SPAIN: SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000100050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Foreign Policy
Spain: Socialist
State Dept. review completed
Secret
EUR 83-10013
January 1983
281
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SECRET
Notice to recipients of Spain: Socialist Foreign Policy, 25X1
January 1983.
Page 4, second paragraph, Luis Tance should read Luis
Yanez.
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Spain: Socialist
Foreign Policy
This assessment was prepared by
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
West European Division, EURA
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
EUR 83-10013
January 1983
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Spain: Socialist
Foreign Policy
Key Judgments The Spanish Socialists are struggling to reconcile the ideals they brought
Information available to office with diplomatic realities and pressures from conservative interest
as of 14 January 1983 groups at home. We believe that Felipe Gonzalez's foreign policy team,
was used in this report.
which generally accepts that Spain's place is in the Western camp, is
prepared to ratify the bilateral agreement negotiated last year with the
United States, but not without trying to establish the fact that the accord
does not require participation in NATO's military structure. Whether the
Socialists ultimately agree to Spain's full integration into the Alliance will
depend in part on their success in negotiations to enter the European
Community and to resolve the dispute with Britain over Gibraltar.
We believe the Socialists, while remaining basically pro-Western, will try
to pursue a more independent foreign policy than their predecessors,
restoring the emphasis on nationalism and ties to the Third World that
characterized Spanish diplomacy before the strongly pro-Western tilt of
the Calvo Sotelo government. Of special concern to the Socialists are Latin
America and the Middle East, where a broad range of interests and
concerns will lead them to champion human rights and national liberation
movements. Some Socialists, in fact, believe a greater emphasis on
relations with the Third World should constitute a second pole for Spanish
diplomacy. This sentiment could spread if Socialist inexperience and
impatience were to lead to rebuffs on the European Community or
Gibraltar, or if friction developed with the United States on the bilateral
agreement or with other NATO countries over Spain's role in the Alliance.
We believe, however, that overtures to the Third World will be the
showiest but least substantive aspect of Socialist diplomacy. Geography,
trade ties, and common political institutions provide Spain no practical
alternative to close diplomatic cooperation with other Western countries,
and we expect Prime Minister Gonzalez to keep Spain in harness with the
United States and Western Europe. The harness, however, will sometimes
be looser than Spain's allies would like.
Secret
EUR 83-10013
January 1983
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Secret
Spain: Socialist
Foreign Policy
The World Through Rose-Tinted Glasses
Opinion in Spain's Socialist Party on foreign policy
ranges from neutralism to strong backing for the
Western Alliance, but several common themes run
through the public pronouncements of most party
leaders.' With respect to the East-West issue, most
prominent Socialists recognize that their commitment
to democratic ideals and free economic institutions
places them in the Western camp. At the same time,
recent public statements suggest that they believe, in
line with traditional Spanish foreign policy views, that
geography and history give their country some unique
interests. The writings and speeches of various leading
Socialists cite in particular centuries-old ties to Latin
America and the Arab countries, as well as Madrid's
claim to Gibraltar and its concern about North
African threats to the Canary Islands and the Spanish
exclaves on the Moroccan coast. These party leaders
believe that Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo's Union of
the Democratic Center government supported the
West in a manner detrimental to these traditional
interests. It is an article of faith in the Socialist Party
that previous governments failed to secure adequate
progress on EC entry and Gibraltar repatriation in
return for Spanish entry into NATO. Party leaders
have been forthright in their criticism of what they
see as Spain's low diplomatic profile in Latin Ameri-
to nuclear war and at the same time precluding the
increased aid to the Third World that the Socialists
consider essential for lasting peace and prosperity.
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ca.
The Socialists, however, think of themselves as inter-
nationalists as well as nationalists, as both their public
and private statements reveal. Their espousal of su-
pranational themes-at least on issues where.Spain
has little immediately at stake-has to us the ring of
sincerity. Nowhere is this strand in their thinking
more apparent than on the East-West issue. To the
Socialists the expenditure of energy and resources on
the East-West conflict has been excessive and harm-
ful. In this vein Emilio Menendez del Valle-a lead-
ing party spokesman-noted publicly soon after the
election that the arms race is bringing the world close
Between the lines of their many statements on this
issue is an unresolved ambivalence toward the Soviet
Union. On the one hand, given their experiences
during the Civil War and their rivalry with the
Spanish Communists since then, we think the Social-
ists have a realistic view of Soviet totalitarianism. On
the other hand, many Socialists appear to view East-
West tensions more as the result of mutual and self-
perpetuating misunderstandings than of aggressive
Soviet actions. Instructive in this regard was Socialist
Party insider Pedro Bofill's suggestion to a US official
that, because the USSR's greatest needs are for
economic advancement and greater material well-
being for its population, the Soviets might respond
positively to Western initiatives that would enable
them to transfer more of their resources to the civilian
economy. Even for those who are less sanguine, the
Soviet threat is distant. Western efforts to counter it,
such as INF deployment in Europe, are regarded as
more immediate threats to peace. 25X1
According to the writings of many key Socialist
thinkers, Spain can play a special role in diverting
more of the attention of developed countries to North-
South issues. These writers argue that Spain, as a
medium-sized country with a modern but not over-
powering economy, has much in the way of technical
expertise to offer many less developed countries. The.
Socialists envision Spanish-sponsored development
projects that are potentially beneficial to Spain as well
as to the LDCs 25X1
The Socialists believe they have some political lessons
to teach, and this didactic urge may sometimes come
to the fore in their dealings with the United States.
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Persecution under Franco convinced them of the
importance of human rights and persuaded them that
the United States and other Western nations can
easily be seduced by a dictator's anti-Communist
rhetoric. They are equally convinced that Washington
miscalculates long-term political trends in many au-
thoritarian countries in the developing world today,
much as they think it did in Spain under Franco..
In reaching out to the Third World, the Socialists
believe that Spain's lack of a significant colonial past
in Africa, its close diplomatic ties with Arab states,
and above all its bonds of blood and culture with
Latin America give it advantages over the United
States and other West European states. Socialist
writers acknowledge that Spain cannot create a new
international order by itself or even affect significant-
ly the foreign policy thinking in most Western capi-
tals. They do assert, however, that their policies can
and, as a matter of principle, should set a positive
international example-one that does not change the
direction of Spanish diplomacy as much as give it a
new tone.
Domestic Political Influences
These general attitudes will be affected-reinforced
in some cases, offset in others-by the need to respond
to domestic influences. For example, Spain-long a
marginal factor in international diplomacy and neu-
tral in two world wars-was out of the West Europe-
an mainstream until the late 1970s. Membership in
international organizations is a relatively new idea for
Spaniards, and one which the Spanish press makes
clear they are still examining critically. Polls suggest
that where the benefits seem reasonably clear-as
with Spain's application to the European Communi-
ty-a consensus is fairly easy to achieve; where the
advantages seem more equivocal-as on NATO
membership-a domestic constituency is hard to
build. We believe Spaniards do not have the same
sense of responsibility for collective security as many
other Europeans, a judgment that is reinforced by
opinion polls indicating that Spaniards worry that
entry into NATO has increased the risk of war for
their country. To the limited extent that the public
thinks about foreign affairs, it often looks away from
Europe.'
A more direct influence on the Socialists' foreign
policy will be their relations with Spain's important
conservative power centers: big business, the Catholic
Church, and the military. Constituting a force the
government. cannot ignore, these power centers are
likely to affect foreign policy issues in two very
different ways. First, we believe the Socialists are
likely to give priority to mollifying the rightists on
domestic issues. This may mean that Gonzalez will be
attracted by the notion of a showy foreign policy to
sustain his government's standing with leftists disap-
pointed with what the government is doing domesti-
cally. At the same time, even though foreign affairs
are of secondary importance to most rightists, the
Socialists must be careful not to produce anxiety in
conservative bastions with diplomatic shifts that raise
doubts about the party's moderate intentions.
The Socialist Foreign Policy Team
Finding equilibrium among ideological predilections,
domestic pressures, and diplomatic realities would be
difficult for even an expert foreign policy team.
' Spurned by neighbors north of the Pyrenees; Franco became both
a prickly nationalist and a self-proclaimed builder of bridges to
Latin American and Arab countries. The data available to us
indicate that many of his countrymen preserve these attitudes.
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Secret
Compounding the Socialists' problems-at least in
the short run-will be their striking lack of experience
in foreign affairs. We believe this will give play on
occasion to their strong streak of romantic
25X1 moralism.
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The Socialists' main defense against themselves in
this regard will be Gonzalez himself. He has gained
considerable foreign affairs experience in the Socialist
International (SI), and his public and private com-
ments indicate he harbors hope of becoming a states-
man of international stature. We believe he will both
lay down the general outlines for Spanish diplomacy
and assume a highly visible role in its conduct.
Gonzalez seems to approach problems from a leftist
perspective but is more often than not receptive to
alternative views. For example, as head of the SI's
Committee to Save the Nicaraguan Revolution, Gon-
zalez, like many other West European socialists,
originally looked at the Sandinistas as embattled
freedom fighters. He nonetheless proved open to
evidence of Nicaragua's authoritarian drift and has
during the past year worked behind the scenes at
home and in the SI to revise the Sandinistas' image in
favor of greater realism.
Fastening on one of the few experienced foreign policy
hands in the party, Gonzalez has named career
diplomat Fernando Moran as Foreign Minister. In
many ways Moran is the odd man out in the Cabinet.
At 56 he is the oldest minister, nearly 15 years past
his colleagues' average age. He also lacks significant
rapport with Gonzalez. Indeed, in a Cabinet dispro-
portionately staffed by moderate, social democratic
technocrats, he has the dubious distinction of being
the only minister who comes from the faction that
challenged Gonzalez's removal of Marxism from the
Socialist Party's self-definition in 1979. Gonzalez
may view Moran's appointment in part as a sop to the
party's left wing.
Moran has a special interest in the Third World and
has long flirted with neutralism in his writing on
foreign policy. High foreign ministry officials of the
previous government have warned US officials that
Moran will be "troublesome." Embassy reporting
indicates, however, that Gonzalez will make Moran
responsible more for the tone of Spanish diplomacy
than for its substance. 25X1
An expanded presidential staff will help Gonzalez
guide Spanish diplomacy. According to press reports,
Gonzalez intends to develop seven presidential direc-
torates to supervise the Cabinet, and 25X1
one will function rather like the US 25X1
National Security Council. In early December Juan
Antonio Yanez was named to manage this director-
ate. He has combined legal, academic, and diplomatic
careers, and he has been especially active in UN
matters, particularly the Law of the Sea negotiations.
In the year before the election he played a major role
in shaping Socialist foreign policy views and advised
Gonzalez during the election campaign and transition
period. 25X1
Elena Flores also is likely to assume a major role in
the foreign policy directorate. A professor of interna-
tional relations at the Complutense University of
Madrid, she has long been a Gonzalez confidant and
has frequently accompanied him on foreign trips. US
Embassy officials place her in the mainstream of the
Socialist Party, but some leading Socialists-includ-
ing Alfonso Guerra, the government's number-two
man-have accused her in the past of being too
moderate. That charge may owe as much to resent-
ment over her close rapport with Gonzalez as to any
policies she may have advocated. 25X1
? Jose Luis Dicenta, a career diplomat and a close
Gonzalez adviser during the transition period. Di-
centa's record as a champion of human rights
suggests to us that he will carry this cause into his
new position as Chief of the Technical Cabinet of
the Foreign Minister.
? Manuel Marin Gonzalez, Secretary of State for
Relations with the European Community. He will
take the lead in Spain's difficult negotiations to
enter the Common Market. An early supporter of
Gonzalez's bid to take over the party in the early
1970s, Marin has a special rapport with the Prime
Minister.
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? Luis Yanez, who will advise Gonzalez primarily on
Latin America. He heads both the Institute of
Ibero-American Cooperation and the National
Commission for the Celebration of the Fifth Cente-
nary of the Discovery of America. Yanez was the
Socialists' main foreign policy spokesman for a brief
time in the late 1970s; he resigned in part because of
disputes with Elena Flora. He is the brother of Juan
Antonio Yanez.
? Carlos Miranda, an aristocratic leftist nicknamed
the "red count." As Deputy Director of Internation-
al Organizations in the foreign ministry, he had
particular responsibility for Spanish diplomacy in
the United Nations. In his new position as Director
General for Ibero-American Affairs in the Foreign
Ministry, he will be working closely with Luis
Tance.
What They Will Do
NATO. Membership in the Atlantic Alliance is the
most controversial foreign policy issue in Spain. At
best the Socialists are cool toward membership. US
officials in Madrid report that many party mem-
bers-including Gonzalez-remain angry over what
they regard as Calvo Sotelo's defiance of public
opinion in joining the Alliance. Some believe they
could have acquiesced-grudgingly-in joining
NATO as part of an overall process of integration
with Western Europe that included entry into the
European Community and solution of the dispute with
Britain over Gibraltar. In any event, Gonzalez has
publicly said that his predecessor acted rashly, imply-
ing that Western Europe should have agreed to a full
economic and political partnership with Spain before
Spain agreed to participate in collective defense. F_
The Socialists have avoided precipitate action-an
indication they think withdrawal from NATO at this
point would both jeopardize Spain's diplomatic objec-
tives in Europe and anger conservative domestic inter-
est groups, particularly the military. They still say
they will call a referendum on the issue after drafting
a report to the nation on the benefits and liabilities of
continued membership. They imply, however, that
they would not ask for such a vote until the middle or
latter part of their 1982-86 term. In the meantime
they have put a freeze on further integration into the
Secret
military structure of the Alliance while retaining full
political membership. This approach buys time and
gives them an opportunity to reduce the potential for
diplomatic and domestic fallout, no matter what they
ultimately decide. 25X1
The Socialists have pointedly tied further steps to-
ward full NATO membership to the repatriation of
Gibraltar. Progress in negotiations with the United
Kingdom, particularly if coupled with a breakthrough
on EC accession, would make it easier for Madrid to
forget the referendum or to engineer its terms to
ensure continued Spanish participation in the Alli-
ance. British rebuffs would weaken the hand of those
Socialists-few in number but well represented in
Gonzalez's inner circle-who favor NATO member-
ship as a means of expediting EC entry, assuring
Spain security, and diverting the military's attention
from domestic politics. Rebuffs might also anger
Spanish rightists and could make them less inclined to
restrain a Socialist government if it decided to pull
Spain out of the Alliance. On balance, because the
diplomatic and domestic price of leaving NATO is
much greater than the cost of remaining in it, we
believe Gonzalez is likely to continue to try to keep at
least a foot in the Alliance
The new government declined to sign the communi-
ques following the meetings of the Defense Planning
Committee and North Atlantic Council in December.
Moran declared that these refusals were based on
Madrid's need to study at length all aspects of
Spanish participation in the Alliance before commit-
ting itself to broad policy statements, but he acknowl-
edged that Madrid did not agree with NATO policy
on INF and other matters.
Spanish representatives already are participating in a
number of NATO military committees, and both the
Socialists and the NATO Allies will have to decide
soon on the desirability and feasibility of allowing this
to continue in the absence of full Spanish integration
into the military command structure. This issue will
probably be most acute in the case of the Nuclear
Planning Group. The issues before that body are, in
our view, the most problematic for the Socialists and
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at the same time the most sensitive-from the stand-
point of security-for the allies. NATO Secretary
General Luns might be inclined to raise the NPG
the monetary and technological contribution such .
companies make to the Spanish economy. In general,
though, we believe that their concern about creating
jobs will force them to stop short of measures that
question early in 1983.
Moran has publicly hinted that the Socialists might
eventually opt for a "French" style membership in
NATO, leaving Spain officially out of the Alliance's
military structure. We believe, however, that the
Allies would be reluctant to accept a highly condition-
25X1 al Spanish membership.
Bilateral Relations With the United States. The
Socialists have moved more quickly on the US-
Spanish base agreement negotiated by the Calvo
Sotelo government. On 23 December the foreign
ministry proposed a protocol stipulating that Spanish
participation in the NATO military structure would
not be required for implementation of the accord.
There are good reasons for them to try to resolve this
issue soon. They have already acknowledged publicly
that the agreement is more advantageous to Spain
than previous pacts. We suspect the Socialists must
know, too, that the longer they delay on securing
parliamentary approval for the agreement, the more
the accord will be seen as their own and not Calvo
Sotelo's-something that could fuel public expecta-
tions for extracting additional concessions from the
United States.
Even if the Socialists approve the agreement largely
intact, we expect they will be more prickly in bilateral
matters than their predecessors. A review of public
and private statements by prominent Socialists leads
us to believe that points of friction might include US
use of the base at Torrejon, nuclear ship visits to
Spanish ports, the refueling of nuclear-capable air-
craft by tankers based in Spain, and transit and
overflight to the Middle East. The new government
might also seek greater US diplomatic support for
Spain's North African exclaves-a matter of special
concern to Moran
The Socialists have an ambivalence toward foreign
investment that could cause problems in the bilateral
relationship. They are cool toward multinational com-
panies and have privately considered ways to enhance
would discourage foreign investment
USSR. We believe Spain's relations with the Soviet
Union are likely to remain cool under the Socialists.
The Socialists will be reluctant to be seen building
bridges to Moscow at the same time they are pursuing
a more independent policy vis-a-vis Washington. To
do so would alarm conservative elites at home and
might also damage Spain's chances of joining the
European Community. Overtures to the Soviet Union
could also increase impatience within NATO over
Spain's current ambiguous status within the Alliance.
That, in turn, could generate Allied pressure for a
quick decision on Spanish membership-something
Gonzalez has been trying to avoid. As part of their
general push for increased diplomatic independence,
however, the Socialists could expand ties with other
Communist states, including Yugoslavia and Cuba.
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Western Europe. Domestic and diplomatic obstacles
will impede efforts to intensify the previous govern-
ment's drive to enter the European Community. An
admittedly unscientific review of public opinion leads
us to conclude that Spaniards-influenced by a criti-
cal press-have grown impatient with what they
regard as foot-dragging on their country's application
by EC countries, especially France. Doubts among
Spanish businessmen about their ability to meet EC
competition have also increased recently, according to
the press. With unemployment at 16 percent and still
rising, the consensus for joining the Community that
was revealed in earlier polls could begin to fade if
negotiations do not soon take a productive turn-and
we believe that the tough French line on Spanish
agricultural exports makes such progress uncertain at
best. The European Community may be reluctant to
accept preferential trade arrangements that the new
government might negotiate with LDCs. These cir-
cumstances have contributed to tough Socialist rheto-
ric recently, insisting on substantial progress during
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the next six months on Spain's application. The
Socialists have begun talking about entry into the
Community as a "right"-a statement of principle
that will do as little for their flexibility as it does to
engender compromise in Brussels.
We believe, however, that the Socialists would have
trouble fulfilling their veiled threat to withdraw
Spain's application for EC membership if they do not
achieve a negotiating breakthrough during the first
part of their term. We think they recognize, among
other things, that a reversal of the trend of the past
decade toward growing trade links with the Commu-
nity would unacceptably lessen the pressure on Span-
ish industry to increase its efficiency. Furthermore,
public statements indicate that Spanish politicians
across the spectrum view membership in the Europe-
an Community as much in a political as in an
economic context. They are seeking final, full Europe-
an endorsement of Spanish democracy
The dispute over Gibraltar further strains Spain's
relations with Western Europe. We see Gonzalez's
opening of the border with Gibraltar to foot traffic on
15 December as his first gambit in a drive to put
pressure on the British to resume negotiations. During
Secretary Shultz's visit to Madrid, the Prime Minister
requested US intercession with London. Gonzalez's
linkage of the Gibraltar dispute to Spain's member-
ship in NATO probably is an attempt to get other
states to weigh in as well.
By raising the stakes on the Gibraltar issue, Gonzalez
may believe that he maximizes his prospects for
success. He may see potential dividends even in
failure, possibly believing that merely tackling this
nettlesome matter will create enough capital with the
rightists to free him to pursue the more independent
foreign policy that would please leftists disappointed
by his moderation on domestic policy. We believe the
danger remains, however, that, if the talks with
Britain this spring are unsatisfactory, this "no lose"
strategy could become a "no win" proposition, making
it harder domestically to remain in NATO and pursue
an unambiguously pro-Western policy at a critical
moment for Spain's bid to enter the European
Third World. Overtures to the Third World, and
especially to Latin America, probably will be the
showiest but least substantive part of Socialist diplo-
macy. In our view, apart from believing that Spain
can be a bridge between North and South, many
Socialists hope that forging links with the Third
World will pay domestic political rewards. The theme
of a "greater Hispanic commonweal" has long ap-
pealed to rightists in Spain, and the Socialists will try
to increase that attraction by pursuing new trade and
investment opportunities as part of the 10-year pro-
gram of cooperation they recently announced.' At the
same time, ventures that show independence from the
West will play well with leftists. The Socialists proba-
bly will call for greater respect for human rights and
support for some radical political movements. Accord-
ing to the press, Gonzalez is considering a trip to
Latin America that would provide him an opportunity
to expand on these themes.
The press has quoted Gonzalez as putting out diplo-
matic feelers for a "Little Helsinki" conference for
Latin America. Among his goals would be solutions
for the "external" challenges to Nicaragua and Hon-
duras and for the "internal" conflicts in El Salvador
and Guatemala. Gonzalez sees ending the "unwise"
isolation of Cuba as another important objective. The
Socialists, however, will probably move carefully on
Latin America. They realize that an overly ambitious
diplomacy would invite embarrassment. They also
recognize that their shows of independence in Latin
America should stop short of antagonizing Washing-
ton, and we expect that they will keep a close eye on
US policy in the area.
Public statements indicate that the Socialists hope to
reinforce Spain's ties with the Middle East, seeking
assurances of reliable energy supplies as well as
increased investment in Spain. In return, we believe
Community.
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they will increase Spain's already strong support of
the Arab cause vis-a-vis Israel)
North Africa-particularly Morocco-is another
area of concern. The Socialists worry about the
vulnerability of their North African exclaves and, to
a lesser extent, the Canary Islands to a Moroccan
takeover. To avert that development as well as to
ensure continued Spanish fishing along the Moroccan
coast, the Socialists, in our view, will place great
emphasis on good relations with King Hassan. Indeed,
in one of his first trips as Foreign Minister, Moran
visited Morocco in December to arrange for an early
exchange of visits between Gonzalez and Hassan. The
Socialists' past support and present sympathy for the
Polisario Front poses problems for their relations with
Morocco, as does their longstanding interest in im-
proving relations with Algeria, a principal supplier of
natural gas to Spain. The Socialists may attempt to
maintain the good will of all parties by promoting a
negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara dispute,
a topic recently rumored in the Madrid press. We
believe, however, that if the Socialists are forced to
choose sides, they will opt for Morocco
Where They Will End
A complex interplay of ideology, domestic political
influences, and traditional Spanish diplomatic goals
will keep Socialist foreign policy in flux during the
first part of the new government's term in office. Lack
of progress on EC entry and Gibraltar repatriation
could lead to second thoughts among Spanish policy-
makers and incline the Socialists to pursue greater
diplomatic independence. Over the longer term, too,
the danger remains that if the Socialists are unable to
satisfy popular aspirations for change-especially eco-
nomic improvement-they could be pushed to consid-
er a more basic shift away from the West in favor of
closer alignment with the Third World
On balance, we doubt that they would act on such an
impulse.. Neither Spain nor the Third World has
much to offer the other. Greater experience in foreign
affairs should increase the Socialists' awareness that,
no matter how frustrating Spain's relations with the
West, it is the Atlantic community that provides the
defense, economic, and political support the Socialist
government really needs to further its interests at
home and abroad. We expect that these lessons will
have a particularly strong impact on Gonzalez himself
and will reinforce his commitment to keep Spanish
diplomacy on a basically pro-Western-but probably
less accommodating-path.
Secret,
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Secret
Secret
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