NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 9 AUGUST 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010133-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 133
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
Top Secret
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
CPAS NID82-
August 1982
Copy 4 0 2
 Philippines: Mrs. Marcos Named to Executive Committee . . 6
Special Analysis
USSR: Impact of Another Poor Grain Harvest . . . . . . . 7
 Israeli forces in Beirut have made no further attempt to en-
croach on PLO-held areas of the city but are maintaining pressure
on the Palestinians through intermittent artillery and tank barrages.
Prime Minister
Begin is showing more flexibility toward the question of a PLO
withdrawal from Beirut. Defense Minister Sharon is adhering to a
Yesterday Israeli troops at a Lebanese Army instal-
lation at Juniyah, 15 kilometers northeast of Beirut,
briefly blocked the exit of members of the US liaison
team that had arrived by helicopter en route to Beirut
to begin preparations for the multinational force. The
US personnel were permitted to leave after the Israeli
colonel in charge received information about the team's
Comment: The Israeli actions may, in part, reflect
newly aroused suspicions that France, which has been
publicly supportive of the Palestinians, is preparing to
land a special force in Lebanon to rescue Yasir Arafat
 Begin said in a speech yesterday that he would allow
up to 2,500 Palestinians to remain in West Beirut until
the arrival of a multinational force. He also said there
is a "basis to the assumption" that the Palestinians
would leave soon, eliminate ty for Israel 25X1
to press on in West Beirut.
Defense Minister Sharon met yesterday with Ambassa-
dor Habib in Beirut to discuss further the PLO's position
on withdrawal. According to press reports, Sharon said
after the meeting that no agreement on the Palestinians'
withdrawal was yet possible because no Arab state had
agreed to receive them. He also reiterated Israeli con-
Defense Ministry sources are responsible for reports
in Israeli media repeating accusations that the PLO agree-
ment is only a fraud. Several newspapers, however,
suggest this view is not universally shared in the gov-
ernment, and editorial writers are generally critical
of the allegations that Habib is conniving to permit the
Comment: //Begin's remarks, besides offering a con-
cession on the timing of the arrival of the multinational
force, provides the first evidence that he believes an
agreement for a PLO withdrawal is obtainable and is will-
ing to bargain on specifics. Until now, he was convinced
the Palestinians were lying about their professed will-
ingness to depart. Sharon apparently still harbors
Supplies to West Beirut
Water reportedly has begun reaching West Beirut
after the Israelis on Saturday reopened the main water
line and the Lebanese completed repairs to a ruptured
portion of the line. The Israelis on Saturday also per-
mitted five Red Cross trucks carrying food and medical
Arab foreign ministers are due to meet tomorrow in
Morocco to discuss holding a summit meeting on Lebanon.
Saudi officials hope that an agreement on PLO withdrawal
25X1
25X1
 The agreement among the major parties to work toward common
coals has strenathened President Magana's national unity government.
At a meeting with Magana last week, leaders of the
liberal Christian Democrats and the rightist parties
ratified seven objectives. They included agreements on
consolidating reforms, exploring solutions to end civil
strife, promoting human rights, and furthering democra-
tization.
The pact also established three special commissions
to pursue the objectives. In addition to one on human
rights, there will be a peace commission that will include
political, military, church, and labor representatives.
The broadest powers fall to a political commission
responsible for putting the pact into effect and setting
dates for presidential elections. Magana will coordinate
this group, which is to be made up of the three vice
presidents, the ministers of defense and foreign relations
Comment: The objectives largely coincide with re-
quirements for US certification. They also appear
designed to help blunt the impact of the guerrilla coali- 25X1
tion's propaganda campaign in Western Europe, which
increasingly is depicting the Magana government as
rightist dominated and thus ready to abandon reforms.
The pact includes most goals Magana has been espous-
ing since the inception of his administration. His
success in having the diverse parties endorse them under-
scores his ability as a political conciliator and suggests
In signing the pact, Constituent Assembly President
D'Aubuisson leaves himself open to almost certain criticism
by his ultraconservative constituents, many of whom believe
he is cooperating too closely with more moderate political
elements. D'Aubuisson's apparent exclusion from the
powerful political commission suggests he may be becoming
 The collapse of the OAU summit in Tripoli over the
weekend brings into the open the breach between African
radicals and moderates over the question of membership
for the Polisario Front. Faced with the absence of a
quorum of two-thirds of the OAU's 51 members, the heads
of most of the delegations still in Tripoli are meeting
separately to discuss regional problems and to plan for
a summit later in the year. Libyan leader Qadhafi and
other radicals are citing the breakdown of the summit
Comment: The failure to hold a summit is a severe
blow to Qadhafi's prestige. It also deprives him of the
legal moans to accede to the organization's chairmanship--
 //The Chinese have criticized the recent visit to
Taiwan of a senior Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
delegation, calling the trip an effort to create "two
Chinas." The New China News Agency has attacked the
"official" nature of the visit as tantamount to treating
Taiwan as an independent political entity.
Comment: China usually ignores such visits, but its
current concern over US policy toward Taiwan, the textbook
controversy with Japan, and Taiwan's press coverage of
the visit have increased Chinese sensitivity. Beijing
almost certainly will continue to pay close attention to
 President Marcos on Saturday appointed his wife
and three other officials to the Executive Committee,
an 11-member body that would act as a caretaker govern-
ment in the event of Marcos's death in office. The
move follows the recent unanimous endorsement of the
First Lady's membership by a ruling party caucus presided
over by the President. Marcos awarded his eldest daughter
Comment: //The appointment substantially enhances
the political fortunes of Mrs. Marcos and reverses the
President's
longstanding commitment
to
avoid institu-
tionalizing
a family dynasty. Two
of
the other three
appointees
also are closely linked
to
the first family.
The timing
of the appointment is surprising, because
fi
i
heduled state
M
'
k
b
f
t comes
ore
arcos
s
ve wee
e
s
sc
visit to Washington. Although it may be intended to
increase Mrs. Marcos's prestige, it has already rekindled
rumors the 64-year-old Marcos is in failing health.//
 //A fourth consecutive poor grain harvest will thwart Moscow's
plans to improve food supplies and become less dependent on grain
imports. The USSR probably will import some 50 million tons during
the marketing year that ends nebt June, including substantial amounts
from the US. Extending the current Zull in purchases would be costly,
and Moscow is likely to resume buying large quantities soon. The
grain problem almost certainly will increase political tensions
among Soviet leaders.// 25X1
//Almost no grain region in the USSR has escaped
some crop damage this year. The main spring wheat belt
in the southern Urals, northern Kazakhstan, and western
Siberia was especially hard hit by hot, dr winds and by
drought in mid-June and early July.// 25X1
//Grain production this year probably will total only
about 165 million tons. Poor weather during the harvest,
which is under way in the European USSR, could contribute
to a crop even lower than the unofficially reported 25X1
//With a crop of 165 million tons, the USSR would
need an additional 65 million tons of grain. The internal
distribution system, however, probably can accommodate
only about 50 million tons of grain imports during the
marketing year. The resulting 15-million-ton shortfall
is likely to lead to some distress slaughtering of live-
//If the Soviets were to buy nearly all their import
requirements from sources other than the US, they would
concentrate on seven exporters that account for about
40 percent of the world grain trade. These sellers could
export roughly 83 million tons, about half of which prob-
ably will be sold to other customers. Moscow may have
 already spoken for 17 of the remaining 42 million tons,
and it could conceivably purchase all or most of the re-
maining 25 million tons from non-US sources.//
Importing the Grain
//Imports of grain probably will cost the Soviets
$6-6.5 billion this year, nearly 20 percent of the
USSR's hard currency import bill. Although Moscow's
financial position has improved in recent months, the
USSR will continue to rely on short-term credit to help
finance grain purchases.//
//The USSR is likely to purchase substantial amounts
of grain from the US, perhaps even more than the 15.5
million tons bought in 1981. Moscow would have to pay
more to buy all its grain from sources other than the US.
As exporters became aware of the Soviets' intention to
avoid purchases from the US, they would force the USSR
to pay some premium for the grain it needs.//
//Only the US can export large amounts of grain
throughout the year, and the USSR would have less flexi-
bility in scheduling imports. Canadian shipments taper
off as winter closes the St. Lawrence Seaway, limited
storage capacity in Argentina requires Buenos Aires to
ship grain as it is harvested, and, in Australia, port'
 //Some 60 percent of Soviet imports are coarse grains
for feed. Without coarse US grains, the USSR would have
to substitute wheat for about 7 million tons of feedgrains,
Imports during August and September are likely to be less
than three-fourths of the monthly average needed if the
//Several factors may be contributing to this lull.
Moscow may have a different view of the crop prospects 25X1
for this year, and it may be delaying purchases in the
hope of getting better terms. In addition, reallocating
//Political considerations also may be affecting
grain-buying strategy. Moscow may be postponing purchases
from the US in reaction to US economic sanctions. Soviet
leaders, moreover, may hope that the lull is creating
uncertainty about US export prospects and that this will
lead to demands in the US to normalize trade relations
This fourth consecutive harvest shortfall almost
certainly will intensify conflicts in the leadership,
especially in the current succession environment. Tight
meat supplies this year would increase the likelihood of
more widespread rationing and could lead to some protests.
Under these circumstances, the leadership will feel in-
creased pressure either to satisfy consumer desires or
to tighten controls over a population that has become
more demanding, less believing, and less pliable during
Whatever the reasons for the lull in buying, the
risks to the Soviets of waiting much longer are mounting.
Delaying purchases is compressing delivery schedules,
 threatening port congestion, and increasing the chances
internal transport facilities will be overcrowded in late
summer and early fall when domestic crops have to be moved
The Soviets probably will import enough foodstuffs
this year to maintain the nation's diet close to current
levels. Opposition may develop in the leadership, however,
to importing substantial amounts of grain in the future.
Concern that the country could become hostage to Western
economic pressures, combined with hard currency strin-
gencies, could create significant support in the leader-
 Approved For Release 2008/08/12 : CIA-RDP84T00301 R000400010133-6
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