PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000300070003-4
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
State Dept. review
completed
the Persian Gulf
Palestinian Presence in
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
NESA 83-10162
July 1983
copy 284
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Palestinian Presence in
the Persian Gulf
This paper was prepared byl Office
of Near Eastern-South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, on
Secret
NESA 83-10162
Jule 1983
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Secret
the Persian Gulf
Key Judgments The nearly 550,000 Palestinians who live in the Persian Gulf states of
Information available Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and
as of 8 Jul. 1983 Bahrain by themselves pose little direct threat to the security of their host
was used in this report.
governments:
? They serve as advisers to the ruling families of several Gulf states or work
as teachers, bureaucrats, journalists, doctors, and tradesmen in all the
states. Most are hard working, family oriented, and politically
conservative.
? They have contributed significantly to the institutional stability and
economic well being of their countries of exile and have a substantial 25X1
i
k
i
h
bili
f
econom
c sta
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n t
e sta
ty o
their host countries.
? Most Palestinians would be loath to jeopardize their residency by
violating the tacit understanding that provides them a haven in exchange
for guarantees of noninterference in their hosts' internal affairs.
Palestinians in the Gulf states, however, have grievances that are exploit-
able. Gulf Palestinians know that, with few exceptions, they will always be
mistrusted as foreigners and potential troublemakers who do not share the
Gulf Arabs' concerns or faith in desert democracy, the informal family
alliances by which the Gulf governments are run. They resent the restraints
on their opportunities and benefits, but there is little evidence that the
Palestinians as a group are plotting against their host governments.
Gulf leaders feel a genuine sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian
refugees and generously support the Palestinian cause. Gulf rulers for the
most part believe the Palestinians have a right to a homeland and that fail-
ure to resolve this issue will be a _major source of long-term regional
instability.
Recent events in Lebanon and the prospect of an enforced exodus from
there of Palestinian refugees have revived concerns among the Persian Gulf
governments about the political orientation of their large Palestinian
communities and the impact of a potential new flood of refugees. The
concern looms largest in Kuwait, where more than half the Palestinians in
the Gulf live.
Concern has been heightened by threats from some radical Palestinian
leaders to retaliate for alleged lack of support for the Palestinian cause by
the Gulf states during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Palestinian
cause is popular, and the Gulf governments fear that any Palestinian
discontent within their countries would spread to natives and other
expatriates unhappy with the ruling families.
iii Secret
,MESA 83-10/62
July 1983
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Gulf leaders will continue to support Palestinian causes financially and to
urge Lebanon not to rescind the travel documentation-legal or illegal-
used by Palestinians. Financial aid and diplomatic pressure are used to buy
protection from Palestinian threats and ensure the Palestinians a place of
return from the Gulf.
At the same time, the Gulf states, individually and under the umbrella of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, have begun to implement legal and
administrative measures to protect themselves and to limit their depend-
ence on Palestinian labor. The measures include denial of visas to family
members of Palestinians already working in the Gulf, selective recruitment
to avoid hiring Palestinians, and nonrenewal of work permits for Palestin-
ians whose skills are not essential.
We do not believe the Gulf states will attempt to expel large numbers of
Palestinians, a decision that would be difficult to implement and would
heighten political and diplomatic tensions. Moreover, expulsion would
weaken the economies of the host countries, particularly Kuwait, where
Palestinians play a major role in many sectors, and the UAE, where they
virtually run the oil industry.
We believe fewer Palestinians will be hired or have their contracts renewed
over the next few years if the economic downturn continues and as skilled
natives assume management and professional positions. A turnaround in
the weak oil market will not reverse this pattern because of project
completions and the increasing availability of skilled natives.
The US positions on Palestinian issues will continue to irritate relations
between the United States and the Gulf countries. Gulf Arab leaders for
the most part support US peace initiatives; many also want to cooperate
with the United States in defense, security, or financial matters. But they
see pro-US policies as exposing them to popular disapproval. Led by the
Saudis, the Gulf Arabs will criticize US support for Israel and urge
Washington to recognize the PLO at the same time they encourage the
PLO to participate in US-backed peace talks. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
Oman in particular will hope to deflect criticism from natives, Palestinians,
and other Arabs for maintaining their links to the United States despite
Washington's refusal to recognize the PLO or press Israel to withdraw
from the occupied territories.
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The Persian Gulf
The six oil-rich Arab states of the Persian Gulf-
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar. Oman, and Bahrain-are a source of financial
support and refuge for Palestinians. In what has
become a mutually beneficial arrangement, the nearly
550,000 Palestinians have provided much of the talent
and labor needed by the Gulf states to modernize
their once primitive economies. In return, the Pales-
tinians have prospered, enjoying good salaries, job
security, and a stable political environment in which
to raise their families. For the most part, they are
loyal and law-abiding. The substantial communities,
particularly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and
Qatar, are probably dismayed by the turmoil that
threatens the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) and the greater Palestinian community in exile,
but they have not pressed their host governments for
more than the standard expressions of sympathy and
support
The era of good feeling between Palestinians working
in the Gulf and the Gulf governments seems to be
ending. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar in particular are
limiting the number of Palestinians hired and substi-
tuting natives for Palestinians where possible. The
Palestinians know their presence is temporary but,
according to State Department reporting, do not yet
appear anxious that large numbers will be deported.
The governments apparently expect those Palestinians
whose contracts are not renewed to return to their
country of origin--primarily Lebanon or Jordan. A
decline in remittances from the Gulf, coupled with the
return of significant numbers of Palestinians, could
cause political as well as economic problems for
Amman and Beirut.
The Gulf states are generous in their n'~nonses to the
Palestinians in exile outside the Gulf. They give
financial and political support to the PLO to alleviate
the hardships of exile for the refugees, to maintain
Islamic and Arab claims to the occupied territories,
A Palestinian who lives and works in the Persian
Gulf states represents a wide variety of interests and
work experiences. Several common themes character-
ize his role in the Gulf and the perceptions he has cal'
his status:
? Male. Age 20 to 50. An older Palestinian may have
his family with him, but male dependents over the
age of 18 must have work or leave the country.
? Required to have employment before entering the
country and can stay only for the length .l' that
contract.
? Employed by the government as a doctor, teacher,
accountant, or technician, or by the private sector in
banking, construction, or service industries.
? Remits part of his salary to an extended family
living in Lebanon, Jordan, or the occupied West
Bank and Gaza territories.
? Middle class in economic status. Circumspect and
apolitical to avoid attracting the attention ol'securi-
tv authorities.
? Prefers Western education, lifestyle, and political
institutions but is careful not to appear critical of
fundamentalist religious practices.
? Supports moderate PLO political positions but is
increasingly uncomfortable with internecine politi-
cal wars within the Palestinian movement and
disillusioned by the lack ol'titeaningl'id support
from the Gulf Arah community
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Saudi
Arabia
MANAMA
YSahraIn _
Persian
Gulf
DONA
Qatar DHABI jI
KILOMETERS 300
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Table 1
Palestinians in the Persian Gulf
Country Total P
opulation
Estimated Native Est
Population Po
imated Palestinian
pulation
Palestinians as Percent
of Total Population
Saudi Arabia 8,500,0
00
5,500,000 12
5,000
1
Kuwait 1,562,0
00
609,000 35
0,000
22
UAE 1,200,0
00
255,000 5
0,000
4
Qatar
Oman
Total worldwide Palestinian population est=4 million.
Total in Gulf= 550,000.
a Less than .5 percent.
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Table 2
Palestinian Representation in the Gulf States
Saudi Arabia Full diplomatic status
(Riyadh and Jidda)
Rafiq al-Natshah (Riyadh)
Afif al-Mas'ud (Jidda)
and most importantly, to buy protection from Pales-
tinian and Arab hardliners unhappy with the ruling
The exceptions to this are Bahrain and Oman. Mana-
ma is publicly sympathetic with the Palestinian cause
in order to stay within the Arab mainstream and
avoid retribution, but it offers little else to the move-
ment. Oman does not even permit the PLO an office
in the country. According to embassy reporting over
the years, neither Amir Isa nor Sultan Qaboos has
much sympathy for the Palestinians. Dependent on
their richer neighbors for military and economic aid
and facing what they consider to be more serious
threats closer to home, the two rulers are unwilling to
expend their limited resources on a distant cause.
Saudi Arabia and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. Saudi Arabia is one of the
staunchest and most generous backers of the Palestin-
ian national movement. It has aided the Palestine
Liberation Organization since its inception in 1964
and has sheltered more than 100,000 Palestinians
since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. PLO chief Yasir
Arafat is a frequent visitor to the kingdom. The
Saudis permit the PLO two offices and urge its
recognition by other countries and organizations.
The attachment of many Saudis, including King
Fahd, to the Palestinian cause is genuine, but a main
purpose of Saudi support is to protect the kingdom
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 Table 3
Gulf States Aid to PLO
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Riyadh has virtually no influence with the more
radical factions that receive aid from Syria, Libya,
and the Soviet Union and are openly hostile to Saudi
policies. As long as Syria has a presence in Lebanon
and controls Saiqa, the second largest PLO group,
Damascus is likely to have more influence with the
Country
Annual Aid
Commitment
Agreement at 1978
Baghdad Summit
(million $ US)
Support to Jordanian-
PLO Joint Committee
for Occupied
Territories
Saudi Arabia
71.43
UAE
28.57
17
Qatar
16.43
10
Oman
None
None
from retribution by Palestinians critical of the ruling
family and its ties to the United States. Saudi leaders'
support is directed mostly toward the more moderate
Fatah faction.
On an ideological level, aid to the Palestinians is
viewed as a moral obligation incumbent on the Saudis
both as Arabs and as self-appointed protectors of
Islam's holy places, especially Jerusalem. Under
terms of the 1978 Baghdad Summit agreement, Ri-
yadh pledged $71.4 million a year to the PLO. The
Saudis also donate $43 million to the Jordanian-PLO
Joint Committee for the Occupied Territories and
provide limited humanitarian assistance-vehicles,
supplies, medicine, and money-to Palestinian leaders
and institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. In
addition to their Baghdad payments, the Saudis col-
lect a "liberation tax" of 5 percent from all Palestin-
ians in the country, which is apparently turned over to
the PLO. The government reportedly collects a
2 percent levy from all Saudi government employees,
which is donated to a humanitarian fund for the
Palestinians. The State Department estimated in 1977
that these levies amounted to about $11.6 million.F_
Despite this aid, the Saudis do not have much lever-
age on Palestinian policymaking. Unlike Syria and
Iraq, Saudi Arabia does not control a surrogate group
within the PLO that it can use to advance its goals.
Palestinians than Riyadh.
Palestinians in Saudi Arabia. Palestinians in Saudi
Arabia prefer to keep their support for Palestinian
issues low key to avoid attracting attention or suspi-
cion. Even so, the Saudis probably monitor the Pales-
tinian community more closely than any other foreign
group for signs of disaffection or political troublemak-
ing.
The PLO is the only Palestinian organization official-
ly permitted in Saudi Arabia. Its principal offices are
in Riyadh and Jidda. They are headed by conservative
Muslims close to Arafat. There are 15 small non-PLO
Palestinian offices termed Popular Committees for
the Families of Martyrs and Fighters, which are
headed by prominent Saudis.
Riyadh does not discourage Palestinian immigration
into the kingdom, but it does restrict entry to Palestin-
ians carrying Jordanian or Lebanese passports. Most
Palestinians live as permanent residents scattered
throughout the kingdom's urban centers and are
subject to the same legal restrictions as other foreign-
ers living in Saudi Arabia. There are no refugee
camps in the country. Palestinians must be sponsored
by a Saudi patron and must have a two-year renew-
able residence permit. The government will not issue
exit and reentry visas for Palestinians unless they have
a signed statement from the regional PLO office that
they have paid their liberation tax.
Palestinians are permitted to remain in the country
after retirement only if they have acquired Saudi
citizenship. Only about 1,000 Muslim Palestinians-
for the most part professionals who have resided in the
kingdom for long periods and proven their political
reliability-have been granted Saudi citizenship by
the King, the only Saudi official empowered to do so.
Children born to foreign parents in Saudi Arabia do
not automatically acquire Saudi citizenship. They
must take the citizenship of the male parent.
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The Palestinian community is estimated to number
between 108,000 (the official Saudi figure) and
140,000 (the official Palestinian estimate). US Em-
bassy sources believe the figure is near 125,000. The
major influx of Palestinians came to Saudi Arabia
before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. There also are
about 168,000 Jordanians in the country, some of
whom are Palestinian by birth. Most of the Palestin-
ians in the kingdom are in the 25 to 45 age range, and
virtually all males of working age are employed.F__
we believe
Riyadh still may prefer them to other expatriates
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Palestinians do not play a key role in the Saudi
economy, and few hold government positions. Those
few who have official posts-primarily in the Foreign,
Oil, and Planning Ministries-usually have resided in
the country since the late 1940s and 1950s and have
been granted Saudi citizenship.
L They are denied access to sensitive petroleum
installations in the Eastern Province, ostensibly for
security reasons.
The largest number of Palestinians are employed as
teachers. Many others hold professional jobs in engi-
neering, medicine, banking, and business. The re-
mainder are small shopkeepers, construction workers,
technicians, and mechanics. Manual workers general-
ly stay in Saudi Arabia for about two years, white-
collar employees four to six years, and those at the
management level for longer periods, some as long as
10 years.
Palestinian white-collar workers are well paid, earn-
ing almost as much as US and British nationals and
more than Arab and other non-Western expatriates.
The average pay for skilled workers in the late 1970s
was $2,300 per month. Many management employees
were earning up to $4,000 monthly. Teachers, who
receive free amenities such as transportation, housing,
and medical care, earn the least take-home pay of the
professional groups.
Outlook. The policies of the Saudi Government do not
appear to threaten legally documented and employed
Palestinians. The country's manpower needs are such
that foreign workers, including Palestinians, will be
required through the next decade. Despite Saudi
misgivings about Palestinian loyalties
whom they regard as even less trustworthy.
The Palestinians have no illusions about their status in
the kingdom. They know it depends on their good
behavior. We concur with the Embassy's assessment
that few Palestinians in Saudi Arabia would give up
their comparatively secure lives in the kingdom for an
uncertain future in a Palestinian homeland. Palestin- 25X1
ians legally in the country enjoy good pay, a comfort-
able standard of living, and relatively secure working
conditions. Most are well educated and have their
families with them. Although many Palestinians may
see themselves as more sophisticated politically,
cosmopolitan, and qualified than their Saudi counter-
parts, they are unlikely to engage in political opposi-
tion.
Kuwait and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. Kuwait generously backs
the Palestinian movement. he
reasons for the support are humanitarian concern for
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the refugees and the presence in the country of a large
Palestinian community, but the aid also reflects the
government's fear of terrorist reprisals. Kuwait's rela-
tions with the PLO are close and cordial, and it is a
frequent host to PLO leaders, many of whom once
lived in Kuwait and whose families reside there. PLO
chief Arafat visits Kuwait regularly to obtain finan-
cial assistance, to brief the Amir and other high- 25X1
ranking government officials, and to take the pulse of
the Palestinian community. Like the UAE, Kuwait
occasionally pushes diplomatically for Western and
Asian recognition of the PLO.
The PLO collapse in Lebanon last summer and
rumors that Lebanon intended to reduce the number
of resident Palestinians underscored Kuwaiti fears of
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Under the Baghdad Summit agreement in 1978,
Kuwait gives $39 million annually to the PLO; it also
contributes $24 million a year to the Jordanian-PLO
Joint Committee for the Occupied Territories. Kuwait
underwrites Fatah-which was founded in Kuwait by
Arafat in the late 1950s-and has made small contri-
butions to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine as well. Kuwait collects a liberation tax for
the PLO from Palestinian government employees and
urges private employers to do the same.
Kuwaiti leaders are cautious in voicing any support
for Middle East peace initiatives. Publicly, they rarely
disagree with PLO policies, insist they will support
whatever the PLO accepts, and criticize the United
States for not dealing directly with the Palestinian
organization.
Kuwaiti security concerns
mean any Middle East peace proposals will be judged
less on merit than on the likelihood of their stimulat-
ing reprisals.
In return for support, Kuwait expects the PLO to
behave inside Kuwait and to help authorities police
the Palestinian community. The local PLO leadership
is fairly docile, headed by unambitious, politically
conservative Fatah representatives who are longtime
residents of Kuwait. Prominent Palestinians living in
Kuwait include PLO Deputy Chairman Salah Khalaf,
the local PLO representative Awni Battash, Fatah
regional representative and Palestine National Coun-
cil Deputy Speaker Salim al-Zanoun, and PNC For-
eign Affairs Committee Chairman Khalid al-Hassan.
In addition to the officially sanctioned PLO and
Fatah offices, the Kuwaiti Government tolerates the
radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (DFLP).
According to the Embassy, local Palestinians strongly
favor moderation by the PLO. They supported Ara-
fat's efforts to seek an accommodation between the
PLO and Jordan. Both the Palestinians in Kuwait and
Arafat himself probably expect little else from the
country beyond its traditional adherence to the Pales-
tinian cause and continued haven for the emigre
Palestinian community.
Palestinians in Kuwait. More than half of the Pales-
tinians in the Peninsula-approximately 350,000-
live in Kuwait as virtually permanent residents. They
form a cohesive, vocal community that contributes
significantly to the economic well-being of the coun-
try. For the most part, Kuwait's Palestinians appreci-
ate the security and relative freedom they have
enjoyed over the past several decades.
Palestinians are 22 percent of Kuwait's total popula-
tion of 1.5 million. According to a 1978 Embassy
assessment, they comprised 38 percent of the work
force and nearly 20 percent of all government civil
servants (approximately 25,000 employees),
middle-level managerial positions in Kuwait's private
and governmental financial institutions. Palestinians
serve as advisers to the Amir and the ruling family
and hold responsible positions in the Defense and
Interior Ministries.
Kuwaiti society is highly stratified. Palestinians as
Arabs and Muslims are accorded higher status than
other Arabs, and certainly more than non-Arabs.
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Nonetheless, social and economic discrimination cre-
ates tensions between the native Kuwaitis and Pales-
There are signs that the relatively open atmosphere in
Kuwait is disappearing. Fearful of threats to its
security and caught in an economic downturn because
of the drop in oil revenues and a local stock market
crash, Kuwait is considering ways to reduce the
number of Palestinians it shelters. First indications
that new restrictions were being considered came
following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June
1982. Believing that PLO fighters and refugees would
flock to Kuwait, Kuwaiti officials set strict limits on
visas and banned appointment of non-Kuwaitis (Pales-
tinians.
The Palestinians are not newcomers to Kuwait.
Many-33 percent according to an Embassy estimate
in 1978-have been residents more than 10 years.
Many have deeper roots than the Bedouin who were
granted citizenship in the 1960s to bolster the "native
Arab" population. Regardless of the length of their
residence in Kuwait or the services they have ren-
dered, few Palestinians have been made citizens. A
naturalized Kuwaiti of Palestinian origin told the
Embassy recently that only 50 Palestinian families
had been awarded Kuwaiti citizenship, and then only
because of their close association with the ruling
Sabah family. Nonetheless, even they are second-class
citizens; they can own land and engage in business
without a Kuwaiti sponsor, but they cannot hold office
and cannot vote in National Assembly elections until
they have been naturalized citizens for 20 years.
Palestinians receive lower salaries than Kuwaitis for
comparable work and are denied government stipends,
social allowances, and pensions available to natives.
Only native or naturalized Kuwaitis can own land,
commercial establishments, and shares in the local
stock market-the principal sources of private wealth.
Palestinians must have a Kuwaiti partner in any
business venture and cannot own more than 49 per-
cent of the company. Palestinians are entitled to
medical benefits and to elementary and secondary
schooling for their children if the child is enrolled
before the age of 7. Palestinians can apply for admis-
sion to Kuwait's university but face a quota.
Outlook. Kuwait for many years had an open-door
policy regarding Palestinian immigration. Because of
its oil wealth, ambitious modernization schemes, and
manpower shortage, Kuwait welcomed the talented
and highly skilled Palestinians. Any male 18 years of
age or older who had valid employment could enter
the country and look forward to a secure and prosper-
Kuwait was preferred for noneconomic reasons as
well. It was a relatively open and permissive environ-
ment where Palestinians could form clubs and support
networks as long as they were apolitical. This was in
direct contrast to the other Gulf states)
tinians) to civil service jobs. They also tightened 25X1
security along the long border with Iraq to stop illegal
crossings and weapons smuggling.
Kuwaiti apprehen- 25X1
ions increased during the summer of 1982 as the
situation in Lebanon deteriorated and Beirut ap-
peared ready to reduce drastically its Palestinian
population and eliminate laissez passer documenta-
tion for Palestinians living abroad. Kuwait began a 25X1
crackdown on illegal aliens, threatening stiff jail
sentences, financial penalties, and deportation. No
residence permits or entry visas were to be granted to
new workers or to families of workers already in
The Kuwaiti Government probably will not imple-
ment all of these restrictions. Similar restrictions were
suggested in 1978 but not strictly enforced.
Palestinians with valid work permits
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and needed skills are probably secure in their jobs for
the next several years at least, but the number of
Palestinians in government and management positions
or without skills will probably decline if the economy
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The Palestinian community in Kuwait, however, still
feels secure enough to lobby the government for tough
measures in support of Palestinian causes. In August
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1982, after the defeat in Lebanon, Palestinian protes-
tors staged a massive rally in Kuwait City and
petitioned the government to sever its relations with
Washington, stop oil sales to the United States,
withdraw its assets from US banks, boycott US
products, and improve relations with other countries
more supportive of Arab causes.
The UAE and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. The UAE was one of the
first of the Gulf states to extend diplomatic recogni-
tion to the PLO. Abu Dhabi is a major financial
backer of the organization and a staunch supporter of
the PLO's bid for international recognition. Under the
1978 Baghdad agreement, Abu Dhabi gives more
than $28 million yearly to the PLO and contributes
$17 million to the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Com-
mittee for the Occupied Territories. In addition, the
federal government collects a 5-percent tax on the
salaries of Palestinian government workers for contri-
bution to the PLO. UAE leaders have included
demands for recognition of the PLO when bargaining
with European and Japanese visitors over commercial
and diplomatic relations.
Federation President Shaykh Zayid is a passionate
advocate of Palestinian rights. He was particularly
indignant about the plight of the refugees in Lebanon
following the Israeli invasion last summer. He also
sharply criticized the United States for not giving the
Palestinians more support
Zayid's concern for the Palestinians also is dictated by
political necessity. He rules an often uneasy alliance
of seven semiautonomous shaykhdoms in which only
one person in five is a native. The 50,000 Palestinians
in the country form a cohesive and vocal community
that lobbies effectively for Palestinian causes and,
Zayid believes, could undermine the stability of the
Lax immigration and security practices have made
the UAE relatively safe for a variety of unsavory
radical Arab and Palestinian factions. These factions
have used Abu Dhabi as a staging ground for terrorist
operations, including airplane hijackings by the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the 1970s
and the murder in 1978 of the UAE Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs during an assassination attempt
on the visiting Syrian Foreign Minister. According to
the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, two Palestinian
terrorist teams bent on attacking American personnel
were arrested in the spring of 1982 by UAE internal
security and deported.
short of skilled, Arabic-speaking workers.
Palestinians in the UAE. Palestinians came to the
Emirates in the late 1960s and the 1970s, when
Shaykh Zayid began a massive industrial develop-
ment program. The Palestinians were especially wel-
come in a country eager to modernize but desperately
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The UAE places few restrictions on Palestinians-or
other foreign workers. Most Palestinians live and
work in the oil-producing emirates of Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, and Sharjah. They comprise only 5 percent of
the total UAE workforce, but most are highly skilled
professionals-doctors, teachers, technicians, and civil
servants employed in the middle and upper echelons
of the federal UAE and local emirate governments
and in the oil industry. Palestinians dominate the
information media and education. They are partners
with local citizens in construction, real estate, and
commercial enterprises.
Like all expatriates, Palestinians must have valid
resident work permits, which must be renewed period-
ically. Few Palestinians have been granted UAE
citizenship. Approximately half of the Palestinians
have their families with them and can be considered
virtually permanent residents. Children born in the
UAE acquire the nationality of their fathers. Primary
and secondary schools are free and open to all Pales-
tinians, and the federal government provides some
scholarships for them at local universities. Scholarship
aid for study abroad, however, is reserved for nation-
als.
Outlook. Opportunities for Palestinians in the UAE
are likely to decline over the next several years, not so
much because of security problems but because of the
scaling down of industrial projects and the increasing
availability of skilled native labor. Higher civil service
positions now held almost entirely by Palestinians and
other Arab expatriates will be assumed increasingly
by younger Emirians returning from university educa-
tion abroad. A similar development will take place in
the private sector as educated sons of the merchant
class begin to fill managerial and submanagerial posts
now held by Palestinians. Investment opportunities
will also be curtailed because of recent UAE meas-
ures to protect its nationals by restricting nonnatives
from owning land or more than 49 percent of business
ventures. Palestinians whose contracts are not re-
newed will have to leave the country, presumably
returning to their country of origin-usually Lebanon
or Jordan.
Qatar and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. Qatar, like its Gulf neigh-
bors, is a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause.
Doha is a frequent stop for visiting Palestinian digni-
taries, who usually receive a sympathetic hearing,
money, and occasionally are allowed to hold rallies for
the Palestinian community in Qatar.
A small and timorous country where only one person
in five is native-born, Qatar is anxious to avoid
antagonizing the PLO. Qatar gives generously to the
PLO and the confrontation states. Doha's contribu-
tion to the PLO under terms of the 1978 Baghdad
agreement is $16.4 million per year. In addition, Doha
yearly gives $82 million to Jordan, $121.6 million to
Syria, and contributes $10 million to the Jordanian-
PLO Joint Committee for the Occupied Territories.
Qatar also deducts 5 percent from the salaries of
Palestinian government workers-estimated at
1,300-for the PLO and contributes to the Palestin-
ian Red Crescent Society for the relief of the refugees
in Lebanon. Apart from official remittances, the State
Department estimated last June that private Qatari
financial support for the Palestinians totaled $4 mil-
lion in the first half of 1982.
Despite its generosity and declarations of friendship,
Doha is uneasy in its dealings with the PLO. Qatar
closely follows Saudi policy and supported the Fahd
peace plan at the Fez Summit in November 1981. We
believe Qatar's ruler Amir Khalifa, like the Saudis,
would like to see the Palestinians granted a homeland,
Jerusalem returned to Arab and Muslim control, and
the suffering of the refugees alleviated. He would also
like to see the PLO moderate its policies and join in
discussions for a negotiated Middle East peace settle-
ment.
Qatar rarely presses its views on the PLO hierarchy.
The Amir does not have the close relationship with
Arafat that the Saudis do and is unhappy with the
criticism PLO leaders level at the Gulf regimes when
they come to town. During visits to Doha in the spring
of 1982 and again in the fall following the Israeli
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 Arab heads of state at Fez Summit, September 1982 (PLO Chief
Arafat standing next to Saudi King Fahd, right center)
invasion of Lebanon, senior PLO spokesmen casti-
gated the governments of Qatar and the other Gulf
states for their failure to support the fighters in
Lebanon and their restrictions on the entry of Pales-
tinian refugees.
The Palestinian Community. Palestinians first came
to Qatar in the late 1940s because of the economic
opportunities and stable political environment. Over
the years, they shared the benefits and some of the
privileges as Qatar prospered and attained one of the
highest per capita incomes in the world. Palestinians
have also generated resentment among many Qataris
because of their talents and the terrorist tarbrush, but
the community remains quiescent and loyal.
Qatar has approximately 25,000 Palestinians, about
10 percent of the estimated total population. They are
well educated and highly skilled and have helped to
create the emirate's modern institutions, serve as
advisers to the ruling family, and occupy key positions
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in the Finance, Petroleum, Education, and Defense
Ministries. According to the Embassy, probably half
of the Palestinians employed in Qatar work for the
government. They hold up to subcabinet level posi-
tions. A few Palestinians serve in the Interior Minis-
try's security force and in the Qatari Defense Force,
In the private
sector, Palestinians tend to be managers and office
directors. According to the Embassy, certain industri-
al and military areas are off limits to Palestinians.
Like other foreign workers, Palestinians are granted
entry/residence permits on the basis of prearranged
employment. They can remain in the country as long
as they are sponsored by their employers. Palestinians
are technically eligible for citizenship, but a source of
the Embassy reports that only 15 Palestinian families
have acquired it.
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Qatar has a closed, highly stratified, tribal society,
with housing patterns and social strictures defined by
class and economics rather than nationality. Although
restrictions on housing are nonexistent, there is little
assimilation. Children born to Palestinian parents in
Qatar assume the nationality of their father. All
children in Qatar regardless of their nationality re-
ceive free education through high school, medical
care, and social service benefits. A 5-percent quota is
in effect for Palestinian students seeking entry into
Qatar's university, however, and only Qatari nationals
are eligible for government grants.
Outlook. Qataris from the Amir down are ambivalent
about the Palestinians, as they are about most non-
Qataris. They acknowledge the contributions Pales-
tinians have made but feel threatened by their num-
bers and influence and by Qatar's dependence on their
skills. According to the embassy, many Qataris be-
lieve the Palestinians are the root of most tension in
the region and a destabilizing element in domestic
politics. They see the regime's generous support of the
PLO as a necessary but onerous form of protection.
Doha would like to replace Palestinian workers
with native or other non-Qatari Arabs. This is partic-
ularly true of Palestinians employed in the govern-
ment sector. The government has relied on attrition to
replace Palestinians with other Arab speakers. It has
also begun restricting the entrance to Qatar of family
members of Palestinians employed in the country,
placed a discreet ban on hiring Palestinians, and
reduced the number of university admissions of Pales-
tinian students. Palestinians in large numbers proba-
bly will not be fired, but few will be hired or have
their contracts renewed.
Oman and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. Muscat traditionally has
shown little enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause. Pro-
Arab nationalist sentiment has never been as strong
here as elsewhere in the Gulf. Long an outsider in
regional politics, Oman supported the Camp David
accords and maintained full diplomatic relations with
Egypt when both were anathema in the Arab world.
Oman does not contribute to Palestinian organizations
and does not permit the PLO an office or a represent-
ative in the country. Government spokesmen have
stated Muscat will recognize the PLO only if the
Palestinian organization drops its support of the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Oman, an Aden-based
anti-Muscat faction that has close ties to radical
Palestinian factions.
Oman's
policy may be changing. Omani nationalists, unhappy
with the sultanate's isolation from mainstream Arab
and Gulf politics, are acquiring broader and more
influential roles in the government. They, like many
younger Omanis, were disturbed by the carnage in
Lebanon last summer and are pressing Sultan
Qaboos-Oman's ruler-to adopt policies more in
line with Oman's Gulf neighbors regarding the Pales-
tinian issue.
Palestinians in Oman. Palestinians in Oman pose no
threat to the country's security. They are few in
number and easily cowed by restrictions. Palestinians
hold no government positions and play only a margin-
al role in the country's economy. Government officials
tend to lump the Palestinians together with the Sovi-
ets, other Communists, and radical Arabs as enemies
Most of the approximately 2,000 to 3,000 Palestinians
in Oman are teachers on contract from Jordan.
Others work as technicians and laborers in the oil-
fields, with a few serving as translators in the govern-
ment and military. For the most part, the Palestinians
are short-term contract workers and live in remote
villages. Few have their families with them, and
virtually all attempt to mask their Palestinian
identity.
To enter the country Palestinians must have passports
or refugee documents from a country recognized by
Oman. Once in Oman, they can work at any job. They
cannot own land, however, and can own businesses
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only if they have an Omani partner; few apparently
do. Palestinians, like other foreign workers legally in
the country, receive free medical care and education
for their dependents if their families have accompa-
nied them. Oman has no higher education facility,
and Muscat will sponsor only Omani nationals for
study abroad. Palestinians, like other contract work-
ers, must leave the country after their contracts have
expired.
Outlook. Oman has prided itself on its ability to
screen out groups or individuals it perceives to be a
security risk. Only recently did Muscat discover,
much to its chagrin, that many of its "Jordanian"
teachers were actually Palestinians. Muscat may seek
to reduce the number by not renewing contracts and
by greater reliance on Egyptians, who already consti-
tute the bulk of the country's teachers. Muscat proba-
bly will not fire any Palestinians already working in
Oman
Palestinians in Oman have few expectations. They are
in the country in effect under pretense and are
discouraged from staying more than a few years.
They have no hopes of becoming citizens. Few oppor-
tunities for advancement exist, and Oman offers no
real educational benefits for their children, two goals
highly valued by the Palestinians. Although little
palpable tension exists between Omanis and Palestin-
ians, we believe the Palestinians know they will be the
first affected as Oman moves toward replacing expa-
triates with trained Omanis.
Oman's Palestinians know, too, that the Omanis'
newfound sympathy for the Palestinian cause is more
form than substance. Reporting over the past several
years indicates that Muscat is unlikely to ease restric-
tions on Palestinians or soon recognize the PLO. We
believe Omanis in government and private life will
continue to regard the Palestinians with suspicion, as
contract workers of questionable loyalty whose skills
are needed for technical and manual labor.
Bahrain and the Palestinians
The Palestinian Diaspora. Bahrain's ability to aid the
Palestinians is limited by the country's size and
financial resources. The PLO has had an office in
Manama since 1974. The government collects 5 per-
cent of Palestinian government employees' salaries
and levies a small stamp tax for the PLO. In addition,
it contributes small sums to Palestinian relief organi-
zations
The PLO office in Bahrain is relatively inactive. Its
chief, a Palestinian long resident in Bahrain who is
employed by the Education Ministry, was handpicked
by the government. The office does not seem to lobby,
as other local PLO offices in the Gulf occasionally do,
to increase support for the Palestinian cause or to ease
restrictions on the Palestinian community in Bahrain.
Pales-
tinians in the country criticize the local eader-
ship for its passivity but not harshly, because they
realize that an activist role might cause the govern-
ment to further circumscribe their status.
Bahrain believes that its support for the Palestinian
cause maintains its credentials as a member of the
Arab mainstream and reduces the likelihood of criti-
cism of its defense arrangements with the United
States. Bahrain is the only Gulf state to allow US
naval vessels to use its port facilities. Manama bal-
ances this liability by criticizing Washington's sup-
port for Israel. We believe Manama is more fright-
ened by the specter of Iranian-sponsored subversion
among its substantial Shia population and by the
Iran-Iraq war than by a Palestinian backlash.
Palestinians in Bahrain. Bahrain's small Palestinian
community poses no real threat to the country's well-
being. Individual Palestinians have acquired great
wealth and influence over the years, but the estimated
200 families of Palestinian origin have never played a
significant role as a group in the government or in the
country's economic life. Nevertheless, Bahrain's rul-
ing. family is suspicious of the Palestinians-as it is of
all foreigners-because of the Iranian-sponsored coup
attempt in 1981 and the ties between Bahrain's two
Marxist opposition groups and the radical Palestin-
Bahrain has never had a large expatriate population.
Its oil boom began earlier and ended sooner, and
modernization was a more gradual process than in the
other oil-rich Gulf states. Bahrain began planning for
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a postoil economy and preparing Bahrainis for techni-
cal jobs in the early 1970s and consequently did not
become as dependent on foreign labor as its neighbors.
Approximately 1,500 Palestinians live in Bahrain,
most of whom probably came in the 1950s and 1960s.
Few have migrated there in recent years, and the
number of Palestinians in the country has been declin-
ing since the mid-1970s. Most have Jordanian docu-
ments, although a few have been given Bahraini
passports. Only a small number of Palestinians-
probably less than a dozen-have been granted Bah-
raini citizenship. Palestinian children born in Bahrain
are entitled to apply for citizenship, but they rarely do
so because their parents are ineligible.
Bahrain has no particular restrictions aimed at Pales-
tinians. They live virtually as permanent residents in
the country's urban centers. They work as teachers
and hold posts in the Education, Foreign, Interior,
and Health Ministries. Palestinians advise the Crown
Prince and Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minis-
ter, and serve in the Bahrain Defense Force. In the
private sector, Palestinians hold jobs as managers and
skilled workers in law firms, banks, and construction
companies. Elementary and secondary education is
free and available for all Palestinian children. State
scholarships for study abroad are restricted to Bah-
raini nationals. Palestinians can apply to the Gulf
Technical University in Bahrain but are subject to a
5-percent quota
Outlook. Bahrainis, like other Gulf Arabs, view the
Palestinians with envy and suspicion. The government
closely monitors the community for signs of antire-
gime activity and has instituted new hiring policies
and immigration regulations to reduce the number of
Palestinians in the country. Major industries and
government agencies are being encouraged to hire
native Bahrainis, preferably Sunni Arabs where possi-
ble, as replacements for foreign workers. Like the
other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
Bahrain has tightened restrictions on immigration
from all Arab countries and is denying visas to
workers without job contracts and to family members
of Palestinians already employed in the country.
These measures are not all formal ones, nor are they
being strictly enforced. Rather, they are offered as
guidelines and are being applied unevenly and dis-
creetly.
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