TAIWAN ENABLING ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000100050010-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 8, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if I I thank the Senator
might interrupt the Senator from Illi- also, for yielding time.
nois, the time now is reserved for the,.:
Senator from Virginia, (Mr. HARRY F.
BYRD, JR.) for 1 hour preceding the vote
on his amendment to S. 245.
Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent, then, that excerpts
from Interpretative Rulings 33, 56, and
70 of the Ethics Committee be printed
in the RECORD so there will be no doubt
about the intentions of the Senate and
the consequences of its action today if we
approve this resolution. Conflicts of in-
terest, any appearance of conflicting in-
terests will remain prohibited.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
INTERPRETATIVE RULING No. 33
The propriety of outside employment is
governed by Rule 45. No employee, regardless
of salary level, may receive compensation
by virtue of influence improperly exerted.
Nor may any employee engage in any outside
business or professional activity or employ-
ment for compensation which is inconsistent
or in conflict with the conscientious perform-
ance of official duties.
INTERPRETATIVE RULING' No. 56
It prohibits Members and employees from
engaging in any outside business or pro-
fessional activity or employment for com-
pensation which is inconsistent or in con-
flict with performance of official duties.
INTERPRETATIVE RULING No. 70
Paragraph 6 of Rule 45 on conflicts of
interest was intended to severely restrict the
practice of any profession (for compensa-
tion) by Senate employees. That paragraph
states in pertinent part that no Member or
(full-time) employee compensated at a rate
in excess of $25,000 per annum shall; a)
affiliate with a firm or partnership, b) per-
mit his or her name to be used by such, or
c) "practice a profession for compensation
to any extent during regular office hours of
the Senate office in which employed."
Mr. STEVENSON. With the assur-
ances of the Senators and that under-
standing, I have no objection to the reso-
lution which they have offered.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, I shall yield 5 minutes of my time
to the Senator from Alaska.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. was recog-
nized.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, I shall be glad to yield 5 minutes
of my time to the Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, we
thank the distinguished Senator from
Virginia and express our deep apprecia-
tion to the Senator from Illinois, chair-
man of the Senate Ethics Committee,
for his forthright and forceful state-
ment.
Mr. STEVENS. I join the Senator from
New York in thanking the Senator -from
Illinois for his statement. I point out for
the RECORD that the rules that are in
effect concerning conflicts, disclosure,
and in particular, the association of a
Senator or employee with firms or pub-
licly held corporations, remain in effect
notwithstanding the postponement of
the date in rule XLIV which will be
brought about in this resolution.
TAIWAN ENABLING ACT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the hour of 11 o'clock
having arrived, there will be 1 hour of
debate on the amendment of the Senator
from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.)
to be equally divided between the Sena-
tor from Ohio and the Senator from
Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will state the bill by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A bill (S. 245) to promote the foreign
policy of the United States through the
maintenance of commercial, cultural, and
other relations with the people on Taiwan on
.an unofficial basis, and for other purposes.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, a
parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I should like to in-
quire, what disposition was made of the
matter we have been discussing for the
last hour?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Senator from
New York informs his friend from Ari-
zona that the, matter will be taken up
following the disposition of the bill be-
fore the Senate at this moment, which I
believe is to be at noon today. We shall
resolve this other matter by 12:30 p.m.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct. The vote on disposition of the
Byrd amendment to the bill will occur at
12 noon. Then the Senate will vote at
12:30 on Senate Resolution 93.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Senate will vote
by 12:30, I believe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Not later
than 12:30, the Senator is correct.
TAIWAN ENABLING ACT
The Senate resumed consideration of
the bill, amendment No. 93.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, I yield myself 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
pending business of the Senate isamend-
ment No. 93 to S. 245.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Is not the
pending matter the amendment offered
by the Senator from Virginia?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it is,
the Senator is correct.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, the pending amendment states
this :
It is the sense of the Senate that approval
by the Senate of the United States is
required to terminate ' any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and
another nation.
Mr. President, in the heat of debate
last evening, some of the opponents
S2297
attributed to this amendment provisions
which are not incorporated in any way
in the amendment. Let me state what the
amendment does not do.
First. The amendment does not
express either approval or disapproval
of the President's decision to give notice
under article X of the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and
the Republic of China.
Second. The amendment does not take
from the President any power he now
has.
Third. It does not prevent the Presi-
dent. from expressing the intent to
abrogate a treaty.
Fourth. It does not affect in any way
the notice the President has given under
article X, which states:
Either party may terminate.the treaty one
year after notice has been given to the other
party.
Fifth. It does express the view of the
Senate that, under the Constitution, the
President cannot unilaterally nullify
a treaty.
I state again the precise amendment
on which the Senate will be voting at the
hour of 12 noon. The amendment reads
as follows:
It is the sense of the Senate that approval
by the Senate of the United States is
required to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and any
other nation.
This, Mr. President, in the view of the
Senator from Virginia is an extremely
important matter. It goes far beyond the
question of Taiwan. The United States
has many very important mutual
defense treaties with many different
nations. The Senate of the United
States, by its action today in voting
down the Byrd amendment, if, indeed,
the Senate takes that action, would be
establishing a precedent by saying to the
Nation and to subsequent Presidents
that a President, acting alone, can
terminate a treaty that has become law
as a result of approval by a two-thirds
vote of the Senate of the United States.
Mr. President, in the discussion yester-
day, the able senior Senator from Loui-
siana (Mr. LONG) called attention to ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution. Article VI
reads thusly:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land, and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Senator LONG then very aptly stated
this:
The impression I gather from that article
is that a treaty signed by the President and
ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Sen-
ate is the law, and if you have a later law
to the contrary, it would supersede that law.
In case of conflicting laws, whichever law
is the latest of the two would prevail. That
is the impression that I have.
Then, he continues :
If you want to repeal a law, you have to
do it with another law. The Executive can
make agreements, but he is sworn to uphold
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It seems to me that the'distinguished
Senator from Virginia has raised a very
nice, interesting, important and far-
reaching question, and the constitutional
implications are broad. They are broad.
It is a question that I think should be
carefully considered.
The Foreign Relations Committee has
indicated that it would hold hearings on
this matter. I suppose that the distin-
guished' Senator from Virginia (Mr.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR.) would certainly
avail himself of that opportunity on such
occasion.
The constitutional questions are so
broad, Mr. President, that I would hope
that the distinguished Senator from Vir-
ginia, having raised the issue, having ex-
pressed a strong viewpoint on it, having
made a case, from his standpoint, that is
worthy of consideration and attention
for hearing and study, would consider
withdrawing the amendment and not
the law himself, so that he cannot repeal
a law just by saying "I just don't like the
law; I am not going to abide by it.
The Senator from Louisiana continues :
If one of us tried to do that, we would be
put in jail. They would say, "You don't have
the right to decide what law you are going
to abide by or what law you are not going
to abide by."
The Senator from Louisiana continues
in that same vein, pointing out that a
treaty, being a law, cannot be set aside
unilaterally by one branch of the Gov-
ernment, or cannot be set aside unilater-
ally by the President of the United
States, whoever he may be.
Mr. President, I realize that there are
many who feel that the President should
have that prerogative, but under the
Constitution I think it is very clear that
he does not have it.
The purpose of this amendment is not
to focus on Taiwan, but the purposes of
this amendment is to focus on the broad-
er problem of what happens to future
treaties made by the United States, rati-
fled by the Senate, with other nations of
the world.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Will the Senator
yield for a question?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I yield to
the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I think it would be
helpful if the members of the Foreign
Relations Committee, including the
chairman, would indicate to those of us
who support the Senator's amendment
whether they would approve of the Pres-
ident abrogating or terminating the
treaty in which it created the United
Nations or created NATO.
I think this is rather important that
the chairman, or ranking member, or any
member, say that they want that condi-
tion to prevail in this country.
If the Senator would further yield, be-
cause he just referred to the words of
Thomas Jefferson which are in our man-
ual, and we are supposed to live by that
manual.
I would like to read what the Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story, a very
? scholarly jurist, wrote in his commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United
States in connection with treaties:
This joint possession of the power-
Speaking of the President-
affords a greater security for its just exercise,
than the separate possession of it by either.
It continues:
(Iit is too much to expect, that a free
people would confide to a single magistrate,
however respectable, the sole authority to
act conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon
the subject of treaties ... there is no Ameri-
can statesman, but must feel, that such a
prerogative in an American president would
be inexpedient and dangerous.
Now, I think that might be right at
the heart of what the Senator from Vir-
ginia is talking about and which we do
not seem to be able to convince the
members of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee is valid. ?
I might further comment that while
the Constitution is not too precise in
this field, the words of the Founding
Fathers are bound with precision in re-
lation to the power of -the Senate in
treaties and the power of the President
in treaties.
Story adds, in words having equal
bearing upon repealing or making
treaties:
The check, which acts upon the mind from
the consideration, that what is done is but
preliminary, and requires the assent of other
independent minds to give it a legal con-
clusiveness, is a restraint which awakens
caution, and compels to deliberation.
To me, that is all we are trying to do.
We want to solve this question, can a
President of the United States wake up
in the middle of the night, without talk-
ing to anybody, and say, "Well, that
treaty, I don't like that treaty, let's end
NATO, let's end our association with
Japan, let's end any of the treaties we
have," and we have to stand by and put
up with it.
We have no power under the argu-
ment advanced yesterday by members
of the Foreign Relations Committee, no
power to act.
I think it is very necessary that the
Senator's amendment is put into this
measure, which I consider to be a good
piece of legislation, much better than
we originally had.
. I think we need the teeth to keep
consistency with the desires of most
members of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that I know to bring back to the
Congress those powers which left this
Congress during the last 40 years.
Here we are playing around with
something that has never been done in
the 201-year history of our country un-
til this President took it on himself to
do it.
I just wanted to make those few com-
ments. I thank the Senator from Vir-
ginia.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The able
Senator from Arizona is so right. I
thank him for his statement.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder
of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RiE-
GLE). Who yields time?
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield
to the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I thank the distinguished chairman.
Mr. President, the Constitution reads
on this particular question, and I am
reading from paragraph 2 of section 2,
article II of the Constitution: "He"-the
President-"shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, to make Treaties"-to make treaties.
It does not say anything about shall have
the power to terminate there.
It would seem to me that the authors
of the Constitution intended for this to
be a share in power, meaning by my say-
ing "this," I mean the terms of the
treaty.
If the authors of the Constitution had
intended that the power to terminate be
shared, they would have said so. The
Constitution only talks about making
treaties, and in that instance includes the
Senate.
"He"-the President-"shall have
rower, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties."
pressing the Senate to a vote on it at this
particular time.
The distinguished Senator from Vir-
ginia has indicated that the adoption of
his amendment by the Senate to the
pending matter would not affect the Mu-
tual Defense- Treaty with Taiwan, would
have no impact on that whatsoever. That
being the case, the distinguished Senator
from Virginia would lose nothing in
withdrawing the amendment, inasmuch
as, in his viewpoint, it would have no im-
pact on what the President has done to
terminate in accordance with the provi-
sions of article X of the Mutual Defense
,Treaty-that treaty.
This is not the proper vehicle for this
amendment. Mr. GOLDWATER, our distin-
guished colleague from Arizona, and oth-
ers-I have not looked over the names,
-but I do know Of Mr. GOLDWATER and
others-are pressing this issue in the
courts; and I think it would be well to let
the courts make a decision on it. In the
meantime, the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee could conduct hearings. Mr.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR. could send a resolu-
tion to that committee, and hearings
could be conducted, evidence could be
presented, and the Senate then would be
in a better position, with that kind of
preparation, to vote on this very broad,
far-reaching constitutional question.
If the Senate had intended in a mutual
defense treaty that the Senate vote on
its termination, the Senate would have
written that in as a reservation. The
Senate approved the ratification of that t
treaty with its eyes open, with its ears
open, and knowing full well of the pro-
visions in article X of the treaty allow-
ing for termination of the treaty by
either party.
Some will say, "Well, who is the
party?" If the "party," by the constitu-
tional forebears, had been intended to
be the Senate, it seems to me they would
have said so, just as they said that the
party in making treaties is the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. They certainly must
have foreseen that treaties might be
terminated, that treaties might even be
abrogated, that it might be in the inter-
ests of our own country.to -terminate a
treaty. They must have foreseen that.
If they had meant for the Senate to be a
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
party to the termination of treaties, I am ident cannot make a treaty without the
constrained to believe that they would approval of the Senate, and I have so
have had the foresight and the wisdom said to Mr. Carter in connection with
to have written that into the Con-
stitution.
Mr. President, I simply urge my dis-
tinguished colleague from Virginia, Mr.
BYRD, he having raised a very important
question here, to consider withdrawing
the amendment at this time and pursu-
ing it before the Commmittee on For-
eign Relations. It is a matter that is
appropriate for thorough consideration
by that committee.
No hearings have been held on this
amendment. There has been no con-
sideration of it by the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. Again I say that the
members of the committee already have
indicated on the record their willing-
ness to hold hearings and to give serious
study to the issue. I think that is the ap-
propriate manner for dealing with this
question. I do not believe that the Tai-
wan Enabling Act is the appropriate
vehicle. It is not a treaty.
In the future, if the Senate wants to
write into any treaty a provision that
will outline clearly the termination of
such treaty, or the abrogation of it, that
it is a question which will have to be de-
cided jointly between the President and
the Senate, it can do so. Also, it can say
in that provision whether or not the
Senate should terminate by a majority
vote or by a two-thirds vote, or what-
ever.
Without the kind of study that is
needed, I hope that the Senate would
not be forced to take action at this
point, and on this vehicle, on an amend-
ment that has such far-reaching impli-
cations. It would be a blanket require-
ment. In order for all treaties to be ter-
minated in the future, the approval by
the Senate would be required. By what
vote? A two-thirds vote? A'three-fifths
vote? What?
It may be in the interests of this
country-who knows?-to terminate
some other treaties down the road. It
may be in the security interests of this
country to terminate some other trea-
ties down the road. Who knows? We
may have a Republican President at
some far distant time in the future, or
we may have a Democratic President.
But, whichever, that Presidnet, as the
Chief Executive of this country, is in the
best position, I believe-and apparently
the Founding Fathers thought so-to
terminate a treaty; and they left it open
to the Senate to write provisions in any
treaty. They left it open to the Senate.
There is nothing in the Constitution
that prevented the Senate in 1954 from
writing a provision therein which said
that either party shall have the power to
terminate, with the understanding that
the U.S. Senae, on the part of the United
States, -shall first approve the termina-
tion.
The constitutional forefathers left
that door open for us. They did not leave
the door open when it came to making
treaties. They said that the President of
the United States shall have the power,
by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. The door is closed. The Pres-
SALT. I said:
If an agreement is sent up there, -count
me out. If it is done by way of an Executive
agreement, count me out-o-u-t.
I am against it to start with, should
it be sent in by an agreement. The con-
stitutional forebears closed the door
there. It has to be done with the advice
and consent of the Senate. It would not
be so with the termination of a treaty.
They did not say that.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. So I do plead
with my friend from Virginia, who is a
very understanding Senator, who is a
very able Senator, who wants the Senate
to do the right thing in the interests of
the United States; and I am sure he be-
lieves that the right thing can best be
done if the Senate is well ? informed
through adequate hearings. If he would
do that, the Senate then would be in a
position to proceed with its hearings in
the Foreign Relations "Committee and
would not have to cast a vote today,
when Senators are not prepared. I am
not prepared. I have my own viewpoint,
hastily arrived at through reading a
couple of lines in the Constitution and
thinking about it overnight. But what.
other evidence do I have? I need other
evidence. I need a report on the part of
the Foreign Relations Committee. I need
its testimony. I need to read its hearings
so that I will be guided properly and so
that I will not vote in the wrong way.
I intend to vote against the amendment,
and I intend to vote for a tabling mo-
tion, if such a motion is offered, but that
might not be the right thing.
I urge the Senator to consider with-
drawing the amendment and letting the
Foreign Relations Committee conduct
hearings on the matter, and let us ap-
proach it from an informed standpoint,
after adequate testimony has been ad-
duced and thorough study has been had.
I cannot read any Senator's mind, but
there are Senators today who, for politi-
cal reasons or otherwise-they may be
running for reelection next year-may
feel constrained, in the light of events
and for other reasons, to vote for the
amendment.
I think it is not. I hope they would
not be forced to do that without ade-
quate preparation and study on a matter
of such far-reaching constitutional im-
plications, and I mean they can be far
reaching with respect to security inter-
ests of this country in the future.
For their sake, I hope they will not
be forced to vote on this issue today. It
is the wrong vehicle. It is the wrong
time. It is under the wrong circum-
stances. It will not affect one way or the
other this particular subject that is be-
fore the Senate, basically, the Taiwan
Enabling Act. And for all of those rea-
sons, I hope that the distinguished Sena-
tor from Virginia will consider with-
drawing the amendment and that he will
withdraw it.
I respect him if he does not. I respect
his right to disagree with me. But I
S 2299
know that he will think about it. In con-
sideration of the need for all Members
of the Senate to be fully informed on
this subject before they vote one way or
the other, I hope that he will withdraw
the amendment.
Now I yield to my friend from Arizona,
Mr. GOLDWATER.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank my good
friend and leader.
I just wished to read a piece of testi-
mony that I gave before the Foreign Re-
lations Committee to show that this is
not exactly new:
I wish to remind the Senate that the is-
sue before us is not novel. It is not new.
In 1856, the Foreign Relations Committee
took up the identical question before us to-
day.
They examined the question of how a
treaty should be terminated when the treaty
itself provides for cancellation after notice
given by either party.
The Committee had no difficulty in answer-
ing the question. In its official report, our
Senate Committee in 1856 said that "where
the right to terminate a treaty at discretion
is reserved in the treaty itself, such discre-
tion resides in the President and Senate."
The report went on to say that a treaty
can also be repealed by joint action of both
Houses of Congress, but it rejected any idea
that the President could do it alone.
Yesterday I put a list of 51 treaties in
the RECORD that have been abrogated or
terminated, as some would prefer, since
the beginning of our Republic. If my
memory serves me correctly only one
treaty of mutual defense was included,
and that was abrogated by the entire
Congress and later the President ap-
proved the action.
So this is not new, and I will say to
that the Constitution is not exactly clear
in this whole field.
I asked a question earlier that no mem-
ber of the Foreign Relations Committee
has answered. I wish to know what the
opinion, for example, of the majority
leader might be on any President-I do
not care if he is a Republican, if we live
that long, or a Democrat if we have to
put up with that-but would he wish to
have any President have the power to
say, "We are going to pull out of. the
United Nations tomorrow," or "We are
going to leave NATO tomorrow," or "We
are going to cancel our Japanese trea-
ties"?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. GOLDWATER. The majority
leader has the floor.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I had hoped
the Senator was letting me yield to him
on his time
Mr. GOLDWATER. Gladly, but I have
to get permission from my boss.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The Sena-
tor from Arizona does not have time.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thought it
was on the Senator's time.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I assume it is on
the Senator's time. I will be glad to split
it with the Senator.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. All right.
Let me just respond, if I may, to the
distinguished Senator.
No 1, he has referred to a committee
of the Senate 123 years ago that in the
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S 2300 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE ,March 8, 1979
light of circumstances at that time is- J. Res. of Jan. 8, 1865, 13 Stat. 566. Reci- 1915. The treaty is counted only once in the
sued a report saying thus and so. procity Treaty with Britain, 1. above tables, being included with those trea-
The Senate did not say it. It was the J. Res. of June 17, 1874, 18 Stat. 287. ties affected by the Seamen's Act in Table A.
committee. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and Termination of the treaty is reported by the
Second, he has asked how I feel about Commercial Convention with Belgium. 2. State Department under the heading "Abro-
Act of February 26, 1883, 22 Stat.. 641, gation of Treaties and Provisions of Treaties
the President of the United States term- Amity Treaty with G. Britain, 1. which Conflicted with the Seamen's Act of
inating this treaty or that treaty, and J. Res. of December 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627, March 4, 1915," Foreign Relations, 1920, vol.
then he mentioned the NATO Treaty. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with 1, pp. 207-209.
I cannot envision any President, Re- Russia, 1.
publican or otherwise-or Democratic- Seamen's Act of March 5. 1915, 38 Stat.
NATO, because that would run against ` ` ?' vv . "W"
International Sanitary y C Convention, , 1,
1.
the security interests of the United Treaty on Principles and Policies Concern-
States. Everyone knows that. ing China (Nine Power Agreement) of Feb-
But there might be a treaty which ruary 6, 1922, 2 Bevans 375, Treaty of Com-
would be not in the security interests of merce and Navigation with Japan, 1.
the United States which the President 1944 Chicago Convention on International
would feel he should terminate and Civil Aviation, 3 Bevans 944, 965, 1928 Pan
American convention on Commercial Avia-
which he had the right to terminate in tion, 1.
accordance with the provisions thereof. 1946 Convention for the' Regulation of
I say leave it to the judgment of that Whaling, 4 Bevans 249, 1937 Convention for
President at that time and under those the Regulation of Whaling, 1.
circumstances. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,
It was clearly within the province of 65 Stat. 72, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
the Senate When the Mutual Defense and Consular Rights with Hungary and Po-
land, 2.
Treaty with Taiwan was written in 1954 1948 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea.
to have included in its provisions that 1929 Convention on Safety of Life at sea. 1.
the approval of the Senate should be had Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 424,
for termination. Commercial Convention with Cuba, 1.
I think it comes at a late date now Export Control Act of 1948. 50 USC App.
to claim that, and the Senator from 2021 et seq.
Virginia does not so claim. He says it Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 USC App.
1 et seq.
would not have affected that treaty, and Mutual Assistance Act of 1954, 22 USC
that is one of the basic reasons why I 1934.
hope he will withdraw his amendment Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
on this occasion, because it will not af- Assistance of 1947, 4 Bevans 559.
fect that treaty.' Cuban Resolution of 1982, 76 Stat. 697.
It can go before the Foreign Relations Byrd Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 427,
Committee. Hearings can be held. They 4 503, "One aspect of our treaty obligations
will be held. And the Senate then will under the U.N. Charter." Diggs v. Shultz, 470
F. in a position to knowledgeably, know- . 461 r. o), 1.
ingly, and in an informed manner vote Fishery C Co ons servaatition ah Monvenmont
on the issue at an appropriate time. Act o of 1976, 16 USC 1801, Three Conventions
on Fisheries, 3.
I thank the Senator. B. Termination with implied authority con-
I thank the Senator for yielding. ferred by inconsistent legislation (3) ?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I have so Date of legislation, treaty, and total
little time. I yield myself just 1 minute. treaties affected:
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151
ator from Virginia is recognized for 1 Commercial Convention with Switzerland, 1.
minute. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi- 48 Stat. 195, Convention on Abolition of
dent, I wish to point out that the Con- Import and Export Prohibitions and Restric-
stitution does not say how to repeal a tions, 1.
statute. It does not say the power to Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934,
terminate a law Is, shared with Congress. '48 Stat. 943, Treaty of Commerce and Navi-
But it is obvious Congress must act to gation with Italy, 1.
terminate a law. t ooxNOTEs
At this point, also, Mr. President, I One incident of Congressional ratification.
wish to print in the RECORD information of a Presidential notice is not included in the
that was submitted table because notice was withdrawn before
yesterday by the the treaty was terminated. In 1865, shortly
Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) after President Lincoln had notified' Great
listing 51 treaties which were terminated Britain of our withdrawal from the Rush-
by legislative action, and I ask unanf- Baggot Convention regulating naval forces
molls consent that it be printed in, the upon the Great Lakes, Congress defended its
RECORD. . power in the field by passing a Joint Resolu-
There being no objection, the material tion based on the principle that Lincoln's
con-
Res ratified
action was invalid rmed by Congress. H.J. until
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, fi
Feb. 9, 1865;
as follows: 13 Stat. 568.
TERMINATION OF TREATY OR TREATY Pao- 2 Congress terminated all existing treaties
VISION WTTH LEGISLATIVE ACTION (51)1 of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations
A. Termination with legislative approval in the Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898, but
or ratification (48)1 the action is not included in the table be-
Authorizing legislation, treaty. and total cause those treaties were not ratified under
treaties affected: the Constitution.
Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578, French- a Another treaty which was terminated be-
American Treaties of 1778-1788, 8 cause of inconsistent legislation is the 1891
H.J. Res. of April 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, Con- w 1rehty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
. In
vention on Boundaries with Great Britain, 1. 1916 6 the Independent atate the he
19, Belgium, which had annexed the Co Congo.
o,
S. Res, of March 3, 1855, 9 Senate Execu- twice denounced the whole treaty after Con-
tive Journal 431, Commercial Treaty with gress directed the termination of a substan-
Denmark, 1. tive article thereof in the Seamen's Act of
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, one further word. I shall, of course,
take under advisement and give full con-
sideration to the wishes and desires of
the majority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's minute has expired.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I yield my-
self one-half additional minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Virginia is recognized for one-
l
ha
f minute.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I will not
make a decision at this moment, but I
will, of course, give full consideration to
his wishes, although I see very little need
for it.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, how
much time remains.to the opponents of
this amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
will advise that 11 minutes remain.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I reserve
5 minutes of that time to reply to the
distinguished Senator from Virginia.
First of all, let me say to him that this
summer the committee will have before
it a major treaty on treaties, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, at
which time we shall be conducting thor-
ough hearings, that could include the
very question that has been raised by
the distinguished Senator.
I should think that 'would be an ap-
propriate time to consider all of the pos-
sible ramifications of the very important
issue he has raised. .
I wish to assure the Senator that at
that time or at some other appropriate
time the committee will examine this
question in depth.
I reiterate the request of. the majority
leader that the Senator from Virginia
give serious consideration to withdraw-
ing the amendment at this time, because
I feel that it is inappropriate as a part of
this bill. Furthermore, before we pass
judgment on a question of such far-
ranging ramification, we should have the
benefit of thorough hearings and expert
testimony.
For example, Mr. President, the reso-
lution as it is presently written raises
questions on its face. Even if we were to
accept the arguments offered in support
of the amendment, which I cannot
accept, the arguments raise a question
as to why the amendment has been
framed in such a way as to be limited to
mutual defense treaties.
In other words, if the Senator from
Virginia or the Senator from Arizona
are correct in their assertion that a
treaty may not be terminated except
with the consent of the Congress, then
why should this sense of the Senate res-
olution be limited to one kind of treaty,
namely, mutual defense treaties? Even
on its face, the amendment is not con- "
sistent with the argument that has been
advanced in support of it.
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The majority leader has already
pointed out that under the Constitution
the advice and consent of the Senate is
required only for the purpose of making
treaties. When it comes to their termi-
nation, it is true that the Congress can
take part, and on numerous occasions in
the past, that indeed has happened.
If the Congress had wished to initiate
the action that would terminate the
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan,
then there is nothing to prevent the
Congress from passing a resolution-a
joint resolution-calling for the termi-
nation of that treaty which, if signed by
the President, would be an act of law.
And, under the well-known doctrine of
supersession, the last act of the Congress,
being last in time, would still supersede
the mutual defense treaty, and once
bearing the force of law would operate
to terminate the treaty.
So I do not argue with the proposition
that it is appropriate for Congress when
it wishes to assert its right to terminate
treaties simply by passing a resolution
which, when signed by the President,
has the force of law and, being the last
statement on the subject, supersedes any
previous law. That is how we change
statutes and treaties.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HEFLIN). The time of the Senator from
Idaho has expired.
Mr. CHURCH. I ask unanimous con-
sent for 3 extra minutes, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing
no objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. In the current case we
happen to have a treaty which includes
in its own text the manner by which it
may be terminated. In article X the
treaty itself provides:
Either party may terminate it 1 year after
notice has been given to the other party.
When this treaty came before the
Senate in the first instance, when the
Senate by a two-thirds vote ratified the
treaty, it also ratified article X which
contains the method whereby the treaty
may be terminated. That is every bit as
much a part of the treaty as any other
article.
So the Senate placed its imprimatur
of approval upon this method for ter-
minating this particular treaty.
The President has acted in conformity
with article X, and I think there is no
question-at least there is no question
in my mind-that he has acted in an ap-
propriate manner, and that by giving this
notice upon the expiration of the year's
period, the treaty will be terminated ac-
cording to its own terms.
I close, Mr. President, with a statement
from one of the foremost authorities on
international law. I quote from the Re-
statement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States by the American
Law Institute, from section 163 which
reads as follows:
Under the law of the United States, the
President, or a person acting under his au-
thority, has, with respect to an international
agreement to which the United States is a
party, the authority to take the action neces-
sary to accomplish under the rules stated in
section 155 the termination of the agree-
ment in accordance with the provisions in-
cluded in it for that purpose.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 3 minutes have expired.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Presiding
Officer.
I ask unanimous consent that the re-
maining time be given to the distin-
guished Senator from New York, the
ranking member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have ex-
pressed to Senator BYRD yesterday, and I
express again, my feeling that it is a
great service to the Senate, and that this
question will be resolved, and I will join-
and I think he has known me long
enough to take my word for that-ac-
tively and vigorously in resolving it, with
his leadership.
I am deeply concerned about the adop-
tion of this resolution now for this rea-
son, Senator: The Senator from Arizona,
exercising his right as an American, has
started a suit. If the Senate declares even
in a sense resolution that the action of
the President, in its opinion, is not law-
ful, it leaves a very grave legal question
as to whether we are complying with the
agreement we are really implementing
here with the People's-Republic of China,
because the communique says:
The United States of American recognizes
the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China.
Therefore, if we are going to violate
that then we have violated what we
started out to do, and this whole effort
and the whole edifice fall.
So my point is because of the frame of
reference in which this amendment is
cast, and quite without the Senator from
Virginia or any other author desiring it,
I agree with that, and I notice the Sen-
ator has put it in writing, and I do not
think you can help it when the Senate
says in its opinion that this is an unlaw-
ful act, because the President has no such
power, then you cannot avoid the legal
consequences which are that the Presi-
dent has not yet acted until somebody
else, stronger than we, more authorita-
tive does so, and that is a tough one be-
cause I think the Supreme Court is very
likely to dismiss this suit on the ground
that it is a political question.
So if he has acted unlawfully what are
we here for? This whole legislation col-
lapses. That is why I am concerned about
That is why I would add, for whatever
it is worth, my assurances to those of the
leadership and those of Senator CHURCH,
our chairman, to most assiduously and
faithfully do this job.
The VICE PRESIDENT. All time of
the proponents has expired.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the
Senator from New York. I yield 2 min-
utes to my colleague from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
As a cosponsor with the senior Senator
from Virginia of this amendment, I ad-
dress to the opposition a question: Since
the Constitution provides the procedures
for the creation of a statute or a treaty
(although it does not in either case
specifically provide procedures for re-
peal), and since it does declare both
statute and treaty, alike, to be the su-
S 2301
preme law, why does it not logically fol-
low that treaties, like statutes, can only
be repealed by action of the Senate?
I bring to, your attention article VI of
the Constitution which says:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof, and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.
How can the President, with just a
stroke of the pen, remove a part of the
supreme law of the land?
The distinguished Senator from Ari-
zona provided for the record historical
facts with respect to past treaties, the
ones that have been either abrogated or
terminated by the President after con-
sultation with this body.
I believe that only -four treaties in
our history have been concluded with-
out the joint procedure. One where the
other party (country) went out of ex-
istence, and the remaining three where
the treaties became totally outdated and
did not require action. Thank you Mr.
President.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time
of the Senator has expired.
The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, article 10 of the treaty with Tai-
wan states that either party, and that
means either government-in the United
States the Government means both the
legislative branch and the executive
branch-either government may termi-
ate the treaty 1 year after notice has
been given to the other party.
So it may be terminated during this
year.
I emphasize again what I said before,
and what other Senators have continued
to insist, that the Constitution says noth-
ing about how a treaty shall be termi-
nated. I say the Constitution says noth-
ing about how a law shall be terminated.
The Constitution does not say how to
repeal a statute. It does not say the
power to terminate a law is shared with
Congress, but it is obvious that Congress
must act to terminate a law.
Frankly, this amendment is so clear
that I see no reason to hold public hear-
ings on it, or any other hearings on it,
I will read it again for the RECORD:
It is the sense of the Senate that approval
by the Senate of the United States is re-
quired to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and any
other nation.
Senator GOLDWATER has put into the
RECORD. 51 treaties which have been. ter-
minated by legislative action.
As I say, I see no reason for an amend-
ment as clear as this to be the subject
of special hearings by the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. I have no objection to
it, however.
I want to give full consideration, of
course, to the views expressed by the dis-
tinguished majority leader. I would give
full consideration to a unanimous-con-
sent request that if this amendment is
withdrawn, the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee will consider and will report back
to the Senate this precise amendment,
expressing any views it wishes to on it,
will report back this precise amendment
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 8, 1979
for an up-or-down vote on a date cer-
tain. I prefer to vote today. I think this
matter is of great importance. I think it
should be'determined now. But I am will-
ing to give some consideration if a firm,
ironclad"agreement can be made to re-
port this amendment back in 30 days;
that it become the pending business be-
fore the Senate, and that an up-or-down
vote occur on the amendment. Of course,
the Foreign Relations Committee can
present any viewpoint it wishes. They
can say it is a lousy amendment and
should be voted down. They can make
any statement they wish. But I would
seek an up-or-down vote on the amend-
ment at a time certain.
If those who are opposing this amend-
ment today want to enter into such an
agreement, I will give it consideration.
But I certainly will not do it merely on
the basis that the Foreign Relations
Committee will hold hearings on it and
may or may not take any action on it.
This is a vitally important matter. It
affects the future of all of our treaties.
It affects the future of the U.S. Senate.
It affects the future of our Nation, as I
see it, if we are going to say by a vote
today, an unprecedented vote, if this
amendment is voted down, that the
President of the United States, in the
sense of this Senate, has the right uni-
laterally to nullify a treaty.
Mr. President, how much time do I
have remaining?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
has 31/2 minutes remaining.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, I want to say again this amendment
does not express either approval or dis-
approval of the President's decision to
give notice under article 10 of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United
States and the Republic of China. The
amendment does not take from the Pres-
ident any power he now has. It does not
prevent the President from expressing
the intent to abrogate a treaty.
It does, however, express the view of
the Senate that under the Constitution
the President cannot unilaterally nullify
a treaty. So far as the Senator from Vir-
ginia is concerned, that is the position
that I think the Senate of the United
State should take, that a President can-
not unilaterally nullify a treaty.
Mr. CHURCH. Will the Senator yield
so I might respond?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes.
Mr. CHURCH. I would be happy to as-
sure the Senator that the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee would hold hearings on
the subject of the termination of treaties.
We would look to the best authorities we
could gather for that purpose. We would
consider the Senator's proposal, and we
would report back to the Senate on the
subject in such form as the committee
believes appropriate.
The Senator will always then have the
opportunity to substitute his amendment
for any proposal the committee might
wish to offer.
I could not commit the committee in
advance to report back the Senator's
amendment in exactly the same language
that the Senator has now presented it.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the
Senator. I will make the unanimous-con-
sent request, and the Senate can do as
it wishes. I ask unanimous consent, Mr.
President, that if the Senator from Vir-
ginia and my associates agree to with-
draw this amendment, that the Foreign
Relations Committee will hold hearings,
or do whatever it wishes to do-I do not
think hearings are necessary-hold hear-
ings or do whatever it wishes to do, and
report this precise amendment back to
the Senate and it, become the pending
business on May 1, and will continue to
be the pending business until it is dis-
posed of either by approval or by tabling.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
reserving the right to object, would the
Senator not consider this type of a re-
quest: That the Senator's amendment be
make that request which, coming from
the majority leader, I think, says the
majority leader cannot change it. He can-
not schedule anything, he is bound by
the order. The committee cannot change
it. It is bound by the order to report the
Senator's amendment back as amended
if amended. The Senator can continue
with all his rights as a Senator to offer
his amendment to that proposal if it is
reported back. I hope the Senator will
allow me to interpose that request.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be an additional 15 min-
utes of debate, to be equally divided be-
tween Mr. Cxvxca and Mr. HARRY F.
BYRD, JR., in order that this matter might
be resolved.
referred to the Committee on Foreign Mr. FORD. Will the Senator yield for
Relations; that the Committee on For-Q' a question?
eign Relations hold hearings on the Sen-
ator's amendment, and that the Foreign
Relations Committee be required to re-
port back no later than, let us say, 60
days. We have to give them more time
than May 1, because under the Budget
Reform Act we have to have the first
budget resolution disposed of before
May 15, so we run into a lot of problems
that, by law, we are already tied to.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Senator from Virginia may
have 2 additional minutes and the Sena-
tor from Idaho 2 additional minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without,ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. No later than
60 days, or we can make it 90 instead of
60, that the committee report back that
amendment, as amended, if amended.
I do not think we can put a committee
into a straightjacket in their conducting
hearings, the Agriculture Committee, the
Small Business Committee, or whatever
committee, to say that it will hold hear-
ings and be required to report back that
particular resolution, word for word,
comma for comma, semicolon for semi-
colon, with no change, and that that
measure then become the pending busi-
ness in the Senate.
I hope the Senator would, with the
assurance by the Senate, buy an order by
the Senate itself that the committee re-
port it back-the chairman and ranking
member would do that anyway-report
back no later than 90 days. Then, as ma-
'jority leader, I am willing to add'the pro-
vision that it then be the pending busi-
ness, unless, at that particular point-
well, the pending business following ac-
tion on any business that then may be
pending. We may have an appropriation
bill up or we may have war powers, we
may have-who knows what we may
have up at that point?
That, it seems to me, is a good arrange-
ment..It gives the Senator the assurance
that his resolution has to be the resolu-
tion that the committee discusses, con-
ducts hearings on, his amendment is
going to be reported back as amended if
amended, his amendment is going to be
the pending business before the Senate
at a particular point in this session. That
gives the Senator assurance that the
Senate is going to have an opportunity
to act on this amendment or resolution.
I hope the Senator will allow me to
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Does this extend, then, the
12:30 vote, or will it come at 1:30?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. What is the
unanimous-consent . request?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. That there be
an additional 15 minutes on this matter;
not to exceed 15 minutes. We cannot
guarantee that a quorum can be called
off in 5 minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there an
objection?
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Reserving
the right to object, I am not sure I under-
stand what the unanimous-consent re-
quest is.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. This unani-
mous-consent request is simply that the.
time be extended for not to exceed 15
minutes before acting on the Senator's
amendment. It probably will not take 5
minutes.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I do not
object.
I,vIr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HEFrna). The clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.- Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I had hoped that the distinguished Sen-
ator from Virginia would accede to the
request which I presented, which I felt
was a very reasonable request, allowing
the Committee on Foreign Relations to
conduct hearings on the resolution of-
fered by the Senator from Virginia,
which is in-the form of an amendment at
this point, which would require that the
committee report back within 90 days,
no later than 90 days-or, i_ the Senator
wished to make it 60, that would be
agreeable, no later than 60 days-the
Senator's resolution as amended if
amended, and that it then be the pending
business before the Senate following the
disposition of whatever the pending busi -
ness was at that particular time.
Mr. President, that is a very reason-
able request. It would allow the Foreign
Relations Committee, which has jurisdic-
tion over this type of legislation, to con-
duct hearings, to get eminent witnesses
to come in, pro and con. Then the Senate
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 2303
itself would have an opportunity to vote it lets everybody have a chance to know
in a knowledgeable way, after they have what they are voting on.
been adequately informed, on a question I may very well vote with the Senator
that could have far-reaching constitu- at that time. But today I would have to
tional implications and which ought not vote against the proposition. As Senator
to be submitted at this time on a vehicle NELSON says, he would have to, also.
which the disting-:lshed Senator from It does put Senators in a difficult po-
Virginia, himself, says would not be af- sition to cast a vote on a matter of this
fected by this. But it is a meaningful kind with such far-reaching constitu-
proposal. tional implications without a word of
The Senators are going to vote. The testimony, without a word of hearing,
Senator does not agree to this request. without a committee report.
The Senators are going to have to vote Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator
on a matter that has far-reaching con- yield?
stitutional implications and they are go- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.
The time
PRESIDING OFFICER
Th
.
e
ing to vote on the basis of their emotions,
I suppose, their political intuitions, has expired.
rather than on the basis of facts care- I ask Ronan moos C. conseMr. nt the Senate
fully secured by the thoroughly Committee For- proceed for 5 additional minutes,
eign Relations, thoroughly studied, and may
with all Senators having an opportunity and that the Senator from Idaho may
to have a committee report, printed control half of the time and the Senator Virginia half. -
hearings, and thus be in a better position from Te PRESIDING OFFICER Without
ably and knowledgeably to vote on such objection, it is so ordered.
a far-reaching question.
Mr. NELSON. Will the Senator yield? Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes. for recognition simply to plead with my
Mr. NELSON. I shoull like to appeal friend, the Senator from Virginia, to let
to the distinguished Senator from Vir- this matter go to committee.
ginia to go along with this request. This I say that because on yesterday, per-
is an important issue which, for some suaded that he was right, I told the
reason or another, in the whole history Senator from Virginia I'would be with
of the Republic, so far as I know, has him on this particular matter.
never been addressed. However, on its On reflection overnight, I am troubled
face, I think the Senator from Virginia by the implications of the resolution. I
is correct. am also cognizant of the fact that
I think if there were no other choice, I nothing would be lost to go to commit-
would vote for the amendment as drafted tee and report back within a period of
by the Senator from Virginia, and after 90 days because the notice, as given by
committee hearings I probably will. the President on -Taiwan, is not affected
However, in that process, something may at all by this amendment.
be raised that would cause me to think So that if we report it back in 90 days,
the Phrasing ought to be somewhat dif- I expect to be with the Senator from
ferent. Virginia. But I am not sure and am not
In any event, in principle, I am in prepared to do so today.
agreement with the distinguished Sena- I would hope we could go to commit-
tor from Virginia. But if there is an in- tee with this matter and find out if there
sistence that the vote occur today, I sim- are any implications that are not ap-
ply will have to vote against it. Parent on one day's study on the matter.
I do not think we ought to be legislat- I thank the Senator.
ing on an historically important prin- Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. May I ask,
ciple, involving all kinds of implications, what assurance would there be that the
without at least going through the nor- Senator from Virginia could get an up
mal process of having hearings and con- or down vote on this precise amendment
stitutional authorities testifying. 60 days from now, as it might be?
I suspect they will come down on the Mr. CHURCH. If I may respond-
side of the distinguished Senator from without prejudging what'the committee
Virginia. But I think we ought to use the might recommend after hearings-the
process, since nothing has been done Senator would always be in a position to
about this in 200 years, and I do not offer this precise language as a substi-
know why we could not wait another 60 tute for the language that was recom-
days. mended by the committee, should he
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the wish to do so; and I .am prepared to
Senator. have that decided then by an up or down
On top of that, there is a case pend- vote at the appropriate time once the
ing, Mr. GOLDWATER has presented a case committee has had an opportunity to do
dealing with the President's action in its work on such a far-reaching issue.
terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty Mr. JAVITS. If I may add one other
with Taiwan, and that case would not be thing, Senator CHURCH and I will pledge
prejudiced one way or the other by a ourselves to see that the Senator has
Senate vote today. that opportunity, and that procedures
I just hope the Senator from Virginia not interfere with the right of the Sena-
and his colleagues who are supporting tor-not just the right, but the right
him in the amendment would think again under this agreement-to substitute any-
one more time, give it another chance, thing we proposed in hoc verba, accord-
and let the Senate order the proposal I ing to the way he has proposed it.
have presented, or would present, as pre- Mr. HELMS. On an up or down vote?
viously outlined. Mr. JAVITS. On an up or down vote,
It is a fair proposal. It is responsible, with no tabling.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The Sen-
ator from West Virginia indicated a 60-
day time frame would be satisfactory.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I said 90 days
earlier, hoping that by doing so we would
not come in conflict with the expired
deadlines in connection with programs,
or with requirements we have to meet
by law, such as the action on the first
concurrent budget resolution which has
to be completed by May 15.
I would like to at least leave a little
room for those contingencies.
Now, this is March, and then we have
April, that is 60 days. May 15 is a dead-
line we know we have to meet under the
law on the first concurrent resolution.
Could we not say not later than 90
days? That assures the Senator he is
going to have a decision one way or
the other on the matter.
We are talking about a different 30
days right now. But I would have to be
conscious of the. other problems that the
Senate may be confronted with in con-
nection with its programing of legisla-
tion, and legislation that by law we have
to dispose of by certain deadlines.
Mr. JAVITS. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. I just made the sugges-
tion to Senator CHURCH, he has to agree,
but I make the suggestion to the Sen-
ator that the report of the committee
come within 60 days, and the majority
leader agree that matter be made the
pending business within 90 days. That
gives us the flexibility.
Mr. CHURCH. That is agreeable to me.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I hope very
much that the Senator from Virginia
would accede to that request-
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Does that
mean it would be made the pending
business not later than the week of the
4th of June, for example?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I have not
had the opportunity to look at the Cal-
endar, but it would be that the majority
would be bound by order of the Senate
to make the resolution reported by the
committee the pending business no later
than 90 days from today.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The resolu-
tion reported by the committee, but the
resolution reported by the committee, I
judge from what the majority leader said
and the chairman of the committee said,
may not necessarily be this resolution.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. It will be that
resolution with the Senator's number, his
name on it, as amended, if amended. It
may not be amended. But I would think
that the Senator would not object to
the committee's taking testimony and
offering amendments, voting on amend-
ments to the resolution, in the light of
evidence adduced.
When the matter comes up on the
Senate floor, the Senator from Virginia
could offer his pending amendment,
which would be sent to the committee
as a resolution, as a substitute for what-
ever the committee reports; or he could
offer a perfecting amendment to the
committee's resolution as reported. He
would maintain all his rights. The two
managers of the pending bill, who would
be the managers in that case, have as-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
sured him that he would get an up-and-
down vote on his amendment.
This goes a long way, I say to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Virginia. No-
body probably has thought of the fact
that his amendment, when offered, can
be amended, whether it is a substitute or
what. The amendment can be amended
on the floor. They have offered to give
him a vote up and down on his amend-
ment as it is written right at this
moment.
Mr. JAVITS. His amendment can be
amended right now.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Of course.
Mr. JAVITS. Even after we vote on a
motion to table.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. There is no
question about it.
The Senator really is being very fair
in considering this request. He is being
protected fully all the way around. He
Is being assured by the order of the Sen-
ate that the committee is going to report
back the subject matter; that the ma-
jority leader will have to program it; and
that the Senator will have an opportu-
nity for an up-and-down vote on his
amendment as presently 'written, ' if he
wants to offer it that way to the resolu-
tion, If the resolution is changed In its
terminology by the committee.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, will the leader
make a clarification? Did the leader make
some reference to the amendment
after-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the
Senator use his microphone? .
Mr. GOLDWATER. It does not work.
(Laughter.]
The leader made some reference to the
amendment as reported by the commit-
tee being then referred possibly to "the
committee on resolution."
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. No, I did
not.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I got "the com-
mittee on resolution."
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I was misus-
ing it. That was an inexactitude in the
use of terminology.
I referred to his amendment as being
reported. It Is an amendment now that
Senator BYRD has offered. I assume that
if it goes to the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, it would have to be a resolution.
When it is reported from that committee,
it will be a resolution. Then the Senator
could offer an amendment to that resolu-
tion.
I just sort of got my tongue tied a bit,
I say to the Senator from Arizona, and
used the word "resolution" when I may
have meant the word "amendment." He
certainly misunderstood me. I did not
say what he thought I said.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ad-
ditional time has expired.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the Sena-
tor from Virginia may have 2 additional
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, as I understand the proposal, this
entire matter would come back to the
Senate, would be scheduled for action
one way or the other in the Senate, not
later than the 7th day of June.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. If that is the
90th day, yes, that would be correct.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Today is
the 8th day of March. If we follow that
procedure, it would be Friday, June 8.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I do not know,
because May has 31 days and April has
30 days. But it is 90 days. Whether we
use.the new math or the old, It is 90 days.
[Laughter.] Provided It Is not a Sunday.
The Senator can be assured that
whether this majority leader is still the
majority leader on that day or not, the
RECORD will be there, the Senate will be
standing, and the majority leader at that
time will be bound and shackled and
chained-he can come in kicking and
screaming; if he wants to-but that res-
olution will have to be made the pend-
ing business when the 90 days runs their
course. -
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, this is a vital matter. I do not
think it is necessary to hold hearings on
It. But I always like to cooperate with my
colleagues. With the assurance that the
matter will come before the Senate not
later than 90 days from today and that
the Senate will have an opportunity to
debate all aspects of it. I will cooperate
with the wishes of the majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Senator from Virginia always has
been cooperative and reasonable, and I
knew that he would be in this instance.
He just vindicated my feelings.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as a co-
sponsor with the senior Senator from
Virginia, I join him in this measure. I
compliment the senior Senator from Vir-
ginia, the majority leader, the chairman
and the ranking minority leader of the
Foreign Relations Committee for reach-
ing this agreement. I believe the ultimate
resolution of this issue will be one of the
historic landmarks of the Senate.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, notwith-
standing anything else, my understand-
ing is that It will be reported by May 1.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
has expired.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unani-
mous consent for 1 additional minute.
Mr. HELMS. What is the request?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
has expired.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for
1 additional second.
The answer is "Yes."
Mr. HELMS. That is all I want to know.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. In other
words, the matter will be handled by
the Foreign Relations Committee be-
tween now and May 1, and it will be re-
ported back to the Senate on May 1.
Mr. CHURCH. By May 1.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. By May 1.
And the majority leader will schedule it
for Senate consideration in a period of
90 days.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this
time, there are two pending unanimous-
consent requests. The Chair asks that
Senators indicate on which request they
would like action at this time.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the
amendment that is now pending, by the
distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), be withdrawn and
that the amendment in the form of a
resolution, bearing his name and the
names of any other Senators he wishes
to have as cosponsors, be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations; that
that resolution as amended, if amended,
be reported back to the Senate no later
than 60 days from today; that it be made
the pending question before the Senate
no later than 90 days from today, and
that there be an up-and-down vote on
his amendment at that time, if the dis-
tinguished Senator from Virginia feels
constrained to offer it.
Mr. President, for the phrase "no later
than 60 days," I substitute "no later
than May 1."
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, reserving the right to object-and
I shall not object-the Senator from Vir-
ginia points out that there are two res-
olutions at the desk, both of which could
be referred to the Foreign Relations
Committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the
name of the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE) be added as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Is it clear,
then, as to which resolution will be re-
ferred to the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Which
one does the Senator want referred? One
is a simple resolution and one is a joint
resolution.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I would be
willing to have both of them considered.
Mr. CHURCH. Very well.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. We will take
'both, but the committee will report back
only one.
Mr. HELMS. The language is the same.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. The lan-
guage is identical.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair is informed, with respect to order
No. 12 under "General Orders," that this
is on the calendar. Should it also go to
the committee?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. May I an-
swer the question?
I ask unanimous consent that the joint
resolution that is on the calendar go to
the committee, because when it comes
back, it will be put back on the calendar.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes. And
the simple resolution, which is identical
to the amendment-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Also go to the
committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, both will go to the committee.
? Mr. HART. Mr. President, had a vote
occurred on the Byrd amendment, I In-
tended a vote against the motion to table
the amendment submitted by the Sena-
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
tor from Virginia, and I would like briefly
to explain my reasons for doing so.
The amendment raises a fulidamental
issue of constitutioanl principle which
rises above one's position on the issue of
normalization of relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. It is the issue of
the Senate's role in foreign affairs and,
more specifically, its role in the formula-
tion and dissolution of treaties.
I do not challenge the President's pri-
mary and constitutionally unambiguous
authority in the realm of foreign affairs.
But the Senate must be forceful and con-
sistent in exercising its own responsibili-
ties in this area. Certainly this body
including many of my colleagues here
who will vote to table this amendment-
has fought hard over the past decade to
restore to itself the constitutional pow-
ers which were eroded by executive usur-
pation and the failure of legislative as-
sertiveness. I wish some of the supporters
of this amendment would have been as
assertive in exercising this responsibility
on issues such as Vietnam and Cambodia.
I wish those who felt as I did then about
unilateral executive action in Cambo-
dia would join me now in witnessing for
the same principle.
My vote is not to turn back the clock
and reverse the President's termination
of the mutual defense treaty with Tai-
wan. Although I believe he acted in an
unwise and unfortunate manner by
ignoring the Senate, I nevertheless rec-
ognize the President's notification to
Taiwan that the treaty will be termi-
nated at the end of 1979 as a fait ac-
compli. I have no desire to undermine
the normalization agreement with the
People's Republic of China.'
Some of my colleagues have correctly
noted that the amendment is not pre-
cise as to the procedure by which the
Senate would give its approval and that
it raises certain other ambiguities.
Others have suggested that definng the
Senate's proper role in treaty termina-
tion is too complex an issue to be settled
at this time and should be addressed in
subsequent hearings. I welcome such
hearings, but I also cannot turn away
from the principle raised by the Senator
from Virginia. Consistent with my deeply
held conviction that the Senate must
meet its responsibilities in the field of
foreign affairs, and reflecting my strong
concern that unilateral executive action
in terminating treaties is a dangerous
precedent, I will vote to oppose tabling
the amendment.O
POSTPONEMENT OF THE EFFEC-
TIVE DATE OF RULE XLIV OF THE
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that the resolution
I offered to amend the rules is to be
voted on not later than 12:30 this after-
noon.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arizona may
have 1 minute on the resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
register my firm and unwavering oppo-
sition to Senate Resolution 93. This
resolution undoes what the Senate has
already agreed to., The Senate ethics
resolution of the 95th Congress, Senate
Resolution 110, limited the amount of
outside earnings a Senator or highly paid
staff member could earn. This provision
was the subject of extensive debate, and
agreement was finally reached that the
amount of outside earnings to be al-
lowed would be about 15 percent of
salary.
The resolution before us today pushes
back the effective date of this provision
until January 1, 1983. Under the terms
of Senate Resolution 110, this limitation
should have gone into effect on Janu-
ary 1 of this year.
I am not unsympathetic to the con-
cerns and needs of my colleagues. Yet,
it seems to me that this body exercised
its collective best judgment in the full
glare of national publicity when it en-
acted Senate Resolution 110-a reso-
lution that was hailed far and wide as
a major reform in Senate ethics. We
are now about to eliminate, at least for
4 years, the central feature of that re-
form. I cannot in good conscience, Mr.
President, vote for this measure. And,
I would urge each and every one of my
colleagues to consider this matter
carefully before casting a vote.
O Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I wish
the RECORD to show that I oppose this
resolution, Senate Resolution 93.0
0 Mr. EXON. Mr. President, if a rollcall
vote would have been taken, I would
have voted "no" on Senate Resolution
93.0
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President. I move
the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Rollcall.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order the Senate will now
proceed to vote on Senate Resolution 93.
The question is on agreeing to the
resolution.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the
Chair.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Ohio have 2 minutes on the reso-
lution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I
rise to indicate my opposition to this
proposal.
I think that when there were salary
adjustments made that this matter was
taken into account. I think it was part
and parcel of the entire package .
I myself have strong reservations and-
objections to changing the effective date
S2305
and wish to be recorded in the negative
in the event there is not a rollcall vote.
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I also
wish to be recorded in the event there is
not a rollcall vote in the negative.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, in the
event there is not a rollcall vote I, also,
wish to be on record as voting in the
negative.
Mr. STEVENS. I move adoption of the
resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the resolution.
(Putting the question.)
The resolution (S. Res. 93) was agreed
to, as follows:
Resolved, That section 313(c) of Senate
Resolution 110, 95th Congress, is amended by
striking out "January 1, 1979" and, inserting
in lieu thereof "January 1, 1983".
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the res-
olution was agreed to.
Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that mo-
tion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
0 Mr. STONE. Mr. President, I was dis-
mayed to learn that today, Thursday,
March 8, the Senate passed by voice vote
a resolution to defer for 4 years the im-
plementation of Senate rule 44. This rule.
which limits a Senator's outside earned
income to 15 percent of salary, was a key
feature of the Senate Code of Ethics
which was adopted with much fanfare
last Congress.
Suddenly, with no committee consid-
eration, little floor debate and no rollcall
vote, the Senate has put Senate rule 44
in limbo for 4 years. It is a step in the
wrong direction and one which could lead
to a total abrogation of the rule when
those 4 years are up.
I regret that this important change in
the Senate rules was made without a
rollcall vote and if such a vote had been
conducted I would have voted against
the change in the rule.0
TAIWAN ENABLING ACT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will now resume consideration of S.
245, which will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk'read as follows:
A bill (S. 245) to promote the foreign pol-
icy of the United States through the main-
tenance of commercial, cultural, and other
relations with the people of Taiwan on an
unofficial basis, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of
the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is
the will of the Senate?
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, on De-
cember 15, 1978, after hurried and secret
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CONGRIESSIONAIL RECORD -SENATE March, 8, 1979
negotiations, and without adequate con-
sultation with Congress, President Carter
announced that the United States would
establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) on
January 1, 1979, with an exchange of
Ambassadors on March 1, 1979. At the
same time, the United States gave the
required 1 year's notice that it would
terminate its Mutual Defense Treaty
with the Republic of China (Taiwan) on
December 31, 1979.
The main issue growing out of the
Carter administration's sudden normal-
ization of relations with the People's
Republic of China is not really the rec-
ognition of Peking, but rather the "de-
recognition" of the Republic of China
on Taiwan. Our major concern today
must be with the security of Taiwan and
of American political, economic, and
security interests there. America's allies
and potential enemies throughout Asia
and the world are watching this debate
closely. They are looking for indicators
of America's resolve to protect her in-
terests and stand by her allies.. The
Taiwan legislation we pass today must
send out a clear message that the United
States will not sell out a friend, now or
ever, to placate any powerful totalitarian
regime.
The administration has proposed that
unofficial relations with Taiwan be main-
tained after January 1 by a State De-
partment manned, nongovernmental
American Institute in Taiwan. This leg-
islation, S. 245 is an outgrowth of that
proposal. It speaks to the security of
Taiwan and attempts to maintain all
cultural and economic agreements and
relations now existing between Taiwan
and the United States. As such, it is far
better legislation than that put forth
by the Carter administration, but it must
be improved. America's security interests
in Taiwan must be clearly spelled out.
While Peking was anxious to normalize
relations with the United States in order
to counter Soviet influence in Asia, the
Carter administration extracted no real
concessions from Peking on the security
of Taiwan. The United States has agreed
to Peking's three major demands: Rec-
ognition of Peking as the legal govern-
ment of Taiwan; withdrawal of all U.S.
troops from Taiwan; and termination of
the United States-ROC Mutual Defense
Treaty. In addition, the United States
has agreed to a moratorium on new arms
sales to Taiwan for 1 year.
In exchange, the PRC has said that
it will seek peaceful reunification of Tai-
wan to the mainland. However, Peking
has very clearly refused to renounce the
use of force against Taiwan. Peking says
it will permit the people of Taiwan to
keep their own political and economic
systems and security forces as long as
they choose. But these verbal pledges ap-
ply only if Taiwan agrees to recognize
Peking's sovereignty and does not permit
foreign military bases. The PRC has
made no formal commitments on these
already very conditional promises, and
the administration itself has done little
to amplify them.
For example, the PRC' has pointed to
Hong Kong and Macao as examples of
coexistence with different economic sys-
tems on territory claimed by Peking, but
those entities have not recognized Pe-
king's sovereignty. A more. disturbing ex-
ample of reunification involves the sub-
jugation of Tibet, a process which many
would describe as "genocide." We should
not take the example of Tibet too lightly.
We have seen recently in Vietnam that
China is willing to use force to achieve
its objectives, but the examples of the
Korean war, the Sino-Indian war, and
the bloody purges following the Com-
munist victory on the mainland should
have already told us that.
In my view, the Carter administration
has taken a stronger pro-Peking tilt
than was necessary to achieve normaliza-
tion and, in the process, has endangered
the people of Taiwan. The Carter admin-
istration rejected alternative ways to
deal with normalization such as the
"German model" of recognizing two
Chinas. It rejected placing our Embassy
in Peking with an official liaison mission
in Taipei.
The Carter administration has even
refused to give any governmental status
to Taiwan. It is the Congress which is
considering granting diplomatic immun-
ity to Taiwanese officials and, despite
promises that the United States would
not interfere with United States-Taiwan
cultural exchanges, the Carter adminis-
tration has moved to close down some of
the Taiwanese consulates.
The weakness of the Carter adminis-
tration in negotiating with Peking and
in failing to show resolve with respect to
the security of Taiwan cannot be cor-
rected completely by the Congress. We
can, however, move to strengthen the
legislation before us, S. 245.
For that reason, I have cosponsored
the amendment proposed by Senator
PERCY which would make clear that the
security of Taiwan effects the security
interests of the United States. I believe
that the language in the bill as reported
by the Foreign Relations Committee is
not sufficiently strong. The words "of
grave concern" do not carry in them the
strong sense of commitment which I be-
lieve should be inherent in this legisla-
tion. Indeed, I believe that national lead-
ers around the world will look upon the
success or failure of Senator PERCY's
amendment as a measure of American
will and reliability.
Today, and in the years ahead, the
Senate must also insure that the secur-
ity of Taiwan is not compromised indi-
rectly. For example, the Congress should
make clear that it will not condone ad-
ministration acquiescence in any form
of discrimination by Peking against firms
doing business with Taiwan, and it must
force the administration to take a firm
stand protecting Taiwan in internation-
al monetary and financial institutions
and facilitating trade and investment
between the United States and Taiwan.
In short, we must make sure that our
political, economic, and security-inter-
ests in Taiwan mature rather than erode.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BAucus). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I would
like to state my.basic support for this
legislation. I believe, that it provides for
the security of Taiwan and for uninter-
rupted continuation of warm and friend-
ly relations with the people of Taiwan.
I do not believe that a relinquishment
of concern for the fate of Taiwan should
result from normalization of relations
with the People's Republic of China. The
Senate should clearly state its determi-
nation that the United States aid in
maintaining the security of Taiwan and
in maintaining fruitful trade and warm
cultural relations with the people of that
island.
This determination matches our desire
to maintain the close and special inti-
macy which arises from our 30-year rela-
tionship with Taiwan. As a result of those
relations, we have at present approxi-
mately 60 treaties with Taiwan covering
such matters as. trade, visas, and eco-
nomic and technical cooperation. Our
total trade with Taiwan was more than
$7 billion last year. Our investment in
Taiwan is almost one-third of all foreign
investment on the island. This relation-
ship cannot and should not end.
If the People's Republic of China
wishes to maintain good relations with
the United States, it must let the peace
of Taiwan stand as the first litmus test
of our new relationship. Let us hope that
the Government of the PRC was sincere
when it declared in its message of Janu-
ary 1, 1979, that it "will take present
realities into account" and will "respect
the status quo on Taiwan ? ? ' in set-
tling the question of reunification."
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Illinois.
AMENDMENT NO. 79
(Purpose: To express United States policy
with respect to any resolution of the Tai-
wan issue by other than peaceful means)
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I call up
my amendment No. 79 to the pending
legislation and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), for
himself, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr.
TOWER, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr.
STEVENS, Mr. STONE, Mr. COHEN, Mr. WEICKER,
Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. MORGAN, and
Mr. DANFORTH, proposes an amendment num-
bered 79.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 14, lines 9 and 10, strike out "of
grave concern to" and insert in lieu thereof
to the security interests of".
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I offer this
amendment on behalf of myself and
Senators GOLDWATER, HOLLINGS, TOWER,
DECONCINI, HUDDLESTON, STEVENS, STONE,
COHEN, WEICKER, PROXMIRE, COCHRAN,
MORGAN, and DANFORTH.
Mr. President, as the chairman of. the
Foreign Relations Committee knows, the
Senator from Illinois has long favored
normalization of our relationships with
China, because it is in the national
interest. China should take its rightful
place in the community of nations.
I believe the distinguished chairman
of the committee would remember my
former professor at the University of
Chicago years ago, Paul Douglas; against
whom I ran for the Senate in 1966. He
will remember him not only as a beloved
colleague, but also as a wise man for
whom we had infinite respect. Nonethe-
less, I did find some of his economic
theories erroneous and I sharply dis-
agreed with his judgment on some mat-
ters in foreign policy.
I certainly disagreed with him, when I
ran for the Senate, on the Vietnam war.
This issue sharply divided us.
Senator Paul Douglas was one of the
founders of an organization formed for
the purpose of keeping mainland China
out of the United Nations and I opposed
him on that particular issue. I felt it
most unrealistic that a government rep-
resenting, at that time, three-quarters
of a billion people, since grown, should
be kept out of the United Nations and
should not be a full member of the inter-
national community.
So, as I have worked in the Senate, I
have taken a deep interest in the affairs
of the People's Republic of China. I was
privileged to lead a delegation of Sen-
ators and Congressmen to China to study
firsthand that remarkable country, and
felt even more deeply at that time that
the process of normalization should be
expedited to the greatest possible extent.
So I am fully supportive of the legis-
lation before us and have enjoyed work-
ing with the chairman of the committee
(Mr. CHURCH) and the ranking minority
member (Mr. JAVITS) on considering leg-
islation that would enable us to move
forward.
I have felt in the past and still feel
today that full diplomatic relations are
not only realistic, but they are also in
the mutual national interest of both
China and the United States. Therefore,
with no intention to jeopardize this proc-
ess, I call up amendment No. 79 to sec-
tion 114 of the Taiwan Enabling Act for
myself and for my distinguished cospon-
sors. Section 114 of the legislation deals
with a continuing and strong U.S. inter-
est in a peaceful solution to the Taiwan
issue. This is a subject that we have been
privileged to discuss among ourselves at
great length, that has been debated by
the American public, and that has been
discussed fully among the Members of
this body and Vice Premier Teng when
he was here, together with the distin-
guished ambassadors and members of-the
Chinese diplomatic mission in Washing-
ton. As we all know, the executive branch
really did not want Congress to make
any statement whatsoever on this issue.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions felt differently. The committee and
the Senate, I think, owe a great deal to
Senator CHURCH and Senator JAVITS for
persuading the executive branch that the
American people's concern about the
future of the people on Taiwan could not
be ignored. A strong statement on the
issue was absolutely imperative.
The fundamental thrust of section 114
is good and there is a great deal in the
language that I support and I urge my
Senate colleagues to support. We state
in this section that it is U.S. policy to
make clear that "the U.S. decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the
PRC rests on the expectation that any
resolution of the Taiwan issue will be
by peaceful means." We also state that
we will maintain our capacity to resist
force or corecion that would jeopardize
the security or social or economic system
of the people on Taiwan. And we state
that we will provide defensive arms to
the people on Taiwan. These are strong
statements of U.S. expectations and in-
tent and I wholeheartedly endorse them.
I do recommend to the Senate, how-
ever one change which I believe strength-
ens and clarifies the section. Section
114 (a) paragraph (3) reads:
It is the policy of the United States to
consider any effort to resolve the Taiwan
issue by other than peaceful means a threat
to the peace and security of the Western.
Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States.
My amendment would delete "of grave
concern to" and would substitute "to the
security interests of."
I believe this substitution of language
is essential, because we have a respon-"
sibility to make to the PRC a clear state-
ment of U.S. interests in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan issue. We must
not lead the Chinese to miscalculate or
underestimate our interests. A clear
statement reduces ambiguity and lessens
the chances for misunderstanding.
Certainly, we, in taking any action,
must take into account that succession
of leadership takes places in our coun-
try and other countries. Therefore,. we
should make unmistakably clear in the
language of this legislation how we feel
on this matter.
The President did not obtain from
the PRC a pledge on the nonuse of force
against Taiwan. Perhaps this was diplo-
matically unobtainable, as the admin-
istration maintains. But the point is
that China's spokesmen have been very
clear in what they have said. Chinese
Premier Deng Xiao'ping told the com-
mittee during his recent visit to Wash-
ington that China will fully respect the
realities on Taiwan. But he also main-
tained, when pressed on the issue, that
China will not make a commitment to
use only peaceful means. In other words,
the Chinese have retained use of force
as a definite option. Vice Premier Deng
was frank with us. He did not worry
about the consequences for normali-
zation.
S 2307
He believed, as. I believe, that. it is best
to be frank in exchanging views. When
we agree, we agree to disagree and do
so openly and we can each express our-
selves. I think we have that obligation
today.
Now it is our turn to be equally frank.
We must state that a PRC effort to re-
solve' the Taiwan issue by other than
peaceful means would be a threat to the
security interests of the United States.
I urged my colleagues on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to adopt
this language, but it was rejected.
One argument made against my
amendment was that it might derail the
normalization process. I reject. this ar-
gument. We should not muddy our defi-
nition of U.S. interest- because we are
afraid of offending PRC sensitivities.
Vice-Premier Deng did not mince words
when he refused to pledge nonuse of
force against Taiwan because of any
concern that normalization would not
proceed. Vice-Premier Deng was not con-
cerned about offending the United States
when he said in Tokyo, immediately fol-
lowing his tour here, that the United
States had shown a lack of direction on
the Iranian crisis and had mishandled it.
The Chinese were not concerned about
derailing normalization when they
stated that they must "punish" Vietnam
and when they soon thereafter invaded
Vietnam. The Chinese say what they
mean and we respect them for it. Now
we must say what we mean and the
Chinese, in my view, will respect us for
it.
I do believe, even though there is
sometimes a different approach taken in
the field of diplomacy, we are still deal-
ing with human beings. The experience
of. the Senator from Illinois has always
been that a relationship is more nor-
mal, natural, and healthy and more long-
lasting when friends are good enough to
speak frankly to each other. I do not
really believe that the Chinese would
respect us if, knowing we felt deeply
about something, we did not forthrightly,
frankly, and honestly express exactly
how we feel in important documents as
is the legislation presently before us.
President Carter has declared that the
United States could go to war over Tai-
wan. This is much stronger language
than I am suggesting and the Chinese
certainly have not terminated the nor-
malization process because of it.
A second argument made in the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee against
my amendment was that it would com-
mit the United States to take military
action if the PRC used force against Tai-
wan. This criticism is unfounded. My
amendment leaves completely open the
options for a U.S. response. It neither
pledges use of force nor rules out the,
possibility of use of force. I would op-
pose language that would commit us in
advance to use force in the case of hos-
tilities directed at the people on Taiwan.
In fact, it is my view that it is unconsti-
tutional to direct the President to use
force under circumstances that may oc-
cur in the future.
We would not want to bind this Nation
to action that goes even further than any
mutual security treaty we have today.
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S 2308
CONGRIESSIONAIL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
None of these treaties, including the se-
curity treaty we are terminating with
Taiwan, authorizes or requires the Presi-
dent to introduce Armed Forces into hos-
tilities,
The mutual defense treaties that we
have with Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines and the treaty that we are
terminating with Taiwan all use the fol-
lowing language:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack
on either of the parties would be dangerous
to its own peace and security and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional proc-
esses.
If my language were to use that exact
language or go even further stating some-
nonpeaceful settlement of the Taiwan Neither do they have the motivation for
issue? Let me share with you my research it, since it is the principle of "one
into some of the language we have used China" and of the PRC being that China
in the past to express our interest in that is the most important to them. Fur-
situations where there really was no real- thermore, the Chinese are wholly aware
istic option of possible use of force. of American feelings on the matter.
In 1956, after the Soviet Union had But to say that the United States is
intervened with force in Hungary, a State opposed to any settlement other than a
Department spokesman said that "the peaceful one is quite a different matter
actions of the Soviet Union are the cause than declaring that a settlement by force
of the greatest concern." But we did would be a threat to the security inter-
nothing. We took no action. ests of the United States.
In 1975, Secretary Kissinger said that Here I should note that,we have the
Soviet introduction of military equip- use of code words "security interests." I
ment into Angola and Cuban participa- think the threat to the security and the
tion in Angola are considered "a serious threat to the security interests brings td
matter ? ? = and not compatible with mind the wording of the previous treaty,
the spirit of relaxation of tensions." that we thought that while on its face
thing to the effect that "an attack on In 1976, a State Department spokes-
Taiwan is considered an attack on the man said the United, States viewed
United States" or "the preservation of "with gravity and concern" the North
the integrity of Taiwan is vital to the Korean slaying, of two American mili-
national security,of the United States," tary officers in the demilitarized zone.
critics, of my amendment might be on Just last month, February 9, the State
firmer ground. But my language states Department spokesman that the United
only that a nonpeaceful resolution of the States "would be seriously concerned"
Taiwan issue would threaten the "secu- over a Chinese attack on Vietnam.
rity interests" of the United States. This And just last week, the White House
is a clear statement of fact and in no expressed "grave concern" over the Is-
way commits in advance the United raeli cabinet's rejection of a U.S. invi-
States to military action. tation to a Camp David summit meeting.
The United States reserves the right- In my view, expressions of gravity and
even under its defense treaty obliga- concern are simply not strong enough.
tions-to determine for itself what mils- The term "of grave concern" is not
tary action, if any, is appropriate. My strong enough. It does not serve in any
amendment makes no inflexible commit- way as a deterrent. Nor does it convey
ment for the United States. But my lan- the strength of our true feelings. We
guage is a more realistic and a more need language that expresses our inter-
accurate statement of U.S. interests in a ests strongly and clearly while at the
peaceful resolution than a mere expres- same time allowing the U.S. flexibility in
sign of "grave concern." And I believe the case of hostilities. I believe my lan-
that it implies more clearly that the guage meets both requirements-and I
United States does not reject the option urge my colleagues to adopt it.
of use of force. In other words, we are Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
retaining the same option that the Chi- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
nese are retaining for themselves. ator from Rhode Island.
Still another argument against my Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the language
amendment is that a PRC effort to re- proposed by the Senator from Illinois
solve the Taiwan issue by other than was discussed thoroughly and at length
peaceful means would not be a threat in the committee. He presented his argu-
to U.S. security interests. I wholeheart- ments there ably and well, just as he did
edly disagree with this argument and my now. But the concern of all of us was
reading of American public opinion Is that this language could produce more
that most Americans would disagree with problems than it would resolve.
it. Can you imagine the shock and the The language proposed by Senator
th' tr if the Peo re's
oon
p P
d
h
l
the language of Senator PEacY's amend-
ment could be acceptable, that when one
takes into account the meaning of the
words and what the words indicate, the
perception of those words to the other
nations in that part of the world, it
could indicate a great deal more than
the words on their face indicate.
So, all told, our committee was of the
view that this amendment should be- re-
jected, and this is the position the com-
mittee takes on the floor.
Let me note here that our military
presence in Taiwan over the past two
decades and our Mutual Defense Treaty
were orginally predicated on the under-
standing of that earlier period that our
interests in Asia faced a monolithic
Communist threat. We might not have
been totally wrong then, but certainly
now it is clear that the situation has
changed radically in these decades from
a primarily East-West confrontation to
confrontations. primarily among Com-
munist states.
In reaching the agreement on normal-
ization with Peking, the administration
agreed to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan, including the for-
mal security commitment in article 5 of
that treaty. The language introduced by
Senator PEacY could easily be inter-
preted as reviving. the concept of that
security. commitment. As some of our
colleagues pointed out in the commit-
tee's deliberations, we canot have it both
ways: We cannot at one and the same
time establish relations with one Gov-
y
rsmay rn rs c
ExcY s
ou
d be rejected, as it was in ernment of China and, retain a security
Republic of China were to resort to the committee. The language of section commitment to another part of China;
force to settle the Taiwan issue? The 114(a) as it now stands reflects -a care- we cannot, in other words, have a new
United States would be faced with deci- ful balance, a balance between accu- Mutual Defense Treaty by another name.
sions that-no matter how resolved- rately reflecting what an armed attack Let us also take a different look for-
would affect U.S. security interests. against Taiwan would mean, on the one a moment at the wording of the Percy
If Taiwan were forcibly overrun by the hand, and, on the other, avoiding legis- amendment compared to that reported
PRC, U.S. stature in the world would be lating an approximation of the language out of committee. We of course do have
seriously affected and the confidence of of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which was political, . economic and moral interest]
America's other allies in the region would terminated as part of the agreement on in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
be weakened. The people of Japan would normalization of relations with the Peo- question. The leaders in Peking, as will
be deeply shaken. The situation could ple's Republic. The current language is their successors, have no doubts about
bolster our adversaries in the region. For a product of the most careful discussions these interests, and we will continue to
example, North Korea would undoubt- by our colleagues, and I think it states assert them clearly. We would, in fact,
edly be encouraged to take aggressive ac- clearly and exactly what the circum- be gravely concerned about an effort to
tion against South Korea. Our security stances require. resolve the Taiwan question by other
interests are clearly involved. I think that all of us are well aware than peaceful means. But this is not the
Certainly, I think there would be a that the People's Republic does not have same as stating by legislation that a non-
shaking of confidence in NATO, in Israel, now and will not have in the foreseeable peaceful' solution would be a threat to
and with every other ally if we were future the capability to launch a serious our security.. Those words, as we all
unable to prevent an attack on Taiwan. attack on Taiwan. To even begin serious know, have a special meaning that goes
Why have I arrived at the conclusion preparations for such an attack would. beyond. what is warranted by the facts.
that the words "of grave concern" do not risk many of the other relationships- And, as the administration has said,
convey to the PRC the seriousness with with Japan for example-that the Chi- any attack on Taiwan would so funda-
which the United States would view a nese have put such importance on. mentally alter the basis on which the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 2309
United States has normalized relations
with Peking that obviously the adminis-
tration would at that time consult with
Congress and decide upon an appropri-
ate response. But the degree of auto-
maticity implied by the Percy amend-
ment is highly undesirable.
At this point and at this time, however,
I believe that we have struck the right
balance in the language of section 114(a)
as it now stands.
Let me add one point. What we want to
achieve on this subject is a clear state-
ment, demonstrating a virtual consen-
sus, about the American people's con-
cerns about our friends on Taiwan. We
want Peking to get the message from
Congress just as it already has been given
the message by the President and Am-
bassador Woodcock. It is clear to me that
Senator PERCY's amendment would not
get strong majority support. What would
we have gained by language of this sort
adopted by a narrow majority? The mes-
sage- that would come through in that
case would be that a substantial minority
does not care about a nonpeaceful reso-
lution. We obviously do not want that.
And it would be small comfort to Taiwan.
I urge that we support the estimable
language that was negotiated in the
committee. It accurately and strongly
reflects the American position on this
subject-in a manner that is called for at
this point in history:
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant- legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the name of the
distinguished Senator from California
(Mr. HAYAKAWA) be added as a cosponsor
of the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, inas-
much as I voted against the amendment
in committee, I think I should explain
why I have changed my position.
On first reading, it appeared to me
that Senator PERCY's amendment was
unnecessary, because it seemed to me to
be covered by other aspects of the same
document. But on second and third read-
ing, and upon more mature reflection, it
seems to me that I must support Senator
PERCY's amendment, and therefore I rise
to do so.
Mr. PERCY. I thank my distinguished
colleague.
Mr. President, the senior Senator
from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the
minority leader, is necessarily absent
from the Senate today on official busi-
ness. Senator BAKER has a ithorize'? me,
however, to make the following state-
ment on his behalf.
Senator BAKER fully supports the
Percy amendment to the Taiwan En-
abling Act. When the committee voted
on the security provision, he specifically
asked that his proxy be withheld so that
he may preserve his option to support
amendments to the provision.
Although he is unable to be here for
the vote, Senator BAKER hopes to be
paired in support of the amendment.
I express deep appreciation to Sena-
tor BAKER for his counsel and advice and
his support. Senator BAKER and I have
met at some considerable length with
Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, have listened to his rea-
soning, and both Senator BAKER and I
have reaffirmed our intention to go for-
ward, because we feel that this is a
point of view that I feel is shared over-
whelmingly by the American people and
by the Senate of the United States.
I should like to ask a question of the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee who was present
at the time of our hearings when Gen-
eral Jones, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, appeared before the
committee. At that time I asked Gen-
eral Jones to indicate whether or not
an attack by force on Taiwan by the
People's Republic of China would be a
threat to our security interests or just
a matter of grave concern to us.
General Jones replied:
I believe that an attack on Taiwan would
be not only of grave concern but would
impact on our security interests. There is
no question about it.
Now the Senator from Illinois does
not wish in any way by offering this
amendment to imply that I believe the
PRC would attack and try to take Tai-
wan by force, because I have'listened
very carefully to everything that respon-
sible officials in the Government of the
People's Republic of China have said
about their intentions. It seems emi-
nently clear that they are patient and
they wish to resolve this matter in an
amicable and peaceful manner. It is also
the judgment of the Senator from Illi-
nois that a nonpeaceful resolution to the
Taiwan issue is not at all in the inter-
ests of China.
It would be so contrary to the thrust
of their intent to develop their economy
and establish goods relationships with
the Western world and Japan. .The Sen-
ator from Illinois cannot really envision
the use of force by China today or in the
foreseeable future.
I was also very, pleased to find that
our own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, of
Staff, felt that as well.
If I could find in the-
Mr. CHURCH. May I reply to the
Senator?
Mr. PERCY. I will be happy to have
a reply while I try to find the response
that. General Jones gave to our ques-
tions on that particular point, But I
would be very anxious to have a reac-
tion from our distinguished chairman
as to whether he does feel that an at-
tack on Taiwan would be more than just
a matter of grave concern. While the
distinguished Senator was off the floor,
the Senator from Illinois reviewed a
series of statements made by members
of the State Department and various
administrations describing U.S. feelings
about particular situations. In each case,
no action of any kind was taken by the
United States. If I could say, the se-
mantics of the situation are such that
the signal is that a matter of grave con-
cern does not imply that we take action;
whereas, without any question, an attack
upon a NATO ally, for instance, or an
attack in other parts of the world where
our vital -interests would be threatened
would certainly call for action. My
amendment falls somewhere in between.
I ask my distinguished colleague if he
would not agree with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the co-
sponsors of this amendment that a force-
fill attack on Taiwan would be a matter
of more than grave concern, a phrase
used frequently in diplomacy without
action following it.
Mr. CHURCH. First, let me say that
the language agreed to by the committee
constitutes, in my view, a broader basis
for reassurance to the people of, Taiwan
than the old arrangement between the
United States and the Republic of China.
But as for the Senator's question, I call
his attention to page 745 of the hearings
where the Senator puts the following
question to General Jones:
Senator PERCY.... Let me put it this way
for you, then. In your judgment, is it stronger
to say "a threat to the security interests of
the United States" rather than saying it is a
"matter of grave concern" to us?
General JoNEs. It may be stronger, but
my problem with "threat to security inter-
ests" is that there is no qualifying factor
there, and that our security interests are less
there than in other areas of the Pacific or of
the world. So, I would be concerned about
the implication being far greater than
intended.
So I think the record should be clear
that General Jones did not call for the
Percy amendment. In fact, at no time did
he express any reservation about the
language that is now contained in the
bill.
Moreover, I believe that a careful read-
ing of the general's testimony, as it ap-
pears here in the hearings, would con-
vey to any Senator the fact that General
Jones thought there were many other
places in the Western Pacific that were
of much greater importance than Taiwan
to the security interests of 'the United
States.
Now, having said that, Mr. President,
let me go on to emphasize that the pro-
visions of the bill in connection with our
continuing concern for the security and
well-being of the people on Taiwan go
very far. If I were a citizen of Taiwan, I
would be better satisfied with this con-
gressional declaration of American policy
than with the 'arrangement that pre-
viously existed.
I intend to speak to section 114 of the
bill, but I would not want to do so while
trespassing on the time of the Senator
from Illinois, who presently has the floor.
I, for that reason, confine my response
at this time to the answer to the ques-
tion he put to me.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I certainly
hope that I did not imply that the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Jones, supports my amendment.
The Senator from Illinois would never
put the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in that position. At no time when I
questioned him did I attempt to put him
in the position of supporting a specific
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
piece of legislation. The administration,
as the Senator from Illinois understood
at that time, had not yet addressed it-
self specifically to this language, but it
was wellknown that they wanted as
little change as possible. The current
situation is somewhat similar to the
Panama Canal Treaty debate where the
administration wanted as little change
as possible, but the Senate of the United
States found it essential in order to ratify
that treaty that we have our mark or im-
print on it. We had to satisfy many of
the concerns that some of us had and we
did change that language.
But it is understandable that the ad-
ministration, after having negotiated an
understanding with China, would not
want to change it any more than was ab-
solutely essential or necessary.
The Senator from Illinois knows that
General Jones would have preferred that
somehow I would qualify the amendment
to show that our security interests In
Taiwan are, for Instance, less than our
security interests in, let us say, Japan.
But I do think that this kind of ranking
does neither ourselves nor our friends
any benefit whatsoever.
When Secretary of State Dean Ache-
son drew the defense perimeter in Asia
to exclude South Korea we saw a war
break out there.
So I would say that for us to Issue such
a ranking in legislation and say one in-
terest is relatively more important than
another would not really serve our
interests.
We are simply trying to say that there
are certain areas of the world where our
interests are not really affected. There
are other areas where they are affected
and we should indicate as accurately as
possible the degree of concern we might
have in a particular area to deter actions
harming our interests.
We are certainly today stating very
clearly that our interests in the Middle
East are far ahead of our interests in
many other parts of the world. They are
absolutely vital there. What the Soviet
Union' might do in some area affecting
the Middle East would be highly impor-
tant to us.
It is highly important that a Marxist
state such as South Yemen not be per-
mitted to increase its strength along
the borders of Saudi Arabia. It is in the
vital interests of the United States that
we provide assistance, help, backup, and
support for the position taken by Saudi
Arabia now so that North Yemen not be-
come a vulnerable spot and endanger
Saudi Arabia whose interests are inex-
tricably bound up in our own interests.
Therefore, when we come to Taiwan we
simply say it would be a matter of much
more than grave concern. It would be a
matter involving our own security inter-
ests because of the close relationships
we have with South Korea, and the close
ties that we have in Japan, and the in-
terest we have in keeping ourselves as a
Pacific power, and insuring as much free-
dom in that area as is possible.
So the Senator from Illinois is once
again gratified at the degree of support
this amendment has in the cosponsors
In the Senate, and that some members
in the Committee on Foreign Relations,
who previously had voted against it or
abstained from voting, have now, after
reflection, supported it.
It would be my hope, of course, that
taking fully into account the agreement
and understanding reached by the chair-
man and the distinguished minority
member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, with the administration, that
they would find it acceptable and would
not find it contrary to our normalization
of relationships, and ? working together
In a new spirit of friendship, accord, and
partnership with China.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the
amendment offered by the able Senator
from Illinois should be rejected by the
Senate, as it was rejected by the com-
mittee. The language of section 114(a)
as it now stands reflects a careful
balance. It is balanced between accurate-
ly reflecting what an armed attack
against Taiwan would mean, on the one
hand, and, on the other, avoiding an
approximation of the language of the
Mutual Defense Treaty-which was
terminated as part of the agreement on
normalization of relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic.
Mr. President, let me note here that
our military presence in Taiwan over the
past 2 decades, and our Mutual Defense
Treaty, were originally predicated on
the belief of that earlier period that our
interests in Asia faced a monolithic
Communist threat. We neither perceived
nor understood the nature of commu-
nism as well then as we do today. In the
intervening years, it certainly is clear
that the situation in Asia has changed
radically from what was a primarily
east-west confrontation to a north-south
confrontation involving the Communist
governments, themselves.
If you look at China now, it is not a
China poised on its coastline ready to
leap across the Straits of Formosa for
the purpose of subjugating the island and
its people. Today's China looks to the
north, expressing its daily concern over
the threat posed by the other titan of the
Communist world, the Soviet Union; and
it looks to the south, where it has just
been engaged in active warfare with
another Communist neighbor, Vietnam.
Before we begin to tamper with the
language in this bill, it would be prudent,
first of all, to consider the nature of the
present threat to the people of Taiwan.
The record is clear, made so by the
many statements of the leaders of the
People's Republic of China, that the
Peking government presently entertains
no intention of attacking Taiwan.
Furthermore, we have it from no less
an authority than the Chairman of our
own Joint Chiefs of Staff, that mainland
China, even if it were to change its mind,
presently lacks the military capability
of successfully invading Taiwan.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
distinguished Senator yield at that point
so that I can insert in the RECORD the
quotations from General Jones that I
have now found that would strengthen
and support that argument?
Mr. CHURCH. I am only too happy to
get whatever support is offered for any
argument I make. If the Senator has
pruned from the testimony of General
Jones that part which sustains my argu-
ment, I would be pleased to have that
material inserted at this point in the
RECORD.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the only
carefully selection would be simply to
boil it down as much as possible. It does
fully support the Senator's position,
and confirms the fact that the distin-
guished chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and the Senator from
Illinois have no disagreement what-
soever about this particular point.
I have stated my own personal judg-
ment that there is no intention on the
part of China to attack Taiwan. General
Jones has already affirmed that it is a
problem not only of capability, but also
intention, as to whether it would be in
their best interests.
I quote from the top of page 741 in the
hearings record, where General Jones
says:
As we look at the People's Republic of
China, we see increasing problems in their
military capability. We have projected levels
of capability and later found they haven't
achieved that capability. We don't see an
acceleration in the threat and we don't see
any great urgency at this moment to make
decisions on additional equipment (for Tai-
wan).
This is certainly reassuring. It should
be reassuring to the people of Taiwan
and it should be reassuring to all peace-
loving people that there has been no
buildup of capability.
If the People's Republic of China
wished to, they could build up that
capability. They have great human re-
sources and great physical resources,
and if they had wanted to, they could
have developed that capacity. But they
have not done so.
Further with respect to their inten-
tions, General Jones said this. Quoting
from the middle of page 751, I will read
the entire quotation, so we can have
in the RECORD once again what General
Jones said about an attack on Taiwan.
He said:
I believe that an attack on Taiwan would
be not only of grave concern but would
impact on our security interests. There is
no question about it.
Then he continued, importantly :
I believe that it is unlikely-not to the
point of a zero probability, but very, very
unlikely-to occur. It would also not be in
the best interests of the People's Republic
of China. It would increase the risk of in-
cursions by the Soviet Union from the
north. It would weaken them in their rela-
tionships with Japan and the United States.
So I think it is clearly riot in their best
Interest-and not in our best interest-
that they do this.
It is General Jones' firm conviction,
shared by so many of us, that it is not
China's intention; they have not tried
to develop the capability, and it is high-
ly unlikely that they would do this, thus
endangering, I might add, not just their
relationships with the United States
and Japan, but also with Western
Europe.
It is those relationships on which
China is now staking Its future develop-
ment. That is really central to their
development. Taiwan is not central to
that development. As they have indi-
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(CONGRESSIONAL IRIEC?RD - SIENA E S-2311
cated, they would have no objection to
the institutions in Taiwan being carried
on in the same way they are now, and
they likened the situation there to that
in Hong Kong.
So what my amendment does not
arise from a concern about the inten-
tions of the present leadership of
China. I simply want to put into law
an advance notice and an honest ex-
pression of opinion as to the degree of
gravity with which the United States
would look upon the use of force, un-
likely as it might be.
I thank the distinguished Senator for
yielding.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the able Sena-
tor from Illinois for his contribution.
It appears, then, Mr. President, that
we are agreed, first, that the Peking gov-
ernment has no present intention to re-
sort to arms to settle the Taiwan
question; and second, that even if this
were not so, the mainland government
does not possess the military capability,
today, to successfully attack and conquer
Taiwan.
Third, if the policy in Peking were to
change, and an attempt. were made to
develop the capability necessary to suc-
cessfully attack Taiwan General Jones
has told us that it would take the
Chinese at least 5 years to develop the
amphibious forces to carry an invading
force across the 100 miles of water that
separate the mainland from the island.
So at the very least, we would have 5
years' notice before any attack could
be launched. There does not seem to be
any disagreement on that score, either.
Furthermore, Mr. President, General
Jones has confirmed that the people on
Taiwan have a sufficient quantity of de-
fensive weapons, today to successfully-de-
fend themselves against any attack. We
have learned, I think, from the Israeli
experience that there is no security
guarantee that can be given by any
foreign country-not even by the United
States-that means as much to the suc-
cessful defense of any land as the will-
ingness and capability of its own people
to defend it. Just as this is true with
Israel, so it is true in the case of Taiwan.
Now, against these basic premises-
first, that the mainland government has
no intention of attacking Taiwan; sec-
ond, that it lacks amphibious capability
to invade Taiwan, and it would require
at least 5 years to build the capaibility;
and third, that Taiwan has the defensive
arms to successfully turn back any at-
tack-let us read the language that the
committee agreed upon in section 114 of
the bill. I read the language, Mr. Presi-
dent, simply to underscore how broad
the committee's expression of interest is
in the future of Taiwan, as set forth in
the language of the bill.
Section 114(a) reads:
In order to achieve the objectives of this
section-
It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to maintain extensive, close, and
friendly relations with the people on Taiwan;
(2) to make clear that the United States'
decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China rests on
the expectation that any resolution of the
Taiwan issue will be by peaceful means;
(3) to consider any effect to resolve the
Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means
a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area. and of grave concern
to the United States; and
(4) to provide the people on Taiwan with
arms of a defensive character.
There, Mr. President, is the statement
of American policy. It will be an expres-
sion of Congress. When signed by the
President, it will be the law of the land.
What do we say about the action we
will take to implement this policy, That
is contained in part (b) of section 114,
and reads as follows:
(1) the United States will maintain its
capacity to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of
the people on Taiwan;
(2) the United States will assist the people
on Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability through the provision of.
arms of a defensive character;
(3) the President is directed to inform the
Congress promptly of any threat to the
security of Taiwan and any danger to the in-
terests of the United States arising there-
from; and
And (4) the United States will act to
meet any danger described in paragraph (3)
of this subsection in accordance with con-
stitutional processes and procedures estab-
lished by law.
I ask you, Mr. President, how could
we design language better suited to ac-
commodate the needs of the people. on
Taiwan as they look to the future?
(Mr. LEVIN assumed the chair.)
Mr. CHURCH. Mischief would be. done
by tampering with this language. The
substitution of the words contained in
the Percy amendment would bring us
back very close to the phraseology that
was used in the old mutual security pact
which will be terminated as a result of
the new relationship we have established
with mainland China.
Yesterday, I spoke with the President.
of the United States. He is prepared to
accept the committee language because
it is drafted in such a way that it does
not infringe upon any commitment he
made on behalf of the United States. The
language in the pending bill will not
jeopardize the normalization of our rela-
tions with Peking, which the. Senator
from Illinois concedes he so strongly
favors.
But if we adopt the language he would
substitute, reminiscent as it is of the
language contained in the old Mutual
Security Treaty, then we place at hazard
the new relationship we seek with main-
land China.
The President was deeply concerned
that we not make this mistake. He told
me, as he has said to others, that he is
obliged to comply with the understand-
ing reached with the People's Republic
of China. If'this bill contains language
that goes beyond that understanding,
then he has only one honorable course
to follow, and that is to veto the bill.
Why should we put this new relation-
ship at such risk when it is utterly
unnecessary?
Earlier in this debate, Mr. President,
I said that if I were a citizen of Taiwan,
I would prefer the statement of policy
contained in this bill over whatever guar-
antees were proffered during the period
of our alliance with Taiwan. I want to
tell you why I say that, Mr. President.
We have normalized relations with
Peking because we believe it will benefit
the United States. Normal relations with
a government that maintains jurisdic-
tion over one-fourth of the human race-
normal relations with the great giant
of Asia-makes sense. It not only opens
up new opportunities for trade that will
be beneficial to our farmers and to our
businesses, but it strengthens the stra-
tegic hand of the United States in Asia.
For the past 30 years, we have dealt
from a position of endemic weakness in
Asia, which was one of the reasons for
our involvement in two costly but in-
decisive Asian wars. With the normali-
zation of relations with Peking we have
the opportunity to convert that position
of endemic weakness into a position of
strategic strength, because as our rela-
tions with the Peking Government im-
prove, the Soviet Union must take into
account the new American position in
Asia.
So we have good reasons to believe,
Mr. President, that not only the eco-
nomic but also the strategic and politi-
cal interests of the Unied States will be
substantially improved by normalizing
relations with the Peking government.
By the same token, the Chinese have
reason to believe that their interests will
also be advanced. Why is Peking inter-
ested in normalizing relations with the
United States? Why did that Govern-
ment make concessions to us it had never
previously made in normalizing its rela-
tions with other powers?
The reason is that China has great
respect for American technology. China
expects that we can contribute to her
own efforts to modernize. China also real-
izes that there may be less danger of an
attack from Russia as long as she main-
tains friendly ties with the United States.
There are many, many different consid-
erations which led the People's Republic
of China to decide to normalize relations
with the United States. And all of the
expectations and benefits they expect to
derive from this new relationship depend
upon continued peace between the main-
land and Taiwan.
Not only do we put Peking on notice
from the very outs-eTthat American pol-
icy rests upon the expectation of con-
tinued peace, but we go on to say that
we will furnish the people on Taiwan
with sufficient arms for their defense in
the future. In addition, we will view any
use of force as a threat to the peace and
security of the western Pacific area and
of grave concern to the United States.
So, Mr. President, on all counts this
language is perfectly adequate. Pb is
broader than the rather narrow obli-
gation assumed under the old security
treaty. It is terribly important that the
Senate uphold this language and not
tamper with it. If we adopt the amend-
ment offered by the Senator from Illinois,
we will jeopardize a relationship that
rests upon an agreement reached between
the President of the United States and
the Government in Peking.
Furthermore, if we adopt by a split
vote the elanguage offered by the Senator
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March-8, 1 9 7 9 .
from Illinois, what have we accom-
plished? What kind of a message do we
send? It is rather like the chairman of
the board of trustees sending the hos-
pitalized president of a corporation a
get-well card, but by a vote of 6 to 5.
Is that the kind of message we want
to send to Peking-that we have nar-
rowly approved an amendment which
substitutes "security interests" for "grave
concern"-and that nearly half of the
Senate opposed it? I do not think that
furthers our interest or our purpose or,
indeed, the objectives sought by the Sen-
ator from Illinois, himself.
How much better to accept satisfac-
tory language that does the job for the
people of Taiwan, and was unanimously
adopted by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in its final vote. That is the way
to send the message to Peking that we
want sent; namely, that it is our ex-
pectation that there will be no resort
to force in the future in the settlement
of the Taiwan issue. For these reasons,
Mr. President, I strongly urge the Senate
to reject the Percy amendment.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD.. Will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to
the able majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Committee on Foreign Relations gave
extensive study to the question of Tai-
wan's future security. The bill that was
originally submitted by the administra-
tion was amended by the Committee on
Foreign Relations to include language
that leaves no doubt about our continu-
ing concern for the well-being of the
people of Taiwan. As the distinguished
able chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee has so succinctly pointed out,
the amendment agreed to in the commit-
tee makes absolutely clear, as clear as
the noonday sun in a cloudless sky, to
the people of the Republic of. China that
its new relationship with the United
States' would be jeopardized seriously if
there were to be force used against Tai-
wan. As the chairman has pointed out,
any effort on the part of the People's
Republic to do this not only would jeop-
ardize its new relationship with the
United States, but it would be an ex-
tremely costly and counterproductive
venture.
Now, Mr. President, the United States
will always act in its own interest. The
language clearly states that such action
on the part of the PRC would be of grave
concern to the United States. The Senate
does not have to write any new language
in this by way of an amendment to pro-
tect the United States in its use of what-
ever force it may need to bring to bear
at some future time when its own secu-
rity interest is at stake. We do not have
to write that into this. That goes without
saying. The United States always has
that option.
Mr President, I yield to the distin-
guished Senator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I feel very
heavy responsibility. I drafted the orig-
inal Taiwan provision and fought for it
in the committee. Then Senator CHURCH
and I worked out this arrangement. The
only possible change in it that could be
made is the one that Senator PERCY
suggests.
I believe that General Jones answered
that completely and the reason that I
accepted Senator CHURCH'S modifica-
tion-I used exactly the same words that
are in this amendment originally. The
reason that I accepted it was that I felt
that Senator CHURCH was right, one, that
we should not guarantee automaticity
of response; and, two, that we should
grade our national security interests
based upon the facts of national security.
He did not put in the first rank, like
South Korea, the national security of the
United States as it might be jeopardized
by the use of force on Taiwan. But the
provisions of the section as I drew it are
very, very strong respecting the protec-
tion to the people on Taiwan. Just in 1
minute, they include conditioning our
normalization on the nonuse of force;
second, that if use of force were tried,
a threat to the peace and security of the
western Pacific area would be created.
That is as much as a threat to the na-
tional security interests of the United
States, quite apart from the words,
"grave concern." Third, that when we are
implementing this, we are going to retain.
our capacity to resist any display of
force, and too, that it . is going to
apply very carefully spelled out, to the
Taiwanese.
But it is very important to me, and
this is what I got for it: one, we would
not only resist any resort to force, and
this is what I got, but other forms of
coercion which would jeopardize the
security, or the social, or economic system
of the people on Taiwan.
Now, that is the guts of it. That is what
we are trying to protect. It is not the
security of the people on Taiwan alone,
it is their right to continue the system
of government which has made them the
second most successful people in the
whole of Asia.
Finally, we got another paragraph at
the end of this section which said, "The
United States will act to meet any dan-
ger." That ties into the way we have
amended paragraph 3, which is the sub-
ject of what Senator PERCY wants to
change. "The United States will act to
meet any danger" described in that para-
graph now sought to be changed, "in
accordance with constitutional processes
and procedures established by law,"
which is exactly the way we approach
NATO.
Taking the whole section together, I
felt it was stronger, more effective, more
particularized and even better notice to
the People's Republic of China than the
way I had originally drafted it; but when
I did, it did contain exactly the same ap-
proach which is now sought to be rein-
troduced. We have added those things
which make it, in my judgment, even
more effective.
For those reasons, I ,am. compelled to
oppose the Percy amendment. I thank
the majority leader for yielding.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi
dent, I move to lay the amendment on
the table.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator hold
that for a few minutes?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I cannot, for
reasons which I shall be glad to explain.
I shall withhold it for 1 minute to the
Senator.
Mr. HELMS. That will not be long
enough. What was the agreement made?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. There is no
agreement.
Mr. HELMS. Is the Senator going to
move ahead and move to table when
other Senators wish to speak?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. There was a
long time in here that I was asking Sen-
ators to please, please speak.
Mr. HELMS. This Senator has been
sitting here a long time, but if the ma-
jority leader has made that judgment,
fine.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I move to lay the amendment on the
table and I ask for the yeas and nays.
I thank the Senator from North Caro-
lina for his usual courtesy and under-
standing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the
Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the
Senator from Hawaii (Mr. MATSUNAGA),
the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
MORGAN), and the Senator from New
York (Mr. MOYNIHAN) are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from North Carolina
(Mr. MORGAN) would vote "nay."
Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) is
necessarily absent.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask for regular order.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a
Senator in the Chamber who has not
voted?
Regular order is called for.
The result was announced-yeas 45,
nays 49, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 12 Leg.]
YEAS-h5
Baucus Glenn Nelson
Bayh Gravel Nunn
Bentsen Hart Pell
Biden Heflin Randolph
Bradley Jackson Ribicoff
Bumpers Javits Riegle
Burdick Johnston Sarbanes
Byrd, Robert C. Kennedy Sasser
Chiles Leahy Stennis
Church Levin Stevenson
Cranston Magnuson Stewart
Culver McGovern Talmadge
Durkin - Melcher Tsongas
Eagleton Metzenbaum Williams
Exon Muskie Zorinsky
NAYS-49
Armstrong Goldwater Pressler
Bellmon Hatch Proxmire
Boren Hatfield Pryoi
Boschwitz Hayakawa Roth
Byrd, Heinz Schmitt
Harry F., Jr. Helms Schwetker
Cannon Hollings Simpson
Chafee Huddleston Stafford
Cochran Humphrey Stevens
Cohen Jepsen Stone
Danforth Kassebaum Thurmond
DeConcini Laxalt Tower
Dole Lugar Wallop
Domentci Mathias Warner
Durenberger McClure Weicker
Ford Packwood Young
Garn Percy
NOT VOTING--C
Baker Long Morgan
Inouye Matsunaga Moynihan
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So the motion to lay on the table
amendment No. 79 was rejected.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I move to reconsider the vote by which
the motion was rejected., and I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a suf-
ficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD addressed the
Chair.
The VICE, PRESIDENT. The Senator
from West Virginia.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I yield to the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I hope
that the Senate will reconsider the vote
that has just been taken.
Mr. HART. Mr. President,, may we
have order in the Senate?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate
will be in order.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President,, the Pres-
ident of the United States is- now in the
Middle East, in an effort to win peace.
I'think that a vote of this kind, occurring
while he is in Cairo,, would send a very
unfortunate message.
Just before he left, yesterday,, the Pres-
ident told me of his anxiety about Senate
approval of this amendment. He said he
hoped very much that the Senate. would
not insist upon going beyond the under-
standing that he had reached with the
People's Republic of China, on the basis
of which it became possible for both
countries to normalize their relations.
I know of the concern of the People's
Republic of China about substituting the
words "security interests of the United
States" for "grave concern." The Am-
bassador from Peking has raised this
matter, asking me many probing ques-
tions about our motives and purposes in
connection with the committee's lan-
guage.
If it is the objective of the Senate to
place in jeopardy the normalization of
our relations. with mainland China, then
let it be clear to everyone that this is
what we are doing with the vote just cast.
I ask the Senate, Why? The substitu-
tion of these words does not improve by
one iota the measure of assurance we
give to the people on Taiwan respecting
their future.
This is a mischievous amendment be-
cause it insists on the use of two words
borrowed from our Mutual Security
Treaty with Taiwan. It thus raises the
whole question of whether we will keep
faith with our commitment to Peking,
which forms. the basis for our new rela-
tionship with Peking,
We are interfering here with what is
regarded as an internal matter by the
Chinese, not alone by Peking but by
Taipei as well. Their proposition is. that
there is but one China and Taiwan is
part of that China. It is a proposition
subscribed to not only by Peking but
by Taipei.
Now when we insert "security interests
of the United States" we draw the Amer-
Iran defense perimeter line between Tai-
wan and the mainland.
And I ask senators why do it? I ask
Senators what greater assurance can be
given to the people on Taiwan than that
D - SENATE
which is already contained in the lan-
guage of the bill?
Mr. President, before we decide upon
the Percy amendment we should have a
clear understanding as to the nature of
the threat to which it is directed.
Earlier in the debate, the Senator
from Illinois and I agreed, based on the
record that was made in the hearings
before the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. We agreed, first, that presently there
is no intention in Peking to attack Tai-
wan; second, that Peking lacks the mili-
tary capability of conducting a success-
ful attack upon Taiwan; third,, that if
the policy in Peking were to change it
would require at least 5 years for them
to obtain the amphibious fleet necessary
to launch a. successful attack upon Tai-
wan; and fourth, that Taiwan today
possesses the necessary defensive weap-
ons to turn back any attack that might
be directed upon them.
Based upon those premises, what has
the committee done to give assurances
to the people of Taiwan as they look to
the future?
If Senators will examine section 114(a)
beginning on line 25 of page 13 of the
bill, they will see that it is the policy of
the United States, which as a part of
this legislation once signed by the Pres-
ident, becomes the law of the land :
(1) to maintain extensive, close, and
friendly relations with the people of Taiwan;
(2) to make clear that the United States'
decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China rests, on
the expectation that any resolution of the
Taiwan issue will be by peaceful means;.
(3) to consider any effort to resolve the
Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means a
threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of grave concern, to
the United States; and
(4) to provide the people on Taiwan, with
arms of a. defensive character.
Now, Mr. President, these expressions
of concern for the people on Taiwan are
broader than any ever contained in the
old mutual security treaty. Read the
language of that treaty and you will see
that it was confined to one thing, an at-
tack, in which event it promised mutual.
consultation in accordance with the con-
stitutional processes of both countries.
But this declaration promises close,
extensive and friendly relations with the
people on Taiwan. This declaration
makes it clear that everything the Chi-
nese expect to get from their new rela-
tionship with our country is based upon
our expectation that there will be con-
tinuing peace between the mainland and
the island.
Do Senators want to send a message to
Peking? What kind of a message do we
send to Peking on the basis of this last
vote? We are telling Peking that, a mar-
gin of four votes, the Senate of the
United States has decided that any fu-
ture attack on Taiwan would be an at-
tack upon the security interests of the
United States. That is. like the board of
trustees sending a get-well message to
the corporate president saying, that,, "We
want you to get well by a vote of 5 to 4."
By four votes, the Senate practically
split in twain. How can we send a clear
signal that way? It is not one of unity
but one of division, not the kind of unan-
52313
imous vote we had in the committee
when we finally adopted the words now
contained in the bill
This is a pointless and self-defeating
amendment to adopt. It does. not advance
the. interests of the United States. It
could put our new policy in jeopardy,
and it does nothing for the people on
Taiwan that is not equally well accom-
plished by the language already con-
tained in the bill.
(Mr. STEWART assumed the chair.)
Mr. CHURCH. Oh, it is political, I un-
derstand that. But I think we should be
concerned here with the fundamental in-
terests of our country. For 30 years we
have been pretending that the Govern-
ment of China was located in Taipei; for
30 years we have Unposed upon ourselves
a position of endemic weakness,, because
we failed to acknowledge the presence of
the giant of Asia.
That old policy engulfed us in two in-
decisive wars in Asia, for which we paid
very dearly. But, oh, we love our illu-
sions, Mr. President, so much so that we
were the last of the major nations finally
to acknowledge the truth, that the Gov-
ernment of China resides in Peking, and
that it is in our national interest, as
other countries have found it to be in
theirs, to have normal dealings with that
Government.
Why put all of that in jeopardy be-
cause of political considerations, parti-
san considerations? i do know that the
words we have added could do mischief.
I do know they could put our new policy
in jeopardy, and I do know that they do
not add one iota to the assurances we
give the people of Taiwan in the language
of the bill.
So I plead with the Senate to recon-
sider this vote, and I do so in the name
of a rational policy. We have been so long
in need of one in Asia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
LEvrx)'. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. I thank the Chair.
Since coming to the Senate I have ex-
pressed my convictions' and concerns
about Taiwan's security on many occa-
sions and, as various officials can testify,
to two administrations. Thus I do not
oppose the Senator from Illinois' amend-
ment because I am any less concerned
about Taiwan than is he, or less con-
cerned about the perception of a U.S.
presence in East Asia, because I share
fully his concern on these points.
The reason why I oppose this amend-
ment is because I feel there is a right
way and a wrong way to send this mes-
sage to all parties to this new normali-
zation process, and to insure security. I
think we will have chosen the wrong, way
if we adopt this ameddment.
This amendment does nothing. to ma-
terially affect Taiwan's security. It pro-
vides no weapons. Yet it creates a serious
risk of the United States being pulled
into a war not of our choosing. That is
the important point about this language.
it creates a serious risk of being pulled
into a conflict not of our choosing.
Should an incident like a raid from
Taiwan or an overflight, whether inad-
vertent or not, of PRC air space trigger
a PRC reaction, we do not have Ameri-
can members of the Taiwan Defense
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S 2314 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
March 8, 1979
Command' present on Taiwan. We will in the committee. General Jones, Chair- involvement in situations not of our making
not have. a U.S. representation when man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told nor under our direct control.
shooting starts in the Straits of Taiwan. the committee that from a broad strate- I would add here . that I have sug-
Without the presence of ? an American gic interest Taiwan is less significant gested that we get going at the earliest
military presence in the Taiwan De- than South Korea, Thailand, and Japan, possible time with the weapons that Tai-
fense Command, now abolished, how do saying, "I would place it in a position wan needs.
we determine the facts?, Do we take of far less strategic interest than other Mr. President, the United States will
someone's word for it that they have been nations in the Pacific.". That is the make very serious judgments before we
attacked? "We just had a ship sinking Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to go to war. They will be based
in the Taiwan Straits, America, come speaking of Taiwan's strategic signifi- on the situation existing at that time.
to our help. We cannot manage this. It cance. The language of grave concern for that
was by a submarine, and we have no Yet we are told by this language that situation that will exist at that time is
antisubmarine warfare capability. We we now say that our front line runs the language that was carefully worked
have' no method of attacking sub- down somewhere through the Straits out in committee. That language does
marines." - of Taiwan. not mislead anyone.
Do we take their word for it and.im- Admiral Snyder, former Chief of Tai- Mr. President, I would submit that the
mediately go out to the Taiwan Straits wan Defense Command, now defunct, language, that has been suggested in this
with a U.S. carrier and start a war? and the most forceful witness for Tai- amendment will, however, lead to much
We would be hard pressed, if this wan's strategic importance, nevertheless misunderstanding. Why do we want to
amendment is' approved, to go against concluded his answer to Senator PERCY lead Taiwan into thinking we will make
that request from Taiwan because what with the observation that although Tai- a commitment to them that we are not
we are saying is that our front line of wan is important- likely to honor in the crunch? Why do
defense is the Taiwan Strait. I do not I think that as long as we can keep Clark we want to mislead our friends around
want to see us make a decision here Air Force Base in the Philippines we can get the world into thinking we would make
today that would give that judgmental along without it. I that kind of commitment? Why do we
factor 'of whether to go to war to some- Meaning Taiwan- want to mislead the people in the Peo-
one else. Thus, with the recently concluded amend- ple's Republic of China into thinking
What if we had a couple' of aircraft ment to the Philippines base agreement, we that wee would have a kneejerk reaction
shot down, inadvertently or not, and retain a power projection capability from to events beyond our control, or our de-
maybe they areshot down by weapons the Philippines, Japan, and our at-sea forces fense command that we would have that
that are incapable of being opposed by sufficient to exert a U.S. presence in the kind of reaction?
the weaponry that the Republi i of Western Pacific. Such a kneejerk reaction would be ex-
China, previously named, has on Tai- So from a strategic standpoint solely pected when it will not occur; and the
wan? They call for our air assets to come Taiwan is neither a vital interest nor world should understand we will not be
out there and help counter that threat. necessary to the effective employment of making that kind of commitment.
Would we go automatically? Are not we U.S. military forces in the region. We need to send abroad a message of
stating that this is the security line that amendment denies the United State our grave concern as it was expressed
we are drawing for the United States of This amendment denies the United in the bill brought out by the committee,
America? Yet, that "line of contain- States the flexibility needed to cope with Mr. President; and I urge my colleagues
ment" is not under our control? an uncertain future. When Senator not to seek to make a commitment which
I find it very hard to believe that we PERCY asked the Chairman of the Joint will leave others .to control whether we
would want to do that. Yet the language Chiefs of Staff about the essence of this go to war, or indicating to the people
that is proposed in this U.S. Senate to- amendment, General Jones noted that of Taiwan and the PRC, or other friends
day could be used as justification for although the language may be stronger: around the world, that we have a com-
just such a call. We would then stand My problem with threat to security inter- nutfnent that we would honor regardless
before the world as going back on yet ests is that there is no qualifying factor of the circumstances that may occur in
another agreement, of not living up to there and that our security interests are less the future. `
our commitments around the world. than in other areas of the Pacific or the Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask
Such a serious situation could arise world. So I would be concerned about the unanimous consent that the name of the
because we made a judgment now that implication being far greater than what is distinguished Senator from North Caro
we did not want to know what was intended. lina (Mr. HELMS) be added as a cospon-
going on, we did not want to evaluate That is a direct quote. sor of the pending amendment.
how serious it was, we did not want to Any U.S. commitment must be credible The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
know what weapons were used, we did and capable of being supported by the STEWART). Without objection, it is so
not want to know why the attack oc- U.S. public; otherwise, the U.S. position ordered.
curred and whether it was instigated by is further eroded. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President,. it is my
Taiwan, perhaps to get us involved. Yet, the Lou Harris and Roper polls intention, at an appropriate time, after
We would be, In effect, ruled out from show. that despite a slight increase in all Senators have spoken who wish to
making those most important life-and- favoring the use of U.S. troops to defend speak on this issue, to move to lay' on the
death decisions if this security language Europe, Korea, and Yugoslavia since table the motion to reconsider.
is adopted. 1974, public willingness to defend Taiwan I think that a discussion of this issue
I do not think we want to see those has slipped. is important. I would like to express
decisions go into other than American More importantly, as I argued in a appreciation to Senator HELMS for his
hands. I do not think we want to see letter I sent to Secretary Vance a short cosponsorship, because I know that Sen- ,
that" at all. time ago, providing sufficient arms to ator HELMS, if I understand his feelings
We do have a moral commitment to Taiwan, thereby deterring PRC action, correctly, feels that the so-called Percy
the people of Taiwan, but it is not in- is to be desired, rather than overblown amendment is the minimum that he can
cluded in the legislation, and it does rhetoric from the United States which accept.
not include, to my way of thinking, a may require U.S. forces engaging in com- 'I have thought very carefully how far
required knee-jerk American response. bat if we are to honor our commitment. We could go to honestly express our point
Much has been made of the fact that The last paragraph of that letter I sent of view, just as honestly as China has
United ed Stis strategically significant to the to Secretary Vance makes this point: expressed its point of view. The officials
es. Like many Americans, I want better rela- of the People's Republic of China have
PERCY. Mr
Mr. yield for Mr. a President,
questtion? ion9 will the tions with the PRC, but still have concerns been very forthright in expressing their
Senator r yield
about the security of Taiwan. I believe Tai- opinion. They absolutely refused to enter
Mr. GLENN. Not until I finish my wan's own military capabilities, aided by into any pledge of nonuse of force,-but
statement. Then I would be glad to the qualitative improvements I have sought- they ' did provide some degree of re-
answer any questions. is the best security guarantee for both Tai-
As to the situation with Taiwan's wan and the United States, and will provide assurance.
strategic location, that was addressed the least likelihood of automatic American Though, as I have indicated, I cannot
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
go beyond the language of the so-called
Percy amendment, I deeply appreciate
the fact that there is wide support de-
spite varying gradations of support. Sen-
ator HELMS' support for this amendment
is meaningful because it is my under-
standing that his own amendment goes
substantially further, and that if the?
Percy amendment fails, he might well
carry forward with that amendment and
press that issue.
The question also involves how we feel
about normalization, and we have differ-
ing views on that. I have made it very
clear that I strongly favor normaliza-
' tion of relationships, providing that
every possible degree of assurance is
given to the people of Taiwan, and pro-
viding also that we state unequivocally
what our own national interest is. Just
as we expect China to forthrightly, hon-
estly, openly, and clearly express their
national interest, we also have that right,
that duty, and that obligation.
I am certain also that the People's
Republic ? of China, particularly after
Vice-Premier Teng's visit here and his
personal discussions with the Members
of the Senate, know how strongly the
American people and the Members of the
Senate feel on this issue. And though
the executive branch of the Government
did not want any changes whatsoever,
Senator CHURCH and Senator JAVITS were
able to convince the executive branch
that it was essential and they put to-
gether language that more clearly ex-
pressed our point of view.
As we all recall during the Panama
debate, many of us indicated there was
no way we could ratify that treaty with-
out amending the language to take into
account certain contingencies. The lead-
ership of the Senate, Senators BYRD and
BAKER, the majority and minority leaders,
helped work out language that made it
possible for many of us to vote for that
treaty, though even then many in good
conscience could not.
I feel that it is necessary, just as the
distinguished chairman and the ranking
minority member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee felt it necessary, to
adopt language that more clearly ex-
presses our views. I think it is necessary
now for the Senate to modify the lan-
guage adopted by the committee, and
the modifications we have suggested are,
in the judgment of many, very mild
indeed.
-- The implication has been made that
the amendment before us would require
the United States of America to act, or
react, in case force was used. In reading
,the amendment, there is nothing that re-
quires the United States to act. The
amendment leaves open the option of
action. It leaves it open completely. The
amendment does not authorize the Presi-
dent to take any action in the case of
hostilities. It is very clear that we simply
are sending a message, a more honest
and meaningful message than in the lan-
guage in the legislation before us.
I cannot perceive how this amend-
ment undermines anything. That word
"undermine" has been used occasionally.
The Senator from Illinois cannot see
that it will jeopardize anything. It jeop-
ardizes nothing. We have a responsibility
to be clear in our statements. We have
a responsibility to be honest with China.
We have honest differences of opinion
which we should express just as honestly
as the Chinese express their opinions.
They do not ever hesitate to lay it
right on the line.
The Vice Premier laid it right on the
line to us here and we respected him
more for speaking forthrightly to us and
letting us know how he stood on certain
issues.
When he went to Tokyo he let us know
through his conversations over there ex-
actly how he felt about the way the
United States had handled the Iranian
situation.
He let us know unmistakably what he
intended to do in Vietnam. And though
we expressed our grave concern or our
deep concern, or however it was we
wrung our hands about that, he said
right here he intended to punish Viet-
nam. He moved forthrightly to fulfill
that pledge, and he did so, and he did it
in a way that was rather impressive to
the Vietnamese forces. The Chinese
forces were very impressive in the way
they administered that punishment.
He was honest about what he intended
to do. Certainly, I think we have that
same responsibility.
I respectfully suggest to the Senator
from Idaho that it is in the U.S. national
interest to state our security interests
and not to mislead the Chinese. It would
be wrong, in my judgment, not to tell the
truth and adequately . express how
strongly we feel.
The distinguished Senator from Ohio
has said that in his judgment the use of
the term "gravely concerned" adequately
expresses how we feel, and adequately
expresses what we might do.
I would just like to go back into his-
tory a little bit and read to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Ohio what we
have said as a country in the past.
In 1956, after the Soviet Union inter-
vened with force in Hungary, a State
Department spokesman said: "The ac-
tions of the Soviet Union are the cause
of the greatest concern."
Did that in any way inhibit or even
impress the Soviet Union? Not one bit.
They held their ground.
In 1975, Secretary Kissinger said the
Soviet introduction of military equip-
ment into Angola and Cuban participa-
tion in Angola are considered "a serious
matter not compatible with the spirit of
relaxation of tension." That was almost
reassuring to our adversaries that the
United States had rejected the possibil-
ity of action.
it is a serious matter. We have said that
before. That may be a signal that we in-
tend to wring our hands. We look on it
with grave concern, but we do not really
intend to do anything because they are
not our security interests. Should any-
one doubt that this Nation will consider
action if its security interests are threat-
ened? Is there any doubt that we should
move in Europe at any time theinterests
of the United States there are en-
dangered?
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield
for a question on that point?
Mr. PERCY. I am happy to yield.
S 2315
? Mr. BIDEN. Is the Senator equating
our national interest in Taiwan as equal
to that in Western Europe? Is the Sena-
tor suggesting they are the same?
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois
is suggesting that the interests the
United States has in a peaceful resolu-
tion to the Taiwan issue, in a nation with
which we have had a mutual security
pact for 30 years, are greater than the
interests we may have in some other more
remote part of the world where we have
not had that kind of close relationship.
No, the Senator from Illinois, on a
matter of priorities, would certainly put
Europe ahead of Taiwan. He would put
the Mideast ahead of Taiwan. And prob-
ably Japan and South Korea ahead of
Taiwan.
Mr. BIDEN. I would hope the Senator
would do that.
Mr. PERCY. But the Senator from
Illinois would feel that if there was a use
of force-I have said many times on this
floor that I do not anticipate at all the
use of force-if there were a use of force,
I would personally feel that something
more than just an expression of grave
concern and a verbal slap on the wrist
would be required. This Nation should
consider acting under those conditions. It
would only be fair to notify the People's
Republic of China ahead of time that we
put a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
issue as a high priority.
The Senator from Illinois put the ques-
tion to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as to how he would look upon
this matter. As I quoted earlier, General
Jones replied, "I believe that an attack
on Taiwan would be not only of grave
concern but would impact on our security
interests. There is no question about it."
Would my distinguished colleague feel
that there should be any question about
it as to whether or not an attack by force
on Taiwan would be contrary to the secu-
rity interests of the United States of
America?
Mr. BIDEN. Did not General Jones
also say that the impact of such an
attack would not be significant to Ameri-
can security? That its impact would be
minimal? I do not have the language in
front of me, but my recollection is that
General Jones' comments were along
those lines.
Is it not also true that the language
of S. 245 as it now exists does not pre-
clude us from using force? We retain the
option to determine how and when we
would use force. Maybe I can repeat my-
self to the Senator. He seems to have
been occupied.
Does the language of S. 245 as it now
stands preclude the United States from
..using force? Do not we retain the option
to use force, depending on the situation?
I assume the Senator would not suggest
that should the 12 million indigenous
population of Taiwan rise up against the
1 billion Chinese who run the mainland
that we would send the U.S. fleet steam-
ing in to take over. Or do my friends
from Illinois and Ohio suggest that un-
der those conditions we do move in?
There are all kinds of circumstances
under which we should have a variety
of reaction options.
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CONGRIESSI ONAIL RECORD - SIENA'IIE March 8, 1979
I was just handed General Jones testi-
mony. He said:
It may be stronger but my problem with
the threat to the security interests is that
there is no qualifying factor there and that
our security interests are less there than
they are in other areas of ,the Pacific or other
areas of the world. So I would be concerned
about the implication being far greater than
that intended.
I cite that to set the record straight.
I am infringing on the Senator's time.
I have a good deal more to say about
this if the managers of the bill will give
me the opportunity, or when I am able
to get the floor in my own right. I think
the question here is whether or not we
will face the political realities or con-
tinue to debate the China question. I
remind my friend from Illinois that
when we were in grade school we de-
bated about "Who lost China." I suggest
today we never had China to lose it, and
I suggest now we are about to begin a
new debate. With these amendments
such as Senator PERCY's, I suggest that
the debate over China will begin anew.
If the Senator succeeds with his amend-
ment, we will be debating again "Who
lost China." The Senator's amendment
suggests that the United States, in effect,
institute a two-China policy. That would
be a sham. Those are not the terms we
agreed to in the normalization proce-
dure. That is what the issue is about
today.
Mr. President, I support S. 245, because
it enables the United States to establish
a creative new relationship with the
people of Taiwan that assures that
island's continued security and economic
well-being without compromising our
diplomatic commitment to Peking.
How to achieve these twin goals has
been at the heart of the issue of our
China policy since 1972. How to be fair,
how to shortchange neither mainland
China nor Taiwan, is the problem the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
just confronted, I think successfully. It
is the crux of what has troubled the
American people about the recent change
in the direction of our China policy.
There is a large body of opinion-both
in the Nation and in this Chamber-
that is skeptical about the good inten-
tions of the Communist Government of
China. Chinese leaders came to this
country and denounced the Soviet Union,
trying to persuade us that "the enemy of
my enemy is my friend." Days after they
returned to Peking, Chinese forces in-
vaded Vietnam.
Now, I do not approve of a leader of a
country coming to our shores and de-
nouncing a leader of a third country.
Nor do I approve of military invasions.
And I reserve the right to share my col-
leagues' skepticism about the motives
and intentions of the People's Republic
of China. But I maintain that recogni-
tion of the Peking government-the gov-
ernment of nearly 1 billion people-a
government that has been in power for
nearly 30 years-in no way implies ap-
proval of that government's every policy
or of that government's social or eco-
nomic system. What we are doing, is sim-
ply recognizing that the government of
Peking is the legitimate and legal gov-
ernment of one-quarter of the world's
population.
What derecognition of the Govern-
ment of Taiwan implies is not abandon-
ment of an ally and friend. Neither my
colleagues in the Senate nor the Amer-
ican people should in any way infer that
the American Government is no longer
concerned with the peace and prosperity
of that island's 15 million inhabitants.
What the new relationship with the peo-
ple of Taiwan signifies is that U.S. policy
has finally come out from under the fig-
leaf of political pretense. The recognition
of Peking and the derecognition of Tai-
pei brings our policy into the clear light
of present-day reality.
To put this diplomatic event into the
proper context,.I think we should look
back. We could look back to the Shang-
hai communique of 1972. But for a mo-
ment I want to look still further back-
into what is for me history.
Let us go I back to 1949. After the
Chinese civil war in which the Commu-
nists defeated the Nationalist forces of
Chiang Kai-shek, the losers took refuge
on the island of Taiwan, then called
Formosa. This handful of Chinese Na-
tionalists sheltering themselves on For-
mosa, still maintained that their govern-
ment was the legitimate government of
the Chinese people. And' the United
States joined them in that fiction.
Because of the geopolitics of the early
fifties, the United States, understand-
ably, did not change this fiction. There
was the Korean war. There was also the
overpowering threat to U.S. interests
posed by the Moscow-Peking alliance.
During this decade of the fifties, there
were many Americans who claimed that
it was the U.S. Policy of the 1940's that
"lost China" for us. The debate over
who lost China raged for a decade. I,
personally, do not believe that China
was ever ours to lose. In my opinion, the
real loss of China for the United States
was the loss of contact with the main-
land. The real loss of China for America
was the loss of influence with the Peking
government.
Now, I will be the first to admit that
it is easier to understand that loss today
than it was 30 years ago. I refer to this
history only because I believe that, after
30 years of deliberate fiction, it is time
to set our relationships with China and
Taiwan straight. In fact, not fiction.
We created that fiction of Taiwan. And
we are willing to take the responsibility
for it today. We will not abandon her.
We recognize the fact of her economic
prosperity and we will do everything we
can to protect it. We recognize the dan-
ger to her security and we will do every-
thing we can to protect it. But we can
no longer perpetuate the fiction of Tai-
wan's political pretensions.
The first step toward a realistic U.S.
policy on China 'was taken by President
Nixon in 1972. The Shanghai communi-
que issued at that time stated that there
is but one China. The communique never
stated which was the legitimate one. But
it recognized the political reality of one
China.
The brilliance of the Shanghai com-
munique was less in its clarity than in
its precise area of vagueness. Its bril-
liance lay in what it did not define. It
contained what lawyers sometimes call
"creative ambiguity."
While the credit for the initiative in
a realistic China policy goes to a Repub-
lican administration, there is little doubt
of the courage of President Carter in
concluding that process of political
reality.
It is to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, however, that the final task
was given. Because it is this committee,
under its new leadership, that was able
to flesh out, to specify and to amend the
administration proposal. In a way that
gives Taiwan a fair shake.
And it is this same committee that has
had the foresight to recognize that giv-
ing Taiwan a fair shake does not mean
that we create another two-China polit-
ical faction to replace the old one. The
committee was able to draft and pass
legislation that is before us today that
meets the objectives of U.S. policy. Let
me say it more plainly-S. 245 serves the
interests of both the United States and
Taiwan.
Mr. President, in the long run, the in-
terests of both countries are best served
by good relations between the United
States and China. And the passage of
amendments to this bill which would, in
effect, create a second China would lay
the basis for another 30 years of fiction,
of illusion and of instability. ?
Therefore, Mr. President, I urge my
colleagues-not to "lose China" a second
time.
Mr. PERCY will the Senator yield for
a question?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes. The Senator has the
floor.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois
appreciates the questions and the com-
ments which were made, but I would like
to point out as I have before that my
amendment does not require the United
States in any manner, shape, or form to
use force. It simply leaves open certain
options. With this amendment, we are
retaining the same options the Chinese
have retained We do not preclude op-
tions, but we give a clearer signal than
does "grave concern" that we intend to
do something other than wring our
hands.
I know that the majority leader would
like to make a motion, but the Senator
from Illinois has' promised the senior
Senator from California the right to
speak at this time. If the motion will`.
preclude the right of Senators from
commenting at this time, would the Sen-
ator withhold his motion?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
my motion would not preclude Senators
from speaking on the amendment. It
would riot.
I 'ask ,unanimous consent that I may
be permitted to withdraw the motion to
reconsider.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The motion to reconsider was with-
drawn.
Mr. PERCY. I thank the distinguished
majority leader.
Mr. HOLLINGS and Mr. HAYAKAWA
addressed the Chair.
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Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois
has not yielded the floor.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield to the Sena-
tor from California and I shall speak
later. I thought since the motion was
withdrawn, we could move on to some-
thing else. I was going to call up an
amendment. I yield the floor and shall
wait until after the Senator from Cali-
fornia has completed.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
if the distinguished Senator from Cali-
fornia will yield, I say to the Senator
from Illinois that I thank him for yield-
ing. Perhaps we could reach an up-or-
down vote on his amendment quickly
after the Senator from California has
yielded the floor.
Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Idaho has
said that the amendment offered by the
Senator from Illinois undermines the
commitment to the basis on which our
relations with the people of Peking have
been established. Perhaps it is an act of
temerity on my part, but I should like
to remind the distinguished Senator from
Idaho that the President may be com-
mitted to the basis on which our rela-
tions with Peking have been established,
but we in the Senate were not consulted
as to that basis on which those rela-
tions were established. As everyone
here will recall, those relations were
established in our absence and with-
out consultation and on a date in
which consultation was impossible.
Hence, I cahnot see how we are similarly
committed.
This is the reason that many of us
in this Chamber are adding amendment
after amendment to the language of the
Taiwan Enabling Act. This is only one
of the amendments.
Mr. President, I have heard a lot of
talk about how the United States can
maintain a' dual relationship with the
two parts of China, and an analogy with
Japan's success in maintaining such a
dual relationship. If Japan can maintain
nongovernmental relations with Taiwan
at the same time as it maintains full
diplomatic relations with the mainland,
why cannot we do the same? That is the
argument we frequently heard. What
those who argue this position ignore is
that Japan felt secure about this dual
relationship, because the United States
had a defense treaty with Taiwan. That
protection to the peace of the Pacific and,
therefore, that protection which Japan's
trade with both parts of China enjoyed
no longer exists at this moment. In short,
Japan can no longer feel as secure as she
did and what Japan will do about that
fact, I do not know.
I do know that the peace of the Pacific
and the whole area is no longer as secure
as it was when we had a defense treaty
with Taiwan. I do not expect or hope
ever to restore that defense treaty with
Taiwan under present conditions. But
the Senator from California does wel-
come the wording of the amendment of
the distinguished Senator from Illinois,
since it spells out specifically the dangers
involved in this new relationship that,
at the same time, treats the two Chinas
as one and also treats* the two Chinas as
two. There are so many ambiguities in
this proposed relationship that the Sen-
ator from California, for one, fully in-
tends to vote for the amendment offered
by his distinguished colleague from Illi-
nois (Mr. PERCY). In one respect, at least,
those ambiguities will be reduced if we
accept Senator PERCY'S excellent sug-
gestion.,
I thank the Chair.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I am ready to vote. I ask for the yeas and
nays on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a
sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, there are
others who wish to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I have listened with
great interest to the comment by the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations and others.
I notice that the distinguished chairman
began.his argument with the suggestion
that the President would be embarrassed
in his Middle Eastern trip if the Senate
were to take the action of approving the
amendment of the Senator from Illinois.
I happened to think of a note that was
left for me earlier this morning by a
friend from North Carolina, who stopped
by. I thought something of this sort
might come up on the floor, and I had
a young lady type it out. Let me read it.
He said:
One final note. I feel that the administra-
tion will try to play on the Carter trip to the
Middle East in its attempt to kill the Percy
amendment. They will say, "Don't embarrass
the President with this slap in the face just
when he is trying to negotiate a delicate
treaty, et cetera." They will claim that
such a move shows the parties to the Mid-
east treaty that the Senate and the Con-
gress cannot be relied on to uphold the
President's actions.
Well, this friend of mine was cer-
tainly prescient. He must have had a
crystal ball in his pocket.
He went on to say, with respect to his
earlier comment:
This is nonsense. Why? Because there was
prior consultation with the Senate prior to
the President's trip-the briefing of the
committee, the Begin visit, et cetera. There
was none of that with Taiwan.
Mr. President, that is it in a nutshell.
The President of the United States has
sent the Senate a scrambled egg and has
said, "Now unscramble it." If he had
conferred with the Congress, or even
with the Foreign Relations Committee,
the Senator from North Carolina does
not believe that we would be in this fix
this afternoon. Certainly. I take no
pleasure in resisting the legislation
pending before us, but I feel in good
conscience that we must do something
to strengthen the defense section. As my
friend from Illinois has indicated, this
is the minimum insofar as the Senator
from North Carolina is concerned. I am
happy to cosponsor his amendment. I
S 2317
think, as he has indicated, that we
should go farther, but I am willing to
compromise on this.
In the comments by the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations earlier, he said, "What will we
be telling Peking?" What will we be tell-
ing Peking -by approval of what the dis-
tinguished chairman called a frivolous
amendment by the distinguished Senator
from Illinois?
I think the more important question is,
what will we be telling such friends as
we have left around the world if we do
not do this? I might raise another ques-
tion, what was the President telling the
Congress when he declined to confer with
Congress when he made the judgment to
dump Taiwan and embrace Red China?
There are all sorts of questions that we
can raise and which we should raise. I,
for one, do not feel that we should in-
dulge in obfuscation. We ought to lay it
all out to be seen.
The statement was made earlier, and I
think by the distinguished chairman,
that General Jones had assured the com-
mittee that Red China does not have the
capability to boycott, blockade Taiwan.
Well, not quite, Mr. President, not
quite.
Actually, what General Jones said
was, and I will read from page 747:
Now that does not mean that they could
not develop that capability over a number
of months, of course.
Obviously, they can. And in a number
of months, not years.
Now, I wish to offend no one, but the
administration has deliberately refused
access to a report that I personally know
is in existence and which was requested
from a number of administration wit-
nesses during the course of the commit-
tee's deliberation of this bill. It is now in
my possession. It is a secret report, en-
titled "Consolidated Guidance Study No.
9, Taiwan's Military Requirements in a
Post-Normalization Environment." It was
made available to me today by a con-
cerned citizen. In this report, high Pen-
tagon officials are on record as knowing
that Taiwan could be blockaded.
I am not going to quote from that
secret report. I am not that kind of Sen-
ator. But if the distinguished chairman
or any other Senator wants to see it, I
will be glad to show it.'
But, in any case, Mr. President, it
seems to me to be rather ominous that
this Senate should be debating the secu-
rity of Taiwan this particular week, be-
cause it was exactly 20 years ago this
week that the Dalai Lama in Tibet was
forced to submit to Peking's terms with
respect to Tibet's future status.
On March 9, 1959, the Dalai Lama at-
tended a meeting of the Chinese State
Council and was forced to accept various
decrees including the establishment of a
so-called "Preparatory Committee for
the Autonomous Region of Tibet."
This action led to the exodus from
Tibet of the Dalai Lama afid many of his
followers. From exile in India the Dalai
Lama protested in April 1959 that in
practice "decisions in all important mat-
ters were made by the Chinese author-
ities."
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S2318 CONGRESSIONAL RECQ
The Dalai Lama did not return to
Tibet, but has remained in exile. Instead
the Peking authorities proceeded with
the communization of Tibet that led to
another revolt by the people of Tibet.
And all this was,done under the author-
ity of the agreement with Tibet signed in
1951 that allegedly granted them re-
gional autonomy.
In a 17-point agreement signed in 1951
the PRC purportedly granted to Tibet
regional autonomy. Does that sound
familiar? It is instructive today to look
at the language of this signed agreement
by Peking and then the following his-
torical record of ruthless suppression of
the people of Tibet that led to the exo-
dus of the Dalai Lama and many of his
followers.
It is important to note especially arti-
cles 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this agreement; par-
ticularly as we now listen to supposedly
soothing words of Teng Hsiao-ping
about the future status of Taiwan. His
are only words; Peking had a written
agreement with Tibet' and it was -Chou
En-lai,' Teng's spiritual predecessors,
who played a large role in "negotiating"
this agreement.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the terms of this agreement be
printed in the RECORD, 'that the brief
chapter on the 1959 uprising in the book
"Revolt in Tibet" be included, and the
statement from exile of the Dalai Lama.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
APPENDIX I
Agreement of Measures for the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet (17-point.Agreement of
May 23, 1951) 1
The Tibetan nationality is one of the na-
tionalities with a long history within the
boundaries of China and, like many other
nationalities, it has done its glorious duty
'in the course of creation and development of
the great Motherland. But, over the last 100
years or more, imperialist forces penetrated
into China and in consequences also pene-
trated into the Tibetan region and carried
out all kind of deceptions and provocations.
Like previous reactionary Governments, the
Kuomintang reactionary Government con-
tinued to carry out a policy of oppression
and sowing dissension among the nationali-
ties, causing division and disunity among the
Tibetan people. The local government of
Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception
and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic
attitude towards the great Motherland. Under
such conditions the Tibetan nationality and
people were plunged into the depths of en-
slavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic vic-
tory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in
the Chinese people's war of liberation; the
common domestic enemy of all nationali-
ties-the Kuomintang reactionary Goevrn-
ment-the aggressive imperialist forces-was
driven out. On this basis the founding of the
People's Republic of China (CPR) and
(CPG) was announced.
In accordance with the Common Pro-
1 The full text of the 'Agreement of the
Central People's Government (CPG) and the
local Government of Tibet on measures for
the peaceful liberation of Tibet', was signed
in Peking on May 23, 1951. The text herein
was given by the New China News Agency.
See also Concerning the Question of Tibet
(Peking, 1959); pp. 14-10; Documents of In-
ternational Affairs (London, Royal Institute
of International Affairs), 1951, pp. 577-579.
D - S ENATIE
gramme passed by the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),
the CPG declared that all nationalities with-
in the boundaries of the CPR are equal and
that they shall establish unity and mutual
aid and oppose imperialism and their own
public enemies, so that the CPR will become
a big family of fraternity and co-operation,
.composed of all this nationalities. Within the
big family of all nationalities of the CPR,
national regional autonomy shall be exercised
in where areas national minorities are con-
centrated and all national minorities shall
have freedom to develop their spoken and
written languages and to preserve or reform
their customs, habits and .religious beliefs,
and the CPG shall assist all national minori-
ties to-develop their political, economic, cul-
tural, and educational construction work.
Since then, all nationalities within the coun-
try-with the exception of those in the areas
of Tibet and Taiwan-have gained libera-
tion. Under the unified leadership of the CPG
and the direct leadership of higher levels of
people's governments, all national minorities
have fully enjoyed the right of national
equality and have exercised, or are exercising,
national regional autonomy.
In order that the influences of aggressive
imperialist forces in Tibet might be suc-
cessfully eliminated, the unification of the
territory and sovereignty of the CPR ac-
complished, and national defence safe-
guarded; in order that the Tibetan na-
tionality and people might be freed and re-
turn to the big family of the CPR to enjoy
the same rights of national equality as all
other nationalities in the country and de-
velop their political, economic, cultural and
educational work, the CPG, when it ordered
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to
march into Tibet, notified the local govern-
ment of Tibet to send delegates to the cen-
tral authorities to conduct talks for the
conclusion of an agreement on measures for
the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the lat-
ter part of April 1951 the delegates with full
powers of the local government of Tibet
arrived in Peking. The CPG appointed rep-
resentatives with full power to conduct talks
on a friendly basis with the delegates with
full powers of the local government of Tibet.
As a result of the talks both parties agreed
to establish this agreement and ensure that
it be carried into effect.
(1) The Tibetan people shall unite and
'drive out Imperialist aggressive forces from
Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to
the big family of the Motherland-the Peo-
ple's Republic of China.
(2) The local Government of Tibet shall
actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and
consolidate the national defences.
(3) In accordance with the policy towards
nationalities laid down in the Common Pro-
gramme of the CPPCC, the Tibetan people
have the right of exercising national region-
al autonomy under the unified leadership
of the CPO.
(4) The central authorities will not alter
the exsiting political system in Tibet. The
central authorities also will not alter the
established status functions and powers of
the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks
shall hold offices as usual.
(5) The established status; functions and
powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni (Lama)
shall be maintained.
(6) By the established status, functions
and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the
Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status,
functions and powers of the thirteenth Dalai
Lama and of the ninth Panchen Ngoerhteh
.ni when they were in friendly and amicable
relations with each other.
(7) The policy of freedom of religious be-
lief laid down in the Common Programme
of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The reli-
gious beliefs, customs and habits of the
Tibetan people shall be respected and lame
March 8, 1979
monasteries shall be protected. The cen-
tral authorities will not effect a change in
the income of the monasteries.
(8) Tibetan troops shall be reorganised
step by step into the PLA and become a
part of the national defence forces of the
CPR.
(9) The spoken and written language and
school education of the Tibetan nationality
shall be developed step by step in accord-
ance with the actual condition in Tibet.
(10) Tibetan agriculture, livestock-rais-
ing, industry and commerce shall be devel-
oped step by step in accordance with the
-actual condition in Tibet.
(11) In matters related to various reforms
in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the
part of the central authorities. The local
Government of Tibet should carry out re-
forms of its own accord and, when the peo-
ple raise demands for reform, they shall be
settled by means of consultation with the
leading personnel of Tibet.
(12) In so far as former pro-imperialist
and pro-Kuon intang officials resolutely
sever relations with imperialism and the.
Kumintang and do not engage in sabotage
or resistance, they may continue to hold
office irrespective of their past.
(13) The PLA entering Tibet shall abide
by all the above mentioned policies and shall
also be fair in all buying and selling and
shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread
from the people.
(14) The CPG shall have centralized
handling of all external affairs of the area
of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-exist-
ence with neighbouring countries and estab-
lishment and development of fair commer-
cial and trading relations with them on the
basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual
respect for territory and sovereignty.
(15) In order to ensure the implementa-
tion of this agreement, the CPG shall set up
a Military and Administrative Committee
and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and-apart
from the personnel sent there by the CPG-
shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel
as possible to take part in the work. Local
Tibetan personnel taking part in the Mili-
tary and Administrative Committee may in-
clude patriotic elements from the local Gov-
ernment of Tibet, various districts and vari-
ous principal monasteries; the name-list
shall be set forth after consultation between
the representative designated by the CPG
and various quarters concerned and shah
be submitted to the GPO for appointment.
(16) Funds needed by the Military and Ad-
ministrative Committee, the Military Area
HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be
provided by the CPG. The local Government
of Tibet should assist the PLA in the pur-
chase and transport of food, fodder and
other daily necessities.
(17) This agreement shall come into force
immediately after signatures and seals are
affixed to it.
Signed and sealed by delegates of the CPG
with full powers: Chief Delegate Li Wei-
Han (Chairman of the Commission of 'Na-
tionalities Affairs); Delegates Chang Ching-
wu, Chang Kuo-hua Sun Chih-yuan. Dele-
gates with full powers of the local Govern-
ment of Tibet; Chief Delegate Kaloon Nga-
bou Ngawang Jugme'(Ngabo Shape); Dele-
gates Dizasak Khememey Sonam Wangdi,
Khentrung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung
Thupten Lekmuun, Rimshi Samposey Tenzin
Thundup.
Peking, 23rd May, 1951.
TYBE'TAN DIISCONTENT GROWS
On April 29, 1954, the "Agreement between
the Peoples' Republic of China and the Re-
public of India on Trade and Communica-
tions between the Tibet region of China and
Yndia" was signed In Peking, according to a
Chinese communique, "bringing to an end
the remnant privileges of the British and so
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March 8, 1979 CONGLIUSSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
establishing the relations between China
and. India, concerning Tibet, on a new basis".
The Agreement laid down five broad prin-
ciples in addition to the liquidation of the.
Indian claims:
According to the Agreement India accept-
ed the principle that Tibet constituted an
integral part of China, and argeed to wtih
draw completely within six months the In-
dian contingent that had been stationed for
decades at Yatung and Gyantse. Peking, it
was stated, would render all assistance and
facilities in aiding the withdrawal of Indian
troops.
India agreed also to hand over all her
property in Tibet to the. Chinese authorities,
leaving questions of detail regarding cost and
manner of payment to be worked out later.
These properties included all the telegraph,
public telephone, and postal establishments,
together with their equipment, and twelve
rest houses situated in various parts of Tibet.
The Agreement, containing six articles, re-
lated only to the two issues of trade and pil-
grim traffic. China would be permitted to
open three trade agencies, in New Delhi, Cal-
cutta and Kalimpong, while India would be
allowed to establish similar offices at Yatung,
Gyantse and Gartok. All trade and pilgrim
traffic should henceforth be. confined to six
specific routes along the two-thousand-mile
common frontier.
The Trade Pact, as it was briefly called, was
acclaimed in India and China and the five
principles, outlined in. the preamble, which
formed. the basis of the pact-mutual respect
for each other's territorial integrity and sov-
ereignty, mutual non-aggression? mutual
non-Interference in each other's internal af-
fairs, equality and mutual benefit and peace-
ful co-existence-became. known as "The
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence!,,, or
"Parch Shila" In India, and were later taken
up at Bandung as the. accepted policy of the
Afro-Asian bloc.
India gained practically nothing concrete
from the pact. it was, rumoured. In Indian
official circles that Mr. Nehru had hoped to
obtain a. fixed delineation of the hitherto.
vague border between Tibet and India, so
limiting China's, exponsitionist ambitions.
but if this .were the case it was another dip-
lomatic defeat for India..
In a, speech delivered in India's Lok Sabha
on a debate on the international situation on,
May 15;. 1954, Acharya T. B. Kripalani,, the
Leader of the Opposition,, said:
'Recently we have, entered into a treaty
with China. This. treaty concerns the whole
of. India.. It does not concern. a party or a
Person, it affects us all., We feel that China,
after It had gone. Communist, committed an
act of aggression in Tibet. The plea is that
China had the ancient, right of suzerainty.
This right was out of date, old and anti-
quated. It was theoretical;. it was never ex-
ercised or very rarely exercised and even
then in theory. It had lapsed by the. flux of
time.... I consider this as much a colonial
aggression on the part of China as any co-
lonial aggression indulged in by Western
nations. The definition of colonialism is that
one nation by force. of arms and fraud occu-
pies, the terirtory of another nation... .
Whether certain nations commit' aggression
against other peaceful nations does not al-
ways concern us. But in this case we are in-
timately concerned,, because China has de-
stroyed what is called' a buffer state. In Inter-
national politics, when a buffer state is de-
stroyed by a powerful nation, that nation is
considered to have committed aggression
against Its neighbours.... It is also well-
known, that in the new map of China other
border territories like Nepal, Sikkim, etc.,
figure. This. gives us an idea of the aggres
sive, designs of China...... do not say that
because China conquered Tibet we should
have gone to war with it. It was possible.
But we did well in not going to war. But this
does not mean that we should recognize the
claims of China. In Tibet. We must know
that it, is an net of aggression against a for-
eign nation. It is as abominable as colonial-
ism of any Western power...
While Prime. Minister Nehru and Chou
En-lat were, being acclaimed throughout
Asia for their magnanimous and enlightened
approach to relations between nations; Tibet,
which had been. the object of discussion and
agreement, took a radically different view'.
The growing bitterness against India felt
by Tibetans of all classs since 1950, which
they interpreted as cynical self-interest and
betrayal, flared up Into public demonstra-
tion inside Tibet.
Posters were printed and pasted on to walls
throughout Lhasa and copies were sent to all
towns and monasteries in Tibet. The text
was published in the Tibet Mirror, issued in
Kalimpong on June 1, 1954:
"To Leaders, Officials, Monks, Soldiers,
Traders,. Craftsmen, Agriculturists, Nomads-
the People of Tibet.
'This' is to alert you to the great danger
threatening our common cause, the inde-
pendence of Tibet, regarding which I feel
compelled to speak a few words.
'1. The last edition of the Tibet Mirror
carried translations of articles from Indian
papers of a trade pact signed at Peking be-
tween India and China regarding Tibet.
There was a? statement that "discusion in
Peking related' only to procedural matters
and not to the substance of the issue."
Neither was there any mention of which
particular treaty formed the basis of the
talks. Further, no fun copy of the agreement
was made public,
T. Were the talks based on the Trade Reg-
ulations of 1893 or. of 1908, both of which
were mentioned in regard. to, the Peking
Trade Agreement2? If so, it. is a violation of
the Simla Convention of 1914 whereby both
of. time, Trade: Regulations are declared re-
voked. in Clause T.
'3. The Peking Trade Pact refers to, Tibet
as "an integral. part of China", and there. are
many mentions of the "Tibet region of
Chins.";, these being terms' unprecedented in
the history of Tibet and also another viola-
tion, of the terms of the Simla Convention,
Clauses 3 and 9. of which first of all recog-
nized the mutual independence of Tibet in
asmuch' as the Tibetan Government kept her
existing rights; which until the time of the
recent invasion. of Tibet included the man-
agement of. her external affairs; secondly,
guaranteed the! non-violation of Tibetan ter-
ritory,. Great Britain and China agreeing to
abstain from sending their troops, stationing
civil-and military officers, or establishing col-
onies. in Central Tibet.
4. The Simla. Convention was signed by the
fully empowered representatives of the three
Governments of Tibet,. India and China,
whereas the Peking Pact was concluded be-
tween India. and. China, the wishes of the
Government and. people of Tibet being com-
pletely ignored. This makes it clear that
China wishes not only to absorb Tibet but to
destroy our culture, religion and eventually
our race by intermarriage, as is shown by
their moves to try to get in, in addition to the
two hundred and twenty thousand in the
Liberation Army already in Tibet, a further
two, million Chinese for the so-called eco-
nomic development of our country. It is only
too, obvious how our two neighbours are will-
ing,' to come to private arrangements in fa-
vour of aggression so as to serve their own
Inter-Asian imperialist policies.
'5. Please read carefully the second Inde-
pendent Treaty signed at Simla. between Ti-
bet and the British. Government in India, on
the same day, and Immediately after, the
Tripartite Simla Convention, as it recognized
not the autonomy but the complete Inde-
pendence-of Tibet;. as follows:
' "Tine Government of China refusing to fix
her official seal thereto and in default of
S-2319
which, all rights-, and privileges. claimed by
the Government of China in and with regard
to Tibet, are hereby declared revoked."'
The- protest, circulating in Tibetan inside
a closed Tibet, evoked no sympathy or re-
sponse either in India or the outside world.
What. was extremely significant about its
widespread circulation inside Tibet was the
fact that the anti-Chinese demands were now
so numerous and strongly entrenched that
such could now be' printed and distributed
throughout, the country without detection of
the organizers.
The chief anti-Chinese organization in-
volved in the demonstrations and pamphlet-
eering was a group known as the Mi-mang
Tsong-du (or People's Party). While national-
ist and subversive; they limited themselves to
public demonstrations against unpopular
Chinese Communist measures and took no
part in violent activities, of any form. Notices
appeared on the, walls of buildings overnight
denouncing or mocking the Chinese occupa-
tion, personnel; Chinese notices were torn
down or besmeared with manure; Chinese
parades or demonstrations were bombarded
from densely packed. crowds with dried yak
dung' and stones; or there were cleverly or-
ganized 'silences'. When the, Chinese arrested
some of the more prominent and handed
them. over for trial to the Tibetan courts they
were released shortly afterwards on 'insuffi-
cient, evidence', or some other bland reason.
At, their, own demonstrations they could
number four or five. thousand. people, and
the Chinese. dared don no more than arrest
some of the more extreme orators and even
then, as? indicated,, only hand them over to
the Tibetan courts, with. complaints.
In. June 1954 the Dalai. Lama received an
invitation from the Chinese. Government to
visit Peking and other places in China. The
invitation evoked an immediate protest in
Tibet and there were many demonstrations to
protest against the Dalai Lama leaving, the
country, the general suspicion being that he
would not; be permitted to return.
In. addition to demonstrations the Mi-mang
Tsang-d'u. in, Lhasa secretly organized a mass
revolt on the day scheduled for the Dalai
Lama's departure; when thousands of Tibet-
ans. were to throw themselves in the Dalai
Lama"s path so that- he, could not pass
through them without, having to, walk over
their bodies. The.? Chinese got word of their
plans, and several days before the scheduled
date of departure moved the Dalai Lama to
a relative's: house and from there on his way
to China.
However, the Chinese were unpleasantly
surprised by the intensity of the feeling
shown by the Tibetans to their invitation to
the Dalai Lama and gave strong assurances
that he would be well, treated In China. On
the other hand, it did not prevent them
from engineering at least two attempts on
the Dalai. Lama's life. on his way to China.
On one occasion a bridge' mysteriously col-
lapsed just after the Dalai Lama had crossed
over;, and the Chinese blamed Kham bandits;
and on another occasion a landslide almost
carried the party away.
The Panchen Lama, had also been invited
to visit China at the same time. For some
while the Chinese had been building up the
Panchen Lama's Influence in Tibet, both to
undermine the Dalai Lama's prestige and to
seek to divide the: Tibetans into two camps
over the centuries-old controversy so that
they could be. dealt with more easily.
After Britain, China and Tibet had signed
the Tripartite Treaty in 1914 and then
Panchen Lama, who was very pro-Chinese,
was forced to flee in 1920 to China where the .
Kuomingtang Party was emerging as the
new government. Right away the Panchen
Lama. began scheming with the Kuomingtang
officials to support him with money, arms
and men, to re-enter Tibet, but the new Kuo-
mingtang Government was in no position to
indulge in.such adventures.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
In 1933 the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died.
During his reign it had been virtually im-
possible for a Chinese national, civil or mili-
tary, to enter Tibet, but as it usually took
several months or years to discover a rein-
carnation of the Dalai Lama the ageing
Panchen Lama prevailed upon the Kuoming-
tai g Government to assist him in 'liberating'
Tibet. On this occasion help was given, and
while the Chinese forces were converging
on Tibet's eastern borders a Chinese good-
will mission was sent to Lhasa to persuade
a leaderless Tibetan Government to accept
a permanent Chinese delegation in Lhasa on
grounds of common cultural and religious
ties. As a direct result of this offensive, in
1935 a meeting was called in Lhasa and it
was decided that the Panchen Lama should
be allowed to re-enter Tibet accompanied
by his household and a few followers, but
before he could take advantage of this the
Panchen Lama died in China.
When the new reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama was discovered in 1938 in Amdo Prov-
ince a new reincarnation of the Panchen
Lama was found in that same year and in
the same province. The position of this re-
incarnation, however, was still unsettled as
there was a simultaneous discovery of two
other claimants in Lhasa. According to cus-
tom the authorities in Lhasa requested the
Amdo claimant to appear in Lhasa for veri-
fication of his claims, but the Chinese au-
thorities, for obvious reasons of their own,
refused to comply with this request and
some years later, without consultation with
Lhasa, officially installed their protege as the
new Panchen Lama. When the Kuoming-
tang Government was defeated and fled to
Formosa the Chinese Communist Govern-
- ment took over the care and training of the
Amdo Panchen Lama.
In 1950, 'at the request of the Panchen
Lama', the Chinese ordered the People's Lib-
eration Army into Tibet, and in 1951 the
Panchen Lama was present for the talks
conducted by the Chinese Communists with
the Tibetan goodwill mission on the special
initiative of the Peking Government. The
pact which recognized China's suzerainty
over Tibet acknowledged also the Amdo re-
incarnation as the true Panchen Lama. In
1952 the newly declared Panchen Lama, es-
corted by a strong force of Chinese troops,
entered Lhasa, and from that time the Chi-
nese had made every effort to build him up
politically, but the Tibetan Government and
people, while accepting the installation un-
der force of circumstances, refused to recog-
nize him as anything more than a spiritual
figure. The Chinese tried by every means to
override the objections of the Tibetan people
and on every public occasion introduced the
Panchen Lama as an equal to the Dalai
Lama.
After being in China several months the
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were invited
to attend a meeting of the Chinese State
Council on March 9, 1955, where they were
forced to submit to a number of decisions on
Tibetan affairs. One of these decisions was
the establishment of a 'Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet'.
The Committee consisted of fifty-one mem-
bers, fifteen from the Lhasa administration,
ten from the 'Panchen Lama's Bureau', ten
from the Chamdo 'People's Liberation Com-
mittee,' eleven from monasteries and 'Peo-
ple's Organizations', and five representing the
Chinese Government, with the Dalai Lama
being named a chairman. It was announced
that the members of the Committee were
appointed 'with the approval of the Chi-
nese State Council' and the three regions of
Tibet were subordinate to it. It was also
stated that the chief task of the Prepara-
tory Committee was to prepare for regional
autonomy in accordance with the provisions
of the Chinese Constitution, the Agreement
of 1951 and the concrete circumstances of
Tibet. The first meeting of this Preparatory
Committee was*held on April 22, 1956, and
thereafter there were in the next three years
twenty-seven meetings out of which the
Dalai Lama was present at and presided over
twenty-five. But on his arrival in India the
Dalai Lama stated at Tezpur on April 15,
1959, that 'in practice, even his body had
little power and decisions in all important
matters were taken by the Chinese author-
ities'.
In China during the visit of the two
Lamas the Peking Government went out of
its way to show preference for the Pan-
chen Lama on every occasion, presumably to
impress upon the Dalai Lama how they were
prepared to treat those who co-operated with
them. If this were so the rather naive policy
had exactly the opposite effect, and as the
Dalai Lama went about the country, saying
the proper things prepared for him by his
hosts but noting particularly their attitude
towards religion, the complete absorption in
ruthless materialistic policies, the cynical
playng off of the Panchen Lama against him-
self to further their own ends, he. came to
certain very definite, conclusions in his own
mind. He said nothing to anyone at the time,
not even to Mr. Nehru, whom he met in Pe-
king during the Indian Prime Minister's visit
to China, and who asked him in a private
conversation if there was anything India
could do to help Tibet, and it was only later
that I was able to find out his impressions
from his family.
Meanwhile in Tibet the Tibetans were
becoming uneasy at the unduly prolonged
visit which seemed to confirm their suspi-
cions that the Chinese were going to hold
the Dalai Lama in China as a hostage. Dem-
onstrations were organized in Lhasa by the
Mimang Tsong-du demanding his early re-
turn, and even in Kalimpong there was a
mass protest and public prayers. From Tingri
in West Tibet, an area noted for its fighters,
several hundred Tibetans marched to Lhasa
to add their voices to the general request and
also threaten armed action if the Dalai Lama
were not returned immediately.
If the Chinese had ideas about the Dalai
Lama they were quickly changed in view of
this ominous reaction and he was per-
mitted to return to Tibet.
Shortly after his arrival in Lhasa evidence
of his new attitude to Communist China
began to appear, both directly and indirectly.
Immediately there was a hardening of official
opposition to Chinese proposals. The move by
the Chinese to have Chinese paper currency
substituted for the silver Tibetan currency
was flatly rejected, and the offer of economic
integration with China refused. The Chinese
then countered with an order that only trad-
ers with letters of credit issued by the Bank
of China and negotiable in branches in India
would be allowed to trade--and found them-
selves with a monumental leakage of Chinese
silver coins being smuggled into India. They
failed to elicit any enthusiasm for their proj-
ect and the-Preparatory Committee for the
Autonomous Region of Tibet became increas-
ingly exasperated by Tibetan excuses at in-
ability to attend.
On the 23rd day of the Tibetan fifth month
(July-August) 1955 the Dalai Lama made a
public speech in Norbulinka, the summer
palace. After reviewing the history of Tibet
and pointing out that when there was a
balanced emphasis on both religion and
politics the country had prospered, but that
when politics took prominence over religion
to the exclusion of the latter there was na-
tional deterioration, he went on:
'At present and in the future we shall
carry out many new changes both in our
religious and political life, and this is the
urgent task which faces us. But in what
way can we make progress? Today our Ti-
betan people are facing many difficulties
from every side. We have no strength of our
own and we have no political experience.
We have no means to progress in any way.
It is for this reason that the Chinese Com-
munists have sent their men here to help
us in the reconstruction of Tibet. But we
must recognize very clearly that the Chinese
Communists have not come here to control
us, or become our masters, or to oppress us.
We should adopt a friendly attitude towards
them.
'If the Chinese Communists have come to
Tibet to help us, it is moat important that
they should respect the Tibetan people's
own social system, culture, customs and
habits, and honour the wishes of the whole
people of Tibet, and not obstruct or do dam-
age to the high principles of our nation. If
the Chinese Communist personnel in -Tibet
do not understand the conditions, and harm
or injure our people, you should immediately
report the facts to the Government. The
Government will certainly take steps to make
them correct their ways. If the Chinese
Communists do not correct their ways our
Government can immediately ask for their
expulsion.
'I hope all our Tibetan people will take
upon themselves the responsibility for carry-
ing out the various tasks allotted to them.
For example, if the members of a family can
themselves control and carry out the affairs
of the family that family may be said to be
a self-managed family or an independent
one. A country is also in the same position
as a family. I sincerely hope that the officials
of the Government and the people will stand
at their posts, will remain determined in
their attitudes, carrying out their responsi-
bilities and using their full strength in per-
forming their duties.
'Today I am very pleased with the officials
of the Government and the people and thank
them for working extremely hard for the
welfare of their district, Government and
country. But there are some officials and
people who have a very narrow outlook and
cannot take a broad view of 'things. For
their own selfish advancement and under the
attraction of glittering gold they do not care
for the good of the country and the people,
they practice oppression and deceit, they
give trouble to the people and harm the
Government, and thus are responsible for
great harm to the country. I would request
such people to correct their former mistakes
and, becoming new men, atone for their mis-
deeds in the interests of the country and
the people. Besides them there are some few
people who disregard their national culture
and history, consider themselves to be pro-
gressive, and who have changed their ways
to doing what they like in a very confused
manner. I regard such ideas as mistakes.
Progress cannot be attained suddenly in a
confused manner and must be attained
gradually in an ordered way. Again, there
are Government officials who are envious of
each other, create conflicts and bitterness,
and cannot cooperate with each other. Be-
cause they fritter away their energies they -
cannot carry out the work of the administra-
tion effectively. I desire that they give up
their selfish attitude and take a broad view
of things, correct each other and become
united together. Only by doing so can we
create and develop our strength. For example,
it is not possible for a single person to lift
a big stone using his own strength, but if
the strength of several people is pooled to-
gether it becomes very easy to lift the same
stone. This is a very simple example but I
know that all of you will pay special atten-
tion to this matter.
'Tibet consists of Kham, Tsang, U and
Amdo, and all consist of the Tibetan people.
Their spirit and way of living have such
intimate connexions that they cannot be
separated from each other. I hope that all of
you will deeply think over this matter, love
each other, and be united with each other,
and not become separated from each other.
'Finally, I hope that the people of the
whole of Tibet by their unity and co-opera-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 2321
tion will increase our strength and put all
their energies into the construction of a new
Tibet based on the unity of political life and
religion.'
This outspoken speech was wildly acclaim-
ed in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet for it
marked the emergence of the Dalai Lama on
the political scene in favour of a united
'Greater Tibet' without Chinese occupation,
and it immediately encouraged and strength-
ened the hands of the anti-Chinese groups
throughout the country.
Two months later the Mi-mang Tsong-du
came out publicly with an even stronger
declaration.
We Tibetan people make the following
appeal because we oppose the Chinese Com-
munists who are destroying all our customs
and systems, and also.because of the com-
plete breach of the Seventeen-Point Sino-
Tibetan Agreements signed by them. . . .
'But speaking about the present situation
in Tibet we declare that our religiou is fac-
ing a very grave crisis which has thrown us
into the very deep valley of darkness and.
destruction. The Dalai Lama. has been robbed
of his political and religious powers.. The
future of the Tibetan nation is facing as
grave a danger as a candlelight in a severe
storm. The root cause of this crisis is. the
oppressive ways in which the Chinese. Com-
munists have been forcing, Communist ideas
upon the Tibetan people, the most deplor-
able policy of violence practised by the
Chinese Communists, and the failure of the
Chinese Communists to implement any of.
the promises made by them to the Tibetan
people. In order to save our country from
this dangerous future we have already, on a
previous occasion, made a formal protest to
the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama.
'Formerly, under the Dalai Lama, there
were Regents, Kashag and the, various other
Government organizations which carried out
the administration of the whole of Tibet.
But since the occupation of Tibet by the
Chinese Communists all the former organi-.
zations of the Government have ceased to
function and the Chinese Communists have
established a large number of illegal orga-
nizations in their place to carry out the
administration. . The Chinese Commu-
nists have not only increased administrative
organizations but they have also established.
organizations such as the "Patriotic Youth
League" and the "Chinese Schools", with the
sole object of forcibly indoctrinating the
youth of Tibet. in Communism, and thus, to
destroy the culture and civilization of the
nation. Moreover, in opposition to the will
of the people the Chinese Communists have
destroyed the social system of Tibet in which
political and religious life are joined to-
gether, and have also destroyed the religion
of the Tibetan people. Therefore we, in the
name of the people of Tibet, have come
forward to appeal to the Dalai Lama. We
request that the Dalai Lama stop the orga-
nization of the "Patriotic Youth League",
close the "Chinese Schools" and prevent the
indoctrination of the Tibetan people in Com-
munism by the Chinese Communists. We are
now resolved not to accept the establishment
of the proposed Regional Autonomous Gov-
ernment in Tibet as we already have the
Government of the Dalai Lama. At the same
time we also request the Chinese Oommu-
nist Military Representative in Tibet .to
allow us to go. to Peking to lodge this pro-
test. If the Chinese Communists disregard
the people's wishes, and by force, oppression
and violence suppress the earnest appeal of
the people, we, in the. name of all the people
of Tibet, are. fully resolved to shed our blood
and sacrifice our lives to oppose the Com-
munists and we shall d'efinitely' not co-
operate in. any of the activities of the
Chinese' Communists in Tibet.'
TnE DALAI LAMA BEARS WITNESS
(The Dalai. Lama has issued four state-
ments which. have had worldwide publicity.
The first went out from Tezpur, shortly after
his arrival in India; the second followed
alomst immediately and was a refutation of
Peking's charge that the Tezpur statement
was issued under duress. The third was given
to the press at, Mussoorie nearly two months
later, when news that he was getting from
Tibet had confirmed his earlier appraisal of
the situation in his homeland. Frequent quo-
tations from these statements appear in the
texts that. follows; but the very obvious
truthfulness of his testimony, his eagerness
to have international inspection of the situ-
ation in Tibet and his simple belief that "the
truth shall make you free", make these the
most important documents yet submitted to
the world on the Tibetan Question.)
TEEM DALAI LAMA'S STATEMENT IN TEZPUR, INDIA,
ON APRIL 18, 1959
It has always been accepted that the
Tibetan people are different from the Han
people of China. There has always been a
strong' desire for independence on the part
of the Tibetan people. Throughout history
this has-been asserted on numerous occasions.
Sometimes the Chinese Government has im-
posed its suzerainty on Tibet and at other
times Tibet has functioned as an independ-
ent country. In any event, at all times, even
when the suzerainty of China was imposed.
Tibet remained autonomous in control of its
internal affairs.
In 1951 under' pressure of the Chinese Gov-
ernment a 17-article agreement was made
between China and Tibet. In that agreement
the suzerainty of China was accepted as
there was no alternative left to the Tibetans.
But' even in the agreement it was stated that
Tibet would enjoy full autonomy. Though
the control of external events were to be in
the hands of the Chinese Government it
was agreed that there would be no interfer-
ence by the Chinese Government with
Tibetan religion and customs and her in-
ternal administration. In fact, after the
occupation of Tibet by Chinese armies the
Tibetan Government did not enjoy any
measure of autonomy, even in internal
matters and the Chinese Government exer-
cise full powers in Tibetan affairs.
In 1956 a preparatory committee was set up
.for Tibet with the Dalai Lama as the Chair-
man and the Panchen Lama as ' Vice-Chair-
man and General. Chang Kuo-hua as the
represetative of the Chinese Government.
In practice, even this body had little power
and decision in all important matters were
taken by the Chinese authorities. The Dalai
Lama and his government tried their best to
adhere to the 17-article agreement but inter-
ference of the Chinese authorities persisted.
By the end of 1955 a struggle had started in
Kham Province and this assumed serious pro-
portions in 1956. In the consequential strug-
gle, Chinese armed forces destroyed a large
number of monasteries.
Many Lamas were killed and a large num-
ber of monks and officials were taken and
employed. on the construction of roads in
China and interference in the exercise of
religious freedom. increased.
. The relation of the Tibetans with China
became openly strained from the early part
of February 1959. The Dalai Lama had agreed
a month in advance to attend a cultural
show in the Chinese headquarters and the
.date was suddenly fixed for the 10th of
March. The people of Lhasa became appre-
hensive that same harm. might be done to
the Dalai Lama and as result about 10,000
people gathered around the Dalai Lama's
summer palace at Norbue Lingka and phys-
ically prevented the Dalai Lama from at'
tending the function.
Thereafter the people themselves decided
to raise a bodyguard for the protection of
the Dalai Lame. Lerge crowds of Tibetans
went about the streets of Lhasa demonstrat-
ing against Chinese rule in Tibet. Two days
later thousands'. of Tibetan women held
demonstrations' protesting, aaginst the Chi-
nese authorities,. In spite of this demonstra-
ion from the people: the Dalai Lama and his
government endeavoured to maintain
friendly relations with the Chinese and
tried to carry out. negotiations with the
Chinese representatives as to how best to
bring about peace in Tibet and assuage the
people's anxiety.
While these negotiations were being car-
ried out reinforcements arrived. to strength-
en the Chinese garrisons in Lhasa and Tibet.
On the 17th of March, two or three mortar
shells were fired in the direction of Norbu
Lingka Palace. Fortunately the shells fell in
a nearby pond.
After this, the advisers became alive to the
danger to the person of the Dalai Lama and
in those .difficult circumstances it became
imperative for the Dalai Lama, members of
his family and his high officials to leave
Lhasa.
The Dalai Lama would like to state cate-
gorically that, he left. Lhasa and. Tibet and
came to India of his own free will and not
under duress. .
It was, due to. the loyalty and affectionate
support of his people that, the Dalia Lama
was able to find his, way through a route
Which is. quite arduous.. The route which the
Dalai. Lama, took involved crossing Kyichu
and Tsang-po rivers and making, his way
through Loke. area, Yarlung valley ? and
Psonadzong before reaching the Indian
frontier at, Kanseymane near to Chuttanmu.
On March 29, 19596 the. Dalai Lama sent
emissaries to cross the Indo-Tibetan border
requesting the government of. India's per-
mission to enter India and seek asylum
there. The. Dalai. Lama is extremely grateful
to the people and government of India for
their spontaneous and general welcome as
well as asylum granted top him and his fol-
lowers.
India and Tibet have religious, cultural
and trade links. over a thousand years and
for the Tibetans. it has, always been a land
of enlightment having given birth to Lord
Buddha. The Dalai Lama is deeply touched
by kind greetings extended to him on his
safe arrival in India by Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and his. colleagues in the
government. of India. The Dalai Lama has
already sent a, reply to this message of greet-
ing.
Ever since the Dalai. Lama entered at Kan-
zeymane near Chuttanmu he has experienced
in full measure the respect and hospitality
extended to him, by the people of Kameng
Frontier Division of the Northeast Frontier
Agency and the Dalai Lama would like to
,state how the Government of India's officers
posted there has spared ho effort in making
his stay and journey through this extremely
well-administered part of India as comfort-
able as possible.
The Dalai Lama will now be proceeding to
Mussoorie which he hopes to reach in the
next few days. The Dalai Lama will give
thought to his' future plans and if necessary
give expression to them as soon as he has had
a chance to rest and reflect on recent events.
His country . and people have passed
through an extremely difficult period and
all that the' Dalai Lama wishes to say at the
moment is to express his sincere regret at
the tragedy which has overtaken Tibet and
fervently hope that these troubles will be
over soon without any more bloodshed.
As the Dalai. Lama and the' spiritual head
of all Buddhists In Tbet, his foremost' con-
cern is the. well-being of his people and In
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S 2322 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
insuring perpetual flourishing of his sacred
religion and freedom of his country.
While expressing once again thankfulness
at his safe arrival in India the Dalai Lama
would like to take this opportunity to com-
municate to all his friends, well wishers and
devotees in India and abroad his sincere
gratitude for many messages of, sympathies
and concern with which they have flooded
him.
STATEMENT BY THE DALAI LAMA MADE ON APRIL
22, 1959
On April 18, I issued a statement at Tez-
pur. I did not wish to follow it up with an-
other statement at this stage. However I have
seen a New China News Agency report im-
plying that I was not responsible for this
earlier statement. I wish to make it clear
that the earlier statement was issued under
my authority and indicated my view and I
stand by it. I am making this brief statement
to correct the wrong impression created by
the New China News Agency's report and do
not propose to state anything more at pres-
ent.
TEXT OF THE DALAI LAMA'S STATEMENT OF JUNE
20, 1959 AT MUSSOORIE, INDIA
Ever since my arrival in India I have been
receiving almost every day sad and distress-
ing news of the suffering and inhuman treat-
ment of my people. I have heard almost daily
with a heavy heart of the increasing agony
and affliction, their harassment and perse-
cution and of the terrible deportation and
execution of innocent men. These have made
me realize forcibly that the time has mani-
festly arrived when in the interests of my
people and religion and to save them from
the danger of near annihilation; I must not
keep silent any longer but must frankly and
plainly tell the world the truth about Tibet
and appeal to the conscience of all peace-
loving and civilized nations.
To understand and appreciate the signifi-
cance and implication of the recent tragic
happenings in Tibet, it is necessary to refer
to the main events which have occurred in
the country since 1950.
It is recognized by every independent
observer that Tibet had virtually been inde-
pendent by enjoying and exercising all
rights of sovereignty whether internal or
external. -This has also been implicitly ad-
mitted by the Communist Government of
China for the very structure, terms and
conditions of the so-called agreement of
1951 conclusively show that it was an agree-
ment between two independent and sover-
eign States. It follows, therefore, that when
the Chinese armies violated the territorial
integrity of Tibet they were committing a
flagrant act of aggression. The agreement
which followed the invasion of Tibet was
also thrust upon its people and Government
by the threat of arms. It was never accepted
by them of their own free will. The consent,
of the Government was secured under duress
and at the point of the bayonet.
My representatives were compelled to sign
the agreement under threat of further mili-
tary operations against Tibet by the invad-
ing armies of China leading to utter ravage
and ruin of the country. Even the Tibetan
seal which was affixed to the agreement was
not the seal of my representatives but a seal
copied and fabricated by the Chinese au-
thorities in Peking and kept in their posses-
While I and my Government did not vol-
untarily accept the agreement we were
obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to
abide by the terms and conditions in order
to save my people and country from the
danger of total destruction. It was, however,
clear from the very beginning that the
Chinese had no intentions of carrying out
the agreement.
Although they had solemnly undertaken
to maintain my status and power as the
Dalai Lama, they did not lose any oppor-
tunity to undermine my authority and sow
dissension among my people. In fact, they
Compelled me, situated as I was, to dismiss
my Prime Ministers under threat of their
execution without trial, because they had in
all honesty and sincerity resisted the un-
justified usurpations of power by represen-
tatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet.
Far from carrying out the agreement they
began deliberately to pursue a course of pol-
icy which was diametrically opposed to the
terms and conditions which they had them-
selves laid down. Thus commenced a reign
of terror which finds few parallels in the
history of Tibet. Forced labour and compul-
sory exactions, a systematic persecution of
the people, plunder and confiscation of prop-
erty belonging to individuals and monas-
teries and execution of certain leading men
in Tibet, these are the glorious achievements
of the Chinese rule in Tibet.
During all this time, patiently and sin-
cerely I endeavoured to appease my people
and to calm down their feelings and at the
same time tried my best to persuade the
Chinese authorities in Lhasa to adopt a
policy of conciliation and friendliness. In
spite of repeated failures I persisted in this
policy till the last day when it became im-
possible for me to render any useful service
to my people by remaining in Tibet. It is
in these circumstances that I was obliged
to leave my country in order to save it from
further danger and disaster.
I wish to make it clear that I have made
these assertions against. the Chinese officials
in Tibet in the full knowledge of their grav-
ity because I know them to be true. Perhaps
the Peking Government is not fully aware of
the facts of the situation.
But if it is not prepared to accept these.
statements let it agree to an investigation on
the point by an international commission.
On our part I and my Government will
readily agree to abide by the verdict of such
an impartial body. '
It.is necessary for me to add that before I
visited India in 1956 it had become increas-
ingly clear to me that ? my policy of amity
and tolerance had totally failed to create any
impression on the representatives of the
Chinese Government in Tibet.
Indeed they had frustrated every measure
adopted by me to remove the bitter resent-
ment felt by my people and to bring about
a peaceful atmosphere in the country for the
purpose of carrying out the necessary re-
forms. As I was unable to do anything for
the benefit of my people I had practically
made up my mind when I came to India not
to return to Tibet until there was a manifest
change in the attitude of the Chinese
authorities. I therefore sought the advice of
the Prime Minister of India who has always
shown me unfailing kindness and considera-
tion. After his talk with the Chinese Prime
Minister and on the strength of the assur-
ances given by him on behalf of China, Mr.
Nehru advised me to change my decision.
I followed his advice and returned to Tibet
in the hope that conditions would change
substantially for the better and I have no
doubt that my hopes would have been real-
ized if the Chinese authorities had on their
part carried out the assurances which the
Chinese Prime Minister had given to the
Prime Minister of India.
It was, however, painfully clear soon after
my return that the representatives of the
Chinese GovernmentC had no intention to
adhere to their promises. The natural and
inevitable result was that the situation
steadily grew worse until it became impos-
sible to control the spontaneous upsurge of
my people against the tyranny. and oppres-
sion of the Chinese authorities.
At this point I wish to emphasize that I
March 8, 1979
and my Government have never been op-
posed to the reforms which are necessary
in the social, economic and political systems.
prevailing in Tibet.
We have no desire to disguise the fact that
ours is an ancient society and that we must
introduce immediate changes, in the inter-
ests of the people of Tibet. In fact, during'
the last nine years several reforms were pro-
posed by me and my Government but every
time these measures were strenuously op-
posed by the Chinese in spite of popular de-
mand for them, with the result that nothing
was done for the betterment of the social
and economic conditions of the people.
In particular it was my earnest desire that
the system of land tenure should be radically
changed without further delay and the large
landed estates acquired by the State on pay-
ment of compensation for distribution
amongst the tillers of the soil. But the Chi-
nese authorities deliberately put every ob-
stacle in the way of carrying out this just
and reasonable reform. I desire to lay stress
on the fact that we, as firm believers in
Buddhism, welcome change and progress
consistently with the genius of our people
and the rich tradition of our country.
But the people of Tibet will stoutly resist
any victimization, sacrilege and plunder in
the name of reforms-a policy which is now
being enforced by the representatives of the
Chinese Government in Lhasa.
I have attempted to present a clear and
unvarnished picture of the situation in Tibet.
I have endeavoured to tell the entire civilized
world the real truth about Tibet, the truth
which must ultimately prevail, however
strong the forces of evil may appear to be
today. I also wish to declare that we, Budd-
hists, firmly and steadfastly believe in peace
and desire to live in peace with all the peo-
ples and countries of the world. Although
recent actions and policies of the Chinese au-
thorities in Tibet have created strong feel-
ings of bitterness and resentment against
the Government of China, we Tibetans, lay
and monk alike,?do not cherish any feelings
of enmity and hatred against the great Chi-
nese people.
We wish to live in peace and ask for peace
and goodwill from all the countries of the
world. I and my Government are, therefore
fully prepared to welcome' a peaceful and
amicable solution of the present tragic prob-
lem, provided that such a solution guarantees
the preservation of the rights and powers
which Tibet has enjoyed and exercised with-
out any interference prior to 1950.
We must also insist on the creation of a
favourable climate by the immediate adop-
tion of the essential measures as a condition
precedent to negotiations for a peaceful set-
tlement. We ask for peace and for a peace-.
ful settlement but we must also ask for the
maintenance of the status and the rights of
our State and people. .
To you gentlemen of the Press I and my
people owe a great debt of gratitude for all
that you have done to assist. us, in our strug-
gle for survival and freedom. Your sympathy
and support has given us courage and
strengthened our determination. I confi-
dently hope that you will continue to lend
that weight of your influence to the cause of
peace and freedom for which the people of
Tibet are fighting today.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, some peo-
ple are saying "Why, Senator, do you
bring all this up?"
Well,' if we do not learn from history,
we are going to remain ignorant. If we
do not ' know now what we are dealing
with and if we do not describe. It clearly,
then we deserve what we will get.
. But the problem is that our friends
and allies on Taiwan are going to be
getting something they do not deserve.
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL ' RECORD - SENATE
I repeat that it is important to note
especially articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the
agreement I referred to' a moment ago,
the so-called the Agreement of Measures
for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,
particularly as we now listen to sup-
posedly soothing words about how we
have taken care of everything.
After all, we had that cuddly little
panda bear Vice President Teng here not
long ago, and we fawned over him-
about as. cute and cuddly as a rabid
panda bear.
But when are we going to learn what
we are dealing with, Mr. President, and
when are we going to start acting like
Americans?
I find myself more and more appalled
as we back up and back up and say,
"Oh, we must not offend this Communist
nation, or that one, we must appease and
we must coexist."
Mr. PERCY. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. HELMS. Yes.
Mr. PERCY. The distinguished Sena-
tor from North Carolina used a phrase,
"When are we going to start acting like
Americans."
That brings to mind, I would tend to
think, the times we have really defined
our national interests, we have really
stood for something, and our standing
for something made a difference.
Mr. HELMS. Exactly.
Mr. PERCY. in human history.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is exactly
right.
Mr. PERCY. In the history of the
world as to whether we have a free
Europe. Our standing for something
could make a difference as to whether
there is an Israel or not.
I think the problem is the U.S. decline
in the opinion of the world. It is because
we have not acted as the world has
learned to respect Americans for acting
in the past.
It brings to mind what kind of develop-
ment we are going to have in the Gulf
area now. We have a pattern developing
in the Gulf area.
South Yemen, moved from being a
British colony, oriented in and tipped
heavily toward the Labor Party unions,
to what is now classified as Marxist.
North Yemen has had three presidents in o
the last 2 years, two of them assassinated.
The feeling is rather strong that the
South Yemenites had something to do
with at least one of those assassinations.
They want to change the North Yemen
Government. They want to, just like
North Vietnam, just like North Korea,
they want to unify it, the Yemenites, and
bring them all together under one flag,
as long as it is red.
Mr. HELMS. That is right.
Mr. PERCY. They are very clear about
what they want to do.
Mr. HELMS. Once again the distin-
guished Senator is right.
Mr. PERCY. And if they cannot get
it by killing the chief executive officers
of the country, then they start harass-
ing him in three different places on the
borders, as they are doing right at this
very minute.
Now, the Soviet Union. is not equiv-
ocating about what they are doing.
They are supplying equipment, man-
power, and training.
The Government of North Yemen has
a large population, 61/2 million. But of
that, a million are in Saudi Arabia.
What would happen if South Yemen
took over North Yemen? What would
happen? The men up there would be
held hostage because their families
would be down in North Yemen and
the men are up in Saudi Arabia.
This would cause concern on the part
of the Saudi Arabians because they also
saw Afganistan fall. They see the begin-
ning of, a pattern, and they are worried
about what we are going to do. They
wonder when we are going to start act-
ing like Americans.
Are our vital interests concerned in
the gulf area? You bet they are.
Mr. HELMS. You bet they are.
Mr. PERCY. This country can be
brought to its knees economically over-
night, and do not think our adversaries
do not have that in mind.
Khrushchev said quite honestly,
"We're going to bury you." He did not
mean they are going to take the risk of
fighting us. They have been through a
war. They lost 20 million people. They
found a much easier way to do it. It is
to just create a little chaos. A little
trouble starts in Iran-throw in the
chaos, ferment the thing. Get the
Cubans to do it. After all, they are send-
ing a million dollars a day to them-
eating all that sugar, smoking all those
cigars. Why not have the Cubans do,
something for them?
So they are waiting around in South
Yemen to see whether they are needed.
They are down there training forces in
South Yemen today. When are we go-
ing to start acting like Americans?
All the people in the world are stand-
ing there waiting to see what the United
States of America is going to do in the
Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, in the
Indian Ocean, and in Europe. The Peo-
ple's Republic of China has criticized us
for not fighting, in a sense, for what we
believe in and for what they conceive to
be our mutuality of interests, including
our deep mutual concern about the in-
tentions and the capabilities of the
Soviet Union. Therefore, I think they
will understand if we make it very clear
how we feel about Taiwan, how we feel
about these 17 million people, how we
have had for 30 years, how we feel about
the representations we have made: that
we intend to keep up the cultural and
educational exchanges, that we intend
to keep up Taiwan's defense capability.
I wonder whether I can read some-
thing to my distinguished colleague.
This is what the President of the United
States has said. I read now from the
Presidential document for the week end-
ing Friday, February 16, 1979, put out
by the White House, the administration
of Jimmy Carter, an interview with the
President. This is what the President
said about this issue, and I quote
directly: .
There's nothing to prohibit a future Pres-
ident or a future. Congress, if we feel that
Taiwan is unnecessarily endangered, from
interposing the. American Pacific Fleet be-
tween the island and the Mainland. And
S 2323
there's certainly nothing to prevent a future
President or Congress from even going to
war, if they choose, to protect the people
of Taiwan, or to protect any other people
in the country [world] that we look on with
favor. So, we still have complete flexibility
to deal with that kind of conjectural possi-
bility if we choose.
When the President expressed himself
forthrightly as to what options were
available to the people of the United
States, I did not hear the People's Re-
public of China say that we had gone so
far that. we had jeopardized. this rela-
tionship. Not at all.
We simply want to change a couple of
words. The words "grave concern," his-
tory has demonstrated, send one kind of
signal-of inaction, wringing our hands,
and doing nothing. We want to send the
right kind of signal. It is not put in the
strong terms that the President used.
The Senator from Illinois used words
so moderate that the distinguished Sena-
tor from North Carolina feels that it is
the absolute minimum we can do. We
simply identify a peaceful resolution of
the Taiwan issue as in our security in-
terests.
The Senator from Illinois stated this
in open testimony at the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee hearings, and the origi-
nal wording of the distinguished Sena-
tor from New York was even stronger.
On reflection, he felt that he should
back off from that. I have many times
commended him and Senator CHURCH for
taking the initiative, the congressional
initiative, and going much further than
the administration had originally
thought acceptable. The administration
will thank us some day, as they will for
the congressional position with respect
to the Panama Canal.
When the distinguished Senator says,
"When are we going to start acting like
Americans?" we had better start today.
The whole process of leadership is erod-
ing. John Connally knows that; Texas
knows it; America knows it.
We had better start acting like Ameri-
cans, unequivocally stating what we
think is in our security interests and
sending unmistakable signals as to what
we might consider necessary. All options
are open as to how we would act. The
whole range is available.
The Senator from Illinois is quite will-
ing to have a degree of ambiguity there,
because it is in our interest to have it
vague, as long as the language is strong
enough to convey that we would consider
taking action.
We canot leave Taiwan out of that
perimeter of security interests. When the
President of the United States says that
the option is open to send our fleet right
in those straits, the Congress should be
free to make a strong statement as well.
. If we just say "grave concern," we are
not sending that signal. We are not re-
flecting what the President has said
forthrightly. We are not reflecting at all
what I consider to be the mood of the
Congress. of the United States, partic-
ularly the Senate.
I thank my distinguished colleague for
yielding. Is that what the Senator had in
mind when. he said, "When are we going
to begin acting like Americans?"
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?CONGR E.SS][ONALL RECORD - SENATE March 8, 1979
Mr. BIDEN. 'Mr. President, will the
Senator from North Carolina yield for 30
seconds?
Mr. HELMS. I yield.
Mr. BIDEN. Isuggest that America will
start acting like Americans .want it to act
when we start to act in our self-interest
and stop engaging in hyperbole which is
a breast-beating exercise in machismo. I
suggest that when we start acting in our
self-interest, we Will be acting like
Americans.
Mr. HELMS. ,dr. President, I never
have heard the Senator from Illinois
speak more eloquently. I commend him.
I say to the Senator that I went to one
of the hotels on Tuesday evening to at-
tend the annual dinner of the Veterans
of Foreign Wars. Each year, the VFW has
an oratorical contest, and there is a win-
ner from each State. The winner this
year was a young lady from Illinois, and
she sounded almost like the distinguished
Senator from Illinois in her presentation.
The last thing. she said was:
Remember that the last four letters of
"American" are t-c-a-n-I can.
I think this is what the Senator from
Illinois is talking about.
But let us speak in a bipartisan spirit.
I recall John Kennedy in the confronta-
tion with respect to Soviet missiles in
Cuba. He stood eyeball to eyeball, and in
effect he said, "I can and we will"; and
the Soviets backed off.
Here we are haggling over the mildest
sort of change in the language. I say this
with no disrespect to the distinguished
Senator from New York, my friend, or to
the distinguished chairman of the com-
mittee, Mr. CHURCH. I simply think that
the language of the Senator from Illinois
is the absolute minimum we should do in
connection with our friends and allies in
Taiwan.
Reference was made yesterday and
just a few moments ago to the effect
that Taiwan' had insisted that there be
one China and that Taiwan be that one
China, *hile Peking was insisting the
same thing on the other side. That
simply is not so, Mr. President. I read
into the RECORD yesterday the history
of Taiwan's position on that: An article
by a distinguished professor at the Uni-
versity of Maryland, Hungdah Chiu,
who reviewed, item by item and year by
year, the position of the Republic of
China (Taiwan), showing that Taiwan
had the position of one China with two
governments.
Anyone who wants to reject that in
order to be consistent has to say "Oh,
well, you cannot-have two Governments
of Korea or two Governments of Ger-
many." I do not think any Senator is
going to seriously suggest that.
But at least let us be fair to Taiwan
in what we say in terms of historical
fact. I do not think Taiwan has gotten
a fair shake.
Mr. President, I issue the invitation
again to any Senator who wants to see
a document marked "Secret" by the
Pentagon, which I have in my hand
here. I will not divulge it to the media;
but with any Senator, who doubts the
accuracy Of what I have said about
General Jones' testimony with respect
to the capability of the People's Republic
of China to blockade Taiwan. I will be
glad to share this secret document. I
am not going to say what it says but it
is marked here and on several other
places. It is marked to show exactly
what the Pentagon said before the Presi-
dent of the United States in secret, and
I use these words advisedly, sold Taiwan
down the river.
That is why the Senator from North
Carolina feels so strongly about this. We
get doubletalk.
We got doubletalk on the Panama
Canal. Last year I heard one thing in my
office from certain military officers, and
then the same officers would appear in
public before a committee and they
would couch their language so carefully
to give the opposite impression. I re-
member one of our distinguished col-
leagues became furious with me when I
suggested that this was happening.
It has happened again here. Every-
thing that the Pentagon drafted for its
own edification with respect to this mat-
ter shows that concern about the capa-
bility of Peking, and now we are told,
"Oh, no, they don't have capability to
blockade Taiwan."
(Mr. FORD assumed the chair.)
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. HELMS. I am delighted to yield
to my friend.
Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not that I
want to dispute the integrity of my good
friend General Jones, but to point out
that men in uniform occasionally can be
inconsistent. Does the Senator remember
General Jones about 2 years ago stating
that we really did not need the B-1? And
now he says that we need another pene-
trating bomber? That is in a matter of a
year or a year and a half.
I also ask the Senator another ques-
tion I think that has a bearing on this,
because I believe the Senator from Dela-
ware made an approach to it. Why
should we have an interest in Taiwan
that would require the kind of language
that the Senator from Illinois has -pro-
posed and which the Senate has obvi-
ously agreed to? I do not think that was
discussed in the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, although I am not a member of
that committee as the Senator is. It is
something that Americans forget that
our central point of foreign interest in
this country for about 101 or 102 years
has been the Pacific, not Europe, not
South America, not Africa, but the
periphery of the Pacific. We bought
Alaska in 1867. We acquired Hawaii a
year or year and a half later. Why? Be-
cause those men over 100 years ago had
the commonsense to realize that Europe
even then was pretty much through as
a developing continent or a developing
nation. I suggest that when any country
reaches its frontiers, reaches its bound-
aries it can only recede and go back-
ward, and that is what Europe had
started to do tlien.
So we moved into the Pacific. We rec-
ognized then that if there were going to
be a part of this world that-in the lifetime
of our Republic, an extended one hope-
fully, would become important it would
be those countries around the Pacific,
and that has proven true. The great
shining spots of the economy of the
world are not in Europe. They are around
the Pacific. They are the countries that
are developing. They are the countries
that are contributing vast amounts of
money in helping us and helping them-
selves.
And so the question always intrigues
me when someone says what is so im-
portant about the Pacific and about
Taiwan?
Let us take a look at it: Here we have
made a deal with the Republic of China,
even though this same body last Septem-
ber passed, without any dissenting vote,
that the President of the United States
should come to us before we did anything
about stabbing Taiwan in the back. That
is the way I put it. I think the Senator
from North Carolina expressed it in an-
other way. He did not do it.
Now we have given a hand up to the
Red. Chinese. I will never know why a
man who has devoted his life time, sup-
posedly, to human rights would want to
crawl in bed with an organization that
murdered 50 million people. I think that
is part of what the Senator is saying
about being an American.
Mr. HELMS. That is it exactly. That is
a minimum of 50 million, I say to the
Senator.
Mr. GOLDWATER. All right. I want
to get back to this subject of the Pacific
to try to explain why Taiwan is so dog-
gone important to us, the United States
of America.
We built one of the finest airbases on
Taiwan that has ever been built in this
world. It will take the weight of any air-
craft yet built and any aircraft that we
are going to build in the. foreseeable
future. Taiwan has two good ports, one
excellent port on the southern tip, that
can handle the ships of our fleet and the
ships also, I might say, of?the Soviet fleet.
Let us say that we did not have this
kind of language that the Senator from
Illinois has put in. Let us say that Tai-
wan is sort of "we are not going to get
any help from our old friends in the
United States. We better take another
look at the Soviet Union," and they say
to the Soviets, "We are interested in trade
with you always but we would like you
to consider the possible use of our har-
bors, the possible use of this beautiful
airbase for protection purposes."
I happen to have been all through the
Island of Quemoy. I have been all over
that area. I have flown over it. I have
been through it. I have to say I would
hate to be the commanding general that
is given the order to take Quemoy. I
think I would ask for leave and relax-
ation some place, but that is beside the
point.
Once the Soviets move in there, and
they are liable to do it if we do not
make this language pretty strong, they
might go into Camranh Bay and like
the secret document the Senator has, I
cannot divulge any more than they
might go into Camh Ran Bay. If the
Senator asks me sometime I will tell him
a little more, but I cannot say it here.
What is next? Singapore. Where is
the Pacific? Gone. Every country in the
Pacific and the perimeter of the Pacific
depends on the Straits of Malacca.
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL R]ECO
Now let us move over there. People
say why are we all excited about the fall
of Afghanistan and the revolution, so-
called, in Iran? I have known the shah
for many, many years, and I remember
asking him, "Why do you want to buy
all 'these helicopters in a country that
borders on Russia that now has over
3,000 of them?" He said, "I am not wor-
ried about Russia. I am worried about
the day Afghanistan falls," and he says,
"Mark my word, it is going to fall, and
when it falls it will fall from Soviet in-
fluence," and that gives them an open
? door across that vast desert of western
Pakistan, and I know something about
it. I used to fly over that in World War
II, and there is nothing out there, noth-
ing to stop the Russians from building
railroads, highways, down to the Indian
Ocean, which they have been wanting
to do all of their history.
Now they are going to do it. They are
going to circumvent the former Straits
of Iran. They are going to go through
Afghanistan which is now theirs for the
asking. They are going to go across Pak-
istan whether Pakistan likes it or not,
and they cannot do much about it. And
they will establish ports on the Indian
Ocean.
The distinguished Senator from Illi-
nois has described what has been going
on in the Horn of Africa. We have lost
that through our stupidity and our weak-
ness. And he said, "When are we -going
to act like Americans?" When we get a
little guts right here?
Mr. HELMS. Right.
Mr. GOLDWATER. That is when we
are going to start.
Now what happens when the Russians
own the Indian Ocean, which I happen
to think is the strategic focal point of
the whole world today?
We have not done much about Diego
Garcia. We sat in here and argued about
it, a little old atoll about 12 miles long;
we want to spend enough money to deep-
en the harbor. We do not have to depend
on Subic Bay which is 4,000 miles away.
We cannot have a, place out in the mid-
dle of the ocean where we can put ships
and put aircraft.
But we have not done much about it.
What we are talking about now is the
connection of the Indian Ocean with the
Pacific through the Strait of Malacca.
When you ask what importance is
that-and we are getting now to the real
nub of it-the Strait of Malacca is a very
narrow strait, it is a very shallow strait.
A couple of tankers strategically sunk in
that strait could stop traffic through it.
This would mean oil would have to' go
either about 7,500 miles further or we
would see the stoppage of all oil from
the Middle East to our friends around
the Pacific.
So we say-friends in this organiza-
tion I have heard them say, "Why are
we interested in the Pacific? Why do we
need language like the language of the
Senator from Illinois? Why do we have
to put something in this bill that we
are talking about," which, I have to say,
is a lot better than we started off with,
and I intend to vote for it, but I will vote
for it with a much better conscience if
we have the language that Senator
D - S]ENAT]E S 2325
PERCY proposes in it. We have got to give
this world some indication that we are
not going to sit over here and back away
from everything that is done to us.
When the distinguished Senator from
Idaho got up I could not think of a better
argument for the proposal of the Sen-
ator from Illinois than the fact that he
said we are making the Red Chinese mad.
I do not care if we, and I do not give a
damn if we, make them mad. I would
like to make them real mad. It is when
they change their spots that I might
change mine a little bit.
I just want to thank the Senator for
allowing me to ask that long question. I
think it is what he expected of me; is
that not right?
Mr. HELMS. I am delighted, and I ap-
preciate the Senator's reply, as I always
do. He is a very courageous man who
has stood fast on his principles, and he
knows of my support.
Mr. President, I am not going to take
much more time. I just want to say again
if any Senator has any doubt that the
administration was working and plan-
ning-and I quote the Senator's words-
"to sell out Taiwan," even during the
closing days of the last session when this
Senate and this House of Representa-
tives were voting almost unanimously for
the Dole amendment. I think there were
four votes against it over in the House
and none in the Senate-all anyone
needs to do is to look at this document
and they will see that the administra-
tion was making plans to sell out Taiwan.
over the reservations and the concerns,
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the
capability of the People's Republic of
China, which I prefer to call Communist
China, to throttle Taiwan.
The point is, Mr. President, that we
cannot unscramble an egg, and yet that
is what we are trying to do here. I know
it must appear to some that the Senator
from North Carolina is being a little
heavyhanded with his friend from New
York (Mr. JAVITS) and his friend from
Idaho (Mr. CHURCH). But that is not my
intent. I know they did the best they
could with what they had. But the prob-
lem is you cannot make a silk purse out
of a sow's ear, and my feeling is we ought
to acknowledge, as many have on both
sides of the aisle, that we have been had
on this proposition. Therefore we ought
to strengthen the security section, at the
minimum, to what the Senator from Illi-
nois proposes and, for this Senator's
part, I will be willing to let her go, as the
saying is.
But if we are going to reject even such
a modest change as proposed by the Sen-
ator from Illinois, then I think perhaps
we ought to debate this thing for a
pretty good while, and we ought to vote
and vote and vote on some amendments
so that we can properly ventilate it.
This I do not want to do. But if the
State Department wants to get this over
with, let them say, "OK, we will live with
the Percy amendment." I guarantee you
that the Senator from North Carolina
will cooperate with anybody in shutting
this thing down.
But there has been too much said
about Taiwan that is not so. There has
been so much done to Taiwan which
should never have been done that I, in
good conscience, as just one Senator,
cannot keep silent. I love nothing better
than comity. I have great love and re-
spect for my colleagues, even those with
whom I disagree with most strongly.
But we have come to the place where
right is right, and as that little girl from
Illinois said, the laws four letters of
"American" are "I can." This Senate
can, and this Senate should, and I hope
this Senate will.
I yield to my friend from-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
believe the Senator yielded to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from North.Carolina yield?
Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator
from New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does he
yield for a question or does he yield the
floor?
Mr. HELMS. I will find that out when
I find it out. The Senator asked me if I
would yield and I said, yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yield for
a question?
Mr. HELMS. Is the Chair going to
impose that strict a rule?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Well,
there have been several Senators stand-
ing wanting recognition. The Senator
attempted to yield the floor. If the Sena-
tor yielded for a question-
Mr. HELMS. I believe that the RECORD
will show that I was attempting to yield
to my friend from New Hampshire. I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator
from New Hampshire.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
want to wholeheartedly associate myself
with the amendment offered by the Sen-
ator from Illinois, and the fine remarks
buttressing those of the Senator from
Illinois offered by the Senator from
North Carolina, the Senator from Ari-
zona, the Senator from California, and
others.
I find it incredibly ironic that at a
time when the United States of America
has in force a mutual defense treaty with
the Republic of China, we should be
quibbling so about the security section of
the Taiwan enabling bill. To be perfectly
honest, I would. like to see the security
section made even stronger than has
been proposed by the Senator from Illi-
nois, with all due respect to him, but
perhaps it is the best we can do. I would
like to see some honor put back in that
section.
In my opinion, all that is being at-
tempted here is to firm up some wobbly
gums a little bit; to firm up those wobbly
gums sufficiently so that in the future
we cannot so readily speak out of both
sides of our mouth on this sort of issue.
I think the fact that we are today quib-
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S 2326 CONGRESSIONAL
bling about the security-section of the
Taiwan enabling bill, on the, one hand,
while on the otherwe'have in force a
mutual defense treaty, indicates that
some fundamental change has taken
place in the relationship between the
United States and the Republic of China,
and of course,, indeed, a fundamental
change has taken place. Indeed, a funda-
mental change is embodied in 5..245.
The very essence of S. 245, Mr..Presi-
dent, is the tacit acknowledgement.by the
Senate and by the United Stag of Amer-
ica of the contention of the People's Re-
public of China that Taiwan is but a re-
bellious province of the PRC.
I reject 'that, and I hope a majority
of the Members of this body will reject
that dishonest contention. The People's
Republic of China has never ruled Tai-
wan. The 17 million people on Taiwan
are free, and they want.-to remain free,
They do not want to' be governed by the
Communist Government of the People's
Republic of China.
Why can we not aid them in that de-
sire .a little .bit? A couple of weeks ago
President Carter, in his speech at Georgia
Tech, made four main points, one. of
which was this: "We shall stand by our
friends."
Well, let us do.it! Let us put into prat=
tice what we say. We "have suffered a
terrible loss in respect, in. credibility in
this world, in the last several weeks and
the last several years, and we will con-
tinue to.suffer ' that .loss as long as we
continue to act in this perfidious,
cowardly, stupid manner.
If we acknowledge to ,the"People's Re-
public of China that ? indeed they own
Taiwan, it is only?a matter of timebefore
they attempt to take what we have told
them they own, by one means or another.
I happen to believe that the most likely
course of action by the Communists will
be an economic 'boycott of the Republic
of China, and I am supporting some leg-
islation in an amendment ? which I un-
derstand will be introduced before this
discussion is over that will at least help
prevent that kind of economic' boycott.
But at the same ,time, while.1 consider
that to be the main threat, I do not for
a minute underestimate the potential for
direct military. action against Taiwan by
the People's Republic. Why should they
hesitate to do that? 'Did they hesitate
to roll their army into Vietnam? Not for
a moment did they hesitate,. even at a
very crucial time in the evolvement of
the new relationship between the United
States and ' the People's Republic of
China. They did not hesitate a' moment;
and to my way of thinking they would
not hesitate a moment, if they thought
they could get away with it, from direct
aggression against' Taiwan.
It has been said in this Chamber to-
day that the People's Republic of China
does not have the capability, and will not
have for perhaps 5 years, of engaging in
a waterborne invasion of Taiwan. Per-
haps that is so, but I am not in the least
comforted by that, because 5 years goes
by very quickly. And at least they do have
today the capability of blockading Tai-
wan by submarines, and 'that would be
very devastating for'Taiwan, and -would,
in my opinion, call for 'the United States
lID -'PA"IEMarch 8, 1979
to interpose its naval forces to, prevent
that.
In my opinion, the People's Republic
of China will show no. hesitation,., if it
thinks it can get' away with it,, in.engag-
ing in military aggression against
Taiwan.
In today's New York Times there is an
article which I should like to read, to
make it a part of the RECORD, about what
are perhaps the first, certainly early
Chinese overtures to this country to' pro-
vide military weapons to the People's
Republic of China. Not ;incidentally, I
have an amendment which I hope to
offer to S. 245 before the discussion is
closed which will make it impossible for
the People's Republic of China to?obtain
military materiel from 'this country.
After all, we do not"sellit,to the Soviet
Union; we do not .sell it to any of the
members of the Warsaw Pact countries;
and we should not, if we have any sense
at all left-and I am not sure we have,
frankly-sell it to the People's Republic
of China.
Some people argue that we ought to
build up the PRC as a counterpoise to
the Soviet Union; but let us remember
that 20 years ago the U,S.S.R..and1the
PRC were fast friends. Twenty years or
10 years from now they may be fast
friends again; and I hope, for the sake
of the future of this country, we do not
build up a second Communist' power.
The New York Times article, under the
heading "China -Showing Interest in
Buying U.S. War Planes;" written by
Fox Butterfield, reads asfollows:
HONG KONG, March 7.-China?has quietly
expressed interest in buying American mili-
tary planes and associated' technology, and
may make a formal request to Washington
within a few months, knowledgeable sources
in the aircraft industry have disclosed.
Such an overture would run counter to the
policy of the Carter Administration to re-
frain from selling arms to 'either the Soviet
Union or China, in order to 'avoid the -ap-
pearance of, favoring one over the other. But
the Administration has said it would not ob-
ject to allies of the United States making
such sales to China, and Peking is negotiat-
ing with Britain to buy the Harrier jet
fighter.
That, parenthetically, -Mr. President,
for those who are not aware of it, and
I suspect most in this -room are, is a
vertical takeoff fighter which requires
only the shortest of runways, one whose
bases could be changed on very short
notice-for instance, to move them closer
to the coastline of the People's Republic
of China.
Resuming the quotation:
According to an aviation industry repre-
sentative who recently visited China, the
Chinese have shown a particular interest in
buying the Lockheed C-130, a versatile four-
engine military transport, and the Lockheed
P-3C antisubmarine patrol 'plane. The Chi-
nese also reportedly expressed interest in ad-
vanced electronic equipment produced by
McDonnell Douglas, which makes the new
F-15 Eagle fighter and the highly effective
but older F-1 Phantom.
Last month Fang Yi, China's Deputy Prime
Minister for science and technology, visited
the headquarters of Lockheed and McDon-
nell Douglas, ostensibly-
Ostensibly, I emphasize-
to inspect their commercial airliners, the
Lockheed Tristar and the McDonnell Douglas
' DC=9 and DC-10. But he was reported ,to be
.surprisingly well informed.about the com-
panies' military planes.
Representatives of the two manufacturers
have made several trips to China in recent
months to discuss 'sales of commercial air-
liners, and during one visit, a Chinese offi-
cial asked a Lockheed representative 'how to
negotiate with the Pentagon for a military
order. "We told them they could buy the
L-100, the civilian version of the C-130;" the
American said, "but they indicated 'they
would like the C-130 itself."
He said the Chinese 'were aware of Presi-
dent Carter's prohibition on arms sales to
Peking but seemed to hope that the normal-
ization of relations between the United
States and China might lead to a relaxation
of the ban.
Another possible motive behind a Chinese
request to buy United States warplanes is
that even if Washington was to turn it down,
,the overture could help give Moscow the im-
pression that there was a growing Chinese-
American alliance. The recent trip to the
United States by Deng Xiaoping, China's
senior Deputy Prime Minister, and his stop
in Tokyo to brief the Japanese on his visit,
may also have been designed with this pur-
pose in mind.
Whatever Peking's motivation, a direct re-
quest to buy American military aircraft could
prove very embarrassing to President Carter,
particularly after China's invasion of Viet-
nam.
Peking'has moved slowly to buy weapons
abroad and has been extremely cautious
about committing its scarce foreign exchange
reserves to military purchases. Analysts here,
for example, say reports last fall that Peking
had sought $700 million worth of French
antitank and antiaircraft missiles were pre-
mature and that no contracts had been
signed.
One reason for delays is that the modern-
ization of China's antiquated armed 'forces
has been given the lowest-priority in Peking's
ambitious economic development program.
This could change, however, because of
China's experience in Vietnam, where Chi-
nese commanders may.have discovered they
were at a disadvantage because they lacked
the modern field radios,' fighter planes and
missiles the Vietnamese had.
China has had considerable difficulty de-
veloping its own aircraft industry. Most of
its 5,000 planes are outdated Russian MIG-
17's, plus a few MIG-21's. There is also a
Chinese-built version of the MIG-21 called
the Shenyang F-9, but Peking has reportedly
had'trouble keeping the plane in operation
because of faulty design.
I commend the Senator from Illinois
for trying to firm up the security section
of the Taiwan enabling bill. To my way
of thinking, there is little to allay our
fears that the Chinese on the mainland
will not continue in the future in their
military. adventurism such as they have
shown in recent weeks. As the Senator
from Illinois has said, we wish to arrest
the decline of the United States, the
decline in our respect and credibility, the
decline in our ability to affect events. We
are going to have to make it clear where
we stand in this world.
Mr. President, I wish we could erect
on that wall right behind you a giant
map of the world with a light behind
each country, each nation, and switch off
one by one the light behind each country
which has disappeared into the darkness
of communism since World War II. II
think if we could do that it would be so
dramatic that there would be no ques-
tion about whether or not the Senate
would agree to the amendment offered
by the Senator from Illinois.
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Things are going to hell in a hand-
basket. They really and truly are. We
are going to have to take a stand in the
world. We are going to have to exert
some leadership if we really care about
passing on to our children the kind of
world we want to see them inherit.
Russian Communists, like nature
itself, abhor a vacuum. Every place we
have allowed a vacuum to form, Russians
move to fill it preceded, perhaps, by the
Cubans, but they come nonetheless.
The future of America is at stake-
not just the future of Tawian but the
? future of America.
I invite my colleagues in this body to
support the Senator from Illinois in his
attempt to modestly stiffen, modestly
? strengthen, the security -section of this
bill which, in any case, will fall far short
of the mutual defense treaty which the
President proposes unilaterally to termi-
nate at the end of this year, and in
which I hope he will fail.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Massachusetts.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Presi-
dent.
I would like to present perhaps a dif-
ferent New England view or position.
The Senator from Illinois said it was
time that we began to act like Ameri-
cans. I would like to give my personal
perspective on that issue.
In the summer- of 1964 I was coming
back from my service in the Peace Corps
to go to law school. I thought I had spent
those 2 years acting like an American
who recognizes the world that exists, not
the world that we' cast in our own
rhetoric.
In that same summer, in this same
Chamber, the U.S. Senate voted the
Tonkin Gulf resolution. As a result of
that action, 55,000 Americans, most of
them my age, are no longer alive.
In my naivete at that point I could not
understand how that was possible. I sat
here and listened to the heady jingoism
or listened to the dynamics that result
from power, and I understand why 15
years ago we moved in that direction.
If I do anything in this body, Mr.
President, it will be to try to make this
body recognize that the world has
changed. You can do what you want
with all your rhetoric, but it is the next
generation that will pay that price.
There is one basic foreign policy flaw
in this Senate. That is that this body as
a whole views the world in East-West
terms. There are only two parts of the
world: Those who are for us and those
who are for them.
Whether or not that was true in the
1940's and 1950's is arguable. It is not true
today. It was not true in the 1960's. There
is a third world that, frankly, does not
give a damn on which side of the ideo-
logical split they end up. Their major
motivation is nationalism, and they did
not give up colonialism from the French,
the British, the Belgians, or whoever, to
take on the Soviets.
If you were a resident of those coun-
tries you would have exactly the same
attitude.
But we do not recognize that. We im-
pose our ideology on the third world. The
problem with that approach is not only Is
it based on an unreality, but it just does
not work.
There is something so psychologically
enjoyable to get up and rant and rave
about this country or that country falling
to the Soviets. I lived in the third world.
I have seen the Soviets in the third world.
They are hopelessly inept. The only way
we have any viable Soviet success is to-
tally based on the capacity of this coun-
try not to know what it is doing.
It seems to me it is about time we acted
in what are the best interests of this
country in not falling into the hands of
the Soviets.
How is it possible when we talk about
acting like Americans that we, as a sup-
posedly advanced, educated, intelligent
society, could not have recognized China
for 30 years?
It is very easy. It is the same rationale
that says we do not recognize Angola
today. We do not learn from the past.
We continue to, repeat the mistakes.
How is it that we -as a country that
talks about human rights, dignity, and
justice could have a long history of sup-
porting leaders hot based on their poli-
cies at home but based on their willing-
ness to mouth the appropriate Ideologi-
cal rhetoric?
I do not know whether we are going
to learn anything. I do riot know
whether my service here Is going to ad-
vance the cause. But I would suggest
that it Is about time -we deal with the
world as it sees itself and not try to im-
pose an American view, not only because
it is right but because it works. There is
the next generation whose existence and
stability is dependent upon the Senate
coming to that awareness.
ORDER VITIATING ORDER FOR
'SESSION TOMORROW
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I hope that the Senate will reach a vote
shortly, up or down, on the amendment
by Mr. PERcY. I ask unanimous consent
that the order for a Senate session on
tomorrow be vitiated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TAIWAN ENABLING ACT
The Senate resumed consideration of
the bill.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I do not
expect to speak more than a few min-
utes, I might reassure the majority
leader. -
I must say, as one Senator, that.I sat
here with great satisfaction and heard
our newer Members express their views.
I say to them: That is what this place,
gentlemen, is all about. You are here be-
cause you bring a new quality, a new
freshness, a new set of ideas to liven us
all up. I hope you keep it up.
Now, as to the measure that we are
debating, Mr. President, I had to pinch
myself to be sure I was awake. After all,
none of these gentlemen invented this
security provision for Taiwan. I did.
When I invented it, I did not propose to
do Taiwan in, I proposed to help and
save Taiwan.
I am mortified, and I do not think I
S 2327
did very well, frankly, that we could not
get a unanimous vote in this Chamber.
That is what really counts. Who is going
to be terribly impressed at 47 to 45? You
cannot even approve a treaty with tlcat
vote.
Let us hear all these strong words
about - how we Americans are going to
stand up when we have a draft up here,
or when we increase the defense budget
10 percent, or when we impose wage and
price controls or gas rationing. That is
what the world is looking at us for. You
can utter all the brave words you like,
you can write them in this resolution;
it means absolutely nothing. It is not
what we say. That has been our trouble:
We have said too much; we have not
done anything.
Sure, this provision is more modest
than it should be, but it was made more
modest in order to get the greatest con-
sensus behind a unilateral policy which
said, "Listen, People's Republic of China,
we are recognizing you, but lay off Tai-
wan."
I am satisfied that these words say it,
"Lay off Taiwan."
Why do I say that? I am not given to
asking you to take my word for anything.
I should like to show very briefly why.
The things which are not in my formu
lation which are in :here now seemed to
me to far preponderate over this concat-
enation of words on whether we say "a
threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of.grave con-
cern to the United States" or whether we
say the same thing, "a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and to the security interests of the
United States.'?
I wrote those words originally. But
when you look at what we gain, when we
want to say to the People's Republic of
China, hands off Taiwan, this is what we
gain:
We gain, one, an absolute condition
that we are recognizing the People's Re-
public based upon the fact that it will not
seek to resolve the Taiwan issue by force.
That is the real guts of this thing. Right
now, for the next years, that is what they
are more afraid of than they are that we
will interpose our Navy between Taiwan
and the mainland. We did that before
under General Eisenhower, and we did
not have such a resolution at that time.
Second: We gain what to me is the
most important part of this thing. That
is, the naked force, the naked boycott,
the naked blockade is not nearly as im-
portant to me as what will, and these
Chinese are very clever, what will jeop-
ardize the security or the social or eco-
nomic system of the people of Taiwan.
That is what we are seeking to preserve.
That is in here now. It was not in here
before.
Finally, we put the word, a very im-
portant word, in the self-defense capa-
bility, which we would equip. That is
doing things. The word is "sufficient."
That is that they have enough to defend
themselves, whatever. it took. That to
me also, in security terms, was a very
important word.
Finally, and very importantly, if the
Members will look on page 15, lines 1 to 4,
we used the very same provisions which
are in the NATO Treaty.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
The United States will act to meet any
danger described in paragraph (3) of this
subsection in accordance with constitutional
processes and procedures established by law.
Now, frankly, as I say, if I knew we
were going to get into this hassle, with
such close votes, I really would have been
appalled before I drafted and dealt with
this thing. It has happened. We are here.
We have the result. But the key to what
we shall do will depend on what we have
in the Pacific. We agree here in this pro-
vision to maintain our capacity to re-
sist any resort to force, with what we
have in the Pacific and our will to use it.
We sent a carrier from Subic Bay to the
Persian Gulf and we stopped it.. Now, I
believe-I do not know, but I believe we
have sent a carrier to off the Yemen
coast and we have not stopped it. That is
What really counts.
So I hope, and the message we send
is to the people of the United States-
they are the people who have to back
what will make this really effective,
whatever form of words we use. Because
I hoped that we could get the greatest
amount of consensus upon this provi-
sion as it was and because of the very
sharp division which has developed here
over these words, I felt it my duty to ex-
plain why I considered the whole provi-
sion far more important' than these
words. I hope very much that we do
sustain the language of the agreement
that we have arrived at with the other
side and that that is a substantial vote.
That is the best way to give notice, espe-
cially if it has behind it our will to im-
plement what we are writing.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should
like to respond to the ranking minority
member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations and ask a question of the
chairman.
Senator JAVITS indicated that the reso-
lution is more modest than it should be.
I agree with that. I have fully taken into
account, however, the overall job that
was done and have persistently and
steadily expressed appreciation to both
of my colleagues on the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee for what they did ac-
complish. It was my feeling, however,
that, good as that job was, we could make
it just a little bit better.
The Senator from Illinois, for better
than 12 years, has seen the Senator from
New York take his pencil and carefully
change a couple of words and get quick
agreement on it. The Senator from Illi-
nois felt there should not be much dis-
pute over this particular point.
Mr. CHURCH. May I just say to the
Senator that it is just a question of
judgment as to how close we have come
to the brink. I think the committee lan-
guage brought us right to the brink. if
you stand right at the brink of the
Grand Canyon, you get a magnificent
view. If you take one more step, you are
in trouble. This is the difference between
our two positions. We disagree on how
close we have approached the brink.
Mr. PERCY. I appreciate that. It is a
question of judgment. It is the judgment
of the Senator from Illinois that we can
just inch forward a little bit and get a
clearer picture of the whole canyon, not
fall over the precipice, and not jeopard-
ize anything.
I persistently and steadily worked to-
ward normalization and will continue to
do so. I have a deep respect for many of
the accomplishments of China and cer-
tainly the commonality of interests that
we share in certain areas of security im-
portant to the United States.
The question the Senator from Illinois
would like to ask the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee-
. Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield
on the point he just made?
Mr. PERCY. Yes, of course.
Mr; SARBANES. I think the differ-
ence with respect to the judgment call to
which the Senator from Illinois and the
Senator from Illinois referred earlier, is
that if the Senator from Illinois is wrong,
it is not within our power to control the
situation. If his language goes too far,
normalization will have been lost. On the
other hand, the language in the commit-
tee bill and the assurances that the
United States Is making thereunder and
the action we will take are within our
control. We can act on the basis. of the
committee's language without the
amendment by the Senator from Illinois,
in order to meet our commitments with
respect to the people on Taiwan. That is
a critical difference. There is no gamble,
from our perspective, with the commit-
tee's language, because how we act pur-
suant to. it is within our control and we
do not need the Senator's proposed
amendment to act differently.
With the Senator's amendment, there
is a gamble, because the reaction to it as
it may affect normalization is not within
our control.
That is the essential difference in the
judgment call being made here on the
floor of the Senate with respect to the
Senator's amendment.
Mr. PERCY. This amendment was of-
fered and fully discussed publicly in com-
mittee.
After the amendment was defeated, I
discussed it with two members of the
Chinese diplomatic mission to see
whether there was any adverse reaction.
I said that we were trying to express in
the language of this amendment exactly
what we had been saying to the Vice
Premier when he visited the Senate and
was in the United States.
There has been ample time for the
Chinese mission, now the members of the
Chinese Embassy, to contact Members
of the Senate to express their concern
about this and say why they feel we
should not be expressing this point of
view and whether or not it would jeop-
ardize normalization of relations.
The Senator from Illinois to this date
has not had any direct indication, nor
has any spokesman for the administra-
tion been able to express anything other
than their own concerns about what
might possibly be a reaction.
But, as I have said, the People's Re-
public of China has not hesitated to ex-
press itself forthrightly and honestly and
they have taken their chances on jeop-
ardizing our relationship and it was their
judgment that plain speaking would not
harm our relations.
So far, everything they have done,
whether it is an invasion of Vietnam or
whether it was a criticism of the policy
of the U.S. Government, with respect to
Iran, has had some degree of risk, but
they were honest and forthright and laid
it on the line.
I think most of us had respect for them
doing that. I would just hope they would
be fair enough to respect us for being
frank. In the Senator from Illinois' re-
lationship with them I have found them
eminently fair.
We have simply agreed to disagree on
some issues, and in interpretation of cer-
tain events transpiring.
All the amendment does is simply state .
what has already been stated by many
Members of Congress and much more
strongly by the President of the United
States in his interviews with the press.
It is certainly more forcefully and
strongly stated by language that has
been developed by others in the Senate of
the United States.
The language offered in this amend-
ment is, as one Member of the Senate
said, the mildest language, in his judg-
ment, we could adopt to honestly express
our views.
The Senator from Illinois understands
there was one other Senator, my distin-
guished colleague from Iowa, who might
wish to speak at this time. If so, I am
happy to yield to the distinguished Sena-
tor whatever time he feels desirable, tak-
ing into account that there is a desire
now to get the vote underway.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator from Illinois yielding the floor?
Mr. PERCY. I am happy to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Iowa is recognized in his own
right.
Mr. JEPSEN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I have heard the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho say today,
"What kind of a message are we send-
ing?"
I have heard the distinguished Sena-
tor from Maryland say, "We are taking a
chance by changing two words."
I have one question, We are taking a
chance with what and with whom? What
kind of a chance are we taking when
Secretary Blumenthal was in Peking tell-
ing the whole world China was an aggres-
sor shortly after our recognition?
I think that is of somewhat greater
magnitude-we talk about taking a
chance-something more than what we.
are talking about here with strengthen-
ing a couple of words.
I do not think we should say the Sen-
ate of the United States is fouling things
up. The administration seems to have an
exclusive right on that.
A friend of mine went out to the Theo-
dore Roosevelt Memorial Island the other
day to enjoy some winter solitude. It is
one of his favorite places in Washington.
It is the island in the middle of the
Potomac across from the Kennedy Cen-
ter. Dedicated as a wildlife refuge, it
features a huge, concrete plaza domi-
nated by an enormous statue of Teddy,
his arm raised in exclamation, flanked
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.CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
by giant tablets bearing inscriptions of
Roosevelt quotations.
Anyway, when he ' was out there, he
was sitting there ' alone, and suddenly a
high-pitched and . rasping voice said,
"Young man, you there."
He looked up. It was the statue that
was talking. The statue of Teddy Roose-
velt.
Teddy said:
Don't be alarmed, I'm perfectly harmless,
I assure you. I simply get lonely from time
to time and need someone to talk to. I get
particularly hungry for news of the outside
world. Tell me, what's going on out there?
I've been out of touch for months.
My friend said:
Well, let's see, last week President Carter
went to Mexico on a state visit and was in-
sulted by the President of Mexico, our em-
bassy was captured by leftist rebels and the
staff had to be rescued by supporters of a
right wing religious nut, and our ambassador
to Afghanistan was kidnapped and murdered.
Teddy Roosevelt said:
Thunderstionl Where did the President
send the fleet first? It would be a difficult
choice. I suppose I'd start with Mexico. An
affront to the President is an attack on the
American flag. Is that what he did? Did he
send the fleet steaming into Vera Cruz, or did
he just send a punitive expedition over the
border?
My friend said:
Neither. He answered the insult by telling
an assembled luncheon gathering about a
case of diarrhea he once had while in
Mexico.
Teddy said:
At at luncheon, you say? Well, not the
kind of revenge I'd have taken but it's
something, anyway. I'll wager he took
stronger action against the cheeky beggars
who took over our embassy in Iran. Send in
a company of marines to occupy the country,
did he? Hang the offenders in a public square
as an example to others?
No, he sent a sharp note to the Soviet
Union, saying that if it didn't stop stirring
up the natives against us, we were going to
get mad.
Teddy said:
Am I missing something? Is the Marine
Corps ill? What did he do about our mur-
dered ambassador, send a telegram of apology
to the heathen who did it?
He said:
No. He expressed dismay and surprise that
the kidnapping was handled so badly by
Afghanistani authorities.
Well, he said:
I know I always advocated talking softly,
but I don't understand what is going on
with this situation.
My friend said: '
Well, he's in a difficult position. We need
oil from . most of these countries and if
we're not nice.to them they won't sell it to
us, we'll have to give up our lifestyle of snow-
mobiles and campers and two cars to a family
and one person to a car.
He said:
That is certainly a sad commentary on
what's happened to the country. If that had
been the attitude when I:was President, we
wouldn't own the Panama Canal today.
My friend said:
Mr. Roosevelt, sir, can you sit down? I've
got something to tell you.
I say to the Members of the Senate
that there is a message today that is
bouncing off the mountain tops, that is
echoing from the valleys and ringing
from the hearts of all freedom loving
people throughout the world. They are
saying, "America, where are you?"
Recently, leaders of the European na-
tions . met in Guadalupe. According to
this administration and press reports,
everything seemed rosy. But then the
leader of France went back and disasso-
ciated himself from American policies-
the policy of now you see it, now you
do not.
In an interview last Friday, I was told
by representatives of the German Bun-
destag that they were worried that "the
United States is going to leave us high
and dry and directly facing the hordes
of Russian military might all by our-
selves"; that this was causing the Ger-
man Government to begin to think about
making book with Russia. But the simple
fact of life is that America no longer
has the conviction and the will to stand
up to those of the left in the world, to
those who, through acts of terror and
intimidation, are bent on destroying the
ability. and the will of freedom-loving
nations to stand firm against the world-
wide conflict being practiced by those
who would like to see America on her
knees.
I think this amendment we are talking
about today is really a drop in the bucket,
but at least it is something. It is a ray
of hope. It is a glimmer. It is a response
to the call that many countries and free-
dom-loving people around the world are
expressing, and that is, "America, where
are you?"
I hope that this distinguished body-
which I understand will vote on this mat-
ter in a few moments-in its wisdom will
vote "aye" on this amendment. It will
be the first indication in some months
that there are people in this country,
100 Members in the Senate, who do rep-
resent collectively all the people of the
United States of America, who are hun-
gering for leadership, who are desirous
that we do take a stand and tell the
world: "Yes, we accept the responsibility
of being the leaders of freedom around
the world. We accept the responsibility
of being the Nation that must keep the
peace."
I assure Senators that if we do not
assume that and accept and continue in
that role, there will not be peace and
there will not be freedom, and some day,
perhaps, there will not be an America.
So I am going to vote for this.
I thank the Senator from Illinois for
yielding time.
.Mr. JACKSON. Vote.
Mr. PERCY addressed the Chair.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
will the distinguished Senator from Illi-
nois yield?
Mr. PERCY. I yield.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Sen-
ator let the Senate come to a vote on his
amendment? Several Senators have
plane reservations and need to leave. If
we could vote now, it would be my plan,
after Senator, HOLLINGS Calls Up an
amendment which he says will be ac-
S 2329
cepted, to go over until Monday-if the
Senator will let its vote now.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator feels that a
vote could come in 5 minutes. I have one
question to ask the chairman.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that a vote
occur, up or down, on the amendment
within 5 minutes.
Mr. PERCY. Better say 10 minutes.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Not later than
10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BUMPERS). Is there objection? The Chair
hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the ques-
tion I wanted to ask the distinguished
chairman relates really to a comment
that he made earlier. I have made a no-
tation about the comment-that you can
understand the politics of this.
I hope there is no implication in that
that politics is involved. The Senator
from Illinois, first of all, deeply believes
that, whenever possible, there should be
a bipartisan foreign policy and will ad-
here in every conceivable way to trying
.to leave partisanship out of policy. It is
confusing enough without partisanship.
Second, I have just checked to see
whether we have received much mail on
this. We have not received as much as
we got in an hour on the Panama Canal.
I cannot recall when anybody has spoken
to me about it, except Taiwanese living
in Illinois who are concerned about their
rights on the island of Taiwan. As a ma-
jority, they do not have the rights they
feel they should have, and they hope
someone will speak up for that. We have
expressed in the hearings our feelings
on that issue.
Was there some implication the Sena-
tor from Illinois did not get as to what
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator knows
that I am aware of his role in the com-
mittee, and I have never known him
not to place the national Interest first.
I am sure he does so in this case.
As I mentioned earlier, this is a judg-
ment call. The Senator from Illinois
would not knowingly or purposefully
offer this amendment in the expectation
that its approval would lead to a dissolu-
tion of the ties that now have been
established between Washington and
Peking.
Mr. PERCY. I thank my distinguished
colleague. I value his friendship and his
judgment.
If there were any political aspect to
this, I must be blind, because I cannot
see it. It does not seem to be an issue of
great public interest, and it certainly
was not during my visit to Illinois.
It is a matter of deep personal convic-
tion that 'we 'should express ourselves,
so that we gain respect by saying ex-
actly what we mean and saying it as
forthrightly and honestly and openly
as other nations have. That is, the con-
cern I have.
In all the relationships that the Sen-
ator from Illinois has been able to estab-
lish through the years in business or in
public life, the central core always has
been the mutuality of interest. Can both
sides gain by this relationship?
The term "brinkmanship" has been
used: Are we on the brink of possibly go-
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S 2330
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
ing over the precipice or losing this? For tee incorporated section 114 designed to
the life of me, I cannot see how we could; help insure the security of the people on
because, basically, from the standpoint Taiwan. As agreed by the committee,
of the United States, it is in our national this section makes very clear the inter-
interest that normalization proceed. est of the United States in the future
We should have diplomatic relation- security, prosperity, and welfare of
ships at the highest level. We should have Taiwan.
every conceivable kind of relationship- We must act to support that interest,
cultural, economic, every other aspect of consistent with the fundamental deci-
interrelationships between the largest sion to recognize Peking as the sole legal
nation on Earth, 900 million people, and Government of China. But we must re-
the most powerful nation on Earth, the member that the primary assurance of
United States of America, economically, ? Taiwan's security rests with the capa-
militarily, and we hope politically, cer- bility of its own people to defend them-
tainly in the Mideast now, as we use our selves. It rests with the readiness of the
influence there to bring peace. Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan
I believe it is in our interest to go for- Strait to resolve their' differences by
ward with normalization and I am peaceful means.
strongly for it. But I also believe normal- Senator PERCY's amendment does not
ization is in the interest of the People's add to that assurance. It runs the risk
Republic of China. of antagonizing the People's Republic
The Chinese are not going to let-some- of China without increasing the security
thing go down the drain simply because of Taiwan by one iota. It reduces our
they might object to our using or prefer future flexibility in determining whether
us not to use words other than "Of grave and to what extent our interests in Tai-
concern." I can not imagine they would wan are actually jeopardized.
permit that to endanger our entire re- Moreover, the amendment suggests
lationship. that our security interests in Taiwan are
normalization is a very good equivalent to our security interests in
,
For them
thing, because it gives them full diplo- Japan, Korea, or other close allies. The
matic relations with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff differ with this
of America. It opens up to them the kind view, as is clear from the committee
of-contacts they need to advance them- hearings. General Jones, the Chairman
selves into the future. They have been of the JCS, told the committee that his
open and forthright about saying that concern with Senator PERCY'S language
they want that technical know-how, that is "that our security interests (in Tai-
thev want that contact between our peo- wan) are less than in other areas of the
The VICE PRESIDENT. Will Senators
please clear the well?
Are there any Senators who have not
yet voted?
The result was announced-yeas 42,
nays 50, as follows:
[Rolicall Vote No. 13 Leg.]
YEAS-42
Armstrong
Hatch
Randolph
Bellmon
Hatfield
Roth
Boren
Hayakawa
Schmitt
Boschwitz
Heinz
Schweiker
Byrd,
Helms
Simpson
'Harry F., Jr.
Hollings
Stevens
Cochran
Humphrey
Stone
Cohen
Jepsen
Thurmond
Danforth
Laxalt
Tower
DeConcini
Lugar
Wallop
Dole
McClure
Warner
Domenici
Packwood
Weicker
Durenberger
Percy
' Young
Garn
Pressler
Goldwater
Proxmire
Baucus
Glenn
Muskie
Bayh
Hart
Nelson
Bentsen
Heflin
Nunn
Biden
Huddleston
Pell
Bradley
Jackson
Pryor
Bumpers
Javits
Ribicoff
Burdick
Johnston
Riegle
Byrd, Robert C. Kassebaum
Sarbanes
Chafee
Kennedy
Sasser
Chilies
Leahy
Stafford
Church
Levin
Stennis
Cranston
Magnuson
Stevenson
Culver
Mathias
Stewart
Durkin
Eagleton
Exon
.Ford -
McGovern Tsongas
Melcher Williams
Metzenbaum Zorinsky
Moynihan
NOT VOTING-8
for their educational institutions. In the 'I agree with General' Jones. Gravel Matsunaga
t
h
a
end, it is going to be beneficial to them. But more fundamentally, I believe t
So the amendment (No. 79) was re-
If there are benefits to the United States the committee's language represents ' jected.
and to the People's Republic of China, good policy as. well as a fair political. . Mr. ROBERT C. - BYRD. Mr. Presi-
this relationship will go forward. compromise. Senator PERCY'S amend- dent, I move to reconsider the- vote by
All the Senator from Illinois is saying went would be a step back from that which the amendment was rejected.
in this amendment is: policy and would undermine that com- Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay that mo-
Let us honestly express our interests in a promise. I urge the Senate to reject this tion on the table.
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Issue. Let amendment.? The motion to lay on the table was
us speak clearly. The administration did not Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I hope, agreed to.
get verbal commitment from the People's upon reconsideration, that the Senate The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
Republic of China that they would not use will reject the amendment offered by the from South Carolina. The Senate will
force. The Chinese have left that option open. Senator from Illinois.
Let us not fail to be just as forthright and The PRESIDING OFFICER. The be in order.
clear in what we say as to how important we Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
consider the people on Taiwan. question is on agreeing to the amendment, dent, will the distinguished Senator
lli
i
So it is not just a question of semantics
or just a couple of words. It is an inten-
tion of a people and it is to make abso-
lutely certain that we express how
strongly we feel about this matter.
Again I commend my distinguished
colleagues for the work they have done
on this matter. In no sense would the
Senator from Illinois, by changing a few
words, try in any way to detract from
the very good job they have done, in the
best tradition of the U.S. Senate, in con-
no
of the senator from I
s. from South Carolina yield?
I On this question, the yeas and nays Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, may we
have been ordered, and the clerk will call have order?
the roll. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
The assistant. legislative clerk called BUMPERS). Senators will please retire to
the roll. the cloakroom. The Senate will not re-
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the sume until there is order in the Cham- -
Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the , ber. Please retire to the cloakroom to
Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the continue conversations.
Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the dent, will the - distinguished Senator
Senator from Hawaii (Mr. MATSUNAGA), from South Carolina yield to me?
junction with the executive branch. They MORGAN), and the Senator from Georgia Mr. ROBERT C.. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
have worked out excellent language that (Mr. TALMADGE) are necessarily absent- dent, there will be no more rollcall votes
I feel is not modified in principle at all I further announce that, if present and today, but Senators who may wish to
but simply improved and somewhat voting, the Senator from North Carolina call. up amendments, and have voice
strengthened and placed on the solid (Mr. MORGAN) would vote "yea." votes thereon-some amendments will
foundation they have built, with respect On this vote, the Senator. from Nevada be accepted-the Senate will continue
to the relationship between the People's (Mr. CANNON) is paired with the Senator to do business until such amendments
Republic of China and the United States from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE). . have been disposed of.
`of America. If present and voting, the Senator UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT TO VOTE
Mr. President, I have no further com- from Nevada would vote "yea" and the ON PASSAGE NO LATER THAN 5 P.M. TUESDAY,
ments to make, and I am ready for the Senator from Hawaii would vote. "no." ' - MARCH 13, 1979, AND TIME-LIMITATION
? Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, after . Senator from Tennessee: (Mr. BAKER) is = -.Mr. President, I - ask unanimous con-
very careful deliberation, the commit-'_ necessarily absent.. - sent and, I have cleared this with Mr
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March 8, 1979
CONGRESSIONAL RIECORD -SENATE S 2331
HELMS and Mr. STEVENS and with other (2) In each odd-numbered Congress, the
Senators-that a vote on passage of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
legislation occur no later than 5 p.m. on designate one of the Members of the House
of Representatives selected under paragraph
Tuesday next, with the proviso that (1) (A) as Chairman of the Joint Commis-
there be 1 hour on each of three amend- Sion, and the President pro tempore of the
ments by Mr. HELMS, that time be Senate shall designate one of the Members
equally divided in accordance with the of the Senate selected under paragraph (1)
usual form. (B) as Vice Chairman of the Joint Commis-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without sion. In each even-numbered Congress, the
objection, it is so ordered. President pro tempore of the Senate shall
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- - designate one of the Members of the Senate
selected under paragraph i
dent, I ask unanimous consent that there man of the Joint nt Commission, as and dha the
the
man
be 1 hour on any amendment to be Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
equally divided in accordance with the designate one of the Members of the House
usual form, other than the amendment of Representatives selected under paragraph
by Mr. HOLLINGS which, I understand, is (1) (A) as Vice Chairman of the Joint Com-
going to be accepted. mission.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I hope so. (d) (1) Members of the Joint Commission
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without shall serve without compensation but shall
be entitled to reimbursement for travel, sub-
objection, it is so ordered. sistence, and other neecssary expenses in-
(Purpose:
Sion on
Asia.)
UP AMENDMENT NO. 32 curred by them in carrying out the duties of
To establish the Joint Commis- the Joint Commission.
Security and Cooperation in East (2) The Joint Commission may appoint and
1 it d
n
eems
f
h
t
ff
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will report the amendment of the Sena-
tor from South Carolina.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows :
The Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
HOLLINGS) proposes an unprinted amend-
ment numbered 32:
At the bottom of page 22, insert the fol-
lowing:
Titlo V-
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the bottom of page, 22, insert the fol-
lowing:
TITLE V-JOINT COMMISSION ON SECU-
RITY AND COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA
SEC. 501. (a) There is established a joint
congressional commission known as the Joint
Commission on Security and Cooperation in
East Asia (hereinafter in this title referred
to as the "Joint Commission") to exist for a
period of three years, which period shall be-
gin upon the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) The Joint Commission shall monitor-
(1) the implementation of the provisions
of this Act;
(2) the operation and procedures of the In-
stitute;
(3) the legal and technical aspects of the
continuing relationship between the United
States and the people on Taiwan; and
(4) the implementation of the policies of
the United States concerning security and
cooperation in East Asia.
(c) (1) The Joint Commission shall be
composed of twelve members. Of the mem-
bers provided for under the preceding
sentence-
(A) six shall be Members of the House of
Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, four
of whom shall be selected from the majority
party, and two of whom shall be selected,
upon the recommendation of the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives, from
the minority party; and
(B) six shall be Members of the Senate to
be appointed by the President pro tempore
of the Senate, four.; of whom shall be selected,
upon the recommendation of the Majority
Leader of the Senate, from the majority
party, and two of whom shall be selected,
upon the recommendation of the Minority
Leader of the Senate, from the minority
party.
person
e as
fix the pay o
suc
s
a
desirable, without regard to the provisions
of title 5, United States Code, governing ap-
pointments in the competitive service, and
without regard to the provisions of chapter
51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such
title relating to classification and general
schedule pay rates.
(e) The Joint Commission may, in carry-
ing out its duties under this title, sit and act
at such times and places, hold such hearings,
take such testimony, and require, by subpena
or otherwise, the attendance and testimony
of such witnesses and the production of such
books, records, correspondence, memoranda,
papers, and documents as it deems necessary..
Subpenas may be issued over the signature
of the Chairman of the Joint Commission or
any member designated by him, and may be
served by any person designated by the
Chairman or such member. The Chairman of
the Joint Commission, or any member desig-
nated by him, may administer oaths to any
witness.
(f) (1) The Joint Commission shall prepare
and transmit a semiannual report to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Presi-
dent on-
(A) the progress achieved by the United
States in maintaining full and unimpeded
cultural, commercial, and other relations
with the people on Taiwan, and
(B) the legal and technical problems aris-
ing from the maintenance of such relations,
together with recommendations for legisla-
tion to resolve such problems and recom-
mendations for strengthening such relations
and for carrying out the commitment of the
United States to human rights in East Asia.
(2) The Joint Commission shall provide
information to Members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate as requested.
(g) (1) There are authorized to be appro-
priated to the Joint Commission for each
fiscal year and to remain available until ex-
pended, $550,000 to assist in meeting the ex-
penses of the Joint Commission for the pur-
pose of carrying out the provisions of this
title. Such appropriations shall be disbursed
by the Secretary of the Senate on vouchers
approved by the Chairman of the Joint Com-
mission, except that vouchers shall not be
required for the disbursement of salaries of
employees paid at an annual rate.
(2) For each fiscal year for which an ap-
propriation is made the Joint Commission
shall submit to the Congress a report on its
expenditures under such appropriation.
to the use of funds in accordance with the
provisions of such section.
On page 23, line 1, strike out "TITLE V"
and insert in lieu thereof "TITLE VI".
On page _23, line 2, strike out "SEC. 501."
and insert in lieu thereof "SEC. 601.".
On page 23, line 4, strike out "SEC. 502."
and insert in lieu thereof "SEC. 602.11.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield to the dis-
tinguished majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the
Senator. Mr. President, for the further
information of Senators, the order for
tomorrow has been vitiated. There will
be no meeting of the Senate tomorrow.
The Senate will come in at 11 o'clock on
Monday.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I.ask
unanimous consent that the names of
the following Senators be added as co-
sponsors of my amendment: The Sena-
tor from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Sena-
tor from Arizona (Mr. DECONCINI), the
Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BOREN),
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY),
and the Senator from Alabama (Mr.
STEWART).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, this is
the amendment establishing an oversight
commission with respect to Taiwan.
Let me first, before we get into the
debate, commend the Committee on For-
eign Relations, and particularly Sena-
tors CHURCH and JAVITS, for the excellent
job that they have done so far in taking
a rather casual, inadequate administra-
tion bill and substantially improving it
by recognizing the agencies and instru-
mentalities on Taiwan, by providing that
when dealing with the institute, it would
be dealt with as an instrumentality of
the government, by providing for privi-
leges and immunities, and by spelling
out that other than peaceful means em-
ployed against Taiwan would be of great
concern to the United States. On the
latter, by a tie vote here on two occa-
sions, we have expressed really the
United States sense that a threat to our
security would be involved.
Mr. President, with those improve-
ments, the bill has been substantially
improved. Though I do not minimize in
any way the hard work doi.e by the For-
eign Relations Committee with the poor
bill submitted to them, frankly, what we
really are engaged in is one of the most
fraudulent shams that you could pos-
sibly conceive. We could not find any-
where else a precedent for calling the
government an institute and the insti-
tute a.government.
We wondered about the covert activi-
ties of the CIA. They might not have
worked well in Iran, but they are work-
ing extremely well right now partici-
pating in designing this covert operation.
So we are saying the Government is go-
ing to work with the government in Tai-
wan, and it is not the Government, but it
is the people, and it isn't the public, but
it is our tax money-and around and
d
ill a circle it goes. I cannot get
(3) For. purposes of section 502(b) of the_ aroun
Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Joint Corn- over the very strong feeling that this is
mission shall be deemed to be a joint corn- pure. sham, and not in the best interests
inittee of the Congress and shall be entitled' of the people of the-United States. But I
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. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 8, 1979
am trying to be realistic in trying to
work out of this situation the best we
can.
We heard earlier-and I guess this is
the best way to get to the point with
respect to the need for a commission-
in the statement of my distinguished
colleague from North Carolina, of a
secret report of how Taiwan could be
successfully blockaded by the People's
Republic of China. That has not con-
cerned me as much as the economic
squeeze and strangulation of the people
by embargo or economic means-and
that is far, far easier, Mr. President, than
any kind of military action to blockade.
I am not minimizing in any sense the
concern that Senators might have over a
military blockade, but that is not really
my primary concern. I had expressed
this concern for several weeks when I
was first briefed on the subject 'of Tai-
wan by the State Department, and then
later an article appeared, written by a
distinguished former ambassador and
foreign service officer of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, Ambassador William J. Porter,
and published in the Christian Science
Monitor of January 10, 1978: I ask unan-
imous consent to have this piece printed
in its entirety in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Jan. 10, 19791
WHAT CARTER GET.- UNrrED STATES INTO
(By William J. Porter)
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Administrative Notice to Shippers-Certifi-
cates of Control and Clearance
(To ease congestion in the ports of the
People's Republic of China (PRC), and to
facilitate the importation and exportation of
merchandise, all shippers are hereby notified
that shipments to and from the PRC, includ-
ing the province of Taiwan, must be ac-
companied by a Certificate of Control and
Clearance (CCC) stating the nature of the
cargo and its port of destination.
(These certificates may be obtained from
the consular section of any Embassy of the
PRC or at any Chinese port on the mainland.)
The thrust of this imaginary "Notice"
should be clear. It is intended. to bring into
view sovereign authority which the Peking
government may choose to assert, and which
the United States is no longer in a position
to dispute once the Carter administration
recognized Peking's hegemony over Taiwan.
The White House has informed the public
that all details of the arrangement with the
PRC have been revealed-with no mention of
safeguards against the possibility of such reg-
ulatory measures. There are, of course, sev-
eral additional areas in which Peking may
choose to exercise its sovereign authority
without fear of anything but remonstrance
from the Americans. The example cited above
begs a specific question. Would the United
Sates accept such PRC regulations if ap-
plied to vessels carrying defensive weapons
to "the province of Taiwan" during and after
the period in which the U.S.-Taiwan mutual
defense treaty remains valid?
Apparently such serious possibilities were
not properly considered or negotiated before
the recognition of the PRC, which indicates
the hasty nature of the President's decision.
We are, of course, assured by those who ap-
prove the manner in which the event was
manipulated that it would not be in the in-
terest of the PRC to take such action. But
such optimism is not convincing because it
presumes to judge in advance solutions which
a very self-centered communist power may
find expedient. The public and Congress are
certainly due an explanation as to why Mr.
Carter, Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance did not
make an effort to obtain necessary assur-
ances concerning actual and possible prob-
lems relating to the matter. Let us note here
that Mr. Teng and his friends avoided that
error: They protected their pwn interests and
preserved all their options very well.
Another embarrassing example of unsea-
soned diplomacy in this matter was the
eagerness with which Mr. Carter used to his
own advantage an alleged statement of ap-
proval of the recognition by Mr. Brezhnev.
The Washington Post, which may be think-
ing of establishing a Peking edition, head-
lined Mr. B's "very positive" message on the
subject, as related in glowing terms by the
President. Moscow, however, corrected the
White House version very quickly in a state-
ment to the effect that the account did not
represent Mr. Brezhnev's message correctly.
The PRC recognition fits into a rather dis-
orderly ensemble, other elements of which
are the Camp David debacle, the oil price
rise which need not have happened, and the
looming Rhodesian disaster In all of which
current U.S. diplomatic techniques figured
prominently. Two years in office would seem
sufficient to impress our leaders with the ob-
vious fact that In these complicated matters
the desire for publicity should not be allowed
to overwhelm the need for thoroughness.
The best we can. hope for now is that,
when he next visits the Far East, Mr. Vance
will be able to tidy up the unhappy position
in which the U.S. finds itself. The statement
from Peking on Dec. 24 is not encouraging,
however, stressing as it does the view that the
PRC alone, and no on'e else, including the
U.S. is qualified to handle the problem of
Taiwan. It made even clearer, if that was
necessary, the PRC's belief that it is in no
way obligated to accommodate the United
States or Taiwan and that Mr. Carter's ex-
pectations are therefore illusory.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Some of our commer-
cial colleagues in Japan, asked whether
or not the Japanese would adhere to
that kind of activity taken by the Peo-
ple's Republic, answered "Yes."
What is that activity? The activity,
my friends, is not a military blockade,
but rather the very simple device of
issuing a public notice in the Journal of
Commerce that, due to the congested
conditions in the port facilities of the
People's Republic of China, vessels enter-
ing the sovereign water of the PRC
would have to obtain an anchorage li-
cense to do business.
So any captain of a ship, not wanting
to be turned back after his long trip,
would apply for the license, and the rest
is very obvious: If you do not like the
way they do business, there will be no
license. If you think they need a lesson,
there isn't much the captain can do
except accept or go back. I am not criti-
cizing the People's Republic at this point,
or addressing their action in Vietnam,
but we do know that we are now dealing
with a people that are willing to give
lessons; and if they wanted to give a
lesson to any particular commercial en-
tity that was not doing business the way
they thought business should be con-
ducted, there would be no license: there
would be a general economic squeeze,
and I venture to say that in a matter of
months or at most a, few years, that $7.2
billion of business done by the United
States of America with Taiwan, export
and import, would all of a sudden be
dried up, and then you would have the
strangulation of Taiwan. We heard
earlier from one of our colleagues that
we tried to impress our way in Vietnam,
and I agree with him; but we learned a
lesson there that the American way was
not always accepted.
But there are areas where the Ameri-
can way is fully accepted, and in Tai-
wan it is accepted: The commercial,
free enterprise, competitive, capitalistic
system.
That' is exactly why we have misgiv-
ings when we see our State Department
use that nice State Department lan-
guage of art, "grave concern." Because
the State Department leaves a lot to be
desired by way of mind and by way of
commonsense.
They really barreled on Taiwan and
took a friend, one of the best friends we
have ever had, and treated them, I
should say, as persona non grata. The
State Department came up and gave
certain "advice" on how Taiwan should
sell their U.S. property to the Saudis.
That advice was not taken. Incidentally,
I will join in the Twin Oaks bill later on.
That wall be a different amendment.
That advice to sell was not taken by
our friends on Taiwan, those who had
accepted our way and whom we helped
prosper economically, and who we helped
build militarily in every sense. They did
everything we asked them to do and we
with them. They then allowed that the
property of the Taiwanese in Washing-
ton would immediately be the property
of the People's Republic of China.
Of course, we know historically the
People's Republic of China in this cen-
tury had neither control nor jurisdiction
of these properties., We were hearing a
little earlier about the little cuddly bear,
Teng Hsiao-ping. Well, I do not know
that the gentleman has ever had the
chance to visit Taiwan, though we here
in the United States have had that op-
portunity. I do not know anyone in the
PRC government, including Mr. Teng,
who has ever been to Taiwan. They do
not have control there and have not had
jurisdiction. To come out now and say
these properties will go to the PRC is
just an un-American way to do business.
The way they admonish their ambas-
sador to not even attend a news con-
ference is another thing. I can go down
a list or a bill of particulars. But nothing
presents it more dramatically than the "
scurrilous piece of legislation sent over
here which shows the total disregard
from what was being said publicly. They
? were saying publicly they want con-
tinued cultural, educational, and com-
hnercial relationships in the full.
As was stated here a little while ago,
on February 16 the President even talked
about the security, and how a later
President could go to war to protect that
security. We know that the President in-
sistedon sending arms. I know not what
the purpose of the arms was to be, except
to protect the people of Taiwan. And I
know of no threat at this particular
moment that the United States is con-
cerned about other than the military
threat of the People's Republic of China
at and against Taiwan.
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So we were concerned about the se-
curity, our President was concerned
about the security, but that has been a
no-no word all afternoon. And we see a
total disregard of the security pact which
we have at this very minute. We have
given notification of termination by the
end of this year, in accordance with the
treaty, but we do have a solemn treaty
with the Taiwanese, a security pact.
When the Senator from Maryland and
everyone else gets upset when we begin
to regard that, when we begin to? ac-
knowledge that, when we begin to show a
little nationalism here on the floor of the
Senate, I do not intend to be lectured
by those who claim to see the real world,
about the nationalism in the other
countries.
I do not know where the nationalism
of the people of South Vietnam ever was.
We gave 56,000 lives trying to develop it.
There is a lot to be said about na-
tionalism. We learned that people do not
like foreigners. We learned that in the
People's Republic of China, in Iran, and
in France, when they kicked NATO out.
We learned that the world around. We
have had many lessons about the con-
sideration they have for foreigners.
But when we try to talk and clarify
"grave concern" or what it means, then
we get blamed for inexact language, and
we should go with nebulous nonsense,
with a frightened stance, and without
speaking clearly.
I want to add one more comment with
respect to Vietnam. I respect my col-
league from Massachusetts and his dedi-
' cation to the Peace Corps and his com-
ments with respect to Vietnam. Others
have also commented on that.
I remeber that commitment. We will
obviously not have time to argue it at
this time. The Senator from Delaware
and others were asking about commit-
ments, whether or not the commitment
to Taiwan was as good as the commit-
ment to Western Europe. My answer is
yes.
The commitment with Vietnam, and
I participated in the debate on the floor,
was one of the finer commitments that
went along with the Peace Corps.
I happened to be in on the innovation
of that institution. There we were do-
ing away with the image of the ugly
American, to go to the undeveloped and
those countries which wanted help from
an advanced nation and say, "Yes, we
will help you in medicine with doctors;
in langauge we will help you with teach-
ers, in mathematics, we will help you
with instructors, and if you want to
build bridges, we will send Peace Corps
members there."
And, yes, we were not only committed
to our white Caucasian heritage, to
Western European culture, but we were
just as committed irrespective of race in
the Far East.
The commitment in Vietnam was the
commitment of the white man for the
yellow man, the commitment of the
richest nation for the poorest nation, the
commitment of the developed for the un-
developed, the commitment of the priv-
ileged for the underprivileged.
People forget that, too, as if it was not
carried through. But -it had the highest
sense of commitment from President
Kennedy, President Eisenhower, Presi-
dent Johnson, and many others. A lot
of us would be glad to debate that par-
ticular commitment some time.
But, yes, to the people of Taiwan I feel
we should have a commitment.
What makes it a tremendous frustra-
tion to us all is the government itself. I
make no commitment to Quemoy and
Matsu. This is why we all have a con-
sternation, frustration, and confusion in
trying to actually treat a country that is
not a country or will not act like a
country.
I cannot get anyone on Taiwan to come
forward and ask for self-determination.
I have discussed this with the Secretary
of State and all the people who have
come to brief me, asking why do they not
have a plebiscite under the United Na-
tions to see whether they want to join
the mainland, whether they want to be-
come an independent entity, or whether
they want to go back to the Japanese.
Again, back in Vietnam we gave 56,000
for the right of self-determination. That
is the kind of commitment I would do for
those people as a people, with their own
way of life, with a confused heritage.
Taiwan was settled by the Dutch and
the Portuguese. The name "Formosa"
means "beautiful island" in the Portu-
guese language. It was a refuge for the
Ching Dynasty and then it was taken
over by the Manchus, and then con-
quered in the Sino-Japanese War in
1895. Then they had the Japanese heri-
tage up until the end of World War II
when our Western culture was developed
there.
I cannot make up the minds, and I
have no intention of making up the
minds, of the people of Taiwan. They can
expect certain measured judgments to be
made since there is no language which
will trigger us. We do believe in their
security but we do not believe in their
claim to mainland China. That was a
charade and that, too, was a sham. I
think the sooner they developed and have
a free election the better the Senator
from South Carolina is going to feel. in
the meanwhile, while we do not consider
it a country, and we are not proud of
abandoning friends, but the friends will
not organize a country, then what do we
do? We try to maintain relationships as
if they were a country and as if they were
still our friends, or in the President's
expression, continue cultural, educa-
tional, and commercial relations.
In looking at that $7.2 billion worth of
business that we have, our ninth largest
trading partner, I can tell you quite can-
didly that these relations cannot happen
under this institute.
That would be like delivering lettuce
by way of a rabbit. That institute is not
going to represent the United States of
America. It will represent the very, very
fuzzy and impolite and discourteous con-
duct of our own State Department.
I say that advisedly, knowing how the
State Department came to the Foreign
Relations Committee and how they came
to our appropriations State-Justice--
Commerce subcommittee with the bum's
rush. There is no better way to describe
it: they tried to treat their own repre-
S 2333
sentatives just the same way they treated
the Taiwanese.
So we are told-take the President's
bill and if you make one amendment, we
are going to veto it.
They came to me and said, either take
the transfer of funds and give them im-
mediately or, come the 1st of March,
there will be riots and there will be
bloodshed down in Taipei, and you will
be responsible for it.
When you are dealing with that kind
of mind and incapacity, and stupidity,
then what you ought to do is try to give
them counsel and care. I will never for-
get when I first came here, I was told
that Washington was the first insane
asylum run by the inmates. Not neces-
sarily, but if you were looking for one
institution, you could go find it in the
personage of the State Department and
the way they conduct some of our af-
fairs from time to time.
I have the highest regard individually
for the distinguished Secretary of State
and many of the officers. I have been a
supporter of their endeavors to get bet-
ter management principles and so on.
There is a lot to be admired, do not mis-
understand. But they have certain ones
from time to time who just go way off the
deep end. This is one of those cases.
With that institute, they do not have
any idea of doing exactly what the Con-
gress intends. The people of Taiwan
know that. The commercial interests in
the United States know that. And to a
man, they have said, "If you can get
some kind of oversight commission simi-
lar to what we had with the Helsinki
agreements, then it would stabilize Tai-
wan materially, safeguard the commer-
cial enterprise, and assist the whole rela-
tionship between Taiwan and the United
States of America."
I have just come back from the NATO
conference, and I have followed the Hel-
sinki Agreement. We traveled and I
learned its tremendous value in Czecho-
slovakia, where my distinguished senior
colleague on the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, the present manager of the bill
(Mr. PELL) served, in Prague. The dis-
sonant movement of 1977 made certain
contacts with us and that is their only
hope-not the agreement itself, but the
Oversight Commission, the Helsinki
Commission, composed of Members from
Congress and from the executive branch.
They can get to and speak to and cor-
respond with and try to help the cause
of freedom in East Europe.
I think if we have a commission, the
administration does not want to have
any executive branch members; I well
understand that. They do not want to
have an institute. They do not want to
have any relations. In fact, I am not
nonplussed at that at all. Their idea of
an institute was to end the relationship.
You would never hear any more than a
one=line report of something from time
to time, but that would phase out
Taiwan and then they would move on to
greater things. Then we would have a
black eye in the Far East about keeping
our word and being true to our repre-
sentations and true to freedom. We
would have lost our credibility because,
assuredly, Mr. President, this is exactly
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S 2334 CONGRESSIONAL RIECORED -SENATE'
what happened in the way the President
conducted the business on the Taiwan
score.
We had asked, we had signed into law
last year. our desire for consultation. We
did not get consultation. ,
Everyone had heard of the great ob-
jection that we had from our strongest
ally in the Far East, Japan, how they
were totally disregarded in the Shanghai
communique and the visitation of Mr.
Kissinger and President Nixon, and as-
suredly we all knew that we should not
disregard them in that fashion again.
But again we awakened them in the
middle of the night and told them that
the Taiwan security pact was gone. They
have always had a war party in Japan.
Now they will have greater persuation,
greater weight for their arguments. They
can say, "You know, we have a security
pact with the Government of the United
States, but you can see how a President
can do what he wants to. He can call you
up in the middle of the night and say,
'That is the end of that.' We had better
start moving."
This President, who has great con-
cerns about nuclear proliferation and
what have you, sure lost the battle on
that one, because I can tell you now that
if you live in Japan, you had better
worry and wonder, under this adminis-
tration, when it comes to a security pact.
Then Israel. That is where the gentle-
man will be on Saturday. If he gives.
them a promise of a security pact, I
hope the Knesset, I hope the Prime
Minister, do not break out laughing
about the security pact, because they
have every right to say, "Mr. President,
that is what you gave to Taiwan and
without any consultation, for reasons of
greater interest that you had at the
moment, you changed a 30-year policy
with a call 'in the middle of the night.
We love your security pact, but we would
rather have greater assurances than
that."
That hurts my feelings, to have our
country conduct its business in this
fashion. I think it not only hurts our
feelings here in the United States; I
think it hurts the feelings of all of our
friends. It raises serious doubts.
We have spent billions upon billions
of dollars to try to establish confidence
and friendship, through all the economic
instrumentalities-foreign military sales,
Peace Corps endeavor, and everything
else-to say "You can count on the moral
force of the freedom-loving nation, the
United States of America, and we shall
always stand for that." Then we turn
and, bam, bam, it's over.
We did not do as Canada did. Canada
said they took note of the PRC's claim
to sovereignty over Taiwan. They did
not recognize, and they got relations
with the People's Republic. Our friends,
the British, acknowledged, but they did
not recognize, and they got relations.
But rather than just acknowledge, we
allowed that Chinese transcript to be
written with the word "recognize" and
they can continue to say "recognize."
I am back to my little economic notice
in the Journal of Commerce. Yes, with
that recognizing of the People's Republic
as sovereign, we cannot interfere with
sovereignty. That is what the whole
argument was with respect to the
Panama Canal Treaties. So we do not
interrupt sovereignty and we have no
standing.
Then they come around and say, "Why
can't we handle the property in court?"
We have no standing in our own court
of public opinion, much less the legal
courts. I am trying to get standing in the
court of world opinion, not any technical
titles and that kind of thing. I am trying
to build America, and I am not ashamed
of it, when I talk as I do on the floor
of the U.S. Senate.
I feel very strongly about this com-
mercial approach to the problem that
we have, because, with all the language
and nuances, whether it is "grave con-
cern" or "security" or whether it is this
or that, it depends on the implementa-
tion of this particular piece of legisla-
tion. I welcome the assiduous concern
and attention that we have had for the
bill itself by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and our Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee. If we can formalize
that concern in the form of an oversight
commission, then we can bring immedi-
ate stability to the dark clouds and
trouble on the horizon of where we go
from here with Taiwan. .
No. 1, Taiwan will not be forgotten. No.
2, there will be contact. No. 3, there will
be oversight. And number four, we at the
appropriations level are going to follow
with good intent the intent of the full
Congress, House and Senate, on this par-
ticular score.
I appreciate the adjustments that the
managers of the bill have made in order
to accept this amendment. As I under-
stand, the amendment will be accepted.
I agreed then that we would not require
a rollcall.
I have agreed to amend that original
version to provide for a three-year dura-
tion of the commission. I am a believer
in sunset legislation. The commission
does not have to go on, but I would think
within 3 years we would approve it. I do
not mind being put on trial with this par-
ticular idea. I would have hoped that the
validity, the efficacy, the need and the
power of an oversight commission would
have proved itself to all men of good will
and good intent with respect to our in-
volvement in Taiwan and that it would
be renewed, perhaps, at that time.
I cannot foresee whether I will be there
to renew it or not. I will watch that gov-
ernment over there to see whether they
have the right of self-determination.
I guess I am recognizing the People's
Republic. I am a realist. I have no bone
to pick with them. If they can pick up
Taiwan by bamboozling the President of
the United States, because they know
how to use their power, and we have lost
the ability to use ours, that will be a sad
ending.
But this little bit of oversight power we
have in a national people's body, the
Congress of the United States-where
we can see that we do act like Ameri-
cans, as the distinguished Senator from
North Carolina pointed out so appro-
priately earlier this afternoon-can help
us keep watch, keep vigilant, keep in-
volved, and hopefully bring a measure of
March 8, 1979
hope and pride where otherwise we
would have none.
Mr. President, I am glad to yield the
floor at this time.
Mr. HELMS. Did the Senator yield to
me or did he yield the floor?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yielded the floor.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have
heard the distinguished Senator from
South Carolina speak on many occasions
and I always enjoy him and admire his
eloquence. But I think he has risen to
new heights today.
I commend him not only on what he
said, but on the amendment that he has
proposed and which, as he knows, I am
cosponsoring with him.
Mr. President, I rise to join the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Carolina
in his concern for monitoring our policy
? in. China. I strongly support his idea of
a Commission on Security and Economic
Cooperation in Asia. Indeed, the Sena-
tor from North Carolina proposed a sim-
ilarly-named commission based on the
Helsinki commission model on January
29. The version of the Senator from
South Carolina is a broader proposal
and I am pleased to be a cosponsor.
The idea of Helsinki-type monitoring
is particularly relevant to this bill, be-
cause Congress must become aware of
the meaning of "peaceful unification" of
Taiwan into the mainland. I recently re-
quested the Far Eastern Law Division of
the Library of Congress, under the com-
petent direction of Dr. T. T. "Shaw"
Hsia to prepare a report on recent devel-
opments related to human rights in the
People's Republic of China. This was ac-
complished in a most scholarly and bal-
anced manner, and has been printed as
a committee document by the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations. I believe that
a copy is on every Senators desk, and I
commend it highly. It will make a fine
starting point for the proposed commis-
sion.
I also want to refer again to the excel-
lent study on human rights in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China prepared by the
Institute on American Relations which
I placed in the RECORD during the debate
on the Woodcock nomination. It is an
excellent and deeply moving report.
Mr. President, the recognition of the
Government of mainland China by Pres-
ident Carter has raised a great amount
of anxiety over the future of the island
province of Taiwan, and the Government
of the Republic of China which is located
there in Taipei. Despite assurances by
President Carter that the mainland gov-
ernment is pledged not to use force
against the Government of Taipei, recent
statements by Chinese Vice-Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping that he would not rule
out the use of force as' the ultimate
sanction to induce negotiations have un-
veiled the ultimate goal.
The question is whether there are any
circumstances whatsoever under which
U.S. policy would like to see the peaceful
unification of Taiwan with any Commu-
nist government on the mainland. The
issue raises larger questions about our
belief in the nature of freedom and our
willingness to see any group of peoples
in the world lost their right of self-
determination. It is scarcely conceiv-
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 2335
able-at least to this senator-that any over the education of their children. Mil- All of these reasons are reasons why
people living in the relative freedom of lions of so-called educated youth have we should not be in haste to consign the
life on Taiwan would willingly choose to been sent from urban centers to remote people on Taiwan to the benevolence of
be absorbed into a Communist society, villages for permanent settlement. Re- the Peking regime. After all, the Repub-
even if such a fate took place peacefully. strictions on marriageable ages forced lic of China has not ceased to be a.legit-
Teng's threat that force must be separation of married couples to. job imate government merely because the
reserved as the ultimate sanction to in- assignments hundreds of miles apart, United States has withdrawn its Ambas-
duce the Government of the Republic of and public pressures on individual sador. It remains in control of a signif-
China to negotiate indicates that a policy women for abortion and contraception icant part of the territory of China. I
of pressure will be followed, one that further erode marital rights and privacy, believe that it is generally accepted un-
d t t 1 1 +1k t a countr
a y
l
doubtless will include diplomatic, eco-
and psychological efforts to iso-
nomic
,
late Taiwan, to restrict its freedom of
action in international activities, and to
destroy its economy. Taiwan cannot be
said to have a choice if its freedom is
strangled "peacefully" in a silken noose.
Similarly, Taiwan's choice cannot be
said to be free if it is threatened mili-
tarily by a buildup of the kind of forces
and armaments directed at military in-
vasion, particularly if these forces are
concentrated in regions adjacent to the
Taiwan Straits. In part, Taiwan's ability
to respond will depend upon the United
States; but a great deal will depend
upon the actions of the Peking govern-
ment.
There are those who say, hopefully,
that Peking will never invade because it
would disrupt relations with Japan and
the United States. But no one can predict
under what future circumstances Peking
might decide to act.
The fact remains that the Peking Gov-
ernment has the worst-let me repeat
for the purpose of emphasis-the worst
human rights. record in history, one that
surpasses even the graphic descriptions
of witnesses to the Cambodian tragedy.
A study prepared for the Senate in 1971
estimated that as many as 64 million
Chinese died during the Communist pro-
grams of liquidation and purge.
Even today, Chinese Communist offi-
cials estimate that between 5 and 10 per-
cent of the Chinese people suffer "the
dictatorship of the proletariat" in forced
labor camps. With a population of 900
million, 5 to 10 percent in forced labor
camps is a number equivalent to one-
quarter to one-half of the population of
the United States. So that, Mr. President,
is what we confront.
Those who are not in the forced labor
camps live continually in the fear that
they, too, might fall under surveillance
or "dictatorship." Legal protections are
virtually nonexistent; men and women Seventh. The rights of due process.
are incarcerated by party directive (the Legal rights simply do not exist in China,
Senator from South Carolina.
As cochairman of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
so-called Helsinki Commission, I am
familiar with the operations of joint
commissions of this sort.
Our commission deals with a different
problem, however. It deals with a treaty
that is multinational in scope and with
a treaty that is really a set of pious
which we hold to be fundamental to the that the total absence of human rights, intentions.
nature of man are rigorously suppressed, as generally understood in the West, will There are very few, if any, specific
including the following: be ameliorated as time goes by. The commitments in that treaty. It is a ques-
First. The rights of family. The Chi- emergence of Teng as the strong man in tion of aspirations and intentions.
nese sense of family runs very deep, China after the death of Mao has given Now, this commission would deal with
based upon the Confucian ideal of re- an indication that there might be evolu- one country-or, no longer a country, an
spect for one's ancestors. The party has tion toward a better situation. But no area, whatever we wish to call it-and
worked very hard to break down this one knows how long the adherents of it is a commission that hasa different
tradition. The liberation of women, Teng will hold power. The historical rec- composition. It is not evenly divided be-
most of whom do manual work in the ord give little confidence that the situa- tween the parties as is the Helsinki
fields, has placed great stress on the tion will change for the better perma- Commission, and it does not have mem-
family unit. Parents have no control nently. It is far too soon to decide. bers of the executive branch on it.
? Gang of Four being the most notorious and the recent calls for the establish-
examples). ment of legal procedures only points up
Personal mobility is restricted not only the fact that, for 20 years, citizens have
by the poverty and failure of the Chinese been at the mercy of party directives, as
? economic system under communism, but interpreted by local officials. There is not
also by one of the most restrictive sys- even a criminal code, much less a code
tems of rationing basic daily necessities for political offenders.
in' the world Indeed the very rights Mr President it is the hope of many
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lions er in ea Iona aw
Second. The rights of religion. Mi
of Chinese were adherents of the Bud- cannot be "de-recognized." A new gov-
dhist, Taoist, Moslem, and Christian ernment may be recognized once it has
faiths before 1949, and millions more de facto control of territory. But once it
were active followers of the ethical pre- is recognized, it is recognized as long as
cepts of Confucius. The thousands of it has that control. The withdrawal of
temples have been closed, many have ambassadors is a separate act that has.
been destroyed. A mere handful of re- no bearing on recognition.
ligious buildings are kept open for the Indeed, nations may withdraw ambas-
inspection of foreigners, but no Chinese sadors and go to war with each other,
citizen would dare to enter. Attendance without any implication that their op-
at religious rites would result in job loss, ponents no longer exercise sovereignty
discrimination, surveillance, decrease in over such territory as they control. In
rations, and perhaps even a trip to the fact, quite the opposite is implied.
labor camps. However, since the administration has
Third. The rights of labor. No Chinese chosen to withdraw the U.S. Ambassador
may join an independent trade union, from Taiwan and to recognize Peking as
much less enter upon a strike. Wages the sole government of China, in defi-
in China have been raised only twice in ance of reality and international law,
20 years. A worker has no right to select special steps should be taken by Con-
his job or his assignment. gress to safeguard the human rights of
Fourth. The rights of property. Need- the Chinese people who are under the
less to say, the right to hold private Government of the Republic of China
property has completely disappeared, in- on Taiwan. Neither, that Government
eluding peasants who may have owned nor the people cease to exist because of
only 2 or 3 acres. Forced collectivization the President's action. It is up to Con-
was imposed on all agriculture. Property gress to monitor the human rights situa-
rights are the foundation of human lib- tion on the mainland and any potential
erties, and they are nonexistent in Com- military buildup which would threaten
munist China. Taiwan.
Fifth. The rights of political expres- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
sion. There is only one party in China. BRADLEY). The Senator from Utah.
There is not even an organized network Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, r appre-
of dissenters, such as in the Soviet ciate having this time, to also associate
Union. The recent, brief flowering of big myself with the remarks of the distin-
character posters, under the careful guished Senator from North Carolina
guidance of party officals, shows that and to express my viewpoint that I have
free political expression on the mainland always enjoyed the comments that he
is nonexistent. makes, even when I disagree with him,
which is not very often.
The rights of economic-self . I have a deep
and
determination. Anyone who advocates very firm regard for him.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- .
personal or private enterprise, no matter sent that I may be added as a cosponsor
how insignificant, is considered a "capi- on his amendment.
talist reader." No individual may at- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
tempt to establish his own economic objection, it is so ordered.
self-sufficiency outside of the collective Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I appreci-
plan. ated very much the kind words of the
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S 2336 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 8, 1979
Personally, I would have qualms about I- am trying to do a substantive thing. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
the enactment of this legislation. How- I am trying to carry out the intent of objection, it is so ordered.
ever, on behalf of the Foreign Relations the Foreign Relations Committee and 'UP AMENDMENT NO. 33
Committee, we accept thq amendment the intent of Congress. (Purpose: To construe the Taiwan Enabling
with the proviso that the words "to exist As the Senator says, the House could Act with respect to the continued mem-
for a period of 3 years, which period shall disagree and turn it down. I thought I bership of the people on Taiwan in cer-
begin after date of enactment of this act" had the leader of the bill; I thought I tain international organizations)
added onto section 501 (a). had Senator CHURCH. But when I hear Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I send
I understand that language is in the someone say, "I don't know about this. an amendment to the desk.`
bill. Helsinki is different," and someone else The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Mr. HOLLINGS. That is correct. That says something about weak words when amendment will be stated.
is the way the amendment is reported. we get to conference, that is why I react The assistant legislative clerk read as
Mr. PELL. Before accepting it, I would the way I do. follows:
defer to the ranking minority manager Mr. PELL. Mr. President, when we go The Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
of the bill. to conference, no matter whether we HOLLINGS) proposes an unprinted amend-
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, as I un- think it is different or not, or whether ment numbered 33:
derstand it, this commission is a com- we personally agree or do not agree, we On page 15, between lines 4 and 5, insert
mission composed of Members of Con- have an obligation to have the act pre- the following:
gress and is limited for a period of 3 vail. If I am in that conference, that is SEC. 115. Nothing in this Act may be con
stoned
years. my intent, whether I agree or not. as a basin foof the r supporting the exwu-sion or In a sense, it tends to deal with the Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the Sen- from continues membershipeople any in a na-
jurisdiction which should be that of the ator acknowledging that, because we get tional financial institution or any other in-
Foreign Relations Committee and, I shaky in the saddle. tenational organization.
think they call it, the Foreign Affairs I have worked with conference com- Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I do
Com
mittee in the House. mittees, and there is one particular com- not know at this point whether this
But. In
stances wh view o the unusual acircum nd the mittee in the Senate that has a very amendment is acceptable to the Foreign
common habit-the Finance Commit- Relations Committee. It is worded in the
fact that we will be going to conference tee-of taking any and all amendments. negative. I reworded it from the origi-
with the House, I see no objection to ac- So I say to the Senator that he should nal amendment I had, with the under-
cepting it. not act as though I am acting strangely, standing that what we want is that
Mr. HOLLINGS. Wait a minute. because I have seen this done, and some nothing be done by the Congr of
Mr. President, I do not know what this here are members of the Finance Com- UnitedStates in this particar billt to
conference with the House is all about. I mittee. They will take the amendments rue out membership by the people of
want to make the record perfectly clear. and say, "Senator, we'll let you make Taiwan in the World Bank, in the Asian
I have talked and worked in good faith your talk, but we're not going to stand Development Bank, and the Interna-
with Senator CHuRcH and the director, for that 5 minutes in the conference." tional Monetary Fund.
and others, of the Foreign Relations I just wanted that understood clearly.
Committee. There was a UPI report relative to the
While I agreed to a voice vote and waited visit of our distinguished
I was told last week they would agree to 'the end, to be courteous to everybody, the Treasury the guieopl Secretary of
e's utholic of
to this amendment. I was told today they we can get into this debate and debate China, effect that the
would agree to this amendment, and I all Monday and all Monday night and there were the pressuring him to help hhelp brins
do not want any monkeyshines in con- make absolutely sure that it is brought about the dismissal the bring
ference. If the Senator wants to have a home to my colleagues. I have been wan from l the kople of hese
full vote, I can get an overwhelming vote working with Senator GLENN and his wan m the World Bank and these
other
for this commission. I do not want to act staff. We put this amendment off, try- That intis of ernational ousicunce
as though this is a little sop to make a ing to work it out, in deference to the who tremendous the e const to and
political record for the Senator from unanimous vote of the Foreign Relations want t to continue tconstancy and
South Carolina. Committee, in being accommodating uninhibited .commercial relations be-
tween
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the and being realistic, and wanting support, o
f Taiwe . I td thou g ht States that should hod she people
Senator yield? also. of Taiwan. be
ev it
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield. But it has to be understood that it is spelled out at least o n not the ante to that
Mr. JAVITS. I hope the Senator will not a political move. We intend, and iscertain certain from that these we institutions. want to Many of
not jump at conclusions so fast about have those on the House side who fully the them guarantees, the business Many re-
sops, and so on. The Senator is welcome intend, to keep it there. guara, many of the bess roe
to his vote, and I will vote with him. But Mr. JAVITS. The amendment is ac- construction have, and many of the
what is so great about that? ceptable to me, period. tton and trade agreements and
guar-
Mr. President, this says that six mem- Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I move the everything else are based on those guar-
bers would be Members of the House of acceptance of the amendment of the antees and loans by the Asian Develop-ment Representatives, to be appointed by the 'Senator from South Carolina. Fund, the World Bank.
Monetary
k.
Speaker. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- Fund, and the World Banknal
Mr. HOLLINGS. Right. tion is on agreeing to the amendment of bate I will fuwait to rther and hear whether will Mr. JAVITS. All I had in mind was the Senator from South Carolina. of the et Foreign fuer a Relations n what at the disposition
Committee '
that they would have an opportunity to The amendment was agreed to. Mr. CHURCH. President, i
examine this and see if it is agreeable to Mr. HOLLINGS. I move to reconsider this s amendment . belongs in tI bill, , think
them, too. That is their pigeon, not ours. the vote by which the amendment was I amengs in the and
Mr. HOLLINGS. I agree with that. agreed to. am happy to accept it.
Mr. JAVITS. I have no quarrel with Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that motion Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distin-
Mr. Senator or his provision, and I wish on the table. tions d chairman of the Foreign Rela-
the Senator would not jump at conclu- ions Committee.
sions about me so fast. I am not given to The motion to lay on the table was Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have no
agreed to. objection to to the amendment.
.
giving sops or receiving them. Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I suggest the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
Mr. HOLLINGS. Well, I have been absence of a quorum. tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
asked by the committee's staff member
for three The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk The amendment was agreed to.
sops within the last hour with will call the roll. Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I move
respect to the Helms amendment; and to reconsider the vote by which the
when I heard. the Senator speak the way The assistant legislative clerk pro- amendment was agreed to.
he did, I could not think of it as anything ceeded to call the roll. Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay that mo-
other than a sop; because it was said, "If Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask tion on the table.
we go along, will you do this, and if we unanimous consent that the order for the The motion to lay on the table was
go along, will you do that?" quorum call be rescinded. agreed to.
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111 a) ?ch 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 2337
VP AMENDMENT NO. 6
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I send
to the desk an unprinted, amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLUEE)
proposes an unprlnted amendment num-
bered 34.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 15, line 4, insert a new section as
follows:
"Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the
President's action in extending diplomatic
recognition to the People's Republic of China,
the absence of diplomatic relations between
the people on Taiwan and the United States
or the lack of recognition by the United
States, and attendant circumstances thereto,
shall be construed in any administrative or
judicial proceeding as a basis for any United
States Government agency, commission or
department to make a finding of fact or
determination of law under the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1964, as amended, and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978. to deny an ex-
port license application or to revoke an exist-
ing export license for nuclear exports to the
people on Taiwan.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, this
amendment deals with the provisions of
S. 245 and the current status of Tai-
wan and their relationship to con-
tinued, uninterrupted cooperation with
Taiwan in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy under the Atomic Energy Act and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978. I have reviewed the actions of the
Foreign Relations Committee and the
reported bill, as they may bear on such
continued, uninterrupted cooperation,
and I am convinced that further clari-
fication and perfection of the bill to in-
sure that cooperation is appropriate
and, in fact, may be absolutely neces-
sary. I am anxious to work closely with
you and the committee to that end.
Nuclear power development on Tai-
wan under the 1972 Agreement for Co-
operation with the United States has
been aggressively pursued. Taiwan has
an advanced nuclear power research
program and it is becoming increasingly
dependent on nuclear power for elec-
tric generation. Six nuclear power re-
actors are in various stages of design,
construction, and operation, and they
will provide over 10,000 Mwe power by
mid-1985. Four additional reactors are
scheduled to begin operation later in the
1980's, and nuclear power by 1990 will
provide about 50 percent of Taiwan's
electrical capacity. Also, pending before
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
this time are seven license applications
for two reactors (pending for almost
a year), critically required fuel and
other materials. Obviously, then, con-
tinued, uninterrupted U.S. cooperation
is an essential element of Taiwan's eco-
nomic future, as well as our good-faith
relationship with the Taiwan people.
Also, as you know, the United States has
played a key role in the development of
this nuclear power capacity within the
context of a renewed commitment to
peaceful uses only of nuclear power, and
strict adherence to nonproliferation re-
quirements, in the context of our mutual
nonproliferation objectives. Continued,
uninterrupted cooperation, therefore, is
absolutely essential for both Taiwan and
the United States.
I reviewed and analyzed in detail the
reported bill, S. 245, after it was reported,
and I was convinced that,'in the absence
of further amendment and additional
legislative history, the U.S. cooperation
with Taiwan in peaceful uses of atomic
energy could be interrupted and seri-
ously jeopardized. I based that conclu-
sion, not on the failure of the committee
to address responsibly the general legal
situation, but rather on the intricacies
and complexities of our domestic licens-
ing law in the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission under the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 1978. I also based that con-
clusion on the January 30, 1979 Memo-
randum to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission's General Counsel on the sub-
ject of "Legal Issues Arising from the
United States' New China Policy" and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
General Counsel's letter of February 15,
1979 to House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee Chairman Zablocki on the same sub-
ject. In fact, I want to commend the
Foreign Relations Committee for con-
certed efforts to deal constructively and
responsibly with the virtual Ghordian
knot of legal technicalities resulting
from the administration's actions in
recognizing the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal authority for
mainland China and Taiwan, and de-
recognizing the Republic of China.
The possibility of difficulties under the
adopted bill flow from the very specific
findings of fact and law that must be
made by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission under the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act. As as demonstrated graphi-
cally in the Tarapur, India, export case
last year, and may be repeated again on
the next export license for Tarapur now
pending in the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, those required findings of fact
and law can and have been rejected on
both narrow legal technicalities and vir-
tually unbounded speculation. My strong
opinions on the Tarapur case and the
outright rejection of the clear congres-
sional intent for continued exports to
India under phase I safeguards was doc-
umented in my testimony before the For-
eign Relations Committee on May 24,
1978 in the hearing on that case. For in-
stance, I am convinced that the recogni-
tion of the People's Republic of China as
the sole legal authority for Taiwan, as
well as the mainland, and the arguable
U.S. position that the People's Republic
of China eventually and ultimately will
be constituted as de facto, as well as de
jure governmental authority on Taiwan,
could and probably would be argued as
the basis for rejection of the required
findings for the pending reactor and fuel
licenses. Also, the legal arrangements
under the bill for the American Institute
on Taiwan and its nongovernmental,
corporate counterpart in Taiwan prob-
ably would be argued as not satisfying
the exact requirements for the specific
findings of fact and law. Additionally,
there are a series of sensitive matters re-
lated to our formal cooperation with
Taiwan dealing with exports and non-
proliferation that must be covered fully
under the reported bill, but which also
could be jeopardized in the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission in the absence of
further clarification and perfection of
the bill. I have taken the liberty of shar-
ing these views with several senior ad-
ministration officials in the nuclear
power area, and they share my conclu-
sions and very serious concern about
continued, uninterrupted cooperation
with Taiwan.
It obviously would be extremely unfor-
tunate if Congress enacted a statute
which generally purports to preserve all
of our ongoing commercial, cultural and
other relationships with Taiwan, but was
immediately followed by an effective
legal embargo on nuclear exports. We al-
ready have experienced that same un-
fortunate result with India after passage
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act last
year, and we also had an extended legal
embargo of our European allies in
EURATOM, under the act. Recognizing
the critical and immediate importance of
this matter, and its extreme sensitivity,
I am convinced that we must act to in-
sure that the enacted bill directly pre-
serves, as a matter of clearly predictable
law, our nuclear cooperation with Tai-
wan. As I mentioned, I have concluded
that an amendment will be appropriate
and probably necessary to achieve that
goal.
Mr. President, once I concluded that
action was appropriate on this issue, I
approached last week the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, my col-
league from Idaho, with my conclusions
and recommendations. We have pro-
ceeded over the last week to work closely
and cooperatively together on this issue,
with the State Department and our re-
spective staffs to develop a mutually-
agreeable approach to resolving the is-
sue. The pending amendment is the prod-
uct of our cooperative efforts. I thank
him, his committee staff, and the State
Department for their assistance and co-
operation in fashioning the required clar-
ification and perfection of the bill on this
issue.
Let me turn now to the details of the
amendment. The effect of the amendment
will be to state expressly in the statute
that this act is intended to and shall be
construed in any administrative or judic-
ial proceeding as providing the full legal
basis, in terms of the continuing legal
relationships betweeen the United States
and the people on Taiwan, to satisfy all
statutory requirements and criteria for
nuclear exports under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and there-
by insure the continued legal basis for
full, uninterrupted coperation in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy between
the United States and the people on Tai-
wan pursuant to the 1972 Agreement for
Cooperation, as amended, and any other
applicable agreements, notwithstanding:
First. The President's action in extend-
ing diplomatic recognition to the People's
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 8,.19 79
Republic of China, the President's action
in withdrawing diplomatic recognition
from the Republic of China, and atten-
dant circumstances; nor; second, the op-
eration of any specific provisions of this
Act, such as those dealing with the Amer-
ican Institute on Taiwan or its counter-
part instrumentality representing the
people on Taiwan. That effect is achieved
by stating affirmatively that the facts of
the People's Republic of China recog-
nition and the derecognition of the Re-
public of China, and attendant facts shall
be legally irrelevant in any proceeding
dealing with nuclear exports and other
forms of coperation under the Atomic
Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonprolifer-
ation Act, and also.that the procedures
under S. 245 for continued cooperation
with Taiwan through the American In-
stitute on Taiwan and its counterpart
instrumentality shall satisfy the proce-
dural requirements of those acts.
The Amendment also states that
nothing in S. 245 on the facts of the
status changes for the People's Republic
of China or the Republic of China can
be used as a legal basis to deny an ex-
port license application, revoke an
existing license, or disapprove other au-
thorized forms of cooperation. These
parallel affirmative and negative formu-
lations in the Amendment will leave no
room for the types of interpretation sug-
gested in the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission's General Counsel's Memoran-
dum of January 30, 1979 or his letter of
February 15, 1979. Also, this formulation
should foreclose as a matter of law the
type of creative misinterpretation which
formed the basis for the opinion of Com-
missioners Bradford and Galinsky in the
Tarapur case last year.
Several additional matters are rele-
vant at this point. This Amendment and
the related provisions of the bill will in-
sure full, continued cooperation with
Taiwan. That cooperation legally can in-
clude government-to-government trans-
fers under section 54, 64, and 111 of the
Atomic Energy Act (section 301 of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act) , tech-
nology transfers under section 57B (sec-
tion 302 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act), subsequent arrangements under
section 131 (section 303 of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act), export licensing
under sections 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, and
109 (sections 304 through 309 of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act), and other
authorized forms of cooperation under
the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.
All of these specific forms of coopera-
tion shall continue through and by the
American Institute on Taiwan and the
counterpart instrumentality on Taiwan.
The legally-satisfactory, specific pro-
cedures for that cooperation, pursaunt
to this amendment and the other provis-
ions of this bill, will be in the following
form:
SUMMARY or NUCLEAR EXPORT PROCEDURES
APPLICABLE TO THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN
UNDER S. 245
Section 101 (a) provides that whenever
any law, regulation, or .order the U.S. refers
or relates to a foreign "nation", or uses
another such similar term, such term shall
include, and such law, regulation or order
shall apply with respect to, the People on
Taiwan. In this regard the Foreign Relations
Committee report on the Act (Report No.
96-7, 96th Congress, 1st session) indicates
that Section 101 (a) continues the eligibility
of the people on Taiwan under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as most
recently amended by the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), contains num-
erous provisions relating to nuclear cooper-
ation with foreign "nations". For example,
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended, requires an agreement for cooper-
ation with a "nation" before certain speci-
fled cooperation may be undertaken. Section
127 establishes criteria that must be met by
nations for nuclear export. Such provisions,
under Section 101 (a) of the Taiwan En-
abling Act (TEA), would be applicable to the
people on Taiwan.
Section 104 of the proposed TEA confirms
that all treaties and other international
agreements entered into between the U.S.
and the government recognized as the Re-
public of China prior to January 1, 1979, and
in force until December 31, 1978, shall con-
tinue in force unless and until terminated
in accordance with law. In accordance with
this provision, the agreement for coopera-
tion with Taiwan and any other applicable
international agreements in the nuclear field
continue in force. Under Section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act, as amended, agreements
for cooperation are prerequisite for certain
nuclear cooperation. Section 405(a) of the
NNPA of 1978 confirms the authority to con-
tinue coperation under agreements entered
into prior to enactment of that Act. Section
104 of S. 245 makes clear this applies in the
case of Taiwan.
Section 105 of the proposed TEA provides
for the continuance of programs, transac-
tions and other relations with respect to the
people on Taiwan in accordance with appli-
cable laws in the U.S. The Foreign Relations
Committee report makes clear that this will
assure continuation of authority for nuclear
exports. Thus, this provision reconfirms that
nuclear programs, transaction and relations
with Taiwan may continue in accordance
with law.
Section 106 (a) of the proposed TEA pro-
vides that programs, transactions, and other
relations shall, in the manner and to the
extent directed by the President be carried
out or through the American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT). In conection with this pro-
vision, it is anticipated that the President
will direct that nuclear programs, transac-
tions and other relations be carried out by or
through the AIT.
Section 108 of the TEA empowers the AIT,
in the manner and to the extent directed by
the President, to enter into perform, enforce,
or have in force agreements or arrangements
relative to the people on Taiwan. In con-
nection with this provision, it is anticipated
that the President will direct that agreements
or arrangements in the nuclear field be en-
tered into, performed, enforced or considered
to be in force by all through the AIT. Thus,
pursuant to this section (and to Section 405
(a) of the NNPA, mentioned above), the cur-
rent nuclear cooperation agreement with
Taiwan remains in force and valid authority
for exports thereunder. Further, Section 404
(a) of the NNPA requires the President to
seek to renegotiate such agreements. Section
108 of S. 245 makes clear that the AIT may
conduct such renegotiation. Further the AIT
will be able to perform, on behalf of the U.S.
or any Department or Agency or enforce
agreements or other arrangements relative
t., the people on Taiwan.
Section 109 of the proposed TEA provides
that any performance, communication, as-
surance, undertaking or other action on be-
half of the people on Taiwan shall be ren-
dered, in the manner and to the extent di-
rected by the President, through an Instru-
mentality established by the people on Tai-
wan. In connection with this Section, it is
noted that Taiwan has announced the estab-
lishment of the Coordination Council for
North American Affairs (CCNAA) to act as
this instrumentality. It is anticipated that
the President will direct that performance,
communication, assurances, undertakings
and other actions in the nuclear area be
rendered or. provided to or received or ac-
cepted from the CCNAA. Proposed Section
109 authorizes this to be done on behalf of
the U.S. or any department or agency. Thus,
assurance that a proposed export is subject
to the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement for Coopera-
tion may be provided by and received from
the CCNAA. Further, any clarification or as-
surance required during the process of ex-
port license applications would be obtained
from the CCNAA.
Section 401(c) of, the proposed TEA indi-
cates that agreements and transactions made
by or through the Institute shall be subject
to the same congressional notification, re-
view and approval requirements and proce-
dure as if such agreements are made by or
through the Department or Agency of the
U.S. on behalf of which the Institute is act-
ing. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee report indicates that this provision in-
sures that procedures parallel to currently
applicable procedures for agreements for co-
operation under Section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act will apply.
Within this framework, the same proce-
dures established by the NNPA, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's regulations con-
tained in 10 CFR Part 110, and the Executive
branch procedures published at 43 Federal
Register 25326-30 will apply. These proce-
dures are described in Chapter IX of the First
Annual Report of the President to the Con-
gress pursuant to Section 601 of the NNPA.
The procedural variance in the application
of the procedures is that we envisage that the
CCNAA will act, in all respects, on behalf of
the people on Taiwan in the export process.
To the extent that the USG must deal with,
seek asurances from, or receive assurances
from the CCNAA, the USG will act through
the AIT.
Thus, the export licensing process for
source or special nuclear material or produc-
tion dr utilization facilities would be as
follows:
The process is initiated when the U.S. com-
pany that is either the shipper of the source
or special nuclear material or the exporter of
the production or utilization facility submits
an application for an export license to the
NRC. The Commission then requests the Ex-
ecutive branch analysis and judgment pro-
vided for in Section 126 of the Atomic Energy
Act, as amended.
In preparing this judgment, the Executive
branch would seek, in accordance with Sec-
tion i (e) of Part B of the Executive Branch
Procedures, confirmation that the export
would be subject to the terms and conditions
of the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement for Cooper-
ation, that the consignee is authorized to
receive the export, and that adequate phys-
ical security measures will be maintained.
Since it is the task of the Department of
Energy to obtain this confirmation, the De-
partment of Energy would submit the re-
quest to the AIT which would transmit it to
the CCNAA. The confirmation of the CCNAA
on behalf of the people of Taiwan would be
transmitted back to the Department of
Energy by the AIT and would in all respects
satisfy the requirements of law.
The Executive branch judgment and anal-
ysis would deal with the criteria specified by
law and would, in addition, transmit to the
NRC this confirmation.
When the NRC receives the Executive
branch judgment and analysis, the export
license application would, in all respects, be
treated as any other similar application. If
during the course of either NRC or Executive
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE S 2339
branch consideration of an export license ap- to find that an export is not Inimicable text of my letter be printed at this point
plication concerning Taiwan there arose a to the common defense and security of in the RECORD.
need to seek further assurances or obtain the United States in approving exports, The letter follows:
further information, the request would be and I have, in drafting the amendment, FEBRUARY 14, 1979.
transmitted by the Department of State clearly intended to address that issue. It Chairman JOSEPH HENDRIE,
assurances or informs- would is my intent that the Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wash-
proovide vide the the necessary the CCNAA,
tion. Commission shall not consider that ex- ingtonDEAR , D.C.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The Senate For-
tension of recognition of f the People's ei n Relations Committee is soon to markup
The procedure that I have outlined Republic of China or the absence of g
here is the complete and adequate basis the Admi do proposed s with legislation
tfor tRegulatoly Commission diplomatic relations between the people under which h commercial relations with the
h on Taiwan and the United States as Republic of China are to be continued. This
to the make e all Nuclear
the findings with mig regard to o cause for establishing any differences in draft legislation in Title I is designed to im-
the continuation of the Agreement circumstances per se for its findings on plement the President's * stated intent that
Cooperation under section 123, including the issue of inimicality to the common all existing commercial relations are to be
section 126a(2) and section 53a and defense and securityof the United States continued. However, in view of the impor-
section 103d requirements of the Atomic with regard to nuclear exports to the tance of American nuclear exports to the
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, along people on Taiwan. Taiwan economy and to our nuclear industry,
with other relevant sections of that act. I should like to receive the specific assurance
Therefore, it is clear to me that the full It is also my intent by offering this of the Commission that under this proposal
? ' amendment that the scope of the nuclear export licensing will continue in ac-
intent tent of of the e to Senainsure te ate in in that the adopting 1 this s amendment not only apply to export cordance with the existing Agreement for
licenses and applications, but also any Cooperation between the United States and
Agreement for Cooperation with Taiwan, other authorized form of cooperation the Republic of China on Taiwan, and that
as amended, has been and remains fully with the people on Taiwan in the peace- the U.S. commitment to the reliable supply
in force. Furthermore, the Tri-Lateral ful uses of atomic energy pursuant to of nuclear goods and services under this
Agreement between the United States, both the Atomic .Energy Act of 1954, Agreement is promptly reaffirmed. For this
the IAEA, and the Taiwan authorities is reason, I am soliciting your early agreement
fully preserved by this amendment and as amended, and the Nuclear Nonpro- to the following:
the act and remains fully in force. liferation Act of 1978. For instance, the That Taiwan, or that the People of Tai-
on the basis of the content of the amendment contemplates that there will wan, meet the criteria and standards re-
be no change in law or circumstance quired for nuclear cooperation under the
Taiwan Enabling Act, it is my belief and with regard to processing applications Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978;
clear understanding that the Nuclear for government-to-government transfer, That the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regulatory Commission can make all will be able to resume nuclear export licens-
of the necessary findings without the technology transfers and subsequent ing under the existing Agreement immedi-
required amendment to the Nuclear arrangements among others. ately following passage of the Administra-
Regulatory Commission regulations once 0 Mr. STONE. Mr. President, I respect- tion's enabling legislation;
'the President has used his authority fully request to join as a cosponsor of the . That the Commission does not foresee any
under the act to direct the appropriate amendment offered by the distinguished legal problems under the Atomic Energy Act
Senator from Idaho. This amendment that may requite a legislative solution to
procedure. v makes absolutely clear that the ending permit continued nuclear cooperation with
The continued approval of exports to of formal, diplomatic relations between the People of Taiwan.
the people of Taiwan is not dependent Your early response to these inquiries will
upon the continuation of the IAEA Tri- the United 'States and the Republic of be greatly appreciated.
Lateral Agreement for Cooperation with China and the enactment of pending Most cordially,
the United States and Taiwan because legislation shall not,' in any way, inter- RICHARD (DICK) STONE.*
the safeguards necessary to satisfy Cri- fere with the present procedures, agree- Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the
terion 1 of section 128 of the Atomic ments, or arrangements in the future be- floor manager of the bill, ? the chairman
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, can be tween the United States and the Repub- of the committee, agree with me that
met under the Bi-Lateral Agreement for lic of China with respect to cooperation the provisions of S. 245 before the Sen-
Cooperation between the' United States in the peaceful uses of atomic energy ate are intended to continue the full co-
and Taiwan. This is so because Criterion pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of operation in the peaceful uses of atomic
1 in the statute only requires that the 1954. energy, pursuant to the Atomic Energy
IAEA safeguards or their equivalent Mr. President, while S. 245 and the Act of 1954, as amended, and the Nu-
must be maintained. Fully equivalent committee report, as reported by the clear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which
safeguards may be provided by and car- Senate Foreign Relations Committee, existed before January 1, 1979?
ried out under the control of the Ameri- make clear that the Republic of China Mr. CHURCH. I agree completely that
can Institute on Taiwan with Nuclear will constitute a "nation" under the the provisions of the bill are intended to
Regulatory Commission or Department Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and would be achieve that result, and I would invite
of Energy personnel for satisfying the eligible for continued full cooperation the attention of my colleague to the fol-
requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory 'under that act, S. 245 establishes such an lowing passages in the Foreign Relations
Commission. This approach should be unusual and unprecedented framework Committee report on the bill. In the dis-
wholly adequate to maintain adequate for the relationship between our coun- cussion of subsection 101(a), on page 23
safeguards over U.S. exports and try . and another country; namely, the of the report, it is expressly stated that
technology in the unlikely event that Republic of China, that I think this the people on Taiwan will constitute a
the IAEA Tri-Lateral ? Agreement is amendment is necessary to remove any "nation" under the Atomic Energy Act
suspended. -ambiguity as to the intention of Con- of 1954, thus continuing the eligibility of
In case there is any doubt, it is my gress that the Nuclear Regulatory Com- the people on Taiwan for full coopera-
belief and intent that the amendment mission proceed as usual in considering tion under that act, and, as a result, the
makes it clear that physical security in- present and future nuclear export ar- Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The dis-
spections pursuant to IAEA procedures rangements between the United States cussion of section 105, on page 25, makes
and required by Criterion III of section and the Republic of China and that specific reference to the assured con-
127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, neither the President's action in recog- tinuation of authority for nuclear ex-
as amended, can be met through assur- nizing the People's Republic of China ports.
ances and inspections provided by the nor the absence of diplomatic relations The discussion of section 109, on page
American Institute on Taiwan and that between the Republic of China and the 27, discusses as an example how the Arms
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States shall be legally relevant in Export Control Act is intended to oper-
should find those assurances and inspec- any proceedings or procedures pursuant ate, under the provisions of this bill,
tions' by the American -Institute on Tai- to the Atomic Energy Act. . through the American Institute on Tai-
wan to be acceptable for meeting the ' Mr. President,.my concern about this wan and the counterpart instrumentality
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act matter is evidenced by a letter which I established by the people on Taiwan. The
of 1954, as amended. wrote ,to the .Chairman of the.Nuclear procedures for the Arms Export Control
I have also considered the requirement Regulatory Commission, to which I have Act would be analogous to those for the
for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission not yet received a reply. I ask that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, and' would
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S 234 'CONGR IONAIL C?RD -SENATE March 8, 1979
be intended to satisfy the .requirements provde all of the necessary authority to transactions and other relations with re-
of the latter act. Also, the discussion of continue those exports and other au- spect to the' people, on Taiwan in ac-
subsection 401(c) , on page 39, expressly thorized forms, and further that those cordance with applicable laws in the
states that the procedures of section 123 procedures under the provisions of this United States. The Foreign Relations
of the Atomic Energy Act, which was bill are intended to satisfy the require- Committee report makes, clear that this
amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation meats of the Atomic Energy Act. and will assure continuation, of .authority for
Act, for review and approval of agree-, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act? nuclear exports. Thus, this :provision re-
ments for cooperation in the peaceful Mr. CHURCH. Yes; S. 245 clearly pro- confirms that nuclear programs, trans-
uses of atomic energy shall continue to vides the authorities necessary for the actions, and relations with Taiwan may
apply to such agreements with the people U.S. Government and the people on Tai- continue in accordance with law.
on Taiwan by or through the American wan to continue procedurally that coop- Section 106(a) of the proposed TEA
Institute on Taiwan. In summary, it is eration, including nuclear exports and provides that programs, transactions,
the committee's clear intent that the pro- other authorized forms, by and through and other relations shall, in the manner
visions of the bill apply directly to the the American Institute on Taiwan and and to the extent directed by the Presi-
cooperation with the people on Taiwan the counterpart instrumentality estab- dent be carried out or through the Amer-
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy lished by the people on Taiwan. Fur- ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT). In con-
and assure the predictable continuation ther, it is the clear intent of the bill that nection with this provision, it is antici-
of that cooperation. those procedures by and through the pated that the President will direct that
Mr. McCLURE. The House Foreign Af- Institute and the counterpart instrumen- nuclear programs, transactions, and'
fairs Committee report on .the compan- tality shall satisfy any procedural re- other relations be carried out by or '
ion legislation, H.R. 2479, on page 10, quirements of the Atomic Energy Act or through the Al'l'.
indicates that the Nuclear Non rol'f t'
i er
A
t
The bill does not affect the future resolu-
tion of legal issues based on changed circum-
stances; it simply makes the fact of derec-
ognition irrelevant to the resolution of those
issues. For example, under' this section, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be able
to make the required findings and determi-
nations under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, in order to permit con-
tinued nuclear exports to Taiwan, and de-
zecognition will not constitute a basis for
not making those findings and determina-
ISons. At the same time, nothing in this
bill will prevent the Commission from taking
into account subsequent changes in circum-
stances in its application of the statutory
criteria.
Also, the House report on page ?8 states
that-
In other words, derecognition is to be
legally irrelevant in deciding issues Involv-
ing Taiwan under United States law. In
particular, this section preserves the rights
and obligations of Taiwan under United
States law.
Is it correct to say that the intent of
the Foreign Relations Committee and
the provisions of S. 245 are consistent
with that expressed House Committee
position.
Mr. CHURCH. Yes; the committee
intends that the provisions of S. 245 will
lead to the same result in that regard,
as the expressed House committee posi-
tion. In effect, the operation of this bill
is intended to satisfy fully the proced-
ural requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act, and further, the facts of the Presi-
dent's action in recognizing the People's
Republic of China, the absence of diplo-
matic relations between the people on
Taiwan and the United States or the
lack of recognition by the United States,
and the attendant circumstances there-
to will be legally irrelevant in any admin-
istrative or judicial proceeding dealing
with nuclear export license applications
or other authorized forms of cooperation
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy
with the people on Taiwan. So, this bill
and our intent are consistent with the
House companion bill and the House
committee position in this regard.
Mr. McCLURE. With regard to the
specific, step-by-step procedures for riu-
clear exports and other authorized forms
of cooperation in atomic energy, would
you agree that the provisions of this bill
a ion
p
c
for Section 108 of the TEA empowers the
such cooperation, as mentioned earlier. AIT, in the manner and to the extent
Procedurally, this is how it would be directed by the President, to enter into,
done. Perform, enforce, or have in force agree-
SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR EXPORT PROCEDURES AP- ments or arrangements relative to the
PLICABLE TO THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN UNDER people on Taiwan. In connection with
S..245 this provision, it is anticipated that the
Section 101(a) provides that when- ;President will direct that agreements or
ever any law, regulation, or order the arrangements in the nuclear .field be en-
United States refers or relates to a for- tered into, performed, enforced, or con-
eign "nation," or uses another such simi- sidered to be in.force by all through the
lar term, such term shall include, and AIT. Thus, pursuant to this section (and
such law, regulation or order shall apply to section 405 (a) of the NNPA, men-
with respect to, the people on Taiwan. tioned above), the current nuclear co-
In this regard the Foreign Relations operation agreement with Taiwan re-
Committee report on the Act (Report mains in force and valid authority for
No. 96-7, 96th Congress, 1st session) exports thereunder. Further, section
indicates that section 101(a) continues 404(a) of the NNPA requires the Presi-
the eligibility of the people on Taiwan dent to seek to renegotiate such agree-
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. ments. Section 108 of, S. 245 makes clear
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as that the AIT may conduct such renegoti-
most recently amended by the Nuclear ation. Further the AIT will be .able to
Non rol1'f t'
er
A
t
p on
a i
c
of 1978 (NNPA),
contains numerous provisions relating
to nuclear cooperation with foreign "na-
tions." For example, section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act, as amended, re-
quires an agreement for cooperation
with a "nation" before certain specified
cooperation may be undertaken. Section
127 establishes criteria that must be met
by nations for nuclear export. Such pro-
visions, under section 101 (a) of the Tai-
wan Enabling Act (TEA), would be ap-
plicable to the people on Taiwan.
Section 104 of the proposed TEA con-
firms that all treaties and other inter-
national agreements entered into be-
tween the United States and the gov-
ernment recognized as the Republic of
China prior to January 1, 1979, and in
force until December 31, 1978, shall con-
tinue in force unless and until termi-
nated in accordance with law. In ac-
cordance with this provision, the agree-
ment for cooperation with Taiwan and
any other applicable international agree-
ments in the nuclear field continue in
perform, on behalf of the United States
or any department or agency or enforce
.agreements or other arrangements rela-
tive to the people on Taiwan.
Section 109 of the proposed TEA pro-
vides that any performance, communica-
tion assurance, undertaking or other
action on behalf of the people on Taiwan
,shall. be rendered, in the manner and to
the extent directed by the President,
through an instrumentality established
by the people on Taiwan. In connection
with this section, it is noted that Taiwan
has announced the establishment of the
Coordination Council for North Ameri-
can Affairs (CCNAA) to act as this in-
strumentality. It is anticipated that the
President will direct that performance,
-communication, assurances, undertak-
ings, and other actions in the nuclear
area be rendered or provided to or re-
ceived or accepted from the CCNAA.
Proposed section 109 authorizes this to be
done on behalf of the United States or
p
expo
s subject
force. Under section 123 of the Atomic to the United States-Taiwan .Agreement
Energy Act, as amended, agreements for for Cooperation may be provided by and
cooperation are prerequisite for certain received from the CCNAA. Further, any
nuclear cooperation, Section 405 (a) of clarification or assurance required dur-
the NNPA of 1978 confirms the authority ing the process of export license appli-
to continue cooperation under agree- cations would be obtained. from the
ments entered into prior to enactment CCNAA.
of that act. Section 104 of S. 245 makes Section 401(c) of the proposed TEA
clear this applies in the case of Taiwan. Indicates that agreements and transas-
Section 105 of the proposed TEA pro- tions made by or through the Institute
.vides for the continuance of programs, shall be subject to the same congres-
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any department or agency. Thus, assur-
ance that a pro
osed
rt i
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March 8,'1979
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE , S 2341
sional notification, review and approval
requirements and procedure as if such
agreements are made by or through the
department or agency of the" United
States on behalf of which the Institute
is acting. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report indicates that this
provision insures that procedures paral-
lel to currently applicable procedures for
agreements for cooperation under sec-
tion 123 of the Atomic Energy Act will
apply.
Within this framework, the same pro-
cedures established by the NNPA, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regu-
lations contained in 10 CFR part 110,
and the executive branch procedures
published at 43 Federal Register 25326-
30 will apply. These procedures are de-
scribed in chapter IX of the First Annual
Report of the President to the Congress
pursuant to section 601 of the NNPA.
The procedural variance in the appli-
cation of the procedures is that we en-
visage that the CCNAA will act, in all
respects, on behalf of the people on Tai-
wan in the export process. To the extent
that the USG must deal with, seek as-
surances from, or receive assurances
from the CCNAA, the USG will act
through the ATT.
Thus, the export licensing process for
source or special nuclear material or
production or utilization facilities would
be as follows:
The process is initiated when the U.S.
company that is either the shipper of
the source or special nuclear material
or the exporter of the production or utili-
zation facility submits an application for
an export license to the NRC. The Com-
mission then requests the executive
branch analysis and judgment provided
for in section 126 of the Atomic Energy
Act, as amended.
In preparing this judgment, the ex-
ecutive branch would seek, in accord-
ance with section 1(c) of part B of the
executive branch procedures, confir-
mation that the export would be subject
to the terms and conditions of the
United States-Taiwan Agreement for
Cooperation, that the consignee I; au-
thorized to receive the export, and that
adequate physical security measures will
be maintained. Since it is the task of the
Department of Energy to obtain this
confirmation, the Department of Energy
would submit the request to the AIT
which would transmit it to the CCNAA.
The confirmation of the CCNAA on be-
half of the people on Taiwan would be
transmitted back to the Department of
Energy by the AlT and would in all re-
spects satisfy the requirements of law.
The executive branch judgment and
analysis would deal with the criteria
specified by law and would, in addition,
transmit to the NRC this confirmation.
When the NRC receives the executive
branch judgment and analysis, the ex-
port license application would, in all re-
spects, be treated as any other similar
application. If during the course of either
NRC or executive branch consideration
of an export license application concern-
ing Taiwan there arose a need to seek
further assurrances or obtain further in-
formation, the request would be trans-
mitted by the Department of State
through the AIT to the CCNAA, which
would provide the necessary assurances
or information.
At this point in the RECORD, I ask
unanimous consent to include a letter
from the Department of State confirming
the administration's intent to proceed in
the manner I have outlined. Again, these
procedures are intended, as a matter of
law, to satisfy all of the Atomic Energy
Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
procedural requirements for continued
cooperation.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., March 8, 1979.
Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U. S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
This letter is in response to your request
for a description of how the Administration
expects the proposed Taiwan Enabling Act,
S. 245, to be implemented with respect to the
processing of nuclear exports. The Depart-
ment has prepared the enclosed summary
document to clarify this matter.
I believe this explanation shows that, un-
der the pending bill, the absence of diplo-
matic relations will be irrelevant to contin-
ued nuclear exports to Taiwan. Apart from
the involvement of the American Institute in
Taiwan and the Coordination Council for
North American Affairs in the procedures,
nuclear exports will proceed on the same
basis as prior to U.S. normalization of rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China.
I hope the enclosed explanation will be
helpful to the Senate in its consideration of
the proposed legislation.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS J. BENENT,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR EXPORT PROCEDURES
APPLICABLE TO THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN
UNDER S. 245
Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as, most recently amended by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), an
"agreement for cooperation" is a prerequisite
for the export of nuclear reactors and fuel.
Such agreements are concluded in accord-
ance with a procedure established by section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Actual exports
of reactors and fuel pursuant to such agree-
ments are licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, after it has received the judg-
ment of the Executive branch on whether the
license should be issued. This licensing is
done in accordance with substantive export
licensing criteria established by law and un-
der procedures established by law, regula-
tions, and Executive branch department and
agency procedures.
The United States entered into a nuclear
cooperation agreement with the Republic of
China in 1955. This agreement, as amended,
was superseded by an agreement that entered
into force in 1972 and'was amended in 1974.
Exports of nuclear reactors and fuel have
been licensed under these agreements.
With respect to the authority for con-
tinued nuclear exports to Taiwan, section
101(a) of the proposed Taiwan Enabling Act
S. 245, provides that whenever any law, regu-
lation, or order the U.S. refers or relates to a
foreign "nation", or uses another such Sim-
ilar term, such term shall include, and such
law, regulation or order shall apply with re-
spect to, the people on Taiwan. In this re-
gard, the Foreign Relations Committee re-
port (Report No. 96-7, 96th Congress, 1st
session) indicates that section 101(a) con-
tinues the eligibility of the people on Taiwan
under the Atomic Energy Act.
Section 104 of S. 245 confirms that all
treaties and other international agreements
entered into between the U.S. and the gov-
ernment recognized as the Republic of
China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force
until December 31, 1978, shall continue in
force unless and until terminated in accord-
ance with law.
Section 105 of S. 245 provides for the con-
tinuance of programs, transactions and other
relations with respect to the people on Tai-
wan in accordance with applicable laws in
the U.S. The Foreign Relations Committee
report makes clear that this will assure con-
tinuation of authority for nuclear exports.
Section 106(a) of S. 245 provides that
U.S. Government programs, transactions and
other relations with respect to the people on
Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the ex-
tent directed by the President be carried out
by or through the American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT).
Section 108 of S. 245 empowers the Al'r, in
the manner and to the extent directed by
the President, to enter into, perform, ,enforce.
or have in force agreements or arrangements
relative to the people on Taiwan.
Section 109 of S. 245 provides that any per-
formance, communication, assurance, under-
taking or other action on behalf of the peo-
ple on Taiwan shall be rendered, in the man-
ner and to the extent directed by the Presi-
dent, through an instrumentality estab-
lished by the people on Taiwan.
The Presidential directives under sections
106, 108 and 109, since provided for by stat-
ute, will have the force of law and be bind-
ing on all persons and government agencies.
Section 401 (c) of S. 245 indicates that
agreements and transactions made by or
through the Institute shall be subject to the
same congressional notification, review and
approval requirements and procedure as if
such agreements are made by or through
the Department or Agency of the U.S. on
behalf of which the Institute is acting.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
report indicates that this provision insures
that procedures parallel to currently appli-
cable procedures for agreements for cooper-
ation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act will apply.
The Atomic Energy Act contains numer-
ous provisions relating to nuclear coopera-
tion with foreign "nations". For example,
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act re-
quires an agreement for cooperation with a
"nation" before certain specified cooperation
may be undertaken. Section 127 establishes
criteria that must be met by nations for nu-
clear export. Such provisions, under section
101 (a) of S. 245, wolud be applicable to the
people on Taiwan.
In accordance with section 104 of S. 245,
and with the stated concurrence of the au-
thorities on Taiwan, the agreement for coop-
eration with Taiwan and any other applicable
international agreements in the nuclear field
continue in force. Section 405 (a) of the
NNPA confirms the authority to continue
cooperation under agreement entered into
prior to enactment of that Act. Section 104
of S. 245 makes clear this applies in the case
of Taiwan.
Section 105 of S. 245 reconfirms that nu-
clear programs, transaction and relations
with Taiwan may continue in accordance
with law.
Under section 106(a) of S. 245, it is an-
ticipated that the President will direct that
these nuclear programs, transactions and
other relations be carried out by or through
the AIT. Transactions by private U.S.. firms
in nuclear matters would, of course, con-
tinue on a direct basic without AIT in-
volvement.
It is further anticipated. that the Presi-
dent will, in connection with section 108 of
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S. 245, direct that agreements or arrange-
ments in the nuclear field be entered into,
performed, enforced or considered to be in
force by or through the AIT. Thus, pursuant
to this section (and to section 405 (a) of
the NNPA, mentioned above), the current
nuclear cooperation agreement with Taiwan
remains in force and valid authority for'ex-
ports thereunder. Further, section 404 (a)
of the NNPA requires the President to seek
to renegotiate such agreements. Section 108
of S. 245 makes clear that the AIT may
enter into such an agreement. Further the
AIT will be able to perform, on behalf of the
U.S. or any department or agency or enforce
agreements or other arrangements relative
to the people on Taiwan.
Taiwan has announced the establishment
of the Coordination Council for North
American Affairs (CCNAA) to act as its in-
strumentality for unofficial dealings on be-
half of the people on Taiwan. It is antici-
pated that the President will, in connection
with section 109 of S. 245, direct that per-
formance, communication, assurances, un-
dertakings and other actions in the nuclear
area be rendered or provided to or received
or accepted from the CCNAA. Proposed sec-
tion 109 authorizes this to be done on be-
half of the U.S. or any department or
agency. Thus, assurance that a proposed ex-
port is subject to the U.S.-Taiwan Agree-
ment for Cooperation may be provided by
and received from the CCNAA. Further, any
clarification or assurance required during
the process of export license applications
would be obtained from the CCNAA.
Within this framework, the same proce-
dure is established by the NNPA, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's regulations con-
tained in 10 CFR Part 110, and the Executive
Branch Procedures published at 43 Federal
Register 25326-30 will apply. These proce-
dures are described in Chapter IX of the
First Annual Report of the 'resident to
the Congress pursuant to section 601 of the
NNPA.
The significant variance in the applica-
tion of the regulations and procedures is
that we envisage that the CCNAA will act,
in all respects, on behalf of the people on
Taiwan in the export process. To the extent
that the United States Government must
deal with, seek assurances from, or receive
assurances from the CCNAA, the United
States Government will act through the AIT.
Thus, the export licensing process for
source or special nuclear material or pro-
duction or utilization facilities would be as
follows.
The process is initiated when a company
that is either arranging or the transport of
the source or special nuclear material or is
the supplier of the production or utilization
facility submits an application for'-an ex-
port license to the NRC. The Commission
then requests the Executive branch. analysis
and judgment provided for in section 126 of
the Atomic Energy Act.
in preparing this judgment, the Executive
branch would seek, in accordance with sec-
tion 1 (c) of Part B of the Executive Branch
Procedures, confirmation . that the export
would be subject to the terms and conditions
of the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement for Cooper-
ation, that the consignee is authorized to re-
ceive the export, and that adequate physical
security measures will be maintained. Since
it ,is the task of the Department of Eenrgy to
obtain this confirmation, the Department of
Energy would submit the request to the AIT
which would transmit it to the CCNAA. The
confirmation of the CCNAA on behalf of the
people on Taiwan would be transmitted back
to the Department of Energy by the AIT and
would in all respects satisfy the requirements
of law.
The Executive branch judgment and anal-
ysis would deal with the criteria specified by
law and would, in addition, transmit to the
NEC this confirmation.
When the NRC receives the Executive
branch judgment and analysis, the export
license application would, in all respects, be
treated as any other similar application. If
during the course of either NRC or Executive
branch consideration of an export license
application concerning Taiwan there arose a
need to seek further assurances or obtain
further information, the request would be
transmitted by the Department of State
through the AIT to the CNAA, which would
provide the necesary assurances or informa-
tion.
Mr. McCLURE. A memorandum of
January 30, 1979, to the Commissioners
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
from the Commission's General Counsel,
Subject: Legal Issues Arising from the
United States' New China Policy, raises
a series of questions about continued
nuclear exports to Taiwan resulting
from the January 1, 1979, change in sta-
tus, including the issue of the legal defi-
nition of "nation" in the Atomic Energy
Act, the status of the 1972 Agreement for
Cooperation, the status of assurances
and commitments, the legal import of the
People's Republic of China recognition,
and other issues. Would you agree that
S. 245 addresses and disposes of all of
those legal issues, so that cooperation in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in-
cluding nuclear exports, can continue,
without any legal impediments, as be-
fore?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes. S. 245 addresses
and dispenses directly of those issues in
the January 30 memorandum to insure
that there is full legal authority to con-
tinue that cooperation, including nu-
clear exports, and it is our specific in-
tent that the authority shall be- used so
that continued cooperation will result.
Mr. McCLURE. A letter of February 15,
1979, to Chairman ZABLOCKI of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee from the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission's General
Counsel responded to -a series of ques-
tions from the chairman on the issue of
continued cooperation, including nuclear
exports. The letter raised some additional
issues regarding the legal import of the
status of the people on Taiwan for nu-
clear export statutory criteria, the legal
authority of the American Institute on
Taiwan and its counterpart instrumen-
tality, under the Atomic Energy Act and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, to pro-
cedurally continue cooperation, includ-
ing nuclear exports, the authority of the
President to establish the specific pro-
cedures, and other issues. Does S. 245
address and dispose of all the legal issues
raised in the February 15, 1979, letter,
so that cooperation can. continue without
any legal impediments, as before?
W. CHURCH. Yes. S. 245 addresses
and disposes directly of all those issues
in the February 15 letter to insure that
there is full legal authority to continue
that cooperation, including nuclear ex-
ports, and it is our specific intent that
the authority shall be used so that con-
tinued cooperation will result.
Mr. McCLURE. Would you -agree, then,
that the pending amendment will clarify
fully, as a matter of law -in the statute,
the clear intent of the Congress that all
of the aforementioned legal and pro-
cedural questions are resolved in the bill
and that this bill shall authorize and as-
sure continued cooperation, including
nuclear exports?
Mr. CHURCH. I agree completely with
your statement of the effect of the
amendment and the intent of the Con-
gress in enacting it in this bill.
Mr. McCLURE. It is my intent by of-
fering this amendment that the scope of
the amendment not only apply to export
licenses and applications, but also tech-
nology transfers, subsequent arrange-
ments and any other authorized form of
cooperation with the people on Taiwan
in . the peaceful uses of atomic energy
pursuant to both the Atomic Energy Act
of '1954, as amended, and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Is that also
your intent in agreeing to accept this
amendment?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes; the intent Is not
to limit the scope of the amendment in
a legal sense to only export licenses and
applications.
Mr. President, I find this amendment
acceptable, and I believe .that it clarifies
the matter of real importance to the
United States in the field of implement-
ing our nuclear policy.
I commend the Senator for offering
the amendment.
Mr. President, I move the adoption of
the amendment.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the
amendment is acceptable to me, and I
am grateful for the explanation about
the detail of 'what the Senator from
Idaho intends.
I thank my colleague.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
from New York.
Mr. McCLURE..I thank the Senator
from New York.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, with the
support of the ranking minority mem-
ber, I again move the adoption of the
amendment. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Idaho.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that mo-
tion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
TAIWAN ENABLING ACT AND THE U.S.-ROC
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY
? Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, today
we are considering the Taiwan Enabling
Act, S. 245. I support that legislation as
an essential part of the process of nor-
malization and the establishment of full
diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China while at the same time
maintaining our strong commercial, cul-
tural, and other relations with the people
on Taiwan on an unofficial, but no less
substantive, basis.
One of the essential acts in the process
of normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China was the ter-
mination of the mutual defense treaty
between the Republic of China on Tai-
wan and the United States.
The President, on behalf of the United
States, has given notice of the termina-
tion of that treaty effective December 31,
1979. I .personally believe that this ac-
tion of the President was c6rrect and
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within his authorized and constitutional
powers because article X of the treaty
expressly authorizes such termination.
However, the constitutional question
of the power of a President to so termi-
nate the mutual defense treaty is the
subject of a considerable difference of
opinion, including that of t*o of the
most distinguished colleagues in this
Senate Chamber. Senator KENNEDY, the
distinguished senior Senator from
Massachusetts, is of the firm view that
President Carter was right in recognizing
the People's Republic of China and in
giving notice to terminate the mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan.
The distinguished senior Senator from
Arizona, Senator GOLDWATER, is of the
equally firm view that the President does
not have the power unilaterally to ter-
minate the mutual defense treaty with
the Republic of China, whatever the
merits of recognizing the People's Re-
public of China as the sole legal govern-
ment of China. Senator GOLDWATER is of
the view that the President needs either
two-thirds approval of the U.S. Senate or
congressional concurrence. This consti-
tutional issue has now been presented by
Senator GOLDWATER and some of his col-
leagues both in the House and Senate
to our judicial system for resolution.
Both Senator KENNEDY and Senator
GOLDWATER have presented their views in
the current issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. Senator KENNEDY
has written an article supporting his
view under the title "Normal Relations
with China: Good Law, Good Policy."
And Senator GOLDWATER has presented
his views immediately following Senator
KENNEDY'S views in an article entitled
"Treaty Termination Is A Shared Power."
Mr. President, I welcome these two
articles and their scholarly and succinct
presentation of the constitutional ques-
tions and public policies involved. I per-
sonally believe that Senator KENNEDY'S
position is the stronger position from the
standpoint, of constitutional law and his-
tory and is the preferable position from
the standpoint of the conduct of foreign
policy. However, I think it important that
each of us consider both sides of this
important question.
Mr. President, I ash that the text of
the article by the Honorable EDWARD M.
KENNEDY and the article by the Honor-
able BARRY M. GOLDWATER in the Febru-
ary 1979, issue of the American Bar
As- sociation Journal be printed in the
RECORD.
The articles are as follows :
NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA: GOOD LAW,
GOOD POLICY
(By EDWARD M. KENNEDY)
For almost three decades, until the end of
1978, American foreign policy was plagued
by an anomaly. Alone among the major na-
tions of the world, the United States had
failed to recognize officially a basic fact of
international life-that the People's Republic
of China effectively governs China's terri-
tory and one billion people. But last Decem-
ber 15 President Carter courageously decided
to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic as of January 1. 1979, and
to exchange ambassadors on March 1. He
thereby successfully concluded the normal-
ization process begun by President Nixon and
Chairman Mao ip the 1972 Shanghai com-
munique.
At the same time the president notified Pe-
king's rival, the Republic of China on'Tai-
wan, that the United States would terminate
diplomatic relations with it. The two com-
peting governments have long held that only
one of them can be recognized as the gov-
ernment of China and that Taiwan is a part
of China. The president also announced that
the United States would give notice on Janu-
ary 1-as it did-of its intention to termi-
nate one year hence the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty with the government of Taiwan under
Article 10 of the treaty.
The United States formerly declared, how-
ever, its continued interest in the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue and the con-
tinuation of commercial, cultural, and other
nongovernmental relationships with the peo-
ple of Taiwan. The Carter administration
also provided for Taiwan's future ability to
defend itself by making clear that its au-
thorities could continue to purchase selected
defensive weapons in the United States.
I welcome and support this decision. It was
right in its recognition of the reality of
China. It was responsible in its provision for
the continuing well-being of the people of
Taiwan. It was a well-timed stroke of grand
strategy, giving the United States maximum
benefit in our triangular relationship with
China and the Soviet Union, consolidating
the unprecedented process of accommoda-
tion among China, Japan, and the United
States, and ushering in a new era of co-
operation and friendship between the world's
most powerful and the world's most pop-
ulous nations.
In thus establishing a normal and endur-
ing relationship with China, the president
enhanced the prospects for peace and pros-
perity of Taiwan. By changing the form of
our relations with the island, the president
enhanced their substance and durability.
While Peking continues to maintain that
Taiwan "is entirely China's internal affair,"
it has not contradicted the statement that
the United States "continues to have an in-
terest in the peaceful resolution of the Tai-
wan issue and expects that the Taiwan is-
sue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese
themselves." In addition, although Premier
Hua Kuo-feng registered China's objection
to continuing American arms sales to Tai-
wah, he said that, despite these differing
views, "nevertheless the joint communique
was reached."
Chinese leaders have often stated their
preference for a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue, and one can understand why.
Peking is preoccupied with the Soviet mili-
tary threat, and it lacks the military means
successfully to invade Taiwan. It is clearly
interested in improving its relations with
the West, especially the United States and
Japan, in order to promote both parallel ac-
tion to balance Soviet power and cooperative
arrangements to modernize its agriculture,
industry, technology, and defense. Nothing
would more surely jeopardize this vital stra-
tegic endeavor than the use of force against
Taiwan.
Of course, circumstances may'change over
time, and it is noteworthy that the United
States managed to normalize relations with-
out undermining the legal basis for Amer-
ican action in behalf of Taiwan in the un-
likely event that should become necessary.
The recent joint communique did nothing
to clarify the United States' view of the legal
status of the island, which the Shanghai
communique left artfully obscure. In the
new communique the United States simply
"acknowledges the Chinese position that .. .
Taiwan is part of China."
This creative ambiguity in our legal posi-
tion leaves open what actions we might take
to assure the peaceful future of Taiwan, just
as that question was left open under the now
terminating 1954 defense treaty, which pro-
vides only the vague assurance that, in the
event of attack, the United States will "meet
the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes."
I believe that the combination of improved
Sino-American sties, continuing nongovern-
mental relations with Taiwan (including ac-
cess to defensive arms), and Washington's
statement of interest' in a peaceful settle-
ment of the island's future will give Taiwan
increased security and prosperity. To help
realize this prospect, I intend to join in
sponsoring legislation that will facilitate
nongovernmental contact with the island
and will sustain its well-being.
CAN THE EXECUTIVE TERMINATE THE TREATY ON
ITS OWN,?
Despite these measures to safeguard the
island, some critics have denounced President
Carter's normalization decision as a "stab
in the back" of Taiwan. Sen. Barry Gold-
water and others are now challenging, in the
courts as well as in Congress, the presiden-
tial notice terminating the defense treaty.
They incorrectly argue that the executive
lacks authority to terminate the treaty, ac-
cording to its own terms, without the ap-
proval of two thirds of the Senate or a
majority of each house of Congress.
I strongly oppose this challenge, which
threatens to sidetrack one of the most im-
portant foreign policy initiatives of recent
history into domestic constitutional con-
troversy. I am confident that this effort will
fail, for law, practice, and policy clearly sup-
port the president's notice of termination
in these circumstances. It is in no one's.in-
terest to throw our future relations with
Taiwan into legal limbo, instead of assuring
the continuity of our relations with the
people of that island.
The president might have avoided the con-
stitutional question by simply exercising his
unchallenged prerogative to recognize the
People's Republic as the government of China
and to establish diplomatic relations with it.
As demonstrated by the experience of other
nations that have switched recognition from
Taipei to Peking, this would halve led to the
lapse of the 1954 defense treaty and of the
other bilateral agreements between Washing-
ton and Taipei, which Peking has always re-
garded as invalid, with the Congress then
providing for continuing nongovernmental
relations with Taiwan. By reiterating its
previous declarations that the defense treaty
was a nullity, Peking could have left no
doubt that the treaty no longer had legal
effect, as a consequence of the position of
China's new government rather than
through a termination decision by Washing-
ton.
The president chose, however, to end the
defense treaty according to its one-year ter-,
minatiomprovision and to state that other
agreements with the Republic of China on
Taiwan endure until replaced by new ar-
rangements with the authorities on the
island. Whatever the merits of the latter
claim under international law and practice,
the president plainly has the independent
authority to terminate a treaty according
to its notice provision. .
Although the Constitution requires the
president to obtain the advice and consent
of the Senate prior to concluding a treaty, it
sets forth no such requirement for terminat-
ing a treaty. In approving the 1954 defense
treaty with the Republic of China, the Senate
might have required the president to ob-
tain the approval of the Senate or Congress
prior to termination, but it chose not to do
so. The treaty simply provides for termina-
tion with one year's notice. In the light of
20th century practice, this plainly confers
on the president the power to terminate the
treaty at his discretion. In his December 15,
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S 2344 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
1978, momorandum to Secretary of State
Vance, the State Department legal adviser,
Herbert J. Hansel, stated categorically that
"the president has the authority to decide
under the Constitution whether the United
States shall give the notice of termination
provided for in Article X of the U.S.-R.O.C.
Mutual Defense Treaty and to give that
notice without congressional or Senate
action."
Presidents have given notice of treaty ter-
mination independent of the Senate or Con-
gress on 14 separate occasions in our nation's
history, and ten of these instances have oc-
curred in the last 50 years:
1815 (Madison). Agreement on annulment
of 1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with
the Netherlands.
1899 (McKinley). Notice of termination of
certain articles of 1850 Convention of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Extradition with
Switzerland.
1920 (Wilson). Agreement on termination
of 1891 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and
Navigation with Belgium concerning the
Congo.
1927 (Coolidge). Notice of termination of
1925 treaty with Mexico on prevention of
smuggling.
1933 (Roosevelt). Notice of withdrawal
from 1921 multilateral Convention for the
Abolition of Imports and Export Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions.
1933 (Roosevelt). Declaration of termina-
tion (withdrawn subsequently) of 1931
Treaty of Extradition with Greece.
1936 (Roosevelt). Protocol of termination
(withdrawn subsequent) of 1871 Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation with Italy.
1939 (Roosevelt). Notice of denunciation
of 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
with Japan.
1944 (Roosevelt). Notice of termination of
1929 protocol to Inter-American Convention
for Trademark and Commercial Protection.
1948 (Truman). Notice of withdrawal from
1937 multilateral Convention for the Reg-
ulation of Whaling.
1954 (Eisenhower). Notice of withdrawal
from 1923 Convention on Uniformity of
Nomenclature for the Classification of Mer-
chandise.
1962 (Kennedy). Notice of termination of
1902 Convention on Commercial Relations
with Cuba.
1965 (Johnson). Notice of denunciation
(subsequently withdrawn) of 1929 Warsaw
Convention concerning international 'air
travel.
1975 (Ford). Notice of termination of par-
ticipation in the International Labor Orga-
nization.
Especially in the 19th century, presidents
occasionally terminated treaties at the di-
rection of or with the prior or subsequent
consent of the Senate or the Congress. But
this fact in no way negates the' president's
power to act independently. In modern prac-
tice this presidential exercise of independent
authority outnumbers the total of all other
methods utilized.
Since 1920 only President Hoover and Nixon
have not terminated treaties pursuant to a
notice provision. All other modern presi-
dents, from Wilson through Carter, have
exerted their valid constitutional authority
by terminating treaties without formal ad-
vice and consent. Their actions have been
accepted by the Congress and unchallenged
in the courts.
No American judicial decisions directly
address the question of the president's right,
pursuant to a notice provision, to terminate
a treaty without formal congressional ap-
proval. Some court cases assume independ-
ent presidential power to terminate. In
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), for
example, the Supreme Court pointed out
that it is for the president to determine
whether a treaty violation has occurred and,
if so, whether termination is warranted.
And in Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270
(1902), the Supreme Court held that on the
question of whether an American treaty with
Prussia survived the formation of the Ger-
man Empire, the actions of -the executive
branch and the German government were of
controlling importance.
Often the issue of treaty termination is
related intimately to the question of recogni-
tion of a foreign sovereign and establish-
ment of diplomatic relations, as indeed it is
in the case of China, and both questions
have been regarded as requiring political
judgments that are within the president's
authority.
An overwhelming number of contemporary
scholars of international and constitutional
law who have considered this question agree
that the president has the clear prerogative
to give notice of termination, pursuant to a
notice provision in a treaty, without the ap-
proval of the Senate or the Congress.' The
American Law Institute takes the same posi-
tion in Sections 155 and 163 of the Restate-
ment of the Law (Second), Foreign Relations
of the United States.
PRESIDENT CAN'T ENTANGLE ALONE, BUT HE
CAN DISENTANGLE
Sound historical and policy reasons sustain
this conclusion. The framers of the Consti-
tution feared "entangling alliances" and re-
quired the president to obtain the advice and
consent of two thirds of the Senate prior to
concluding a treaty. The framers manifested
no similar concern with the president's exer-
cise of discretion to disentangle the nation
from alliances, and the Constitution thus
imposed no requirement of Senate participa-
tion in treaty termination.
In the absence of specific constitutional,
treaty, or statutory language restraining the
president, it has been understood that he is
responsible for determining how to deal with
treaties once concluded. For example, in re-
ferring to the 1793 Neutrality Proclamation
by President Washington and its relation to
American treaties with France, Alexander
Hamilton wrote that "treaties can only be
made by the President and Senate jointly;
but their activity may be continued or sus-
pended by the president alone." Hamilton,
incidentally, made this statement with spe-
cific reference to a situation almost identical
to that involved in normalization with China.
He wrote, as quoted in Letters of Paciflcus
and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neu-
trality of 1793:
"The right of the executive to receive am-
bassadors and other public ministers, may
serve to illustrate the relative duties of the
executive and legislative departments. This
right includes that of judging, in the case of
a revolution of government in a foreign coun-
try, whether, the new rulers are competent
organs of the national will, and ought to be
recognized, or not; which, where a treaty an-
tecedently exists between the United States
and such nation, involves the power of con-
tinuing or suspending its operation. . . .
"This power of determining virtually upon
' See, e.g., Cohen, "Normalizing Relations
with the People's Republic of China," 64
A.B.A.J. 940 (1978) ; Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law 164 (1978); Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution 136 (1972);
Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Inter-
preted and Applied by the United States, Vol.
II, 1519-20 (2d rev. ed. 1945); McDougal and
Lans, "Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or Presidential Agreements," 54 YALE L.J. 181,
336 (1946) ; McClure, International Execu-
tive Agreements 16, 306 (1941) ; Willoughby,
The Constitutional Law of the United States,
Vol. I, 585 (2d ed. 1929); Reeves, "The Jones
Act and the Denunciation of Treaties," 15
A.J.I.L. 33, 34, 38 (1921) ; Letter from Lowen
feld to the New York Times, May 28, 1978.
March 8, 1979
the operation of national treaties, as a con-
sequence of the power to receive public minis-
ters, is an important instance of the right of
the executive to decide upon the obligations
of the country with regard to foreign na-
tions."
Despite the fact that the president's inde-
pendent power to terminate treaties is well-
established, supported decisively by modern
practice, and accepted by the Congress and
most scholars, Senator Goldwater now seeks
to challenge it. Because the president, espe-
cially in the nineteenth century, occasionally
terminated a treaty with prior or subsequent
Senate or congressional participation, he ar-
gues that the president must always obtain
legislative approval, except that, as he wroth
in China and the Abrogation of Treaties,
"history indicates the president may, if Con-
gress raised no objection, determine whether
or not a treaty (1) has been superseded by
a later law or treaty inconsistent with ol:
clearly intended to revise an earlier one, (2)
has already been abrogated because of its
violation by the other party, or (3) cannot be
carried out because conditions essential to
its continued effectiveness no longer exist
and the change is not the result of our own
action." He would dismiss the many instances
of independent presidential treaty termina-
tion as "exceptions" to the supposed general
rule requiring legislative approval.
Senator Goldwater's analysis is seriously
flawed. When carefully examined, the in-
stances of independent presidential termi-
nation do not fall into the three categories
of "exceptions" that he suggests. Rather,
they demonstrate that the president has been
free to terminate treaties in a variety of sit-
uations whose common denominator is that
in each case it was no longer wise for the
United States to adhere to the treaty in ques-
tion. Contrary to Senator Goldwater's asser-
tion, most instances of independent presi-
dential termination have occurred in cir-
cumstances in which there was no incon-
sistent law or treaty superseding the treaty
in question, there was no violation by the
other party, and there was no impossibility
of performing treaty obligations.
? For example, Senator Goldwater claims
that President Coolidge independently ter-
minated our 1925 treaty with Mexico on the
prevention of smuggling because it was "im-
possible to implement the convention." Yet
there is no factual basis for this contention.
The record reveals that the secretary of
state thought it inadvisable to retain the
treaty so long as Mexico failed to conclude
an arrangement safeguarding American
commerce against discrimination. (U.S. Ar-
chives, 74 D 481, Box 16678.)
Similarly, Senator Goldwater seeks to por-
tray President Roosevelt's 1939 termination
of the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan as
being compelled by our obligations under
the 1922 Nine-Power Agreement. But nothing-
In the later agreement required the United
States to terminate the purely commercial
treaty.
The only evidence offered to support Sena-
tor Goldwater's view is a statement by Sena-'
for Schwellenback that actually shows
that he did not believe it necessary to ter-
minate the 1911 treaty, (84 Cong. Rec.
10785.) The treaty was terminated, as the
notice stated, because it "contains provi-
sions which need new consideration .
with a view to better safeguarding and
promoting American interests as new de-
velopments may require."
In fact, not only is Senator Goldwater's
interpretation flawed by its misconstruction
of the precedents, but it also is flawed
logically as well. What is the source of the
president's power to make "exceptions" un-
less it derives from his authority to termi-
nate a treaty without legislative approval?
Why cannot the president make other "ex-
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March 8, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 234 5
ceptions"? Since the 14 cases of independent tional interest, in the interest of Chinese on presidential termination of any treaty to
presidential termination that auppessdly both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and in the which the United States may now be a party
constitute "exceptional' outnumber the total interest of peace in Asia and the world. We or become a party ia' the future-for -in-
of all other methods utilized is modern should not allow an argument that is based stance, with Israel. This unchecked concen-
practice, they are strange "exceptions" in- on a supc deed. frthe law to om s
the pesiden
The treaty porter is not the only one in ship. The Congress and the American people ment.
which the Constitution requires the ap- should focus their efforts on co-operating However one may feel about the wisdom of
proval of the Senate before the president with the executive branch to develop the independent presidential termination of the
takes certain action but does not require measures required to consolidate our new defense treaty as a step required to complete
similar approval when he undoes that ac- and encouraging relations with both the full normalization of relations with Peking.
tion. The Senate's consent is necessary for People's Republic and Taiwan. we each should remember the admonition
the appointment of cabinet officers but not of Chief Justice John Marshall: "The pecu-
for their removal. (272 U.S. 52; 295 U.S. TREATY TERMINATION IS A SHARED POWER liar circumstances of the moment may render
602.) "The conduct of foreign relations, like (By BARRY M. GOLDWATER) a measure more or less wise, but cannot ren-
the duty to see that the laws are faithfully der it more or less constitutional." In filing
executed, is a plenary executive power," On December 15, 1978, while the Congress suit, it was my purpose to defend the legis-Prof. Randall Nelson wrote in 42 Minnesota wps out of session, President Carter an- nounced that the United States would rec- lative function conferred by the Conatitu-
or wrong-
Law Review 879 (1958). "In the absence of ognize the People's Republic of China as the n eon, of not his o policies, contest the which can b be e ghtndeebated in
express limitations upon the power to re- other ated in
move and the power to terminate, there is a 1ol1979legal government of China as et also so othforums
t.is silent as to how a
strong presumption that no such limitation In 1, 1979. . At known, same time the president The Constitution i
g , through informal briefings for treaty shall be terminated. It 1s also silent
was intended." the media his unilateral decision to termi- on how a statute or any other law shall be
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE HAS REPUDIATED nate the defense treaty with the Republic of cancelled. Yet no one makes the argument
EARLI I VIEWS China, claiming authority to act under Ar- that the president alone can repeal a statute.
In seeking to bolster his position, Senator ticle X of that treaty, which states "either In fact, in The Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall.
Goldwater relies on quotations from Thomas party," not "either president," may cancel 92 (1874), the Supreme Court expressly said
Jefferson and James TTadison-uttered be- it after giving one year's notice. Without that "no power was ever vested in the presi-
fore the nation had any experience with public announcement, the actual notice of dent to repeal an act of Congress."
treaty termination-to the effect that legis- termination of the defense treaty was sent It is my belief that by placing treaties
lative consent is legally required. Yet in the by diplomatic note to the Republic of China among "the supreme Law of the Land" in
same discussion Jefferson ? conceded that on December 23, 1978, to be effective on and Article VI, clause 2, and by requiring in
there were disagreements about the treaty as of January 1, 1979. Article II, Section 3, that the president "shall
power, and in 1815 Madison became the first The president's decisions were shrouded in take care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
president to terminate a treaty without legis- secrecy and contrary to the purpose of Sec- cuted," the framers meant, and expected
lative consent. Subsequent presidential prac- tion 26 of the International Security Assist- without saying more, that the president
tice has plainly repudiated the early view of ance Act of 1978, a law enacted by Congress would carry out a treatty in good faith. This
Jefferson and Madison and confirmed that just three months preceeding his announce- is exactly the opposite of giving him an im-
of Hamilton and later Madison. ment, which specifically called for prior con- plied authority to cancel any treaty at will.
Nor is there substance to Senator Gold- sultation with the legislative branch. It is also well known that the framers were
water's general argument that, apart from On December 22 I filed suit in the United concerned with restoring dependability to
the many "exceptions," when the president States District Court for the District of treaties made by the United States. They
terminates a treaty without legislative con- Columbia, with 15 of my colleagues from both were anxious to gain the respect and conS-
sent, he violates his constitutional duty to houses of Congress, challenging the validity dente of foreign nations by keeping our
"take care that the laws be faithfully exe- of the president's attempted termination of treaty commitments.
cuted," because the Constitution makes a the treaty without any supporting legisla- For example, in the preface to his notes on
treaty "the supreme law of the land." tive authority. We asked the court to declare debates in the Constitutional Convention,
This misses the point of the very case at the president's action unconstitutional and James Madison singles out the lack of obedi-
issub. Article 10 of the treaty in question illegal and to set aside his purported notice ence to treaties as one of the conditions the
provides for its termination. In giving notice to cancel the Treaty as having no effect. federal Constitution was intended to correct.
of an intent to terminate the treaty pursu- It is the premise of our case that in acting Our unfaithfulness to treaties, Madison
ant to that provision, the president was not alone to interpret the defense treaty and to wrote, is among "the defects, the deformities,
violating the treaty but acting according to make a self-serving interpretation of the the diseases and the ominous prospects for
its own terms-terms that were approved by constitutional allotment of powers among which the Convention were to provide a rem-
the Senate when it consented to the treaty. the executive and legislative departments, edy, and which ought never to be overlooked
As Charles C. Hyde, former legal adviser to President Carter has not only usurped pow- in expounding & appreciating the Constitu-
the Department of State, put it in his lead- ers conferred on the Congress, but has at- tional Charter the remedy that was pro-
ing treatise: "The president is not be- tempted to exercise a function the Supreme vided."
lieved ... to lack authority to denounce, Court has said is clearly reserved to the In a similar vein, James Wilson, who signed
in pursuance of its terms, a treaty to which judicial branch, the power "to say what the the Constitution and sat on the first Supreme
the United States is a party, without legis- law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. Court, lectured his law students that a coun-
lative approval. In taking such action, he is 683 (1974.) try "which violates the sacred faith of trea-
ties, violates not only the voluntary, but also
merely exercising in behalf of the nation a The question is not whether any past the natural and necessary law of nations...."
privilege already conferred upon it by the precedents justify the president's assertion He added: "As the United States have sur-
agreement." of independent power, although I believe the passed others, even other commonwealths, in
This suggests the proper course for Sena- weight of historical evidence proves that the excellence of their constitution and gov-
tors who are troubled by the president's in- treaties are normally terminated only with ernment; it is reasonably to be hoped, that
dependent authority to terminate a particu- legislative approval. The true question is they will surpass them, likewise in the Sta-
lar treaty or category of treaties. At the time whether his action represents the original bility of their laws, and in their fidelity to
that each treaty is made and submitted for intent of the people who drafted the Consti- their engagements."
their advice and consent, they could seek to tution. Would the framers, who regarded violation
condition Senate approval on acceptance of This is a legal and historical question, and of "the sacred faith of treaties" as "wicked."
the Senate's participation in its termination. the hard fact is that nothing in the records "dishonorable," and contrary to the best
The Senate might have done so when it con of the federal convention or in the explana- interests of the country in acquiring respect
rented to the 1954 defense treaty with the e tions at the state conventions on ratifying in the community of nations, have contra-
Republic of China, but it did not. Any at- the Constitution confirm in any way the dicted these purposes by making it as easy
tempt, at this point, to invalidate the presis president's sweeping claim of unchecked under the new Constitution for a single ofri-
n notice of intention to terminate d power. To the contrary, contemporary mate- cer of the government to repeal a treaty as it
not t only unwise as a matter of enlightened rials and the -text of the Constitution show had been for individual states to nullify a
China policy but also without legal founds- that the termination of a treaty, involving treaty under the Articles of Confederation?
tion. Prof. Louts Henkin, one of our leading as it does the sacred honor of the country We should also remember the concern of
constitutional authorities, has written: "At- and serious policy interests, is a decision of the framers with sectional economic inter-
tempts by the Senate to withdraw, modify, or such major importance that the framers re- ests. Many of them hoped for advantageous
interpret its consent after a treaty is ratified quired the joint participation of both po- commercial treaties that would open up
have no legal weight; nor has the Senate any litical departments, the executive and legis- trade for their sections with other nations.
authoritative voice in interpreting a treaty lative, in making that decision. The framers also had extensive discussions
or in terminating it." If left unchallenged, the president's uni- about treaties of peace as being included
GOOD LAW, GOOD POLICY, AND IN OUR AND lateral action will set a dangerous precedent within the treaty clause, in recognition of
CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS that would enable him or a future president the fact that those treaties would be the
Normalization of relations with China is to terminate any defense treaty at will. In normal method of terminating a war. With-
good law and good policy. It is in our na- fact, the precedent could be used for the out any supporting textual evidence to show
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S 2346
CONGRIESSJONAIL RIECORD - SIEISTATIE March 8, 1979
it, it is inconceivable that the framers as-
signed to one person power to denounce a
commercial treaty that would be highly ben-
eficial to the interests of a particular geo-
graphic region or a peace treaty that had
formally concluded a war and whose faithful
adherence would presumably advert the
chance of resumption of hostilities, however
slight that chance may be. As the language
of the Constitution does -not distinguish
commercial and peace treaties from other
treaties, such as a security pact, it is obvious
that all treaties share the same protective
armor.
JOINT PARTICIPATION NEEDED FOR ANY
"GENUINELY CRITICAL DECISION"
In his landmark work on the subject in
5 Seton Hall Law Review 527 (1974), Prof.
Arthur Bestor persuasively shows that the
doctrine of separation of powers is "pre-
scribed as explicitly for the conduct of for-
eign relations as for the handling of do-
mestic matters" and explains: "The purpose
and effect of any such arrangement is to re-
quire the joint participation-the co-op-
eration and concurrence-of the several
branches in the making and carrying out of
any genuinely critical decision."
Justice Joseph Stork one of the foremost
scholars to sit on the Supreme Court, con-
firms his statement. In his Commentaries on
the Constitution, Story writes, in connec-
tion with the decision of the framers to
allot the treaty authority jointly in the
president and the Senate, "his joint pos-
session of the power affords a greater security
for its just exercise, than the separate pos-
session of it by either" and that it "is too
much to expect, that a free people would
confide to a single magistrate, however re-
spectable, the sole authority to act conclu-
sively, as well as exclusively upon treaties."
Story adds, in words having equal rele-
vance to making or unmaking a treaty: "The
check, which acts upon the mind from the
consideration, that what is done is but pre-
liminary, and? requires the assent or other in-
dependent minds. to give it a legal conclu-
siveness, is a restraint which awakens cau-
tion, and compels to deliberation."
This is what the framers had in mind in
establishing a system of checks and balances.
They sought to protect the security of the
people by making the president and the Sen-
ate checks on each other in the exercise of
the full treaty power. By providing for the
added deliberation and attention to the sub-
ject that woud be required by vesting the
full treaty power jointly with the president
and at least one branch of the legislature,
the security of the people would be far bet-
ter protected than it would be if the power
were conferred on a single officer. The se-
curity that follows caution and added delib-
eration woud be lost if no check had been
put on the unmaking of a treaty.
Why the framers woud want to offer the
people security in the making of treaties, but
not in their termination, is unexplained by
those who argue this difference exists. I be-
lieve there is no difference and that the
checks and balances called for in the separa-
tion of powers is equally as applicable to the
critical decision of casting aside our for-
mal treaties with other nations as it is in
making those treaties originally.
The early authorities, including some
among the Founding Fathers, saw the repeal
of a treaty in,the same light as they saw
the repeal of a statute. It would have been
strange to hear anyone argue that the presi-
dent, by his sole authority, could terminate
whatever treaty he wished, whenever be
wished. James Madison, for one, believed that
"the same authority, precisely," would be
exercised in annulling as in making a
treaty." Thomas Jefferson, when he was
Washington,s first secretary of state, wrote
a report in which he reasoned that the same
authority who possessed the power of making
treaties consequently had the power of de-
claring them dissolved. And, when he was
vice president, Jefferson compiled the first
manual of rules of the Senate, in which he
wrote: "Treaties being declared equally with
the laws of the United States, to be the
supreme law of the land, it is understood
that an act of the legislature alone can de-
clare them infringed and rescinded."
Further evidence that the frames linked
the repeal of treaties to the repeal of stat-
utes appears in John Jay's brief analogy In
The Federalist, Number 64: "They who make
laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them, and it will not be disputed the they
who make treaties may alter or cancel
them ..."
Justice Iredell, who served on the first
Supreme Court, shared the views of Madison
and Jefferson as to the legislative role in
terminating treaties. In an opinion accom-
panying Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (1796),
he twice stated his belief that Congress alone
has "authority under our government" of
declaring a treaty terminated, even in cir-
cumstances where the other country has
first violated it.
Another authority who believed the legis-
lature must act before a treaty is terminated
is James Buchanan. In writing about the
anticipated cancellation of a commercial
treaty with Denmark considered damaging to
our exports, then Secretary of State Bu-
chanan wrote that "an act must first pass
Congress to enable the president to give the
required notice.. ." His official concession
of the joint possession of power is especially
noteworthy since that treaty contained a
provision similar to the one in the R.O.C. de-
fense treaty so heavily relied on by President
Carter.
Each treaty authorizes termination after
notice being given to the other party. How-
ever, Secretary Buchanan obviously believed
the sovereign authority who could make the
decision to give notice was not the president
alone, but the president, together with the
authority of a law enacted by Congress.
When the United States finally cancelled
the treaty with Denmark, it was accom-
plished by a Senate resolution of March 3,
1855, passed unanimously, which advised
and consented to authorizing President
Pierce to give notice of its termination. The
president had requested the authority, there-
by giving some indication of his belief that
the decision-making authority was jointly
possessed by him and the legislature, or at
least one branch of it, and was not vested in
him alone.
The incident led to an authoritative report
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 1856. In response to public discussion
over Whether the Senate had acted properly
in authorizing presidential action without
the concurrence of the House of Represent-
atives, the committee concluded that the
Senate and president jointly possessed com-
petence to terminate a treaty "without the
aid or intervention of legislation" by the
other house. Speaking precisely to the same
issue presented by Article X of the R.O.C.
defense treaty, the committee decided that
"where the right to terminate a treaty at
discretion is reserved in the treaty itself,
such discretion resides in President and
Senate."
The committee explained: "The whole
power to bind the government by treaty is
vested in the president and Senate, two
thirds of the senators present concurring.
The treaty in question was created by the
will of the treaty making power, and it con-
tained a reservation by which that will
should be revoked or its exercise cease on a
stipulated notice. It is thus the will of the
treaty-making power which is the subject of
revocation, and it follows, that, the revoca-
tion is incident to the will." Thus, the com-
mittee clearly took a position at odds with
the novel theory asserted by President Car-
ter today.
LODGE THOUGHT CONGRESS COULD DISAPPROVE
TAFT'S NOTICE
Henry Cabot Lodge, when, he was chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 1911, also believed the power of treaty ter-
mination was jointly posssessed by the presi-
dent and legislature. In response to a ques-
tion in the Senate whether notice, given
Russia by President Taft to terminate a com-
mercial treaty because of Soviet violations,
would be legal in the absence of congres-
sional ratification, he replied, "Of course,
Congress can disapprove his action; and then,
I take it, the notice fails.... " Senator Lodge
added his opinion that the power to ter-
minate that treaty by notice, as authorized
in an article thereof,; was vested in the
Senate and president together "because in
making such a treaty the Senate and thee
president represent the high contacting
party."
Lodge was then acting as floor manager of
legislation that did ratify the president's
action, and his statements clearly express his
interpretation of the term "contracting
party," used in a treaty provision, as mean-
ing the Senate and president jointly.
In 1917 Prof. Edward Corwin, recognized
as one of the leading authorities on the Con-
stitution in this or any other century and
generally a 'defender of broad presidential
power, wrote: "[Al11 in all, it appears that
legislative precedent, which moreover is gen-
erally supported by the attitude of the execu-
tive, sanctions the proposition that the power
of terminating the international compacts to
which the United States is party belongs, as a
prerogative of sovereignty, to Congress alone."
Another official admission of the necessity
for legislative concurrence in the decision to
provide notice in circumstances in which a
treaty itself authorizes the giving of notice
comes from an attorney general's opinion. In
1941 Francis Biddle, then acting attorney
general, was asked to advise President Roose-
velt whether, in view of the dislocation of
ocean-borne commerce because of war, the
International Loan Line Convention, which
governed ocean tanker tonnage loads, had
ceased to be binding. Biddle concluded the
convention was inoperative because of the
"well-established principle of international
law, rebus sic stantibus, that a treaty ceases
to be binding when the basic conditions
upon which it was founded have essentially
changed."
But he sharply qualified his opinion. While
the president could decide whether the treaty
was inoperative or suspended under this prin-
ciple of international law, the president
alone could not terminate the treaty if he
acted under a treaty provision allowing with-
drawal by giving due notice. Biddle wrote:
"It is not proposed that the United States
denounce the convention under Article 25
(47 Stat. 225), nor that it be otherwise`
abrogated. Consequently, action by the Sen-
ate or by the Congress is not required."
Article 25 of that convention provided that
it may be denounced by any "contracting,
government" by notification to the other
parties and that the withdrawal should take
effect 12 months after the date of notifica-
tion is received. The article is similar to Ar-
ticle X of the R.O.C. defense treaty, which
likewise allows denunciation by the United
States after one year's notice. Thus, it is clear
that Biddle believed legislative concurrence
was needed in order to authorize presidential
action pursuant to the terms of a treaty in
circumstances identical to those asserted by
President Carter as grounds for unilateral
action. President Carter's decision to notify
the Republic of China on his sole authority
is directly in conflict with a 20th century
opinion of the country's highest law enforce-
ment officer.
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History confirms the denial of an inde- did. That paper, actually a legal argument, By admitting that the defense treaty "is
pendent treaty termination power of the contains highly selective quotations from au- technically still in effect" in 1979, until the
president, although there are minor excep- thorities (none cited in this article appears notice period expires, the administration re-
tions explainable under principles of ordi- in the memo) and sets forth a dubious list jects any notion that the treaty lapsed upon
nary contract law. In fact. the first treaty of alleged precedents for unilateral presi- derecognition of the R.O.C. By this and by
terminations were done by act of Congress dential action. Although the legal adviser asking Congress for legislation to permit the
in 1798. These were the three treaties of alli- lists 12 precedents for independent treaty other "current agreements and treaties in
ance with France, which were cancelled by termination, he admits on the face of the effect with the government on Taiwan to re-
Congress after repeated French attacks on brief that two were never terminated (notice main in force," the administration admits
American shipping. was withdrawn) and two more were in- that the authorities on Taiwan are a de facto
The second instance of termination by the stances in which the other nations first de- government in control of the territory of
United States was in 1846, 57 years after the nounoed the treaties, which seriously weak- Taiwan and that we can have dealings with
Constitution was approved. President Polk ens the relevance of the precedents. them. I
asked Congress for authority to pull out of a The State Department reaches so far to The only remaining question is whether,
treaty with Britain yielding joint rights to find an early precedent that it wrongly at- although the president normally cannot ter-
the Oregon Territory. A joint resolution was tributes the first example of presidential minate a treaty without further legislative
enacted giving him authority to provide treaty termination to President Madison. action, the Senate has consented to his action
notice of withdrawal, as was authorized in This seeming rock of the State Department in the case of this treaty by having approved
the treaty. This is the first known instance list is created from a passage in a letter from language in it that allows termination by
of termination by notice and is impressive Secretary of State Monroe in response to the notice. The answer is clear that no authority
historical evidence of what procedure is re- claim by the Netherlands in 1815 that an of this type can be inferred from the treaty
quired to carry out a treaty provision Simi- earlier commercial treaty had expired. or legislative history.
lar to Article X of the R.O.C. defense treaty. State claims Monroe's answer appears to First, it should be noted that the provision
In all, I have identified 48 instances in accept the interpretation given the treaty does not authorize termination after notice
which treaties have been terminated or sus- by the Netherlands. Once Monroe was presi- by "the president" or "executive" of either
pended by the United States-40 with the dent, however, he repudiated that meaning country. The treaty uses the term "party."
clear authorization or ratification of an act of his letter. Monroe's secretary of state, This obviously means the sovereign authority
of'Congress, joint resolution, or Senate reso- John Quincy Adams, insisted that the earlier of the state giving notice. In determining
the
lution. Four a
sovereign late r statute or treatyein conflict wt h the sity treaty Miller, 14 N C 1888 (1831), the Supreme necessary to consult the constitutional proc-
earlier find what power.
as makes theedecision state t d give o notice and,, after
in The United States has been Monroe 's position and enforced the President
termin termination treaty.
that decision has been made, what power
joint action by the president and Senate or law.
Congress. The State Department also omits mention- shall actually transmit the notice. Under
Only four treaties have been cancelled by ing in its memo that the early commercial our Constitution, it is clear that whoever
the president entirely independent of any treaty had been concluded with a different communicates notice, the power of making
supporting legislative authority. The presi- state. During the Napoleonic wars the United the initial decision belongs jointly to the
dent may not have acted constitutionally Netherlands, with whom we had signed the president and Senate or Congress.
even in these isolated cases, which are ab- treaty in 1782, was absorbed into the French - Although it is generally accepted that the
normal. In fact, Congress may not have been empire, entirely disappearing as a separate president is "the sole organ of the nation in
informed, and thus no challenge was made nation. After the war it was reformed and its external relations, and Its sole representa-
at the time. But if there is any difference in joined-with other areas. tive with foreign nations" (29 U.S. 304, 319-
the two groups of cancelled treaties, a logi- Samuel B. Crandall writes the state thus 20), this proves no more than that it is the
cal explanation may be found in, contract erected from the ashes of war "differed- in president who shall act as the official repre-
law. name, territory,. and form of government sentative of the nation in communicating
For in each of the situations of independ- from the state which had entered into the with the foreign government. His capacity as
ent presidential action, the other party had treaty... .. In other words, if the treaty was a diplomatic organ in no way need imply a
first violated the treaty, it was impossible to annulled, it was because of the disappearance power of making-the critical policy decision
perform the treaty, or there was a funda- of one of the parties and not because of any required before delivery of the notice.
mental change of conditions essential to the - broad power held by the president. This is There is absolutely nothing in the legis-
operation bf the treaty and originally as- the stuff of which the State Department lative reports and proceedings concerning the
sumed as the basis for it. In none of these memo is made. 1954 treaty that indicates the president can
incidents was the reason for terminating or Of the few alleged precedents that have act alone in giving notice. In fact, the lan-
withdrawing from a treaty the result of a any plausible basis (three or four at most), guage of the defense treaty differs in a Big-
breach or other action on our part incon- all can be explained by invoking the prin- nificant way from the text of the related
sistent with the purposes of the treaty con- ' ciples of contract law discussed above. None Formosa Resolution, which did specifically
cerned. of these, exceptions has any application to authorize the president to cancel it. Thus,
the R.O.C. defense treaty. the record bears strong evidence the. Senate
In these circumstances, the incidents fall Even as to this handful of precedents, there did not mean for the president to act alone
within the rules of early qontract
. an law is no ground for asserting independent Presi-
which a party is released, from a agree- - in denouncing the treaty, since similar lan-
ment. All the first writers on the law of na- dential power. There is no court decision up- guage was not used in the treaty.
tions, such as Grotius and Battel, whose ' holding their legality, and the last precedent The Formosa Resolution and the defense
works were consulted by the Founding Fath- is no better than the first. As the Supreme treaty both came before the Senate at the
ers, agreed that there is no difference in the Court said in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. same time. The treaty was first considered in
rules of law applied to public treaties or 486 (1969) : "That an unconstitutional action Committee concurrently with the resolution
private contracts. has been taken before surely does not render, in January, 1955. The resolution was reported
The framers may well have silently as- that same action any less unconstitutional at to the Senate on January 26 and signed into
a later date." law on January 29. The treaty was reported
ded the president could determine a treaty other It has been suggested that since the presi- on February 8 and approved by the Senate ded
en if
be violated by cunt it should a the othhe dent alone has the power to remove executive on February 9.
coountry, if performance e became e impossible,
or if there was a fundamental change of con- officers appointed by and with the advice and IF THE TREATY MEANT "PRESIDENT," WHY DID IT
ditions not'of our own making. In their own consent of the Senate, he, also has power to SAY "PARTY"?
experience, it was an implied condition of remove treaties. The two cases aree completely . The Senate had each measure before it for
dissimilar. The ability to remove officers
it is
ttin
thi
o
g,
s se
n. In
a contract or treaty that the obligations of
clearly under his direction aids in the efff- immediate comparis
the parties ended or were suspended on the cient performance of the president's duties. striking that the Formosa Resolution, by its
happening of one of these events. Without The removal of treaties violates the presi- own language,- expires "when the president
conceding the legality of occasions these the dent's constitutional duty to see "that the shall determine that the peace.and security
interna-
ciples president had acted unilaterally, these nde- laws be faithfully executed." It is obvious of the area is reasonably assured by interna-
pends t presidential law may explain inal al that the president's relation with subordinate tional conditions created by action of the
pendent of action in exceptional cannot be equated to his relation with United Nations or otherwise, and shall so re-
regarding which the e'R.O.C. de- the sovereign authorities of other nations. The port to the Congress." The treaty, on the
president's action ac,ctioonn none
residea courts, also have' sharply restricted the re- other hand, provides for termination on one
tense treaty. moval power to purely executive officers, year's notice by "either party."
STATE DEPARTMENT'S MEMORANDUM BACKS holding the president cannot removal officers Why, if the treaty meant to authorize "the
CARTER'S ACTION who exercise quasi-legislative or judicial president" of either party to terminate it by
The State Department has released a mem-' functions in Humphrey's Executor, 295. U.S. giving notice, did, it not say. so? The Senate
orandum by Herbert Hansell, its legal ad- 602 (1935). As the treaty power has long been had before it language of the. specific kind
wiser, dated December 15, the same day as. found to partake more of the legislative than in the Formosa Resolution, which it could
President Carter's public announcement, executive 'character, the analogy with the re- have substituted for Article X, 'if' it meant
claiming 'the president could do what he moval power does not hold up. - to approve independent presidential action.
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100050010-1
S 2348 CONGRESSIONAL RIECORD - SIENATIE March 8, 1979
When it advised and consented to a treaty A bill (S. 233) to amend the international been enact
d: + .
e
It by the executive branch or in its own In 1974, the Senate, without a dissent-
hearings, report, . or floor debate, indicating The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there ing vote, adopted Senate Resolution 347
that the term meant something other than objection to the present consideration. authorizing the Senate.. Commerce Com-
what it said ("party"), this is surely conclu- of the bill? mittee to undertake a comprehensive
sive that it did not understand "party" to There being no objection, the Senate study of the tourism industry and to rec-
mean "president." proceeded to consider the bill which had ommend legislation to establish a na-
In 1856 the Senate Foreign Relations Com- been reported from the Committee on tional tourism policy. That mandate was
mittee had unequivocally found that lan-
guage similar to Article x referred to "the Commerce, Science, and Transportation carried out. Last year, the Commerce
will of the treaty-making power," which it with an amendment on page 2, beginning Committee Published the National Tour-
defined as "the president and Senate." The with line 8, strike through and including ism Policy Study.
Senate, together with the president and of- line 14, and insert in lieu thereof the Mr. President, that study found that
ten with the House of Representatives, had following: three USTS travel service programs dur-
participated in the termination of nearly 40 "SLc. 9. The Secretary shall reduce the ing the period of fiscal 1974-77 for tour
treaties by 1955, virtually all of which con- number of employees of the United States development, incentive travel, and con-'T.
tained duration provisions similar to Arti- Travel Service in the offices of such Service ventions had a cost-benefit ratio of $18.60
cle X of the R.O.C. defense treaty. From this, in the District of Columbia. in order that tha
-,, -----5 v aauuuc4 W
the Senate when the treaty was ratified, it
was that the term "party" meant the presi-
dent and Senate jointly.
But. the State Department would not only
attribute a meaning to the R.O.C. defense
treaty of which It never informed the Sen-
ate. It would put the same,meaning on doz-
ens of other major treaties that contain sim-
ilar provisions. For example, the North At-
lantic Treaty Alliance and our security pacts
with South Korea, Japan, and the Philip-
pines include articles allowing either "party"
to withdraw after one year's notice. The Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biolog-
ical Weapons Convention, the Universal
Copyright Convention, and the Outer Space
Treaty, among others, each provide by their
own terms for termination after one year's
or less notice to the other parties. The con-
sequences of accepting the State Depart-
ment's interpretation of these provisions is
far reaching indeed.
No matter that the Senate was not clearly
informed of what the language meant when
It gave its advice and consent to ratifying
these agreements. No matter that the execu-
tive may have had a different understanding
than the Senate and kept silent about it.
When it suddenly suits the needs of ex-
pediency for its policy of the moment, the
State Department unveils a doctrine it has
.hidden from public discussion. After having
exploited the use of executive agreements to
the point where the president can make vir-
tually any treaty he wants by calling it a
mere executive agreement, now the State
Department is ready to usurp the power of
unmaking treaties as well.
Events in the year ahead may well deter-
mine whether the executive succeeds or fails
in this historic power grab.p
ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL MON-
DAY, MARCH 12, 1979
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate completes its business today it
stand in recess until the hour of 12 o'clock
noon on Monday.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
AUTHORIZATIONS
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of Calendar
Order No. 15, S. 233.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title. .
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
ceed 40 per centum of the total number of every USTS budget dollar expended.
such employees as of December 31, 1978.". That would seem to me to represent
So as to make the bill read: a very fine investment, particularly at
Be it enacted by the Senate and House a time, that the deficit in the United
of Representatives of,the United States of States balance of payments has reached
America in Congress Assembled, That the an all-time high.
first sentence of section 6 of the Interna- In spite of this, the administration, by
tional Travel Act of 1961, as amended (22 recommending that the USTS not be
U.S.C. 2126) is amended by striking out "and" funded for the coming fiscal year, has
immediately after "1978;", and inserting im- proposed to eliminate an agency which
m
the ediately before the period at the end there- has had a strong fiscal positive impact toward
of the following: "; and (8) $8,000,000 for reducing that balance-of-payments
year ending September 30, 1980". deficit.
SEe. 2. The International Travel Act of
1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2121 et seq.) As a result of the National Tourism
is further amended by adding at the end Policy Study by an earlier Congress, the
thereof the following new section: Commerce Committee has held hearings
"SEc. 9. The Secretary shall reduce the and soon will come forth with legislation
number of Service pnthe offices of
the of nits setai s to implement a national tourism policy.
T the District of Columbia, in order vice In the meantime, I believe that the U.S.
the total number of such employees as of Travel Service, for the reasons I have
September 1, 1979, and thereafter, does not already mentioned, should be continued
exceed 40 per centum of the total number at a reduced level until such time as Con-
of such employees as of December 31, 1978.". gress acts On implementing a national
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, tourism policy.
I yield to the distinguished Senator from Therefore, Mr: President, I support
Virginia. Passage of S. 233.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the distin- Mr. President, i ask unanimous con-
sent that Senator Pressler may have the
guished Senator from West Virginia. remainder of my time.
Mr. President, I rise in support of S. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
233.
The chairman, Senator CANNON, and Mr- PRESSLER. Mr. objection, it Is so ordered.
the chairman of the subcommittee, Sena thank the e Senator r from Virgini prima. Il
ator INOUYE, and myself have cospon-
sored this bill. I wish to express my support for S.
It is for the purpose of continuing the 233 and to commend Senators CANNON,
INOUYE, Travel Service for a year at a greatly and WARNER for their leadership
reduced level. in this his area.
Mr. President, I rise to support S. 233 I join as a cosponsor In that effort.
introduced by the senior Senator from I commend them for their recognition of the Hawaii, Mr. INOUYE, which I cospon- try in our importance Nation. . Their work in tpthis
sored, to continue funding of_ the U.S. area try
by the people this
Travel Service for 1 year at a greatly of South greatly Dakota , and appreciated pf.
reduced level. Included in this reduction In South Dakota, tourism is our sec-
ts a 60-percent cut in the staff of the and largest industry. This is largely
USTS Washington office. family tourism, and much of it Is in the
International travel and tourism- Black Hills. It is very important for
persons coming to the United States Congress to take a careful look at this
from other countries-are of tremen- wholesome industry, and the importance
dous benefit to our Nation's economy. It of retaining the U.S. Travel Service
is for this reason that, in 1961, the Con- offices, both here and abroad.
gress approved the International Travel I was very concerned to hear that the
Act, authorizing the Secretary of Com- administration wanted to eliminate the
merce to encourage such travel and tour- USTS budget for 1980. Eighty-six per-
ism In the United States through the cent of our foreign visitors come from
U.S. Travel Service. ? the six 'countries where we maintain
Since enactment of that legislation, USTS offices: Canada; Mexico, the
the Congress has kept a close watch on United Kingdom, France,'West Germany,
the tourism industry. Extensive hearings and japan. Five percent of our inter-
have been held on the subject and, from national. tourism is from nine countries
time to time, additional legislation has where USTS conducts travel promotion
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