STRATEGY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 18, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 18, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, J
Subject: Strategy in Southern Africa
The situation in Southern Africa requires urgent.
action on two issues: 1) whether we should continue to
support the UN-sponsored negotiations for the indepen-
dence of Namibia; 2) how to curtail Soviet influence in
Angola, manifested by the Cuban troops there.
Our actions should be governed by our overall
strategic objectives: to resist and reduce Soviet,
Cuban and local Marxist influence; to strengthen our
relations with all states, ensuring our access to
critical minerals and markets; to pursue policies in
cooperation with our allies (the Contact Group) whose
African interests are more substantial than our own;
to avoid total identification with South African racial
policies and a political rupture with black Africa.
Frankly, the Namibia and Angola issues pose a
thorny problem for us. In an ideal world, it might be
preferable to stand aside and let the pot simmer. But
the long history of Western diplomatic involvement on
Namibia and the substantial concerns of our key allies
require that we adopt a damage limiting strategy. We
are in something of a box. Our approach needs to get
us out without a costly rupture in our allied and
African relations.
In pursuit of these objectives we should do the
following:
-- Support efforts of the UN, the Contact Group
and the so-called Frontline states to arrange
Namibian independence, but argue that internation-
ally supervised elections in Namibia should await
the creation of a constitution that specifies
minority rights, protection of private property
and neutrality (the latter with an international
guarantee).
State Dept. review completed
RDS-3 3/18/11
8 E.- C., fR [E T
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
-- Strengthen-Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA group
through public support
so that he can harass the Cubans in Angola, as
part of a broader strategy of pressing the MPLA
into dealing with Savimbi and getting rid of the
Cubans.
These tactics will enable us to address our deepest
concerns: the Soviet presence in Angola and the possi-
bility of a Soviet dominated Marxist state in Namibia.
This should enable us to restore South Africa's sense
of confidence in us and to persuade Pretoria to cooperate
with us in facilitating the emergence of an independent
Namibia not dominated by the Soviet Union. Simultane-
ously, we shall be able to argue to the black African
states that our influence with South Africa on the
Namibia issue will be more effective if they can persuade
the Angolan Government to phase out Cuban "assistance."
Harassed on the ground by Savimbi and under pressure
from other African states, the MPLA government in Angola
may reassess the costs and consequences of the Cuban
presence and Soviet patronage.
Among the virtues of the proposed approach is that
we may be able to avoid a major strain on our relations
with key European allies or friendly black African states
at a delicate moment for our overall diplomatic objectives.
Moreover, the entire process can be launched without much
fanfare and takes advantage of the inertia left over from
previous efforts. An immediate advantage will be to de-
lay a test of strength in the U.N. over sanctions, a battle
that would benefit only Moscow. The most important benefit,
however, is that these actions may enable us to improve our
relations with the black Africans and South Africans while
simultaneously hampering the Cubans and Soviets.
We are also on firm ground in our insistence that the
constitution-making exercises be a prelude to independence,
as it was in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The United States would
take a stand for Namibian independence but an independence
marked by democratic institutions, not simply a one-time
vote. The constitutional issues are fairly few in number,
so the exercise itself, while it means further delay, is
not an interminable process.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
? LL3\.it%L..a
Recommendation:
That you approve the strategy outlined above and'
sketched in more detail in the attachment to this
memorandum. Our approach is safeguarded, so that we
can, if necessary, reappraise the situation in which
case I will come back to you to consider our alternatives.
Approve Disapprove'
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1 -
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
Scenario of U.S.' Strategy in Angola/Namibia
1. Initial Moves
A. Indicate to allies in Contact Group US intention
to pursue Namibia negotiations and US desire that CG con-
tinue to work with us in exploring the "remaining issues"
(Time: Now). We are therefore sending a senior emissary
to the area.
-- In early April (to head off a UN test of strength)
send senior emissary to talk with South Africa, Frontline
states, and CG (in that order) to outline our key ideas in
Namibia:
inform South Africa that we intend to
address the issue of Cuban presence in
Angola and danger of a Marxist take over
in Namibia in expectation of their co-
operation in moving to settle Namibia
within 18-24 months.
retain existing elements of UN plan, but
demand insertion of a democratic consti-
tutional requirement prior to elections,
with equal opportunity for SWAPO and
internal Namibian parties to state their
views before a "neutral" constitutional-
commissioner acceptable to us. The
commissioner would write the constitution
according to key criteria acceptable to us
on: the rights of minorities, guarantees
on property rights, and an international
guaranty of Namibia's neutrality (e.g. no
foreign troops).
inform Frontline states that our influence
with South Africa depends in part on this
constitutional issue (minority protection
and guarantees) and can be improved if
there is movement toward Cuban withdrawal
from Angola.
issue high-level public declaration (in
launching our consultations prior to Savimbi
visit) of US serious commitment to inter-
nationall-recognized independence for
Namibia and-our intention to move the
stalled negotiations forward now.
I - ' Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
0 QL., ?%i- _..1 ?
B. Signal to Savimbi to come to Washington for
policy level discussions of his aims, plans and needs
(in early April). Determine nature and level of US
assistance.
-- Use press guidance at time of Savimbi visit
indicating that Savimbi is a bona fide nationalist seeking
genuine independence for his country, and making clear
that US relations with Angola are out of the question
while Cuban troops remain in Angola.
-- Signal the MPLA (before Savimbi visit) our
preconditions for a normal relationship with Angola,arid
invite them to send an emissary to US to present their
ideas. If they take us up, time after Savimbi visit.
C. Couple our existing invitation to South African
Foreign Minister with one to his Nigerian counterpart to
visit Washington for high-level consultations. This gesture
is essential to indicate. US commitment to deal in serious
and balanced way with regional problems.
Safeguards and Alternatives:
1) we will of course veto. sanctions against
South Africa in UN if Africans press the issue.
2) make clear to South Africa we are firm in
our desire for progress on Namibia; they should
not complicate our task by regional adventures
that help Moscow's position or "complicate" the
goal of Cuban withdrawal.
3) tell Africans they will not get an inde-
pendent Namibia without us. Unless they play
ball on pressing the MPLA and keep SWAPO in the
Namibia talks, we will have no leverage on the
South Africans.
4) we disengage diplomatically if there is no
prospect of movement, leaving the parties to
their military options or possible direct (SA-
Angola) talks. Continue to assure adequate
support to assure gradually heightened military
pressure on Cubans and MPLA.
L) d E i` ; ti...
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
-3-
II. Follow on Moves
A. If there is movement as pressure grows on
MPLA, add additional carrots to open rifts in leadership:
suggest US logistic/financial support of
an African force to replace Cubans in
MPLA-controlled territory.
promise to stop South African raids on
Angola if MPLA curtails SWAPO military
activity.
-- Use enhanced food aid and other carrots with
Angola and Zambia, the SWAPO hosts, in effort to scale
down level of Namibia fighting.
B. Begin Namibia constitutional exercise (and
seek incorporation of it in UN plan context as important
new element of a package settlement, internationally
guaranteed).
-- Develop strong public posture supporting Namibia
independence linked to concept of a genuinely democratic
constitution with safeguards for minorities, checks against
seizure of minority interests, and an international or 5- -
power guaranty of Namibia's status (e.g. no foreign troops).
Safeguards and Alternatives:
assuming Namibia talks can go forward (Africans
play ball), resist imposition of deadlines on
negotiating process, making clear privately to
Africans we are dead serious about the need for
Cuban withdrawals as an element of overall
regional settlement.
stand behind South African retention of Walvis
Bay unless and until the SAG itself decides to
divest itself of this position.
tell SAG we will not accept indefinite delaying
tactics on Namibia if there is movement in Angola,
and make clear there is a firm limit to our
willingness to support their foot-dragging on
procedural or technical issues.
L.; E ts --z L- i
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1
-4-
threaten all parties with US disengagement
from the issues.
Guarantees: the concept of external guarantees
behind the constitution will require careful
handling. A formal Western defense commitment
is not envisaged. But we (US plus allies)
would sign a constitutional document indicating
our endorsement of it. Standing behind the
document would be South African presence at
Walvis Bay as a deterrent to unacceptable
alternations of the accords, and the Namibian
government's extreme dependence on Western and
South African assistance, investment and trade.
Presumably the constitution would also receive
UN endorsement.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601520002-1