THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL: ITS ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
STAT
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Socialist
International:
Its Organization
and Activities
State Dept. review completed
Secret
EUR 83-10089
CR 83-11017
March 1983
Copy
A A 1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Directorate of
Intelligence
The Socialist
International:
Its Organization
and Activities
This paper was prepared by
European Issues Division, Office of European
Anal sis
IIt has been coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations and the
National Intelligence Council. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief
European Issues Division, EURA
Secret
EUR 83-10089
CR 83-11017
Mnrrh /OR?
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
The Socialist
International:
Its Organization
and Activities
Key Judgments The Socialist International (SI)-which holds its biennial congress in
Information available Lisbon from 7 to 10 April-is a West European-centered organization that
as of 11 March 1983 in recent years has branched out to encompass some 50 socialist and social
was used in this report.
democratic parties worldwide. Once little more than a debating society and
a source of patronage for its members, the SI now engages in global
political activity in its efforts to foster disarmament, improve North-South
relations, and protect human rights.
The transformation of the SI owes much to its president, former West
German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who believes that the organization must
deal pragmatically with non-European political groups and their problems,
both to increase its prestige and to offer a socialist alternative to
Communism. In practice, however, we believe SI actions have often tended
to legitimize radical groups, some of which enjoy Soviet or Cuban backing.
Although the SI's cohesiveness and formal powers are often overestimat-
ed-and its ability to provide material assistance is virtually nil-political
groups try hard to influence its policies. The Soviet Union and other
Communist regimes employ covert tactics in efforts to influence the SI.
More overtly, by claiming that they sincerely want "peace," the Soviets are
able to perpetuate a disarmament dialogue with the SI that has propagan-
da advantages for Moscow. Privately, the Soviets regard the socialists as
serious rivals in the Third World.
Despite the proliferation of members, the West European parties continue
to dominate the SI because of their extensive involvement and the size of
their financial contributions. Among them, the West Germans have the
greatest influence, with the French increasingly a close second. The Swedes
and Austrians play important roles, as do the Spanish and Portuguese
parties.
Nonetheless, Third World members exert strong and sometimes decisive
influence on issues related to their regions. SI meetings in recent years
have taken on a "mini-UN" flavor as the new members and observer
groups have added their parochial causes to the organization's agenda.
Indeed, the disorganized nature of SI meetings and the tendency of the es-
tablished West European members to defer to the judgment of those most
affected by a particular issue have often made for resolutions in support of
radical causes.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10089
CR 83-11017
March 1983
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
We believe that the SI's more responsible leaders are now having second
thoughts about some of the more radical parties and causes the organiza-
tion has supported. During the past year, for example, the SI has subtly
qualified its support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and assumed a lower
profile regarding the Salvadoran conflict. There are also signs that the SI
will henceforth be less receptive to the applications of prospective Third
World members.
Further, most SI leaders in our judgment seem to realize that their efforts
to contribute to peace in Central America, the Middle East, and the
disarmament field have hit serious snags. Each of these areas has thus been
deemphasized in favor of other issues such as the world economic recession,
North-South relations on a general level, and Southern Africa.
The fundamental differences in outlook between the SI and the United
States are likely to persist. The socialists will continue to work against
what they see as a tendency by the superpowers to divide the world into
blocs, whether in Europe or the Third World.. Thus, despite the belief of
many party leaders that they are promoting Western interests, the SI's
activities in some areas probably will continue to run counter to US
policies.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
Contents
Organizational Features
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
The Socialist
International:
Its Organization
and Activities
The Socialist International
The Socialist International (SI) is an umbrella organi-
zation encompassing some 50 socialist and social
democratic parties. Formed in 1951 to promote demo-
cratic socialism, the SI traces its lineage to the First
and Second Internationals, founded in 1864 and 1889
respectively. According to SI statutes, its specific
purpose is "to strengthen relations between the affili-
ated parties and to coordinate their political attitudes
by consent."
For more than two decades, the SI was little more .
than a debating society and a minor source of political
patronage for West European party functionaries.
Since the mid-1970s, however, changes in SI person-
nel and policy have propelled the socialists ' into
global political activity and enhanced their political
influence. Willy Brandt's election as president of the
SI in 1976 constituted a major turning point for the
organization. Worried that the SI had become irrele-
vant to international politics, Brandt and Social Dem-
ocratic colleagues such as Egon Bahr believed that it
should concentrate on the most challenging global
issues, especially peace, North-South relations, and
human rights .2 They also thought that the SI parties
needed to deal pragmatically with non-European po-
litical groups, both to increase the SI's prestige and to
offer a socialist alternative to what Bahr called the
Communist sickness.
Thus the SI came to support a wide assortment of
political movements which had some pretensions to
being socialist: and democratic in orientation. In the
Third World, leftist credentials sometimes took prece-
dence and a commitment to democracy was left to
later missionary work by the SI. The SI's campaign to
become a major actor worldwide has proceeded on
several fronts:
? Third World parties have been admitted.
' The term "socialists" is used throughout the paper as a matter of
convenience to characterize the socialists, social democrats, and
labor party members who participate in the SI.
? SI meetings now take place more frequently in
locations outside Europe.
? Well-publicized SI missions have visited Third
World areas to consult not only with member
parties but also with the. major actors on controver-
sial issues 25X1
In its post-1976 spirit of activism, the SI has stated its
support for some "liberation movements," including a
few that have had Soviet or Cuban backing such as
the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) in Namibia.and the Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front/Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FDR/FMLN) in El Salvador. Such support
was a departure from earlier SI behavior. SI rules
were also stretched to allow membership for the
ruling party of a leftist one-party state: the New Jewel
Movement (NJM) from Grenada. Moreover, maw25X1
other new Third World members have urged a dia-
logue with radical regimes. Although
rictifT on nd the radicalizing effects of expanded25X1
membership, they seem reluctant to use their finan-
cial. and political muscle to rein in the debate.
25X1
Role and Activities
The SI serves several important purposes for member
parties. It provides a public platform where party
leaders benefit from the prestige of the organization
as a whole. The SI's well-publicized meetings allow
party leaders to seek public support for their individ-
ual interpretations of international issues. It also
affords them opportunities to demonstrate fidelity to
socialist principles which are sometimes inexpedient
to implement at home. 25X1
The SI serves as a meeting ground where party
officials exchange views and information on political
questions. Meetings give the parties a chance to
persuade their colleagues from other countries to
support their perspectives on issues. For some par-
ford an opportunity to seek out and adopt positions
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
consistent with a leftist consensus; they are better able
to protect their flanks at home if they can say that
their sister parties agree with them.
Increasingly, SI meetings also provide a place to plan
future SI activities in substantive fields, such as the
creation of a committee to study disarmament, or the
dispatching of an SI mission to the Middle East. SI
missions and committees do not push a particular
policy line with their outside interlocutors because
they generally are not given a policy line. Rather, they
look into problems, and their findings sometimes
provide a basis for SI resolutions.
Finally, SI meetings are a reminder to all participants
about the socialist traditions of internationalism and
fraternal good will. The SI's long history, so often
invoked, reassures members about the durability of
socialist principles.
The SI is unable to formulate a coherent policy
because on substantive issues it operates more like an
academic conference than a government. Neverthe-
less, party leaders have increasingly viewed'the orga-
nization as a promoter of broad values on which they
can agree. In our judgment, they generally believe
that through its contact with political forces around
the world the SI can boost the appeal of democratic
socialism as an alternative to Communism or capital-
ism. While SI leaders know that radical groups gain
stature from such meetings, they hope that, at the
same time, the groups' more-bellicose attitudes can be
The SI's main activity is generating resolutions, and,
to the extent that it "decides" political questions at
all, it operates on the principle of unanimity. In
practice, when controversial questions are at issue,
unanimity is usually achieved through generalities. SI
resolutions sometimes exert a minor influence over the
positions of parties or even governments. The Belgian
socialist parties, for example, in government and in
opposition have tended to accept the SI's analysis of
Central American problems. Nevertheless, resolutions
are in no way binding. There is no attempt by the SI
as a whole to measure the conduct of its members
Organizational Features
Formally, the main decisionmaking body of the SI is
the biennial congress, which all member parties and
selected observers may attend. The congresses are
massive public relations operations. Important deci-
sions normally are taken beforehand by smaller meet-
ings, and the congress does little more than ratify
resolutions and elect the president, the vice presidents,,
and the general secretary.' The next SI congress will
take place in Lisbon from 7 to 10 April 1983.
The SI usually elects more than a score of vice
presidents, whose selection depends on the importance
of their party, their personal prestige, or the impor-
tance attached to some region or cause. Other than
the president, the general secretary is the only impor-
tant full-time SI official. He oversees the SI's small
headquarters in London and handles administrative
matters that cannot be taken care of at periodic SI
meetings. The current general secretary, Bernt Carls-
son of Sweden, who is to be replaced at the approach-
ing congress, has been in the post-as long as Brandt
has been president.
IHe has been reined in
by party leaders during the past year and he now has
little scope for independent action.
The SI debates major political issues at its semiannual
bureau meetings, which are attended by two repre-
sentatives from each party. More often, however,
decisions are made by the executive committee (or
presidium), composed of the president, the general
secretary, and the vice presidents. Meeting as often as
necessary, the executive committee decides how to
implement SI resolutions, prepares major meetings,
and alters political guidelines in response to changing
developments. Various committees which meet be-
tween the major conferences give greater continuity to
the study of particularly important issues and often
affect the SI's attitude on these issues
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X6
25X1
against the organization's pronouncements.
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
As president, Brandt has considerable authority to
convene meetings, decide who may attend, and issue
declarations in the name of the SI. He is obliged to
tread carefully, however, to preserve the outward
harmony of the organization, and on occasion his
decisions have been amended to reflect more accu-
rately-the SI consensus. The French and Italian
parties were unsatisfied with Brandt's soft public
statement on behalf of the SI regarding martial law in
Poland, for instance, and demanded an executive
committee meeting which eventually published a
stronger denunciation.
SI meetings in recent years have taken on a
"mini-UN" flavor, as the new members ' and observer
groups have added their own parochial causes to those
promoted by the West European members. The con-
fused and poorly organized character of these meet-
ings affects the SI's political course. The process of
proposing and passing resolutions, for example, has
become so' muddled that it is easily exploited by
parties to promote their special interests. It is clear
from press reporting and the results of SI meetings
that, ensconced in their convention hotels and full of
fraternal good fellowship, party leaders are often
unconstrained by standards of political caution under
which they operate in their own capitals; in short,
romanticism is rampant. Strong disagreements plague
the SI in its private sessions, but it tends to close ranks
The SI's annual budget
one for such a' large organization. The biggest contrib-
utors are the West Germans, Swedes, and Austrians.
The bulk of this money goes into administrative
expenses, conferences, and the SI's magazine. Occa-
sionally, SI-sponsored meetings are funded outside
the normal budget by a group of member parties.
Nevertheless, we believe the SI's resources generally
are not sufficient to allow for significant financial aid
to "fraternal" parties or movements. The SI can
provide such groups publicity and moral support that
may be parlayed into increased international legitima-
cy, but it does not have
sufficient resources to support them financially.'
25X1
Patterns of Influence
In our judgment, the West European parties have
always had the greatest impact on the SI's political
course. With a few exceptions, the influence of specif-
ic parties is commensurate with their financial contri-
bution and level of activity-two factors which usual-
ly go together. Thus, the West German SPD, which
contributes the most money and manpower, is the
most influential party. The Swedes and Austrians
play an important role as well.
There are other paths to influence, however. We 25X1
believe that the Spanish and Portuguese parties have
grown in stature recently because of the role their
leaders have played in developing contacts for the SI
outside Europe. A few parties are accorded a respect-
ful hearing in a particular issue area-for example,
the Finnish party in disarmament matters. In our
judgment, Third World members also exert strong
and occasionally decisive influence in the SI's treat-
ment of regional problems.
25X1
Discussion at SI meetings indicates that the French
socialists have gained greater prestige within the SI
recently, largely because of their newfound status as a
governing party. Prior to 1981 there was substantial
friction in the SI between the leaders of the French
and West German parties. Since Francois Mitterrand
became President of France,
the parties have agreed to meet
periodically to discuss political questions, including SI
activities. They appear to realize that the organization
'The press and Third World groups sometimes confuse the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), the West German Social Demo-
cratic Party's political action affiliate, and the SI. The FES has a
permanent presence in some Third World countries, but it has no
organizational relationship with the SI. Although West German
Social Democrats shape its policy, much of its money comes from
the West German Government. This money is often used to fund
specific projects in support of friendly parties abroad. Despite the
separate identities of the FES, the SPD, and the SI, we doubt that
recipients or potential recipients of financial aid always understand
the distinctions. As a result, the SI may enjoy a greater reputation
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Lionel Jospin have become less outspoken. Although
faulty decisions about Third World movements may
recur, the opposition within the SI to further expan-
sion of Third World membership,
Knowledgeable insiders now
view the French as serious competitors with the West
Germans for the distinction of "most influential
party," but we believe that the French are likely to
fall short of that unless they increase their contribu-
Lion of less than $20,000 annually to the SI budget.
Third World and Communist Pressure
Since the late 1970s, the SI has attracted increasing
attention from Third World and Communist countries
seeking to influence its position
Contacts with prominent socialists
also proceed on a day-to-day basis in individual
capitals.
The Salvadoran National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR) and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, for instance,
attend and speak at SI meetings as members and
observers, respectively. In addition, the Salvadoran
insurgents also pursue their public relations campaign
through offices in capitals where socialist parties are
important, including Bonn, Paris, Madrid, London,
Rome, and Brussels. Representatives of the Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Front played an important role
early in the conflict in fostering the idea that the
Salvadoran junta was corrupt and that the insurgents
had popular support.
The SI also attracts groups from the Middle East, and
In our judgment, many of the major party leaders in
the SI were flattered by the first wave of attention
they received from nonmember countries early in the
Brandt era. In their attitudes toward Third World
groups, some leaders provided a degree of support
which, we believe, they later regretted. While some
leaders still strongly support radicals in certain areas
(for example, Bruno Kreisky in the Middle East and
Olof Palme in southern Africa), Brandt and other
leaders like Spain's Felipe Gonzalez and France's
critical attitude.
does suggest a more
The Soviets also devote extensive overt and covert
resources to efforts aimed at influencing the SI.
Although Soviet officials normally do not frequent SI
meetings, they meet with socialists individually or in
groups to try to persuade them to oppose US security
programs like INF (intermediate-range nuclear
forces) or to endorse ideas the Soviets find useful, such
as European nuclear-free zones. At the same time,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
they try to prevent or
tone down SI criticism of Soviet policy, in Afghanistan
25X1
or Poland and to make the SI less effective in its
25X1
efforts to turn liberation movements away from the
judgment, however, the process of consensus forma-
tion in the SI would make direct control over the
substance of SI positions very difficult. To be effec-
tive, the Soviets would have to recruit at least one-
and probably more-of the most prominent SI lead-
ers. Even this would not guarantee that these leaders'
views would command a consensus at meetings.F
Moreover, recruiting a major leader would be a
formidable task. Although these leaders often criticize
US policy, we believe that none is sympathetic to
Moscow. All have reached a political pinnacle in their
own countries, and such connections could jeopardize
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
their careers. The international secretaries and staffs
of individual parties play an important role in prepar-
ing drafts of SI resolutions. We do not know whether
the Soviets have penetrated any of the party secretari-
ats. If so, they might be able to put a particularly
anti-US twist into some drafts. These resolutions,
however, would still require approval by party leaders.
More importantly, Soviet influence in many cases
would not be crucial because the criticism of US
policy found in some resolutions originates in widely
shared attitudes within the drafting parties. We esti-
mate that infiltration of the SI secretariat in London,
on the other hand, would have only a limited effect
because its functions are largely administrative and it
has virtually no influence over.SI positions on sub-
stantive issues.
We believe that the Soviets' most effective tactic in
dealing with the SI has been to convey the impression
that they sincerely want peace. SI members flatter
themselves that they can contribute to peace and
stability worldwide, and are willing to talk to almost
any government to achieve their goals. This is in
marked contrast to the SI's attitude in the predetente
era, when any contact with Communists was frowned
upon. On the other hand, many of the more conserva-
tive parties in Western Europe, beginning with the
French Gaullists in the mid-1960s, have long pursued
such contacts.
Other Communist regimes try to influence the SI.
Although SI resolutions commonly contain harsh
language about rightwing regimes, especially in South
Africa, Latin America, and Turkey, criticism of
human rights violations in Communist countries is
less frequent, and non-Communist leftist governments
almost always escape unscathed. The 11 exiled social
democratic parties of Eastern Europe often bring up
human rights abuses, but, except in the case of a few
celebrated dissidents or the unavoidable issue of mar-
tial law in Poland, little of this is reflected in SI public
In our judgment, virtually all member parties find
Communist systems repugnant and want to prevent
Communist expansion. Nevertheless, their perception
of the need for constructive relations, combined with a
sense that protest is futile, prevents them from de-
nouncing such regimes, especially in Eastern Europe.
25X1
We believe the SI's propensity for occasionally taking
positions that undermine US policy flows much more
from their independent analysis of the issues than
from Communist influence-of which SI leaders have
become increasingly wary. Nonetheless, this does not
reduce-and indeed may increase-the potency of
their efforts against US policy.
The SI World View
Since the late 1970s, the SI has established contact,
both inside and outside its organizational framework,
with liberation movements and other groups that it
previously would have shunned because of their radi-
calism. Such contacts helped build the SI's prestige
and in some cases helped parties forge ties that
promoted the political and economic interests of their
the Third World in an East-West perspective.
countries. More generally, this change of emphasis
reflected the socialists' growing dissatisfaction with
what they saw as the superpowers' tendency to view
By the time of Brandt's accession to the presidency,
the public statements of many West European social-
ists indicated that in their view "anti-Communism"
was a weak foundation for Western policy. It was
commonly accepted in Western Europe that the gap
between the rich and poor nations was widening, while
political oppression continued to thrive in the Third
World. Thus, conditions in the Third World were
supposedly fostering revolutions which were impossi-
ble to repress and morally wrong to oppose. But the,
revolutionary impulse was generally nationalist rather
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
With an optimism typical of the West European left,
most SI parties now operate on the assumption that
Third World countries' main oals are self-determina-
tion and nonalignment.
Support;
for "liberation movements," however, leads the SI
into conflicts of ends and means. Such groups, wheth-
er in or out of power, often display no concern for the
democratic practices the SI endorses. From the public
statements of SI leaders, we believe some have decid-
ed that revolutionary movements they perceive as
having popular support can be preferable to authori-
tarian governments operating behind a constitutional
facade. With the exception of Grenada's New Jewel
Movement, however, the. SI has not allowed parties
which rule undemocratically to be members, and the
major parties often urge the Grenadans and the
Sandinistas to institute democratic reforms.
We detect disagreement within the SI over the degree
of political democracy it can demand or expect from
Third World countries. a
majority of SI parties want these countries' imple-
mentation of democratic practices .to be a major
criterion in decisions about SI support. A few party'.
leaders, however, apparently believe that the Third
World's major economic and social problems make:
effective parliamentary democracy impossible. This;
has led to a schizophrenic SI outlook on radical
regimes, most notably in Nicaragua and Grenada. For
the longer term, the SI has publicly advocated mas-
sive economic aid by the industrialized nations to the
Third World to help create conditions more conducive
to democracy. The record of socialist governments on
development aid, however, does not always match
their rhetoric. For example, while the Norwegian and
Dutch parties maintained a strong commitment to
such aid while in power, the West German Social
Democrats and French Socialists have given such
On European security issues, the period of detente '
during the late 1960s and 1970s has, in our judgment,
shaped the SI's outlook more than any other factor.
The influential central and north European SI par-
ties-especially the West German SPD which. under
Brandt and Bahr inaugurated Ostpolitik-are the
strongest supporters of the idea of reduced tensions
with the East. Detente is in keeping with the tradi-
tional socialist emphasis on peace and international-
ism, but it became especially-popular in West Germa-
ny because it allowed increased contact with friends
and relatives in East Germany and seemed to keep
alive the idea of eventual German reunification.
Detente is popular in central and northern Europe
generally because it lessens the psychological and
financial strain on the populace by appearing to
reduce the risk-of war. Moreover, the stigma attached
to contacts with Communist regimes has diminished
as West European political institutions have grown
stronger and the possibility of internal subversion by
Communists has appeared to diminish. In our judg-
ment, the belief of many socialists in detente is
strenthened by a conviction that their parties would
be hurt if it ended. Karsten Voigt, an SPD spokesman
on foreign affairs, argued in an article last July that
conservative parties thrive in a period of international
tension.
During the past few years, some SI leaders have been
quick to blame the United States for world tensions.
Brandt criticized the
United States in January 1982 for seeking -military
superiority over the USSR. Olof Palme of Sweden
and Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway have made
similar statements publicly. Distrust of US motives,
however, has rarely been visible in SI statements.-on
disarmament, due to the SI's consensus rule. Even
though the concern with nuclear dangers is strong
within the SI, the north European, parties cannot
override other parties, such-as the French and the
Portuguese, which hew carefully to the concepts of
military balance and deterrence.
programs relatively low priority.
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
Nevertheless, in our judgment, the sharp rise in East-
West tensions has affected profoundly the thinking of
most West European SI leaders, as it has West
European opinion generally. The socialist parties to-
day are important centers of activity for those who
believe that West European interests-especially de-
tente-should be asserted more forcefully in relations
with the United States.
Prospects
The SI's upcoming congress is unlikely to produce
much drama, though it may bolster the Portuguese
socialists in parliamentary elections later in April.
The parties have agreed to three main themes for the
congress:
? Economic justice and development.
? Security, peace, and disarmament.
? Regional issues.
enthusiastic public stance. 25X1
SI criticism of Communist regimes can also be en-
couraged marginally by persistent informational ef-
forts. Nevertheless, the SI probably will continue to
devote more attention to abuses in Western countries
like Turkey and Third World states such as Guatema-
la. Member parties believe that they have some
chance of effecting improvements in these countries
by influencing their governments and Washington.
25X1
25X1
25X1
For the longer term, the SI will remain an organiza-
tion in search of a role. Despite widespread publicity
about its activity since 1976, the organization has
been ineffectual in helping to resolve specific interna-
tional problems. The SI is likely to continue to seize
issues with a flourish, only to deemphasize them and
move on to something else when opposition develops
and reality sets in.
general level, and southern Africa.
There is some realization among SI leaders that their
efforts to contribute to peace in Central America, the
Middle East, and the disarmament field have hit
serious snags. Each of these areas has been deempha-
sized during the past year in favor of other issues: the
world economic crisis, North-South relations on a
In our view, the SI's overall attitude toward Third
World problems is unlikely to change any time soon.
Its positions on specific issues will remain subject to
alteration, however,. due to external changes and shifts
in the balance of power within the organization. Thus,
it is possible that at some point the SI will reflate its
rhetoric on Central America or try to present itself as
a mediator. 25X1
On the other hand, the SI's handling of specific issues
may sometimes be moderated by information or pro-
tests by outside governments such as the United
States, particularly if factual errors in the SI analysis
can be pointed out. Evidence about human rights
violations or Soviet ties of SI-supported groups are
unlikely to produce a public reversal in attitude-
which would embarrass SI leaders and threaten the
organization's prestige-but it could in some in-
stances lead to qualification of SI support and a less
25X1
Non-European membership in the organization is not
likely to increase substantially.
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
Because of its West European orientation, the SI will
also continue to focus heavily on Atlantic and East-
West relations. Greater European influence in world
affairs (including NATO), promoting detente, and
protecting East-West trade will be priorities for most,
West European members. These goals are shared to
some degree in other parts of the political spectrum,
but socialists feel a special responsibility for seeking
detente and are more optimistic than conservatives
about the lengths to which detente can and should go.
It also suits their electoral self-interest to be seen
steering a "moderate" course between the two super-
powers. Only a long period of recurrent world crises
which changed the parties' perceptions of internation-
al affairs would stand much chance of altering this.
philosophy.
In sum, the publicity the SI attracts and the political
pressure it generates will continue to be troublesome
factors in international relations. Despite the belief of
many party leaders that they are working on behalf of
Western interests, the activity in some areas will
probably continue to run counter to US policy.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
Secret
Appendix A
Disarmament
We believe that the SI's increased involvement in
disarmament questions over the past few years above
all reflects West European popular concern, borne out
in numerous public opinion polls, about the arms race.
While-the' SI has always placed strong emphasis on
the need to promote peace and oppose "militarism,"
the SI's formal activities in the disarmament field
increased markedly only after the neutron bomb issue
emerged in Western Europe in 1977-78. In our judg-
ment, many party functionaries began to believe that
a wave of new and unnecessary weapons programs
were being planned that could sweep aside earlier
progress in arms limitation.
With West European public opinion strongly in favor
of detente, identification of socialism with the fight
against the arms race also had an obvious political
attraction. Trips by party representatives to Washing-
ton and Moscow to discuss arms control tended to
enhance the stature of the leaders and parties in-
volved
Not all SI parties, of course, had the same priorities in
pushing for involvement in disarmament efforts. Like
so many SI initiatives, disarmament work was placed
in the hands of the parties which over the years had
shown the most interest in it. In this case, the Finnish
Social Democrats, with their long tradition of specific
(albeit abortive) arms control proposals, took the lead.
The Austrian socialists, who as representatives of a
small, neutral country bordering Eastern Europe had
a similar history, also took a prominent role. These
parties along with the other Scandinavians and the
Dutch are normally the strongest lobbyists for disar-
mament efforts within the SI.
Such activity also serves a purpose for parties that are
more cautious about disarmament. For leaders under
pressure from their party left wings (or from rival
parties further to the left), disarmament activity by
the SI furnishes proof of their concern for peace
without demanding specific statements that might be
During the group's trip to Moscow in 1979 and a
similar trip by Brandt as SPD chairman in 1981, the
Soviets bombarded the socialists with a wide variety
of implied threats and concessions on arms issues,
while playing to world opinion. According to US
officials, SI representatives listened to specific Soviet
arguments with a good deal of skepticism. Their main
aim, however, was to encourage US-Soviet negotia-
tions on European-based nuclear weapons, and they
unpopular in NATO councils
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
25X1
25X1
The SI's most recent efforts to promote disarmament
began with its decision to sponsor a conference on
disarmament in Helsinki in 1978, with spokesmen
present from both the United States and the Soviet
We believe that the goals of the Soviets in their
dialogue with the socialists were threefold. First, they
hoped to convince some delegates that there was merit
in their arms control positions. Second, they wanted a
forum that would help them publicize their analysis of
security issues and lend credence to it. Third, they
probably wanted to play up the "historic" significance
of a socialist-Communist dialogue in order to exacer-
bate differences among SI parties about such rela-
tions. 25X1
The Soviets proposed a high-level dialogue with the
SI, but Brandt turned this aside by engineering the
creation of a lower level SI "study group" on disarma-
ment. The study group undertook an ambitious re-
search effort which included consultations in Wash-
ington and at the UN, as well as in Moscow.
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
sometimes perceived reason for optimism when the
Soviets indicated an apparent openness to negotiation.
The study group's report has been extremely slow to
develop; although drafts have been produced, the
report has never been finalized. The draft report, as
presented to. the Madrid SI congress in 1980 and
amended several times since, is a mundane endorse-
ment of earlier and existing arms control forums
spiced by some visionary sueeestions for global
security
The draft calls for a comprehensive ban on nuclear
testing. It also appeals for progress in strategic arms
talks, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tion negotiations. It praises the idea of a Conference
for Disarmament in Europe, vaguely endorses the
concepts of regional disarmament and nuclear-free
zones, and appeals for a halt in international arms
sales. The report suggests a mechanism whereby
nations would divert a percentage of money spent on
armaments into development aid for Third World
countries,. and it advocates an agreement between- the
major powers to abstain from developing new military
technologies. The study group's report has not yet
taken a position on whether NATO's INF deployment
should take place; it has welcomed any steps toward
removing missiles of this kind in East and West, while
noting that time for an INF agreement between the
United States and USSR is growing short.
The draft report is ambiguous on military questions.
It says that disarmament should take place in an
equitable and balanced manner but also argues that
peace and security cannot be attained through mili-
tary balance and deterrence doctrine. In our judg-
ment, these ideas reflect differing views within the SI
over the extent to which the question of military
balance can be ignored in efforts to dispel mistrust
between East and West
During the past year, disarmament has not been a
central theme in SI statements. Moreover, a sched-
uled trip by the study group to Moscow in early 1982
proved to be a failure because of the crackdown in
The perennially tentative disarmament study has been
remanded again to the group for further.study. Ac-
cording to a Finnish official who talked with US
Embassy officers, the study group-which is now
called the Disarmament and Arms Control Advisory
Council-has been having. trouble deciding what it
should now be studying. The SI leadership sees little
point in sending the group to Moscow and Washing-
ton again.
According to US officials last November, the French
socialists-who are sensitive to SI studies that might
undercut French Government policy on nuclear weap-
ons-suggested that the SI was placing too much
emphasis on disarmament. Disarmament will appear
on the agenda of the Lisbon congress, but pressure
from the French, the Italians, and some of the other
parties probably will prevent a radical resolution. It is
likely, however, that the SI will refer favorably to the
possibility of nuclear-free zones or an "interim solu-
tion" on INF deployment.
The views of SI party leaders on disarmament run the
gamut from cynicism to missionary zeal. In our
judgment, few socialists believe that the SI's Advisory
Council will find a magic formula for resolving arms
control problems. Many do believe, however, that the
SI's activities encourage the superpowers to negotiate.
Although SI leaders make little claim to expertise in
this field, their statements and actions indicate that
they think the key to progress in arms control is the
political will to reach an agreement, not facts and
figures
Eastern Europe .
In our judgment, theSI's central European center of
gravity has strongly influenced its policies toward
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Secret
25X1
25X1
Eastern Europe. A majority of its members favor
what might be called the West German soft line on
Eastern Europe, although this attitude does not al-
ways emerge publicly. Other parties such as the
French or Italians sometimes inject contrasting points
of view.
Central America. There have been two major turning
points in the evolution of SI attitudes toward this
region:
? The Nicaraguan revolution, which convinced many
West European SI leaders that revolution was both
constructive and inevitable in many Latin American
countries.
Karsten Voigt summarized mainstream SPD views
about Eastern Europe in an article last July in which
he argued that the liberalization all socialists seek for
Eastern Europe can only occur through evolution, not
aggressive popular opposition. Moves that threaten
the systems in East European countries, asserts Voigt,
only result in greater repression and heightened East-
West tensions. From the standpoint of Western poli-
cy, detente rather than confrontation is the preferred
policy for encouraging an evolution toward pluralism.
Socialists should therefore deal with existing regimes,
while making it clear that they disapprove of the
Communist system.
all SI parties except
the Italian PSDI opposed the idea of sanctions against
Poland after the imposition of martial law. Public
statements suggest that some opponents of sanctions
agree with Voigt's ideas. Others oppose action be-
cause they believe sanctions are ineffective or might
damage their countries' economies. Future SI state-
ments are unlikely explicitly to oppose sanctions
25X1 against East European regimes or the Soviets, but
support for such actions is unlikely.
We believe that when well-publicized cases of East
European repression occur, there is usually some
pressure within the SI for a strong denunciation,
notably from the French and Italian socialists who
find the issue useful as a weapon against their domes-
tic Communist rivals. The West Germans and Austri-
ans, therefore, may have to allow stronger statements
than they would like, but these are likely to be less
25X1 severe than most Western government statements.
Central America
In recent years, the most frequent subject of disagree-
ment between the SI and the United States has been
? The decision of the SI-affiliated National Revolu-
tionary Movement in El Salvador to leave the junta
and join the insurgency, thus giving the insurgents a
veneer, of respectability while reinforcing the im-
pression that they had popular support and
momentum. - 25X1
Several factors have helped make the SI more recep-
tive to the idea of revolutionary change in Latin
America than in other areas. The post-1976 drive to
recruit Third World parties attracted many Latin
American parties, almost all of which we'e suspicious
or even hostile toward the United States. These
immediately became a strong pressure group demand-
ing that the SI oppose authoritarian regimes in the
region. West European parties also agreed in 1980 to
the creation of an SI Committee on Latin America
and the Caribbean. Although the SI president and
general secretary were included as ex officio members
and West European parties could attend as observers,
in practice the Latin Americans often held meetings
on their own and took responsibility for drafting
,resolutions to be presented at SI meetings. Since the
SI traditionally has sought advice from the member
parties most directly involved in regional issues, the
West European parties could not have controlled the
committee's activities even if they had wanted to. F_
25X1 25X1
We believe that the views of SI parties on Latin
America are also heavily influenced by political anal-
ysis emanating from the region, exemplified by a
symposium on Latin American democracy sponsored
by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) last Octo-
ber. According to a US diplomat who attended that
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
meeting, even participants in the "democratic main-
stream" agreed that representative democracy was
often a device used by elites to dominate the masses.
Many speakers played down the importance of consti-
tutional forms. The skeptical attitude of West Euro-'
pean socialists about elections in El Salvador, for
example, derives in part from such ideas, which are
often replayed in Europe.
Much of the current academic literature on Latin
America also stresses economic underdevelopment
and "dependency" on the large industrial econo-
mies-especially the United States-as an explana-
tion for political problems in the region. The solutions
most often invoked are economic aid to these coun-
tries and help in throwing off the "yoke" of multina-
tional corporations. These ideas too find favor among
Until about 1981, however, there was little' recogni-
tion among the West Europeans that the advice they
were getting might be unsound. In our judgment,
most West European party leaders have little time to
focus on Latin America, which is low on their person-
al lists of priorities. Many do not have staffs that can
brief them adequately on the region. Moreover, the
rushed and haphazard nature of SI meetings usually
ensures that resolutions prepared by Latin Americans
will pass largely unchanged.
We estimate that for West European parties, Latin
America is also a topic on which the normal balancing
constraints of domestic politics and national interest
are weak. It is easier for party leaders to uphold the
cause of the downtrodden in this region than in
Africa, for example, where governments are generally
connected with Western Europe by an intricate net-
work of economic and political ties. We believe,
moreover, that some socialists have opposed US sup
port for the Salvadoran Government because they
envision another Vietnam war. The influential West
German SPD, in particular, is sensitive to the possibil-
ity of.the United States becoming involved in a Third
World morass that might reduce the attention it
devotes to Europe.
Nicaragua. The SI's strong interest in Nicaragua
dates from 1978 when its first mission to the Caribbe-
an recommended special. attention to this key candi-
date for "democratization." During the period of
resistance to the Somoza regime, virtually all SI
members sympathized with the insurgents. According
to press reports, the Venezuelan Government, con-
trolled at that time by the SI-affiliated Democratic
Action Party, provided arms and other supplies, while
West European parties contributed some money. The
FES provided funds to the Sandinistas for travel and
for courses in democratic socialism and trade union-
ism.
SI party leaders were enthusiastic about the Sandinis-
tas' eventual victory, which they interpreted publicly
as a harbinger of a democratic society in Nicaragua.
The SI's Madrid congress in 1980 created an Interna-
tional Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan
Revolution. This group, chaired by Felipe
Gonzalez and composed of top socialist leaders, is
supposed to promote self-determination and noninter-
vention in Nicaragua.
We believe that the enthusiasm of many SI leaders
for the Sandinistas has soured since 1980. Beginning
with Mario Soares of Portugal, who by March of that
year was calling attention in SI forums to Communist
influence in Managua, many leaders have avoided
praise of Nicaragua and tried to encourage the Sandi-
nistas to moderate their repressive domestic policies.
The high point of this trend came in March 1982
when the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party re-
fused at the last minute to host an SI meeting in
Caracas if the Sandinistas came. In the end, however,
this episode revealed party leaders' overwhelming
concern about the organization's prestige and inde-
pendence. Resentment against perceived US pressure,
25X1
25X1
25X1
reinforced by the effects of the Falklands crisis, led 25X1
the SI to close ranks.
they decided to main-
tain solidarity with Nicaragua and continue to en-
courage aid, while pursuing a more "critical" dia- 25X1
logue. Since then, the ambiguous formula of private
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
criticism and public support for the revolution's "orig-
inal aims" has prevailed.
Nicaragua now occupies a smaller part of the SI's
time, energy, and press releases. Several SI missions
to the region were planned and canceled before a low-
level group went last December. According to reports
from the US Embassy in Managua, the socialists
warned the Sandinistas in private that democracy,
pluralism, and nonalignment were prerequisites for
their support, but the Sandinistas subsequently used
the visit to substantiate their claims of broad interna-
tional backing.
With Sandinista faults increasingly apparent, the
West European SI members in recent months have
edged toward an analysis that is as much West
European as socialist. While acknowledging that the
FSLN has looked increasingly toward the Eastern
Bloc for support, they insist that this process may be
arrested by maintaining contact with Nicaragua.
West European socialists frequently suggest-as
Elena Flores of the Spanish party recently did to US
officials-that the Soviets do not want another Cuba
in Nicaragua. This optimism is encouraged by the
fact that they, unlike the United States, have little to
lose if their diagnosis is incorrect. The socialists
frequently cite the example of postrevolutionary Por-
tugal, which they claim they helped bring back to the
Western fold by maintaining contact and encouraging
democratic practices after the United States had
seemed to concede the country to the Communists. In
public statements and conversations with US officials,
West European SI members are especially critical of
alleged US-sponsored military pressure on Nicaragua,
which they contend unites Nicaraguans behind the
regime while giving the more radical of the Sandinis-
tas an excuse for greater repression
Unless the Sandinistas actually profess allegiance to
Moscow, they almost certainly will continue to be
invited to attend and to speak at SI meetings. The
publicity the Sandinistas receive will encourage West
European governments to continue their relatively
high level of economic aid to Nicaragua. The Sandi-
nistas are unlikely to be granted membership in the
SI, however, unless Nicaragua shows definite signs of
becoming a pluralist state.
El Salvador. The SI's positions on El Salvador have
also changed since 1980. In its resolution at the
Madrid congress that year, the SI called on the
United States to stop supporting the Duarte govern-
ment, which it condemned as a "despotic regime."
The resolution declared the SI's "deepest solidarity"
with the insurgent forces. At about the same time,
General Secretary Carlsson told US officials that the
United States should get on the winning side in
Central America-the side (he implied) of the insur-
gents. 25X1
During 1980-81, the SI's lack of reliable information
on Central America markedly affected its stance.
Guillermo Ungo, the head of the SI-affiliated Nati25X1
al Revolutionary Movement in El Salvador, had ar.
After the SI's early statements on the Salvadoran 25X1
conflict became a subject of controversy, however,
intensified contacts with US officials and with a
variety of Latin American parties provided a broader
base of information which had some moderating
effect on SI statements. Since 1981, the standard SI
position has been solidarity with its member party, the
MNR, rather than the FDR/FMLN. Moreover, the
implicit hope for a guerilla victory has faded, replaced
by emphasis on negotiations between the government
and the insurgents. In this context, the SI endorsed
the 1981 Franco-Mexican declaration, which called
the insurgents a "representative political force."
25X1
SI leaders were harshly critical in their public state-
ments regarding the March 1982 elections in El
Salvador, insisting despite much evidence to the con-
trary that the population was not free to express its
true preferences. Since the elections, however, the SI
has largely ceased its earlier "initiatives" on El
Salvador. 25X1
In our judgment, most SI members now realize that
their efforts on the El Salvador issue are ineffectual.
They perceive the current Salvadoran Government as
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
farther to the right than the previous one, and believe
that only the United States can nudge it toward
negotiations. And although the larger SI parties sucli
as the West Germans. and the French were: willing to
risk some US displeasure as long-as they perceived a,
chance a settlement, they have no desire
to antagonize the United States and create problems
for themselves in other areas when they have no
Despite increasing doubts about the insurgents' goals
and prospects, SI parties are still openly critical of El
Salvador's~human rights performance, failing to dis-:
tinguish between rightwing terrorists and the govern,-
ment. SI leaders, in our judgment, will probably
continue to pontificate about US "mistakes" in El
Salvador, although they will probably keep SI pro-
nouncements less strident than they were in 1980-81'.
Many of these parties will continue to leap at new ,
formulas for a negotiated settlement
The SI's Future in Latin America. West European
countries will probably broaden their economic and
political interests in Latin America in the coming
years, and the SI will undoubtedly try to keep step. By
increasing its visibility, particularly in South Ameri;
ca, however, the SI may experience greater strains
over specific issues.'Some West Germans have al-
ready complained to US officials about the lack of an
institutional check on Latin American members. Ef'
forts are under way to get all resolutions cleared with
a coordinating committee before they are brought to
the floor at a conference. -Similar efforts to. control the
Latin Americans have been made before, however,
and in our view the reluctance of the West Europeans
to confront the Latin Americans openly probably will
prevent much change
Middle East
The attitude of SI members toward the Middle_ East
has changed over the past 10 years from relative
indifference to active concern and involvement. Until
the early 1970s, the most important influence on Si
positions came from the Israel Labor Party (ILP),
which as a longtime member had close ties with most
of the West European party leaders, especially the
West German Social Democrats. We estimate that
party leaders made relatively little effort to seek other
perspectives on the Middle Eastern situation until
they-like all West European politicians-were
brought up short by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In 'the
aftermath of that conflict and the Arabs' use of the oil
embargo as a weapon, the European Community
almost immediately recognized the right of the Pales-
tinian people to what it called a "national identity,"
and the socialists also began to show greater apprecia-
tion for Palestinian arguments.
A more active search for a Middle East peace also fit
well with the growing desire of SI leaders to deal with
important problems outside Western Europe. Some
parties probably were also affected by the increasing
international support for the Palestinian cause-for-
example, at the UN. Finally, although these factors
would have sufficed to make the SI more receptive to
Arab views, we believe that many of its more specific
actions were attributable largely to Chancellor Bruno
Kreisky of Austria, who took an active interest in
Middle Eastern problems.
with PLO representatives.
Kreisky has insisted publicly that the PLO be treated
as the representative of the Palestinian people, who
should have their own state. It was largely due to
Kreisky's efforts that the SI approved three separate
factfinding missions-led by him-to the Middle East
during the mid-1970s. If it had not been for Kreisky's
zeal, some member parties might have maintained for
a longer time their reserve about face-to-face contact
At the SI's congress at Geneva in 1976, a vague
resolution was passed which cited the right of all
people to self-determination within secure and recog-
nized borders. During this period, the formal position
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
of the SI was similar to that of the European Commu-
nity and other West European political groups. The
most dramatic indications of SI sympathy with the
PLO, however, came when Willy Brandt, apparently
through Kreisky's influence, accepted the idea that
"selected Palestinian representatives" should be in-
cluded in Middle Eastern negotiations
to destroy Israel and said that he would advise the SI
In 1979, Kreisky and Brandt met with Yasir Arafat in
Vienna-though not on behalf of the SI. Neverthe-
less, Brandt stated publicly that the PLO did not seek
Despite contacts with the PLO by some prominent SI
25X1 members, the organization's resolution on the Middle
East at Madrid in 1980 did little more than implicitly
25X1 endorse the Camp David process, calling on the
Israelis, neighboring countries, and the Palestinians to
negotiate peace. Felipe Gonzalez, Benedetto Craxi,
and Mario Soares, who had argued for recognition of
the PLO, criticized the Madrid resolution as a step
backward from stands taken earlier by the SI and the
EC.
In our judgment, the socialists generally believe that
Arafat can be encouraged toward greater moderation
by engaging him in a dialogue with the SI. This would
supposedly enhance his prestige, provide him with
"role models," and perhaps make him more reluctant
to take radical actions which could endanger the
dialogue. The strongest supporters in the SI of the
Palestinian cause and the most severe critics of Israeli
policy have been the Austrians and the Spanish, with
the Italians and Swedes occasionally joining in. The
British Labor Party and the Dutch Labor Party were
formerly the most frequent defenders of the ILP
interpretation, with some support from the French.
During the past few years, however, the Israel Labor
Party has become increasingly isolated on the ques-
tion of PLO attendance at SI meetings, PLO partici-
pation in negotiations, and a possible Palestinian
state. No SI party leader today would wholly accept
the ILP's analysis of the Middle East; in our judg-
ment, many believe that the Israelis are not the best
judges of their own interests. 25X1
Kreisky has suggested publicly several times that the
ILP be expelled from the SI for what he terms its
obstructive attitudes toward peace efforts. After the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year, Felipe Gonzalez
also suggested expulsion. The French and West Ger-
mans, however, successfully opposed such a move.
25X1
At the most recent semiannual bureau meeting, the
ILP was able almost singlehandedly to prevent pas-
sage of a resolution explicitly recognizing a role for
the PLO in the peace process. Such ideas have been
debated almost constantly in the context of the up-
coming congress, and the ILP will face increasing
demands that they show flexibility. We believe, how-
ever, that unless the other SI members discover a
mechanism for bypassing the consensus rule and thus
the ILP, these ideas will remain in limbo. The West
Germans, as usual, have quietly taken the lead in
controlling resolutions for the congress.
Despite their doubts about the wisdom of ILP posi-
tions, we believe that most West European SI mem-
bers hesitate to take actions that place the party in an
awkward situation at home and reduce its chances of
ousting the Begin government. They are also reluctant
to risk alienating the United States now that the
Reagan administration has "recognized the Palestin-
ian problem." Kreisky, who in an election year needs
to demonstrate a good relationship with the United
States, has publicly praised the President's Middle
Eastern policy. 25X1
Another moderating influence has been Kreisky's
gradual replacement as the SI's point man on the
Middle East by Mario Soares. Although Soares has
also argued over the years for greater recognition of
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
the PLO, he praised the Reagan proposals in conver-
sations with US officials last September. His initial
draft report on the post-Lebanon Middle Eastern
situation was cautious and limited in scope. Soares.
has implied publicly that the United States is the only
country with influence on the current Israeli Govern-
ment. These perceptions reduce the likelihood of a
Middle East resolution at Lisbon that would conflict
sharply with US policy. Emphasis during the next few
months probably will be on encouraging the with-
drawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.
Southern Africa
The SI recently has become more actively involved! in
southern Africa, largely at the behest of the French
and Portuguese parties. They have taken,the lead in
promoting a conference in Tanzania with the so-called
In keeping with past SI
statements, SWAPO probably would receive an en-
dorsement. South African military incursions into
Namibia almost certainly would be condemned. Re-
flecting the viewpoint of the French and most other SI
parties, the conference might urge Namibian
independence regardless of Cuban military involve-
ment in the region.
The SI already has postponed the conference from'
June 1983 until later in the year, however, and the'
project now depends on resolving disagreements
among prospective participants.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
an economic boycott.
the SPD has said that it will not accept "acrimonious
accusations" against South Africa. The French party,
despite its strong interest in resolving the Namibia
question, probably also would like to avoid the issue of
The Frontline States, however, are sure to demand a
strong denunciation of South Africa and may also be
lobbying for tangible pressure against that country.
Aside from the publicity involved, the main aim of the
SI parties seems to be to strengthen groups in south-'
ern Africa which are friends-or potential friends=of
the SI. To achieve this goal, the SI will try to present
itself as a supporter of the Frontline States' interests.
The fact that the SI's sympathy with those states only
extends to a certain point, however, will prove a
difficult obstacle to the success of a conference.
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Appendix C
SI Membership
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Chile
Costa Rica
Denmark
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Finland
France
Germany, Federal
Republic
Great Britain
Grenada
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Netherlands
New Zealand
Northern Ireland
Popular Socialist Party
Australian Labor Party
Socialist Party
Barbados Labor Party
Socialist Party (BSP and PSB)
New Democratic Party
New Democratic Party
Radical Party
National Liberation Party
Social Democratic Party
Dominican Revolutionary Party
National Revolutionary Party
Social Democratic Party
Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party
Labor Party
New Jewel Movement
Social Democratic Party
People's National Party
Democratic Socialist Party
Socialist Party of Japan
United Socialist Party
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
Democratic Action Party
Malta Labor Party
Mauritius Labor Movement
Labor Party
Labor Party
Northern Ireland Labor Party
Social Democratic and Labor Party
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
Norway ~ Labor Party
San Marino Unitary Socialist Party
Senegal Socialist Party
Spain Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
Sweden Social Democratic Party
Switzerland Social Democratic Party
Turkey Republican People's Party
United States Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee
Social Democrats USA
Cyprus EDEK Socialist Party
Paraguay Febrerista Revolutionary Party
Venezeula Democratic Action
Bulgaria Social Democratic Party
Czechoslovakia Social Democratic Party
Estonia Socialist Party
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Social Democratic Party
Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100160001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5
Secret
rt
r
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/10: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100160001-5