IRAN: MILITARY MANPOWER PROBLEMS LIMIT WAR OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000100120003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy 7 ? 5
October 1983
NRSA R3-10259C
Top Secret
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iran: Military Manpower
Problems Limit War Options
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Iran: Military Manpower
Problems Limit War Options
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 83-10259C
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Iran: Military Manpower
Problems Limit War Options
Ton Secret
Key Judgments Iran's greater population has not given it the decisive advantage in its war
Information available with Iraq that Tehran expected. The Khomeini regime's difficulty in
as of 3 October 1983 securing sufficient numbers of highly motivated volunteers for the battle-
was used in this report.
field was so great by the spring of 1983 that it was forced to change its mil-
itary strategy. Iran has abandoned its tactic of frequent large-scale attacks
to bring down the Iraqi regime through a major military defeat. Instead it
has reverted to a war of attrition to bring down the regime of Saddam
Husayn over- the long term
Iran has nearly three times the population of Iraq-nearly 42 million
compared with some 14 million-and theoretically has the manpower to
continue throwing masses of infantry against the Iraqis. Indeed, the
Khomeini regime has sought to create an image at home and abroad that
an "army of 20 million" stands ready to sacrifice itself in the war. In fact,
Iran's manpower pool is largely untapped, and its national defense
commitment is one-fourth that of Iraq and less than that of almost any oth-
er Middle Eastern state
We believe the lack of motivated volunteers and declining morale at the
front are serious problems for Tehran. Since July 1982, when the first of a
yearlong string of costly defeats occurred, the fanaticism of Iran's infantry
has failed to overwhelm the better equipped and more heavily armed
Iraqis. The regime's difficulty in recruiting volunteers also indicates the
erosion of popular support for the war. Iranian leaders are particularly
concerned about flagging support among the lower classes, which are the
Khomeini regime's primary political base and the source of most military
manpower.
Several interrelated factors have hindered recruitment:
? Tactics that have caused disproportionately heavy casualties among the
regime's staunchest supporters.
? Failure to make meaningful gains on the front since May 1982.
? Changed motivations of Iranian troops once the Iraqis were expelled
from Iran.
? Lack of a cohesive policy and centralized organization for managing
wartime manpower.
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Of these factors, the heavy Iranian casualties appear to have been the key
issue in a debate within the Khomeini regime from mid-1982 through the
spring of 1983 that eventually led to its shift in military strategy.
Throughout most of the war, the regime has exalted battlefield deaths-
which we estimate at 125,000-as martyrdom in the cause of Islam. But in
early 1983 Iranian leaders for the first time publicly stated that the
regime's decisions on the battlefield were linked to its concern over
excessive casualties and that "martyrdom is not the chief objective of the
. Iran could get more than enough men to prosecute the war at a higher level
by using more coercive methods of recruitment or by implementing a
general mobilization. Our analysis suggests that Tehran seriously consid-
ered, but ultimately rejected, a general mobilization in late 1982. We
believe that the regime does not want to risk diluting the political loyalty of
the armed forces by resorting to such measures. Moreover, Khomeini
believes that the faithful should come forward spontaneously as a religious
duty to defend against the evil represented by Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn. In Khomeini's view, he, as the religious guardian, can encourage
but not coerce Iranians to do their duty. The. regime probably also is
concerned about the drastic economic consequences of a general mobiliza-
tion and the limited ability of the military to absorb rapidly large increases
in manpower.
Instead, to alleviate its manpower shortfall the regime has:
? Encouraged volunteers from the paramilitary forces to take additional
tours of duty.
? Begun to form a paramilitary reserve system.
? Established an active regular Army reserve.
? Authorized the Revolutionary Guard to use conscripts.
? Lengthened the period of compulsory military service.
? Reduced the number of exemptions from the draft.
? Instituted extreme penalties for draft evasion.
? Authorized the Ministry of Defense to hire educated and specialized
personnel under contract in lieu of compulsory military service.
We do not believe these steps will provide Iran with enough manpower to
resume launching frequent large-scale attacks against the Iraqis
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Iran could rebuild a conventional war-fighting capability by purchasing
large quantities of major weapons systems. This would allow Iran to
resume fighting a higher intensity war by substituting new weapons,
increased firepower, and conventional tactics for politically unacceptable
casualty rates. We believe, however, that the effort would require many
years and confront the regime with possibly insurmountable political
barriers and immense practical problems.
Moreover, the quality of Iran's military force has been severely degraded
by a number of factors that would preclude rapidly assimilating large
quantities of new materiel soon. Half of the force is comprised of illiterate,
poorly trained, undisciplined paramilitary troops. Training resources are
inadequate, and the regime's aversion to foreign dependence has denied the
Iranian military access to valuable expertise and training. Finally, selecting
personnel for their political reliability rather than their military qualifica-
tions will continue to hamper effective employment of forces.
Although Iran has had to give up any hope of bringing down Iraqi
President Saddam Husayn soon by direct military action, we believe that
Iran's larger manpower pool gives it an advantage over Iraq in fighting a
war of attrition. The Iranians have undertaken a strategy designed to tie
down the Iraqi Army while keeping closed Iraq's oil outlets from the Gulf
and through the Syrian pipeline. To put greater pressure on Baghdad,
Tehran has armed Kurdish groups to fight Iraq and responded favorably to
Syrian offers to unify Iraqi opposition groups.
Iran's war of attrition could result in the capture of large areas along the
border of the Kurdish area of Iraq, and its economic warfare is increasing
the financial and political stress on the Iraqi regime. Continuing the war,
however, also increases internal Iranian political and economic pressures
that in the past few months have shown up in demonstrations in major Ira-
nian cities. We believe, however, that on balance, Iraq will be less able than
Iran to withstand the ravages of a war of attrition.
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Key Judgments
Basij
Recruiting Systems
The Quality Problem
Khomeini's Mobilization Edict 15
Arguments Against Mobilization 17
Iran: Army Manning, September 1983
Revolutionary Guard Manning
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Iran-Iraq Border, September 1983
Q ;re S'hirin
f? '~''iA?3 N y
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Jragi-held are@
--!ran an-held area
Iraqi-held
area '
Infantry division
Mechanized division
Armored division
Infantry brigade
Armored brigade
Airborne brigade
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Iran: Military Manpower
Problems Limit War Options
Composition of the Armed Forces
Iran has over 600,000 men in its military, paramili-
tary, and security forces (see table 1).' This is double
the number of men under arms before the war and
about 20 percent more than the number in the Shah's
regular armed forces. Approximately 175,000 of these
troops, mostly irregulars, perform internal security
roles; the remainder are almost entirely occupied in
the war. The figures do not include personnel in a
number of defense-related functions such as the Min-
istry of Defense staff, government or semiprivate
arms industries, and revolutionary organizations sup-
porting the war effort.
The composition of Iran's military and security forces
has undergone major changes since the Khomeini
regime came to power in early 1979. The key change,
in our view, was the creation of large paramilitary
elements that exist alongside the conventional armed
services that provide for national defense-Army, Air
Force, and Navy-and traditional domestic security
forces-Gendarmerie and National Police:
? Revolutionary Guard. The Guard is the regime's
elite paramilitary force and the most important
armed element in Iran today. Mainly a lightly
armed paramilitary force, it has some armored,
mechanized, and artillery units. The Guard per-
forms both national defense and domestic security
roles.
? Basil. The Basij-from Basij-e Mostazafan or Mo-
bilization of the Oppressed-is a mass militia creat-
ed in late 1979 to prepare the population to resist an
expected US invasion to rescue the hostages. It since
has become a part of the Revolutionary Guard but
is not so well equipped or disciplined as the Guard
cadre. The distinction between the two is likely to
remain for the near future. Like Guard cadre, the
Basij performs both national defense and domestic
security roles.
? Komitehs. Revolutionary Committees or Komitehs
were formed more or less spontaneously at many
mosques throughout Iran at the outset of the revolu-
tion. They act as local vigilantes to enforce the
regime's social and religious policies. Each Komiteh
has some light weapons at its disposal for its
domestic security role, but only a token number
have served at the front.
Army. With some 235,000 men, the Army has about
the same number of troops as the Guard and Basij 25X1
combined but is the better equipped and better
trained fighting force. About 175,000 Army troops
Initially the Khomeini regime made no changes in the
Army's structure but allowed Army manning to fall
from 280,000 to less than 150,000
have nine divisions and 300,000 men by the early
1980s were scrapped.
Once the war began in September 1980, however,
Iranian press revealed that the
regime authorized the Army to expand. During late
1980 and early 1981 the Army brought existing units
to prerevolutionary combat strength by calling up
reservists, reinstituting the draft, and shortening the
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Table 1
Estimated Number of Men Under Arms in the Iranian Armed Forces, September 1983
Total
590,000-780,000
625,000
270,000-333,000
National Defense Forces
430,000-545,000
450,000
265,000-325,000
Domestic Security Forces
160,000-235,000
175,000
5,000-8,000
Army
235,000-270,000
235,000
145,000-150,000
Air Force
40,000-60,000
50,000
NA
Navy
10,000-20,000
15,000
NA
Revolutionary Guard
National Defense
45,000-75,000
50,000
Domestic Security
45,000-75,000
50,000
Basij a
National Defense
100,000-120,000
100,000
75,000-100,000
Domestic Security
25,000-30,000
25,000
NA
Gendarmerie
30,000-60,000
40,000
4,000-6,000
National Police
35,000-40,000
35,000
500-1,000
Komitehs
25,000-30,000
25,000
500-1,000
a In late 1982 the Basij claimed a membership of 2,500,000 men, of
which some 400,000 had been trained for combat.
Revolutionary Guard. We estimate that the Revolu-
tionary Guard has between 100,000 and 150,000
cadre personnel plus an equal number of armed Basij
personnel. Our most authoritative source of Guard
cadre manning is a progress report publicly issued in
March 1982 by the Guard's Programing Division.
This official statement on the size of the Guard noted
that "preparation of personnel allocation programs for
100,000 Guards" had been made. It is unclear wheth-
er that figure represented Guard strength for 1982 or
a planned objective for March 1983
involved in military training courses.
Basij. The strength of the Basij, unlike that of the
Guard's cadre, has been stated frequently in the
Iranian media. Official Iranian statements and Basij
training practices suggest the following as of late
1982:
? A total of 2,500,000 people apparently had been
recorded as "members" of the Basij.
? Less than 20 percent-about 400,000-had re-
ceived some form of military training and served at
least a two- or three-month tour of duty at the front.
? Approximately 100,000 Basij probably are at the
front just before major battles, and most of those
sent there after July 1982 already had served at
least one three-month tour.
? Each month another 10,000 or 20,000 Basij may be
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MU"
We believe that notwithstanding the regime's incon-
sistent statements on Basij manning and its vested
interest in inflating the totals to demonstrate support
of the masses, official statements in late 1982 general-
ly reflect the actual maximum strength and rate of
growth of the Basij.
Other Armed Elements. We estimate that the three
armed organizations now under the control of the
Ministry of the Interior-Gendarmerie, National Po-
lice, and Revolutionary Komitehs-have about
100,000 men under arms. Each has had small num-
bers of men fighting the Iraqis throughout the war,
but their primary function is domestic security. (This
Ministry does not control the additional estimated
75,000 Revolutionary Guard cadre and Basij person-
nel' who also are involved in domestic security.) These
units compete for troops with the regular and irregu-
lar armed services. Men serving 'in the Gendarmerie,
Komitehs, and possibly the National Police are ex-.
empt from military duty.
Recruiting Systems
Under the Khomeini regime Iran has evolved a dual
approach to military recruitment. A conventional
system to recruit males 18 and 19 years old for
compulsory military service in the regular armed
forces exists alongside a separate system for recruiting
volunteers into the Revolutionary Guard and Basij.F-
apparently are willing to die in defense of Iran but are
Most regular Army conscripts, on the other hand, 25X1
The two recruiting systems differ in several respects,
according to Iranian press; but
most importantly in the motivation of the individual
recruit (see table 2). During the war, the Guard and
Basij have sent to the front about a half million
individuals who are fanatically committed to the
defense of the regime and exporting its Islamic ideas.
less likely to fight ardently to advance into Iraq.
Analysis of recruiting systems and military demogra-
phy also reveals a number of important aspects of
Iran's military manpower situation:
? Iran's. large pool of males eligible for service and
those with prior military service is largely untapped.
? Contrary to the regime's rhetoric, some 50 percent
of the troops fighting in the war with Iraq are
conscripts, not volunteers.
? The regime's elite Revolutionary Guard has been
forced to recruit men, particularly educated and
trainable men, from among conscripts.
? The regime has proposed a draft law to lengthen
compulsory service, tighten exemptions, and severe-
ly punish evasion.
? Lack of acentralized system for managing man-
power resources probably has led to inefficient
utilization of manpower, particularly of supporters
of the regime in the myriad of revolutionary organi-
zations.
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More than any other group fighting in the war, Iran's
Basij-from Basij-e Mostazafan, literally Mobiliza-
tion of the Oppressed-has captured the imagination
of observers. This is largely a result of Iranian and
Iraqi reports of children in their early teens leading
"human wave" attacks across minefields, selflessly
becoming "martyrs"for the Imam and Islam. For its
part, the Khomeini regime has carefully nurtured the
view that an "army of 20 million"Iranian youth
stand willing to sacrifice themselves in defense of
Iran and the regime. Basij clearly played a militarily
significant role in Iranian victories from late 1981 to
mid-1982, but analysis reveals that Iranian propa-
ganda has greatly inflated their contribution.
When the war with Iraq began, the Basil was a
loosely organized grassroots movement. It was
formed in late 1979 in response to Khomeini's call for
an "army of 20 million" to defend Iran against a
possible US attack. Before the war the Basij had
done little but hold political rallies in the major
cities, but to most leaders in the regime it was the
logical vehicle for rapidly mobilizing large numbers
of men to confront the Iraqi invasion in September
1980.
A mullah haranguing a crowd,
encouraging people to volunteer
for the front as youngsters
have. The children's sashes de-
clare their willingness to die or
God
During the first few months of the war, public calls
for fighters by local Basil "offices" throughout the
nation brought in thousands of volunteers who were
sent directly to the front. But there was no prior
coordination on how they would be organized,
equipped, and trained for combat. Some ended up in
ragtag Revolutionary Guard "units" and played an
important role in the bloody defense of Khorram-
shahr; most probably did little more than add to the
mass confusion created by thousands of refugees
fleeing the advancing Iraqis.
An insight into the problems of the Basij in the early
months of the war was provided by Dr. Mustafa
Chamran, Khomeini's representative to the Supreme
Defense Council and later commander of irregular
forces in Khuzestan. In an Iranian press interview in
late October 1980, he graciously thanked the volun-
teers for their enthusiasm but emphasized that "in
order to achieve a speedy victory, it is better to
undergo the necessary military training prior to
departure for the battlefronts.'
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Basij Manning in November 1982:
Official Claims Vary Widely
Hojjat-ol Eslam Salek, head of the Basij: "The Basil
has so far dispatched over 250,000 volunteers to the
fronts ... The Basil has more than 20 million
volunteers at its disposal."
Conscription is the primary source of personnel for
the Army-even more important than it was under
the Shah. The percentage of all Army personnel who
were conscripts was 50 percent in 1969, growing to 60
percent in 1976.
President Khamenei, quoting Basil head Salek: "To-
day we have more than 400,000 battle-hardened men
and more- than 2,500,000 trained personnel."
Hojjat-ol Eslam Rafsanjani, Khomeini's representa-
tive to the Supreme Defense Council, quoting Basij
statistics: `In only one year, over 410,000 of the
children ... have taken part in training courses and
have been sent to the fronts one or two or three times
... 2,500,000 people have been trained in the same
period ...'
Editorial in Kayhan International: "In three years,
2,500,000 of our people have been trained and
450,000 have been sent to the warfronts ... in 6,000
centers of mosques we have 9,000 groups which
encompass 2,500,000 people who can use arms, can
defuse bombs or landmines, and so forth. "
Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the Revolutionary
Guard: "... there are over 500,000 of the Basil at
the fronts. "
Conscription. The regular military's conscription sys-
tem in many respects is the same as it was under the
Shah, although basic changes in the 1972 conscription
law have been proposed. Analysis of Iranian press
statements indicates the system still is managed main-
ly by the Gendarmerie through its offices in major
cities and towns, although in some rural areas draft
registration now takes place at the local mosque.
Those selected are called up at 19 years of age, lightly
screened, trained at military facilities, and, in war-
time, sent to serve two years in the active armed
forces.
Revolutionary Guard and Basij. The political-ideolog-
ical criteria for screening new Guard members are
more stringent than for its Basij members or any of
the other armed forces, according to public statements
by Iranian officials. The selection process is aimed at
preserving the political and ideological purity of the
regime's main security force. Interested men can
volunteer by going directly to Guard offices with a
letter from their local mullah. Others are identified in
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Table 2
Iranian Military Recruiting Systems
Primary source of manpower
Conscription
Volunteers
Volunteers
Secondary sources of manpower
Volunteers, reserve recall, and
contract employees
Conscripts and contract em-
ployees
None
Age of most recruits
19
17 to mid-twenties?
14 to 18
Initial military training
Peacetime: 20 weeks; wartime:
nine weeks
1 to 28 days
Wartime only: 1 to 28 days
18 months (24 months pro-
posed)
Primarily career; conscripts
same as Army
Term of service in wartime
24 months (32 months pro-
posed)
Primarily career; conscripts
same as Army
Voluntary, but normally 30 to
90 days
Recall status
Probably only in war or general
mobilization
Conscripts same as Army
Voluntary only (many now serv-
ing 2nd, 3rd, and 4th tours)
Hierarchy of motivations in war
with Iraq
Nationalism, defense-of Iran,
and anti-Arab feelings
Ideological, defense of regime
and Khomeinism, nationalism,
and anti-Arab feelings
Ideological, defense of regime
and Khomeinism, nationalism,
and anti-Arab feelings
Basij training courses or recommended for member-
ship by Guard members. Prospective recruits then are
investigated by "the spiritual leaders of Qom and the
personal representative of Ayatollah Khomeini with
respect to level of belief in the Islamic Republic and
lack of attachment to East or West," according to.
Guard Deputy Commander Shamkhani. The few
descriptions available to us from the press probably
overstate the efficiency of the selection process, but
they reflect the regime's emphasis on bringing in only
politically reliable personnel.
Over the course of the war, the methods of acquiring
manpower for the Basij have become more systematic.
Initially an administrative nightmare, the Basij now
has a national-level staff within the Revolutionary
Guard headquarters that oversees 10 regions that,
correspond to the Guard's nationwide administrative
regions. By December 1982 the Basij staff controlled
9,050 "resistance centers"-groups formed in
mosques and villages where volunteers register-and
6,107 training camps. The national staff instructs
Basij offices in each locale to issue calls for volunteers
through Friday sermons at the local mosques and
through the mass media
Elderly Basil among other POWs captured by
Iraqis in February 1983 battle on the Doveyrich
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Revolutionary Guard Selection Process
Membership in the corps has particular sensitivity,
and the guards have to be picked with utmost care.
Fortunately the department in charge of picking the
guards has continuously developed and discovered
new methods that prevent the infiltration of undesir-
able elements into the corps. The Guard now has a
vast department called Reception with methods of its
own, and even many of the ministries and governmen-
tal organizations are inclined to use these experiences
and this organization in choosing their own personnel.
Guard and Basij Calls for Volunteers
In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful
... it is required of all Tehran mosques-those bases
for prayer and struggle-each to earmark a group of
22 people who have undergone military training for
preparation and assignment as soon as possible, and
to send them to the headquarters of the Basij in the
Imam Khomeini Mosque ... with a written recom-
mendation. These groups, after gathering ... will be
sent to the west of the country.
26 September 1980
June 1982
After an initial interview, a complete investigation is
taken of the volunteer's background before and after
the revolution, his ethical qualities, political posi-
tions, social activities, conduct in family, neighbor-
hood and place of work. The volunteers are asked to
name references who also are investigated. After
these requirements have been satisfied, the volunteer
must ... first register with the Basij ... Then they
must be recommended by a special member of the
Basij to the Guard personnel unit. Those accepted by
the Guard must also spend three months'service in
the Basij, where they will be evaluated by the recom-
mending member. With reevaluations, they will be
accepted into the Guard.
September 1982
In the name of God ... right now whoever has the
power to go to the fronts should present himself to the
responsible officials and if he is needed at the fronts,
then he should go to the fronts. And it is more
necessary now than at any other time ... There is a
great need for the trained and educated forces to be
sent to the fronts ... I, as the Friday Imam of Yasuj,
ask whoever can do so to answer the call of the Imam
and go to the Guards committee for registration.
14 April 1983
movement to spread Khomeini's message within Iran
than as a military recruiter. Anyone who will pro-
claim Khomeini as his leader apparently is eligible to
join the Basij's mass membership, and anyone re-
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questing combat duty apparently is allowed to go.
At times, thousands of people have responded to these
calls, so many that, occasionally, the Basij claims in
the press that it cannot process and train them all and
Members are predominantly children of elementary
and secondary school age, but adults of all age groups
also are represented.
must conduct a lottery to determine who will get the
privilege of being sent to the front.
the Basij is having difficulty
getting enough volunteers for frontline duty.
Moreover, a comparison of Basij membership to Basij
personnel who have been sent to the front-2,500,000
versus 400,000-strongly suggests that the Basij has
been even more important to the regime as a mass
To identify prospective members and fighters, the
Basij sponsors rallies and classes. Such "first-stage
training," according to Iranian officials, is designed
primarily to'spread the precepts of the Khomeini
revolution to the masses, particularly those in rural
areas. It also is supposed to identify those who will be
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sent to "second-stage" military training before going
to the front. We do not know the qualifications for
combat duty, but old men and children as young as 10
have been sent into combat. The bulk of the fighters,
according to the Iranian press, however, are poorly
educated, highly religious males aged 13 to 18.
Manpower Problems
The Khomeini regime has sought to create an image
at home and abroad that it has an "army of 20
million" ready to sacrifice itself to bring down the
Iraqi regime and spread Khomeini's Islam abroad.
Analysis of Iran's military manpower, however, re-
veals the regime faces a significantly different
situation:
? Iran's military commitment-measured by the ratio
of males eligible for military service to males on
active duty-is less in wartime than that of some
other Middle Eastern states in peacetime.
? The regime has insufficient volunteers to man the
present forces and has had to continue the Shah's
conscription system to man the regular military.
The Army has acquired nearly all its manpower by
the draft, and even the elite Revolutionary Guard
has been forced to select men from the ranks of
conscripts. .
? The number of Basij youngsters volunteering for
action on the front apparently reached a peak by
mid-1982. Many and probably most of the Basij
that volunteered during 1982 and early 1983 were
the most fanatically committed who already had
been to the front more than once.
? The Army and the Guard have had increasing
difficulty acquiring and retaining sufficient num-
bers of men capable of learning to handle and
maintain even the relatively unsophisticated equip-
ment in the ground forces.
Level of Commitment. At any given time, only about
5 percent of the Iranian males eligible for military
duty are serving in the national defense. By this
measure, Iran's military commitment is lower than
that of most other Middle Eastern states in peacetime
(see table 3). If all domestic security elements were
included, the percentage of men under arms would
Table 3
Comparative Levels of National Defense
Commitment, 1983
Country
Number of Persons
Share of
Eligible
Total
Eligible Males Males in
Males in
Population,
Ages 15-49
National
National
1983
Defense' Defense
(percent)
Iran
41,810,000
9,600,000
450,000
5
Iraq
14,480,000
3,300,000
650,000
20
Egypt
45,110,000
11,190,000
450,000
4
Jordan
3,620,000
820,000
65,000:
8
Syria
10,080,000
2,220,000
300,000
14
Israel
4,220,000
1,010,000
200,000
20
'Men in paramilitary, gendarmerie, and border police organizations
who serve primarily domestic security functions are not included in
this table. Including them would double Iran's national defense
commitment and raise that of others a few percentage points.
increase to 7 percent. If the few hundred thousand
other people in revolutionary organizations directly or
indirectly supporting the war effort also were added to
the domestic security forces, Iran's "military" com-
mitment might rise to about 10 percent. Nonetheless,
Iran's large pool of military manpower is largely
untapped.
Iran has an estimated 9,600,000 males aged 15
through 49 who theoretically are eligible for military
duty (see table 4). The Khomeini regime probably
perceives the pool of eligible males to be even larger
because the Basij draws some of its manpower from
the 2,670,000 male children 10 to 14 years old. Draft
callups Iran has publicly issued during the war have
encompassed some 3 million men. This group is
diluted by a number of factors but should be sufficient
to keep a much larger force in the field and absorb
375,000 wartime casualties. The group includes the
nearly 500,000 young men who annually become
eligible for conscription as well as supplementary calls
for men as old as 26. Iraq, on the other hand, with a
smaller pool of manpower, has had to call up men as
old as 35.
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Table 4
Iranian Total Population and Males Eligible for
Military Service, 1982-83
Total population,
of which
40,550,000
41,810,000
Total males
20,580,000
21,220,000
0-4
3,720,000
3,810,000
5-9
3,080,000
3,200,000
10-14
2,590,000
2,670,000
15-19
2,210,000
2,270,000
20-24
1,860,000
1,920,000
25-29
1,580,000
1,620,000
30-34
1,270,000
1,330,000
35-39
970,000
1,020,000
40-44
770,000
790,000
45-49
640,000
650,000
50-54
530,000
550,000
55-59
440,000
450,000
60-64
340,000
350,000
Over 64
580,000
590,000
Total males eligi-
ble (age 15 through 49)
9,300,000
9,600,000
Failing Volunteer Drives. Official Iranian press state-
ments suggest that, despite Iran's large untapped
manpower, since mid-1982, the regime has had
mounting difficulty acquiring sufficient volunteers for
the war. Evidence that shortfalls in recruiting drives
have become chronic includes:
? Basij?officials and the press have been blamed for
poor response to volunteer drives. Colonel Shirazi,
Commander of the Army, said that press coverage
was inadequate to "attract sufficient forces."
(August, September 1982)
Ethnic groups. The non-Persian ethnic groups and
tribes have a low rate of volunteering for the Basij,
according to Iranian official statements, and proba-
bly present government authorities with major diffi-
culties in serving draft notices.
Medical Status. Forty percent of conscripts were
rejected as unfit for service under the Shah, but by
changing the rules for medical exemption, the new
draft law would take a higher percentage.
Literacy. Many military specialties require litera-
cy-about 40 percent of the male population is
literate-but as in the days of the Shah, few men
would be rejected by the Army or Revolutionary
Guard today for illiteracy. Literate males probably
prefer the Air Force and Navy to wartime duty in the
Army or Revolutionary Guard.
Revolutionary duty. A large but undetermined num-
ber of young men are involved in the myriad of
revolutionary organizations important to the regime's
efforts to Islamize Iran in its own image. Members of
from the draft but probably can avoid it.
most of these organizations get no legal exemption
Family exemption. For most of the war, one son of
families with martyrs has been exempt from military
service. Since casualties during much of the war have
been disproportionately high among volunteers, this
rule has had greater impact on the more fanatical
supporters of the regime than the average draft-age
male.
? Appeals for volunteers increasingly emphasize the
need for personnel with combat experience. Indeed,
an increasing percentage of Basij going to the front
have been there more than once. (Since July 1982)
? A regional Revolutionary Guard commander stated
that "We are faced with one issue that has so far
stopped the operation. This is the question of a
shortage of manpower. The Imam, as you are
aware, stressed this issue. The Basij centers are
currently ready to accept you." (September 1982)
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? Mohsen Rezai, the Commander of the Guard, stat-
ed that the Basij "needs 10 times the forces now at
its disposition." Later in the fall he visited outlying
provinces to promote recruitment "so as to send
more forces to the battlefields." (September,
November 1982)
? Khomeini had to give calls for volunteers the added
authority of a religious decree orfatwah. (Novem-
ber 1982)
The regime's pool of committed supporters is drained
by a wide variety of factors, but the requirements of
the internal security forces-the Gendarmerie, Na-
tional Police, local Basij vigilantes, and Komitehs-
are particularly heavy. The Gendarmerie officers
academy received 10,000 applications from college
graduates before selecting 800 of "the most faithful
and committed brothers," according to official Irani-
an statements in the press. The high number of
college applicants suggests the Gendarmerie is a
favored way to avoid the draft. The Police presumably
also have similar tests of religious reliability, and last
year both organizations were authorized to grow. The
Police alone were short 20,000 men last year. In
addition, members of the Komitehs are among the
regime's firmest supporters but are exempt from
compulsory service at the front
A variety of other "revolutionary organizations," also
draw volunteers from the pool of males eligible for
military service. These groups could number several
hundred thousand supporters of the regime who would
not be available for frontline duty
The Quality Problem. Iranian official statements
reveal the regime is concerned not only about absolute
shortages but also about shortages of qualified mili-
tary manpower:
? The Majlis (parliament) authorized the Ministry of
Defense in late 1981 to hire anyone needed for
"combative and technical occupations ... to make
up for shortages of manpower in all organizations of
the military." Even draft age men with an elemen-
tary school education could be hired under contract
in lieu of their compulsory service if they agreed to
work in technical specialities for four years.
? Calls for volunteers to the Guard and Basij increas-
ingly include pleas for men with basic skills. For
example, the Guard Commander noted the need for
volunteers in November 1982, "especially for those
who are specialists in various areas such as mechan-
ics, drivers, and support and logistic services."
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Selected Revolutionary Organizations Draining the
Pool of Military Manpower
Reconstruction Crusade (Jehad-e Sazandegi). Mem-
bers may number a few hundred thousand and are
involved in nationwide efforts to build and maintain
roads, bridges, and civic facilities. It performs an
important role in military engineering activities at the
front
Foundation of the Deprived (Bonyad-e Mostazafin)
In charge of confiscating property of the Shah and
other wealthy figures of his regime.
Martyrs' Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid). Is responsi-
ble for looking after the families of those killed-
martyrs-or disabled in the war, the regime's revolu-
tionary analogy to the US Veterans' Administration.
Office of Do Good and Stop Bad Deeds (Amr be
Maaru've Nahy az Monkery Members are mainly
young, ambitious clerical students who ensure Islam-
ic moral codes are not being violated in homes.
? This spring the regime issued public draft calls for
high school graduates between 19 and 26 years of
age; which reveal a continuing shortage of literate
or competent personnel; previous calls to some of
these age groups apparently had not brought an
adequate response.
In addition to the difficulty of getting qualified
people, a number of factors have reduced the overall
quality of Iran's fighting personnel, which in our view
will seriously, impair their ability to fight a conven-
tional war for the next several years: ?
? Half of the ground force is comprised of ill-trained,
poorly disciplined paramilitary forces that will not
be integrated into the regular military unless the
regime fundamentally changes its policies.
? The Army-Guard dichotomy precludes efficient use
of all types of military resources, particularly scarce
instructors and training facilities.
? The regime's fear of foreign dependence has denied
the Iranian military access to valuable expertise and
training.
? Selection criteria that value political reliability over
mental capacity and experience shrink the pool of
qualified manpower.
? Closure of the universities and interruption of na-
tionwide literacy programs reduced the quality of
the manpower pool. Most volunteers in the paramili-
tary forces are uneducated and illiterate.
? Inefficiency of existing recruiting, selection, and
assignment procedures hampers effective use of
manpower.
? The stigma of being in the military continues-
despite the regime's positive treatment of the regu-
lar military in the press-and will slow recruiting of
the best personnel for a long time.
We believe most of the problems with manpower
quality are a result of policies that the regime consid-
ers fundamental to the revolution and is unlikely to
alter soon. Some of these factors are endemic to a
developing society and hampered recruiting of the
best people even under the Shah. As a result, we
expect shortages of qualified personnel to continue for
the near future. Iran will continue to experience
considerable difficulty employing its current military
forces and will not be able to rapidly assimilate large
quantities of new materiel soon
Flagging Will To Fight. Evidence also is mounting
that Iranian troops are less willing to fight major
battles under present battlefield circumstances, a
situation only recently of concern to the regime. In
early March 1983 the Iranian Minister of Energy
stated that the war was "sapping the revolutionary
spirit from the people" and causing increased deser-
tions from battlefield units,
The
instances desertion this summer are most meaning-
ful to the regime because they involve Revolutionary
Guard personnel
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Causes
Iran's manpower shortages are caused by a variety of
factors, the most important of which are changing
motivations of the individual soldier, massive casual-
ties with no identifiable gains on the ground, and poor
management
Changing Motivations. We believe that the shortages
of volunteers and eroding morale reflect a fundamen-
tal change in the motivations of many of Iran's troops,
partly because they no longer are fighting for their
own land but invading that of another. The motivation
problems experienced by the Iranians during their
attempts to invade Iraqi territory are analogous to
those experienced by the Iraqis when they were
fighting inside Iran.
Throughout most of the war regular military person-
nel were motivated primarily by nationalism, that is,
by the desire to defend Iran. Although the bulk of the
Basij and Revolutionary Guard troops are motivated
by Islam and devotion to Khomeini, the defense of
Iran almost certainly has also been a strong compo-
nent of their will to fight. Some Iranians
ave consistently argued that most Iranian fighters
Casualties. Another major cause for Iran's manpower
problems is the high rate of casualties. We estimate
that at least 125,000 troops have been killed and
another 250,000 wounded. Hints that concerns over
heavy casualties had become a serious policy issue
first appeared during the fighting near Basrah in July
Although we have lost a number of beloved ones in
this war ... what our country has achieved is much
greater and more valuable than all these losses ...
Those who are pessimistic, who are sitting in a corner
and who point out the deficiencies and who ask why
so many of us have been killed, why the situation is
such and such, and other such questions, they never
look at the other side to see what we have achieved.
Of course, we, and everyone, know how many of us
have been killed, crippled, or injured ... with such
thinking, criticism also should be leveled against His
Holiness the Lord of the Martyrs (Imam Hosein).
23 December 1982
By the fall of 1982 a variety of indicators strongly
suggested that excessive casualties were a primary
issue in a debate within the regime over whether to
cism apparently had reached levels requiring Khomei-
ni to respond to war critics pointedly and at some
length. He went so far as to suggest that criticism of
the regime's war policy and the large number of
casualties was tantamount to criticism of Imam Ho-
sein, Shiism's most important martyr.
Nonetheless, it was not until after another failure in
early February 1983-the first stage of Operation Val
Fajr on the Doveyrich River front-and another
8,000 Iranian dead that the regime first publicly
stated that its decisions on the battlefield were linked
to its concern over excessive casualties. This is a
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Some of the 8,000 Iranian dead after the abortive Baghdad Observer
attack on the Doveyrich River front, February
significant departure from the regime's policy of
exalting death on the battlefield as martyrdom in the
cause of Islam. The statement takes on additional
significance because it was made along with leaders'
repeated statements that Val Fair's next phase would
be the final offensive. Although the regime had
described other offensives as "final"-meaning they
would lead to an Iraqi collapse-by March the regime
appeared to be reassuring the population that what-
ever the outcome of the battle, it would desist from
further moves that would result in heavy casualties.
While planning the next phase of Val Fair, the
behind-the-scenes debate on whether to continue the
war and how to reduce casualties apparently raged
"If we should decide to fight the Iraqis and achieve
victory at any price, then it would be sufficient to aim
our artillery at Iraqi cities ... our combatants ...
have shown that if it becomes necessary to cross over
to Iraqi territory, they can do so. This shows their
might. But we shall not do it, because the lives of our
combatants aremore precious than anything else. We
are trying to end the war with as few martyrs. as
possible. You who are going to the battlefield must
not resort to any measure in order to be martyred, for
martyrdom is not the chief objective of war." 25X1
Hojjat-ol Eslam Rafsanjani
9 May 1983
The failure forced the regime to again evaluate its
position on the war, and casualties were again a major
feature-possibly the most significant feature-of its
deliberations. On 9 May Rafsanjani again publicly
linked battlefield decisions to casualties but pointed
out that "martyrdom is. not the chief objective of the
war.'
Rafsanjani probably was joined by President Kha-
menei, Prime Minister Musavi, Chief of the Joint
Staff Zahirnezhad, and many high-ranking profes-
sional military officers in arguing against another
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invasion attempt soon, according to public statements
by Iranian officials We believe
those who were predisposed to continue large-scale
attacks and were less sensitive to the broader implica-
tions of casualties probably include radical clerics
such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Commander of the
Revolutionary Guard Rezai. and Army Commander
Shirazi.
Iran's estimated 375,000 casualties are considerable,
but still less than 1 percent of its population of nearly
42 million. The regime's concern, however, is ampli-
fied by the disproportionate toll that war casualties
have taken among its supporters. One contributing
factor is the strategy of leading attacks with Guard
and Basij units, which are comprised of the regime's
most ardent supporters. Moreover, the bulk of the
paramilitary volunteers come from the poorer ele-
ments of the Persian ethnic group who are the
primary supporters of the regime. This concentration
of the burden of the war probably is a major factor
slowing recruitment drives.
Poor Management. The administrative havoc caused
by lack of cooperation among the various organiza-
tions requiring manpower probably limits the regime's
efforts to tap the pool of males eligible for military
duty. It forces the paramilitary recruiters to depend
on public calls for men on an ad hoc basis whenever
an operational need arises. In addition, it probably has
allowed a large number of young men to avoid their
military obligation by serving in the various revolu-
tionary organizations, despite the fact that only Komi-
teh members are afforded a legal exemption. Finally,
lack of centralized management of wartime manpow-
er resources may to some extent negate the regime's
attempts to resolve manpower shortfalls by issuing a
new draft law and stren thening the reserve system.
I
The regime's first serious attempt to centralize man-
agement of wartime manpower and materiel appar-
ently began in July 1982.2 A press account of Iranian
' In the first month of the war, the Prime Minister established a
group to coordinate the government's war efforts. Even if the
government had developed an administrative structure capable of
managing such an effort, it probably would have had little jurisdic-
tion over the various revolutionary organizations that derive their
attempts to centralize manpower management at that
time revealed the fundamental problems the regime
has controlling the anarchic tendencies of competing
groups throughout society. This was part of the
regime's overall effort to define more narrowly the
authority of many revolutionary organizations and to
bring them under at least nominal government con-
trol. It entailed a meeting of 20 representatives of
several governmental and revolutionary institutions in
July 1982. The problems of managing war manpower
and materiel capabilities were aired, including the
lack of:
? A "unified policy toward mobilizing all
capabilities."
? "Precise statistical information" on the existing
forces and materiel contribution.
? Cooperation among organizations
The manpower management study group decided to
form another organization to study the problem fur-
ther. According to an Iranian press account, an
organization called the Mobilization of Capabilities
(Basij-e Emkanat) was to hold weekly sessions and
create other commissions to study wartime resource
management problems and to develop a plan. That
organization did not appear to have authority to
implement recommendations, a step that probably
would require laws passed by the Majlis (parliament)
and much additional debate in the regime.
The Ministry of Defense was given a key role in
bringing order to resource management, but the revo-
lutionary organizations feared a loss of their autono-
my. Representatives of the Reconstruction Crusade
and other revolutionary groups, according to the press
account, emphasized that the new organization must
retain a "revolutionary essence" and not become
subject to "bureaucratic relations." They correctly
feared that centralization could cost them unique
Islamic prerogatives they enjoy in a more fluid institu-
tional environment.
We do not know if the Mobilization of Capabilities
ever became a functioning organization with the
authority to resolve Iran's manpower problems.
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In the Name of the Most Exalted. In the present
conditions every individual who is capable of going to
the front should notify the concerned authorities, and
if it is considered that he is needed on the fronts, it is
incumbent upon him to go and this has priority over
every other kind of work.
regime, however, these issues have profound impor-
tance. Religious issues that probably were at the heart
of the debate included:
? Concept of duty. Despite its literal English meaning,
the edict does not make war duty a religious
responsibility. The edict used a nonreligious term
that defined duty as a general obligation "incum-
bent" on every individual.
Solutions
Iran could eliminate its shortfalls in military man-
power by implementing a general mobilization. Such
a step would be highly disruptive, but it would give
the regime a legal basis for impressing any males it
desired, particularly those who have been trained in
military specialties and civilians who have basic skills
needed by the military. Our analysis of press state-
ments by Iranian officials suggests that the regime
seriously considered implementing a general mobiliza-
tion in November 1982 but rejected the idea, appar-
ently on political, religious, and practical grounds. F-
Khomeini's Mobilization Edict. On 7 November
1982 Ayatollah Khomeini issued an edict (fatwah)
that was literally a general mobilization order but fell
far short of being the religious equivalent of a general
mobilization order. Afatwah is the most authoritative
and binding form of religious directive that can be
issued by a senior Shia ayatollah. The edict's issuance
demonstrates the regime's need to take unusual meas-
ures to get more volunteers. Subsequent statements by
Iranian officials reveal that general mobilization was
the subject of discussions-probably even heated de-
bate-within the regime: President Khamenei and
Prime Minister Musavi were against general mobili-
zation, and the commanders of the Army and Guard
were for it.
The debate over thefatwah appears to have involved
arcane religious issues that in most other nations
would be irrelevant. Under Khomeini's theocratic
? Concept of holy war. The edict does not explicitly 25X1
call for a jihad-which would be equivalent to the
civil concept of general mobilization-against the
Iraqis. Were the issue up to some of the more
radical Iranian clerics and possibly Khomeini him-
self, holy war would have been declared against the
Iraqis long ago. Muslim doctrine, however, pro-
scribes calling a jihad against other Muslims.
? Authority to redefine duty and declare jihad. Call-
ing a jihad and redefining war duty could be done
authoritatively in Iran only if enough of the senior
Iranian ayatollahs-few of whom are members of
the regime-collectively acted. Such a group offi-
cially could declare the Iraqis infidels-as Khomei- 25X1
ni and other religious leaders already have done
publicly-and then institute a jihad. In November 25X1
the senior ayatollahs,
balked at Khomeini's attempts because declaring
jihad against another Muslim state is contrary to
Islamic doctrine
Despite Khomeini's strong desire to continue the
invasion of Iraq, he did not declare jihad on his own
authority, possibly because it carried too high a risk of
being rejected both by the senior ayatollahs and by
the mass of Iranians. The regime presumably could
attempt to institute general mobilization using civil,
rather than religious authorization. Given the conflict
in the regime over how to address the casualty
problem, we believe that option also would risk failure
and cause additional rifts in the regime.
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The Army-Guard Call for Manpower
... In the course of thanking the beloved nation for
its unprecedented response to the edict (fatwah) of the
Imam of the nation and shadow of God for people to
go to the battlefronts, we direct the attention of the
national officials and various classes of people to
some of the priorities and necessities that exist at the
front and behind the lines:
? Since activities behind the lines, from helping to
mobilize the people to helping with obtaining provi-
sions and support for the fronts, are especially
important, it is therefore requested that national
officials and authorities, the provincial governors,
and officials of organizations give top priority con-
sideration to the above matters, for the desired
management of the war directly depends on this.
? It is necessary that those who have had military
training or who have been to the fronts previously,
as well as those who are specialists or are familiar
with engineering, or mechanical repairs, go to the
front with the cooperation of military people
throughout the country, so that, with the full
cooperation of the armed forces and the help of the
fighters of Islam, the evil of Saddam's infidel
followers will be eliminated as quickly as possible.
We have evidence of only one minor religious leader
interpreting Khomeini's edict as making service on
the front the religious obligation of each Muslim. On
10 November 1983, the Friday Imam of Shiraz
broadcast a sermon making war duty a condition for a
favorable reception in the afterlife that concluded: "It
is my ardent desire that all friends must leave their
work and join" other martyrs. The Commander of the
Guard repeated the substance of Khomeini's decree
calling on "all able persons to go to the front," adding
that "the more forces there were on the fronts the
better." Guard offices in Tehran used the fatwah for
added authority in what have become standard calls
for "all brothers who have not had the opportunity to
be dispatched to the front." Other groups-the cabi-
net, government workers, political-ideological workers
in the Ministry of Defense-announced their readi-
ness to answer the edict by going to the front, a
gesture of no substance given subsequent events.F
? All of those whose continued presence in the coun-
try's offices and organizations is in some way
necessary, based on the discretion of organizational
and ministry officials, must remain, so that, with
the cooperation of officials and adherence to priori-
ties, advisable decisions can be made with regard to
sending them to the front. In conclusion, it is
necessary to note that, in the event of the emergence
of other necessities and priorities, the matter will be
put before the martyr-nurturing nation. We are
desirous of the glory and greatness of Islam and
God.
Col. Seyyed Shirazi, Army
Commander
Mohsen Rezai, Revolutionary Guard
Commander
7 November 1982
Army-Guard Desire for Mobilization. A unique call
for support from the nation was issued on the same
day as Khomeini's edict by the two top commanders
at the front, Colonel Shirazi, Commander of the
Army, and Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the Revo-
lutionary Guard. The statement-the first such joint
address to the nation-is important not only because
it amplifies Khomeini's edict but also because it
strongly implies that elements in the government are
not placing high enough priority on the war.
Unlike Khomeini's decree that all able-bodied person-
nel go to the front, the commanders explicitly wanted
all trained and specialist personnel to go. Nonetheless,
if the statement had had legal force, it, too, would be
tantamount to a general mobilization.
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Khamenei Deflates Khomeini's Edict. In fact, neither
general mobilization nor holy war was implemented
by the decrees, a point that President Khamenei took
pains to make clear the day afer they were issued. He
was granted an audience with Khomeini in order to
clarify whether the edict required everyone to go to
the front. Following the audience, Khamenei an-
nounced the following:
The Imam said his message did not mean that
everyone should go to the fronts. It meant that
when there is a need-and there is a need on the
frontline for additional personnel-and this need is
communicated to the public by military command-
ers, then, according to this decree, it is necessary to
meet this need by sending ordinary people regard-
less of their job. At present the commanders have
not made such a request, and there is no need for
such a huge force on that level. Therefore, govern-
ment employees and other organizations should
continue working at their job. At present there is
no need for them to be sent to the fronts. Fortu-
nately, from the beginning of the war up to now
there has been no need for such a general mobiliza-
tion, and we hope there will be no need to mobilize
everyone in the future. If such a situation arises,
then everyone, in whatever job, should leave for the
fronts.
Khamenei's reinterpretation essentially reversed Kho-
meini's edict. It directly conflicted with Rezai's asser-
tion that "the more manpower on the front the better
for combat operations." It ignored the fact that
military commanders-Shirazi and Rezai-had is-
sued a statement of need for previously trained and
specialist personnel. Both the Khamenei and Shirazi-
Rezai statements agree that government personnel
need not go to the fronts now. In an interview with
Iranian media representatives a few days later, Prime
Minister Musavi stated that the nation was "ready,
when necessary, to administer the coup de grace to
(the Iraqi) regime with a general mobilization," an-
other effort to reassure the public that, whatever it
had heard, this drastic step had not been taken. F_
Arguments Against Mobilization. Our analysis sug-
gests a number of reasons why the regime rejected
general mobilization. From a practical standpoint, the
regular military, Revolutionary Guard, and Basij
could not train, equip, and manage a massive influx of
personnel quickly enough to influence battles then
planned. In addition, the already weakened economy
would undergo widespread disruption if large num-
bers of employees were required to go to the front.F-
We believe that political considerations, however,
probably were more important factors in the decision
to reject general mobilization. Using coercion to place
more men under arms not only would field a less
motivated force but could place under arms a larger
number of men who would threaten the regime.
In the context of its broader concerns over casualties
and domestic support for the war, the regime probably
was unwilling to take the political risks of instituting
more coercive recruitment measures. We believe that
if the regime had the full support of the population for
its war policies, some leaders, including Khomeini,
probably would not hesitate to continue throwing ill-
equipped infantry into battle in hopes Iraq would run
out of men first. But our analysis indicates that over
the past year the rate of volunteering has slowed
considerably.
Other Options
Instead of a general mobilization, the Khomeini re-
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teers, tightened draft regulations, and formed new
volunteer regular and paramilitary reserve units, all'of
which are only temporary and partial solutions to its
manpower problems.
New Draft Law. After a yearlong debate in the
Majlis, the regime is about to replace the Shah's 1972
conscription law with an Islamic one. According to
Iranian officials, the new law will lengthen the periods
of service, tighten exemptions, and reduce the chance
of evasion. Exemptions for students and professionals
that primarily benefited the elite under the Shah
would be drastically curtailed. Men previously ex-
empted for certain medical problems like poor eye-
sight and flat feet would serve in military support
units. Even theological students would serve after
exemptions for the period of their schooling expire. I
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? Requires males to register in their 18th year to be
drafted in their 19th year.
? Establishes rules by which males 15 through 18
years of age can volunteer for military service and
be accepted if they "have the physical and mental
ability' -not further specified for military serv-
ice. (This may be an attempt to legalize aspects of
the Basij volunteer system.)
? Lengthens the period of peacetime compulsory serv-
ice in the regular military from one and a half to
two years.
? Lengthens the period of service in the "precaution-
aryforce"from six to eight months. This reserve
force can be activated during wartime, which in
effect would extend compulsory service to 32
months.
? Changes the reserve categories to which conscripts
will be assigned following compulsory service'and
time in the `precautionary force"- primary reserves
(10 years), secondary reserves (10 years).
? Establishes a legal basis for reviewing the political
reliability-or, as the draft law states, the "moral
and security competence"-of conscripts.
? Tightens significantly the rules for draft exemp-
tions.
Draft evasion is so rampant that the regime considers
the law's severe punishment for noncompliance to be
one of the most important changes. Failure to register
for the draft or to appear for duty when selected long
has been subject to legal sanctions, including prison
terms. The new law, however, would deprive draft
offenders of a livelihood. For example, a draft evader
would not be able to get a driver's license, sell
property, get government financial aid or housing,
and, in time of war, would be proscribed from using
utilities like running water and electricity. Although
the proposed law is not yet in force, press statements
by Gendarmerie officials suggest some of the more
stringent measures are already being enforced.
At the same time, however, the proposed law opens
other loopholes that benefit the new religious elite.
Drafted theological students are accorded military
rank commensurate with their level of religious
schooling. In addition, the cleric-dominated Supreme
'Defense Council is able to exempt high-ranking mul-
lahs. Finally, another law was sent in early 1982 to
the Majlis, according to the Iranian press, which
would allow the armed men in local Komitehs to
perform domestic security jobs in lieu of compulsory
military service.
New Volunteer Army Reserve Units. Following the
debate over whether, to institute general mobilization,
the Army was authorized on 24 November 1982 to
develop a system of volunteer reserve units called
Qods (Persian for "Jerusalem") Reserve Battalions,
according to official Iranian statements. This consti-
tuted the first expansion of the Army that the regime
has authorized since the early months of the war. The
battalions have permanent facilities at Army garri-
sons throughout the country and are manned by
volunteers who have completed their compulsory
service.
The Qods system, as described by President Kha-
menei, gives the military "access to a vast voluntary
force that will greatly increase the forces at the
disposal of the armed forces." The Army moved
quickly to form some of the battalions and place them
in combat. Within two weeks of budget authorization,
most major Iranian combat units and training centers
had been issued instructions and publicity materials
concerning the battalions, and by 9 December 1982
the first units were formed. We do not know how
many men volunteered for the units, but the registra-
tion period was extended for 10 days, implying that
sufficient numbers were not immediately acquired.
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Paramilitary Reserve System. In mid-1983 the Revo-
lutionary Guard publicly announced its intention to
develop its own system to tap more rapidly the pool of
Basij personnel who have served at the front. No other
information is available, but the Guard apparently is
on the verge of developing a reserve force similar to
the active reserve system the Army has been develop-
ing since late 1982. Heretofore, the Basij has depend-
ed on the initiative of individuals to respond to
manning requirements for impending operations. To
maintain manning levels, we would expect the Guard
also to lengthen the one- to three-month tours of duty
that Basij personnel now serve.
Prospects
We do not believe that these steps will provide Iran
with the manpower it needs to resume frequent large-
scale attacks against the Iraqis. Unwilling to coerce a
larger percentage of recruits into the armed forces
and unable to acquire sufficient numbers of highly
motivated troops to mount large-scale attempts to
invade Iraq, Tehran, in our judgment, has been forced
to reduce the scale or frequency of attacks to lower
Iranian casualties to a level that could be replaced by
current recruiting methods. This entails giving up any
hope of bringing down Iraqi President Saddam Hu-
sayn by inflicting a major military defeat on Iraq.
Such a war of attrition could, with economic pressure
and subversion, bring down the Iraqi regime. Iran
could also initiate a long-term rearmament program
to raise conventional warfighting capability to match
Iraq's. This would bypass Iran's manpower problems
by substituting new weapons, increased firepower, and
conventional tactics for the heavy personnel losses
involved in human-wave tactics.
War of Attrition. The current military situation sug-
gests the regime already has reverted to a war of
attrition.
of pushing deep into Iraq soon.
military units suggest dispersal rather than concentra-
tion of forces. Iran appears to have given up any hope
Tehran's problems with recruiting and motivation of
military personnel are not serious enough to preclude
fighting a long-term war of attrition along the border
with occasional multibrigade attacks. Against Iraq's
vastly superior firepower, however, we believe such
attacks would have little prospect of advancing deep
into Iraq. Instead, the Iranians apparently are trying
to keep the Iraqi Army tied down while keeping the
Gulf and Syrian pipeline closed to Iraqi oil exports
Iran's attack near Haj Umran in July fits into such a
strategy.
the attack took place in
the mountains of northern Iraq, where the terrain
favors Iran's infantry and limits the effectiveness of
Iraq's armor, artillery, and airpower. Both of these
factors also tend to limit Iranian casualties)
At the same time, the location of the attack is
symbolic for dissident Iraqi Kurds. Haj Umran was
one of the major staging areas for Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, leader of the major Kurdish revolt against
Baghdad in 1974-75.
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A strategy of limited attacks using Iraqi dissidents
will limit Iran's personnel losses while exploiting the
ethnic strains in Iraqi society..Given Iran's limited
success in Iraqi Kurdistan, additional attacks can be
expected
The Rearmament Option. To win the war on the
battlefield by pushing deep into Iraq would require, in
our view, a massive Iranian rearmament program
designed to achieve conventional military superiority.
This option would allow the regime to resume fighting
a higher intensity war by exchanging politically unac-
ceptable casualty rates on the battlefield for new
equipment, increased firepower, and conventional tac-
tics. Iran has the economic and manpower potential to
achieve that goal, but we believe the effort would
require nearly a decade. This option also would
present the regime with possibly insurmountable polit-
ical barriers and immense practical problems.
The regime would have to abandon its cherished
domestic and foreign policies. To rearm quickly, Iran
would have to depend heavily on foreign suppliers and
advisers for several years, giving up the relative
independence achieved at the revolution's outset. It
also would have to decide on major Eastern or
Western arms suppliers, thereby giving up the policy
of depending on "neither East nor West." Nearly all
major suppliers so far have been politically unaccept-
able to the regime. Moreover, economic development
and war reconstruction programs would have to be
shelved indefinitely. And finally, the regime would
have to bring educated professionals back into the
military to handle the influx of sophisticated equip-
ment, another political risk we believe it is unlikely to
take soon. A consensus to rearm is unlikely in the
short term.
From a practical standpoint, the military could not .
readily absorb large amounts of equipment quickly. In
our view, the required numbers of educated and
trainable personnel are not now available to operate
and maintain existing equipment. The training estab-
lishment already is stretched beyond its capability to
provide even basic training. Several years and high
levels of foreign support would be required to train
enough Iranian troops and instructors just to absorb
replacement equipment.
Impact of the War. Iran has little prospect of bringing
down the regime of Saddam Husayn by military
action in the next few years, but its population
resources and economic situation give it a long-term
advantage over Iraq in a war of attrition. The burden
of keeping a large standing army in the field has a far
greater impact of Iraq's smaller population. More-
over, as long as the Gulf and the pipeline across Syria
are closed to Iraqi oil exports, Iraq's financial situa-
tion will continue to deteriorate and, together with the
strains of the three-year-old war, could eventually
bring down Saddam's regime.
During the next two years Iran probably will be able
to occupy large sections along the border in Iraqi
Kurdistan, some as large as a few hundred square
kilometers. The mountainous terrain there favors the
Iranian style of combat and reduces the importance of
Iraq's materiel advantage. Such gains are unlikely to
directly threaten the Iraqi regime in the short term,
however, because the remote sections of Kurdistan
always have been tenuously controlled by Baghdad. F
Continuing the war of attrition' in the north will not
impair Tehran's power either, even if an occasional
large-scale attack incurs heavy casualties. Nonethe-
less, the war continues to increase internal political
and economic pressures that have in the last two
months manifested themselves in widespread, demon-
strations in Iran's major cities. In addition, the re-
gime's policy of arming Kurds and giving them a role
in the war of attrition could backfire if the Kurds,
known for their shifting allegiances, eventually turn
on their Persian patrons
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Appendix A
Iran: Army Manning, September 1983
Total Army personnel
235,400-
269,000
Total combat
32-34
175,400-
189,000
64th Infantry
3-4
14,000-
19,000
3-4
15,000-
20,000
81st Armored
88th Armored
92nd Armored
Independent combat elements
84th Infantry Brigade
1
5,200
37th Armored Brigade
1
4,000
55th Airborne Brigade
1
5,400
23rd Special Forces Brigade
1
1,600
11th Artillery Group
3,000
22nd Artillery Group
3,000
33rd Artillery Group
3,000
44th Artillery Group
3,000
55th Artillery Group
3,000
Combat units formed during the war
30th Gorgan Infantry Brigade
1
4,300
40th Sarab Infantry Brigade
1
4,300
58th Zolfaqar Infantry Brigade
1
4,300
11 other new infantry battalions
7,700
12-20 Qods reserve battalions
5,400-
9,000
60,000-
80,000
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Appendix B
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Revolutionary Guard Manning
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Guard brigade is much smaller than a regular Army
brigade, usually the size of Army battalions and
sometimes as small as a company.
the first days of the revolution, the Guard had no
central organization and was more a collection of
followers of different powerful mullahs who were
loosely affiliated by the appellation "revolutionary
guard." Members of a number of these organizations
were, and some still are, called "revolutionary
guards" or pasdaran, a source of analytic difficulty.
Most members were young, illiterate, fanatical Mus-
lims, and many were ruffians out to profit from the
disorder created by the revolution.
Once given Ayatollah Khomeini's blessing, a narrowly
defined Revolutionary Guard organization has
emerged from the confusion of the early months of the
revolution to become the most powerful armed force
supporting the regime. The Guard has since evolved
from a loose confederation to a constitutionally ap-
proved organization with national and regional of-
fices, military control structures, its own government
ministry, and conventional military units.
Analysis of the manning of Guard conventional com-
units suggests that
between 50,000 and 150,000 men have been fight-
ing the Iraqis. Such analysis-relatively straightfor-
ward when applied to Army units-yields a wide
range of manning levels for the Guard because of the
hazy distinction between Guard cadre and Basij
elements,
and the haphazard structure of Guard units.
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