LIBYA S QADHAFI: VULNERABILITIES AND PROSPECTS

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Libya's Qadhafi:
Vulnerabilities
and Prospects
Directorate of
#"` Secret
Intelligence
Secret
NESA 83-10117
June 1983
333
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Libya's Qadhafi:
Vulnerabilities
and Prospects
This paper was prepared by of the
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10117
June 1983
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Libya's Qadhafi:
Vulnerabilities
and Prospects
Key Judgments The only serious challenges to Qadhafi come from the domestic sector.
Information available Either a military coup or a power play against Qadhafi from within his in-
as of 1 April 1983 ner circle could unseat him, and Qadhafi remains vulnerable to an attack
was used in this report.
by a lone assailant. We believe, however, that Qadhafi's security system is
more likely than not to block such an attempt, at least in the short run.
Qadhafi is compulsive in his concern for his security, skilled in techniques
that ensure his survival, and endowed with an able security service that ob-
tains cooperation through intimidation if nothing else. His outrageous
policies stimulate dissent, but Libya's repressive atmosphere discourages its
expression. In sum, the odds favor his continuing in power for at least the
next few years.
Qadhafi's insistence on instituting political, social, and economic "reforms"
that do violence to traditional Libyan ways has alienated most segments of
society-even large portions of the lower classes that have benefited most
from his rule. For example:
? His own tribe may be growing disillusioned with his leadership.
? Growing disaffection within the military has prompted widespread
plotting and repeated coup attempts against the regime, all foiled by
informers or by Qadhafi's efficient security services.
? Qadhafi's increasing estrangement from the colleagues who helped bring
him to power has exposed him to moves by men he formerly trusted.
The only known organized opposition to Qadhafi-as opposed to the ad hoc
plotting we have seen in the military-exists in the exile community, but
the exile groups do not at the moment pose a serious threat to the regime.
They have had a strong psychological effect on Qadhafi, however, spurring
him to initiate an assassination campaign against exiles in 1980 and to
threaten another last fall.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10117
June 1983
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Although hardline US policies have on occasion intimidated Qadhafi and
have probably been partly responsible for a reduction in his involvement in
international terrorism, Qadhafi has at times been able to turn them to his
advantage:
? They allow Qadhafi to generate sympathy both at home and abroad by
posing as the victim of an implacable superpower, thus mitigating some
of Libya's domestic disaffection and international isolation.
? They feed Qadhafi's ego, which delights in confrontation and attention.
? They have occasionally caused the United States trouble with its allies
and adverse international publicity.
Qadhafi's vulnerabilities play into the hands of the Soviets. There has been
a rough parallel between his declining popularity at home and failed
policies abroad, and his willingness to turn to the Soviets for security and
intelligence assistance, diplomatic support, and defense.
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Libya's Qadhafi:
Vulnerabilities
and Prospects
Qadhafi is a man beset by problems that his policies
continually compound. He has undermined his domes-
tic position by ramming through "reforms" that do
violence to traditional Libyan practices and deep-
rooted beliefs. Most significantly, from the point of
view of his continuation in power, he has alienated
large numbers of the military by pursuing foreign
adventures unrelated to the national interest, disre-
garding the military hierarchy, and raising the possi-
bility of disbanding the military as an institution. He
has also whittled away at the loyalty of his own inner
circle, partly by the adoption of misguided policies
and partly by his preference for advisers and confi-
dants who feed his impulses toward excess. By turning
his back on the colleagues who helped bring him to
power, he has rendered himself doubly vulnerable. He
has deprived himself of the moderating advice of those
who, at least on occasion, have shown some willing-
ness to put the country's interests ahead of their own;
at least two of his colleagues have reportedly been
willing to argue against his more radical policies.
Secondly, he has exposed himself to possible moves
against him by those he formerly trusted.
Such internal problems-growing popular unhappi-
ness, dissidence within the military, and strained
loyalties and rivalries within the regime-constitute
the greatest threats to Qadhafi's hold on power, but
they are by no means the only threats he faces. So
many Libyans-most of them educated, middle class
professionals-have fled the country over the years
that there is now a sizable and growing body of
dissidents in exile, primarily in West European coun-
tries but also in Cairo and Rabat. These men are
largely incapable of acting directly against him,
though some of the exile groups show signs of trying.
Nonetheless, their continued activity preys on Qad-
hafi's mind, perhaps because they collaborate with
countries eager to see Qadhafi's demise. Qadhafi
must also worry about direct military action against
him, not so much from his immediate neighbors-
these Qadhafi probably figures he could contain-but
on the part of a hostile Israel suspicious of Libya's
nuclear reactor, or a United States willing to act alone
or to throw its military might behind Egypt.
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Qadhafi faces other problems caused by the soft world
oil market. He could worsen these problems-as he
did in the early days of the oil glut in 1982 when he
kept Libya's oil at unrealistically high prices and saw
his market evaporate. He has since eased the situation
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by cutting prices. If the present oil price structure
continues to crumble, Qadhafi's problems will go
beyond a readjustment of market strategy.
Popular Disaffection
Qadhafi has made himself vulnerable to political
overthrow by pursuing policies that have stirred grow-
ing resentment on the part of virtually every class
within Libyan society. The problem has grown acute
primarily in the last four years, perhaps as a result of
the effect on Qadhafi of the example of the Iranian
revolution. Until that time Qadhafi moved with rela-
tive caution, possibly because his own revolutionary
thinking had not jelled (the first volume of the Green
Book, Qadhafi's blueprint for transforming society,
was not published until 1976, the second in 1978, the
third in 1979). Even so, Qadhafi showed himself
willing to defy traditional Libyan practices, launching
in 1973 the system of "people's committees"-groups
elected by the people to run Libyan organizations at
all levels-and in 1977 forming his "revolutionary
committees" as watchdogs of the revolution.
Qadhafi's most unpopular reforms have been in the
economic sphere. The initial moves tended to strike
primarily at the middle class-the confiscation of
houses not occupied by their owners, the takeover of
many businesses by their employees, and the national-
ization of import industries. But as more radical
measures were adopted, the circle of those affected
grew. After the nationalization of the traditional suqs
(small shops) dispossessed their middle class owners,
all consumers were forced to shop in state-owned
department stores, where long lines and shortages
became facts of life. Individual savings above a
certain minimum (variously reported, but possibly as
low as $3,380) were blocked-in effect confiscated by
the regime-in a move that reached the lower classes
as well
All orders of society were hit by problems caused by a
faltering oil market and declining oil revenues in
1982. A spate of reporting throughout that year
stressed Libya's generally deteriorating economic sit-
uation and the popular demoralization that resulted.
Prires of basic food items reportedly jumped; 2 staples
2 According to press accounts, the price of sugar rose from nine
cents to 25 cents per pound (200 percent), cooking oil went from
$1.02 to $1.70 per can, and a can of tomatoes rose to 68 cents from
became unavailable or in short supply; municipal
services deteriorated. Perhaps because these problems
gave the regime enough to contend with, it backed off
from a program announced in December 1981 to
compress wages by enforcing a countrywide wage
scale. The government instead cut all workers' sala-
ries by perhaps 15 percent in late 1982, presumably to
reduce disposable income and dampen demand for
consumer imports.
Qadhafi's most ruthless-and resented-measures
have not been reforms at all but attempts to imbue
society with his own brand of revolutionary fervor and
extirpate dissenters. He may have been impelled by
frustration; after 10 years in power, he had largely
failed to stir the Libyan people from their customary
practices. He may have been moved by jealousy; the
seizing of the US Embassy in Iran in November 1979
turned the international spotlight on that revolution,
which involved a radical transformation of the coun-
try. In any event, in 1980 he turned to the existing
revolutionary committees, previously not particularly
active, and gave them a key role in organizing massive
purges and corruption trials that involved thousands
of arrests, some of them of influential businessmen,
high government officials, and senior military officers.
committee members.
Denounced by revolutionary committee members,
these people were rounded up, tried before special
tribunals also composed of revolutionary committee
members, and sentenced. Some, after dramatic tele-
vised "confessions" much like the show trials in Iran,
were released; others vanished. At the same time, the
regime launched a campaign of murders of dissidents
abroad. Eleven people in all were killed, and others,
including children, were wounded. Many of the
deaths were brutal and were clearly the work of
amateurs-presumably overenthusiastic revolutionary
The regime apparently decided by late 1981 to put a
stop to the corruption trials out of concern for growing
public resentment over the purges. It also seems to
have made sporadic efforts to rein in the revolutionary
committee members. Even so, the populace still has
cause to fear their excesses and those of other groups
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close to Qadhafi.
The purges, murders, and excesses of the revolution-
ary committees go a long way toward explaining the
lack of organized opposition to Qadhafi inside Libya
and point up the significance of the dissent that does
crop up. Only the brave or the desperate are likely to
take action in an atmosphere so repressive. Many of
those who do are students-perennially idealistic and
personally threatened by Qadhafi's conscription poli-
cies-and Muslim fundamentalists. Although our in-
formation is scanty, there seems to have been a clear
pattern of increasing student activism in the past year,
predictably followed by stepped-up regime repression.
Qadhafi's quasi-religious ideology and willingness to
flout traditional Muslim practices-particularly with
respect to the role of women-probably have antago-
nized Libya's Muslim leadership, although only occa-
A somewhat different-and potentially more seri-
ous-problem for the regime involves recent indica-
tions of increased activity on the part of radical
Muslim groups.
Qadhafi has generally disregarded the wishes of the
populace in ramming through his revolution, and with
respect to the civilian sector he almost certainly is safe
in so doing. Control mechanisms in Libya are omni-
present. The revolutionary committees, though some-
what more subdued than in their 1980 heyday, effec-
tively stifle most manifestations of discontent.
Undoubtedly extra surveillance is given by regime
security forces to students, Muslim fundamentalists,
and probably the Province of Cyrenaica as a whole
since it is the center of tribal loyalty to the Sanusi
religious order and the monarchy that stemmed from
it and a traditional source of anti-Qadhafi sentiment.
Unarmed civilians are in any case unable to move
effectively against the government, although the ap-
pearance of antiregime slogans on city walls-as they
have in the past-could prove briefly embarrassing.
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Qadhafi remains vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the
international oil market. The potential scope of the
threat was demonstrated in 1981 and 1982, when the
soft oil market and Qadhafi's stubborn oil pricing
policy triggered a sharp decline in the country's eco-
nomic activity. Per capita income, which had reached
$11,000 in 1980, fell to $7,900, according to the
International Monetary Fund. Real GDP, which rose
an average of 8.7 percent yearly during 1976-80, fell
21 percent in 1981 and another 4 percent in 1982.
Libya's current account fell into deficit in July 1981,
ending the year $2.3 billion in the red. Tripoli reduced
the deficit to $500 million last year as imports were
slashed by $4 billion. Foreign exchange holdings
plunged from a peak of almost $14 billion in June
1981 to a low of $6.3 billion in September 1982. F_
The regime's strong measures to control financial
outflows in 1982 had significant domestic repercus-
sions. Import restrictions were imposed in May cover-
ing a wide spectrum of consumer goods including
food, a move that intensified food shortages that
summer. Price increases of as much as 300 percent
were slapped on some food and services. A cutback of
a low of 660,000 barrels per day (b/d) in February
1982 to 1.75 million b/d in December.
Libyan oil production was 1.1 million b/d in April
1983. We believe it is likely to average near 1.3
million b/d for the year despite Libya's 1.1-million-
b/d OPEC quota. This level of production will result
in a small current account deficit again this year if
Libya can maintain an average price near the new
official price of $30.40 per barrel for its oil and if
import growth continues to be curtailed. Given these
assumptions, the Libyan economy should improve to
the point that the domestic irritants of the past two
years-shortages, price increases, severe import
cuts-will diminish in 1983. In the longer term,
Libya would find it impossible to complete its devel-
opment plan, but this need not directly affect the bulk
of the population.
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the regime's grandiose development schemes had
little impact on the public, who are shielded from
unemployment problems by a large foreign labor
force-40 percent of the total labor force-but dealt
a shock to planners and managers used to seemingly
Qadhafi compounded the problems caused by the
international oil glut by his inflexibility on price,
continuing to insist on $40 per barrel for Libyan crude.
By April 1982, however, it had become clear that the
problem was not transitory, and Tripoli undertook an
aggressive marketing program. It encouraged foreign
equity producers to step up production by offering
substantial price discounts; it tied repayment of obli-
gations owed to firms in Italy and Turkey to new sales
of oil; it arranged barter deals with Brazil, Italy,
South Korea, and a number of East European coun-
tries; it entered processing agreements with foreign
refiners, which gave Libya part of the proceeds of
product sales. As a result, oil production leaped from
Qadhaft continues to have the option of pursuing
aggressive price discounting policies, although this
course of action seems unlikely so long as Tripoli can
maintain oil production and prices near official
OPEC levels. A sharp price cut by UK or Nigerian
producers would probably cause an equal or even
more aggressive response from Qadhaft. Significant
cheating within OPEC ranks would also impel the
regime to adopt aggressive marketing policies at
variance with official OPEC guidelines.
The regime could face severe economic problems this
year if oil prices fell sharply. At the $25 per barrel
level, for example, Libya would face a projected
current account deficit of $4 billion in 1983 with
production at 1.3 million b/d. Such a deficit would
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probably push the regime to cut imports even more to
prevent depletion of its remaining foreign exchange
reserves. A $20 per barrel price would push the
current account deficit to $6 billion, given last year's
import levels. Because foreign exchange reserves
would be exhausted, the government would have to
slash imports to bare essentials, economic priorities
would have to be drastically reordered, and the
development plan would certainly be scrapped. Al-
though revenues would be sufficient to meet the basic 25X1
needs of the country's small population, popular
discontent with the regime would increase.
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Internal Threats
From the Inner Circle. In the past few years, Qadhafi
seems to have turned increasingly to a younger, more
radical group of advisers who have undercut the
influence of the few remaining colleagues who helped
bring him to power: Abd al-Salam Jallud, Mustafa
Kharubi, Abu Bakr Yunis, and Khuwaylidi al-
Humaydi-usually regarded as men who have exerted
a restraining influence on Qadhafi's policies. The men
who now have Qadhafi's ear seem to be
eager to encourage Qadhafi in his revolu-
on power and line their pockets.
Most members of this newly powerful group are
Qadhafi's close relatives and fellow tribesmen-
rough, barely literate, but unswervingly loyal to
Qadhafi because they owe everything to him and
would probably not long survive him. Often these
individuals have no fixed position but do Qadhafi's
bidding in matters he believes he cannot trust to
the extent of his power has always been ambiguous.
His position appears to have deteriorated following a
coup attempt in May 1981 involving members of his
tribe, the Magarha. Jallud's enemies were eager to
use the incident against him by arresting his support-
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Probably the most influential of this group are
Sayyid
Ahmad, who may have the major role in Qadhafi's
current campaign to intimidate the opposition abroad.
Another longtime associate is Lt. Col. Hasan Ashqal,
A key radical reportedly gaining in influence is Col.
Khalifa Hunaysh, the commander of Qadhafi's secu-
rity battalion, one of the top men in the country's
Of the 12 original Revolutionary Command Council
members who came to power with Qadhafi in 1969,
only four remain-and three of them have seen their
positions erode in the past two years. Jallud, who
holds no formal title, is still referred to as Qadhafi's
Intraregime rivalries are significant because they
have resulted in the least able group of men rising to
the top, magnifying the inefficiency of the regime,
and because the increased scope given to the hard-
liners ensures that Qadhafi's more ruthless tendencies
will be encouraged, intensifying opposition to the
regime. In terms of Qadhafi's staying power, the
rivalry means that those on the outs will be more
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likely to move against Qadhafi if they are sufficiently
disgruntled over their treatment or if they believe they
are directly threatened-perhaps suspected of a plot
and about to be imprisoned, or worse.
From the Military. Any of these men might move in
conjunction with malcontents from within the mili-
tary. Disaffection in the ranks of the military is
mounting. It has suffered the consequences of Qadha-
fi's determination to intervene in Uganda and Chad,
both times at the cost of heavy casualties. When the
regime decided in 1979 to apply its system of revolu-
tionary committees to the armed forces, young zealots
were elevated over the heads of senior officers-a step
that guaranteed serious discipline and morale prob-
lems. In addition, high-level officers were among
those arrested and executed during the 1980 purges,
and the military has been the primary target of the
waves of arrests following the many actual or suspect-
ed coup plots. Men involuntarily inducted into the
military have even more cause for complaint, given
recruiting methods that frequently involve deception.
External Threats
Organized activity in opposition to Qadhafi takes
place within the exile community, where a number of
dissident groups have been formed over the years.
Qadhafi.
stronger on talk than action, although the broadcasts
beamed into Libya by the National Salvation Front
are said to be attracting a wide audience and angering
activities inside Libya that might have an impact on
the regime. Even here, announced plans have been
Only the Libyan Liberation Organization (LLO) and
the Libyan National Salvation Front, however, have
attracted significant support among foreign countries
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Although the exiles pose only a slight threat to
Qadhafi, they have had a psychological impact on him
out of proportion to their activity. In 1980 Qadhafi
was so unnerved by signs of exile opposition that he
launched a murder campaign that left 11 dead and a
number of others wounded-a move that proved
counterproductive since it won adherents to opposition
circles and sparked the creation of new groups that
promise to be more efficient and more realistic.
In a speech on 7 October-appropriately
enemies.
named "Vengeance Day" to commemorate the expul-
sion of Libya's Italian community in 1970-Qadhafi
warned exiled dissidents that they faced a new assas-
sination campaign unless they return. This time,
Qadhafi promised, murders would be carried out not
just by revolutionary committees or hit squads, but by
every Libyan traveling abroad, who must accept
responsibility for the elimination of the regime's
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The murder threats may be a bluff. Qadhafi called off
the last campaign-not out of a sudden change of
heart, but because it had stirred up a hornet's nest of
problems with European governments and the United
States. He must know that a renewed campaign
would generate the same reaction. He will probably
wait and see if his verbal threats have any impact on
dissident activity, then make a final decision on
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whether to strike. He is no longer restrained by the
prospect of assuming the chairmanship of the OAU,
but he is still seriously isolated in Arab circles,
worried about US intentions, and preoccupied with
The exiles are not Qadhafi's only external headache;
he sees himself in a hostile world, ringed by ene-
mies-chief among them Israel and the United
States. From the disposition of Libyan defenses, we
know he is worried about the possibility of a US 25X1
thrust from the Mediterranean or an Israeli air
attack-probably against the nuclear reactor at Taju-
ra. His confrontation with the United States in the
Gulf of Sidra in August 1981, Washington's reaction
on learning of Libyan plans to assassinate President
Reagan, the recent US response to a threat against
Sudan, and Israel's raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
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Chad.
With the exception of Magaryaf's National Salvation
Front, and perhaps the LLO, none of the groups seem
to be thinking of operations within Libya-the only
kind of activity likely to have a perceptible impact on
the regime. Few claim much support inside the coun-
try, and it is not clear that such followers as they may
possess have any access to Qadhafi or to sensitive
installations. The exile movements, in addition, are
split by rivalries that reflect the social, geographical,
and ideological strains within Libyan society as a
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Libyan defenses indicate that Qadhafi is, to a lesser
extent, worried about a possible thrust from Egypt as
well-though an Egyptian invasion force would have
trouble penetrating deep into Libya because of ter-
rain, logistics, and operational deficiencies. The Liby-
ans have to consider the possibility of an Egyptian
commando raid against their oilfields, but, because of
the redundancy and dispersion of its facilities, Libya's
oil production and export system is less vulnerable to
physical interruption than that of most producers.
An Egyptian attack would probably
serve to strengthen rather than weaken Qadhafi as
potential dissidents rallied to defend their home-
land-an effect experienced after the E tian-
Libyan border conflict in 1977
Antiregime senti-
ment is stronger in yrenaica now, but the Egyptians
could not expect mass defections to their side
Qadhafi considers Chad another potential threat. He
presumably fears that if Habre solidifies his position
he could draw on tribal ties to harass the Libyans in
the Aozou Strip or in Fezzan itself. Habre might well
receive help in such an effort from any of Libya's
many enemies-notably Egypt and Sudan, but per-
haps also Morocco and Saudi Arabia. He could even
be aided by the paramount tribal chieftain of the
Fezzan, who has followers in Chad, northern Sudan,
and Niger
(Qadhafi is trying to
emit are by stepping up aid to anti-Habre
dissidents in Chad.
We judge that at present Qadhafi has no intention of
going beyond such clandestine activities because of
the dangers of outright intervention. If Qadhafi were
to be drawn again into an open military intervention
in Chad, he could seriously weaken his hold on power.
He would again have to confront the problems experi-
enced during his first intervention: a reluctant mili-
tary, which does not consider involvement in a war in
Chad in Libya's national interest; heavy casualties,
which would compound Qadhafi's problems within
the military and with the general public; and escalat-
ing expenses at a time when financial reserves are
Qadhafi's fears of attack by enemies, particularly the
United States and Israel, serve to keep him somewhat
off balance and may have some impact on his foreign
policies, but they do him little harm domestically. If
anything, his ability to cast the United States and
Israel in the role of potential aggressors probably
helps distract the populace from real grievances
against the regime and deflects growing dissent.
Qadhafi's Prospects
Qadhafi is facing unprecedented domestic dissent. He
knows he stands in very real danger of assassination.
His security precautions-always careful-have mul-
tiplied in recent months.
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This compulsive concern for personal security is only
one of the factors working in favor of Qadhafi's
continuing in power. Perhaps his greatest asset-
despite the economic problems of the last two years-
is Libya's overall economic prosperity. Before the
discovery of oil, Libya was one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world, and revenues remained low-by
today's standards-even after the start of production
in the 1960s, thanks to prices that ranged between
$1.30 and $2.50 per barrel. Since Qadhafi's accession
to power, the surge in world oil prices has given Libya
one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa and
enabled the state to provide many services-subsi-
dized food, free education and medical care, hous-
ing-that go a long way toward alleviating other
complaints.
Not all of Qadhafi's reforms have been unpopular.
The people's committee system, for example, though a
rubberstamp process at higher levels and a source of
managerial inefficiency where it is applied, has given
large portions of the Libyan population at least some
voice in day-to-day matters, usually of greatest per-
sonal concern. It can be argued that because Qadhafi
spearheaded the early efforts by oil producers to wrest
a greater share of profits from Western oil companies,
he deserves a large share of the credit for the
country's subsequent soaring oil revenues. Regardless
of the effects of his actual policies he is the beneficia-
regime. Each unsuccessful coup attempt makes
Qadhafi safer and shrinks the circle of individuals he
allows to have access to him
At the same time, purges and arrests in themselves
generate additional discontent. Qadhafi, as he well
knows, cannot afford to relax. Of all his many
vulnerabilities, two are particularly serious: disaffec-
tion within his inner circle, and-probably the most
dangerous-military discontent. If Qadhafi is ever
unseated by force, the most likely scenario involves a
military coup. Qadhafi does his best to guard against
it, but the fact that efforts persist, even in the face of
widespread arrests, means that dissent goes deep and
large segments of the military are in the mood to act.
Further, in his ruthless cutting down of potential
opponents Qadhafi is capable of policies so outrageous
that they alienate previously loyal supporters-people
whom he still trusts. One day, one of these may move
successfully against him. Qadhafi seems to have
intimidated the civilian population, but he cannot
completely protect himself against a lone assailant
with a grievance and a gun
We believe that the threat against Qadhafi, though
growing, will prove manageable for at least the next
few years. Qadhafi's ultimate fate is another story.
The odds seem good that he will not leave power
ry of the country's good fortune
From his earliest years in power, Qadhafi has relied
for advice on relatives and fellow tribesmen on whose
loyalty he believes he can depend, and he has appoint-
ed them to sensitive positions. Perhaps most impor-
tant, his security services have proved so far both loyal
and efficient enough to stay on top of the many
threats Qadhafi faces-though their success is proba-
bly largely a function of the ruthlessness with which
they pursue their targets.
Another asset is the generally repressive atmosphere
Qadhafi has imposed on the country. Widespread,
frequent, and sometimes even random arrests and the
activities of revolutionary committee members with
virtually limitless powers discourage even the expres-
sion of disaffection, let alone action. Individuals with
greater courage, or shorter fuses, have already made
their move and been eliminated as threats to the
voluntarily.
Implications for the United States
Since Qadhafi is likely to surmount his many vulnera-
bilities, at least for the short term, he will continue to
pose a threat to US interests in the region. His
weaknesses have not proved exploitable in limiting his
troublemaking. The US boycott of Libyan oil, with-
drawal of citizens from Libya, and insistence on
continued naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra have
intimidated Qadhafi to some degree. He backed away
from his willingness to threaten US officials in the fall
of 1981. He has made no move to challenge US
exercises in the Gulf of Sidra since August 1981. He
has repeatedly indicated his interest in improving
bilateral relations. Partly out of unhappiness with his
current isolation in the area and partly as a result of
US pressure, he has generally reduced-at least for
the moment-his involvement with international
terrorism.
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Even so, his activities continue to jeopardize US
interests in the region. The foiling of the coup he
sponsored against Sudan's President Nimeiri has re-
moved the immediate danger to the Sudanese regime
but has not affected Qadhafi's long-term intentions
toward Sudan. He still supplies radical Palestinians
with large sums of money and tries to undermine US
peace efforts by his radical attacks on Arabs who are
willing to cooperate in such efforts. He is working to
destabilize the Habre regime in Chad and is mounting
subversive attacks with varying degrees of intensity
against a host of other African targets. The United
States has virtually no leverage to force him to change
his ways.
Indeed, Qadhafi has many reasons to welcome US
efforts against him. So far, he has been able to exploit
strong US actions-the boycott, the clash in the Gulf
of Sidra, the AWACS-by casting Libya as a small
Arab state victimized by a giant superpower and has
successfully won sympathy from the broader Arab
community, which has little use for his actions other-
wise. A similar reaction almost certainly occurred
inside Libya as well, although we do not have enough
information on Libyan public opinion to document it.
In consequence, US sanctions have been in part
counterproductive, somewhat mitigating domestic dis-
satisfaction and international isolation.
Qadhafi's vulnerabilities have had the effect of play-
ing into the hands of the Soviets. As Qadhafi's
popularity has declined and his policies have failed,
his ties to the Soviets have strengthened. Qadhafi is
not a Soviet surrogate and is not likely to become one,
and his pro-Soviet stance has not precluded signifi-
cant periods of friction. Nevertheless, we believe that
as his domestic position frays, he appreciates the
utility of Soviet help in security and intelligence; as
his foreign policies isolate him, he turns to them for
international diplomatic support; as the United States
adopts a harsh stand against him, he sees them as a
counterweight. Though the Soviets have been and will
continue to be wary of binding themselves too closely
to a leader they consider wildly unpredictable, they
are increasingly in a position to exact concessions-in
the form of increased access to Libyan ports, for
example-for their aid.
tional publicity.
The United States faces serious pitfalls in dealing
with Qadhafi. He will probably be able to turn future
confrontations to his advantage by dramatizing his
willingness to stand up to a giant and characterizing
the United States as implacably set against him. He
will continually portray the United States as conspir-
ing against him and blame it for all his troubles, from
the existence of exile groups to the loss of the OAU
chairmanship. When he does go, the United States is
certain to be blamed-as it still is, for that matter, for
his taking power--and even Arabs happy to see him
go will find new grounds for distrust of the United
States in his demise. A continued tough approach to
dealing with Qadhafi will generate objections-par-
ticularly from European allies-that such attention
only feeds Qadhafi's ego and international stature
(though the argument is heard less often now that
European oil concerns have diminished). For all these
reasons, keeping Qadhafi intimidated-to the limited
extent that it is possible-may involve the United
States in trouble with its allies and in adverse interna-
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