,out in the preamble of the treaty, it is expected "that Japan will itself
increasingly assume responsibil'iy for its own defense."
Article 1 further provides that United States forces in and about
Japan may be used not only for the security of Japan but "to con-
tribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the
Far East." This is an important provision which assures that any
United States forces in and about Japan are not required to be set
apart for a limited purpose only, but may be broadly used for the
maintenance of peace and security in the entire Far East.
Article I further provides that United States forces in and about
Japan may be used `at the express request of the Japanese Govern-
ment to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in. Japan,
caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or
powers."
This provision established, it is believed, a precedent in recognizing
the danger of indirect aggression, and in authorizing international
measures against it. To a large extent, and particularly in the Far
East, Soviet communism has used the method of indirect aggression
and civil war. China was conquered by so-called civil war. The
North Korean attack was alleged to be civil war. There are "civil
wars" and "civil disturbances" in Indochina, Malaya, and elsewhere
in the Far East. In all of these, countries the insurrectionary forces
have the moral and material backing of Soviet communism and could
not be formidable without it. If the security of Japan should thus
be assailed, United States forces could be utilized for the security of
Japan. But this would only be at the express request of the Japanese
Government, and the independent concurrence of the United States_
that the circumstances warrant this unusual action.
The provision has great potential value and it is believed will con-
stitute a deterrent which will make its actual invocation unnecessary.
This is what the United States hopes.
Article II provides that Japan will not grant any military facili-
ties to any third power without the consent of the United States.
Article III provides for administrative agreements to cover the
disposition of the armed forces of the United States in and about
Japan. Such administrative agreements are now in the process of
preparation. It is expected they will be completed before the security
treaty comes into force.
Article IV provides for termination "whenever in the opinion of
the Governments of the United States and Japan" there are satisfac-
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tort' alternative provisions for the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Japanese area. Thus, on the one hand, there can--
not be termination without the concurrence of the United States,
which concurrence, it can be assumed. will not be unreasonably with-
held. On the other hand, it is in the mind of the parties that the
present bilateral arrangement is only an initial step in an evolutionary
process of collective security. It is to be presumed that the United
States would welcome developments which would reduce Japans
initial, almost total, dependence on the United States for security.
The security treaty is a grant by Japan of rights of a very broad
character. It involves a significant commitment of Japan to the
cause of the free world and it testifies to Japan's trust in the United
States to be an honorable representative of the free world in its quest
for collective security.
The security treaty between the United States and Japan presup-
poses the prior coming-into-force of the treaty of peace with Japan
and the consequent restoration of Japan's complete independence.
Article 5 of the peace treaty between the 48 Allied Powers and Japan
contains the enabling clause, referred to in the preamble of the se-
curity treaty, whereby the Allied Powers recognize that Japan, as a
sovereign nation, possesses the inherent right of individual and col-
lective delense and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective-
security arrangements.
Article 6 of the peace treaty is a further enabling article, which
provides that the ending of the occupation shall not-
prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory
under and in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements between
one or more of the Allied Powers and Japan.
The United States delegation to conclude the United States-Japan
Security Treaty consisted of the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster
Dulles, Senators Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, John J. Spark-
man and H. Alexander Smith of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Senators Richard B. Russell and Styles Bridges of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, and Representatives Overton Brooks ahd
Dewey Short of the House Armed Services Committee.
(Attachment: Statement of principles.)
PRINCIPLES FOR JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
There is given below a brief general statement of the type of treaty
envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the
state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only
suggestive and tentative and does not commit, the United States Gov-
ernment to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is
expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this out-
line there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elabo-
rate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first
glance.
The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end
the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty, and bring back Japan
94118-52-Ex. A, B, C, and D--4
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22 JAPANESE PEACE, TREATY AND SECURITY PACTS.
as an equal in the society of free peoples. As regards specific matters,
the treaty would reflect the. principles indicated below :
1. Parties.-Any or all nations at war with Japan which are willing
to make peace on the basis proposed and as may be agreed.
2. United Nations.-Membership by Japan would be contemplated.
3. Territory. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Ko-
rea; (b) agree to United Nations trusteeship, with the United States
as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; and
(c) accept the future decision of the United Kingdom, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and the United States with refer-
ence to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the
Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the treaty
came into effect, the United Nations General Assembly would decide.
Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.
4. Security.-The treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfac-
tory alternative security arrangements, such as United Nations as-
sumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing coop-
erative responsibility between Japanese facilities and the United
States and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international
peace and security in the Japan area.
5. Political and commercial arrangements.-Japan would agree to
adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing.
Prewar bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement.
Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would ex-
tend most-favored-nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions.
6. Claims.-All parties would waive claims arising out of war acts
prior to September 2, 1945, except that (a) the Allied Powers would,
in general, hold Japanese property within their territory, and (b)
Japan would restore allied property or, if not restorable intact, pro-
vide yen to compensate for an agreed percentage of lost value.
7. Disputes.-Claims disputes would be settled by a special neu-
tral tribunal to be set up by the President of the International Court
of Justice. Other disputes would be referred either to diplomatic set-
tlement, or to the International Court of Justice.
ANNEX 3
As indicated in annex 2, the United States conceived that the
establishment of peace in the Pacific meant not only liquidating the
old war but strengthening the fabric of peace as against the threat
of new war. Of immediate concern were the Pacific nations whose
people had been fellows in arms in World War II, namely, the Philip-
pines, Australia, and New Zealand. These nations, with Japan and
the Ryukyus, were links in what is often called the Asian "offshore
island chain" which marks the western rim of the Pacific.
In the case of the Philippines there already existed a security ar-
rangement with the United States in the form of a base agreement.
There existed, however, no formal understanding as between the
United States and Australia and New Zealand. The lack of this was
felt the more acutely in Australia and New Zealand because these coun-
tries have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific
area. Also, these nations felt that a security arrangement with the
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United States was the normal counterpart of a Japanese Peace Treaty
which imposed no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament. It seeme4
eminently appropriate formally to register a sense of common destiny
with these two nations of similar political traditions, which relation-
ship had been demonstrated in common sacrifice and effort in two
world wars.
Mr. Dulles and the State Department members of his mission, which
for this purpose now included Mr. Livingston Satterthwaite and Col.
C. Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense, visited Australia
and New Zealand the latter part of February 1951, and they conducted
at Canberra, Australia, 4 days of intensive discussion with the Aus-
tralian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. P. C. Spender, and the New
Zealand Minister for External Affairs, Mr. F. W. Doidge. The result
was the drafting at Canberra in February of a proposed security treaty
substantially in the form of that which was later signed on September
1, 1951, after detailed consideration by the governments concerned.,
including, in the case of the United States, the Department of State,
the Department of Defense, the Foreign Relations and Armed Serv-
ices Committees of the Senate, and the Foreign Affairs and Armed
Services Committees of the House.
The treaty consists of a preamble which sets forth the reasons for
the making of the treaty and eight substantive articles.
Article 4 constitutes the essence of the treaty. Thereby each party-
recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and each declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
The first-quoted language is drawn from the declaration of President
Monroe, which established the Monroe Doctrine and the existing
United States constitutional limitations are fully maintained and
respected in relation to any action which might be taken.
Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack on any of the parties in-
eludes an armed attack not only on the metropolitan territory of the
parties but also on island territories under its jurisdiction in the
Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.
That would mean that there would be an "armed attack" on the
United States, for the purposes of the treaty, if there were an armed
attack on the trust territories--the former Japanese mandated
islands-which the United States is administering; or if there were
an armed attack on the Ryukyu or Bonin Islands over which the
United States was exercising jurisdiction under the Japanese Peace
Treaty; or if there were an armed attack upon armed forces which,
under the United States-Japan Security Treaty, the United States
might maintain in and about Japan.
Article 2 of the treaty embodies the language of Senate Resolution
239, Eightieth Congress, the so-called Vandenberg resolution, to the
effect that the parties will "by means of continuous and effective self-
help and mutual aid" develop their capacity to resist armed attack.,
The treaty provides for a consultative relationship through a coun-
cil. Any party may withdraw from this council on 1 year's notice. ,
The treaty, as such, like the Monroe Doctrine, has no fixed duration
because the essence of the treaty is recognition of a fact of presumable
indefinite duration, namely, the fact that an armed attack upon one
of the parties would be dangerous to the others. If ever this ceased
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ND RITY to be the fact., then the basis for the treaty would disappear and the
treaty itself could be terminated.
It should be noted that the preamble to the treaty provides that it
is designed to coordinate the efforts of the parties "pending the develop-
ment of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the
Pacific area." Thus, like the United States-Japan Security Treaty,
evolutionary developments are contemplated.
It is understood by the parties that this treaty is designed as part
and parcel of the Japanese peace settlement and the related program
for creating peace and security in the Western Pacific area and pre-
supposed the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty by the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand.
* s
The members of the United States delegation to conclude the treaty
were the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Senators Tom
Connally, Alexander Wiley, John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith,
Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and Representatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and
Walter H. Judd of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
ANNEX 4
The mutual defense treaty between the United States and the
Republic of the Philippines translates into dignified and mutual form
a relationship of interdependence which already exists. As such, it
marks a new milestone in the relation of the free West and the free
East.
The historical relationship between the United States and the
Philippines, and their common struggle in the Second World War,
are themselves sufficient to assure that, as President Truman said
in his public declaration of April 18, 1951-
the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack
on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous
to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.
Furthermore, there already existed an agreement, March 14, 1947,
with the Philippines, granting the United States certain military
rights and facilities in the Philippines, so that an armed attack upon
the Philippines would almost automatically involve an attack upon
the armed forces of the United States.
However, the geographical position of the Philippines in the West-
ern Pacific and its fully sovereign status made it desirable that the
Philippines should be a full and equal partner in any postwar arrange-
ment for peace and security in this area.
This possibility was discussed in a general way by Mr. Dulles and
other members of his mission with the President of the Republic of
the Philippines and other leading personalities of the Republic during
mid-February 1951; and, after plans were further developed in the
light of subsequent discussions in Australia and New Zealand, the
United States formally proposed to the Republic of the Philippines,
in August 1951, the conclusion of a mutual security treaty along the
same lines as were being considered in relation to Australia and New
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Zealand. This proposal was promptly accepted by the Republic of
the Philippines. The negotiations were brief because of the under-
standing and community of interest which already existed and the
treaty itself was formally signed the same month in the presence of
the President of the United States and the President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
The putting of our relations with the Philippines on a treaty basis
of sovereign equality was strongly urged by members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, who were particularly active and helpful in this connection.
Since the substance of the mutual defense treaty follows closely
that of the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty, its terms re-
quire no comment here beyond that contained in annex 3 in relation
to the comparable articles of the other treaty.
It was understood that this treaty was part and parcel of the Jap-
anese peace settlement and the related treaty program for creating
peace and security in the Western Pacific area and presupposed the
ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty by the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines.
The members of the United States delegation to conclude the Philip-
pine Mutual Defense Treaty were the Secretary of State, Mr. John
Foster Dulles, Senators Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, John 'T.
Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B.
Hickenlooper of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Repre-
sentatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and Walter H. Judd of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
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TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN
Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth
their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals,
cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare
and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore
desirious of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions
still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between
them;
Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for mem-
bership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize
the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek
to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined
in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already
initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and
private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted
fair practices;
Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out
in the foregoing paragraph;
The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude
the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full
powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following
provisions:
CHAPTER I-PEACE
(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers
is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into
force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for
in Article 23.
(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese
people over Japan and its territorial waters.
CHAPTER II-TERRITORY
(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all
right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart,
Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores.
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands,
and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over
which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of
Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.
26
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