ANGOLA: THE GROWING UNITA INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000300040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Secret
ALA 83-10098C
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Angola: The Growing
UNITA Insurgency
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r_~,, 11 Intelligence
Angola: The Growing
UNITA Insurgency
This paper was prepared by I Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, with research
assistance from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
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Angola: The Growing
UNITA Insurgency 25X1
Key Judgments Since last October, Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed National Union
Information available for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has enjoyed greater
as of l June 1983 military success than at any time in the past.
was used in this report.
The insurgents have virtually doubled the territory they control in Angola's
southeastern quadrant. UNITA's forces in this sparsely inhabited region
have been increasingly using conventional military methods rather than
purely guerrilla tactics
In more populous central Angola, UNITA has intensified its guerrilla
operations, isolated a number of government-held positions, and seized
Western and Communist foreign aid personnel as hostages. The guerrillas
have also stepped up their forays into the northern third of the country,.
where they have successfully attacked key transportation links and other
targets.
There are several reasons for UNITA's growing success:
? The insurgent group has been expanding in recent years.
? It has benefited from strong leadership, high morale, and good discipline
and organization.
? South Africa's already substantial aid has probably increased.
Other key factors underlying UNITA's success are the growing military,
economic, and political weaknesses that plague the Soviet- and Cuban-
backed Marxist regime in Luanda.
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We believe UNITA may be able to take some additional territory during
the next several months. Its next major gains could come in the northeast,
where the Angolans and Cubans do not have a strong military presence.
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 The insurgents, in our judgment, will find it more difficult to make major
new advances in the other regions in the immediate future because of the
presence of sizable Angolan and Cuban troop concentrations. In the
southeast, we expect UNITA forces during the next few months to
concentrate on consolidating their recent gains and on preparing to defend
against a possible government-Cuban counteroffensive. UNITA also is
likely to continue guerrilla operations in central Angola
We believe that UNITA's successes since late last year have made it even
more difficult than before for the Luanda regime to contemplate sending
the Cubans home-a precondition for a settlement of the Namibian
problem-in the absence of some sort of UNITA-MPLA accommodation.
Soviet-backed hardliners in the MPLA appear to be preventing any serious
negotiations with UNITA.
Yet, there remains a possibility-considering the acute economic and
military pressures besetting the dos Santos regime-of a breakthrough in
the Namibia negotiations that includes an Angolan commitment to a
phased withdrawal of Cuban military personnel. If a Cuban withdrawal
were to occur without an end to the UNITA-MPLA war, we believe the in-
surgents would make significant military gains. Just how far UNITA
would advance in such circumstances would depend on whether some
Cubans remained, on whether they played active combat roles, and on
South African actions.
A total Cuban withdrawal, in our view, probably would paralyze the
Angolan Army and enable UNITA to win the war outright in the absence
of a UNITA-MPLA accommodation
We believe that even if Namibia became independent, depriving South
Africa of the ability to use Namibian territory, Pretoria would probably
find a way to continue assisting Savimbi. And even if South Africa were to
stop providing aid, we believe the well-organized, highly motivated insur-
gents would pose a formidable threat to any MPLA regime that no longer
enjoyed Cuban protection.
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Secret
Recent Insurgent Gains: Operations on Three Fronts 1
Expansion in the Southeast 1
Intensified Campaign in Central Angola 2
Reasons for Insurgents' Success 3
UNITA's Growing Strength and Potency 3
Government's Weaknesses and Disadvantages 7
Anxiety in Luanda 9
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Angola: The Growing
UNITA Insurgency
Since last October, Jonas Savimbi's National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has
enjoyed greater military success than ever before. The
insurgents now control the southeastern quadrant of
Angola, have isolated several key government posi-
tions in the central part of the country, and have
stepped up raids and sabotage in the government-
dominated north
In the next few months they advanced steadily north-
ward and overran several small towns and garrisons
between Lumbala and the Benguela Railroad. Several
government garrisons that were too strong to be
assaulted were surrounded and isolated.
Western journalists witnessed two of the battles
during this campaign-at Cangonga and Munhango.
They reported that regular UNITA battalions mount-
ed well-planned operations against the garrisons at
both towns. Some government troops were killed-at
least 200 defenders were reported killed at Cangonga,
for example-while others fled. UNITA's forces
looted and destroyed the captured garrisons and then
withdrew to avoid possible government counter-
We believe UNITA's gains have
made Luanda-'even more uneasy about agreeing to a
withdrawal of all Cuban combat forces from Ango-
la-a precondition insisted upon by South Africa
before it will remove its own forces from neighboring
Namibia and grant independence to that territory.
This paper discusses UNITA's recent successes, their
impact on the Luanda government, and the insur-
gents' prospects for further gains.
Recent Insurgent Gains:
Operations on Three Fronts
UNITA has been expanding its area of control in the
sparsely populated southeast since the late 1970s. In
central Angola-where most of UNITA's ethnic sup-
port is concentrated-it has been conducting guerrilla
operations for an even longer period. UNITA
has also been sending patrols and raiding parties into
parts of northern Angola for several years. Starting
late last year, UNITA operations on all these fronts
became bolder and more intensive.
attacks.
By April, the insurgents had gained control of most of
Moxico Province, thus virtually doubling the area
under their domination. According to the journalists
who observed some of the fighting, UNITA relied
primarily on conventional or semiconventional mili-
tary tactics, as had been its pattern in the southeast
for the past several years.
Since April, UNITA appears to have concentrated on
consolidating its hold over the newly captured territo-
ry rather than trying to push farther to the north and
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Expansion in the Southeast
UNITA forces began moving out from their bases in
Cuando Cubango Province last October. They cap-
tured an Angolan garrison at Lumbala in November.
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west. The insurgents have been expecting government
counterattacks following the end of the rainy season
in April. There have been fragmentary reports that
such attacks may be under way, but we have seen no
indication that UNITA has yielded any ground. F_
We would not be surprised to see UNITA pull back to
some extent in Moxico Province if the government
were to send in large forces. In the past, the insur-
gents have often employed the tactic of pulling back
to allow the government columns to penetrate. Then
they have attacked inadequately protected convoys
attempting to resupply the government's forward ele-
ments, eventually forcing the government forces to
Intensified Campaign in Central Angola
In more populous west-central Angola, inhabited pri-
marily by the Ovimbundu ethnic group that provides
most of UNITA's popular support, the insurgents
have stepped up their operations since late last year
and have succeeded in isolating a number of govern-
ment positions. In this region UNITA primarily relies
on guerrilla tactics-ambushes sabotage, and other
small-unit operations
Among UNITA's main accomplishments in the cen-
tral region this year has been the isolation of the key
provincial capital of Huambo. The guerrillas have
attacked road and rail links to the city and have
raided some government outposts near it; according to
press Huambo is now largely cut
off from outside access except by air
life in the city has become very difficult
for government and Cuban forces as well as civilians.
Supplies of water and electricity are frequently cut
off, and there are shortages of key supplies. Only the
presence of sizable Cuban and Angolan forces in and
around Huambo prevents the guerrillas from overrun-
ning the city
The guerrillas have carried out several fairly dramatic
operations this year in west-central Angola. These
operations seem aimed in part at attracting public
attention at home and abroad and at convincing
Angolan and international observers that the Luanda
regime and its backers are increasingly unable to
contain the insurgency:
? In March, according to press
they captured 64 Czechoslovak and 20 Portuguese
aid technicians and dependents at Alto Catumbela
and shepherded them on foot to UNITA base camps
The seizure of the foreigners reflects the insurgents'
longstanding policy, acknowledged publicly by
UNITA leader Savimbi, of taking hostages in order to
gain attention and to discourage foreign economic
assistance to the regime. A few Brazilian aid person-
nel as well as international Red Cross workers and
members of foreign religious groups have also been
captured in recent years. UNITA officials have indi-
cated an interest in exchanging some of their captives
for UNITA or other prisoners being held by the
Angolan Government.
According to press) Ithe insurgents
have also continued to attack the Benguela Railroad
in central Angola, preventing the regime from using
most of the 1,350-kilometer east-west line. The guer-
rillas sabotage the rail line and rolling stock at will.
Before UNITA effectively shut down the railroad in
the late 1970s, it had been a major transportation
facility for Angola and its neighbors to the east.
UNITA's attacks on the line have forced neighboring
Zaire and Zambia to use alternate routes for most of
their foreign trade in recent years, thus increasing
their dependence on transportation links through
South Africa as well as depriving Luanda of much-
needed foreign exchange
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Breaking New Ground in the North
Since late last year UNITA has also stepped up its
forays into the northern third of the country. Guerril-
la operations in this region are generally conducted by
raiding parties or sabotage teams that go in to attack
a specific target and then return to central or southern
Angola.
UNITA lacks a tribal base in the north, where there
are few members of the Ovimbundu tribe, the insur-
gents' main source of support. The region, moreover,
is relatively distant from the insurgents' bases and
supply lines in the southeast. The insurgents, however,
apparently hope to capitalize on local antipathy to-
ward the Angolan Government to build UNITA's
Guerrilla operations in the north have focused in
recent months on the road and rail lines that traverse
the relatively populous Malange area and the
diamond-mining region in the northeast. Important
guerrilla operations have included the destruction of a
key bridge west of the diamond-mining zone around
Saurimo and a number of attacks on rail facilities and
roads around the city of Malange.
We lack reliable information on the current status of
the diamond industry-Angola's second-largest
earner of foreign exchange after crude oil. On the
basis of fragmentary evidence, however, we believe
that diamond production has been seriously hurt b
UNITA's guerrilla operations in recent months.
In our judgment, UNITA's gains since last October
are due to the cumulative impact of the insurgents'
growing strength and prowess, South Africa's
substantial and probably rising assistance, and the
Angolan Government's severe military, economic, and
political weaknesses.
UNITA's Growing Strength and Potency
UNITA claims, privately and publicly, to have rough-
ly 35,000 fighters-15,000 regular troops and 20,000
irregulars or guerrillas-and to be capable of training
1,500 men every three months. These figures repre-
sent a substantial increase since 1981, when the
insurgents claimed to have a total of 20,000 to 25,000
regulars and irregulars. Many of UNITA's irregulars
are unarmed and are used as bearers or auxiliaries
during operations.
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More South African Aid
We believe South African assistance to UNITA
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Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, founder, president, com-
mander in chief, and unchallenged leader of UNITA,
was born on 3 August 1934 of Ovimbundu parents in
Munhango, central Angola. His father was a station
master for the Benguela Railroad and also worked as
a Protestant missionary in the predominantly Catho-
lic colony. Savimbi studied medicine in Lisbon in
1959 and political science in Switzerland starting in
1960. His studies were interrupted by. periods of
political and insurgent activity in Africa, but he
eventually earned a degree in political and legal
science from the University of Lausanne in 1965.
Savimbi was a member cf Holden Roberto 's Front
for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from
1962 to 1964, when he broke away and tried unsuc-
cessfully to gain admission to the Marxist-oriented
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA). He founded UNITA in 1966. He accepted a
cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese in 1974,
formed a short-lived front with Roberto against the
MPLA in 1975, and has been waging war against the
Marxist MPLA regime for the past eight years.
Savimbi does not seem firmly wedded to any particu-
lar ideological orientation. In recent years he has
described himself as a moderate Socialist and has
espoused pro-Western, anti-Communist positions as
well as economic policies that combine socialism and
free enterprise. Savimbi has also propounded a phi-
losophy of black power or "Negritude, "probably in
part as a reaction to the role played. within the MPLA
regime by Marxist-oriented mulattos. He has insisted
that his approach is not "racist" and that he is simply
arguing for having blacks, who comprise the vast
majority of the Angolan population, hold the key
positions in any Angolan regime.
ISavimbi is said to
favor seeking a political settlement in which UNITA
would be given a major role in a coalition regime:
The differences within UNITA over goals appear to
break down along age lines, with older, more politi-
cally sensitive leaders favoring a political settlement
and younger, more militant troop commanders call-
ingfor total victory.
pendence.
UNITA seems to lack other figures with Savimbi's
personal appeal and exceptional leadership abilities,
and his removal would be a severe setback. We do not
believe UNITA would disappear, but it would be
considerably weakened, at least temporarily. Ulti-
mately, it could emerge as a more inflexible move-
ment seeking an all-out military victory rather than a
negotiated solution. UNITA might also become more
heavily influenced by South Africa without a leader
of Savimbi's stature to maintain a degree of inde-
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UNITA: History and Present Status
Jonas Savimbi founded UNITA on 23 March 1966
after breaking with Holden Roberto's Front for the
National Liberation of Angola (FNLA).a UNITA
initially operated from bases in Zambia and main-
tained a headquarters in Lusaka.
UNITA grew rapidly because of energetic organizing
among Savimbi's fellow Ovimbundu and some east-
ern Angolan tribes. It nonetheless remained smaller
and weaker than the Zairian- and Western-backed
FNLA and the Soviet-supported Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
Zambia expelled Savimbi and his followers in 1967
because of Portuguese pressure. In 1968 Savimbi
infiltrated into Angola and established a headquar-
ters in its sparsely populated southeast. UNITA's
main theater of operations, however, was the more
populous central highlands, where the Ovimbundu
tribe, comprising about 40 percent of Angola's popu-
lation of around 7 million, predominates
In February 1976, after UNITA had been militarily
defeated by the newly installed Soviet- and Cuban-
backed MPLA regime in Luanda, Savimbi led a
return to the bush to rebuild the movement. Some
1,500 ill-equipped guerrillas retreated to southeast-
ern Angola. In the ensuing years UNITA gradually
established its control over most of Cuando Cubango
Province in the southeast and carried on a guerrilla
war in central Angola
Savimbi has remained UNITA's unchallenged leader.
A 17-member Politburo is the top party organ. The
leading officials after Savimbi are Secretary General
Miguel Puna and the military Chief of Staff.
Demostenes Chilingutila. Puna is a Cabindan, and
the UNITA leadership includes a few other non-
Ovimbundus as well.
We estimate, on the basis of UNITA claims and other
evidence, that UNITA's army-the Armed Forces for
the Liberation of Angola (FALA)-includes some
15,000 regular troops and 20,000 guerrillas. Military
operations are directed by a Strategic Operations
Command led by Savimbi and senior commanders.
a The FNLA, which operated in northern Angola, has been
virtually moribund in recent years as a result of factional quarrels
Within the area of control, UNITA has set up a
functioning government with an array of rudimentary
but well-run health and educational services and
agricultural enterprises, according to Western jour-
nalists who have visited the region.
UNITA's area of expansion-the northern third of
the country-has no permanent insurgent presence.
We believe the insurgents may soon move to establish
a permanent guerrilla force in this region.
UNITA has chosen to equip its forces mainly with
rifles and other light infantry weapons. Artillery
support for the conventional battalions and brigades
is provided by light mortars and recoilless rifles.
UNITA also has captured some SA-7 missile launch-
ers and a few larger artillery pieces from the Angolan
Army.
In addition to seizures of arms and ammunition from
government forces, we believe the insurgents continue
to receive military supplies from South Africa, pur-
chase other weapons on the international arms mar-
ket, and still have sizable stocks of Western arms
supplied in the 1970s.
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I`~Nrl fr
et~3'avimbi has openly ac now a get
UNITA accepts aid from South Africa.
Pretoria, in our view, has seen the UNITA insurgency
as a way of keeping Angola's Marxist regime weak
and unstable. An apparent increase in Pretoria's
assistance to UNITA may also reflect a growing
belief among South African officials particularly in
the military-that UNITA can overthrow the regime
in Luanda. The South Africans, moreover, value
UNITA as an ally in combating the Angola-based
Namibian insurgents of the South-West Africa Peo-
pie's Organization (SWAPO)
South African assistance to UNITA has grown in-
creasingly important in recent years as aid from other
sources has fallen off:
? China provided training to UNITA leaders in the
1960s and furnished substantial quantities of small
arms and other supplies in the late 1970si
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Beijing has established diplo- 20A]
matic relations with the Angolans as part of its
recent efforts to improve its relations with pro-
Soviet regimes in the Third World, and we believe
it no longer assists UNITA.
? Black African nations, including Zaire and several
other Western-oriented countries, have evidently
this activity is unclear.
tries now have diplomatic relations with Luanda.
There is some evidence that Zaire still permits
UNITA to operate on its territory, but the extent of
Government's Weaknesses and Disadvantages
Manpower and Tactical Dciencies. In contrast to
UNITA, Angola's 25,000- to 35,000-man Army re-
mains plagued by poor leadership, inadequate train-
ing, lack of discipline, and low morale
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Angola's military efforts against the insurgents also
are hindered by poor tactics.
have not committed their larger units to battle.
Angolan forces continue to do most of the fighting,
but further UNITA advances could lead to heavier
Cuban involvement.'
substantial portion of the government's forces are tied
down in defense of fixed positions-bridges, roads,
and garrisons-threatened by the insurgents. More-
over, the government does not make effective use of
its airpower, and UNITA, according to Western
journalists, operates with little fear of air attack.
Problems Created by Rainy Season. UNITA's most
recent gains coincided with Angola's wettest rainy
season in several years. In general, while UNITA has
operated successfully during both wet and dry periods
in the past, rains work against the government's
forces. Rainfall makes the country's poor roads even
more difficult for Army truck convoys carrying troops
and supplies.
ne rains also spur vegetation , growth augmenting the
cover available to guerrilla forces and thus increasing
their ability to lay ambushes and avoid aerial detec-
tion.
Limited Cuban Military Effort. Cuba's military
forces have been criticized for years by some Angolan
officials for not doing more of the fighting
the Cubans have
become more active against UNITA since early 1982.
Economic and Political Difficulties. The Angolan
Government's broad economic and political shortcom-
ings also have continued to impede its efforts against
UNITA
Angola's economic performance-except for
estern-run oil production in the northern Cabinda
enclave-has steadily worsened in recent years, fur-
ther eroding the government's popular standing and
enhancing UNITA's opportunities. Living conditions
have fallen to new lows throughout the country over
the past year, The
insurgency has continued to disrupt agricultural, min-
ing, and industrial production, as well as transporta-
tion networks. The country still suffers, moreover,
from the departure in the mid-1970s of the Portu-
guese personnel who had run most of the economy.
Soviet and East European economic and technical aid
remains far short of the country's substantial needs.
Public support for the government has never been
very broad. It comes mainly from among the 1.7
million members of the Kimbundu tribe and some
smaller groups the Kimbundu dominate. Ideological
and ethnic factionalism within the regime has further
weakened its ability to combat the insurgents. F_
' We estimate that there are 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban military
personnel in Angola. This includes roughly 20,000 combat troops
and 5,000 to 10,000 advisory, support, and technical personnel. The
bulk of the Cuban forces are stationed in central and southern
Angola. In addition to their role against UNITA, the Cubans man
For the most part, however, the evidence suggests to
us that the Cubans still see their main role as one of
guarding rear areas and main garrisons.
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aid and to meet other war-related expenses such as
food imports necessitated by the decline in domestic
UNITA's gains since late last year have instilled a
sense of crisis throughout the ruling Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
UNITA, in fact, has achieved its gains in the face of
increased Cuban and Angolan Government military
efforts. Starting in late 1981, three additional Ango-
lan brigades and a Cuban brigade were moved to
positions facing UNITA's southeastern stronghold.
The government also launched several counterinsur-
gency offensives during 1982, took steps to improve
and secure its supply lines, and moved to deny
UNITA access to the population in several areas by
forcing civilians into fortified villages defended by
government troops. The failure of all these efforts to
prevent a widening of UNITA operations almost
certainly has contributed to the atmosphere of grow-
production as a result of the fighting.
down to defeat.
As Angola becomes less and less able to pay for
military aid, the Soviets will be faced with difficult
decisions as to the levels at which such assistance is to
be maintained. Although Angolan officials may fear
that the result could be a cutback in Soviet military
aid, we believe that Soviet and Cuban assistance is
likely to remain at existing levels or even increase,
given Moscow's unwillingness to see a client state go
We believe UNITA may be able to take some addi-
tional territory during the next several months. Its
next major gains could come in the northeast, where
the Angolans and Cubans do not have a strong
military presence
ing concern in Luanda.
Adding to the government's distress,
are the severe economic and social
disruptions resulting from the insurgency. In addition,
although the oil industry has not been directly affect-
ed by the fighting, Angolan officials are worried over
growing difficulties Luanda is having in paying for
Communist military aid. Revenues from oil' exports,
the country's primary source of hard currency, have
been falling due to the softness of the international oil
market. Although available statistics are scanty and
contradictory, we believe that Angola in recent years
has had to use most of its hard currency earnings to
pay for Soviet, East European, and Cuban military
The insurgents, in our judgment, will find it more
difficult to make major new gains in southeastern and
central Angola in the immediate future. The recent
gains in the southeast were made against relatively
undefended areas, and any large-scale UNITA ex-
pansion from the southeast to the west would bring
the insurgents up against major, well-defended
Angolan-Cuban garrisons.
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In central Angola, we expect guerrilla attacks to
continue at or near their current levels. Although
UNITA almost certainly will continue to make life
difficult for the Angolans and Cubans in this area, we
doubt that the guerrillas can decisively defeat the
major Angolan and Cuban forces in the central region
during the next few months
Reconciliation With the MPLA?
Savimbi has made clear, both publicly and privately,
that he wants at a minimum to force the Luanda
regime to negotiate some sort of power-sharing ar-
rangement in which UNITA would be brought into a
coalition government and the Cubans would be sent
home.
A Cuban Withdrawal?
In the absence of some sort of accommodation be-
tween UNITA and the MPLA regime, all. or most of
the leadership in Luanda-hardliners and moderates
alike-recognize how vulnerable they would be with-
Despite the extreme difficulty Luanda would have in
agreeing to a withdrawal of all or most of the Cuban
forces, we believe there remains some possibility of a
breakthrough on this issue, considering the acute
economic and military pressures on the dos Santos
government and what we know of attitudes within the
regime.'
' The Cubans, for their part, have reiterated publicly that they
would withdraw from Angola if asked to do so by Luanda.
A total Cuban military withdrawal, in our view,
probably would paralyze the Angolan Army and
enable UNITA to win the war outright unless accom-
panied by a UNITA-MPLA accommodation. The
Angolans depend not only on Cuban combat units
that participate in the fighting but also on Cuban
advisers and technicians who hold key support and
operational positions throughout the Angolan Army-
positions for which the Angolans lack trained person-
nel of their own
levels of support from the USSR.
If the Cubans withdrew most but not all of their
personnel-for example, if they removed the bulk of
their combat troops but kept most of their advisory
and support personnel in Angola-the effect would be
more difficult to predict. We believe, however,
that if such a withdrawal occurred and there
were no UNITA-MPLA accommodation, UNITA
would make significant new military gains. Exactly
how far the insurgents would advance in these cir-
cumstances would depend on just what roles the
remaining Cubans played-specifically, on whether
they assumed combat responsibilities or remained
only in advisory and technical capacities-and on the
We assume that, as part of an agreement providing
for a Namibian settlement and a Cuban withdrawal
from Angola, South Africa would be asked to curtail
its support for UNITA. Even so, we would expect
UNITA to remain fairly well armed and supplied and
to continue posing a military threat to the Luanda
regime if no accommodation were reached:
? We think the South Africans would find a way to
continue supplying arms and supplies to the insur-
gents clandestinely, although probably at a some-
what reduced level since Namibian territory would
no longer be available for this purpose. South
African supplies might be brought in by air or sea,
or via Zaire assuming President Mobutu could be
persuaded to acquiesce.
? Even if Pretoria were to stop providing aid following
a Namibian settlement, we believe it would furnish
UNITA with large quantities of arms and supplies
ahead of time, enabling the insurgents to build
sizable caches.
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Secret
? UNITA in any case would almost certainly continue
to capture munitions and other supplies from gov-
ernment forces.
Thus, we believe that a withdrawal of most Cuban
forces from Angola as a result of a Namibian settle-
ment or some other development-and without an
accompanying UNITA-MPLA accommodation-
would result in significant UNITA gains and perhaps
an outright UNITA military victory. Moreover, we
believe this would occur regardless of the level of
South Africa's support to the insurgents in the wake
of such a settlement.
As UNITA began making new military gains follow-
ing a Cuban withdrawal, the MPLA, in our view,
would probably become anxious for a negotiated
settlement. UNITA, however, might well lose interest
in negotiatior_s if it believed a complete military
victory was in sight
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Major Tribal Groups
Bakongo
Chokwe-Lunda
Gang uela
Haneca-Humbe
Herero
505921 6-83
Khoisan
Kimbundu
Ovambo
? Ovimbundu
^ Xindonga
Figures shown are
percentages of the
total population.
Population Distribution
S LUNUA
q CUANZA M, LANGE`' RT-\f
_ ~NOPTE"L ~ .~
Rdalatandd ~~ Saunmel
BENG O V
1 / r ` LUND,A
~'v I ~~? r SSdL 1
9
MOXICO
CUANDO
CUBAN GO
Population density
based on 1970 census
Persons per square kilometer
0 2 10 20 35
0 5 20 52 91
Persons per square mile
-?- Province boundary
UNITA'S Presence and Recent Actions in Angola
505920 (546940) 6-83
13
Boundary repreeemetbn is
not necessarily authoritative.
Secret
Nzeto
Luand
axito
South Ngunza
Atlantic
Ocean
Lob it
Benguela
Brazzaville
Ndatando
19
cola
Matal
Kinshasa
N'gage
ldcala
13
itial~"a
v.Anduld\
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