SEYCHELLES: THE MELLOWIWNG OF PRESIDENT RENE

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Seychelles:
The Mellowing of
President Rene
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 83-10155
October 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Seychelles:
The Mellowing of
President Rene
This paper was prepared by~ Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, with
biographic contributions from
the Office of Central Reference. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 83-10155
October 1983
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Seychelles:
The Mellowing of
President Rene
Key Judgments The brief history of independent Seychelles, an island state with a dual
Information available French and British colonial heritage, has been characterized by political
as of 15 September 1983 chaos and economic decline. Since Albert Rene took power in a bloodless
was used in this report.
coup, in June 1977 just a year after independence-the country has
experienced a half dozen coup scares, a foreign mercenary invasion, a
major mutiny in the Army, and chronic instability that compelled the
regime to request foreign troops and advisers to shore up its military. Much
of this turmoil was self-inflicted, the product of the radical socialist
experiment launched by Rene. Rene now presides over a deeply fractured
society and a regime that is almost totally dependent upon Soviet, North
Korean, and Tanzanian security assistance.
The country's political instability, combined with a number of ill-advised
and ill-timed economic decisions by the Rene government, has disrupted
Seychelles' inherently weak economy. The country's traditional economic
base-agriculture and fishing-has declined dramatically since Rene came
to power, and the once promising tourist industry has been badly hurt by
Seychelles' radical image and the worldwide economic downturn. We
believe that Rene's efforts to find a quick fix-increased taxes and import-
control schemes, without addressing the problem of disproportionate
government expenditures on social programs-offer little hope of resolving
the country's economic problems.
As economic hardship has begun seriously to affect the average Seychel-
lois, the gulf between the tiny minority of radicals who have run the
government in Victoria and the bulk of the people has widened. The Army
mutiny of August 1982, which grew out of parochial grievances among the
troops, has surfaced the key underlying division among the Seychellois.
The overwhelmingly black population is dominated by a small group of
whites and mulattoes who are better educated and more experienced in
government and politics. In the aftermath of the mutiny, Rene-a white-
has moved against potential black rivals by sending abroad those he
considered most threatening and taking more direct control of the ruling
political party, which has a large black membership.
Over the past year Rene has appeared increasingly aware that his
economic and political problems feed on one another and together pose a
serious threat to his grip on power. Although his regime is now deeply
dependent on highly unpopular foreign security assistance, we believe Rene
has come to recognize that he cannot govern permanently by use of force
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ALA 83-10155
October 1983
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and repression. Thus, since the mutiny last year, he has taken a number of
steps to moderate the government's policies, designed primarily to reopen
more fruitful economic and political contacts with the West in general and
the United States in particular. He has curtailed the influence of promi-
nent radicals in his government, muted his own and the media's strident
rhetoric, avoided gratuitous insults of the West in international forums,
and demonstrated a more positive attitude toward the major US interest in
Seychelles-the US Air Force satellite tracking station on Mahe Island.
He has acted to restore US and UK access to Seychelles port facilities and
reportedly is considering an expansion of trade, investment, and tourist
relations with South Africa.
Reversing the country's radical trend will not be easy. The main impedi-
ment may well be Rene's close military and security relationship with the
Communist and radical African states. Rene, we believe, is one of the
region's most insecure leaders, and we doubt he would remain in power
long should the North Korean and Tanzanian military contingents-
numbering some 70 to 80 and 140 men, respectively-depart. According to
a Soviet Embassy official, seven Soviet military officers serve as advisers to
the Seychelles Army; they reportedly have substantial influence on its five
key officers. We believe, however, that Rene recognizes the dangers of
overdependence on the Soviets; the Mitterrand government has been fairly
responsive to Rene's requests for assistance as an alternative to Moscow,
and Rene probably is anxious to keep the Tanzanians and North Koreans
for the same reason.
We believe that the political pressure on Rene will ease a bit for the short
term, if only because he has been able to convey the image that he is active-
ly pursuing a new course. Popular discontent will grow over time, however,
unless he is able to halt the economic slide by gaining more foreign aid and
by getting the moribund tourist industry on its feet again. Nonetheless, his
unwillingness to dispense with foreign military protectors will work against
these aims. There are, moreover, still some influential radicals in Rene's in-
ner circle who are, in our judgment, likely to continue to push policy lines
inimical to Western interests. Their hand will be strengthened should Rene
perceive yet another security threat to his continued hold on power.
Rene remains the dominant political figure on the domestic scene, and we
doubt that the present system could survive his departure. His death or
retirement would almost certainly precipitate a power struggle between the
moderate and radical factions. Despite the conservative, pro-Western
orientation of the black majority, the Soviet-trained military officers-
aided by foreign troops-probably would assume control of any successor
regime and pattern it along Marxist lines.
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A Troubled Economy
Stagnating Agriculture, Undeveloped Fishing
Foreign Policy: Untangling Priorities
The Economic Imperative
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Area of
Main Map
AFRICAN IS Mahn
Eagle 1 t
AMIRANTE Ile Desroches
ISLES POIVRF IS
Alphonse I _ Bijoufier l
Saint Franeo,s I
Seychelles
ALDABRA Providence I
ISLANDS Saint Pierre I
COSMOLEDO
GROUP
Asrooe I
?: FARQUHAR
GROUP
Madagascar
GLORIOSO ISLANDS
(France)
Praslin
Island
North
Cousin
USAF satellite
tracking station A
Therese I.
Manrelle
Island
Sainte Anne Island
Cerf Island
Seychelles International Airport
Mahe Island
Marie
Anne
Island
La Digue
Island
REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES IN PERSPECTIVE
Geography: Seychelles is composed of 92 islands with a land area of 171
square miles, scattered over some 150,000 square miles of the west Indian Ocean.
The largest island, Mahe, is about 17 miles long and 5 miles wide at its widest
point, and accounts for about 50 percent of Seychelles' land mass.
History: The Seychelles were not settled until the late 18th century when French
farmers and soldiers from the Indian Ocean islands of Reunion and Mauritius
established a small colony on Mahe. The settlers soon imported slaves from Africa
and Madagascar to work on plantations. Seychelles became a British territory in
1814, but the French legacy of laws, customs, land titles, and religion has
persisted. Seychelles remained a dependency of the British colony of Mauritius
until 1903, when it became a crown colony. Following World War II, the United
Kingdom gradually allowed Seychelles a greater measure of self-rule, granting full
self-government in 1967 and independence in 1976.
0 10
KILOMETERS
People: Seychellois or Creole-a generally dark-skinned admixture of Asians,
Africans, and Europeans-comprise 92 percent of the population, estimated at
68,000 in 1982. Whites and light-skinned mulattos make up the remaining 8
percent of the population and dominate the islands' politics and economy. Some
90 percent of the islands' people live on Mahe, with most of the remainder residing
on two nearby islands, Praslin and La Digue. English is the official language, but
Creole-a patois of French and African languages-is most widely spoken, and
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Seychelles:
The Mellowing of
President Rene
Since it came to power in 1977, the leftist regime of
Seychelles' President Albert Rene has repeatedly
called on foreign military intervention to counter both
real and perceived threats. These included numerous
coup scares, a largely South African mercenary at-
tack sponsored by antiregime exiles, and an Army
mutiny. The mutiny in August 1982-by far the most
dangerous crisis Rene has yet faced-destroyed the
regime's credibility and popular support, shattered the
Army, and left Rene wholly dependent on foreign
military support to remain in power.
The rapid deterioration of the economy has emerged
as another serious threat to the longer term stability
of Rene's government, forcing him to adjust both his
domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the radical-
ism of Rene's first five years in power has given way
over the past year to less doctrinaire, more pragmatic
policies consistent with the country's desperate need
for economic support. This paper examines these
developments and their impact on the primary US
interests in Seychelles-the continued operation by
the US Air Force of its satellite tracking station on
the main island of Mahe and the prevention of further
expansion of both Soviet political influence in the
islands and its military access to port and air facilities
there.
given the Seychellois one of the highest per capita
income levels in Africa. Although only 10 percent of
the work force is now unemployed-a relatively low
figure by African standards-there is considerable
underemployment. According to press reports, all the
large luxury hotels except the one owned by the
government were up for sale during August. Other
press reports reflect concern that high taxes and
bureaucratic overregulation have stifled initiative and
confidence in the private sector, further slowing down
the economy.
Declining Tourism
Tourism-which accounts for about 90 percent of the
country's foreign exchange earnings-has experi-
enced a serious decline in recent years. The tourist
industry grew rapidly following the opening of an
international airport on the main island of Mahe in
1971, fueling a major expansion of the economy and
attracting extensive foreign investment in the con-
struction of hotels and other tourist facilities. The
number of tourists climbed to nearly 80,000 in 1979,
and higher average spending per visitor drove earn-
ings from tourism to its highest point in 1980, despite
a decline in tourist arrivals. That year, tourism gener-
ated $53 million for the Seychelles' economy, ac-
counting for more than 35 percent of GDP, about one-
third of employment, and 14 percent of tax revenues.
Earnings from tourism fell by $9 million in 1981,
however, and plummeted another 30 percent in 1982.
Victoria's economic problems stem largely from de-
clining revenues from tourism-the major industry-
and a reduction in foreign aid flows. Seychelles-
which enjoyed a balance-of-payments surplus as re-
cently as 1980-incurred large deficits in 1981 and
1982 and has had to draw down its foreign exchange
reserves to dangerously low levels.
The economic pinch is beginning to affect the man in
the street, bringing a halt to a decade-long rise in real
income that had fueled growing expectations and had
Both internal and external factors have contributed to
the industry's sagging fortunes. Recession in Europe
and the sharp rise in oil prices, which boosted airline
fares, have combined to force many potential visitors
to choose less distant vacation spots. An ill-timed
revaluation of currency in early 1981 also has made
Seychelles a more expensive place to visit compared
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In June 1977, then Prime Minister Rene assumed
power in a successful coup against his bitter rival
James Mancham, who had been elected President
when Seychelles gained independence just a year
before. Both Rene and Tanzanian President Nyer-
ere-who had supported Rene for years and may
have played an active role in the coup found Man-
cham's flamboyant lifestyle and his close ties to
Western business interests distasteful.
Since becoming head of state, Rene has been heavily
preoccupied with guarding against a countercoup by
those from whom he seized power-now organized
into a London-based exile organization called the
Movement for the Resistance (MPR). Rene abrogated
the Constitution immediately following his seizure of
power and ruled by presidential proclamation for two
years. Although he initially allowed fairly open criti-
cism of his regime by Seychelles' traditionally lively
and unfettered press, his growing fears of an MPR
threat soon resulted in increasing repression. Jolted
by a well-attended rally of Mancham supporters in
February 1978, Rene moved to curtail dissent by
arresting or harassing political opponents and by
gradually eliminating press freedom. Rene's near
paranoia over the possibility of a coup was height-
ened by the takeover of the Comoros Islands in late
1978 by foreign mercenaries.
In June 1979, Rene promulgated a new Constitu-
tion-based on the Tanzanian model-which estab-
lished his Seychelles' People's Progressive Front as
the sole legal party and strengthened his power as the
chief executive. Nonetheless, after his landslide vic-
tory in the June 1979 general elections-98 percent of
the vote as the sole presidential candidate on a yes-no
ballot-Rene began to encounter stiff opposition,
including public protests, to his socialist policies.
Rene's leftist leanings and chronic concerns over
security have led to closer relations with the USSR
and other Third World radical states at the expense
of the Seychelles' historically close ties with the
West. In April 1979 Rene successfully called on the
Soviets to send warships as a show of support for the
regime during a coup scare. That November, fearing
a coup attempt backed by the French, Rene requested
another Soviet naval ship visit and jailed a number of
suspected plotters. He also arrested a French police
adviser and detained the French military crew of the
Seychellois patrol boat Topaz, causing a crisis in
relations with Paris. Rene's suspicions of French
machinations against his regime-which were not
totally groundless, according to US Embassy report-
ing-also led him to suspect the intentions of other
Western powers.
Rene's foreign military support has enabled him to
weather two major challenges to his regime. Exile-
sponsored mercenaries flew into Victoria in Novem-
ber 1981, but were quickly defeated with the help of
the contingent of Tanzanian troops stationed in Sey-
chelles since 1979. In August 1982, Tanzanian troops
again were instrumental in putting down a two-day
mutiny, which, according to Embassy reporting, in-
volved as much as half the Seychelles' 700-man
Army. In both cases, the Soviets responded quickly
by dispatching warships to the scene. French warships
also were sent to Seychelles waters in both instances,
underlining the improvement in relations after the
inauguration of Socialist President Mitterrand in
1981.
Under Rene, the Seychelles' economy has deteriorat-
ed badly. Foreign investment has fallen off considera-
bly, in part reflecting the completion of projects such
as hotels and other tourist facilities that were fi-
nanced almost entirely by foreign investors. In addi-
tion, however, Western investors have become in-
creasingly chary of Rene's socialist policies,
characterized by the creation of parastatal corpora-
tions or the buying out of private companies.
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Figure 2
Seychelles' Tourist Arrivals, 1974-82
1974
Iailia ted
with its main nearby competitors, Kenya and Mauriti-
us. Moreover, the government for years failed to
promote its tropical beaches, lagoons, and exotic
wildlife as tourist attractions aggressively in overseas
markets and has neglected investment in hotels and
other facilities that would make service and accom-
modations more competitive. The regime's recent
firings of two expatriate directors of the National
Tourist Board have compounded overall management
problems. Finally, the coup attempt in November
1981-which received wide press coverage because of
the involvement of South Africans-the subsequent
Army mutiny in August 1982, and the government's
political affiliation with the Soviets and radical non-
aligned states have created a specter of political
turbulence discouraging to many would-be visitors
The drop in tourist arrivals has led major airlines to
curtail service to Seychelles, forcing President Rene
to conclude a costly-$10 million per year-agree-
ment with British Caledonian Airways to provide air
links between London, Frankfurt, and Victoria in
order to maintain access from major European mar-
kets. These arrangements may be proceeding too
slowly for Seychelles to benefit from the 1983-84 peak
winter season. As a result, tourism will continue to
rely heavily on less profitable charter flights; the
primarily European companies that organize these
cutrate packages take payment abroad, demand re-
duced rates for hotels and recreation facilities, and
delay their remittances to Seychelles. Moreover, tour-
ists on package tours spend much less than do individ-
ual tourists. As a result, Seychelles tourist revenues
were down over 27 percent during the first half of
1983, despite a 20-percent increase in tourist arrivals
over the same period in 1982.
Stagnating Agriculture, Undeveloped Fishing
Agriculture and fishing, once the backbone of the
economy, now contribute only about 10 percent of
GDP. Production of copra-which, along with cinna-
mon, is the major export crop-declined in 1982 to
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the lowest level since the mid-1970s. Revenues from
both crops have been hurt by low international prices
and poor organization and planning within the sector.
Production of food crops has failed to keep pace with
the demands of tourists and the local population,
forcing the regime to spend scarce foreign exchange
on food imports. The regime is now attempting to
improve the degree of self-sufficiency in selected
foodstuffs such as sweet potatoes, yams, cassava,
bananas, sugarcane, and tea. The government faces
an uphill battle, however. Jobs in the tourist sector
have eroded productivity by luring large numbers of
workers away from the agricultural sector. Further-
more, the capacity to expand agricultural production
is limited by land availability. Only 54 percent of
Seychelles' 171 square miles of land is arable-a
much smaller portion is prime cropland-and level
land suitable for agriculture is also in demand for
government-sponsored construction projects.
The fishing industry, long recognized as a prospective
money-earner that is second only to tourism in poten-
tial, has remained largely undeveloped. Over the past
five years, the government has sponsored a series of
studies of the prospects for tuna export. According to
recent press reports, government officials have con-
cluded that at least 20,000 tons of tuna could be
caught each year without the risk of depleting
stocks-a total which, conservatively, could contrib-
ute some $30 million annually in foreign exchange. In
fact, tuna exports earned only about $1 million in
1982, amounting to only slightly over 3 percent of the
earnings from tourism. The poor performance is the
result of muddled administration, the lack of ade-
quate shore-based facilities to support commercial
fishing, and the need for additional foreign technical
assistance to organize and manage the industry. Sey-
chelles' inability to exploit its own fishing resources
has led the Rene government to license foreign boats
to fish territorial waters, but the annual returns have
been paltry-some $1.2 million
The Search for "Quick Fixes"
The country's foreign exchange and budgetary pinch
drove President Rene to implement several restrictive
measures in July 1983: a temporary ban on automo-
bile imports; higher import duties on luxury items; an
extension of the 5-percent turnover tax on all transac-
tions; higher taxes on those in the middle and upper
income brackets; and increased bus fares. The regime,
however, avoided the politically more sensitive step of
cutting back on government expenditures on its exten-
sive social programs-including free schooling, free
medical service, and government-subsidized hous-
ing-which take up a third of the annual budget.
Moreover, although Rene is aware that the overvalu-
ation of the Seychelles rupee has both encouraged the
import of relatively cheap foreign goods and hurt the
vital tourist industry, he remains opposed to devalua-
tion for fear of giving new impetus to domestic
inflation.
According to the US Embassy, there is growing
circumstantial evidence that Rene may be pursuing
another option-offering to launder money for Euro-
pean professional criminal organizations-in an effort
to obtain sufficient foreign capital to bridge the gap
until tourism revenues improve. Illicit money has been
cycled through the Seychelles for some time, but an
Embassy source reports that European criminals are
now bribing Seychellois leaders to enact legislation
that would permit a large-scale expansion of this
operation.
Growing Alienation
The Army mutiny in August 1982 was, in our judg-
ment, the most significant development in the string
of crises that has struck Seychelles over the past five
years. It was the catalyst for a number of important
political changes that subsequently have taken place.
The mutiny revealed the isolation of Rene's leftist
regime, whose members are drawn from the Sey-
chelles' white and mulatto elite. The regime's radical
leftist policies clearly had alienated not only the
conservative black community comprising 92 percent
of the population, but also Rene's own party-the
Seychelles Peoples' Progressive Front (SPPF)--which
had been designed to give its largely black rank-and-
file membership the illusion of meaningful participa-
tion in government. It also focused the regime's
attention on the need to deal pragmatically with the
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Seychelles' economic problems have increased the
importance of the substantial development assis-
tance the islands receive from foreign, primarily
Western, donors. Foreign aid, largely in the form of
grants and concessional loans, amounts to nearly
$20 million annually, according to US Embassy
France is the largest single aid donor among Western
countries. Paris provided almost $9 million in aid
last year. according to the French Ambassador, and
also provides important assistance to the nascent
Seychellois fishing industry. Additionally, French
tourists have been the single most important contrib-
utors to the Seychelles' tourist industry, although
Paris's decision to impose currency controls on
French citizens traveling abroad is likely to severely
limit the number of French visitors to Seychelles in
the near future.
The United Kingdom is Seychelles' second most
important trading partner and a leading aid donor,
furnishing $7.9 million in 1981. As London fulfills
the aid commitments that accompanied independ-
ence, however, aid levels are declining. An agreement
to locate a BBC relay station in Seychelles will help
close this gap by generating badly needed hard
currency.
During 1982 US economic aid-$3.3 million in grant
aid, including $2 million in Economic Support
Funds-and the revenues generated by the tracking
station-$2.5 million in rent and another $3.5 mil-
lion in expenditures-accounted for over $9 million
out of a GDP of approximately $125 million. (c)
Seychelles also has received economic assistance
from a variety of Third World sources. The radical
Arab states have made large financial aid commit-
ments, although their record for fulfill
ntent is s o
vanced an additional $3.5 million to help finance a 25X1
trial fishing project. Iraq reneged on a May 1980
agreement to provide $10 million in concessional
loans, but did furnish $3 million in 1981. Algeria has
made over $10 million in grants and soft-term loans
available since 1979. Victoria has met with varying
degrees of success in its approaches to other countries 25X1
garnering some unspecified economic assistance from
India, Japan, North Korea, and China.
Moscow's economic aid to Seychelles fits its Africa-
wide pattern; until recently it was minimal. In a
gesture apparently aimed at protecting its political
influence with the economically beleaguered Rene
government, however, Moscow in March 1983 agreed
to provide $2.6 million worth of cement and diesel 25X1
fuel as grant aid. In June it concluded another aid
package worth approximately $3 million, consisting
of construction equipment, spare parts, and the provi-
sion of technicians.
country's growing economic problems, which had
begun to threaten the massive social welfare programs
that have acted as a buffer against major unrest
among the underprivileged majority.
The revolt emerged from protests of the Army's
enlisted men against incompetent and brutal officers,
but Embassy reporting indicates that the mutiny's
root causes lay in deeper discontent that included
economic grievances and nascent black nationalism.
Guy Sinon, the country's most popular black leader
and the Secretary General of the ruling SPPF, in-
formed the Embassy that he and other black leaders
had advance knowledge of the revolt and took refuge
on an outer island to await the results. The Embassy 25X1
concluded that the country's black leadership tacitly
supported the mutineers
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Moving Against Rivals
Rene responded to the mutiny
by moving to lessen the influence of potential
black rivals to his rule. As the result of changes
enacted at the SPPF Congress in September 1982,
Rene increased his personal control over the party.
The Congress authorized the Central Executive Com-
mittee to nominate the membership of the 23 branch
committees, which previously had been elected, and
reduced the size of the committees from 10 members
to five. The changes reduced moderate SPPF Secre-
tary General Sinon's influence by depriving him of the
ability to organize local support through the party
structure.
In what was probably the most significant move
against possible rivals, Rene engineered the quiet
ouster from the Seychelles political scene of Matthew
Servina, a black who had long touted himself as a
potential successor to Rene. Servina, who had ques-
tioned Rene's public support following the Army
revolt, was forced to resign his positions as SPPF
Deputy Secretary General and Minister of Agricul-
ture and was sent abroad for study.
Rene followed his moves against potential black rivals
by strengthening the moderate faction within his
regime in an attempt to improve his government's
domestic and international image. In November 1982,
he replaced unpopular radical Foreign Minister
Jacques Hodoul with the more moderate Maxime
Ferrari and shifted Hodoul to the Ministry for Na-
tional Development. The transfer, however, by no
means eliminated all tensions between the numerical-
ly balanced radical and moderate factions within the
Cabinet. Hodoul, in his new capacity, has continued
moment-appears to be waning.
his efforts to rally opposition to measures that pro-
mote private investment or encourage closer relations
with the West, but radical influence-at least for the
According to remarks Ferrari made to US Embassy
officers, Hodoul is becoming increasingly isolated,
and his support may be drifting away. Ferrari noted
that Education and Information Minister James
Michel-who also serves as Army Chief of Staff and
once was a hardline radical-can now be counted on
to side with the moderates in most cases. Ferrari also
said that opportunistic Defense Minister Ogilvy
Berlouis, apparently sensing which way the wind is
shifting, has also been proving himself a "useful ally."
The strengthening of the moderate faction in the
regime has coincided with Rene's recent efforts to
resolve what had for the first years of his regime been
treated as separate, at times conflicting, foreign policy
priorities: economic necessity and national security.
The country's overwhelming dependence on economic
aid and tourism have long argued for close ties with
the West. But the regime's almost total reliance on
foreign security assistance to remain in power, cou-
pled with the radical ideological views of several key
officials, have served to promote close relations with
the USSR and the "progressive" nonaligned states. F
The Economic Imperative
As Seychelles' economic problems have worsened,
Rene has made several gestures to improve relations
with the West, including the United States. Press
coverage has become more balanced in the past year
and a half, and the regime has muted its anti-US tone
in international forums. The removal of Hodoul as
Foreign Minister and Seychellois nonparticipation in
three key UN votes in the latter part of 1982-in
which they normally would have lined up with the
Soviets-were intended as signals of growing open-
ness to the West, according to Seychellois officials.
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We believe that Rene's recently stated willingness to
relax the 1979 requirement that visiting naval ships
declare that they are neither nuclear powered nor
nuclear armed-which effectively cut off US and UK
naval visits-is another example of the new influence
of economic considerations. Rene has openly ex-
pressed hope that his move will stimulate more gener-
ous aid from Washington and London; moreover, he is
mindful that the ship visits themselves generate signif-
icant hard currency earnings-as much as $200,000
per visit.
Seychelles' economic requirements have led it to
mitigate somewhat its harsh stance toward South
Africa. Pretoria has long served as Victoria's primary
source of agricultural imports, and Rene reportedly is
considering a further opening of Seychelles to South
African investment and tourism. His recent release of
six mercenaries captured in the abortive November
1981 attack may have been an effort to lay the
Moscow's primary interest in Seychelles stems from
the country's strategic location, offering the potential
for enhanced Soviet surveillance capabilities in the
Indian Ocean area. We believe that the Soviets would
like to operate maritime surveillance aircraft out of
Seychelles, although we have no evidence that they
have requested such access. From Seychelles, IL-38
aircraft could cover areas such as the waters around
Diego Garcia not accessible by the Soviet reconnais-
sance aircraft currently deployed to South Yemen
and Ethiopia. The Soviets apparently also are inter-
ested in access to Seychelles as a stopover point for
Soviet military transport aircraft flying to Africa.
Moscow established the precedent for such use in the
first half of 1983 when a number of military trans-
ports, most in transit to or from Mozambique, staged
through the airport at Victoria.
groundwork for closer future cooperation.
Security Concerns
Moscow as the Mainstay. The Soviets remain Sey-
chelles' most important source of military assistance,
a fact which Moscow uses as its primary lever of
influence on the Rene regime. Rene's failure to speak
out on the recent Soviet shootdown of the Korean
airliner reflects Seychellois reluctance to confront its
benefactor. Moscow's assistance takes three forms:
deliveries of military equipment, naval ship visits to
show support for the regime during coup scares, and
the provision of military advisers and training for
Seychellois military personnel.
We do not believe that Moscow is interested in
pressing for naval basing rights, although recent
Soviet proposals to refurbish fuel storage tanks for
Seychelles suggest Soviet interest in establishing
emergency access to such fuel reserves. Seychelles
does not have well-developed port facilities and is far
from Moscow's primary area of naval interest in the
Indian Ocean, the area near the Persian Gulf. Sey-
chelles does offer a convenient rest and recreation
location, however, and also has deepwater anchor-
ages, such as that off Coetivy Island, some /80 miles
Between 1978 and 1982, Moscow provided Seychelles
with some $7.6 million in military equipment, includ-
ing small arms, ammunition, light artillery, armored
personnel carriers, trucks, a mobile radar installation,
and two Zhuk-class patrol boats. Reports indicate
that during 1983 Moscow has provided two weap-
ons-SA-7 antiaircraft missiles and BM-21 multiple
rocket launchers-not previously in Seychelles' inven-
from the main island of Mahe.
ern influence has made significant gains.
Politically, Soviet aims are served by the establish-
ment of a firmly committed anti-Western regime. We
believe Moscow harbors hopes that such a regime
would restrict US access-as occurred in 1979 with
the ban on visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-
armed ships-and, ultimately, evict the USAF track-
ing station. Moscow's recent moves to increase eco-
nomic aid to Seychelles probably reflect efforts to
bolster its presence in the primary area where West-
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The Soviets have hoped that naval ship visits, made in
response to Rene's fears of internal unrest or external-
ly mounted coups, would solidify Moscow's influence.
Since the mercenary attack in November 1981, some
of the visits have included amphibious landing ships
capable of carrying naval infantry.
Military advisers and training form only a relatively
minor part of Soviet military assistance. A Soviet
Embassy official told US Embassy officers in early
1982 that seven Soviets were serving as advisers to the
Seychellois Army. During the same period, a Seychel-
lois security official informed the US Embassy that
those advisers were influencing the five black majors
who form the top echelon of the Army's leadership to
press Rene for a greater military role in decisionmak-
ing and an increased military budget.
F4/forts To Diversify. Rene also relies on a number of
other sources-primarily France, Tanzania, and
North Korea-for security assistance.' This policy
allows him to avoid total reliance on Moscow in the
security field while maintaining his claims to non-
alignment. President Mitterrand's responsiveness to
Rene's request for a show of French support following
the mercenary attack in 1981 opened the way to
renewal of military ties. Paris followed up the port call
by French warships immediately after the attack by
deploying warships and maritime patrol aircraft to the
area for two weeks in January 1982. Soon thereafter,
Seychelles and France reached an agreement provid-
ing for occasional deployments of French maritime
surveillance aircraft, an increase in French naval ship
visits, and French provision of nonlethal military
equipment. France, in return, reportedly gained the
right to establish logistic support facilities for French
warships visiting Seychelles.
' Rene has had some success in attracting military assistance from
additional countries. India donated two helicopters in 1982 and this
year agreed to provide related training and spare parts, as well as
training for naval cadet officers, according to the Seychelles'
Defense Minister Ogilvy Berlouis. Seychelles has also contracted
for three patrol boats from Italy, but only one has been delivered
thus far.
the event of an attempt to topple his regime.
Embassy reporting indicates that in May 1983 the
French Ambassador decided on a significant reduc-
tion in the 14 French naval visits planned for 1983.
The reduction will be costly for Seychelles in econom-
ic terms-the 26 French naval port calls in 1982
earned Seychelles between $2 million and $3 million
in desperately needed foreign exchange-but the US
Embassy notes that Paris may have given Rene
unofficial assurances that it would come to his aid in
Tanzania and North Korea also play a significant
security assistance role in Seychelles. Tanzania cur-
rently maintains approximately 140 troops in Sey-
chelles. Dar es
Salaam would like to bring the troops home for
economic reasons, but Rene-who has been forced to
rely on them despite widespread public resentment of
their presence-apparently has negotiated their con-
tinued stay at least through the end of the year. The
Tanzanian force played the major role in both the
defeat of the 1981 mercenary attack and the suppres-
sion of the 1982 Army mutiny.
Rene's concern over the possible withdrawal of the
Tanzanians, combined with his sensitivity to the
resentment that their ill-disciplined behavior has gen-
erated among the Seychellois, probably were the
primary factors behind his recent request for North
Korean military personnel. Reporting from the US
Embassy indicates that almost all of the 70 to 80
North Koreans now serving in Seychelles arrived last
April. The Embassy reports that they are virtually
integrated into the Seychellois Army at the junior
officer ranks and appear to be functioning primarily
Rene's more open stance toward the West and his
moves to curtail the influence of the largely unpopular
radical element of his regime have relieved some
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potential causes of black popular unrest. He still faces
serious problems, however, in dealing with an alienat-
ed black majority that has seen its voice in the Rene
government muted even more since the Army upris-
ing.
For a limited time, Rene will be able to sustain the
regime by conveying the image that he is actively
pursuing his new course. Within six months to a year,
however, he will have to show concrete results-
reduced unemployment, increased aid flows, or, at a
minimum, a halt in the slide in economic perform-
ance-to effectively assuage popular discontent. Ac-
complishing such results would require a level of firm,
timely policy direction and coherent planning, which
Rene's factionalized regime has thus far been unable
to achieve.
Specific options exist that could have significant
beneficial impact on the Seychelles economy. All offer
the prospect of enhancing earnings from tourism-the
current focus of the regime-but all entail some level
of political cost:
? We believe Rene is likely to open Seychelles to
South African tourism. Although he would face
some loss of stature internationally as a staunch foe
of apartheid, the move would have minimal impact
domestically on all except extreme radicals-who,
in any event, are in eclipse.
? We believe Rene will continue to avoid the political-
ly risky steps of cutting government expenditures in
the social welfare area to provide additional funds
for investment in the tourism sector or devaluing the
rupee to make prices more attractive to foreign
tourists. Such steps, which could contribute signifi-
cantly to Seychelles' economic recovery, could also
provoke a backlash from the black population.
Seychelles' continuing security concerns and its near-
total dependence on Communist and "progressive"
Third World states for military assistance present
Rene with the requirement for a delicate balancing of
foreign policy between East and West. Even if ten-
sions between the regime and the civilian population
ease, the possibility of another mutiny by the military
or of another exile-sponsored mercenary attack will
remain a threat, in Rene's mind. As a result, the
contingents of Tanzanian and North Korean military
personnel will in all likelihood remain on the islands
despite domestic resentment against them. Moreover,
Rene's continuing requirement for military support
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the radical elements of the government against a
complete loss of political influence, despite the current
low ebb of their fortunes
President Rene remains the dominant political figure
on the domestic scene, and we doubt that the present
system could survive his departure. His death or
retirement would almost certainly precipitate a power
struggle between the moderate and radical factions.
Despite the conservative, pro-Western orientation of
the black majority, the Soviet-trained military offi-
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sume control of any successor regime and pattern it
along Marxist lines.
The Rene regime's tilt away from the extreme policies
of its first five years in power offers opportunities for
maintaining or expanding US influence, although the
opening may be transitory. At least for the short term,
we believe Rene will avoid challenging US interests;
indeed, we expect him to encourage the United States
both to maintain the tracking station and to resume
ship visits. He is likely to continue to temper his
stridency on East-West issues-as he recently did on
Chad-in an effort to portray his regime as truly
nonaligned. He clearly hopes to attract additional
economic assistance and increased Western tourism
from this approach and is counting on the resulting
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increase air or naval access to Seychelles.
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Despite our view that Rene's leftist ideological affini-
ties will, over the short term, take a backseat to his
newfound, economically motivated pragmatism, the
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continued presence in the Cabinet of influential radi-
cals and the regime's continuing dependence on for-
eign military assistance could result in occasional
lurches in policy inimical to Western, and especially
US, interests. The introduction of North Korean
military personnel earlier this year is an example of a
decision apparently taken by the disorganized and
frightened regime without careful consideration of the
adverse impact on relations with the United States.
The stability of the Rene regime, moreover, is likely
to remain fragile under any foreseeable circum-
stances. As a result, Rene's continuing dependence for
political survival on security support from the Soviet
Union, North Korea, and Tanzania to counter inter-
nal and external threats provides these countries with
powerful levers. Rene is gambling that he can main-
tain a delicate East-West balance between his eco-
nomic and security requirements that will enable him
to withstand this pressure. Any real or perceived
increase in the security threat, however, would further
strengthen the Soviet hand and probably result in
Rene's return to more radical leftist policies.
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Appendix
Biographic Profiles
France Albert Rene
President
Maxime Ferrari
Minister for Planning and External Relations
A moderate and a pragmatist, Maxime Ferrari, 53,
has influenced President Rene to adopt a nonaligned
approach to foreign relations issues. His considerable
political and foreign affairs expertise has been instru-
mental in establishing new sources of foreign econom-
ic assistance to his country. He encourages the US
Navy to resume ship visits to Victoria and maintains
cordial relations with US Embassy personnel in Sey-
chelles. Ferrari, a member of a prominent white
family, has earned a reputation for opportunism and,
in the view of US State Department officers, may not
A confirmed socialist, France Albert Rene, 47, pro-
fesses a nonaligned approach toward world affairs,
but favors ties to leftist governments. He has become
more outwardly moderate in his actions, hoping that a
more balanced foreign policy will attract vital foreign
economic investment to Seychelles. Rene, a white,
faces continual social problems in maintaining the
control of his white and mulatto government over the
predominately black population. His popularity has
remained low since the August 1982 Army mutiny.
He hopes for an economic recovery to reverse this
trend, but remains overwhelmingly concerned with his
personal security and government stability.
be entirely trustworthy
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Jacques Hodoul
Minister for National Development
Jacques Hodoul, 40, is the most radical Marxist
minister in the government. As Minister of Foreign
Affairs from 1979 until 1982, he was the ideological
force behind his country's shift to a radical leftist
orientation. He was replaced in November 1982 as
part of President Rene's effort to project a more
moderate image. Hodoul favors a disciplined, Cuban-
style island state and close relations with the Soviets.
He descends from one of Seychelles' wealthiest white
families. Hodoul is highly intelligent,
James Michel
Minister for Education and Information
Lt. Col. James Michel, 39, serves as Chief of Staff of
the Seychelles People's Liberation Army, in addition
to holding his ministerial portfolio. He is one of
President Rene's most trusted advisers. Once a hard-
line radical close to Minister for National Develop-
ment Jacques Hodoul, he is now taking a more
moderate political stance. Michel, a mulatto, is popu-
lar among his colleagues, but he is considered politi-
cally naive
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Ogilvy Berlouis
Minister for Youth and Defense
Col. Ogilvy Berlouis, 33, has full responsibility for
both internal and external security matters. He is a
key minister and adviser to President Rene. Berlouis,
a mulatto, is a nondoctrinaire socialist formerly allied
with the leftist ministers, but he has become more
moderate and pragmatic on certain economic policy
unpopular with many government officials, but enjoys
good relations with the diplomatic community.F-
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