NORTH KOREA: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000100010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: FORM

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STAT
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Directorate of secret
Intelligence
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Korea:
A Sociological Perspective
Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division, Office of
East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
This paper was prepared by
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 83-10002
January 1983
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North Korea:
A Sociological Perspective
Introduction For over three decades the United- States has maintained forces on the
Information available Korean peninsula to defend the Republic of Korea against military
as of 24 September 1982 aggression from the regime in the North.
we have pieced together a picture of North Korean society that
provides some insight into the regime's ability to sustain the discipline
necessary for this nation of 20 million people to support the sixth-largest
army in the world.
What emerges is a depressing picture of a highly regimented, colorless
society revolving around the central figure of Kim 11-song. In over 35 years
at the top, he has removed any potential threats to his dominance and
reordered society more thoroughly than any of his Communist counterparts
in Europe and Asia. Adapting Korea's rigid class structure and long
tradition of authoritarian rule, Kim has created a society where political
loyalty to the "Great Leader" is the sole criteria for advancement.
The mechanisms for maintaining control have been effective. Frustration
and dissatisfaction exist, to be sure, but we have been able to turn up only
the most limited evidence of overt displays of dissidence. Kim's carefully
laid plans to turn power over to his son, however, are testimony to his worry
that his legacy and place in history will eventually suffer a fate similar to
Mao's or Stalin's.
Secret
EA 83-10002
January 1983
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North Korea:
A Sociological Perspective
Tradition Versus Reform-The New Social Order
Capitalizing on the traditional stratification of
society, the North Korean Communists have aggres-
sively reclassified a whole society according to their
own criteria. Just as traditional Korean society was
broken into four main classes (nobility, privileged,
peasantry, and slave or outcast), contemporary Com-
munist society has developed along similar lines. The
difference is that Kim stood the traditional order on
its head.
Songbun
Two criteria determine status in North Korean soci-
ety: songbun or class background and, within the
songbun category, loyalty to the cult of Kim 11-song.
An individual's songbun is either good or bad, with
various gradations within the two.
In the Communist view the only "good" people in
Korea in 1945 were factory workers, laborers, poor
farmers, and those engaged in revolutionary struggle
against the Japanese: these people and their descend-
ants are the privileged class of today. Highest distinc-
tion goes to the anti-Japanese guerrillas who fought
with Kim 11-song. Next are the veterans of the Korean
war and finally the descendants of the pre-
revolutionary workers and the poor small farmers.
Together, these favored groups constitute some 30
percent of the population; the uppermost level, the
ruling elite, is no more than 1 percent of the popula-
tion. Ranked below them in descending order-in
what must be the most class-differentiated society in
the world today-are some 47 distinct groups general-
ly divided into those with acceptable songbun and
those without.'
' Perhaps the only touch of humor in this otherwise deadly business
of ranking people according to songbun is the party's terminology
for the chosen versus the unchosen-the "tomatoes" versus the
"grapes." "Tomatoes," which are completely red to the core, are
considered worthy Communists; "apples," which are red only on
the surface, are considered to need ideological improvement; and
the "grapes" are considered hopeless.
Generally, North Korea's population can be broken
down into three main groups. The preferred class
(elite and privileged) is given every advantage, and
with hard work its members can rise to the top. The
middle 40 percent of the population-the ordinary
people-hope for a lucky break, such as a good
assignment in the military, that will bring them to the
attention of party cadre and get them a better job;
they have no hope of a college education or a profes-
sional career, although membership in the party is
still possible. The bottom 30 percent of the popula-
tion-the "undesirables"-are treated like pariahs;
all doors to advancement-the Army and higher
education-are closed to them. They can expect little
except assignment to a collective farm, a factory, a
mine, or doing menial labor in a city other than
P'yongyang.
Party cadre and security officials keep detailed rec-
ords on everyone, documenting the degree of goodness
and badness. in the late 1940s
and during the period immediately after the Korean
war songbun records were rather spotty and people
were able to conceal the fact that their father or uncle
or grandfather had been a landowner, doctor, Chris-
tian minister, merchant, or lawyer. In the late 1960s,
however, the regime began a series of exhaustive
secret investigations. Since then the public security
apparatus has periodically conducted additional inves-
tigations to the point where everyone now has been
repeatedly checked.
records today are extremely accurate and compete.
Living With Songbun
Everyone in North Korea seems to have a fairly good
idea of what their songbun is, although official notice
is never given. At every important juncture in life its
effects are obvious: admission or nonadmission to high
school or college, entry or nonentry into the Army,
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admission or nonadmission to the party, approval or
nonapproval for marriage, assignment to a job, or
transfer into or out of the city or a collective farm.
Just how good or how bad a person is viewed becomes
clearer over time, with the more subtle changes in a
career.
who had lived privleged lives in
yongyang had been disturbed by the system's injus-
tices. They resented those with better songbun being
excused from volunteer labor on collective farms
while they had to work 18-hour days, seven days a
week, for three or four weeks during the rice trans-
planting season; they resented others being able to
vacation at government rest homes while they had not
had a vacation in years; they resented those with
superior songbun being given the honor of graduating
first in their class, although others might have had
better grades; and they resented those with good
songbun being given choice assignments over better
qualified candidates.
Besides fostering resentments of this type, the song-
bun system has crippled incentive, ambition, and hard
work. The privileged have a feeling of guaranteed
success in life, whether they work hard or not; the
nonprivileged have a sense of futility that eventually
kills any incentive to work hard and do well..
If the songbun system is as important to upward
mobility as current information suggests, it will be a
major impediment to economic progress. The govern-
ment seems to have begun to recognize this problem
in recent years, particularly in trying to motivate that
middle 40 percent of the population from which the
regime draws most of the working force and the
majority of the armed forces. While offering no hope
for change in social status, it has begun to offer some
monetary and other material incentives to increase
productivity and to sustain a higher level of worker
commitment and output.
The regime has done little, if anything, to motivate
the bottom third of the population. Lacking any hope
of significant advancement, people with bad songbun
tend to act the way the party describes them-lazy,
mistrustful, and sometimes obstructionist-in a kind
of self-fulfilling prophecy; many have been relocated
to remote areas.
In denying social advancement to such a large seg-
ment of the population, the regime has created a
situation in which people have good reason to be
dissatisfied with their lot in life. They can hope for
nothing more for their children than what they have
received; and, although there is some chance for
improving their material standard of living, there is no
way for them or their children to move up the social
ladder, to obtain a higher education, to choose their
own job or place of residence, or even to marry outside
their class.
The potential for opposition from those so openly
discriminated against is difficult to assess, but it
clearly has been one of the reasons for the regime's
preoccupation with "antirevolutionary sentiments."
Propaganda constantly decries elements hostile to the
regime's programs and projects a level of security
consciousness excessive even in such a controlled
environment. Reports of antiregime activity that occa-
sionally reach the outside world suggest the regime's
concern is warranted.
recounted myriad stories illustrating
the importance of being a "Kim II-song man"-loyal
to Kim's thinking and teaching. They do not, however,
always recognize the interplay between songbun and
political loyalty-and the two are inseparable. Politi-
cal loyalty is the key to career advancement; however,
it operates only within the constraints already dictat-
ed by songbun.
Dedication to Kim I1-song cannot erase bad songbun,
but it can improve a person's lot in life-within the
limits established for his class. The son of a former
landowner will not get into college or the Army, but
proven dedication to Kim is likely to get him a low-
ranking job in a factory rather than on a cooperative
farm. Dedication to Kim's teachings might give some-
one in the middle social bracket a chance to live and
work in the city as a lower level bureaucrat rather
than as a factory worker. And among the privileged
class it determines who rises to the top in government,
education, management, and medicine.
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Less-than-zealous devotion to Kim is grounds for
demotion, but again within established limits. People
with good songbun are not likely to be sent to a
collective farm or a coal mine except for the most
serious offense, such as the defection of a close family
member or some other treasonable act. Normally,
they will be dropped several notches within the range
of occupations reserved for their social class; for
example, a top party official might be demoted to
some lower level party position on a collective farm, a
high-level factory manager reassigned to office work,
or a middle school teacher demoted to a factory
worker.
Ambitious people in North Korea are forever trying to
outdo one another in their show of loyalty to Kim.E
rnce observed a North Korean diplomat
aww c upon arriving at P'yongyang Airport from an
assignment overseas, immediately began to bow osten-
tatiously to a photograph of Kim he had pulled from
his wallet. thought the diplomat was
acting for the benefit of the foreigners present, but,
he would have done it if no
foreigners had been there. His extravagant show of
fealty is likely to have won him more status than a job
well done.
No one except Kim and his immediate family--is
immune from such political displays of loyalty. For all
their special privileges, the elite are just as obligated
as any other North Korean in this regard. Indeed, as a
person rises through the ranks to the top, more is
expected in terms of political loyalty. Thus, the most
exaggerated worship of the cult occurs at the upper
levels of government. From all reports, in an embassy
the ambassador is invariably the most fanatical. He
got where he is that way; it may not be a measure of
his true feelings, but it is the price of success, if not
political survival.
The adulation of Kim and the central role he is given
in almost every aspect of daily life in North Korea
exceeds that of any other modern personality cult. In
part, this is possible because of North Korea's rela-
tively small size and its homogenous population. Kim
is also a man of considerable charisma; he has taken
special pains to cultivate a close relationship with the
people. His unusually long tenure and penchant for
making on-the-spot inspections have allowed him to
become personally familiar with virtually every town,
village, factory, and farm in North Korea. Most
North Koreans have seen him at close hand on one or
another of his routine visits to their province. Think-
ing of North Korea as about the size of Pennsylvania,
it is easy to imagine the relationship that a charismat-
ic governor of such a state might develop with his
people over a period of 40 years, if he spent 150 to 200
days on the road each year, as Kim II-song has.
The meticulous study of Kim's writings at every level
of society, excessive displays of loyalty to him (partic-
ularly on special occasions such as his birthday), and
the mass mobilization to construct national develop-
ment projects or monuments for his personal glorifica-
tion reinforce the mystique of his leadership.
The higher a person's education, the more hours spent
studying the life and thought of Kim. University
students in the social sciences spend no less than 40
percent of their time studying Kim. Students in the
science departments are reported to devote about 20
percent of their time to political study.
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Seeing Kim Through the Cult
While the cult to a degree reflects genuine popular
support for Kim, it has become exaggerated to the
point that it is also a major irritant. Many Koreans
have long since passed the tolerance point for learning
more minutiae about Kim's life-when he visited a
certain factory, exactly what he said, or what the
weather was like that day. This does not diminish
their affection for him, and they consider him worthy
of respect, but it does make them critical of party
officials who carry the national religion to absurd
proportions.
From all reports, the cult's most onerous aspect is the
forced display of emotion. It is not uncommon for
North Koreans to cry when speaking to foreigners
about the "Great Leader's unbounded goodness."
Visitors to North Korea have so many encounters of
this kind they are convinced these "spontaneous"
expressions are carefully rehearsed.
confirms this beyond any doubt.
On the occasion of Kim's 65th birthday in April 1977,
all diplomatic personnel abroad received watches as a
special commemorative gift, presented at formal cere-
monies in the embassies. The diplomats were instruct-
ed to "show their love and gratitude to Kim with tears
of joy." Movies recorded the event for later showing
in the Foreign Ministry.
With support for Kim so broadly based, the regime
must calculate that it can afford this kind of non-
threatening dissatisfaction. It may also be unable to
stop the momentum it put in motion when it orga-
nized society on the basis of political loyalty to Kim.
Other Communist societies, never as thoroughly polit-
icized as North Korea, have not faced the problems
that result from making loyalty to a particular leader,
rather than the system, the sole basis for advancement
in society.
In our view, the regime has let things get out of
control. Dissatisfaction with the cult's excesses among
the regime's supporters is likely to be a more serious
threat to "Kim Il-songism" over the long run than any
problem posed by the politically disenchanted, partic-
ularly because the cult seems to offend the educated
and privileged more than it does the ordinary North
Korean. The less privileged do not seem as deeply
affected by the cult's excesses because they have other
sources of dissatisfaction-the denial of a higher
education or a better job with a higher income. The
better educated, however, who are more easily bored
with the emotionalism and trivia of the cult, must
suffer greater exposure to it. Just as Deng Xiaoping
and other Chinese leaders now admit they were
repulsed by the excesses of the Mao cult (though they
gave no indication of it at the time), some of North
Korea's leaders must be similarly repelled by many
aspects of the Kim cult.
The Social Setting
The life of an average North Korean family is still
spartan, although there has been some gradual im-
provement. The average working-class family (all but
the most privileged and the elite) still needs two wage
earners to meet basic needs. Even with two salaries,
the average family income of 120 to 180 won per
month barely covers the costs of food and clothing.
Most people cannot afford to have more than two
children, even though the government-in an effort to
ease the labor shortage-offers limited incentives to
families to have more children.
Most women-whether married or single-must work
out of economic necessity. They make up just over
half of the work force, dominating such areas as
teaching, medicine, and textile manufacturing. Wom-
en are predominant in the party and government at
the middle level and below, but there is only token
representation at the higher levels in both organiza-
tions. Women are also well represented in higher
education but are generally restricted to those profes-
sions they dominate.
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The basic social grouping is the work unit. Every
North Korean belongs to one. A unit can be a school,
factory, collective farm, government office, or mili-
tary unit. It is the vehicle for political development,
observation, and social control. The unit provides
housing as well as employment. It gives permission to
marry and distributes rations of clothing and shoes. It
authorizes travel, out-of-town accommodations, and
even a dinner at a public restaurant. It approves
vacation time and arranges for a stay at a government
rest home. A person must have the unit's permission
to see a doctor, have an operation, or buy a watch or a
bicycle. Finally, it is with members of the unit that
North Koreans attend all party meetings, militia
training, self-criticism sessions, morning and evening
study sessions, and cultural or social events.
Because of military service, marriage is forbidden
until a man is 30; a woman is discouraged by the state
from marrying before age 24. Divorce is difficult to
obtain and harmful politically. Children are quickly
introduced to state-sponsored group activity. Most of
the family's limited leisure time will be spent with the
work unit rather than together. All children join the
Young Pioneers at age 9 or 10 and the Socialist
Working League between 14 and 16. The latter
introduces the child to basic political indoctrinations,
self-criticism sessions, and volunteer labor. Student
schedules for vacations, political study, and volunteer
labor will differ from those of their parents. Still,
family ties appear to remain strong and stable.
State-directed activities consume a major part of an
individual's daily existence. Political study may take
up as much as three hours a day during the six-day
workweek. Add to this several hours of weekly self-
criticism sessions and volunteer labor after work, on
weekends, and during "free time" and some North
Koreans will have spent the equivalent of 145 work
days each year on these activities.
This leaves little time for recreation in any form.
What evidence there is suggests that leisure time is
concentrated on Sundays and limited vacation peri-
ods. It usually means going to a park, sporting event,
or simply relaxing at home. The media-radio, televi-
sion, and the press-offer only limited recreational
opportunities. All printed material is designed to
glorify the regime and stress its political message. The
same is basically true for radio and television, al-
though they carry some sporting events and local
news.
The high moral standard the regime claims for its
people stems in part from the fact that most people
have little time or energy for getting into trouble.
Reports of juvenile delinquency almost always involve
the children of the elite or privileged.
Elitism and Equalitarianism
In keeping with the regime's priorities, the system has
produced an elite group-perhaps 1 percent of the
population-that meets the twin criteria of excellent
songbun and proven loyalty to Kim. As in other
Communist countries, members of this group enjoy
privileges, tangible and intangible, that make their
lives vastly different from those of ordinary North
Koreans. The price, however, is high: close and con-
stant monitoring of all but the most senior party and
government officials.
At the same time, the system has produced a basic
egalitarianism in the lifestyles of most other North
Koreans-more noticeably so than in other Commu-
nist countries. In addition the regime's emphasis on
political loyalty and constant observation prevents
even those with privilege from flaunting their status.
The regime's claims that there is no great income gap
in North Korea are not true, just misleading. Exclud-
ing Kim 11-song, the highest paid government officials
earn only about three or four times the wage of the
average North Korean worker. In a system, however,
that makes only the most limited use of the open
market to distribute goods and services, wages are
irrelevant. They are little more than an allowance
given to a child in the West for expenditures above
and beyond the housing, food, clothing, education,
and medical care provided by parents. In North
Korea, as in the USSR, privilege operates outside the
system of wages, rations, and the normal distribution
of goods and savings.
Most consumer goods are not purchased, but distrib-
uted through individual work units. The food ration-
ing system allocates foodgrains and other staples on
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the basis of the physical energy required on the job.
Thus, higher level officials get smaller rations than
fishermen, coal miners, and workers in heavy indus-
try. And prized woolen clothing goes only to the
military, coal miners, fishermen, and others exposed
to harsh working conditions.
Moreover, except for the very top leaders who live in
exclusive executive apartments, housing for the privi-
leged is much the same as for the lower classes. Most
people live in a housing unit comprising a living-
dining room, one bedroom, a kitchen, and a bathroom
that is usually shared by several families. The elite
may have private baths and sometimes two bedrooms
instead of one. Education and medical care are free to
all, suggesting equality in the area of so-called social
consumption as well as personal consumption.
With the state providing most basic commodities,
including housing, wages go for extra food and cloth-
ing, cigarettes, entertainment, and sundries. A high
wage can mean a more varied diet, one or two extra
suits or dresses, occasional movies or dinners at a
restaurant, travel to visit relatives, or the purchase of
a major item such as a wristwatch or bicycle.
Food
P'yongyang uses an extensive, complex, and rigorous
rationing system, ostensibly to ensure equitable distri-
bution. Its novel features seem in many respects to
favor the less privileged over the more privileged, but
in actuality it reinforces the inequities in the system.
To a North Korean the amount of rice in the grain
ration is as important as the total grain allotment.
Preferring rice to any other foodgrain, North Koreans
would choose a smaller grain allotment composed
exclusively of rice over a larger grain ration with a
mixture of less rice and other grains. Only the elite,
laborers with very hazardous jobs, some military
officers on special assignment, and seriously ill pa-
tients in hospitals receive their full grain ration in
rice.
Over the years the share of rice in ordinary grain
rations has been cut from 70 percent in the late 1960s
to 50 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1973.2 This
forced decline in rice consumption was the result of
the need to expand exports to repay overdue interna-
tional debts. the substi-
tution of other foodgrains has been very unpopular
and is a source of growing dissatisfaction. Nonethe-
less, the people have no choice but to accept the
regime's explanation that it is stockpiling rice to "feed
the starving South Korean masses'on the happy day of
reunification."
The elite, however, have countinued to enjoy their full
grain allotments in polished rice, a form of rice
unavailable to most North Koreans for years. Thus, a
cabinet minister receiving 700 grams of polished rice
a day is being treated much better than a blast
furnace operator receiving 900 grams of grain per
day, 30 percent in unpolished rice, 50 percent in corn,
and 20 percent in wheat flour. The equality of giving
larger rations to those who do heavy work and need
more food is counterbalanced by the elitism of saving
the finest for the privileged.
The average basic diet is not a healthy, balanced one.
It is heavy on carbohydrates and low in fats, proteins,
vitamins, and minerals. Whether living in the city or a
rural area, the average Korean eats almost no meat,
limited amounts of fish or poultry, and very little
fruit. There has been less improvement in food than in
any other consumer area.
Clothes and Consumer Goods
No formal rationing system exists for clothing as it
does for food. However, since clothes are distributed
through schools, factories, offices, or cooperative
farms, the regime has almost total control over the
process. Everyone is issued two winter outfits and one
summer outfit, but the higher quality designs and
fabrics go to those in the privileged occupations and
schools. The nominal cost of state-supplied clothes has
no relation to the price of clothes in the stores. The
latter are for sale to those who can afford extra
clothing not deemed essential by the state.
Compared with other items sold on the open market,
clothing is reasonably priced, except for quality wool-
en and leather goods. This reflects a price structure in
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which goods that the regime deems essential (unra-
tioned foods, simple clothing, cosmetics) are subsi-
dized while nonessential items (above-average cloth-
ing, electric appliances) are sold at inflated prices.
The profit the state makes on the latter compensates
for the losses on the former.
An ordinary North Korean could never save enough
money to buy a refrigerator or a black and white
television. Imported color televisions and Swiss and
Japanese wristwatches cost more than an average
worker earns in an entire year. Consumption is con-
trolled by price alone, without resorting to rationing.
Such items do become available to members of the
middle class and the privileged on special occasions,
such as Kim's birthday. They are distributed as
"personal gifts" from Kim.
Relative to wages, all prices are high-reflecting the
limited role of money in the economy and the minor
role of the open market in the distribution of goods
and services. A nylon sweater and two pairs of nylon
socks cost the ordinary worker a month's wages. The
average daily wage of 2.5 won can buy either 1 meter
of cotton cloth (not nylon, silk, or wool), a toothbrush
and toothpaste, one private bath in a bathhouse and a
cake of soap, or a set of ping-pong paddles and a ball.
in
addition to the direct distribution of goods through
work units, there is a network of "special stores" that
most North Koreans never hear about. Some are open
only to foreigners and charge exorbitant prices to earn
much-needed foreign exchange. Others, modeled after
those in the Soviet Union and operating independently
of the open market, are available only to privileged
North Koreans and sell prestige items at discount
prices. Not only are prices lower than in regular
government-operated stores, but goods (mostly im-
ported) not otherwise available are for sale: leather
shoes, wool suits, beef, pork, fresh fish, caviar, wine,
liquor, and high-quality cigarettes. Except for some
shoes imported from Japan, no foreign-made clothing
is available to ordinary North Koreans. Beef and pork
are almost never available, and wine and liquor only
on national holidays and special occasions such as
weddings.
The elite, however, have ready access to these goods,
at discount prices, all year
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Housing
Housing is another area in which elitism flourishes
alongside a basic egalitarianism. Of all consumer
areas, housing has consistently received top priority,
second only to investment in heavy industry and
surpassing transportation, agriculture, and light in-
dustry. Although the share of state capital allocated
to housing has gradually declined in recent years, the
absolute amount has grown steadily. Since the Korean
war, the regime has constructed new housing for more
than three-fourths of its population, urban and rural.
Visitors to North Korea are inevitably impressed with
the modern high rise apartments (many of them 12 to
20 stories high) in P'yongyang and other cities and the
cement-tiled cottages of rural North Korea. Both
bespeak a higher standard of living than in neighbor-
ing China. North Koreans take pride in the significant
improvement in housing since the war and the basic
equality of the system.
Even though the people are more impressed with the
improvements in housing than in any other area,
complained of cramped housing more
than the shortage of meat and the lack of variety in
the diet, the cost of warm clothes, the poor quality of
other clothes, the scarcity of medicines, or the limited
opportunities for higher education. Although city
dwellers believe their one-bedroom apartment is an
improvement over the past, they look forward to the
regime's promise of a two-bedroom apartment for
every family of five or more.
Housing construction, whatever its record, simply has
not kept pace with demand. Families are assigned
housing associated with the factory, cooperative farm,
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or government ministry where the father works. Even
if they had the money, people could not choose to
spend more on better housing or housing in a different
location at the sacrifice of other consumer wants.
No other consumer area seems to have presented the
same challenge to the regime. Rural housing still
consists primarily of single-story dwellings with two
basic rooms plus a kitchen shared with another fam-
ily. All homes have electricity but few have inside
plumbing.
Despite significant improvements in the quality of
construction, it would be wrong to leave the impres-
sion that North Korean apartments-even the newer
ones-are of superior construction.
observed: "None o the walls are free
rom cracks. Most electric switches and outlets are
defective. The wooden floors are not properly laid.
Rain soaks through many of the roofs, the doors are
narrow, and there are no screens on the windows."
Housing for the Elite. People do not cite discrimina-
tion in housing as a major complaint, largely because
of the regime's success in concealing the special
housing available to the elite. The inequalities, how-
ever, are every bit as striking as in other consumer
areas. In urban areas at least, the level of privilege is
also disguised by placing special housing units in
sections of the city where ordinary citizens have no
reason to visit. Thus, the single-unit homes of the
most privileged or the three- and four-bedroom execu-
tive apartments are visible only to those who live
there.
Basic furnishings-a dining room table, one or two
wooden wardrobe chests, a wooden desk, and pantry
cabinet for kitchenware-come with every apartment.
Furnishings for higher class apartments-sewing ma-
chines, fans, televisions, and small refrigerators-
represent a substantially higher standard of living and
are beyond the hope of most North Koreans. Most
would have access to a black and white television and
sewing machine only through their apartment build-
ings or collective farms, much as US students have
access to a television and laundry facilities in their
dormitories. Thus, when the regime boasts that all
North Koreans have television, it means that all
citizens have access to television. Small villages typi-
cally have one to three televisions that villagers can
gather around to watch sporting events, the evening
news, or movies.
While ordinary North Koreans typically share com-
munal bathrooms with other families on the same
corridor of their apartment building or in their com-
plex of rural homes, residents of the elite apartments
have private bathrooms-some with running water
and flush toilets. The apartments of the privileged
usually have other conveniences, such as elevators,
central heating, and sometimes air conditioning and
private telephones. have spoken of
the disadvantages of living on the upper floors of a
high rise apartment building with no elevator or
running water. North Koreans
much prefer individual housing units in rural areas to
apartment living in the cities because "they so dislike
carrying trash, water, coal, and groceries up and down
so many flights of stairs." One of the luxuries of the
executive apartments is that they are only two or
three stories high.
The North Koreans have devised a novel system for
ensuring that the privileged always enjoy the latest in
modern housing. As new apartment buildings with the
most up-to-date conveniences are constructed, privi-
leged families are moved out of their old apartments
into these new ones. The people who rank just below
them move into the old apartments, and on down the
line. People are constantly moving in and out of
apartments, in a slow but steady improvement in their
standard of living. The family of a senior military
officer is known to have moved nine times in 16 years,
all within the P'yongyang vicinity. Since apartment
buildings are occupied by people working in the same
government ministry or factory, the residents are
moved as a group, with no disruption of their social
ties.
In addition to their own special housing, the elite have
access to luxurious vacation homes along the beach on
the east coast, in mountain areas near P'yongyang,
and as far away as the northwestern border with
China. The North Koreans have created artificial
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lakes in these remote mountainous areas. The palatial
home built for exiled Kampuchean leader Sihanouk
on a secluded hillside about 15 minutes from down-
town Pyongyang is located near such a manmade
lake and has a private boat dock. On the other side of
the lake are equally impressive and equally isolated
villas, also with private boat docks.
Similar villas on the edge of manmade lakes in the
remote mountain areas of northwest North Korea
have even more elaborate, covered boat docks
Kim 11-song is reported to have a palatial home
outside Pyongyang, near Sihanouk's home. John
Wallach of the Hearst papers interviewed Kim in one
such villa in May 1979. Wallach described it as
"enormous, by far the most lavish villa I have ever
seen in the Communist world." It was surrounded by
acres of terraced planting, a swimming pool, and
Medical Care 25X1
Although free medical care for all North Koreans
implies a system of basic equality, there is a large gap
between medical services for the elite and that avail-
able to most North Koreans. Visitors to P'yongyang 25X1
are routinely taken to the showcase facilities: the Red 25X1
Cross Hospital, the P'yongyang Medical College Hos-
pital, and the new Maternity Hospital. These, how-
ever, are the only modern hospitals in North Korea.
In addition, there is a clinic located in the Ponghwa
section of P'yongyang for high-ranking party and
government officials only. Most North Koreans do not
even know of the existence of the Ponghwa Clinic, just
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as most Soviet citizens apparently do not know of the
Kremlin Clinic in Moscow. Both leaderships make
every effort to keep such prestige facilities secret.
North Korea's almost irrepressible desire to show off
its prestige facilities, including its premier medical
facilities, we know of no foreign visitor who has ever
been taken to the Ponghwa Clinic.
Although the three central hospitals in P'yongyang
are reasonably good by world standards, they are not
typical of the 6,700 hospitals, clinics, and rural health
centers outside the capital. These three are the only
ones in the country with central heating, air condi-
tioning, private rooms, and comfortable beds with
mattresses. most hospitals are
poorly equipped, overcrowded, badly heated, and no-
torious for their poor food, uncomfortable wooden
beds, and inadquate supplies of medicines.
Education
The North Korean leadership has long touted its free
educational system. Having lost most of its intellectu-
als and skilled technicians in the mass exodus to the
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Figure 4. The Pyongyang Maternity Hospital a showcase facility
not typical of most hospitals in North Korea. ~
South after the war, the regime was faced with the
immediate need to develop a new class of skilled
technicians "to accelerate the revolution and promote
national construction." P'yongyang claims that the
educational system has produced an unprecedented
number of "new intellectuals." In the Communist
sense of the word, "intellectual" is often interchanged
with "technician." The North's basic concept of edu-
cation is to link study with work, a kind of on-the-job
training through life.
Korean war; in history, they study the Communist .
revolution in Korea; in music, they sing Kim's march-
ing songs; and in drama, they reenact his life story.
estimated that "about 80 percent of the
contents of schoolbooks in some way concerned the
idolization of Kim."
The regime has made notable progress in expanding
mass education at the lower levels, but it has not
made commensurate efforts at the higher levels even
Political indoctrination is the other key ingredient of
the North's approach to education. From nursery
school on, students are taught the national ideology as
part of every subject. Young children become used to
thanking Kim 11-song for every meal, their school
supplies, their teachers, and the schools themselves. In
reading, students learn about Kim's guerrilla exploits;
in math, they learn by counting the number of
American soldiers killed or tanks destroyed during the
for the privileged class.
only about 30 to 40 percent of middle school gradu-
ates go on to high school, less than 10 percent of high
school graduates go on to college or university, and
only some 5 percent of military draftees return to
school. Competition for admission to Kim II-song
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University is intense. As of late 1980, only one of
every five or six applicants was accepted and in some
departments only one of 10.
Thirty-five years after its founding, Kim 11-song
University with 12,000 students is still the only four-
year university in the country; 200,000 to 300,000
students attend specialized two-year colleges. Each
year the regime allocates substantial resources to
improve the facilities of the university-reserved for
the chosen elite-but gives no consideration to estab-
lishing other four-year universities in the country.
Imbalances in the curriculum reflect the skewed
nature of the educational system, which is structured
to provide the necessary training for productive labor.
Sciences predominate; social sciences are all but
neglected, except for the study of Marxism-Leninism
and the Communist Revolution in Korea
as many as eight out of every 10
classrooms at Kim 11-song University are laboratories
for the study of biology, chemistry, geology, commu-
nications, and related practical subjects. The regime's
defensiveness about its academic program in the
social sciences is evident in its unwillingness to allow
visiting social scientists to meet with their North
Korean counterparts.
Most elementary schools outside P'yongyang suffer a
shortage of supplies and an even more acute shortage
of teachers, most of whom are undertrained and
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JGt.I ~t
overworked. Teachers of primary grades in rural areas
are usually new graduates of middle school, barely 17
years old. Other than paper and pencils, teachers and
students must make most classroom equipment-all
maps, charts, pictures, chemicals, and other experi-
mental materials.
Despite these weaknesses, the regime has succeeded in
many areas. When the Communists came to power in
1946, illiteracy was widespread and less than 20
percent of all Korean youth had gone beyond elemen-
tary schooling (taught in Japanese). The Korean lan-
guage was immediately introduced at all levels. From
the outset, the regime put a premium on the rapid
training of technically oriented personnel who could
aid the one-generation industrial revolution being
planned.
Since the early 1970s, the increase in school enroll-
ments at all levels has been phenomenal. Education
seems to have been one of the few areas unaffected by
government cutbacks resulting from the economy's
disappointing performance during the mid-1970s.
By 1980 the number of colleges had grown to 170, of
which 25 were in P'yongyang. According to North
Korean statistics, school enrollment jumped from 2.6
million students in 1968 to 8.6 million in 1980. Some
6 million students were reported to be in primary,
middle, and high school. Enrollment in colleges had
increased substantially, from a low of 200,000 in 1970
to 350,000 in 1980. Attendance at factory colleges,
night schools, and correspondence courses was aboat
2.3 million.
The relatively high enrollment in these factory col-
leges suggests no less emphasis on adult education
even though the government was expanding its efforts
in other areas. The regime claims the number of
factory colleges increased from 20 in 1960 to 85 in
1981. some 15
percent of the country's workers and peasants had
studied in adult education programs by the end of
1981.
The results of these tremendous efforts in education
have been impressive in many regards. Over 600,000
technicians and specialists were reportedly trained
during 1970-76, bringing the total number of trained
technicians in North Korea to more than 1 million, up
from 22,000 in 1953 and 497,000 in 1970. As a share
of the estimated total work force, this is an increase
from under 1 percent in 1953 to over 8 percent in
1970 and up to 15 percent in 1980. About 10 percent
of the labor force are graduates of college and higher
technical institutes, and the average worker has seven
to eight years of education, compared to four to five
years in the 1970s.
Education for the Privileged. Perhaps the greatest
privilege of the elite is access to the finest education.
Although all children go to nursery school from the
age of three months, the children of the privileged
attend the celebrated 18 September Nursery, a show-
case school featuring a heated swimming pool, mod-
ern playgrounds, spacious classrooms, and a well-
trained staff. None of the other 60,000 nursery
schools or kindergartens, which accommodate some
3.5 million children up to the age of 6, have similar
facilities.
Privileged children living in P'yongyang have the
opportunity to pursue extracurricular activities at the
plush Children's Palace, a huge complex of some 500
rooms offering courses in music, dancing, embroidery,
the martial arts, science, mechanics, painting and
sculpture, gymnastics, swimming, boxing, soccer, bas-
ketball, volleyball, weight lifting, and ping-pong.
as many as 10,000
of North Korea's most privileged children, ages 8 to
16, use the Children's Palace daily. A staff of 500
full-time teachers plus another 1,000 part-time teach-
ers direct their activities.
Apparent y, some stu ents ge o go
more often than others depending on the prestige of
their schools.
the exclusiveness of higher
education is a major source of dissatisfaction. In a
system that promotes the sons and daughters of the
elite by virtue of their having the best songbun, the
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people who get ahead by going to the best schools are
those who have grown up amidst relative privilege.
Members of the second-generation leadership-typi-
fied by Kim Chong-il-who have gone to North
Korea's most prestigious schools, who have avoided
spending eight to 10 years in the military, who have
lived in comfortable homes, played tennis, driven cars,
and vacationed at beach resorts while others have
been doing volunteer labor on the farms are somewhat
out of touch with the mass of people who lead very
different lives. Certainly, they are a different breed
from the first-generation leaders-self-styled guer-
rilla fighters with little formal education, devoted to
the cause of Korean independence and reunification,
and much more egalitarian in their thinking.
Second-generation leaders cannot claim to have
known hard times or to have lived as the ordinary
North Korean lives, as Kim Il-song can. As members
of the new aristocracy, they will probably claim
leadership on the basis of birth and rank. And that is
precisely what we are seeing in Kim Chong-il's ef-
forts, with his father's blessing, to establish the first
"Communist monarchal succession" in history. Com-
pared with its predecessor, this generation is likely to
be much more elitist in its thinking and more con-
cerned with preserving the system that protects its
privileged position.
Educational Weaknesses. An educational system that
puts a premium on political skills naturally motivates
the bright and ambitious to cultivate their political
rather than academic skills. Guaranteed as they are of
a successful professional career in the future, privi-
leged students at the best schools feel relatively little
need to do well. Even in technical fields the regime
has remained relatively unsophisticated. Political dis-
tortion is even more noticeable in the social sciences.
North Koreans know nothing of'US involvement in
World War II or much else of world history, focusing
instead on Korean history and the study of Marxism-
Leninism.
The regime has begun to feel some of the inadequa-
cies of the educational system. The lack of English
linguists, in particular, has inhibited P'yongyang in
advancing its diplomatic objectives. English is now
compulsory in the school curriculum, and the govern-
ment is sending a relatively large number of students
abroad for English-language training.
In short, the educational system at any level provides
little in the way of a truly intellectual experience.
North Koreans are technically trained and thoroughly
imbued with Kim's teachings-and not used to think-
ing for themselves.
Life in Pyongyang
So great is the difference between living in P'yong-
yang and living elsewhere in the country that some
feeling for P'yongyang is necessary for an apprecia-
tion of privilege in North Korea. P'yongyang is the
center of everything-the government, the arts, sci-
ence, and technology.
Kim 11-song has built a showcase city in P'yongyang
that is atypical of the rest of the country. There is
great natural beauty in its parks and rivers and
grandeur in its public buildings and wide, tree-lined
avenues. Added to this is the city's extraordinary
cleanliness, some even say sterility.
Part of Kim's design in creating his "dream city," as
he calls P'yongyang, has obviously been to limit the
size of the population-which now stands at about 1
million. more North Koreans
want to live in P'yongyang and many people would
migrate to the city were it not for the tight controls
exercised by the government. North Koreans cannot
move into or out of P'yongyang without official
approval.
Bicycles are forbidden in the city, and trucks are
restricted to certain sections to maintain its orderly,
uncluttered appearance. Since there are no privately
owned automobiles, the only cars evident are those
owned by the government and used to transport high-
level party and government officials, university pro-
fessors, and distinguished artists and athletes. Other
people travel by bus, trolley, or subway. The lack of
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traffic, along with the absence of industry within the
city, has kept it free of air pollution, a troubling
problem in most other areas of North Korea.
Unlike most cities, which grow helter-skelter, P'yong-
yang was carefully planned. Reduced to rubble in the
Korean war, it was rebuilt on the drawing boards. The
streets, laid out in a north-south, east-west grid, give
it a well-ordered appearance. Its public buildings-
built on a grand scale-make it a monumental city.
The city's showcase quality, however, may be best
illustrated by the extensive P'yongyang subway. The
mere existence of a subway in P'yongyang seems
unreal, given the state of transportation in the rest of
the country. It is hardly typical of a country where
most of the people walk to and from work and only the
lucky are bused to their factories. Built deep under-
ground to also serve as an air-raid shelter, the subway
stations have marble floors and sculptured ceilings,
exquisite chandelier lighting, and beautiful mosaics.
For North Koreans the rebuilding has been dramatic.
The whole country takes genuine pride in the city.
This pride is reflected in the question North Koreans
often ask foreigners: "Do you like our city? Is it
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pleasing? Tell us how to make it even better."
believe that som t
people think that the improvements justify their hard
work." They are particularly proud of the cleanliness
of the city.
Summary
This description of life in North Korea presents to any
Western observer a depressing picture of a highly
regimented, disciplined, colorless, and tense society, in
which life is hard, improving only at a glacial pace,
and any fires of hope and ambition have been all but
snuffed out. This is not necessarily the way people in
North Korea see their lot, although there is ample
evidence of frustration and unhappiness. The vast
majority of citizens have known only authoritarian
governments, first under the Japanese, briefly under
Soviet occupation during 1945-48, and since then
under Kim I1-song.
At a minimum, Kim has established a government
free of foreign domination, one that took the lead in
rebuilding the country after the war, and now pro-
vides jobs, housing, and security. Because of the
isolation in which North Koreans have lived through-
out this period and the constant drumbeat of propa-
ganda that has compared their relative well-being
with the "misery" of South Korea or other states, they
have no basis for comparing their standard of living
with that elsewhere.
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A key element in sustaining the regime's control and
the essential docility and cooperation of the people has
been the figure and personality of Kim I1-song. The
careful and deliberate manner he has taken to groom
his son to succeed him and to perpetuate his type of
leadership reflects the difficulties he foresees once he
is no longer on the scene. Kim probably is not so much
worried about a sharp growth of dissidence or a
breakdown in public discipline as he is in a slower
unraveling of the control mechanisms that depend, to
a large extent, on his unique personality as the
unrivaled leader of North Korea for over 35 years.
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