NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 25 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010087-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 87
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
DIA review
completed.
NGA Review
Complete
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
CO 1VIDC
25 March 1982
Copy `# 0
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Guatemala: Junta Spurns Political Parties . . . . . . . .
1
Central America: Insurgent Schedule Slowed . . . . . . .
2
Israel: Begin's Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Israel-Lebanon: Pressure on Arafat . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Iran-Iraq:
Status of the Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
USSR-China:
Brezhnev's Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Poland: Pro
duction Improves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Bangladesh:
Calm After the Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
USSR: Visit
to Moscow by BiZZy Graham . . . . . . . . . .
to
Greece: New
Chief of the Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Seychelles-F
rance: Increased French Influence . . . . . .
11
Special Analysis
Syria: Rebounding From the Rebellion . . . . . . . . . .
12
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Top Secret
GUATEMALA: Junta Spurns Political Parties
The junta appears unwiZZing to share power with the opposition
political parties that charged the Lucas administration with eZec-
toraZ fraud and prepared the way for the coup.
In his first public statement junta president Rios
Montt said that the political parties--which, he implied,
exist only to win elections--would have no role in the
interim government for the time being. He stated the
armed forces were able to meet the nation's political,
//Rios Montt and the other two junta members--
General Maldonado and Colonel Gordillo--also hold key
cabinet posts. General Lopez, a close associate of
rightwing leader Sandoval and an important figure in the
coup, is Army Chief of Staff. The junta has asked private-
sector organizations to nominate persons to head several
social, and economic challenges.
ministries.//
//By excluding the political parties from the regime,
the military apparently has doublecrossed Sandoval's
National Liberation Movement.
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Comment: The junta may be willing to compromise and
accept some politicians in the regime, since their con-
tinued exclusion would cause further domestic strains and
tend to discredit the interim government internationally.
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Top Secret
CENTRAL AMERICA: Insurgent Schedule Slowed
ing their control over the Nicaraguan economy.
In EZ Salvador, the insurgents continue to encounter problems
in disrupting the elections but have succeeded in engaging Venezuelan
President Herrera in a dialogue. The Honduran Government has created
a National Security Council to improve its ability to respond to
challenges from Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, meanwhile, are extend-
Venezuelan Contact With Salvadoran Insurgents
publicizing the letter at his press conference.
According to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Zambrano,
the letter from Salvadoran insurgents to President
Herrera was worked out in Managua last weekend in dis-
cussions between Caracas's Ambassador to the OAS and
guerrilla leaders. Zambrano, who claims that President
Duarte was kept fully informed, anticipates that the
guerrillas will soon make a positive response to Herrera's
contribution toward these objectives.
Although Herrera reiterated strong backing for Duarte
and the electoral process, he noted that the insurgents
shared Venezuela's interest in achieving "peace and par-
ticipative democracy" after the elections. Herrera ex-
pressed his belief that he could make a decisive personal
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they cannot count on Venezuelan support if they win.
gents will send a message to Salvadoran rightists that
Comment: Venezuela's intentions are still unclear.
Herrera appears to be trying to gain some flexibility in
his Salvadoran policy, a subject of intense debate in
Venezuela. While highly supportive of Duarte, Herrera
is concerned that the voting on Sunday will result in
rightist gains that will diminish chances for a moderate
solution and leave Venezuela isolated. Caracas may also
believe that acknowledging its contacts with the insur-
in US policy planning.//
//In addition, Herrera also probably hopes that his
initiative will quiet domestic critics and refurbish his
image as an international statesman. He probably believes
that Venezuela must be willing to play a more active role
in postelection developments to preserve its claims to
hemispheric leadership, to counter Mexico's higher pro-
file in the region, and to ensure that Caracas is included
Sandinista Economic Regulations
An immediate price freeze also has been instituted.
A new decree gives the Nicaraguan regime the author-
ity to direct production and sales throughout the economy
and provides government inspectors with unlimited access
to firms' physical plants, offices, warehouses, and books.
gency continues.
Comment: Managua probably will use the new economic
powers to increase the production of defense-related goods.
These measures are likely to accelerate the decline in
living standards. Although business leaders feel the
decrees threaten the existence of the market economy,
they are unlikely to resist as long as the state of emer-
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ISRAEL: Begin's Options
and enable him to weather the current crisis.
Prime Minister Begin probably hopes his threat to resign on
Tuesday will prompt stronger support among his coalition partners
The defection of Chaim Druckman, an ultrarightwing
religious deputy opposed to the Sinai withdrawal, has
reduced to 60 the number of seats that Begin controls in
the 120-member Knesset. Begin's remaining coalition
partners, however, reportedly are urging him to stay.
tion to complete the Sinai withdrawal on schedule.
leaders that, should he resign and become a caretaker
Prime Minister, he would fulfill Israel's treaty obliga-
Unlike Begin's own party, which has strong popular
support, the other parties in the coalition have fared
poorly in recent opinion polls and are reluctant to have
an early election. Moreover, Begin yesterday succeeded
in postponing consideration in the Knesset of crucial
budgetary issues--thus temporarily avoiding another pos-
sible tie vote. Begin is said to have assured coalition
key West Bank and Palestinian issues.
Comment: Begin may hope that the Knesset's one-
month break scheduled for April will enable him to avoid
further challenges until after the pullout from the
Sinai. He may now try again to persuade the two-member
Telem Party of the late Moshe Dayan to join the coali-
tion. He also hopes that, following the Sinai evacuation,
Druckman and the three members of another party opposed
to the withdrawal will join the government to strengthen
its hand against any future pressure for concessions on
would be four months or more.
If such efforts fail, or if Begin's government falls,
he could seek Knesset approval for a bill to hold an
early national election. A minimum of 100 days would
have to elapse before a vote, but the interval probably
coalition.
Begin could avoid an early election by resigning
and then asking President Navon for the mandate to form
a new government. Navon could accept Begin's request
or ask Labor Party Chairman Peres to try. Either man
would have up to 42 days to put together a majority
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growing unrest on the West Bank.//
//The infiltration attempt into northern Israel yesterday by
a small group of radical Palestinians may have resulted from their
dissatisfaction with PLO leader Arafat's cautious approach to the
//Israeli reaction to the incident so far has been
low key. Israeli mili-
tary officials did not warn of retaliation.//
Comment: //Radical Palestinians have long been un-
happy with Arafat's decision to enforce the cease-fire,
and their concerns probably have been aggravated by his
hesitation in reacting to the unrest on the West Bank.
Despite Israeli claims that the PLO is organizing the
the unrest, Arafat until now has limited his response
to calling for an emergency session of the UN Security
Council. The radicals apparently believe that this
damages the PLO's image, and the infiltration attempt
may have been intended to demonstrate solidarity with
the protesters and embarrass Arafat.//
//Although Arafat wants to maintain the cease-fire
in Lebanon, his control over dissident Palestinians is
clearly diminishing. Moreover, if the death toll on
the West Bank continues to rise, radical pressure could
force the PLO chief to take some kind of action in the
West Bank that also could endanger the cease-fire.//
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IRAN-IRAQ: Status of the Fighting
//Iran Launched a second and larger phase of its offensive
yesterday, but its forces have not yet achieved a breakthrough.//
the Iranians have
advanced between 2 and 10 kilometers on an 18-kilometer-
wide front southwest of Shush. They are trying to cut a
second major supply road to Iraqi forces in the Dezful
area.//
//The Iraqis have conducted an orderly withdrawal,
but their forces are thinly spread. Each side claims
to have inflicted substantial casualties.//
//On the northern edge of the Dezful salient, the
Iraqis were pushed back several kilometers on Monday.
Fighting continues along sections of the major road there,
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have been well planned, its failure to attack simul-
taneously and with equal intensity on all fronts has
allowed Iraq time to reinforce its positions and deal
with each thrust individually. Iraq needs to stabilize
the situation in the south quickly, however, to prevent
Comment: //The next few days will be crucial to
each side's chances of success. Although Iran's attacks
its supply route there from being threatened.//
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USSR-CHINA: Brezhnev's Speech
President Brezhnev's remarks in Tashkent yesterday on rela-
tions with China are unlikely to reduce Beijing's mistrust of Moscow.
concrete steps toward improved political relations.
question and to agree without preconditions to various
Brezhnev said that the Soviets recognize that China
is a "socialist" state, reject the "two Chinas" concept,
and support China's sovereignty over Taiwan. He also
stated that the USSR is ready to hold talks on the border
Soviet leaders.
Comment: Brezhnev's remarks do not change the Soviet
position on the basic issues in dispute but are much
friendlier than his references to China at the 26th party
congress in February 1981. They underscore the more
positive approach toward China recently taken by other
trade, cultural, and sports contacts.
The Soviets apparently believe that recent friction
between the US and China over Taiwan make this an oppor-
tune time to seek some shift in the Beijing-Moscow-
Washington relationship. The Soviets also may be en-
couraged by China's recent slight expansion of bilateral
tory actions.
The Chinese, however, probably will not see anything
new in Brezhnev's speech. In Beijing's view, Soviet
words of recent months have not been matched by concilia-
abandon its hostility toward the USSR.
to foreclose Moscow's ability to manipulate the trian-
gular relationship in its more recent warning on the
Taiwan arms issue by publicly stating on 1 March that,
even if relations with the US deteriorate, it will not
Beijing evidently believes that recent Soviet efforts
to give the impression that relations are warming are
intended to gain leverage with the US. Beijing sought
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POLAND: Production Improves
Industrial production increased slightly from
January to February, with coal, copper, and other mining
industries leading the way. Nevertheless, production
was still nearly 12 percent below the level of a year
ago, and output of manufactured goods was down more than
20 percent. Planning Chief Madej predicts that indus-
trial production in the second half of this year may
be 2 to 3 percent higher than the same period last year
but that the results for the entire year will still be
less than those for 1981.
Comment: The figures for February offer the first
tentative sign that Poland's industrial decline may be
ending, but the economy remains extremely depressed.
Industrial production, national income, and exports are
all at the level of the mid-1970s, while housing con-
struction is at the level of 1967. Western sanctions
and Poland's financial situation are the major impedi-
ments to more rapid recovery. CEMA assistance in off-
setting reduced imports from the West will continue to
be the key factor in Poland's economic performance in
BANGLADESH: Calm After the Coup
The situation remains calm in Dacca following the
coup. The country has been divided into zonal commands,
and the Navy and Air Force chiefs are serving as assist-
ant Martial Law Administrators. All political activity
has been banned by Chief Martial Law Administrator
Ershad, who also has announced that he would appoint a
civilian head of state. New Delhi's response to the
coup has been restrained, although Indian troops sta-
tioned along the border are on a precautionary alert.
Comment: Ershad's support will erode quickly if
Bangladesh experiences a prolonged aid cutoff, and he
will have to take decisive action on economic problems
if he is to retain his hold on power before an expected
food crisis occurs this summer. The Indians probably
hope that both the military and the former ruling party
will be sufficiently discredited that a pro-Indian
government--led by the leftist Awami League--will come
to power when elections are held.
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USSR: Visit to Moscow by Billy Graham
exerts considerable influence.
Top Secret
Russian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Filaret, in an
interview with TASS, has announced that Reverend Billy
Graham will attend the Soviet-sponsored World Peace
Conference scheduled to open in Moscow on 10 May. The
interview focused on the acceptance of Reverend Graham,
who was the only attendee who received separate treatment
in the article. All the other prominent churchmen
scheduled to attend are from countries in which the USSR
efforts to persuade West European churchmen to attend.
Comment: The Soviets clearly hope that Reverend
Graham's participation will lend some respectability to
the conference. They also will use it to strengthen the
legitimacy of the KGB-controlled Russian Orthodox Church,
which serves as an instrument of Soviet interests abroad.
Filaret has already used Reverend Graham's decision in
GREECE: New Chief of the Navy
Comment: //Papandreou is sensitive to the military's
distrust of him and has moved cautiously on military
matters, generally consulting President Karamanlis before
making changes. The elevation of Pappas is likely to
upset some senior officers, however, and Papandreou prob-
ably would have preferred to avoid such a controversial
decision. Both Pappas and Lieutenant General Kouris, who
holds the top Air Force slot and is a strong candidate for
Chief of Staff in a year or two, are favorites of the
socialist government. Although they are considered pro-
West and approve of continued Greek membership in NATO,
they are likely to be tough negotiators in the coming
the military junta then ruling Greece.
Prime Minister Papandreou has named Nikolaos Pappas
as head of the Navy following the resignation last week-
end of Vice Admiral Kapetos, who reportedly quit because
he disagreed with the Deputy Defense Minister over the
assignments of senior naval personnel. Pappas, whose
promotion to Vice Admiral has forced the retirement of
three other senior officers, is best known for his role
in the unsuccessful naval insurrection in 1973 against
US base talks.//
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SEYCHELLES-FRANCE: Increased French Influence
permit foreign military bases, implicitly rejecting
Soviet requests for more frequent air and naval access.
Leftist President Rene has turned to France rather
than to the USSR for additional security and economic
assistance following the unsuccessful coup attempt by
mercenaries last November. France is to continue mari-
time surveillance, conduct periodic air exercises near
Seychelles, have its naval ships make more frequent
visits, and use the islands to resupply French warships.
Paris also will double its economic aid. At French
urging, Rene has restated his longstanding refusal to
plicity in the coup attempt.
Comment: Seychelles lies midway between the French
bases at Djibouti and on Reunion Island, and the new
accord will benefit France's Indian Ocean Fleet. Rene
evidently prefers support from a major power that does
not involve closer ties with either the US or the USSR
or any shift in ideology. He still approves of the lu-
crative presence of the US Air Force tracking station
on the main island, although he suspects the US of com-
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SYRIA: Rebounding From the Rebellion
aggravated sectarian rivalries in the armed forces.
alienated many Sunnis throughout the country, however, and also
President Assad's traditional power base--the minority Alawite
community, senior military and security officers, and the Baath
Party apparatus--still appears to be intact following the rebellion
in the northern city of Harrah Last month Zed by the Sunni Muslim
Brotherhood. The regime's ferocity in suppressing the uprising has
nal security forces, few are willing to risk their lives
in an open conflict. Resentment of the regime has grown,
however, as has the number of people bent on revenge.//
//Damascus's actions reportedly have convinced the
Brotherhood that there is little chance of ousting Assad
any time soon. The absence of uprisings elsewhere in
support of the rebels in Hamah has shown that, although
many members of the Sunni majority may resent Alawite
domination and the brutal tactics of the regime's inter-
Assad's Response
community. In addition, the Baath Party has staged
major prorecgime rallies in Damascus and in Hamah.//
//Assad has tried in recent weeks to repair some of
the damage and shore up popular backing for his govern-
ment. Late last month he addressed the Chamber of Com-
merce in Damascus and courted the support of the business
for the acts of religious extremists.//
was assured that Damascus did not hold it responsible
//The government also bought together religious
leaders from all over Syria and promised them that the
mosques in Hamah will be rebuilt. The Sunni community
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//Over the longer term, the country's economic woes
may prove more troublesome than episodes of sectarian
violence, which Assad is trying to blame on
Jordanian provocateurs.
//The economy could well undermine Assad's efforts
o restore public confidence.
Military Views
//The events in Hamah do not appear to have shaken
the loyalty of Alawite officers who run the armed forces,
the security and intelligence services, and the military
win of the Baath Party,
The regime is certain to be the target of further
sporadic violence from the weakened but determined
Muslim Brotherhood. The events in Hamah, however, have
strengthened the hand of those in power who advocate
repression of all opposition.
Although the regime's isolation from the Sunni
majority almost certainly will increase, Assad--with
the continued support of the Alawite community and
military--should be able to maintain power. If he
should show signs of faltering, however, a move against
him might come from within Alawite ranks.
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Top Secret
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