CABLE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2373 FROM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 8, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2
JUN 8Z 21 _ : 31z
Department of State TELEGRAM
State Dept. review completed
SECRET NO0$1$
PAGE II JERU$A G17$$ .2 no
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0. uue'Ot' JUN e2 ZFP.4
FM ANCONIUL JERUSALEM'
TO SEC3TATE WASMOC IMMEDIATE 2373
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
AMENBA33Y LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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...5 E C R E T SECTION 02. OF 0 M 1L17sIt'"`'""
NODZS
'WITH SYRIA. TIME WAS VERY PRECIOUS AND THEY ARGUED
THAT THE U.S. SHOULD THEREFORE"PLAY AN IMMEDIATE ROLE,
CERTAINLY THERE WOULD OE NO CEA3EFIRE UNTIL THOSE PLO
BUNS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN/3IL!NCED EITHER MILITARILY OR
POLITICALLY. .
To R"I" REMARKED TWAT AFTER THE TOP MILITARY OPERATION
ENDS-AN ADEQUATE POLITICAL SOLUTION NZSNT- TAKE FROM THREE
TO FIVE WEEKS AND WARNED US THAT THE IDF WOULD $IMPLY
NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT SUCH A SOLUTION. IN MIS VIEW THE
2SRAELI.'OPERATION MAD NOW GIVEN THE U.S, BETTER CARDS
FOR A LONG-TERM NEGOTIATION OF THE LEBANE4E1PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM, IN ANY EVENT, WE WOULD HAVE TO BRING THE SYRIANS
AROUND BEFORE THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW OR EVEN BEFORE A
CEASEFIRE WENT INTO EFFECT, IN THIS CONNECTION, ALL
THREE WERE CRITICAL OF Tiic FACT THAT THE U.S. By TTS
VOTING AND BY ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD JOINCO THE UN
CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL 13R.AEC'I-WITHDRAWAL, A DEMAND
WHICH THEY. FOUND UNACCEPTABLE.
?~ I THEN REVIEWED IN OUTLINE MAJOR CURRENT U.$,"?CONCERNS.'
ON THE QUESTION .OF THE USE OF U,S,?FURN;SHED EQUIP:NENT :.
SECRET
NOT TO Approved For Release 2008/08/13 CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2 : SECRETARY
 De
artment of State INCOMING
TECEAM
SECRET
PAGE. SZ JERUSA 817SR iZ OF SE. RE ot3lt
IN LISANON, AND I WARNED
THEM WAS. NOT MERELY A ' QUESTXON, ? AE THEY PUT IT, Of DEAL.
ING-MITH LEGALISMS, WHEN I TOUCHED ON A POSSISLE MOVE
TO APPLY SANCTIONS ASAINST ISRAEL.UNDER.A.SECURjTY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION INVOKING CHAPTER 7j THEY IMMEDIATELY
RESPONDED THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION MOULD DEPEND HEAVILY
ON THE U.S. STANCE. EBAN NOTED THAT GENERALLY THE FRENCH
STAND AGAINST CHAPTER'7 SANCTIONS AND PERU SAID TOW
NOTWITHSTANDING MIS ATTACHMENT TQ EBANOPC H IUR4 4
-WOULD IE PRAGMATIC. SAN Lff"Ibiw THAI.. ML MAO SEEN ---
ADVISED"THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT ISRAEL
*EXPECTED* A U.S, VETO OP SUCH A RESOLUTION AND COUN?
SELED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE MOST PELIOZTOUS PHRASE'TO.EMPLOY, -
p, PERKS THEN STATED THAT HAVING CAUCUSED LAST NIGHT,
THE ALIGNMENT WOULD STATE ITS POSITION IN TODAY18 KNE$SET
DEBATE AS.IOLLOWSI
??' THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE,
??. THERE SHOULD BE EXPRESSED THE "WISH" OR 'OESjRgo
THAT A PROMISITION OF TERROR ABROAD SE INCLUDED IN THE
DEFINITION OF THIS CEASEFIRE (THEY NIALIZI OP COURSE
NOW DIFFICULT TMIa WOULD 8E TO ACHIEVE).
?? SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD SE MADE 30 AS TO REPLACE.
THE' IOM THROUGHOUT THE NEW 40?K jLOMETER SUFFER ZONE.
WITH INTERNATIONALI0RCES. (HERE PZR93 CLARIFIED THAT
THEY WERE NOT THINKING or U,39 FORCES AND THEREFORE HAD
NOT USED THE EXPRESSION "MULTI?NATIONAL FORCE,')
we. ISRAELI POSITIONS ZN THE GALILEE SMOVLO 81 PURTM(R
FORTUFIE.D,
SECRET
NOT TO di Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2 eeis~T. s..
Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2
 _ Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 JERUSA @Ile3 02 OF e& $1Rt2iz
10. ASKIO.WHAT THEY THOUGHT THE PHALANGE WOULD DO, Pangs
AND RABIN REPLIED DISDAINFULLY THAT THE PHALANGE WANTS
ISRAEL TO 00 EVERYTHING, IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY VSN.
TUNED THE POSSIBILITY THAT If WE COULD NOT EMPLACE. AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO REPLACE IHE IDF, A'FALLBACK P03I?
TION MIGHT BE TO EXPAND MADOADIS FORCE $0 AS TO DO THE
JOS, I THREW COLD WATER ON HADDAD-TAKING DYER SOUTH
LEBANON, PERES REMARKED THAT THE COMBINATIONO ARE END?
LESS 1E,6. HADDAD PLUS THE PHALANGZSTS?. .IN THIS CON.
NECTION, THE QUESTION WAS ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE.
SHItA Of SOUTH LEBANON WOULD NOW D01 OUT THERE WERE_NO
1t. BEFORE WE WOUND UP, PERRI ET AL CAME SACK TO THE
VITAL N`CESSITY Of SOLVING THE PROBLEM ON THE EASTERN
FRONT WITH THE SYRIANS. PROO&D FOR SOLUTIONS, THEY
STAVED THEIR OBVIOUS PREPERENCEai
?*> SYRIAN FORCES TO WITHDRAW.
:?? THE PLO TO TAKE OUT ITS ARTILLERY, ROCKETS, AND
OTHER UNITS, WHILE THE SYRIAN FORCES WOULD REMAIN.
?w AS A MINIMUM FALLBACK ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE HIGHLY
DUBIOUS, THE SYRIANS, WHO ARE BELIEVED TO CONTROL AND
COORDINATE THE PLO, AT LEAST IN THAT AREA, MUST ENSURE
THAT THE PLO DO NOT FIRE? GROVE a
CONCLUSIVE ANSWERS,
SECRET
NOT TOO! Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490023-2