THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
SECRET
THE INT 73,T, IGEN CE RE CO IllafENT S POP. ECONOMIC WARFARE
agitifff
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
AIL
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RD141,60014A000100050002-5
I. 7(.40M42114
Aw. Definition
B. Scope of DWI
C. As limptions.
D, The Role of Moo
yr v
-erfore in the Present Crisis.
X, The Transition from Peecetine to Wartime Intellicence
Reqatramests.
,
A. Gemara
D. As to In,
C. As to Allied Ittisms
. As to Neutral Nations
The TrT!.nsittn from reasetime to Wartime Palter and Plr,nning
III. JrrEftaTtrrfSliffaIXIMS
A, General
'8. Foreign Trade Measures
1. Import Licensing
2. 'sport Lic,nsin4
Var ?rtsts Agreements eith Neutrals
4 . Control of Anew end Neutral ShIllOne
5. Control of DAMINT %ports
6, Prevention of SemeA5ing
7, ProclaiwA Li-tine end llackliettnK
S. Preclusive %ring
C rvi
SELAET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDFet00014A000100050002-5
C. financial Measure*
D. jittery Keesures
1. Disruption and Destruction of*Enemy Ammpor
Diernption and Deetr7ction of Dnemy ndustrial Power
Z. Other Measures
1. Promotion of
Areas.
2. Sabotage of
10 Lb'
b.
0.
ear Supplies
Di
k is rzfil,1%,c
(1) State Department
(2) The Armed 7,Vrome
(3) Doperteent of COMM4214-0
(4) Department of Agriculture
(6) Department of Justice
(6) Department of Interior
(7) Treasury Department
(S) Sederal Reserve Srstms
(S) DscArtment of Labor
(10) Teriff Commission
(11) looncele Cooperation Administration
(12) Department of Archives
(13) Other Ageneies
al
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPe400014A000100050002-5
(14) Oen
d. Library Date lel.
e. Private Polandatioas, Se satiric Associations and
bsontalc Sind, Crou-
/*reign broadcasts.
g. Dotage*, and Displaced Person*
h, Nottraing Travellers and Merchant Seamen
I. 1/3 Finis and Trade Ansocia.tions
Additional bourses Available in Wart re
a, Censorship
b. Inter(' ted Messages
c. Captured Imlay Material.
da Prisoner, of War
Itplonags
t. Atrial Doconnalseance
I. Other Pictorial Coverage
h? Intermptional ftehiL71-41 of Sconomie Tntellieenct
Production of Intelligence
C. Distributionof letellirence
-GRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Aft
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6A)014A000100050002-5
WARY
filOononic Warfare is use here to refer to all those measures
which seek the attrition of the edononic potential for war of an mum/
or probable snow. Thls d initiors_however, may be broadened to include
Ch.A.4-4.?? 51/*, C CAr2 CI 4 j r-
forein economic aosist While eeonomie assistance and econonie
attrition are obviously diametrically opposite operations, they may be
handled tly separste bureaus In a single superagency as was done finally
In Vorld War any event a single ()Mee of Economic Into:insane*
could support both operations.
-?--host, if not aU, or the me mires of economic warfare may be executed
Ay
$x.FAin *wencies of the mvernment.
In the tvissition rrom pepce to were narked chen.-es *re noted In
the mu/resents for economic intellicerce, in the sources, in the
methods of proosssinr, in the neture of the product and in the Intel -
r
mrsiaiiiit$014
-
-r644.
Shmitser a4sumptions as to AlkortLative invulnerability of the
z',.'Sipirtert Woo Up olosomic warfare are-now -subject to review. Those
garttsp.seetoolons wen' is tam tesed on the assumption (1) th4t the
Soviet bloc was relatively self-sufficient and () that in any future WPX
there wvule be few If any neutral areas. Both of these nssumptions
nay now be ehallerred. Economia warfare bast an izportnt role in the
cold vv,r red may be expected to be as ivTortsat, perhaps decisive factor
t
in an future w.r.
In Uorld War II qreat Britain early assumed leadership in economic
--ALA/dx.A.,X4K4 --
warfare oper%llens. There is neA indicative that this will be the ca_As
In thy. 1.esert struggle, The major reeronsiblIlty has Shifted to the V.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
qy ea Tale ewveriagenvo.
7 -
Add to 3rd para of Sumicary
Basic, strategic intelligence for pallor-making and planning is needed
more than ever but in addition there aft requirements for a vastly greater
volume of current, tactical, and spotttelligence, properly evaluated
and immediately transmitted to the using agendies?
-
a 0-
111-E.Z
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP0014A000100050002-5
1. That tntui.ncy nrvwe be mede of the vir-itireeimta-kaiL
ic o sration.p4w41--
2. that intermency surveys 1O of the yr,,nt facilities
for the exIloitation of ench source of economic inte11bc.and the
fci1ittsa recuired in the event of wer.
3. ThAt, to avoid duplication and to p
tion of existinr, ntelliPence facilities
,ter
agencies and
cart in selooted non-IAC acancies orrene, for the benefit of other
1,18, E series of presentations efkthei fecilities for the coll
tion or pr ductinn of economic intalige
4, Tht economic yr /lax* Intel 1 IF-enne sentt,1 e the
use of (a) ro!ortta. officers (b) cansore (a) interrok
a.
5. .hat an Office of conoic intellience be established within
hii
tild furnish the nucleus for an Economic Warfare Adotnistra-
tion or foreicn Reononic Adninistretion.
HET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61,00014A000100050002-5
Firot prat
8 SepteMber 1950
"aalars
To determine the intelligence support rialuired for economic
warfare and the type of economie intelligence orga ation best
suited thereto.
Refinition.
this per, is intended
It urrappuQup
no1c Warfare, as the term is used in
include "the use of economic, military,
dtplo*atio, or other measures to injure an enemy novic support
of his war effort or a possible em-'s economic potential for war.
It includes suah measure, as Ohl ping contras (ship warrants and
navicerts), naval 1jrercption, export contro17, import controls,
proclaimed listing, preclusive biving. fiaAnciel Pressures, war
trade agreerents with neutrn1 nations, alien property control foreign
funds control foreign exchange control, and lilitary attack on
economic target9."1/
In this meaning,ic warfre includee all measures
wtich seek to effect the strangulation Or attrition of an enemz's
eoonow or to limit the economic potential forwar of a probable
enemy, although the latter measuret! z.re ;Awe strictly called economic
sanctions>)
(lconomic warfare is thus defined in the 11;14 of its
otJectives rather than of the means 1 ,ed. The term Imis firA
adoi4ed by the 15ritiSh in the period betweenoeA. 4ars I and II.
S
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved
Aptiwt
ease :
TAIR1DP64=00014A000?
t
If OectioNit twiistanco to our alliv ,r0 triandrt and the eerinomic
at rition oar oremies e,ow both to lan' oonsiderod ntrrts of aooncnic
lerf:Irs or of our forelir oconmit tme. ircludt4 ir otet or,
izstioo(and soot an plan, admittrely, h rttn. rtAvntlegse)w then it
wouid be netseeserY#
it was in the tost of TRA, to have sorarte offieee
or bureaus 1t7lind1iw: the two distinetive epcertiona. tut in t,,,nr event,
the monoftle intelligence rcrulremente woulA lareely be the ems. To
afleorrAth either assistnroe or attrition, It is neeeesarY te have
sleoncsic intelligence os to all *rens and all oommoditis. Flb7 this Foregone
wh1;.e the sTphr_sis in this tu4 r 111rOmitnto it on electronic
fare the attrition of our enemies. the T-m-'401J Pihn of orgnnivAlom4
duvet-lived is Poi, /fikenvtelone an rifle* of Teoncmic Intent on,'to thpt
voila support both orert,AL-Als.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
/Oh
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6tIN0014A000100050002-5
Edonomic warfare became
bet ttute for and enlar-ement of
their blockade operations in the first var. Their Mitistry of
Blockade in the first war became the Ministry of teononie Warfare
in the second. Economic warfare thus became mynonomous with the
figurative meanira7: of blockade.
"Economic Warfare is sometimes used o include all
neaeures for the economic mobiliaation of a nation, including
procurement production, foreign economic istance, and all the
oonowdo upsets of war. The objection to this populr or rhetor?
ical use of the term is that It is so broad as to have no specific
application, and leaves us without a term for a very important
and epeciflo aspect of the war effort, namely, the interdiction
of an enemy foreign trade aid the attrition of his economY.
oonoaic warfare intellienoe? as the term Is used
herein, may be defined as the rouct of the analysis, synthesis,
interpretatian, and evaluation of ioformation and intelligence
in support of and application to economic warfare. It draws on
all categories of economic intelligence as to all foreign areps,
enemy, allied, and neutral.
3. Scone of Study. This study will seek to ap raise the role
of economic warfare in the present world. crisis and to dell ,te
the intelltirence reauirements for the rapport of economic warfare
operations with special emphaels on the transition from peacetime
to wartime. It will deal first with the intelliaencv reouiremeate
for economic warfare aoliv(Part II). This ill consist largely
of estimates of caabi1ities and vulrortbilIties. rota:Alla coareAk
1
E
*1'
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Alk
Sanitized - Approved For Releav : CIA-RDPe00014A000100050002-5
of action M probable err
These estimates have been rw.uired during the pre. ? iod for
this determinati n of naWnr1 policy and for OVVIWO c lar of
. will oortinue to be requir nt
of wart1-0 operti.zv, but their relatie importance will be.
overshadowed by th olune isd extent of current operations
out of which new policies and. cham,res in policy will evolve. eht
study will then attempt to assess the intelligence requirements
of economic werfare according to pvereti4is in tho fields of
t LL
foreign tradli,flnancial preseure miliury, and political me-
surs (Pert III), The sources of economic werfare intelligence with
vestal reference to the new sources developed ia wertime,
recessing, production and distribationoNwill be rev swedaPart IT),
again with special reference to the requirements of wartime a*
distinct frcm those of p etime. Finally', in consideration
of the organisation remired for eccnomic wrrtere inte11147ence in
wartime (Pert /), there is a brief review of the World iar LI
experience, both DS and British, the existing organiration for
economic in enigmas, and a proposed plpn of organisation for
economic warfare intelligence in wnrtime.
C. Asemmntiona, It is agsumed that the various ecoIc
warfare measures will be administered by the appropri
agencies of the government for example sort-import lIsbp
by the Department of Commerce; actual Implementation of export-
import controls by the Puritan of Customs; foreign exchanee controls
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6D00014A000100050002-5
Department and the Ted
Dapper*y eontrol by the Derartment of Justice; preclusive buying
by the Munitions Board and the General Services Administr!Alon;
the ship warrant and navieere aster by the Maritime Commission,
the Navy and the Bureau of Gaetano; and naval interception and
military attack on economie tarTste by the armed fore's. Some
of these MOSIRMOS are now in effect with the machinery for their
adalmistrationjunctioning effee44rely. Others are closely related
to the normal operations of the reapective agencies and experi-
enced personnel are available to implement them. It it further
asnAmed that an Administrator of Bconomic Warfare will be appointed
to coordinate both policy and operaWns in this field, or that a
Coordinator of Bbreign Iconomic Operations will perform this
function as well as that of supervision of foreign imonomic assist-
. Until
fairly recently it was aiessned 1 many persons in this country and
abroad that Goomonic warfare would have a relatively minor role in
apy war with the Soviet Onion. This repsoninc was bpsd on the
folleving aseunptions:
Tirst, that the Soviet Union is lav.ly self-sufficient,
with relatively limited dependence an overseas trade, and is there-
/ PiairAPP.,143c.frAmr-1
fore not vulnerable to blockade; and seoond, thatmommAsek=msomomr
shslt ih mill( future onfltt thr,r vill
s bnlu
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Rel-6ease : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
Both of these essumptions ley now to challenged. It is
trne that the Soviet Union is leraely self-sufficient for its some'.
What austere civilian economy and its ?verse:Ai trdel is relatively
small. But its industrial erstem because of Its leek of flexibility
and diversity, and spectalisatton, is highly vulner ble to a denial
of a )list of strategic meter ale and of .uipcent
tine an advanced teehnology. This has been
out in a series of reports and estimates by the American Babasey at
noecowliandii further evidenced ty the frantic efforts of the
Soviet Union to *weirs those items from the Western nation*.
So also the aesumption s.e to .absenee-e-f---asek-noutrality
in a future world conflict, especially one between the USSR and
Western Nations, is new 'subject to review. As a result of mill
tary exigency and political expediency, there is a reasonable pros-
pect of varying degrees of neutrality and non-belligerency for taper-
tent and strategically placed areas. Noonomic warfare, therefore
has a very important role In the present crisis and will be an
0-0'N
*Portant, perhaps decisive, factor in a, War of attrition with the
Soviet Union.
Yhfi tr,11101t4fell PPM stir*t Wrtl,llama
uirements. In peacetime the principal intelligence reauirenents
of economic wear, are bade udies of the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of various are: s. studies of foreign trade and
finance, basic commodity studipe, and 'leaning studies for economic
warfare operations. In wartime and in the Teriod of strained rela-
tions often preceding a ware there is a Shift to the analysis and
RET
Sanitized
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
-6-
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP0014A000100050002-5
evaluation of current spot intellicance ar-ainst the background of
these basic studios. In peacetime probably nine-tenths of the
Information on which economic intellimence is based is from ?len
SOUreel. In wartime probably nin
meows., oensorship gieenings.?0,1aes fied and covert sources.
In peacetine most +meanie intelligence is basic and strategic in
character. In wartiTA4 current and tact/ . ,
1,t
as to a country's economic potential its manpovvr* productive
capacity, foreign trade* internal economy, long-term position,
25X1 X1 or Release
Cl
technological development, all this is strategic economic war-
fare intellience. In the category of tactical economic warfare
intelligence aro such reports at the following; an unnavicerted
ship is about to leave a emitral port; censorship reveals an illegal
financial transaction; a member of a ship's crew is suspected of
smaggyAng Jewel bearings; a neutral trader is shipping to a
suspected cloak; an intercepted message eels negotiations betimes
an enemy agent and a neutral firm.
warfare .latelligence.
Stated another way, in the proceesi of information into
strtegic intelligence in peacetime, the emOhasis is on the production
of reports and entiriates. In wrtims it 18 on the analysis* inter.
pretatIon, nd eraluatiAl of current tactical, an spot rerorts,
against a bOckground of -0rsonal knowledge amyttudies and estimates
for the most part previously prepared. More Wortant now than
refinement of estimates on the degree of capability or vulnerability
in.produr!tion of straWic commodities is intelllence as to how
the Soviet surly, Whatevr it is, of strategic materiAAD can be cut
this-is 'tact tcsl economic
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Aft
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64i-00014A000100050002-5
off or reduced; for example, ball xi 7s from estern Shrove,
pyrites from Spain, molybdenum from the US to:ote the Soviet
bloc, aviation gasoline to Communist China andAKorea, petroleum
drill ng equipment from Austria to !Roumania, transportation
equipment from Western Surope to the Masts which ironical/Fa ma,
facilita,s military movement from the Seat to Western %rope. Also
needed is new intelligence of new Soviet r.uiremsnts for new methods
new products weapons, and new re,utremente of mrAerials pro.
viously without significance which, as sobstitutes for strategic
materials* have themselves become str research and
analysis in sepport of economic warfare operetiens were of sone,lhat
greeter reletive importance in World Mar II than they may be expected
to be In a future conflict because it was necessary in 1941 to 'start
from scratch.' In the present situation thaw is a vast body of
material prepared In World war nand the experience of that war
available to us, The period of the cold war furthermore, hraa
afforded the opportunity and the necessity for maw studies. This is
not to discount the importance and urgent necessity for contineed
research and enelysis. The Soviet situation and the Soviet methods
differ radically from thoseof the Germans. Less basic infOrmatir
is available as to their foreign trade and still less as to their
domestic production, A greater emphasis therefore, is pieced on
the analysis sad synthesis of current intelligence to mhprlY this
deficiency,
And so in or,aairatien for eoonoic infltence there is
necessarily a conversion of at 1.epat pert of an organi-ation designed
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Aft
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6,0014A000100050002-5
for the production of basic reports and estimates to one for the
analysis and evaluation of current information and the support of
daily operations. To borrow a fieure from industrial production,
what is indicated in the transition from p petiole to wartiae
intelligence production for economic warfare, is the conversion and
retooling of a factory produalog capital goods (basic studies) to one
producing consumer geode (operational in elligencm).
XIS
such bit vith
with national
ments for pol
are ctftc'rne4 here not with national policy as
nsonance of economic warfare policy mad strategy
. In broad principle the intelligence require-
ing and strategy in the field of economic warfare
aro not es.nt tally different from those of policy making in other
fields. Against a background of historioal precedent and a ()copra.
otoolon or the foreign policy objectives of the US land other countries,
they include an estimate of the current situation 1,nd of tho probable
consevuences of alternative courses of action. More specifically, they
include estimates of the economic capabilities pnd vulnerabilities
of enemy, allied, and neutral nations; estimates of intention; and
?stimatet of oonwuences of probable courses of action. While
tho outline of the National Intelligence surveys other basic
peacetime economic studies of foreign countries is essentially the
some for all countriem tha pattern of the economic warfare esti-
mates and tho supporting data roldred for eoonomic warfare policy
and plowing will very accordina to the status of the country as
an enemy, ally, or ntatr,l.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
/Mk
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
An to Now *Atone, In the case of an enemy or potential
ene tion, the purpose of the stimates of capabilities and valuer
-
61
abilities is to determine its economic potential for r, Its inten-
i"
tions and probable em an
rses of action. its d-ficieneies in raw
materials, in technology, in facilities, in trarnyortation* in Maib
power, and its ralnerability to interdiction of its international
trade and the disruption etrategic bombitw or ?the:owl * of its
domestic production and transport.
G. gui, 14 1.1110d;latinne. In the case of allied natio
ne r
ble allies, the policies for which intelligence support is
have to do with the feasibility of combined or parallel
the execution of economic warfare. measures arAinst the
common enereespecifAy in e:-porto.import controls, control
facilities, communicatiGns, and blacklieting) the ability of the
Pa
allies to contribute to the allocation of essential civilian sup-
(.3')
lag
plies to cooperating neutrals, the dependence of allies on
(A) )5&-k._
neutral sources of supply,
D. As to NetAral Nations, The neutral nations, as st_ted
above, constitute the principal battleel'ound of economic warfars.
end in this area will arise the majority of 000DOMIC wrfare
prob-
lens roxising policy deternimtion. Xs imates of capabilities and
vulnerapilities are for the purpose of determining the position of
the neutrrA nation as a possible s urce of supply for the enemy.
Intelligence support vill be reltired for the neotiation of vra.
trade agreements, which vill seek to limit its exports to the enemy
and to secure supplies for the US and all nations; for preclusive
baying proignms where esport limitation agreerents are not fftsiblo
SEiIRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Aft
Sanitized - Approved For Ro : CIA-RDP6"014A000100050002-5
or off or determining the ulnerabi1tty of the nen ral
to prescures from the enemy or from the allies, and its abiliti to
maintain its neutrality.
B.
In he period preceding hostilities these etiates are in broad and
comprehensive terms. Ivan though
detailed studies of raw
matrials, manpower, and productive capacity and on econoric ora-
Laotian, technological progress, end international trade and finance,
and on ,,11 the factors emamerated In the National Intilligenoe S4rveys,
they necessarily include many assumptions 64 to possible fixture situ.
attests and conditions. After the outbreak of wr these estimates can
be brought into sharper focus a the status of various countries is
revealed as that of eneny, ally, or nemtva black, White, or
varying shades of gray.
of the effects' of exist
the war neriod, ftuthernore, evaluation
licies led estimtes of probable effects
of proposed policies are largely this by-products of operatiowl intel?
ligence. Bsonsgaic warfare policy and strategy are dynamic, not
static, and the policymeking process Is pea *eerily a continuing
one. ev policies and changes in policy evolve from oeration1
expertenc, In World War I the US, as late as October, 1915 vigor
may protested to Great Britain that "the methods employed by
Gat Britain to obtain evidence of enem,,, destination of cargoes
bourd for neutral ports and to *pose a contraband Character on web
cargoes ere without justification .... indefensible Illegal in
oonception and water* The talk of dhampioning he integrity
of neutral rights the Salted States unhesitationely aesumes.wilu
/.
AGRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
/Pk
Sanitized - Approved For Relehte : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
later as public entthent became aroused in Brite
the US dee
vised the unavicert* which was to become e "rineira1 instrument of
;CS.
economic warfare, and in 1917, of ocuteealbecame the fall ally of Great
Britain in the war. Sometimes the events that force chanees of economic
warfare policy cone with dramatic suddenness. Today's events may make
today's policies anachronistic tomorrow. RUSSill was delivering stretegic
supplies to Germany up to and. tnetwt' the week preoeding the German
invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941.
broad and basic estimates of capabilities and
vulnerabilities are a requirement of peacetime planning. After the
outbreak of war, those previously areeared studiee furnish a basis or
background for the evaluation of current intellts'sn,e and a point of
deaarture for more saecifie estimates of caeabilities,
and probable courses of action. The necessary Integration of the produce
tion of thee latter estimates with the operational intelliaence recess
and in fact with the close support of actrial execution of economic were
fare measures is illustrated in the experienee of both the US and the Ut
in world 'War II referred to in rection V below.
III. ;PK mrsvirwA Il1JzNlm7NTs OF *ON lc 4 70J,ITS.
A. general. The intelligence requirements for economic warfare
operations maw be regarded at drawing on the entire field of economic
intelligence. It is difficult to corceive of any area of economic in-
tellicence, in wartime or in a "cold ware, some atpecta of which are not
germane to economic warfare. Studies of ec,!rlamic organization. manpower
food and agriculture, forest produets. minerals, fuels and pnwr, ram.
facturing, transportation, communications, interm,tio. 1 trade And
finance all furnish support for economic warfare operations.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Alk
Sanitized - Approved For Reid-1M : CIA-RDP61%0014A000100050002-5
The ulrements are lar
for the analysis anthesla, interpretation
and application of that part of the varioog fields of econceic intelligens*
pertinent to the particular problem. The restating production of renorts
and estimaes All "cut across the board". For exaiple, an estimate
of "The Vulnerability of the SI,Tedish Iron and Steel Industry to frestrares
from the EarA and the West* would reauire intelligence as to mining,
aanufacturing, transportation, finance, economic organization, inter-
national trade, and other atibjects. So also would a study or The
Feasibility of Increasing Stockpile Objectives to the Point of Pres i
of Certain Strategic Minerals,
imealeAente or "Transit Trade to Eastern una's through Tr "(or
Switzerland or Atetrie)iieeithe Feasibility of Preventing Export to the
Soviet Sloe of Strategio Materials from Spain
C
Zpreins, Trade Meaeureq. Le/economic warfare seeks the attrition
of an enemy's (or probable enemy90) economic potential for war, so the
measures that seek to cat off his foreign trade represent the greater
part of economic warfare operations and reqaire the greatest amount of
intelligence support. These measures are export licensinr, import
licensing, war trade agreements with neutral nations, control of neutral
shippintareombrel of eneny exports , prevention of mauggliang, parmateimed
/
liat4ee-asa4 blackliatingr\and preclusive buying. They are considered
here according to the reeuirements for each operation. Obvionsly several
operations may require the name intelligence support. In Section IT
this intelligence is considered according to its source, and in Section V
according to its subjeat matter and the organization recuired for its
production and anulication.
It is interesting to note the extent to whikh
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Relefve : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
the intellleenee reeuired for the various; measurer
on the same
rource of ray information end demands a similar tyee of analysis and
estimate. This is due to the mutual impact and interrelation of the
several economic warfare operations.
1. laggiradjamdac. eport licensing is esually the first
measure of economic senetion or economic warfare to be invoiced by a
nation, feelethe reason that the imelementation it entirely within its
oa power. Most other measures involve negotiation with other nations.
Purthermorejexport licensing may be and actually is employed to conserve
supplies needed for the domestic economy or national defease and_ se e&
not necessarily imply a sanction against any other country. Report
licensing mfty be administered on a selective basis as to the oommoditiee
to be controlled, and as to destinations and coneignees, or there may
be eeteargoes or 'imitative controls by cat,ories of commodities to all
or certain areas. In peacetime or in the period preceding the outbreak
of wer, the controls are usually instituted on a *elective basis. In
wartime, of course, all exports to the enemy are embargoed, some eome
modities are embargoed to all deptinrtions, materials in short rupely
re allocated among allies, minimum essential civilian Implies are
rationed to neutral, and non tretegic Items in maple eueele are
uncontrolled except as to enemy dertinations, or are controlled under
general licenses.
In any event, the intellieence sport required draws on
the entire field of international trade, 0; all major categories of
commodities, And an politicoeeconomic intelligence as to all areas, but
especially on intelligence to defielences of the enemy or probable
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
4111k
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPA00014A000100050002-5
-'14-
enemy. Intelligence is required for export licensing policy, 7:1rogramming,
detrminetton of the extent of controls, and the fixing of '11,otas.
tellisence is also required for the processing- of the individual license*
especially intelligence as to intermediaries and the ultimnte consignee.
This includes not merely cheering against wteh lists but positive Intel.
ligence as to his acceptability and also as to the ultimate end-.lee Of
the material. A vigorous and aggressive intelWence rapport is required
for the enforcement of ontrols and the apprehension and treatment of
violators.The burden of the intelWence support is more onerous in the
ease of the selective approach than in the categorical classificetion
71C.r.,(....4 a (1
because of of beljefinement of technical definition .Process, and end.use, es
well as the investie-etion of the cOnsigneee?i
2. Ammort Liemsinds. Import licensing may be used in the
exercise of pressures on and inducements to neutrsle in connection -4th
the negotiation of war trade agreements and cooperation in other respects .
It may also be used to supplement and reinforce the controls of enemy
erport, by denying licensee for the inport of commodities any part of
which is of enemy origin. It may also supplement foreign exchange controls
in conserving or controlling US dollars. rerhaps the most fx.ortant
use of import licensing* however, is in the sonservatin and alloatton
of sWiping space, but this objecti,e is larsely outside the ntelc of
economic varier*. The nature of the intel1l,7ence support required
for import licensing is very similar to that retired for e7port licens-
ing, i.e. as to international trade various comodities, and thepoliti-
cal and economic situation in the ey-Tortit4.- counry and in the coun.ry
S r;?
1
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPM00014A000100050002-5
of , if it represents a t tommerciel iwellieence is also
required es to the Coneignor instead of the consignee as In the came of
export licensing.
3. Nar Trade Arreemeett with Ieeerale. This represents in
some respects the most ieportant area of economic warfare because, then
satisfactory agreements can he reached, thee may furnish the belie ror
export-import licensine, limitation of exports to the enemy, compliance
with the navicert and ship warrant ses em, supply.purdhase arreements,
and other ceoperative relations consistent with nentrality. 1Ple negotia.
tion ef war trade agreements req t es intelligence 0, the neutral
nations" production, imports, ooneumpti7m extorts of the eriecieal
commoeitiespin order thet imeort quotas may be agreed neon, against ehich
all export licenses and all approved navicerts may be charged. In
addition to this estimates are required of the current political and
economic situation of the country. Also required is biocrehical
licence of the leading political pereonalities, especially those enraged
in the negotiations.
4. .Control 9f Nnenr and Neutrallbineting. we ooee noe to
the prinet:,,1 veemem, in the arsenal of economic waleare . the /melee t,
the ship navicere, eni the *hie warrant the instruments of the meaper
blockade," It is in faet a caper blockade. It depends for its effective.
nese an political and economic ressnres and inducements as set ant else-
where in thls stuea, and of corree,es a 1 t rrt, on enforcement by
military end naval pover. Nut its extent and effectiveness are far
preater than couid. be achieved by physical enforcement al
Iavicerts are in ee'enoe commercial aarnorts. It is
interestine to note that the navicert was invented by the American
General in London during Iorld war its pureo-e wan to facili
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Reigme : CIA-RDP6Z00014A000100050002-5
American exports during the period of neutrality. The ritih insti-
tuted the navlcert device early in world War II, December 1939, and made
it conpmlsory in July 1 40. All nomeavicerted his and cargo vessels
were subject to seizure.
The ship wvicert, or its text indicatee, was given When
all the items of the anifect had 'bean nevterted. It permitted a ship
to *eke a siwle voyage through naval controls. It provided a deecrlia.
tion of the shia and its proposed itinerary; a list of its officers, crew,
andpas-sena:ern; a descrition of its cargo, ship store, nail, d. loney;
an account of the source and destination ?!vesignor and consignee. vhen
an application for a ship's navicert was received, the crew and passenger
lists !sere cheeked and a requirement made that objectionable aeons be
simoved.
If the Americans devised the navicert it wav the British
who invented the ship warrelet. A ship warrant entitled a ship to the
use of British and Allied .,.ort facilities . hunkering, shire stores,
repairs etc.. To receive a warrant he owner agreed that no ves7.81
owned or controlled or operated by him would sail to or from the nevi-
coat area without a ship navicert; that he asnild not sell or part with
effective oontrol of any vessel owned by him without the alairoval of
the Mini try of Air Transport; that he would not employ any eesraY
company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or any other facilities;
and many other agreements. In addition, fleet owners. were required
by the British tO charter to the Ministry of War Transport a portion
of -.heir fleets. All of this constituted the price which the j4itish put
on the port facilities Alich they owned or controlled. It is claimed
JET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64700014A000100050002-5
for the ship warrant syetem that it is a purely eommercial bn
avoids all questions of international law or even of dOrlomstic die
curnioe. It we the Price which the Britith rut on facilitiee which
they controlled. ert-
The intelligence sumort Tee ed for the admAnistr7Aion
of the nevicert and shipw,.?trrant system Alad the control of enmity and
nentrA shipp ng rermires ftrt of all intelligence as to the movement
of enemy shipping rze. the movement of all ships carrying nnnavicerted
cargo and all blaCklisted ships, i.e. ships net having a shin warrant.
Close liaison must he naintained with the Maritime Commission ,qe with
the aammereial ehipp re info Alan services. In the cese of the
itish Ministry of Economic arfere in World War II the liaison was a
two-way street, the ETM PostingAman.in Lloyd'sland Lloyd's k?ping a
rerresmat tive in the Shiple Record (intellirrence) Section of Mr7. eh.
movenents of tankers were handled. ,vraely from those 0
vovnees were classified els? aE to area, e.g. Atlantic, l?nnific, BleCk
Sen, etc..
In addition to inellfrEnee el to voype, the administre.
tion of the navic_ t Ystem racuires all of the economic. istellieence
required in the adminietration cf export licensing. As the exrort
licensing would control the e-A-nert of nwteri'1 s from this country nd
from allied countrier, so the navicert system ,,mmlet control the exorts
from nentril conntriee, and the same intelligence ae to commodities,
requirements, rroucticn and trede would be necessary.
The admInistrnti.n of the ehl varrsnt rystem rivnires
detailed intelligenee as to port facilities allied, enemy, neutrel
4.16. E
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
.Eis=
After the US entered the war this country vas atsocirtad4,f in the
ship warrrnt sygren and in fact aleper*Aed during the rIoi. of "aid to
Britain short of war". But It wnt the .7.1.(1 chz. n of 7 .h ports that rd
the system most er7sctive,
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6T00014A000100050002-5
around t
. This is necessary to know those facilities that are
available and Uwe that are not available to enemy end blccklisted
? ?
neutrel ships. rstimetes are recuired af the'feeelbi.144y of*bledkade
voyageso in the light of refuelling facilities and other factors.
-15. Control of Inner Exlmorts. The intplligence reo ired for
the tion of enemy exports includes analyses of the normal peace.
time export channele and the effectiveness of the measures dopted to
cloee them; the requirements of neetral nntions which were formerly
met by imports from the enemy and the feasibility of supplyieg them
from allied sources in considertiTn of the interdiction of the former
trade; mad analysis of proposed ?lent el export* to determine those Aith,
or any parts or components of which, are of enemy origin, in order that
navicerts may be denied. Censorship submissiens end intercepted messages
give SOMS C1110 to an eacvrts, The difficulty in controlling enemy
exports to contiguous neutrals however, is that the neeotiaticms Iodis-
ing to the export and the fimmcial transactions in connection there.
with do not come under surveillnee or control except to R limited extent.
6, rrevention of Seueellai. The prevention of the snuggling
Ahrough the bloakade of industrial diamonds, platinum, cnart crvstrls,
mica, certain drugs and ether highly strategic items of nnall hulk was
one of the most difficult problems of the allied economic Itarfare agencies
in world. War IL The effort was made to control at the cource the 7...T0.*
daction nad pale of strategic items susce7Aible to erageling, wtere
po ible agreements were negotiated with rhe 71rodprine countries where.
by the entire output was to be sold to the US or is alit's. Movements
of suspetted black market operators were carefully watched by under cover
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For ReIdte : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
operatives. Zia& market tricot; vee whtdhed as an indteation of the
':..resenee of buyers. It vas noted that prices rooe sharply ,,-Oven certain
neutral ohl,:s put into port. This led sometines to intercention and
search of the veeels and sA.7!ure of the contraband. Few vessels were
given z1 thorough search at contrA "ort s and even ':hen th.i? was done
itwa..s difficult to discover mall items in the absence of clues. These
clue came orincieally from undercover operetivs and intercopted
messag40. In addition to these sourcen, there is recuirement for
foreign service reporting of market fluctuation, esocially in the bin&
maxket, hni of tra jent diversions, irregular movementvovl other
evasions of the con' r?125XbO Anerican F.hasey at Brusels, for example
recently reeorted that had a throe pkge list
Svies importern who eere traneshipping inustriel diamonds be the Xast.
7. LeocleimelListimeexanacklirAinc:. The Ut ;'rocleimed
Lipt of Certain Blocked nationaln" pablished fir:A 1)7 PreAdenttel
Iroclamation July 17, 1941 vas a lint of
(a) "certain -persons deemed to be, or to have been acting
or Purnorting to act, directle- or indirectly. for the
bene7it of, or under the '1.reeti.ln of, or under the
inrInilietion or, or on behalf of. or in oollabor-Aion
with Oermany or Ital.:: or e nationel thel-eof.'
-eersons to vhonjor on vhoe behalf, or for
whose necount, the eynortatin Oirectly or indirectly
of any articl or mhterlal exported fro vi the 'United
'Antes, in deemed to be detrimental to the intereht
f the onal lefenee.P
coy,?
The Prolained 7i&t an the atre e publi'Held
de:!ntlene. In altdition to ther litr, u.ptriec nain'7Linod
olllerklint," end 1".atch vhich rre rocret. The 1,1iiktF ineluded
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6D00014A000100050002-5
all names on the .:vticlaimed and statutory lists end in sAltion other
name* of persons against vhom derogatory inform tion han. been obtained,
but who had not yet been processed for the published lists or Nose
names for one reason ?r,,v_re omitted from the .N1lished 'intr. In
addition to these lt,ts there wa in arIch nountry a third secret "watch*
list which carried no atii7ra. but al to 'Arirjr there areared to be rufficient
reasons for survoillA)ce. All nnarIs on the ITS Proc17,ined List were auto-
matic-My added to the British Statutory List, 7nn after re-r1 Warbor
all names on the British list were added to the US list, At the V7-..!?.
time high the',Procltd,ed List consisted of ovr 154000 mn baric
of this were hundredoo thousands of files nd countless docul-ntr.
censorohip extracto, intercerted messaget. abstrnets from export 11.en.7,1e
and navicert aprliatione, foreign renortse cornercill rePor,
rd .11eL
mnny othsr items. In World war ',from .V21 1918 to Aril 1C1.9,1'7,000
rop.orts
digested by the Burepu of Mar Trnde Intellirsence. The
sourcer of these reports were identified as folios: Ceneorshi
Yoreim Service 3* and !A.seellaneons 30%. ft conparnble r,tAU;tie.P
are available 673 to the 'forld 'Far II ev2erlene, but tore is -1deme
that the percenta,7.8 distribution 4,7.t s1,111nr, an the volum. o c se.
vastiv greater.
In the event of wnr vith the Soviet Union, it ybe svAlmed
that bi lj2t ifl attain even larger 7roportions and their maintenance
present serious problam? in intellirence P.W1 In adminlstrAlor. Ths,
fifth cOluTwi of fsllow trellers in countries will b: frnjtful
ware.. In Asia ,lone. the ?hinese busine -men. in other ail.ntri 8 are
already ,71.-ving evideree of "smiling :lc. the And sits,14 111 njoYITIP the
patronage of Comrunlpt Chi
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Reid:lase : CIA-RDP61%0014A000100050002-5
The prob1om7, of intellipence 'n ort re a,Wnitrn of
b1aCk1i7te arc oo great, in fact, ar to unrrtl,nt !onsideratior of *White
Mote" inets. of b1^411rts. The rwriccrt -1141 ship warrant sytar is
esaenttafly basd on tho prindt9le of the "white 1t t ae aro "7,1ot of
Our licensing sytems in both domestic -nd affair>
4?Phe burden is on the linereee to pr ye his good faith in
of undertakingc inelnp in some circumstances the pAvinr of
bond. The prin-lule of the "white 11to is 'el&ted in the Prltieh 11,1ndp.
25/
book of Economic Warfare as follopms
In countries where evidence ae to uraesirable commercial
activities proves wTpecially difficult to obtain (e.m_ In
territories ',4here commerce ir suble(:1 to little or no
regulation nd whore men of etra?!", or "cloaks." can ror;Aily
be fonrA to cover undesirable tAsnsa:Airs) the ,4hite Lit
may be ernloved: tr an alternativ for the BlAck 1,17A and
Statutory List. It I57, in eence. a 1.1t of trders known
to be: mbove susnicien: 'orsirn7lonts to or from them are
sublet to no Interference. nil trar,Actions involv.
irg traders not on the white Lint Yre rer9.red Ath ruspiAen
and ar far as yloirsible hindered-11
Peraps both Vhite Lit t,zre: 331%et-Lint *4th an
rIrdiate nrratorial list ray be advirable. In .rly event, tM, 7trotl?
renresents one of the r tt irportmt irtellfrent orrr..tine of vartine .
_
There ir rt. ''resent an irpentreutroeii for a comprel%ereivr. cooeinated
at,41 List. eupperted b filer on ech name: brd..:9oled on mnch.cr
to indicate nationality, ,:eimy7oillity rrou m an:. trr.ez are, nd
ther relevant inforation. Thi F7 wnld furnih the nucl u.r of a roclaimdd
1.1,t Ir the event of 1,Mr. TP Dooart,ent of Comrerce mAntTirs
Vetch Lt 'A in cornectiAi A.th the enforert of .e7r,:t cortrole.
alro ebeF- the noononic Vnrrre 33,51f:th of the r,-onol7Ac Divisi r of CIA.
The: Department of State 17uir Divi,lon or 4i0,-rrhi1 Tht1, Aid has
'
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Bi
Sanitized - Approved For Reis : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
s(ehical Regitter al0. an Indastrial Regittor. Neither of thene
ht to includes foreign traders (both individuals and firms) ec euth.
The Inter.Arunty Study Group reported to the NMI on 13. Anvil 19-'9s
types: of
*The Central Intelligence Agency hen been 7neried PS to the
exittence and availability of intellience indicting the
need for or the utility of a rublished bleak Lit in the
event of car, and the status of its facilities for gather?
ing infor tin retuired in a blaCklitting pro ran. It
vould sypeex that no study of qc.is w,tare has beer rade,
that relevant: informtion is spotty, and that eaecuate
facilities to Collect tne necessary data do not exist."
The re-aires!..ent, however, doe-, evlet.
8. .PrAMIUSiTO Buying. Yrecliltive biying eecnireF the same
eeenotc reportirt: and esti --ter a- are reutired in
eupport of exrort.import licensing, negotiati3r AP war trade apreetente,
and in the adriniFIrction of the nevitert system. In addition it ruires
current intelligene nAs to market finctations, and the aper ::tions ane,
-anirullions of enemy parc7nasing agents nnd black oaret orators. It
also recuiree estim,%tes of the feasibility of ecluive
t!tcluding hrojetie of ,11.0 effect of mich poo,rra.nt., lett they defeat
'heir purpose by stimulating nere and more rront:!ti n to he rfeluded at
igher and 114i:her pki
.Limairj?fa. In general the objectives ef f1.-nrolyt71,
measures in eoonomic -go'rfre are (1) to 71revent the buildinr ut. of
enemy external financial assets, () to vc't or setw3ster such assets
as exist or (3) to imobill-e them by prevetil Their ti'ansfer between
different centere, and (4) to bring financiej, presures on neutral
rutlare and their m.tiorrAs, These oijeoti be alcorlisbeni by.
the ontrol of foreign 'funds and other 7issets; by foreign ex:It-. ,7e ro t;
the export ;-rid imrort licentilr of gold, siivr nd currency; the
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Aid
Sanitized - Approved For Rete : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
ntui.tton of foreign iaarketn, e.g., the irthr of eold or silver
on foreign markets where the enemy le welling bullion or e-ecle for
he purpone of prorurtng foreign exnhange; by the granting or with,.
holding of credit, exchenee facilities ineuranee protection to
neutral tr dors.
To
there arn re?trentA for estimates
nd lyses of the fiseal coeition, financial resources and rxenetary
nysteme of *nary and neutral coun oboervetion and interpretation
of leering balance between enemy d neutral countries; analyele of
international cert.'s and other internationaal corporate and fleancial
retat1onshipe rvl exeminetion end analysis of inventories of foreign
Nude and other foreign assets. There is also P reAdrement for the
evnIuation, interprettion cw nalytis of finantiel inforration in
censorship tnibmiesions, intercepted meseagee, foreign pubileatione,
interrogationm, and other eourees of current information vith r7iecial
reference to evidence of ocloalene an other evasione !7eve violations
of the exchange centre:1s.
A Mil:Merv. Measures. lqlitary action a weapon of econorie
warfare denotee the ume of the armed forces to 'ieny to the enemy eanmod
ities reeuired for the erosecution of the enr. Zi This eeti:el ie direeted
Cm)
the dteruption and destruction or the e
sport by 1
form of blockade and (b) at the 61zreetion f,sie de-t e tan of enemy
industrial pro -',r by trtgtc bombine or other military nAtek on
economic:targets. Obviously, these measures tly serve irmediste
military objectivee aa veil ae economc "rfare ?bjecttv, in the
tntton va
_!#37e of the caPture of a art or other etratee
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Aairoved For Rase : CIA-RDP6V00014A000100050002-5
This should occasion no controvercy, howfwer. ac to ,jh.e.,r- a. particular
measure or operation is military or etonoric warfare. Tho ulte
objective of all scononie warfare is to sumport the milWxy dbjective
by the strangnition Aid attrition of the emmee seamomy, and as stated
above, eeonomie. military, psychological and. political ve,-ons may be
employed &nd it ie axiomatic that military operation, are not an end
in thausel7es but an instrument of national policy. Military crertilre
In swoort of economic ,?,:arfre, by sea, land. and air, are necessarily
controlW aml directed by the military on the 711,21$ of operational,
factors, but such of the intelligence on which they arc based and the
desired order of priority o7 targets ars mnttert of economic warfare.
1. Almpttpn and; Restruct of vnamy Traworl. This
includas (a) air and. naval patrols (both aprface and subrprintO,
caption, and blockade; and (b) attack on strategic tranwportation targets,
by air, land, or eoa. It it the forner th7A we are ancerre4 Ath
primarily, in economic warfare nA only becre of the inport:nce of the
actual PhycleAl interception of ontrnband, ehipping, but even morn co
becuse of the fact that on this ulti-nte 72hylical enforcenent denends
the effecWeness of tha whole system of t,',1 sparer blockades. The
intelligence required. In support of the ilitary blocknde in-ludec that
previously outlined for export it eneing. In addition there is a
reluiremmt for technical inforion to arty and nentr 1 chirring,
including Vontification, *peed, fuel capacity, etc.. As it it -iselrobable
that nothlw!: in the thipts pa-pers of blockade runner will ineticte it
do,tinntian nd that no.tring an the manifest tif n--visted ships will
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
A1116.
Sanitized - Approved For Fftase : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
tndtcat the contraband character of my of the cargo, there
rel,uirement for covert I:atoll/genee na to thee covert hirent-.
2.
-
addition to all of the basic intelli,
emy vannbilitile ard
-uineraltilities in certain indu,-trie,1 thm de-ired order of nriority
of economic terreV., nuch us electric po-lr lante, ntroleum refineries,
maitione factorise, synthetic rubber -)1Antn, or trm,naportn,tion gateways,
here ir7. a re:mirement for evallvted information to the specific
inetallation, including
a. lo-Ation of taret, and ider i(Win4 tnfor-tionso to
nearby cities, nduetrial installations, hon7114, railrob,
mountains, and other terrain features.
b. phyqcal delriptiJ)n of p1 nrl nd iOinte of vnlnerability.
c. adminintr2tie inforation, iijj., ovnerell rovern-
nent agency having euthoritY, and. names oflty officials of the facility.
4. capnoity .cnd produntion. Including ,y-i,?er and uantities
'rothiot; serial /rubor, trade-mar}, end ether identifyinr avlbols;
e. Leber force, ineludinp uxbre joyed, work shift
tiortUty, skillu, ercertage of forced labor,fr.1$ni'Ations qa to Ilusinr
na
food, fle other morale fa.tors.
f. Importance of thiu fact
to the indu7tr7
by the ditribution of it
prodwt, nd by the derenkmeo of other faelilities on "tie r-unrce.
g. Poibja impoxtm.e of thiz ?lenity' to Its
tion fors, in ,he event of oo,-
- ..
c,Etion of the are
t 9t1P,r-M
Oreg0 nr, reprenent the rinelpal measures
of economic Tlerfaxe, but they are not e7elura of othre, Alch in
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A00100050002-5
Sanitized - Aaroved For Wiese : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
given eireumetance, be of ree).t effect. Arlene these are erechologIcal
`t?
meeouree. sabotnee. and a varieteetivitier to elague andoufouM
the enemy and ht' friends. temples of the leet eatceory are the
dropping of counterfeit ration carr oey enemy territory to confece his
retioning eyetem, eounterfeiting his money, led onee in World er II,
according to uneveluebed reports, the "bnsTine or 1:43.4 game hr de in
Africa to drive them from unfriendly to friendly tribes.
1. Potion 9f Submreign,and Direfreation in Zeeme Inge-stria
Amt. Just ac military operatione may be directed to economic otjectiven,
ne 'cbological weapons be unlietered In aueport of econemic warfare.
Propaganda ray be directed to certein Industrial Are are individual
recilitiotinceori3ination lith ellitary, erenomic ane eolitieal stretegy.
For the benefit of the weseamish, the ereeseenda eer be the propaMa
of truth. and the mere effective for that reeeen. The intellieeece re-
.111red in the selection of tareett and in the ehoice of amemnition would
Include ieTortc of eorditions And incieenta In the area coneerned/evalum
ated agalw7t P backeround of knoeledee of poUtii, soeioloeical and
-economic feetera.
2.
,-.e of
a
Sabotege
ordinerily be the wotk of forced labor, die ident groups and tneivideels
In the enemy country, and resitite patriots in the satellite and
occupied areal. Stbotaee is no longer simr1A `IR the theevine of a shoe
in the mnehlnery, Tett mey be a highly technical -rd coeelireted. opfee4tion.
Intelligenee eetireees All deal vith the feasibility end probability
of eabetage, the anticipated offsets, ane the reeldremnte In mneeriel,
and supplle* for the op rf,tion.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved ForlafrJease : CIA-RDPa-00014A000100050002-5
u, V mir vliqTAkk
A. 941cet1on.
1. Peacetime Sourees, The peacetime sources of economic
warfare intelligence *re discussed is e by the Economic Warfare
Planninr. Committee in the State 'Department under date of April 18, 1949
to avoid
leati
An effort hp.s: been node here
virts go well covered in that dlcument.
a. mura,102104,Troe Date,. Pirst perhps on the
of 1:ercetime source e of intent -enc. re-uired for ettnomit wrfare should
1
Oe statistics and other date -a to internativrn1 trade. The lack of
uniformity in reportinT: and ether deficiencies htve long plazued econoi.
mists. This was trio: even vhen there was the beet of intehtion and good.
will. It bps bcoln creWtly ae*ravated hy the recacitrance and scare-
tiveness of the Soviets. it has the belief of vanY that the toe.
pieta And uniform repertinp of data as to rotuction, cormar7tion.
domestic distribution, and internatif7nal trade by pll nptions would
have tended to prevent w,re, by indicting rlike intentions. The
strAistics of the Longue of rations sme lrAterly of the International
rrimide ergeni7,4ion, our cwr"Yearbooks* ftrivIVM: Colverce, Viner!as
.k7riculture - t4W, monthly r*vporte, are the princtrrl reference
sources alone with the other sources dir,.custed belor.
b. 11$ jorekisA Svj?roatl. The periodic and ilLecial
reports of our forein service officers Are the most fruitful sfAirce
of Intelligente for efttomie vn.rfare rolicy anr lannin in Iree.
tins and R valuable source eft operational intqlnce in wartime.
In wartime the foowraphical area of their coverwee is reftced by the
recall of our representaVves fron enemy countries ane by aornewitt,A
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized --proved For Rektise : CIA-RDP6T00014A000100050002-5
restricted opportunities in sone n trnl
as.
Us intelligence from foreign service reporting officers
is much less than thpt from censorahip, interee4ed messages ond other
wartime sources. The Sconomic Manuel: A Guide for Reporting (Wipers
in the Foreign Service of the United States*. is an excellent amd comp.
prehensive statement of economic intelltionce requirements for all
purposes, bt so organized as to be of greet use in economic warfare
reporting. The adequacy of foreign service reporting is discussed in
the Appendix.
a.
lialmalm There Is 4
ce of
material Tertinent
to economic warfare in the various go-,-erumental agencies in mashington,
the correlation of which is the statutory responsibility of CIA.
(l) States Rewtment, Reference has already been
made to the foreign service reporting, which -rovidee the mens of
collecting economic intelligence for all government agencies. The
Office of Intelligence Researah (OIR) and the Office of Libraries and
Intelligence Aoluisition (Ott) provid, the means for processing intent-'
ence within the Department.
(2) Aad Forces, lach of the armed forces
maintains attaches attached to the dirlomatic missions. thili
report primarily on subjects of special interest to their reepective
services, but also make economic estinte The Intellience Division
of the Army (ID) is interested in intelligence required for logistictl
opertAlonerand planning for civil afl.irs, adminiatration in the
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized -;Proved For Retease : CIA-RDPa-00014A000100050002-5
occupied e. The Iri1untrtl Colleee of the
Armed Forces includes Neon
study of economic wcrfere, as such, hpA its eemesis in the 01 in the
industrial College in 1940. The Office of Ravel Intellieence (00;4'4
is interested in these subjects and particularly in ship building, port
facilities and relrled subjects. Air Force intellieek:Ns interested
particularly in tercet information for strAegic bombin.7.4 and Its
StrateJc Vulnerability Branch ha.s doro extenstve work in this fie's.
(3) penaktmAat_pf commerce. The Department of Comers*
is of cut stndIi importnce in economic inte licence. Yerelem service
reports, especially those of tivvostmercial Attaches, are available to all
departsvnte and in the Department of Compere are the basis for eommodp.
re in its curriculum. In fact, the
ity IndwAry? and
o.al economic studies. j"hile these studies are
primarily for the benefit of DS industry, they are else of greet value
in economic wrre. The Office of international Trade, the Office
of Industry and Commerce, especially in connection with the adminiettel-
tion an forcement of export controls, the Civil Aeronautics Admin.
istration4 the Office of fichnicza Services, the Patent Office, the
Bureau of Standards, and the Bureau of the Census, . all have a sipuif.
lova contrientias to econ-nic wrfare intellirence. Since the trnefer
of the Karitiee Commission to the Commerce Depertment the intelligence
support for the ihip vernt system mentioned in III- 4 above is no
In the Commerce Department.
(4) kmarjekeeLaActipsagr. In the De?artiont or
Agriculture, the Office of Foreign Agrieulturel Relations, the Agri
cultural Research Administration, the 'Crest Sersice, the Bureau of
Agricultural Bdonemice,
and ottlifir furnkhed basic studies and
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6100014A000100050002-5
current reports on agriculture' commodities end on aericulterol
conditions in foreioei arat,
(5) ;erarpment of Jusiare, recuse of its interest
in internotinl carfile, the vectine or wietratirn c forelen oemed
assets, and other matters related to eccnomic earfere, the Department
of Justice mainteined in 7Vorld War II an 7nonoric Warfere Division.
Since that time the Office of Alien Proocrty h en. oleted in the
Justine Department and in edltien to the eCx:ini7Itetion of control
or veating of alien property, bendles ell litioetion growing out of
foreign funds program of the Tr ,eary Department. The rolerel Blereeu
of Invemtieetion (7BI) rendered valuable asnistence in Vorld 7'far It
especially in connection with detection of emeoeline oTerations end
other violations. The Immigration and Netionalt7tion Service, charged
with the admission, exclusion, Altfl doeertetion of eliets, end with their
reeistrtion and fin, er orintiee, vcf, a source of biorr-r,lc-i
a /714-4-4,10-4- Ate
ligence andAthe discovery of sourcea for irterrorotion.
(6) peeartment of Interior. Minerele reprerent the
Laroest category of strateeic matF:riels, ond the Bureeo or rines and
the US Geological Survey heve been tke uouroerof much of the tABle
material Amido,The mineral attaehe,, in certein dielometic missieoe have
furnished much of the current Luformotion ee ential to economic ear?
fere operations reoerling rinerele fuels, oo'-r, weer resources,
(7) Treasury peivE.Atipent, The 71-asury Deeartment
was the first aceney of the Ooverneent to ieelenent en economic
faro neescre in World Var II, or, more erooerly, to apply n economic
sanction, since the US was not et ever at the tire. This wet the
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Ap-proved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
freezing of the alv te of Dorwry and Denmark in A iii 1940 and the
extension of the order In June and July 1140 to the Axle oountries
and the turopean nentrels. Vhile this WS for the purpose f ro-
tecting the interests of riehtful owners of these astets from
exploitation, it wes also iress.d with economic warfeze cons
tions. From that ti xe on the Treasury Department wa
ctively inter-
ested in the implementation of econonic warfare measures through Its
lOreign /Ulnas Control and the Amelia of Customs, end in intelligence
through its Monetary Research Division.
cY
(a) Zatimajdusgrin intill -ence sup ort
through its Division of Research raid Statistics, and in implementation
of foreign exehange controls tbrmugh member banks. the Arderal Reserve
System also has a part in economic wrier*.
(9) boashrafingalitaka. The bureau of Labor
Statistics prerares studies of 1.ber conditions in. foreign countries,
beied in part on reports of labor attaches abroad.
(10) TAW: confeketia. De-cause of the emphasis
on tnternttona1 trade and world, wide commodity studies, many of the
reports and analyses of the Tariff Commission are germane also to
economic warrare.
(11)
'Ca is concerned with foreign economic assistance, which is the antithesis
of for .in economic attrition, its intellieunce concerninr the F2P
coun,ries is complementary to that rear in the Soviet and *stele-
lite countries and includes some of the most rominent of the
probable neutrals. The statistical and other economic reports pre-
pared by its large staff of econoeic analysts contain much intelli-
gence of economic warfare
is"r"SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved Fog Release ? cIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
The ECA does not luxe an intelligence Division as such. It does have a
Statistics and Reports Division and a Security and Investigation Division,
but its intelligence production and analysis in Washington is largely
integrated with the work of the various functional divisions.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
32
Sanitized - AFProved For Release : CIA-RDP6Z00014A000100050002-5
(12) peoartnent of AreVves. The Department of
Archives is the repikfitory of a vast store of official documents and
records, in amazingly available arrwecent When the quantity and
diversity of the material are comeidered. The Depar slant is enged
in the preparation of a series of handbooks of records of World War II
that wibl mike these records even more 3erviceable,
(13) Other Agest4es. The foregoing list is not in.
tended to be ,xcwtve of a number of agencies some of them very
c3.ose4 tdintifte&. with economic warfre, but o henries than in
intelligence support, for example, the National Securities resources
Botrd and the Bureau of the Budget in connection with mobilition
planning and organisation; the General Services Administrtion in the
implementaWn of preclusive buying; the Ilport-Import Bank in financial
intelligence and in the negotiation of foreign loans; the yarioue war.
time eencies notably the Office of Censorship, the rredomintnt source
of economic warfare int4lience in Tame diecussea. elschere in
this study, the lar Production %lad the Office of liar Infer flop,
the Petroleum Administration for "an, the Val* Shipping Adminintration,
,Jad
C0112110,
Are filla]ly? of
(14) pty4., n
s the Central Intellience Agency, charged by statute
Ath responsibility for correlating all intelligence affecting the
n7:A,iona3. security and making rer*mmeadttine to the National Security
Council for cordination of intelligence activities. It is accord
ing,ly the responsible agency under the N tional Seel= t; Col:rail for
the correlation of economic rfare the nsti,(.lve
SECRET
?
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
R.IloitAtion of domestic sources of fortin tnt 111,enoe, oovrrt
ovorseits, nnd noultorier of forstra bremdeoeto
inpertnnt murose of osonowl? *means irteill-menAere mere th4
serr.t' fort4 n!.. of ce== ccenero to al the intA1147onne
noneles,
t.itiam.v....41.1.11Aae the act-res r of JVrrj
nr,teriti is the Librrry of remTror. Ti eAdttito to its
.Z4.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6T00014A000100050002-5
f. porsien ,Rroadcazts. In World War II the Radio Unit
of the Banomic In!,0111 ence Division in the ftard of Yconnrtic Warfare
rceessed reports and transcripts of foreign broadcasts. Theqc brond.
c1,17.ta vcre monitored for the most part by the Federal Communications
Commission, the output at ttmea approximating three thousand tee per
day of wonitcrs1 reports and ranseripts.(Approsimetely SS 000 words
daily are monitored, translat,d, transcribed or digested, and disseminated
to the avropriate divisions for analysts and interraretationOn addition
there was an exchange of selected material with the British Broadcast.
is Corporation and other allied sources. Only a small rtion of the
broadcasts contained: informatin of value but the otential signifi-
cance of that small portion was frequently very grolwA. It mefnired the
winnowing of a. vast amount of chaff to serarate the grain. Bvaluation
and interpretation were very importer:A. Yer exammle* the theme of the
propaganda to condition the public mind might be an indication of a
probable course of action. It is also frequently necessary to broad.
cast official announcements to the people even al the calculated risk
of iWdisolosure, Am tasted above the monitoring Of foreign broad.
eaits is now a responsibility of CIA.
g. beftiess and Displaced persons. X r before in htetox
have there been so many displaced craons in the world as the millions
who were exiled by or who fled first from italri id then from Soviet
tyranny. 'tom German Sudetenland from Silesia, from the Baltic states,
from Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria. Albanla, from
Communist China andiwhen they could, from the Soviet Union itself. Peat
of them have refused to return to their former homelands now held by
the Communists. Yany have resisted or *peeped the Soviet kidnap gunge
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
45-
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00014A000100050002-5
in the name of reetrla vn. Among their number are statesmen,
ecientiate engineer,, artists, lawyers, doctors W farmers and
laborers. Their value as sources of intelliFenee has ben recognised..
They ars being developed as wadi as We and svnilable personnel will
permit. But morn needs to be done.
The first intelligence requirement
as to those 7eople themselves, as r us, As types, PS individwls;
then the exploitation of selected sources both for the infortation they
have and for What they can ac7
ire, not me
ive but ctive Intel
lirence. And not merely intellicenca but or ion of re
of liberr.tion, Rut this it- beyond the score of this study.
h.
7 _I
abrol,d, ew.cielly merchant see
source. Eerly in Y,71.4, Ka the Office of Naval
their *Boarding Report included Inform-ti-'r
in forrign ports. In t
initiate4 PM orranlsed rr
unions for interroratinr merchant seamen.
Re
be f fruitful
telltnoe, in
sic conditions
the Economic Intelli e Division
000pe tion with the maritime
December of that year
the operations were turned over to the Office of 5trate4e Services
..nd beapme known the Shim Observer Projeet, d in addition to the
economicnt informetioy 1 lded political, regeholoricel and even military
intell i9nce.
1. The foreien economic
intelligence in the 'c.. essin of US exporters end importers, erne,.
fecturers, enginecri, lAnks kild insurance compsnie Pile,. tr.de neociaa.
tiors is ?ctically unlimited. They iv -e trAded '4th or in coetttirn
ith internatiobel traders all over the world. TN& have su
ecluipment and technical *know-how', for induetrial facilities. They
N
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
-36-
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
have built and op ted wubeldiariee In many of thb le,iding countries.
They have conducted resenrch into markets., r,etual and potential. They
have financed car,its1 improvements and comercial trnnsections. They
know the capabilities ;Ind vulnerabilities of the major industries and
the individual facilities. ?hey know the requirements and sources of
eetiontial raw materials, and possible substitutes for those in short
suPP1.71
The tntellience is there. It Is freely available, and
yet its adelucte exploitation ts serious difficulties in adninietra?
tion, in collection, 'evaluation, analysis, interpret tion and dissem-
lw-ttion. Such was the dupAlcation and competition in this field in
the early years of World War II, between OSS and MA, that they finally
worked out a modus viven,1 in this in may othsr problems, and
opmbined their efforts. As a result of this eerienes, after thc ase-
of the Rational Security kat of 1947, the extloitation of individuals
eme organizations in the US for intelligence purposes was made the
responsibility of CIA, The Planning Study for Nconomic warfare prepared
in the State Department in April 1949 states;
At the present tire, through bmnel offices established in the
vlintipal cities, and through a contact register in Wathington. CIA
isvoollecting and disseminating &Urge quantity ef Useful iota...
lions. information from these sources. As presently carried on,
however, there are serious Shortcomings in the operation. IISCID 7
does not recognise explicitly either the interests of civilian
ADD .IAC agencies in the inddreastion deriveed from these "curves,
or the capabilities of the civilian agencies for collecting
infbrnation as a by-product of their normal operstions. Althoue,h
the directive requires the IAC agencies to msOrio available =oh in-
formation acclulred in the course of their norm' opersting contacts
with domertic sources, the bepartment of State has no estab-
lished procedure for effecting this provision. There Is DO
doubt that many areas of the Department are regularly acquiring
useful economic intellif!ence informetion ?hich is not being
disseminated to interested arencies or even to other arees of
the Department itself, Undoubtedly the game condition exists
in other IAC and non-IAC agencies. The wters which ehould be
taken, therefore, are (1) to recognize the interests of , and
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
S moevaidbc o rlay Rea vre :the CIA-RDrat00014A000100050002-5
u , DM. AC agencies with ?spree%
to these sources; (2) to establish within the Departrett of State
( and other agenclee) aroceduree for gatherirg and di-saemirating
the information collected as a byaproduct of normal operat1.n7
contacts with busintes firms, individuals, etc./ (3) to stroaathenaa
and use more fully the resources of CIA in tapaieg these scnrclawat
Trade essociatione h.we exceational Opportunities and
fatalities for the collection and pmoduetion of intelligence on an
industry-wide basie and have matte notable oontribut ons. TYPIcel of
these associations have been the American Leon and Steel Institute, the
Machine Tool Builders Association. the National Indastrial Ilcefeeence
Aoard the National roreien Trade Council nod wanness others.
2. Weal SoureeeMpilabke 4n Wartiagt. In aeditian to the
taloa of some of the source!) of economic Intel ig nce
foregoing
available in peacetime, important additiaaal sources are available in
wartle. Among this are censorship, interce-ted MEW as, interrogae
tion of prisoners of war, analysis of captured enemy materiels,
OsyLnage and aerial reconnaiseanee,
a, ceesorship. As has already be -n indicated, censorihip is
the seers, of the gr atter aart of current economic intelligence in wara
time. The extent So Which the arincil.alle or aeents in illegal or
inimical transactions will go in their communicetions is almost in-
credible. Sometimes it is du* to careles*ness or ignorance. sore-
times the parties think they have suocessfelly concealed the signifi
canoe of the message sometimes they assume a Calculate risk, such is
the urgency of the communicetion; sometiaes the informatian is revealed
by collateral references of innocent parties; sometimes a clue is gleaned
from the mere fact of oorreepondence between certain parties even
though a private code is used; sometimes the WARD, of communications
fo
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
-3A.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
froz or to a given source is an indication to an alert censor or intent.
genes officer of sospicious eircumstances,
Whatever the explanatins, cnsorebi in Vorld Yar II epotted
... number of targets for the economic warfare batteries. Among these
were the following:
Obtained tnforn tion pthpotnti,w for the Air Toros tarets
of strategic and tactical importance; such as the exact engineer-
in details of the dams in the Rhine area and ,-revioulaY um:knows
defenses being constructed in the Mamma Forest of the Nether-
lands capitrA.
Obtained inforration conosrning trategic and critical
materials making it possible to lucrporo Allied war production
and weaken the enesiyt a production; one cPneorship item alone
enabling the War production Board to obtain $25,000,000 worth of
much needed textiles; other censorship items uncovered some
$2,000,000 worth of dragline dredges, galoshes, cocoa, cattle
hair and other diversified commoditiee.
In the ease of illicit truffle in c modities vitt rewcill
post between the United States an the near tart seized parcels
valued at more than $100,000, in addition to Which about 0200o00
worth of merchandise vas returned to the senders because of
violations of export licenses not vnzranting seizure.
Bnpoeed black market activities.
Discovered an reported vd latione of exrort license
controls; at one tine, accordin an official af the Foreign
i;conomic Administratin, SO% of the cases of violations of
export licenses were discovered throw7h censorship..
Aided in preventin, the outward flow nf technical &A.
?
Relied to imjement controls of the intAmaticnol transfer
of funds; one 7tonp of oensorehi items showing how !finds had
been provided to build up a stock of gooda at a Latin American
port for traneport by a German blockade runner, while in another
instance censorship mnterial Showed that a considerable anoint
of money sent to the Bank of China was intended for beneficiaries
in Japanese-Occupied tern. try.
Assisted in the enforcement of restrictions applicable
to the Peoclelmed List of Illodked nals; one of eensorehipis
greatest contributions in this restect being to snp-Ay data
indicating thrt listed parties were using intermediaries or
cloaks to meek their activities.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Detected commercial transactions which t1ht
in the Nests obta.inin7 vitally a:Wed commoe ties.
It is desirable for the eco-I inte1li7
a manual of instructions to censors and to ire4r, it curr,114
important to post economic intellience officers in the ri
ship control ofices. Rven so* with, thm vast volume of material handled
it is not feasible to be too disc intii in the first selection as
to what may or may not be of volue to the economic learfare ammo,. Accord?
ingly* a unit in the latter eo,lincy met further screen and analyre the
material and prepare copies or extracts or digests for the inter**
t 4
branches. Thousands of these are handled daily.
b. haluctallIsmaema In additinn to the info sub.
bitted by the censors, there are intercaltee, teleceetainicatt..n measages
betwaen enemy and neutral countries. teeny of these are in the el 4.
oiring only to be translated, while others are truenitted in private*
commercial* or official codes. Here aiTftin there is first sifting in
the communications agency and then in the intelligence enc y 7:110. final
procealne by the appropriate analysts.
c. Captured !Amor *aterial, From the b -inning of World War II
and in fact in the period between the wars,the tritish bed node careful
technical examination and analysis of Gorman materiel and invites and
found it an importent source of intallienee regarding the menet
supplies of raw materials* his use of substitutes* manufecturine processes,
technical Innovations and other factors in production. The laboratory
analysis in some respects was not unlike that of the Federal Duress of
Iuvestigationts crime detection labor-try, and frequently as fruitful
of cluas. It was not until 1943 that the leconomic Intellieence Division
of PIA undertook similar act tv1tic with regard to Ja-anese materiels.
rfr.p. re
3FIN
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Aaroved For Release : CIA-RDP64:00014A000100050002-5
rrior to that tth, the War end Navy Departments had been exp_mining
enemy materiel 1,rimarily with a view to determinitt: the military
operational potentialities and limitations of such equij.ment, and the
possibility of any improvement* that miAlt be introduced into our own
design. The economic intellitence now sought had to do with (1) sub-
stitutions revealing ihorteees (2) uality of workmanihip? (3) fetures of
design, especially changes.
d. 7risonex, of Wy1 While the first objective in the interrogar.
tion of prisoner* of war is to extract information of immediate military
ignificance it Is also true that maw of them are possible sources of
economic intelligence of great value. Due to lack of coordination and
sometimes of cooperation, the economic intelligence agencies in World
4ar II had only limited opportunity for interrogation of prisoners of
war. In some theaters, he-,ever, notably at Sew Delhi where the
Combined Services Departmental Intelligence Center (CSDI ) was organ-
ised, very important results were achieved. A valuable aid to intlltence
officers, . whether economic military, scientific, political, is an
Seonomic Interrogation Manual kept up to lete, and classified not only
by industries and regions, but according to the experience and competence
of the type of individual being interrogat,-11,
e. jetionage. Covert intellience in World *far II was the
resonsibility of the OSS. In this as in so mnuy other respects ther-
we for a time an unwillingness to make the intelligence available to
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
25X1B4d
25X1B4de
aalla
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
the Economic latelligence Division of ISA. After rim tock proper
security measures, however, the economic in lligenee obtained through
covert swans was made available to then. Since the establishment of
CIA with responsibility for this Was of intelliaence aollection overseas
this is a valuable source of voluntary reports as well as reports in
response to specific economic intelligence requirements.
f. Aerial pecalanalepame. Great progress was made during and
after World war II In the development of aerial photograrhy. The new
techniques of making mosaics anr. the saecialited skills in interprets..
tion have greatly increased the value of this Intelligente* scasciallY
for economic purposes. It is frequently possible to assess-with fair
Salenragr new industrial developments the extant of industrial activity
at a particular facility, the nature of bomb dsmans, Condition of agri-
cultural crops, congestion in transportation gateway's, and character
and direction of transporttion movements.
g, Quatzsigaw, Coverage. A Ptetoril iecordaon
was established in OBS with the idea of becomina central collection
for all govarnmeat agencies. This uniaae collection is now in CIi, and
the recommendation bps ben modetY that it be maintained as a 0oomzion
service to IAC and non IAC agencies.
h. ladernational lOolleneet pf Sannomiat intent:awe, rmanoalc
warfare , even more than any other phase of the er, effort squires
coabined, or parallel and coordinated operations among allies. In
ononoolc warfare, the measures and the weapons are laraely the same and
:loys0 from a world vide viewpoint. /t is the Saila firms
and tMiv1i.uls to be blacklisted by the allies for tradiav with the
enemy, the same ships to be navicerted or interceated, and the same
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - AFproved For Rwatase : CIA-RDP61-00014A000100050002-5
commoditiesto be p?pti
consistent with seeuritr.
and to conserve manpower
divisio
h of th
can heme more complete and
valid economic intelligence than would otherwise be possible. All sof*
intolliconce mast be caret:11y ermined and evaluated for subjective
elemws and national bins. Another important warning to be observed
is not to permit US: ageneiee to compete one with anther in securin
intelligence from allied seaxees -ad at the same time make it possible
for allied agencies to play off one US agenoi a4minvt another. Perhapo
the opeportion betwoen the Pritiih )inietr of Economic Warfare and the
succet,sion of U5 agencies in this field, heginrdni: with the Adniniatretion
of X21:014 Control and continuing through the nA, wee the finest elmowle
of allied 000perp,tion Which the war afforded. As early as March 1
the Administrator of Mrport Control posted an officer in the KEW in London
and in 1942, after our entry into the war, this liaison was expLInded into
Adomoale warfare Division of the American Embassy. Combined ocasittesa
were established for all econonic warfare opemtions.
B. krndegtivv Inv mg considered, in barest ontl..ne and suggestion,
he requirements of economic wrfare intelllence and the !our ev for
collection of the information on which it is based, it is order now to
look at the methods of prooeseine ttuA informptior into intelligence.
Aanin, ms In the case of the
noted that in the event of Re
is and the sources, it IR to be
d even now with the aecelerat-
leg tempo of the economic wr, sinittcant chanes will he neees7ory
in the processing end rodettoa of the empportine intelligence. Now,
more than ever, time is of the essence. Comprehensive treatment of the
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
43
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPe4-00014A000100050002-5
subject1 the uuer of ornisqtton and
?
of
style, complete coordiestion ell elwrye desirable - are less important
now than speed the gree est possible e& In distribu ion to the using
agape, consietent with accuracy of the evaluation and sundness of the
estisiate.
The stops in the procesat&w of luforsw,
a,e U.l1y Identified somenhst as
synt
o ?
aifttion, Indexing,
an$y cia, interprete t ion, evaluaWn. ?Alt steps frequently
occur in thRt order, slthouebl of coane:e t sesserily so. Xealuation
and interpretation nay be necoosary at varioas ;Maces in the process
fro e: the source to the finishai product. Classification and ind sing
hey. a once greater significanee then these words usuelly connote. The
eleesifY/ag aad indexing are done not merely for future commies'% reference.
They serve an immediate pu , a that A' metohlne u the. lease of the
/
ides
Ji-saw r lo into an I tif le Intelligence picture. Interpretation
and evaluktion are bot more difficult And more irporUnt than is the
peacetime ..rnosse. CensorshiD submissioes and ittercepted messnees?
frequently tr,..Ansle ed rmeforel4n languet, and even ehen not in coda
frfulueetly have a jer6on faniliar only to the parties concerned, Sut
after the message Is made istelliglelee its. significance Gen usually be
Interpreted end ovelueed only la a eynthesis of Oho, messages between
the awls points r the seme prtles, or with reforence to the leNme or
*talar transactions.
And as the nets and the source nd the tethode of processing
eacinonic intelligence uadergo ra ietichesee in the transitive PPM a
peacetime to a tewrillne enenemY, so does the fore 4Uch the rcialvWn
takes. As stated in the Introductions while there will be a grevter need
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
.44.
Sanitized - Aaroved For Release : CIA-RDP6r00014A000100050002-5
than ever for rerpoYta ane eetliewtee, periodicel amd special in pport
of economic warfare policy and operrtions there will be an even greater
requirement for current intelligence noreiida and spot reports. *an.
titative27? these latter forms will oonstiVute by far the reater part
of the production.
D. ipitrputionk of 110,1Tillpuco. It is to be noted that "distribution
is used here rather than the usual wort 'dissemination. The distinction
Is important. "Diseeninv-tioe has always been 'IA ine
to and unfortunate
ford for the distribution of inte1117ence. Aocording to Oster, 'dis-
seminate' moans *Wow broadcast, to epeerd broadcast; to weed, dis-
perse scatter," While "distribute to deal out to aloe. Certain-
ly it is not desirable to smatter
lreed broadcast secret int111-
gene*. Not only for security reasons vouid. it b wow to disseeleate
trafillagOnme. dieseminete information and Intelligence to analyst,
and others Who are not concerned with the wdbjeet of that -aril-collar
intelligence is a needless waste of their time It also males or delays
the dietribetiwi to -someone oleo who does reluire it. The Ideal diatr
tution Is to deliver As promptly as poseibe to every analyst all the
info tion he needs and nothing elsVto deliver to ecth nil n &Tncy
the intelligence Whit& it reayares and nothing else; and within ermh
1w:env to distribute the intellience to tech officer Who requires it
arid to no others. Only the lase irtnt naterisl thoul, be 'circuited.
Within the agency all incoming intercepts, reports from oversee, and
other inforuation r qniring action should be duplicetd, or digested
and then depliceted end. ditritcuted as fast as received throughout
the
and nicht - to the responsible branches, with one eopy
designated AA the action copy.
SEC1ET
?
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Alb
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPe00014A000100050002-5
ittit
btxefitintt-c.
tt t oreh roratareb
tib. o1.irlorot .ao opootili so I:0101b1* to
th Iriduol or initiridwl taw roviro it,
is th? Mimeo* I..:rocoos etelpitiktis.
saw
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For ReW114IA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
V.
A. rma 2rttioh Mararientwt. Prior to the outbreek of *rill War I!
an 1 September, 1939, the 7tritteh CamniWe of Imperial Defense bed developed
eonlote plane for the condnet of economic !:1,nrfare nM for the crention
of the min1etr7 of Baaavala warfare, Maim plan* Inelndea the they nod
orani7.ation of **anemic warfare, the weapons, otv't the 7,roeeduree, with
drafts of the necessary legislation and orders in oouncil, a pin of
organisot on for the Anietry of Econoeic 'larfre? and for the itnplemonm
totion of the various economic warfar measures hy the aklroprlate
of the :lavernment. It mite a 'Ilan more honored in the observanee than in
the bra. The lecialation WRS enacted witheOl'ohenge on the dr1 war
WV declared, and the Ministry of Reencmic rfare sprene Into biArwl
into action, The only tortant ohance that oecurred to the early life
of the nintatr7 wns one of special pertinence to this stud,. in the
berinninc the ATF coneisted of an intence Nrrartment, rim** Depart.'
nen*, and throe operationftl departriantersto nelaticho, rviT44 and
IlLtlsolel Pressure, with a T.,e,31 1*.mrtrmnt ,rstablishments (.1Aftlhifitroe
Steel )epartment. The Finn* Department we te re plant oaverinfr the
111,Aa fioll of *cosmic rfare, and the Intellience Dearteent wma
,)matud to eentrAlge all the intellirenen. wor.. However, the *operation
O f from action, oven mor, the exietenee of a separate
plannitv, body between the two, .proved unmetiofamtort, When ttmm wa of the
+Iacono*, oction frequently hadtc be tokken?while, as one offieiel e.
pr+wed It, the Plninning lad Intelligence Departnente "were runntir
betted twine: to catch u with the 'Alm," rimmatne, trtmllironoo tsd atin
were theratore ntacI: tall the divisir of work triA41 lmrPm1I on a
torritrinl ane fnrttonm7 bnole. Plmnr:W, Int01114:ne*, nod motion
CRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - 4-proved For Raease : CIA-RDP61--00014A000100050002-5
vars, of col
till recopnirodc ntial elements but they were
ined. in the opprovrlete territorio functioual derartnent.
Certain intelligenc* bolctione were pertori in the "Pecords
tics Department* a.s ghom in the attaehed Chart Arrendix
Deluded the Consorahir Section SW.* Pecord Section, illetklist
ions and Statistics SecttAw. Peen in these ***Woe, however, ?tannin
were perfermeds In the Vlooklist SeeWo., for eimmle, vms the
im of the StatutoryAsnrl
This close integration of intelli ncs jnrtin 07eretions III
wartime i sigtificant of the trinsition from reacettio to wnrtime re-
on
guiX5flt5, Thb11 half of the work of the intellience 1,114
tha *overt ooneisted largely of instrucqs to the various ac:'Ineiers
of the $:over.nt o execute specific measures . te the AdmArnity to intercep
.,hi, to 7,ort LicnsInDepartmant to deny a license o the Orrd of
()mama in the control o vt3etre: under the rrnt Vet,
Ion to make premmptive llurchnseo
etc,. He most importnt opertirs performed by the KW were necotiation
to the United Zia-dom Comm
X
e Agreement?, a reepoosibilitY uhicn .14- delee-ktod to
b7
the lOr.ipn Cffiea, _ae? the r1ntetmttor of the nvicvyrt gystam.
caay ws the Vinistry of Rico lc v-rfare the en fel' the eoordiheep
tion of economic warfare it was in effect the rconoolo Intelliflonee
Avow for the entire (Tovernment. All of Ris Majesty,* rep eentottees
NAID OrHERS
abrolYtf-diplomntic and7consnlar rereventetteeer-the Ceneorahlp, meld
the armee force, reported direotly to the MY on matters of economic
fnrC4
7or centur
* n rRet maritime psoJor he relied on the
de, in the broke! definition, 46 the rA*Incirel feeture of its mrmnd
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
etrtialy, Fast of techniines, most of the terminology, as ritteh
In their oriJa as oomen 1w1 plendin:- or the 1,7mg1ieh lemma!, itself. Ail
of this le not to sco that the US 414 not plat an ilsortent part in economic
wears in :'Noth world wars. In preclusive !paying, in nerottations with
the Latin-American countries 4n4? moot important of an, in the, control of
exrorts from this "arsonl of AemocrrJoy$ the 1.7,u1ttily had the mjar
rrAe. Ana* qorld 4ar II and is the present *sold mke there is no in.
dieation that Great 3ritain, no or subtle .tlently, dli plea* any arstiA
reliance on **onomie lexfp,ree the moment, seerWnly? the lerWlish *nosh%
is on .reE,Int economic reclmvery rtther ?%hnnultimute military eocurity. The
ceJev reetenelhility, nceorOingly, iv-for eoonomic fv,neti,ms in the cold
130. economic warfare ia the event of hostilitite rests vitt' the ma
a, zip Us klxLerionnt. The '-lanassion of .enclos . the Aeministrator
of 4x?ort Control, the boonocle Defense '',,oard, tho ',i.oard of Ilconomic
faze, the uffiee of veenotlit 1N,rfar nad finally the Foreign );Iconomic
ALOrinistratio. end concurrently vith this the Co(lodinator of Itfornatien
which 't.iscrele e& the Cffice of Str;Ae-ic !::sa-vicos tolls a *tory of
1.:dz.rov cation, in eon trr,st to the 1rtttsh RAvanne planet Ur, :acth the
,tA and the CSS had iatelliehee rn operylloril reeronsit:ilitir:s in the
field of economic warfare, but after 5 vAri&. of duplinfAio juris.
Laute-dwie
aictiorAal dieputeell.icelle,4rvIed In the eollectiot, analysis. Warl, eirlicae
tion of ecocccie intellt7ence, sae worked mt satisfactory mous vi.
vsndi?
'.%oonocio wr:;:rft,re intolii
le '4?ar IT bemnn with the establiehm
vvot in 1940 of 6 Projects Section in the office of the Adrdnitratvr of
mixtrt Control !Mit lvter bectme esesreh Division, with en intent-
otnee Sootion in the Neenomie Define Nyard. T%ortly fterT'IvAl Narhc,r,
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
this 7ioar1. now eat1ed the Posrd of Economic Varfore, divide this
:Research Diviel,n into four geographical divisions ?. ituropowl. Tiritieh
Akpire. Ameriftr ASmisphere and Per Eest;t rash division hme. an analysis
sestina and an intelligence section. Ay the end of kpril 1942, the Intel.'
liFAinee sections of the four goo?rmoThlo5,1 divioions wore comtioM into a
Meoltomie intialionece rilvision, it etvuld be noted that this
divialon w,* concerned primarily with procuremsnt of intelWence. The
wrk oi analysis, with or witboak positive reoommoention, rvs the rem
eponsioility of the Office of Beonomic rfare Analysis, It should rise
oe noted that &TV aid its snecf:soor nzenois* also had a Trude Intell100
OAce DiV1411.12 Which hat the responsibility of proonring, analy71ng vind
*raring economic intellicenee to the exrort 'legating Procodure?
fc_10,Jia6 a visit of the Chief of the i,00nomio intelltlince Division to
London in July 1942 the 6007100.12 intolWeoce function was hroni4ht eloper to
op: lions ar makine the tomato Intellionoe Division e prt of a nowly
organi7ed Roomy :iranch. The fenotiomlof the Intent:linos Division ,prtre
desorlued ea fonolose
e.The conTAIinc, slave/3)1er, it ivutin; of information
ootoined from censorship interoonts, forelegs radio broadorsts.
ftm pdbliontions, Iritioh AMOr:41411 business firms with
foreign intezpAe. refugees, returw74 travelers, foreign rerre4-
sentatives AM. other uovornment %grannies and ell 6-,urces other
than eiriona$14
?b. ?no answrerin,7 of s77,asifie reeker-ts for ecomatic
informaWa ?rpm other Divieins of the Irv, the Armed fame%
and the Ministry of goomoric Warfkrel
*o. The oontinual 'marsh for now sources of economic intelWomoet
The indenont,7, routiar rad eofw-tvrdiwr of ell reet?inteet,
oonfidential, in secret docucents which ortrinG.te in the
Zoerd or erre to the Aoard from other souromit
aGRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Al7proved For Release : CIA-RDP6T-00014A000100050002-5
UAW. on 30 Sovelber. 1942, the Assistant Director, Office loonomio
warfare Analysis, !oar d of Scononic varfere, stated the eiwence of the total
ligenee function to be *to find see( exploit all possible scarcer of Ofteeni*
inforartion useful in the work of emomonic wrfers nod to mobilise this
information in much a way tUt it makes the maximum possible contribution to
the wort( of the Board.. The. Xeonomie intelli7ence Dteision live beTriLY
ever afterwards, or rather to the end of the mar and the liquidation of 1T44
4 At thm rrmeent
time therm te no flTicis of Vcomonic
ucl, at lther the deport.
mental or nationAl level, the Offlo, of Intellience- 'Rese.2.,rch pee the Office
of Librarian end Intelarenee Acrulsition 4n the rienartnent of Stite deal with
all eases' of intelliennee but with einiesphasit on the politidel end
eeenonie, The Aetivities of other egenclee in r,.tters connected with economic
intellicence were reviewed in IV.A eplre4 In the 'Clifioe of neports ii retinetes
of CIA. there Is an Romanic, Division coneletine of twenty.five persons, of
Whom three are in the retonamlx '.1rfere Bre.reshoend 4.11 `i',feononiet 1,rnth In the
ZeArkmen Vnrop*RnDtrtThn, leo consistin of lect'w terAy.five lereerm. Ant
there. Is no comerehfinelve eoenenin irt,741igence ornt ttn *11.4121410d to :toll
with both strzAeeic end tactica economic letellijenee either at the denarl-
n7Aionel 1074.
?he: Interacency Stu ei for Nobill7elion Planeta7: on Veport Contrels, on
Mere! ?731, 100) nee the followilr rovoilltectio?(i
litt in believed that naniurt.0 hanel.W of exr,crt trpntrols can tw carried.
ot only Athin tho fremework of tote,. economic warfare, and. It to therefore
recommended than on economic warfare comer with overritine powrn over All
foreien tri,notqct nettritie tbLt&t tel.. endin the str,'fine
and operatioe ?f such an rk7ortry, %h. '-'reeWnt ahr;u114. delientte aelneine currently
responeDle In there field's end mh,-A1a proWe for an intrrin cloorllintinr, anther.
tty to anrTy forward the neessenry inmedinte eetleo. nthto Immll eh W.71o0Y
which mula analuar- reArrant mIrtivitie an ',11rsonrol trnyInferred fron existing
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPeA-00014A000100050002-5
aeAncles. plans rn poltcte stbUsh 1n the Interim rsriod could be rut
tnto effect rrourtly.
If an 74conoeic *errs ',teeny is est.tbitehed, It vill reontira intelli -once
support from the CIA, and will oleo re-tire an ittellif'enes elvition within
Its own orgnnization. An Cffiee of leonomio !t. to *oitbin C/A omld.
disohar-e CIA's responsibilit7 for teenomia varfw,-r, intolli sacs at the nationei
level p,ed coold tarnish the nacie s of In lett/lir:encl. division for tho "canonic
4arfors Aelm4,4
11, , t ? ft *AN "it Atteoi Aetiim the
oatline of a '[svposed pUm of orant7ation of an Office of teonomic
It is not offered as a rigid patter% .n.d is not oannlete in detail. Th4re ere
nonir 'awls in whioh yeah on organisation crnld he constitted. This t one. The
attett hnq bees made to 41vo consideratto to It Mmleion of labor ia aoacr&.
ands with the r res!'onsibilitieto and with ft, rvd to n reasonOle !Iran
of control. It will he noted that there are lift divisions 7Perlienp1, Con17c4
Ints11tenoo Support, information Control, 7nblic7,tiolls, and AdminietrAtive.
'hi* reoommenantion le haerd. on thr Iostalate th,lt mot% ocommic intent once,
mad partimularly eooncnic wears lnteliternoo, involvos reTIonm14
and fonotiorel cousidoratiore. rr7inn&I branChes will b otrierrted prlm
nartly vith the politica fine geheral economic conditions invlsi.h r..1or.? While
tho
0om7ADditr brAsohes toill be coneernee, with, portioninr aomnoitins, the
Latellistoo 9sprort branahos vith the apitcti of the intelli-eano to the
varioue srecifio foreim edonomic operations. Tho other three
Infornetion Cortrol, ;Atalirm!tiona, ane Administrativ te.r' with the
tornel 4asting of the Cffice. A3 will br avparont from the discatzton of the
various divistons Which fellows, eleee conabortion betwom them
necessAry. liost of the Intellience rodnotiors cosTrehenstve studios
And survais or evaluated spot infomation, ooncerns et1c of the divisiors,
SECIET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP6t-00014A000100050002-5
52
but una,-411 in different FAspewts.
I, ,:ileAprAl Diwtsioji, The 7n.4,7101, IvIre -roposod, wolld
be divV.o1int thrae '.A"ntrAches, ,totaine-, with Allied, ?now, and 71-,ntr-.1 arez,v4
In morti.a? foreign 000rtrits Ara oent,V,tred to themt mna in aAle
matters the respective ,7roura cram be dt 'It with -4 An ,InItitX. In Pthnr rnttarss
the rvLtins it o dellt with eccrdinrly er-oh reAonr,1 brtneh
Airdivici into the vmrions "country riess." he count,r7 leaks romA the rforimqn1
Sronolla woulzt concerned ,..,rirri74,7 with the politico-Icenomic ns.acto If
inte1li?eA04, "Ac with conoi conlitions in It?o rooyaettte ecnntr.07:m
;ic'Itto with mora 2',F,rt of crAh of tha teroin economic uctivitics 'Istod
under tho Intellienot 3u ort ?moth.
A.visloao Th.f Nonolity DtT1SLn wcull tt iviled Into
brenehas amoording to a zrouin7. of the rrincir.01 calamolities, for szArple,
iron .9.31 eteel, nonforrous mincrols? lAtrolemn pro,luotv, food and agriculture,
machirt, chemicals, electronics, eloatric pc-Aaron:1 tr7insno7taWo Inuipm4mt.
The oemloliv branches wool deal both with the reorectile raw srAt7.11ll and
mall the correspn'Anr.,; industries .rlyt industrial products. Scm77-01Itia not
1,4 .ulnj of theat grrAke world bo h:a1,61 the no7:t nThrly rifltet
brAnah. jiood 411,zulture, trehe for ac4mTle? woul LhnnAlt fmrset
testi' 1.Aborl the CtomicA Arlmoh wzuld Ineltez -.J.,,hruce--.J100-411 17
items, IMOT4 VIVA one branch would be int-tretted. Steel rails von1A 7-.;.,z
tribilW of the Inn and Steel 'ranch as to preqctien ratters, nnd of the
TronvertatlAt 15;uipmen% Aroma 410 to transportation rmlnirmtnt7, 7h, Comodit7
!t woe be rostorsible fOT the 7roductit of basic commodity :Audios and,
=rib laPortnntlY. for Mt adaptation of waeh stualJTe to rTort situtlxne. It
would aleo be rolpeasibla for the evO.uation of carront sod spot infornption
involvin6 oommoUties.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
-1111
Sanitized - Ariproved For RiaISUse : CIA-RDP6Z-00014A000100050002-5
Intellizmyvt vkr Pivisiopv In resronso to re-nA to from the
amine ri?:uffez rud on its ?me initiativo, the Intelliaenct Su-port D5vition
would dovc3.cp requirementF for int-111:-,.:nr,-. It would coo ?rte m4th the
tp rorrifJo reflor,..1 And ccwot brrzchrortprofteitr an! evnlm,tinr ftt 1.
11,enco. It woud. *bit the liaison of the (1insir(of Ydoononic intellirmee with
the corres?om!in divisions of the economic wnrfpre Age-Cy. If, rAs tor.o the ease
with tho Finistry of roonenic ''arfa:elane to a 11,1r,o, extont our own
Eoard of -conumic 'arfare and ite ottreftecr m'enciese lutellirrince hhIlsold
merged with ?I.:angora in ecvnonic wi-fp.rtite those hTftChr n1.dbocorr
Jaz. uatit,s or ,,rould 0 102-0.:ed -r1th their oppoolte numbare in the opPrJrk?-.
agencies.
4.
This dividn woad lm renponsiblo
for the reeelt dintritution to the aprroprirge brnehso cf all ineenirle
raw information from censorship, irtv,rov:ted mess/woes Yorol6n bro.r'c. te. and
public7.to? iatererattofts, rm0 othA7 esmrce? and for the recol7t
distriatioa filla of intalIicenco reports and eitiates fro other orrice,
Of CIA eat from other sources. it mould maintnin the lcilo librrry rnA
and records. It would 171 resporelele also .or the eneral distribut1x,n. of
intsliismcm PUalontiont of tOs Cffice other thtn theWtranenittod !.irectIY
Ar the IntelliJance Support Division to the uziw: ngrencios, rocM?T't of
the t000nt inVcroatios sad its diatributioc to the appropriate branches
of the Ctfice of Economic Intr'lligence is ono of the most intere:Ainr. 'nd important
fienctio tho entire economic wear* opemtion. As dencried in IV.:% this
branch ?,1eul1 receive the thousands of items daily from conser17,hip? intercepted
animate, me ottvir sources, and would duplicate, or dlgost and then luarliorto,
and distribute to the avreprinte branch all Incomin tntel1%p e. !le PiveolPt?
Reprwituttion? and Distribution Erfurt& woW work. alone the clock* in orcler
SEGR-t-"r
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
.154-
that this important incomtnr 1,4ormntion coull he distributed 1.2.ne4Inte1y cad
oiwiltnneonqly to thp intoreetc4 brefoohe ith one ecti,n cory to thn tr,Alah
with the or;qtrent domimmt imt-rect. Then* items ere numbersa And the lnterePtted
braache (len secular cement or conlnrrenoe in 71rolo:frA action by ti'lcrhone.
In blckliotine, crzort licenoin4:, mud nnviccrt eTrovnls, or tteninln, theec
ce, uenal74, cleared in volumc in deny ricAlogc of the Irrroprinto committoel6
5. Zalatagigar4Maisa. The PUbliceloae rivision would edit and
rubl oh the periodical ani special rely)rte of the Office of 7monemic Intel-
ligence.
5. liglantrntive Divioda. ?his nivimion, with branches on 7ersonnol,
office anager2ent, emi locurity control, wo-11 h-ve re7onstbi1ity for those
fmnctione. wabject, of collree, to the responsibility Of the oorreeponding unite
et thc Arency lewq.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
1. Induetriel %liege of the Armed Torcoo
!lther Definitionot
Gordon snd DengorfiV. in 7t, RidenWADO4, N.T. Herner Prothors,
1947: "Tho nos of dirloMItic, oconorAo, finenciel, ,n4 somf,ttuvms militory
moons to ant the Axis off from the enrollee they flooded: to firht, end to
destroy their economic powor throughout the world."
Dictionary of Sq4orn rAmosmies, N.Y., Public Affair, Pres*. 19491
"a prooess of conflict in which measures ere employed to throttle an amomyle
trodo, destroy hi* foreign credit, and/or prevent him from acquiring marrlies
necessary or the prosecution of %tortoni,. Among the !Peownres need In thie
connection aro export restriction*. forein funis control, blackliotinp of
national* of foreign countries, the purchasing of gloods to 1)rovent other*
from getting them, end, novel blookedes ?
25X1C8bRDPE
50002-5
vi I am Y. tlliott.ho41 satiop Flannine and the itj locurity.
Public Affairs DulLAin R. 81, July 1Ot "Teonemic rfare ..,. hes many
definitions ranerally *peeking, economic uarfari! 1, the 114' of
dinlomotic, economic, mad financiol power in posno or in war dirocto4
toward the weakening of enemy resources, and the +strengthening of 01100f!
own position. .... it is nonmilitary in cherector escort in actual war
when blockading and strategic bombing take it into the field of military
operations --- but it* objective* ere the some as the objectives of militorY
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5
Sanitized - Allproved For RegggIA-RDA-00014A000100050002-5
-a-
victories. In time of war, the nrineirni th-atre of economic warfare
hos been the rrmtrel pewl!. In tiP of 7eene. its theatre is universal1
but rartieuler emehosie is placed on the sources on whir* the nw7, Alsrengis.
and on the source, from which he would himi to orevate his anringbonrdo of
offense. rxesn'les of economic warfare ueed 17 the Allies in World war II
were the blockade, export and import oentrols. 71reelnsive buying, the
safo-heven program. and the birkekliet teohnique. 77xamp1eot of economic vim-
fare eurrently being used by the Western rywors ery ex7ort control on
glittery items organist the goviet end Ito Stellites in rest-vest trade;
the economio aid Ilrograms; AAA technical and ca'tial cosistance prOrrnme."
a.
3. Note of locrotnrr, trAnOtript A'bs,edor
4. RItchle. 7. The Nevicert **tee Darinp: the
25X1A2g
at London, Oct. ln 1915.
Carnegie 7ndowneent for International Peace19.
6. Renort of the var "'rode Poard. 1l171919.
6.
7* ibid. ?,
6. rp. 301, 39.
14 !cr. 1fashington* D. C.
p? 7.
wash,. V. C. GPO 1930. pr 266-9.
9. N5qT4 floe. 119 "Csnworhsir Yobilkyation PAlaanipc.s (lonfidential) Jul
r 74 3,
10. rsign 7tionom1c Administration.
for trawl* Purre10%,* (fteret) An enel,
inteilirene!rn Mvition of the !wird of ?venom
Varfare end rorsign roan-onto Adainistratiln 1942
11. Did, 11, 57
25X1C8b
r.rjenep of the V00
erlk. Office of veonolo
944. p. 00.
14. Torolen
15. Ibid. r.
16. MP
ttleurne
omie Administration. *Net. *
7
rotenone rarfstre
EC RET
9.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100050002-5