NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 14 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010158-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 158
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
a"^~f Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence 25X1
o al Intelligence Daily
:(Cable)
Y4 Apr-1982
view
feted.
eview Complete
Top Secret
CPAS NIDC 82-087 25X1
14 April 1982
:K :i
402
COPY
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
UK-Argentina: Status of the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
France-Japan: Mitterrand's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
USSR: Grain Crop Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Portugal-Angola: Visit by President Eanes . . . . . . . . 5
Namibia: GuerriZZa Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Special Analysis
North Korea: Moving Toward Transition . . . . . . . . . . 7
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
UK-ARGENTINA: Status of the Crisis
//The British and the Argentines are continuing to make state-
ments designed to appeal to their hardline supporters but have not
closed the door to a negotiated solution. Although the Argentine
fleet remains in port, reinforcement of troops in the Falklands is
continuing by air. Soviet media increasingly are attacking the US
role in the dispute, but Soviet naval activity related to the crisis
remains limited. //
//British Foreign Secretary Pym claimed to the press
yesterday that Argentina has backed away from the initial
negotiating positions it conveyed to Secretary of State
Haig, and he blamed the Argentines for the lack of
progress in the talks.//
//Citing a Foreign Ministry source, press reports
from Argentina denied that US efforts to resolve the
dispute had failed. The source was quoted as saying
that talks are still under way and that new suggestions
would be sent to Secretary Haig. Argentine Foreign
Minister Costa Mendez had. stated earlier, however, that
there had been no progress and indicated that Buenos
Aires would reject further diplomatic moves.//
25XJ
25X1
//The mixed signals from Buenos Aires may reflect the
government's efforts to appear tough to hardliners in
the military at home while showing some flexibility to
interested parties abroad.//
Argentine Military Moves
//The Argentines continue to move troo s and sup lies
by air to the Falklands. In addition,
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
9th Infantry Brigade is in the Falklands and that an ar-
tillery battalion and an armored regiment--totaling about
1,100 troops--are being redeployed to the south. Previous
reports indicated that some 5,000 military personnel have
already relocated to southern Argentina.//
//Despite an Argentine pledge to abstain from entering
the maritime exclusion zone, there are indications that
the Argentine fleet may be preparing to sail.//
//Argentina has banned imports from the EC in retal-
iation for the EC's ban against Argentine products and
arms sales to Buenos Aires. Canada and New Zealand
have followed the EC's lead by breaking trade links with
Argentina. Ottawa also announced a freeze on export
credits to Buenos Aires.//
Comment: //If the crisis is drawn out, Buenos Aires's
move could be costly. The EC supplied Argentina with
products difficult to secure elsewhere, including parts
for its auto industry.//
Diplomatic Developments
//The OAS yesterday adopted a resolution offering its
"friendly cooperation" in helping to resolve the crisis.
Although the resolution did not take sides, it made no
reference to the UN Security Council resolution that
calls on Argentina to withdraw its troops.//
//Argentine political and labor leaders departed
yesterday for the US, Western Europe, and other Latin
American countries to defend Buenos Aires's case. They
claim that they are under intense pressure from the gov-
ernment to undertake the mission.//
Comment: Buenos Aires is concerned that its position
is not well understood internationally, and that the level
of anticipated diplomatic support has not materialized. F_
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
//Soviet media are taking a tougher line on the US
role in the Falklands dispute, saying that Washington is
giving "secret military-political cooperation" to London.
Pravda said yesterday the US role of honest broker is not
believed by either side, and TASS said the US has a
"clearly biased" stand.//
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
today promises to be Long on atmospherics and short on results.
President Mitterrand's official visit to Japan that beginf
predecessors.
Comment: This is the first time an incumbent French
President has paid a state visit to Japan. The trip will
be portrayed and received as a measure of Mitterrand's
higher regard for Japan's world role than was held by his
pluses with France and the EC.
Both sides see the trip as preparatory to the
Versailles economic summit in June, and discussions be-
tween Mitterrand and Prime Minister Suzuki will range
over international economic and political issues that
are likely to arise at the summit. Mitterrand will
express concern about the growing Japanese trade sur-
ent of Japanese exports, and thus has little leverage.
There is virtually no chance that Japan will offer
major concessions. France accounts for less than 2 per-
overwhelming.
The French leader will seek concessions on imports
of aircraft and agricultural products. He also will
push for expanded technical and industrial cooperation.
Mitterrand will argue that without some relief, protec-
tionist pressures in France and the EC will become
Mitterrand.
Tokyo resents France's stringent restrictions on
Japanese exports and does not believe that Paris can
muster the united support of the EC. Moreover, reducing
import restrictions presents as large a domestic politi-
cal problem for Suzuki as rising unemployment does for
face-saving offers.//
//The two sides probably will be looking for ways
to save Mitterrand the embarrassment of an unsuccessful
trip. Tokyo may offer to buy more French helicopters
or propose general agreements to explore technical
exchanges in the area of nuclear energy. With an eye
to the summit, Mitterrand probably will accept such
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
USSR: Grain Crop Prospects
lower yielding spring grains to reduce possible losses.//
Comment: //Pessimistic reports by the Soviet press
are not unusual at this time of year, and, after three
consecutive crop failures, farmers can expect frequent
exhortations to overcome the challenges ahead. Crop
problems appear to be confined thus far to areas that
account for less than 3 percent of total grain output.
There is still ample time to replant damaged areas with
planting spring grains./,/
//Early prospects for grain production in the USSR
continue to be favorable, despite gloomy predictions
in the Soviet press. The weather has been mild so far
this spring. soil moisture
in the southern European USSR is more t an adequate for
PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: Visit by President Eanes
two principal former colonies.
President Eanes arrives in Luanda tomorrow for a
four-day visit, the first by a Western head of state
since Angola became independent in 1975. Like his trip
to Mozambique last November, it reflects Portugal's
desire to restore political and economic ties with its
Comment: Lisbon lacks the resources to provide
substantial aid, but the Portuguese would like to serve
as a bridge between their Marxist-ruled former colonies
and the West. Eanes recognizes, however, that better
relations between Angola and the US probably are un-
attainable as long as Cuban troops remain in Angola and
hand in dealing with Western countries.
the Namibian problem is unresolved. He also is aware
that Angolan President dos Santos does not have a free
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
NAMIBIA: Guerrilla Activity
A group of South-West Africa People's Organization
guerrillas, with a strength of about 90, clashed last
weekend with a Namibian counterinsurgency unit more than
100 kilometers south of the Namibian-Angolan border.
Eight guerrillas were killed, but the remainder reportedly
escaped. White farmers in the area have been alerted
to the possibility of SWAPO attacks.
Comment: The group probably is the largest SWAPO
force ever to operate so far south in Namibia. It may
be planning a spectacular attack against a military or
economic installation.
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
NORTH KOREA: Moving Toward Transition
The massive and lavish celebrations planned this week in
Pyongyang to mark the 70th birthday of President Kim IZ-song and
Kim's plan to have his son succeed him point to an era of transi-
tion. P'yongyang has made steady progress in gaining international
acceptance over the past decade and--at considerable cost--has
built a formidable military establishment. The regime, however,
remains frustrated over its inability to reunify the Korean Peninsula
under North Korean control. By dint of one-man rule and a pervasive
personality cult, Kim has kept these conflicting pressures in check,
but any successor regime will have greater, difficuZtu in calling for
continued economic and social sacrifices.
Kim has ruled North Korea since 1945. To the popu-
lace, he is both a political leader and a father figure.
The extravaganza this week is testimony to the extremes
of the personality cult that has developed around the
"Great Leader."
Progress--and Problems
Kim is proud of the progress North Korea has achieved.
The country is nearly self-sufficient in agriculture,
has effective education and health care systems, and
has made impressive gains in some industries. At the
same time, however, North Korea has defaulted on debts
both to Western countries and to its more traditional
Communist trading partners. Daily necessities such as
rice, red meat, and clothing are still rationed, and con-
sumer goods are in short supply.
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
//North Korea's difficulties reflect in part the
problems associated with a tightly controlled socialist
economy guided by an aging leadership ill-equipped to
cope with the demands of modernization. In pursuit of
his ambition to reunify the peninsula under P'yongyang's
control, Kim has subordinated economic growth to the
development of a substantial military force and an indig-
enous arms industry capable of equipping most of that
force.//
On the diplomatic front, North Korea is recognized
by almost as many states as is South Korea, which is
twice as populous and more advanced economically.
Despite P'yongyang's expanding diplomatic contacts, its
xenophobia and emphasis on self-reliance have discouraged
intellectual, scientific, and cultural interchange.
//North Korea's refusal to accept the legitimacy of
the government in Seoul continues to hamper P'yongyang's
efforts to broaden its political and economic ties.
Japan, for example, could assist the development of the
North's civilian economy, but P'yongyang's hostility
toward Seoul and the US makes such a course politically
infeasible for Tokyo.//
Over the years Kim has had little success in ad-
vancing reunification, and the prospects remain bleak.
South Korean President Chun has consolidated his position
and has seized the initiative on the sensitive issue of
the North-South dialogue on reunification. The US mili-
tary presence in the South has been reaffirmed and aug-
China and the USSR have shown little interest in
supporting Kim's reunification drive. An indefinite
extension of the status quo on the peninsula is more in
line with their broader strategic interests.
Kim increasingly appears to realize that his goal
of a reunified Korea will not be fulfilled in his life-
time. For the past 10 years, he has been grooming his
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
Top Secret
eldest son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor. The son,
who holds a number of high party positions, is now han-
dling virtually all domestic political and economic
affairs.
country to the younger Kim.
Although the younger Kim was not appointed to a
post in the new government lineup announced earlier this
month, he is likely to expand his involvement in the
more sensitive areas of national security and foreign
policy in the months ahead. We doubt Kim Il-song, who
is active and in reasonably good health, will step down
in favor of his son any time soon. He may decide to do
more traveling abroad as a Third World statesman--a role
that he enjoys--leaving the daily routine of running the
and security services, and the government bureaucracy.
Nonetheless, Kim Chong-il probably will not be able
to achieve the kind of absolute power and influence
wielded by his father. Kim Chong-il will need to devote
more attention to controlling the party, the military
his policies.
Kim Chong-ills Prospects
The intensity of Kim's campaign to legitimize his
son as his political heir is unprecedented in the
Communist world. It reflects the President's concern
that his legacy be carried forward by someone closely
identified with him and committed to the preservation of
reunification drive.
If North Korea increases its exposure to outside
influences, popular desires for economic and social
advancement will increasingly reduce the ability of Kim
Chong-il or any other successor to sustain Kim I1-song's
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1
 Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2008/05/13: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000200010158-1