THE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS: OBSTACLES AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000100140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review
completed
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DIA review completed.
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Intelligence
Regional Implications
The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
STATE DEPT REVIEW COMPLETED
DIA review completed.
Secret
ALA 82-10120X
August 1982
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MASTr
ER ZME COPY
OT O1' E SOT
OR ARK OH
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications
This assessment was written by
and the appendix was prepared by -1
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division,
ALA
This assessment was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations.
Secret
ALA 82-10120X
August 1982
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The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications
Key Judgments The pace of the Namibian talks has quickened recently, largely as a result
of South Africa's initiative in presenting an accelerated timetable for a
settlement and its new flexibility on a number of Namibian issues. But
Pretoria's demand that a settlement be linked to withdrawal of Cubans
from Angola poses a formidable obstacle.
Although important details on the cease-fire and other aspects of the UN
plan still need to be worked out, we believe that the remaining differences
over strictly Namibian issues are not insurmountable. Any one of the
unresolved issues, however, provides ample opportunity for either side to
procrastinate or even to break off talks. Unexpected military developments
could also derail the settlement talks.
The prospects for agreement on the withdrawal of Cubans are far less
certain. The critical issue is whether the Angolan regime is willing or able
to send a sufficient number of Cubans home and in a manner that satisfies
Pretoria's demand that Cuban forces be withdrawn. South Africa appears
uncompromising in its current demand for the verified withdrawal of all
Cuban troops. It may eventually settle for less-although we believe it will
insist upon the departure of considerably more than half of the 20,000 to
25,000 Cuban troops that we estimate are in Angola.
Pretoria recognizes that the political strength of the South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) has not been diminished by South
Africa's military operations during the past year, and this, in our view,
underlies South Africa's linking of a Namibian settlement to withdrawal of
Cubans from Angola. The Botha government probably believes that it
needs the political ammunition of a Cuban withdrawal to defuse a domestic
rightwing reaction to a probable SWAPO electoral victory in Namibia.
Although the issue of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) has remained largely on the periphery
of the negotiations, calculations about UNITA's strength relative to that of
the Angolan regime heavily influence the thinking of the ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) about the Cuban issue.
Information available as of 17 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
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ALA 82-10120X
August 1982
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We believe that Luanda could not afford to lose more than 5,000 to 7,500
members of the total Cuban military force without suffering appreciable
territorial losses to UNITA.
Luanda probably has neither the desire nor the ability to reach a
reconciliation with Savimbi at this time. Moreover, the Frontline States for
the most part support Angola's view that Savimlii is a "traitor" and a
South African "puppet" and are unlikely to press reconciliation on
Luanda. South Africa, on the other hand, views UNITA as a valuable
source of leverage that costs very little. Consequently, we expect the
UNITA issue to remain in the background as negotiations continue on
Namibia and Cuban withdrawal.
The manner in which the Cubans would withdraw is also important to both
Luanda and Pretoria. Angola, with strong support from its African and
Communist backers, has repeatedly rejected any explicit linkage between a
Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal, insisting that the Cuban
issue is an internal Angolan matter and that the ,Cuban troops would leave
as a natural consequence of a settlement. In view of repeated South
African public statements, however, we expect the South Africans will
insist that they be allowed to state publicly that the Cubans will withdraw
before beginning implementation of a Namibian settlement.
A Namibian settlement that included the withdrawal of substantial
numbers of Cuban troops would be widely viewed as a major success for
US policy toward southern Africa. For such a settlement to occur,
however, we believe that the United States is likely to be pressed to make
several formal and informal commitments to thelvarious parties-promises
which could have long-term consequences for US interests. The Angolans
probably would demand assurances about Western economic assistance
and future South African behavior. The South Africans, in return for
concessions on the Cuban issue or on policies toward their neighbors, might
insist on improved relations with the United States. For example, in
addition to wanting greater US tolerance for the pace of racial reform in
South Africa, they have expressed interest in closer cooperation on nuclear
matters and a relaxation of US restraints on trade in items that could be
used for military purposes.
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If the Cuban issue proves intractable and the settlement talks collapse, we
believe the South Africans, disclaiming responsibility for the failure, will
proceed with an "internal" settlement-that is, holding elections next year
that exclude SWAPO and the UN-with the expectation of some degree of
support from the West. The South Africans might decide to conduct
military operations of unprecedented scale in southern Angola. Such
operations would be aimed at inflicting a humiliating defeat on SWAPO
and punishing its Angolan and Cuban backers. The South Africans may
also decide to increase their support to Savimbi's insurgency.
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The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications
Introduction
The situation in southern Africa has changed marked-
ly in recent months as diplomatic activity has acceler-
ated on Namibia and related issues. In early May,
South Africa told the United States that it was willing
to move rapidly to implement the UN plan for
Namibia and to drop some of its earlier demands
concerning the size and functions of the United
Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG)
and assurances of UN impartiality. South Africa has
also reversed its position on the mechanics of electing
a preindependence constitutional assembly, agreeing
to choose between single-member constituencies and
proportional representation-either of which the
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
has said it will accept. Meanwhile, the Frontline
States, particularly Tanzania and Zambia, now ap-
pear to be pressing SWAPO to be accommodating in
the negotiations.'
But Pretoria has coupled its newfound flexibility on
Namibian issues with its insistence that Cuban mili-
tary forces be withdrawn from Angola simultaneously
with the withdrawal of South African forces from
Namibia. While the pace of US-Angolan talks on the
Cuban issue has quickened, the prospects for agree-
ment are far from certain. The critical question is
whether Angola is willing or able to send a sufficient
number of Cubans home and in a manner that
satisfies Pretoria's demands.
The issue of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has re-
mained largely in the background, but calculations
about UNITA's strength relative to that of the Ango-
lan regime heavily influence negotiations on a Cuban
withdrawal. Savimbi's insurgency is feared by the
ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Ango-
la (MPLA) and highly valued by Pretoria as a source
'The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Nigeria has periodically participated
of leverage against Angola. An accommodation be-
tween the MPLA and UNITA probably would be
required to end Luanda's dependence on the massive
Cuban presence.
The Namibian Situation
Aggressive South African military operations into
southern Angola during the past year have put
SWAPO on the defensive militarily. South African
attacks have driven Angolan forces out of a portion of
south-central Angola, creating a de facto buffer zone
in southern Angola consisting of inhospitable territory
to the west, a South African-controlled area in the
center, and UNITA's stronghold in the east. SWAPO
has been largely unable to infiltrate into northern
Namibia and, despite a few well-publicized attacks
earlier this year, its military activity has remained25X1
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Pretoria's military success, in our view, has not eroded
SWAPO's political strength within Namibia. Mos25X1
observers believe-and we concur with this judg-
ment-that SWAPO would win an internationally25X1
supervised election. Pretoria probably shares this
We believe that Pretoria's recognition of SWAPO's
political strength underlies the linking of a Namibian
settlement to a withdrawal of Cubans from Angola.
The South Africans have argued publicly that if the
Cubans remain in Angola after the South African
troops are withdrawn, the Namibians will be intimi-
dated and thus vote in favor of SWAPO. We believe,
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however, that Pretoria's calculations are driven pri-
marily by its own political concerns, both domestic
and international:
? The Botha government knows, in our view, that its
rightwing critics would react harshly to a SWAPO
election victory, and Pretoria probably believes that
it needs the political ammunition of a Cuban with-
drawal to -offset the onus of "losing" Namibia to the
SWAPO "terrorists."
African Government to the UN Secretary General,
warning that Pretoria would retaliate if SWAPO
carried out alleged plans to increase military activity,
appears to have been a pretext for operations alread
? If negotiations founder on the Cuban issue-as
hardliners in Pretoria undoubtedly hope-the South
Africans could proceed with their often-stated in-
tention to hold elections next March or April,
without SWAPO participation and UN supervision.
Pretoria would hope that its flexibility on specific
aspects of the UN plan would enable it to avoid
blame for the failure of the negotiations.
Thus, we believe that the South Africans view a
Cuban withdrawal as a necessary domestic sweetener
to accompany the bitter pill of an international settle-
ment in Namibia. They also see the Cuban issue as a
means of deflecting Western reaction in the event that
negotiations collapse and South Africa pursues an
"internal" solution-a possible outcome that the
South Africans have raised frequently with US offi-
cials.
While numerous details on the cease-fire and other
aspects of the UN plan still need to be worked out,
our assessment is that the remaining differences over
these issues are not insurmountable, provided both
sides continue to negotiate in good faith. Any of the
unresolved issues relating to the UN plan, as well as
questions that appear to be settled or unrelated to the
negotiations, could provide ample opportunity for
either side to procrastinate or even to break off talks,
but we do not believe this will occur unless the Cuban
issue remains unresolved
Unexpected military developments could also derail
the settlement talks. Although there had been no
evidence of new Angolan or SWAPO moves south-
ward, the South Africans moved mechanized infantry
units into southern Angola in mid-July and followed
with air attacks. A letter on 20 July from the South
Angolan Issues
The Military Equation. The MPLA regime in Luan-
da depends on the 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military
personnel to buttress the Angolan Army of roughly
30,000 men.' In Luanda, the Cubans help protect
hardline Marxist ideologues who dominate the MPLA
government from coup attempts by a more moderate
black nationalist faction. In the Cabinda enclave,
Cuban troops guard Angola's vital oil production
facilities. In southern Angola, Cubans man ground
and air defenses along the Mocamedes rail line, which
serves as the main line of defense against deep South
African incursions. The Cubans also provide essential
support to the Angolan Army's operations against
UNITA.
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Although Luanda claims that the Cubans are present
solely to protect Angola from South Africa, we
believe that relatively few Cubans-perhaps 2,000 to
3,000 men-are dedicated to defense against South
African attacks. We believe Luanda's principal secu-
rity threat is UNITA, with a total force of roughly
20,000 men, of whom we estimate some 10,000 to
15,000 to be armed combatants and the rest "auxilia-
ries" in various stages of training.'F----] 25X1
air and ship activity between Cuba and Angola
' Reliable information on UNITA force levels is limited. In 1980
and again in 1981 Savimbi claimed he had some 25,000 men, of
whom he said around 10,000 were "regulars" and the rest "guerril-
indicate that some of the "guerrillas" are unarmed trainees or LJ/~ I
"auxiliaries." Newsmen who have been in contact with UNITA
have given totals somewhat lower than those provided by Savimbi.
Our rough estimate that UNITA has around 20,000 men thus is
based on the assumption that Savimbi was overstating his strength
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Cuban casualties mounted as a result of UNITA's
practice of targeting Cuban personnel-Cuban troops
are essential to maintaining the current standoff
because they provide logistics support to the Angolan
Army and serve as a deterrent to more conventional
UNITA forces continue to operate relatively freely in
southeastern Angola, where they dominate rural areas
and hold several towns. The insurgents also operate in
the more heavily populated central part of the coun-
try-up to and including the Benguela railroad, which
they sabotage routinely-but they do not control
urban areas in the central region. While UNITA has
had some success in expanding its area of activity in
recent years, it has not made major gains. Although
little direct fighting between Cuban and UNITA
forces has occurred since 1978-a year in which
UNITA operations
If all of the Cuban military personnel in Angola were
withdrawn, it is our judgment that UNITA probably
would be able to gain control over virtually all, the
territory south of the Benguela railroad probably
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within six months to a year of a Cuban withdrawal. In
addition, it is not certain that a new military equilibri-
um would be established even at this point, given the
likely impact these UNITA gains would have on the
Angolan military's morale and on the political situa-
tion in Luanda. A Cuban withdrawal and major
UNITA military gains would, in our judgment, great-
ly weaken the hardline Marxist faction that currently
dominates the Angolan Government and armed forces
and could lead members of the nationalist faction to
seek an accommodation with UNITA
We believe that no more than 5,000 to 7,500 Cuban
personnel could be withdrawn without appreciably
changing the current military situation. If more than
that number were withdrawn, UNITA would be likely
to make significant gains, even if its South African
support were withdrawn as part of a Namibian settle-
ment. We base our judgment on cumulative reporting
on the activities of the various military forces active in
Angola in recent years and on the pattern of the
fighting. Engagements between UNITA and govern-
ment forces have steadily increased over the period,
and despite substantial Cuban assistance to the Ango-
lans, the size and capabilities of UNITA have grown.
UNITA has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to
take individual towns when they are not protected by
significant garrisons, although it has not been able to
hold them in the face of a large, Cuban-Angolan
counterattack
A Political Complication. The manner in which the
Cubans are withdrawn is also an important issue.
Angola has rejected, publicly and repeatedly, any
explicit linkage between a Namibian settlement and
Cuban withdrawal, adamantly insisting that the Cu-
ban issue is an internal Angolan matter and that the
Cuban troops would leave as a natural consequence of
a Namibian settlement.
We believe that Luanda is at least partially bound by
its own rhetoric and probably would require some way
around an explicit coupling of the Cuban and Namib-
ian issues, even if it agreed to a Cuban withdrawal.
The Frontline States, as well as the Soviets and
Cubans, have strongly supported Angola's rejection of
explicit linkage, although some Frontline leaders ad-
mit privately to US officials that the Cuban issue
must be addressed now.
South African leaders, on the other hand, have insist-
ed publicly on an overt and formal linkage between a
Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal; Prime
Minister Botha stated in mid-June that the "mass of
Cubans must go" and that "their departure must be
seen to be happening." On the basis of this and
similar public and private statements by South Afri-
can leaders, we believe that Botha and his like-minded
colleagues view a publicized Cuban withdrawal as
critical to countering a rightwing backlash to a 25X1
Key Players and Their Interests
The prospects for the Western-sponsored endeavor to
induce South Africa to cede control over Namibia and
for US efforts to persuade Angola to reduce or end its
reliance on Cuban troops depend ultimately on how
the various parties view their concerns in the region.
An assessment-necessarily somewhat speculative-
of what we believe are the key players' essential 25X1
interests follows.
South Africa. Pretoria claims that its new sense of
urgency on settling the Namibia problem "one way or
the other" stems from growing domestic political and
economic pressure. South African officials have told
Contact Group members that the longer the Namibia
issue remains unsolved the greater the risk that the
new South African Conservative Party, which split off
from the ruling National Party in March 1982, will be
able to exploit the issue to undermine National Party
solidarity.' The South Africans have also said that the
financial burden of maintaining control in Namibia,
which costs about $600 million per year for economic
assistance and another $400 million for military
operations, is becoming intolerable for their slumping
economy. 25X1
Although these factors have probably influenced Pre-
toria's thinking, we believe that South Africa's shift
stems primarily from a belief that the time is now ripe
either to obtain an acceptable resolution of the Na-
mibia question or at least to gain stronger Western
support for its position if negotiations fail. If an 25X1
The Western Contact Group includes Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany-the sponsors of
the Namibian settlement plan contained in UN Resolution 435.F-
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international settlement is achieved, Botha would be
able to justify to his public any security risks entailed
in SWAPO's accession to power by pointing to Cuban
withdrawal from Angola. If, however, a settlement is
not achieved, Botha would be able to claim that South
Africa is not to blame for the failure of its "sincere"
effort to negotiate. Pretoria could then proceed with
an "internal" settlement, hoping that the West will
look more sympathetically on such a settlement,
despite repeated statements to the contrary by mem-
bers of the Contact Group.
Pretoria, in our view, is likely to remain firm on the
Cuban issue. South Africa has appeared uncompro-
mising in its current demand for the verified with-
drawal of all Cuban troops. On the basis of past tough
South African bargaining tactics, however, and be-
cause Pretoria's domestic political requirements could
be met by less than a total Cuban withdrawal, we
believe it may eventually settle for less. We believe,
nevertheless, that it will insist on the departure of
considerably more than half of the 20,000 to 25,000
Cuban troops we believe are actually in Angola.
Moreover, we also expect South African leaders, with
an eye to their domestic critics, to insist that they be
allowed to state publicly, and before beginning imple-
mentation of a Namibian settlement, that agreement
has been reached on a Cuban withdrawal.
South Africa has stated publicly that it would not be a
party to any settlement that "betrays" Savimbi by
abandoning UNITA to Cuban forces in Angola. For
Pretoria, UNITA is not simply a bargaining chip vis-
a-vis SWAPO, but a critical means of pursuing
broader regional goals. UNITA serves South African
purposes by destabilizing a hostile regime in Angola
and providing a useful counter to Luanda's support
for the African National Congress (ANC), the princi-
pal South African insurgent group. Angola serves as
the ANC's principal training area; ANC guerrillas
receive military and terrorist training from Cuban
and Soviet instructors, and probably from East Ger-
man personnel as well. Consequently, UNITA will
remain a valuable source of leverage for the South
Africans even if there is a Namibian settlement.C
Angola. Most Angolans almost certainly would like to
see a Namibian settlement to end South African
attacks on Angola and rid themselves of the burden of
supporting SWAPO.
currency payments for Communist support.
ence in the long run, if only to end Luanda's hard
improve relations with the West, particularly the
United States, in the hope of gaining assistance for
their devastated economy. Many Angolan leaders
probably would like to reduce the Soviet-Cuban pres-
The factionalized MPLA leadership appears unable,
however, to address decisively the related issues of a
Cuban withdrawal and 'reconciliation with UNITA.
the dominant,
mulatto-led group tends to be dogmatically Marxist
and pro-Soviet and has rejected the notion of a
negotiated compromise with UNITA. Moreover, we
believe the massive Soviet-Cuban presence ensures
the hardliners' dominant position in the regime and
serves as a hedge against black nationalists in the
party or the armed forces. Cuban troops intervened to
keep former Prime Minister Neto in power when a
black nationalist leader, Nito Alves, attempted a coup
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Deteriorating Economic
and Social Conditions in Angola
Luanda has been unable to reverse the steady eco-
nomic decline that started when Portugal granted the
country independence in 1975. Shortages of food and
other necessities are frequent, and rationing is com-
mon. Near-famine conditions may exist in some parts
of the country.
The growing problems of the Angolan economy are
reflected most acutely in the agricultural sector. Once
the world's fourth-largest coffee exporter, Angola
now produces about one-tenth of the coffee it did in
the early 1970s. Despite its suitability for a wide
range of crops, only 2 percent of the arable land is
cultivated. Managers and skilled workers are scarce,
and corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies are
pervasive. Angola now imports 90 percent of its food.
Only oil production-the government's principal for-
eign exchange earner-has been maintained at prein-
dependence levels. But the recently falling interna-
tional prices and demand for oil have reduced
government revenues below the level required to pay
for Soviet and Cuban military advisers and equip-
ment, leaving no funds available for reconstructing
the collapsing economy.
The Angolans have been unable to get the type of
assistance from their Communist backers that they
need to arrest their economic slide. The USSR has
extended only miniscule amounts of aid for fisheries
and agriculture, and $100 million in East European
aid for agricultural and marine development has
hardly been tapped. Nor have the roughly 10,000
Communist economic technicians, mostly Cubans,
now in Angola been able to fill the gap left by the
350,000 Portuguese workers who departed at inde-
pendence. The need for development assistance and
expertise has been a major factor in Angola's interest
in improving relations with the West, particularly the
United States.
Although dos Santos is now willing to discuss the
Cuban issue with US officials, the question of
UNITA remains largely unaddressed. In view of the
MPLA's internal divisions, we believe that Luanda
has ruled out any negotiations with UNITA's leader-
ship at least until the adroit and charismatic Savimbi
is removed from the scene. The Angolans might 25X1
demand, however, that the West and South Africa
abandon Savimbi as the price for Cuban withdrawal.
Frontline States. Reporting from US Embassies in
southern Africa indicates that the Frontline States,
particularly Tanzania and Zambia, appreciate the
opportunity to achieve a Namibian settlement that is
now before them and want to persuade SWAPO to
overcome its suspicions. Although each of the Front-
line States has sought aid from Communist states, we
believe the black leaders want to avoid an increase in
the Soviet and Cuban presence that would accompany
a major expansion of the SWAPO insurgency. We are
uncertain, however, about the Frontline's determina-
tion or ability to put real pressure on SWAPO as the
need arises. Frontline States were unwilling or unable
to budge SWAPO earlier this year in its rejection of
the Contact Group's electoral proposals. Moreover, if
an obstinate SWAPO is strongly supported by the
Soviets, there is little the Frontline can do, since pro-
Soviet hardliners in Luanda probably could prevent
MPLA moderates from applying pressure on
SWAPO. 25X1
While the Frontline leaders have stoutly supported
Angola's rejection of any linkage between Namibia
and Cuban withdrawal, we believe most would go
along with a simultaneous withdrawal of the bulk of
the Cuban troops from Angola and the withdrawal of
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South African troops from Namibia during the settle-
ment's implementation. But the Frontline leaders are
unlikely to press this position on either Luanda or the
Soviets, since they contend that the Cuban issue is an
internal Angolan matter. The Frontline is even more
reluctant to raise the UNITA question with Luanda,
also viewing it as an internal Angolan matter and
perhaps seeing the potential for setting an undesirable
precedent for such members as Mozambique and
Zimbabwe, which face troublesome armed opposition
groups of their own
SWAPO. Although SWAPO probably recognizes that
it can ultimately take power in Namibia only through
a negotiated settlement, SWAPO officials frequently
express their deep suspicions of the South Africans
and of recent Western efforts to promote a settlement.
SWAPO undoubtedly suspects that Pretoria's sudden
flexibility on Namibian issues conceals a South Afri-
can plan somehow to manipulate the transition to
independence and deny SWAPO a political victory.
less, if arrangements are agreed on that are strongly
supported by the Frontline States-and not opposed
by the Soviet Union-SWAPO probably would go
along despite its misgivings
Cuba. The Cuban troop presence in Angola, soon to
enter its eighth year, enables Havana to gain hard
currency, employ surplus labor, and highlight Cuba's
commitment to the "liberation struggle" against
South Africa. Nonetheless, military service in Ango-
la-performed largely by mobilized reservist
1 out as art of a Western uaranteed
reluctant to pu p g
package, Cuba might be willing to withdraw its forces
as part of a larger arrangement, perhaps including
some bilateral accommodation with the United
Although we believe Havana wou e
implementation of an "internal" solutio
Soviet Union. The Soviets, in our view, see important
geopolitical benefits in their continued involvement in
Angola. Angola is the only point on the West African
coast where the USSR enjoys guaranteed air and
ola also remains a useful symbol of 25X1
l access
An
.
g
nava
Moscow's superpower status and of its willingness and
capability to project power to distant shores in support
of its friends.
A number of diplomatic and other sources have
reported repeated Soviet efforts to obstruct a
Western-brokered Namibian settlement-especially
one that is coupled with a Cuban withdrawal from
Angola. We do not believe the Soviets would try
openly to block a Namibian settlement endorsed by
the black African states, but they could use their
substantial influence within the Angolan Government
to prevent Luanda from asking for a Cuban troop
withdrawal. The Soviets may also be apprehensive
about what might happen if negotiations fail, in view
of the possibility of having to bail out a weak client
state under even greater military pressure from the
South Africans. On balance, we believe the Soviets
probably will encourage SWAPO and Angolan hard-
liners and others who are distrustful of the Western-
led effort, but will not openly attempt to sabotage the
negotiations
Implications for the United States
The effect of the settlement process on US interests
would depend on whether the current negotiations
lead to a successful settlement, an indeterminate
outcome with negotiations continuing in some form,
or a collapse of talks followed by South Africa's
If a Settlement Is Achieved. A Namibian settlement
that included the withdrawal of Cuban troops would
d as a major success for US policy 25X1
i
id
l
b
y v
ewe
e w
e
toward southern Africa. A conclusion to the seeming
ly endless negotiations over Namibia would be greatly
welcomed by the blackjAfrican states, despite any
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discomfort they might feel over the coupling of a
Namibian settlement with a Cuban withdrawal.
While it would undoubtedly be apprehensive over the
prospect of black rule in Namibia, Pretoria would
derive significant political benefits from forcing the
withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and removing a
major obstacle to a South African rapprochement
with the West.
The only clear losers would be the Soviets and the
Cubans. A negotiated Namibian settlement, especial-
ly one coupled with a Cuban withdrawal, would be a
particularly sharp rebuff to Soviet policy and would
undermine Soviet interests in the region.
For such a settlement to occur, with its undeniable
returns to the United States, we believe the United
States is likely to be pressed to make a number of
formal and informal commitments to the various
parties, promises which could have long-term conse-
quences for United States interests:
? Angolan acquiescence in the departure of enough
Cubans to satisfy the South Africans probably
would require firm assurances about Western eco-
nomic assistance and future South African behav-
ior, particularly with respect to UNITA.
? Pretoria most likely would tie any concessions it
made on the size of Cuban withdrawal and South
Africa's policies toward its neighbors to US flexibil-
ity on major bilateral issues. In addition to wanting
greater US tolerance for the pace of racial reform in
South Africa, Pretoria has expressed interest in
closer cooperation on nuclear matters and a relax-
ation of US restraints on trade on "gray area" items
that could be used for military purposes.
? South Africa also has raised the question of a
development fund for an independent Namibia to
replace Pretoria's annual economic subsidy of about
$600 million. In addition, Pretoria probably would
ask for US intelligence assistance in verifying a
Cuban withdrawal
Thus, the successful conclusion of US efforts to
promote a negotiated settlement could also result in a
closer identification of the United States with South
Africa, possibly coupled with an informal commit-
ment to the black African states to restrain Pretoria
in its policies toward its neighbors. If South Africa did
not moderate its regional policies-a strong possibili-
ty, particularly in view of its substantial and continu-
ing support for the antigovernment insurgency that
threatens President Machel in Mozambique-the im-
provement of US relations with black Africa and the
reduced Soviet role in the region that stemmed from a
Namibian settlement could be early casualties of
heightened conflict elsewhere. 25X1
If an Indeterminate Outcome Occurs. Namibia settle-
ment efforts would not automatically collapse if,
despite agreement on all aspects of the UN plan, a
mutually acceptable formula for a Cuban withdrawal
continued to elude the negotiators. South Africa
would not agree easily, however, to ignore its self-
imposed deadline for a settlement in order to give the
Contact Group extra time to find ways around the
impasse on the Cuban issue. South African officials
have stated publicly that the Namibian issue must be
settled now, since the burden of supporting Namibia
has become intolerable, and that elections will be held
next March or April regardless of whether SWAPO
or the UN participates. The Botha government has in
effect promised its public a resolution of the Namibia
problem "one way or the other" within the next year.
To renege on this commitment, Pretoria might de-
mand some gestures of good will from the United
States, moves which could strengthen African percep-
tions of deepening US involvement with Pretoria.
25X1
Moreover, if Pretoria was unable to get its way on the
Cuban issue, it might back away from its concessions
on the UN plan; the South Africans stated in May, in
fact, that their acceptance of key points of the UN
plan was contingent upon the withdrawal of Cubans
from Angola. Pretoria's disavowal of previous conces-
sions-or stubbornness on any minor outstanding
issue-would leave the South Africans vulnerable to
charges of bad faith from the black African states,
which have never accepted linkage in the first place.
Some Contact Group members that have only reluc-
tantly supported linkage-France, Canada, and per-
haps West Germany-might join those accusing
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South Africa of sabotaging the negotiations.
Consequently, we believe that an indeterminate out-
come to the current round of talks-essentially an
agreement by all parties to put the UN plan on ice
pending a breaking of the impasse on the Cuban
issue-would be a difficult enterprise. The war would
continue, of course, and any new escalation could
substantially complicate Contact Group efforts to
resolve the Cuban issue
If Negotiations Fail. If US-Angolan talks on the
withdrawal of Cubans appear fruitless after a few
more months, we believe the South Africans will
begin implementing an "internal" settlement. Al-
though the Contact Group has stated repeatedly that
the West will not recognize elections that exclude
SWAPO or the UN, Pretoria probably would expect
some degree of support from the West, claiming that
South Africa should not be held responsible for the
"recalcitrance" of the black Africans
Collapse of the negotiations probably would lead
Pretoria to conduct military operations of unprece-
dented scope in southern Angola. Foreign Minister
Botha recently warned that the South African Gov-
ernment "could see itself required" to launch such
attacks if its 15 August deadline is not met. One
diplomatic report, however, indicates that the South
Africans recently extended their self-imposed dead-
line by another month into September
As ardent admirers of Israeli strategic tactics-For-
eign Minister Pik Botha recently drew parallels be-
tween Israel in Lebanon and South Africa in
Angola-the South Africans, in our view, would
intend to inflict a humiliating defeat on SWAPO and
punish its Angolan and Cuban backers as a first step
toward proceeding with an "internal" settlement.
A more remote, but still plausible, possibility is that
Pretoria might seek militarily to create a de facto
partition of Angola through increased support to
Savimbi's insurgency a new "reality" it would hope
to convince the West to ratify. Pretoria may see
benefit in strengthened', UNITA control over a larger
part of Angola, which would serve as a buffer for a
Namibia that became independent under strictly
s
,
South African auspice
The area Savimbi currently controls in southeastern
Angola is for the most part sparsely populated "bush"
country. UNITA uses it as a rear base for its main
theater of operation in central Angola-the country's
agricultural and population heartland that is Savim-
bi's Ovimbundu tribal home. South Africa could help
him expand his base by turning over to UNITA much
of the territory it currently controls north of the
Namibian border, but this probably would not create
a viable "state" for Savimbi because it would leave
Angolan-Cuban defenses intact along the Mocamedes
While the South Africans probably could attack
successfully at several points along the Mocamedes
line, we believe that it would be extremely difficult
even for a combined UNITA and South African force
to dislodge the Cubans and Angolans from the Moca-
medes-to-Menongue line and hold these gains against
likely counterattacks. The South Africans, however,
may have exaggerated estimates of UNITA's
strength-Foreign Minister Botha claimed recently
that Savimbi had 22,000 trained troops with 3,000
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more expected by the end of the year-and may
believe that such an ambitious undertaking is within
UNITA capabilities.
In any case, Prime Minister Botha has said repeatedly
that he will proceed with elections, with or without an
international settlement; fear of adverse domestic
political reactions may make him keep his promise.
South African imposition of an "internal" settlement,
unadorned by even desultory negotiations and coupled
with increased support for Savimbi, undoubtedly
would provoke stronger anti-Western sentiment in the
black African states, including more uncooperative
behavior in international bodies, calls for mandatory
sanctions against South Africa, and possibly anti-US
demonstrations. Pretoria's neighbors probably would
become more receptive to Soviet blandishments in
anticipation of more aggressive South African mili-
tary and covert actions. In the increased regional
instability that we believe would ensue from a South
African move toward a unilateral solution to the
Namibian problem, the United States probably would
be widely viewed as South Africa's "silent partner."
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Appendix
25X1
Recent Military
Developments
25X1
Since mid-July, South Africa has conducted air and
ground attacks at probable SWAPO/Angola targets
deep in southern Angola. It has also augmented its
equipment, supplies, and troops in northern Namibia
to a level that will allow it to conduct larger opera-
tions in Angola with little warning.
Air Buildup
and Strikes in Angola
base. The South Africans encountered heavy antiair-
craft fire and one Puma was shot down, killing 15
men. On the following day it discove --d and destroyed
another SWAPO base near Cuvelai.
Pretoria has publicly admitted the loss of its helicop-
ter and 14 additional personnel during the current
operation, which it claimed began in June. It also
claims to have killed 418 guerrillas and captured a
large cache of Soviet-made arms in operations rang-
ing as far north as Techumatete. As of 12 August,
South Africa said that the operation was still under
way. 25X1
In late July, Angola publicly charged that South
African Mirage jets attacked its facilities at Cahama
on 21 July, and Cahama, Jamba, and Mulondo on 26
Increased Ground Operations
According to the US
defense attache in retoria, out i yr~ric:'] attacked a
SWAPO base at Mupa on 22 July. The source claims
that the operation continued as South African units
tracked the retreating guerrillas to bases north of
Cuvelai. This led to a significant battle on 9 August in
which South Africa, using heavy Mirage F-1 air
support and troops inserted by Puma helicopters,
attacked a more-than-300-man SWAPO guerrilla
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Operation Protea in August-September 1981, South
Africa established small bases at Xangango and 25X1
Ngiva to support aggressive patrolling-in-force
throughout the area
We believe that these patrols have operated across the
Cunene River as far north as Cahama, but their
activities have been limited by South Africa's destruc-
tion of the bridge crossing the river at Xangango and
by the limited size of the South African force. We
also believe that small units have routinely ranged
beyond Evale in the north and beyond Anhanca in the
east. Before July, South Africa maintained approxi-
mately a 500-man presence in this zone and supported 25X1
it with light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters as well
as with ground convoys, from Namibia.
Angolan Defenses
Luanda's key defenses against South African attacks
in southern Angola consist of a string of major
garrisons along the Moeamedes-to-Menongue railway
and a loose network of smaller garrisons to the south 25X1
but above the area South Africa has dominated in
southern Angola since August 1981. 25X1
Zone of Control
Before its most recent operations, South Africa had
dominated an arc-shaped area about 100 km deep in
southern Angola. After securing this area during
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