NAMIBIA: A HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000100120005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
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Namibia: A Handbook
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
ALA 82-10116
September 1982
334
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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Namibia: A Handbook
Intelligence Council.
Secret
ALA 82-10116
September 1982
Africa Division, ALA,
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and with the National
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Namibia: A Handbook
Introduction Namibia is a country that has been long in the making. The only African
Information available territory yet to gain independence, Namibia, also known as South-West
as of 30 June 1982 Africa, was turned over to South African control-but not ownership-
was used in this report.
through a League of Nations mandate in 1920, after more than a quarter
century of German rule. Pretoria ruled the territory without criticism until
the establishment of the United Nations after World War II. Since then
South Africa has faced increasing opposition to its rule from within
Namibia, the Third World, the Soviet Bloc, and the West. These
developments have led to the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) undertaking a Soviet-backed insurgency that has disrupted
northern Namibia, drawn South Africa into a military conflict, and
contributed to Pretoria's increasing international isolation.
After resisting the mounting pressure in a variety of ways, Pretoria began
in the late 1970s to cooperate-albeit hesitantly-with the UN-backed
effort of the Western Contact Group to negotiate internationally accept-
able terms for Namibian independence. The prospect now looms that some
time in 1983 South Africa will divest itself of legal responsibility for
Namibia, either through an internationally accepted formula or through an
"internal settlement" that would almost certainly lack foreign recognition.
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An independent Namibia, no matter who comes to power in Windhoek or
how, will be shaped in large measure by the nature of its economy and po-
litical life. Control over Namibian investment, foreign trade, transporta-
tion, and skilled manpower gives South Africa a virtual stranglehold on the
narrowly based modern sectors of the Namibian economy. These sectors-
mining, fishing, and agriculture-are vulnerable to events beyond Nami-
bia's control because of their heavy export orientation. There has been no
economic growth for three years; the key sectors have declined sharply and
output remains depressed as a result of political uncertainty, weak world
markets, and drought. Public and private investment have all but ceased,
and most foreign enterprises are loathe to increase their stake pending the
outcome of the protracted international deliberations on independence.
Namibia's internal politics are not in bloom either. The territory at present
has about 45 political parties, some of which are joined in loose, shifting co-
alitions. Some parties participate in the South African-sponsored "inter-
im" government. Most parties have a base only in one or another of
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ALA 82-10116
September 1982
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Namibia's 11 officially designated ethnic groups, and none can claim the
loyalty of more than a fraction of the territory's more than 1 million
inhabitants. Most parties spend their time jockeying against each other,
sharing the few political responsibilities Pretoria grants the territory, and
posturing against SWAPO in preparation for an eventual UN-sponsored
election.
While the economy falters and the politicians scramble, the insurgency
waxes and wanes. To defend the territory, South Africa has mounted an
aggressive defense that carries the war into SWAPO's Angolan sanctuary
but has failed to prevent the insurgents from making northern Namibia a
theater of terrorist activity or from blocking occasional forays farther
south.
SWAPO, meanwhile, anxiously waits in the wings-in camps in Angola
and Zambia, in small terrorist groups operating inside Namibia, and as a
legal but suppressed political force within the territory. Its exiled leaders
have become more radical in recent years, more indebted to the Soviets,
and more out of touch with their constituency in Namibia. At the same
time they remain, above all, opportunists, who say they want to follow a
nonaligned course when they come to power.
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Figure 1
Libya
Algeria Niger
Chad
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poor
Volta e,ma Nigeria
- 17 C.A.R.
Ivory
Coast
Cameron
Zaire Rw.
eprpP~
South Africa,
(Walvis Bay)I~
LesO,J )
\V /
Mozatnbique
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Indian
Ocean
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Secret
Politics (SWAPO) 23
Politics (Internal) 31
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2. Windhoek, capital of Namibia (photograph)
4. Diamond mine on the southern coast (photograph)
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6. Population and Ethnic Composition (map)
11. Rehoboth, Basterland (photograph)
7. Ovamboland: huts and fields (photograph)
12. Namibia: Economic Comparisons (graphic)
14. Namibia: Economic Indicators (graphic)
15.
16.
Police break up SWAPO demonstration against 1978 elections
(photograph)
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Structure of Namibia's Interim Government (graphic)
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SWAPO guerrillas doing weapons maintenance (photograph)
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White farmers patrol against SWAPO insurgents (photograph)
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1. Namibia's Population: Ethnic Composition
2. Namibia: Leading Mineral Investors
3. Namibia: Annual Mineral Production
4. Namibia: Fish Catch
5. SWAPO Central Committee
6. Internal Namibian Political Groups
7. Deaths Resulting From the SWAPO Insurgency
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Geography
Natural Geography
Area, Location, and Boundaries. Namibia's vast, thin-
ly populated, and largely and territory covers an area
of about 824,000 square kilometers (including Walvis
Bay) extending along southern Africa's Atlantic sea-
board for about 1,500 kilometers and straddling the
tropic of Capricorn. About four times the size of the
United Kingdom, Namibia is bordered by South
Africa on the south and southeast, by Botswana on
the east, and Angola on the north. In addition, the
narrow Caprivi Strip in the northeast extends between
Botswana and Angola, providing Namibia with access
to the Zambezi River and a common border with
Zambia.
The port of Walvis Bay-a natural, oval-shaped
harbor-and a surrounding zone totaling 1,124
square kilometers are claimed by South Africa and
administered as part of Cape Province. Without the
use of Walvis Bay, Namibia is for all practical
purposes landlocked. Walvis Bay is the only deep-
water port between Lobito in Angola and Saldanha
Bay to the south.
A dozen small, South African-claimed islands are
scattered for more than 180 nautical miles (nm) along
the southern portion of the Namibian coast, north and
south of Luderitz. The most northerly of these lies
about 6 nm off the coast, but most of the others are
less than one-half nm offshore. All are uninhabited,
but South Africa has claimed 12 nm extending sea-
ward from these islands as territorial waters and 200
nm as fishing zones.
Topography. Namibia was once described as a dry
place between two deserts. While not entirely accu-
rate, the statement is a fair generalization. About one-
fifth of the total area is covered by the barren and
inhospitable Namib Desert. Varying between 80 km
and 120 km in width and stretching along the entire
coastline, the Namib is an area of coarse, shifting
sands, weathered rock, and salt pans. The sandy
portion is highlighted by long lines of towering dunes
that can reach over 300 meters (about 1,000 feet) in
height-the highest in the world. Except for isolated
populations at the diamond mining sites in the south,
the ports of Walvis Bay and Luderitz, and the town of
Swakopmund, the coast is uninhabitable.
Another desert, the Kalahari, covers a large part of
the eastern areas. Here the chief characteristics are
thick layers of sand and limestone and an absence of
surface water. The landscape is less stark but much
more monotonous than the Namib, broken only by
100-meter-high sand ridges. The area is inhabited
primarily by Bushmen who are hunters and gatherers.
Sandwiched between the two deserts and stretching
from the South African border in the south to the
Etosha Pan region in the north is the better watered
Central Plateau. It is here that most of the whites
have settled. The plateau varies between 1,000 and
2,000 meters in altitude, with an average of 1,200
meters, and comprises more than one-half the total
area of Namibia. The highest point is a peak of over
2,600 meters near Uis.
The Central Plateau itself has three separate zones:
the arid, hilly lands in the south, where sheep are
raised; the semiarid, mountainous cattle and sheep
area around Windhoek; and the wide, wooded savan-
nas (flat to rolling terrain) of the north. Traditional
farming and livestock raising are practiced in the
north, where most of the blacks live and where
population density is the highest in the territory. Also
in the north is the large, flat, swampy Etosha Pan,
which boasts concentrations of African wildlife and is
one of the oldest animal preserves in the world.
There are no perennial rivers within Namibia proper,
but four such rivers form parts of the territory's
boundaries. The Orange River sets the southern bor-
der with South Africa, while the Kunene, Okavango,
and Zambezi Rivers form much of the northern
borders with Angola and Zambia.
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Climate and Vegetation. The availability of water is a
major constraint on human settlement and economic
activity in Namibia. The territory has distinct sea-
sons: the winter season (May-October) is dry and
summer (November-April) is the wet season. Average
annual rainfall across 70 percent of the territory is
under the 400 millimeters that is considered a mini-
mum for dryland agriculture in a hot climate. The
average can be misleading, however; there is wide
variation in rainfall across regions. In much of the
territory, moreover, rainfall is not particularly effec-
tive because of the intense rate of evaporation.
In the Namib Desert, annual precipitation averages
less than 25 mm (1 inch), and vegetation is totally
lacking over most of the region. Years may pass with
no rain at all. Despite its scanty precipitation, the
coast is chilled by cold sea winds, and thick nocturnal
fogs drift inland during the early morning hours,
supporting the few plant forms that have adapted to
the harsh environment. The coastal islands are also
virtually barren of plant life, but the drenching mists
allow sparse grasses to grow.
The Kalahari Desert receives up to 400 mm of annual
rainfall. Because of its porous soils, however, vegeta-
tion is confined to sparse desert grasses and shrubs.
Precipitation in the Central Plateau ranges from a low
of 150 mm in the south to over 500 mm in the north,
and vegetation varies accordingly-scrub and sparse
grasses in the south, lush grasses and scattered trees
in the north. The northern vegetation includes scat-
tered stands of deciduous forest, cultivated fields of
millet and sorghum, and even a few palm trees along
the streams. It is the only region suited to crop
cultivation, especially in Ovamboland and Caprivi,
which normally receive the greatest rainfall-up to
700 mm yearly. The rains are unpredictable, however,
and serious droughts are frequent. At other times the
rains are so intense that vast areas are flooded.
Temperatures are moderated by sea breezes on the
coast and by altitude in the plateau region. Only in
the Namib Desert are temperatures likely to be
extreme, and even there they rarely exceed 381 C
(100.4?F) during the day or drop below freezing at
night. In Windhoek, daily temperatures range from a
high of 290 C (84.20F) to a low of 160 C (60.80F) in
summer, and a high of 21 ? C (69.8 OF) and a low of 7 ?
C (44.60F) in winter.
Natural Resources. Namibia's rich mineral re-
serves-diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc,
salt, vanadium, and others in smaller quantities-
support a mining industry that is the linchpin of the
economy. The world's largest uranium mine is near
the coast at Rossing. Alluvial diamond deposits along
the coast south of Walvis Bay are among the world's
richest, with an output consisting almost entirely of
high quality gemstones. Copper, lead, and zinc are
extracted from one of the world's unique geological
formations at Tsumeb. Both industrial and consum-
able salts are "harvested" at low cost from natural
and man-made evaporide deposits on the coast north
of Walvis Bay.
Commercial agriculture is a small but important part
of the economy. The southern and central portions of
Namibia's Central Plateau cannot support crops but
are well suited to ranching of the prized karakul sheep
and of cattle. These support an export industry of
pelts and beef, respectively. Plateau woodlands permit
a very small lumbering industry.
The better watered north supports subsistence cultiva-
tion and traditional livestock raising. In addition, the
northern border rivers represent a significant but
largely unex0loited potential for hydroelectric power
generation, as well as for irrigation.
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Figure 3
Namibia and Walvis Bay
South Africa
(Walvis say)
Ango a
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fiooikop
Airport,
Namibia
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Figure 5
Vegetation
MeM
Swakopmund
South Africa
(Walvis Bay)
Walvis Bay, i
i Open woodland savanna
Steppe
F Semi-desert
Desert
BoundearSrePre
yen,ation
~ n t n ce saril au horitat~ve
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Figure 6
Population and Ethnic Composition
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Population density of the South African
Walvis Bay district does not include the
urban center Walvis Bay, population
21,730
Figures shown are percentages of the total
population. The data were taken from a press
report of the May 1981 population, based on the
May 1980 census. Although earlier press reports
indicated 27,000 Bushmen and 9,500 "others",
-~; these figures were not included in the report of
the final census totals, nor was an explanation
given for their apparent omission. Due to
rounding, the percentages do not add to
100 percent.
Bounecassepresentation
\` of n arily a0horilative1
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Table 1
Namibia's Population: Ethnic Composition a
Group/Subgroup Percentage of Tribe
Kwambi 12
Ngandjera 8
Colored (mixed race)
Caprivian
Rehoboth Basters (mixed race)
Tswana
Total
a Percent totals are blacks, 85.6 percent; whites, 7.5 percent; and
mixed race, 6.9 percent.
b Due to rounding, components do not add to total shown.
Note: Source is South Africa Press Association report of the May
1981 population, based on the official May 1980 census, as reported
to the Namibian National Assembly. Earlier press reports of the
census gave the Bushman figure as 27,000 and "other" as 9,500.
These figures were not included in the report of the final census
totals, nor was an explanation given for their apparent omission.
Namibian population figures have long been controversial, with
SWAPO and the UN accusing South Africa of underreporting the
black population. Independent estimates have ranged as.high as 1.5
million.
7.6
7.5
25,800 2.6
6,800 0.7
1,009,900 100.0
The officially reported total for whites is an increase of almost 4,000
over an unofficial account of the census carried in press reports in
December 1981 and may have been inflated for political reasons. It
nevertheless represents approximately a 20-percent drop from the
1971 census. The nonwhite figures are probably understated,
especially for Ovambos. Moreover, official statistics do not include
the sizable exile population that includes SWAPO freedom fighters.
Our estimate is that the total population approaches 1.25 million,
including about 71,000 whites.
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Human Geography
Differences in origin, race, and language have long
fragmented Namibia's population into many cultural
groups. According to official South African classifica-
tions, there are nine African, one white,aand two
Colored "groups." Although the group divisions have
deep historical roots, South African policy through
the 1970s accentuated the distinctions by assigning
most of them to distinct "homelands" with separate
government administrations. The trend in current
Namibian domestic policies is slowly away from an
apartheid system, but the ethnic divisions are still
dominant in the country's social and political life.
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and fields
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Africans. The African population is composed of two
broad ethnic groups: Bantu-speaking peoples
(Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivian, Herero, Kaokos,
and Tswana) and Khoisan tribes that speak distinctive
"click" languages (Nama, Damara, and Bushman).
The Ovambo comprise over half of Namibia's popula-
tion and are concentrated in Ovamboland; another
large group lives across the Angolan border. Accord-
ing to 1978 figures, about 85 percent of the Namibian
Ovambos live in the 56,000-square-kilometer home-
land, with the rest serving as contract laborers-
mainly in mining-in other parts of the territory. In
Ovamboland the chief occupation is farming and
livestock raising.
The Ovambos are divided into seven subtribes that
live in distinct areas but' speak a mutually intelligible
language. As a group they remained largely aloof in
the 19th century from white settlers and the tribal
wars that afflicted other tribes in Namibia. They
were, however, subject to a strong missionary move-
ment with the most successful effort made by the
Finnish Lutherans starting in 1870. Today the most
powerful church in Ovamboland is the Finnish Evan-
gelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church.
Ovamboland eventually; fell under white control, al-
though it was never an area of significant white
settlement. Ovamboland is the prime battleground in
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Figure 8
Ethnic Groups
Homeland
Nama Dominant tribe(s) within a
homeland
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`Bounecess,p,e taboo is
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the South-West Africa People's Organization insur-
gency against South African control of Namibia.
While the bulk of the population appears to cooperate
with the local authority, which is backed by a heavy
South African military presence, most informed ob-
servers believe that SWAPO has the support of about
70 percent of the Ovamboland population.
The Kavango occupy a 270-mile strip along the south
bank of the Okavango River. They are closely related
to the Ovambo, and share a similar subsistence
economy supplemented by river fishing. About 12
percent of the Kavango are employed in mines and
jobs outside their homeland.
The East Caprivians are composed of two tribes
which speak a common language and are related to
tribes in Zambia and Botswana. Largely excluded
from the territory's modern economy, they are culti-
vators and stock farmers living in groups of about 30.
Because of the marshy nature of the area, villages are
often laid out on high ground, with huts and granaries
raised on platforms.
The Herero, taller and more slender than other Bantu
groups in Namibia, are noted for their education and
independence, as well as their arrogance toward other
groups. A pastoral people, they originally occupied
Kaokoland and then moved into the central part of
Namibia. Those who stayed in Kaokoland evolved
into two tribes, the Himba and the Tjimba. Those
who moved fought and defeated other tribes-first
the Bushmen and the Damara and then, after a
century of warfare ending about 1900, the Nama.
Having emerged as the strongest force in the area, the
Herero rebelled against German rule between 1904
and 1907. The rebellion was put down with much
cruelty, resulting in the near extinction of the tribe.
Of those who survived, some fled to Botswana and
most returned to Kaokoland.
Today those Herero who returned to Kaokoland,
together with the Himba and the Tjimba subtribes,
are classified as Kaoko, although their population
numbers are combined with the Herero. Those few
Herero who stayed in central Namibia were left
without land, cattle, or leadership, and much of their
traditional social structure was shattered. In the long
Figure 9. Digging for water in Kaokoland
~annister, 25X1
period of disorientation following the rebellion, mis-
sionary activity also undermined many traditional
values and beliefs. The Herero nevertheless displayed
unusual resiliency, and, although adapting to change,
they have refused to accept permanent loss of their
confiscated land in the desirable central portion of
Namibia.
The homeland assigned them by Pretoria-in the
northern Kalahari Desert in eastern Namibia-is
inferior and only about half the Hereros live there.
Hereros have long been in the forefront of the move-
ment for an independent Namibia, with their effort
predating that of the Ovambo by at least a decade.
Some Hereros hold senior positions in SWAPO, but
the focus of their political effort has been on internal
politics.
The Tswana are an extension of a tribe of the same
name living in Botswana. Living in a homeland on the
fringe of the Kalahari Desert, they have little interac-
tion with other Namibian tribes.
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The Damara, of unknown origin, are found only in
Namibia. Before the establishment of white authority,
these short, extemely dark people were either enslaved
by the Herero and the Nama or led a precarious
existence as fugitives in marginal lands, living as
hunters and gatherers. They have no knowledge of
their original language but have adopted that of the
Nama.
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In 1870, at the request of missionaries, a tract of
semiarid land was granted to a group of Damara at
Okombahe in the central highlands, where they en-
gaged primarily in animal husbandry. In the 1960s
South Africa enlarged and set aside Okombahe as the
Damara homeland. Only about 12 percent, however,
live in the area, according to 1978 figures. More than
other tribes, the Damara have fared better under
South African rule than at any previous time. They
are active in the modern economy as herders, serv-
ants, or handymen. Considerable numbers are em-
ployed at the Uis tin mine situated in their homeland.
The Nama are relatively short, yellowish-brown-
skinned people, probably related to the Bushmen.
After years of devastating warfare between the Nama
and the Herero, the Germans imposed an uneasy
peace. Today they live mainly on several large reser-
vations-consolidated into "Namaland," in the arid
southern part of Namibia-where they graze their
flocks of sheep and goats. Some have been absorbed
into the modern economy, working as herders and
laborers on white and mixed-race farms or as work-
men in the towns. They are not a united group and
have not agitated for a return to their traditional
lands to the north, nor have they been leaders in the
independence struggle.
The Bushmen are Namibia's most ancient inhabit-
ants. They are short in stature-males average 1.47
meters (4 feet 10 inches)-with a light yellowish-
brown skin and peppercorn hair. In the 19th century
the Nama and Herero regarded the Bushmen as a
danger to life and property, and killed them or drove
them into more inaccessible desert regions. During
German rule, a judge ruled that the Bushmen were, in
fact, human, and that it was illegal to kill them.
The Bushmen are organized into small bands, whose
size depends on the availability of food. Roaming
bands of Bushmen erect temporary shelters of grass or
branches, which they occupy until the game, seeds,
and berries in the vicinty are exhausted. Personal
possessions consist only of bow and arrows, skin
garments and adornments, and a few utility articles.
The Bushmen are divided into three main groups
living mostly in the northern Kalahari Desert from
the Etosha Game Reserve to the Botswana border, an
area that includes their official homeland.
Coloreds and Basters. Both the Coloreds and the
Rehoboth Basters are of mixed racial origin and share
a Christian heritage and the Afrikaans language.
Historical factors, however, have molded them into
separate communities. Most Coloreds are former
South African Cape Coloreds who emigrated from
South Africa within the past few decades. They reside
in urban centers for the most part and do not occupy
any specific area of their own. They are employed
mainly as factory workers, craftsmen, and traders;
some operate their own businesses.
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Originally, the Rehoboth Basters were one of several
scattered groups residing in the northwest part of the
Cape Colony. Displaced by white expansion, some 800
Basters crossed the Orange River under the leader-
ship of Hermanus van Wyk, who negotiated with
Herero and Nama chiefs for title to the area around
Rehoboth in 1869. The Basters have retained their
exclusive identity and have traditionally had greater
local autonomy than other nonwhite groups. Today
they are engaged mostly in animal husbandry, and
their land, around Rehoboth, is among the best in
South-West Africa. Many have large incomes, as
their personal possessions, such as cars and homes,
reflect.
Whites. Although officially a single population group,
whites are in practice divided by language and culture
into three groups. Approximately 60 percent speak
Afrikaans, almost one-third speak German, and the
remainder speak English. Afrikaans and English are
official languages; German is not, although it has a
privileged status and its, use is furthered by the
dominant role that ethnic Germans play in Namibia's
cultural life. Most whites are to some extent
trilingual.
The first white settlers came from South Africa and
from Germany during the 19th century. Most of the
present population, however, are recent immigrants
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The South African administration in Namibia has
created 10 ethnic homelands for the nonwhite popula-
tion. These are located primarily in the northern half
of the territory.
Ovamboland. Periodic droughts and famine are com-
mon due to rainfall that, although substantial on
average, is irregular. Land along the Kunene and the
Okavango could be irrigated, as some near the Kune-
ne already is.
Kavangoland. The population is concentrated almost
entirely in a strip adjoining the Okavango River,
where subsistence farming can be practiced. Away
from the river, the dry forest country yields only wild
fruits. Diseases appear to bar satisfactory pastoral
development.
Caprivi. A considerable area in the south is swamp-
land, while the northern part has sandy or loamy
soils and is well watered. Subsistence agriculture is
successful in the northern part with maize, millet,
pumpkins, and watermelons the chief crops. The
grazing is relatively good.
Kaokoland. Arid climate, scanty ground-water re-
sources, and meager pastures characterize the region,
which is isolated by desert from the other homelands.
Little prospect of agricultural development exists.
Bushmanland. This is an area with plentiful game
and suited to hunting and gathering. Present natural
resources, however, will be insufficient for the grow-
ing population. The sandy terrain is ill-suited to
cultivation and settled pastoral use.
Hereroland. Surface water is almost nonexistent
except for one perennial spring. In the extreme west,
where the sand cover is relatively thin, ground water
is more plentiful than farther east. Although cattle
raising is the traditional occupation of the Hereros,
only one-fiftieth of the homeland can at present
support stock.
Damaraland. About one-third of the homeland is
suitable for stock; two-thirds is desert.
Tswanaland. Located in the Kalahari Desert, its
potential for any use is limited by the very deep
ground-water level that makes boreholes expensive
and difficult.
Namaland. The area has limited suitability for small
stock (goats and sheep). Underground water is brack-
ish; in many cases, borehole water is too highly
mineralized even for stock to drink. There is slight
potential for irrigation of small areas.
Rehoboth (Basters). Unsuitable for agricultural culti-
vation, but grazing is equal or superior to the white
area in the south.
from South Africa who live primarily in the larger
urban areas, although some have established large
farms. Socially, culturally, and politically they are
very close to the white community in South Africa.
On the basis of language, whites tend to form separate
cultural communities, each with its own schools,
newspapers, clubs, and other institutions, and there is
some sense of social distinction based on differences in
occupation and lifestyle. Class consciousness is less
pervasive than is usual in modern Western society,
however, because the white community is relatively
small, because all its members have a privileged status
in relation to nonwhites, and because each of the three
components of the white community has a high degree
of social cohesiveness. Family institutions and rela-
tionships follow the general patterns prevalent in any
advanced Western country.
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Political and social roles among the white groups
differ considerably. Afrikaners are politically power-
ful, their numerical strength assuring them electoral
victory. To this group belong almost all white civil
servants, who come generally from South Africa; the
lower strata of the white population, concentrated in
railroad and similar employment; and most of the
white farmers of the territory. White farmowners and
renters are scattered over the central area of the
territory on large farms ranging in size up to 28,000
hectares (70,000 acres). Because the government re-
gards them as the backbone of the country, they have
long been the recipients of extensive public financial
assistance. This and other privileges provoke the
resentment of the general community. German speak-
ers are engaged mainly in business and commerce,
and they dominate the white community in a cultural
sense. German architecture is pervasive in many
towns and many festivals with a German theme are
celebrated. The English-speaking sector plays an im-
portant role in the financial and business life of the
community, but its numerical weakness renders it
politically weak.
11
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Economy
Structure of the Economy has taken its toll on the modern economy. At present,
South African investment, technology, and manage- public spending probably accounts for over 60 percent
ment have built an economic beachhead for whites in of gross national expenditure.
Namibia that is narrowly based in mining, fishing,
and ranching. Beyond this beachhead, the Namibian Key Sectors
economy-despite rich natural resources-is charac- Mining. Mining of extensive reserves of diamonds,
terized by a variety of weaknesses that dampen uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc, salt, and vanadium is
prospects for growth and development. Namibia's leading industry, accounting for at least
two-thirds of total exports and 60 percent of all
Key among Namibia's limitations is the lack of a domestic tax revenue. Despite its capital intensity,
skilled nonwhite labor force. This results from policies which causes it to offer proportionally less employ-
imposed by South Africa that fail to provide educa- ment than most other nonagricultural sectors, mining
tion and job training to blacks, restrict black labor provides employment for about 20,000 black workers.
mobility, and make the economy dependent on South The wages of the workers, in turn, contribute signifi-
African and other white, skilled manpower.' cantly to the cash income of more than 100,000 of
Namibia's 1.25 million inhabitants, primarily in
The modern sectors draw cheap, unskilled labor from Ovamboland.
rural areas, where the majority of the more than 1
million nonwhites live. Unskilled black workers, most- The mining industry, which includes various process-
ly from Ovamboland in the north, are permitted to ing facilities, has benefited from substantial private
work only on short-term contracts as temporary mi- investment by South African and Western interests.
grants. These workers account for about half of the The investments are primarily in diamond and urani-
roughly 200,000 workers in the nonagricultural labor um production, the most important mining activities.
force. Namibia produces an average annual output of 1.5
million carats of gem diamonds. Its alluvial diamond
Along with their dependents, the South African civil deposits are among the world's richest, with 98 per-
servants and skilled technicians who run the govern- cent of the recovered stones being of gem quality and
ment bureaucracy and operate and maintain the commanding a higher average price per carat than
infrastructure comprise nearly half of Namibia's any other diamonds in the world. Namibia's uranium
75,000 whites. Most of the other whites provide the production-nearly equal to that of South Africa and
managerial and technical expertise to run the modern entirely from the world's largest uranium mine-is
sectors of the economy, including commercial shipped to South Africa for reexport. Namibia pro-
agriculture. duces about one-sixth of the world's uranium, but the
ore is of low grade and is relatively costly to extract.
Sustaining the narrowly based, white economy, ad-
ministering the rest of Namibia, and providing bases Agriculture. Namibia's farming and animal hus-
for operations against the insurgency of SWAPO have bandry, which employ about 60 percent of the labor
entailed substantial increases in Namibian public force, do not yield enough to feed the population
spending. Its share of total expenditure has increased adequately. As a result, Namibia relies heavily on
even more rapidly over the last few years as recession South Africa for cornmeal and wheat flour, dietary
' A Western authority on Namibia has estimated that there are, at
most, 300 university graduates, including five lawyers and five
doctors, among nonwhite Namibians; many of these reside outside 25X1
the country.
15 Secret
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Figure 12
Namibia: Economic Comparisons
GNP per Captia, 1981 Real GDP Growth, 1976-80
US $ Percent
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
a For blacks.
b Estimated.
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
12.0
Zimbabwe -0.9
Zambia -3.1
Angola -3.3
ZJ9 2 Non-OPEC
LJ LDC Average
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Botswana
Angola
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Angola
Namibiab
Botswana
7A
Footnote: Namibia's GDP per capita is about one-
third higher than the GNP figure because it includes
repatriated profits, royalties and other foreign remit-
tances by the large international business sector.
staples of the nonwhite population. Subsistence agri-
culture-primarily cultivation of millet, sorghum, and
corn, with some livestock raising-suffers from the
tribal homelands policy imposed by Pretoria. Most
areas designated for nonwhites have poor soil and
little water, although some areas in the better watered
and fertile northeast are often self-sufficient in grain
crops. The Kunene River in the northwest supports a
trial irrigation scheme in Ovamboland that could be
expanded when peace returns to the region. Only
limited grazing land exists within most homelands-
Basterland is an exception-and this seriously con-
strains livestock raising by Africans.
Commercial agriculture is limited to the white-
controlled ranching sector which, except during peri-
ods of drought, is highly productive. Livestock raising
provides beef for export, 75 percent of which is
usually shipped on the hoof to South Africa, with the
rest processed for export to Western Europe. The arid
regions of southern Namibia are ideal for raising the
hardy karakul breed of sheep; this, however, is the
only economically viable form of agriculture for the
region. Namibian pelts'usually supply over 50 percent
of the world market for luxury karakul skins.
Fishing. Although depressed in recent years, fishing
has historically been Namibia's second-leading indus-
try. Lobstering and a few fisheries are located at
Luderitz, but most of the fishing and fish processing
industry is located within the South African enclave
at Walvis Bay. Virtually all of the catch is taken from
Namibian coastal waters. A 200-nautical-mile exclu-
sive fishing zone was enacted in 1981 but never
enforced because of an inability to mount effective
patrols.
South African-owned fish factories at Luderitz and
Walvis Bay generally employ up to several thousand
nonwhite migrant workers during the fishing season,
but employment is dependent on the annual catch.
Very, little fish is consumed locally and most fish
products are exported to South Africa, Europe, and
the United States.
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Figure 13
Economic Activity
Angola
Cu
Pb
S
Cattle raising with some
commercial farming
Nomadic grazing and
subsistence farming
Semi-intensive sheep grazing
Nonagricultural
Fishing
Copper Sn Tin
Lead U Uranium
Salt Zn Zinc
South
Africa
Botswana
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Table 2
Namibia: Leading Mineral Investors a
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South-West Africa DeBeers Consolidated Mines (100)
South Africa
IMCOR Zinc (lead, zinc) ISCOR b (100)
South Africa
Klein Aub Copper Co. General Mining and Finance Corp./Federale
Mynbou (100)
South Africa
Falconbridge Nickel (75)
Canada
Industrial Development Corp. (25) b
South Africa
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. (55.5)
United Kingdom
Industrial Development Corp. (13)
South Africa
General Mining and Finance Corp. (7)
South Africa
Minatome, SA (10)
France
South-West Africa Co., Ltd. (lead, vanadium, zinc) Anglo-American Corp. (44)
South Africa
Consolidated Goldfields, Ltd. (43)
United Kingdom
Tsumeb Corp. of South-West Africa, Ltd. (copper, Newmont Mining Corp. (30)
lead
zinc)
United States
,
American Metals Climax Corp. (30)
United States
Union Corp. (9.5)
South Africa, others
O'Kiep Copper Co. (9.5)
South Africa, others
a These enterprises represent most of the foreign investment in
Namibia. In some cases total shares may not add to 100 percent
because minor owners are omitted.
b State corporation.
Transportation and Utilities. Namibia's transport,
electric power, water, and communications facilities
are among the most sophisticated in Sub-Saharan
Africa. They were designed, however, to serve only
the major towns and economically productive regions
and are inadequate for the economic and political
integration of the widely scattered population.
Rail and road transport is especially deficient in the
relatively populous north, but some road improve-
ments have been made by the South African military
to support its numerous installations along the
Namibia-Angola border. The Caprivi region in the
northeast, however, is virtually inaccessible by land
from the rest of Namibia.
Electric power for the national grid has been obtained
increasingly from hookups to the South African grid.
Local generating capacity consists primarily of a coal-
fired thermal station in Windhoek, operated by a
parastatal corporation. This is supplemented by diesel
generators in some towns. In addition to those facili-
ties, private mining companies retain some auxiliary
capacity for their own use. All of Namibia's power
facilities are designed and situated to support the
modern sector and have' had little or no direct impact
on nonwhite living standards.
The Kunene hydroelectric project on the Angolan
border near Ruacana could provide all of Namibia's
electric power needs-as well as a surplus for sale to
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South Africa. The project, however, remains an unre- South Africa's Economic Assistance
liable power source so long as the SWAPO insurgency
and troubled relations with Angola continue.
Manufacturing. Namibia's highly developed modern
sectors mask serious gaps-beyond those in public
works and services-that limit its growth potential.
Most important among these is the small size of the
domestic market, which tends to discourage any
broader industrialization.
Namibia's budget for fiscal year 1981182 contained
several revenue items that Pretoria claimed as budg-
etary assistance to Windhoek:
1
Manufacturing industry today consists almost entirely
of food processing-primarily fish oil and fish meal
production and beef and lamb packing-and has
never contributed more than about 5 percent of
national output. With a population of about 1.25
million, most of whom earn less than $300 a year,
there is little incentive to develop new product lines
for domestic sale. As a result, up to one-fourth of
Namibia's gross domestic product is repatriated by
foreign producers as profits, royalties, and other re-
mittances-mostly to South Africa-and is not
reinvested.
The problems of the small domestic market are
exacerbated by the dominance of nearby South Afri-
can producers in a wide range of manufacturing
activities. Indeed, Namibian domestic commerce con-
sists largely of the retailing and servicing of South
African and other imported goods. Imports account
for up to 95 percent of all goods consumed and
invested in Namibia.
Dependence on South Africa
The territorial government in Namibia depends on
South African aid to help defray the considerable
costs of administering the vast territory and of con-
struction and development programs. Pretoria's budg-
et assistance to Namibia has risen sharply in recent
years. In 1981/82 (1 April to 31 March) Pretoria
contributed at least $650 million-over 70 percent of
Windhoek's budgeted revenue.' Details of Namibia's
2 About two-fifths of this assistance was allocated from revenues of
the South African Customs Union (SACU), which includes Botswa-
na, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Although Namibia is not an official
member of this union, for revenue-sharing purposes Pretoria treats
it like one. In recent years, Pretoria has used artificially inflated
shares of SACU revenue as a hidden form of foreign aid to member
states, thereby encouraging their continued membership.
Share of SACU receipts
260.0
1981/82 transfer from Pretoria
83.2
Transfer remaining from 1980/81
41.6
Compensation for services taken over from Pretoria
139.4
Loans guaranteed by Pretoria
128.8
Total
653.0
In addition to such budgetary assistance, Namibia
benefits from South African subsidies for post and
telephone services and for the operations of the South
African Railways and Harbors Administration in
Namibia. All such parastatal services are reported to
operate at a loss but, except for postal services, no
data are available to confirm this or to indicate the ex-
act size of the next subsidy involved. It may amount to
several tens of millions of dollars. Documentary
sources for South African transfers are often contra-
dictory and incomplete because government reports on
financial relations with Namibia are closely held.
25X1
fiscal year 1982/83 budget are incomplete, but Pre-
toria's contribution appears to again exceed $600
million. The cost of South African counterinsurgency
operations, not included in the Namibian budget, may
exceed an additional $400 million annually. An un-
known but probably large portion of defense expendi-
tures is for military construction, which almost cer-
tainly provides substantial employment and income
opportunities for Namibians.
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Figure 14
Namibia: Economic Indicators'
Note change in scales
Real GDP Growth
Percent
GDP, by Sector, 1980
Percent
1976
1.5
Other-10.7
77
7
Mining-47.
78
Agriculture
and Fishing-9.6
79
_____.
-7.5
Government-32.0
80
1.0
Uranium Oxide Production
Thousand Short Tons
-I
aMost data are estimated.
b Preliminary data.
cBased on an implicit GDP deflator
compiled by US Embassy, Pretoria.
dData are for fiscal years beginning 1 April of the year stated.
Not including spending for police.
Mining-6
Government-7
Services-8 -
Industry and
Commerce-19
Agriculture-60
Budget Assistance From South Africad
Million US $
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
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Table 3
Namibia: Annual Mineral Production
Thousand tons
(except where noted)
Besides South African money, food, and manpower,
the Namibian economy depends on close ties to South
Africa that will probably continue after independence:
? Walvis Bay, which will at least initially remain
under South African control after independence, is
the only deepwater port on the Namibian coast, and
access to it is crucial for mineral exports. The small
port of Luderitz, which will belong to independent
Namibia, can only handle shallow-draft vessels, is
poorly equipped, and is distant from most mining
centers.
? Namibia's rail network, which is owned and operat-
ed by Pretoria, is connected only to South Africa.
Other existing or proposed regional transport links
offer no foreseeable prospects for easing Namibia's
trade and transport dependence on South Africa.
? South Africa supplies about 90 percent of Namib-
ia's imports, acts as an entrepot for about two-thirds
of all Namibian exports, and is the final destination
for about 10 percent of Namibian sales. Freight cost
advantages alone will continue to make South Afri-
ca the most attractive trading partner and conduit
for most Namibian trade.
Namibia, moreover, depends on South Africa for
commercial fuels and vital electric power hookups.
Exploitation of Namibia's coal deposits is thus far
uneconomic. No domestic petroleum reserves have
been found, although offshore areas have not been
fully explored. Namibia has no refinery, so all petro-
leum products must be imported. Partly for security
purposes, southern Namibia is linked to the South
African power grid. An additional link will be estab-
lished this year, which will allow local thermal sta-
tions to be held in reserve for emergency use.
Recent Performance
Since the late 1970s, the Namibian economy has
suffered from a virtual cessation of private investment
(prompted by uncertainty over the outcome of inter-
national negotiations for independence), a severe
drought, steadily rising import unit costs, and slack
world markets for primary commodities. The result
has been declining real output and increased inflation.
Average annual growth of over 4 percent in the 1970s
on the basis of a mineral boom gave way to an average
annual decline of over 8 percent after 1978. Mean-
while inflation continued to range between about 10
and 20 percent. The post-1978 recession was es-
pecially important because an annual growth of 6 to 8
percent is estimated to be necessary simply to employ
blacks entering the labor market. As a result of these
adverse trends in modern sector performance, unem-
ployment has now reached over 15 percent of the total
labor force, according to Namibian press reports.
Weak world markets have especially hurt the mining
industry. The depressed world demand for diamonds,
especially for stones of gem quality, has caused
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Table 4
Namibia: Fish Catch
a Preliminary.
b Includes anchovies.
DeBeers to reduce its Namibian output. Mineral
earnings would have been even worse if uranium
production had not begun in 1976 and accelerated
thereafter. Only the fulfillment of long-term, fixed-
supply contracts has made uranium production profit-
able in the face of a depressed world market. Prior to
the recent slide, minerals often accounted for well
over 40 percent of national output-a proportion that
has now fallen to about one-third.
Fishing has also suffered. During the 1970s, overfish-
ing by foreign fleets and local mismanagement re-
duced the catch that supports the domestic canning
industry. During 1981, the Namibian fishing fleet was
largely idle, most canneries were closed, and several
thousand migrant workers were unemployed. The
catch showed some signs of recovery in early 1982,
but fisheries experts have warned that a sustained
recovery to former catch levels is still uncertain.
Commercial and subsistence farming have been hit
hard by prolonged drought and by the sharp drop in
world prices for karakul pelts. Farm output, which fell
by nearly one-third during 1976-80, continued to slide
in 1981. Namibia's cattle herd fell by one-third last
year alone, while the number of sheep and goats
dropped by one-forth, because of drought-induced
slaughter and the transfer of some livestock and herds
to South Africa for grazing. In March, rains returned
to the northern cattle-raising regions, bringing the
prospect of some return of stock from South Africa.
The drought continues in the south, however, and by
the end of this year's dry season karakul herds are
likely to be at less than half the level of two years ago.
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Politics (SWAPO)
25X1
25X1
I
25X1
From Moderation to Radicalism
Leaders reflecting a variety of political views have
dominated the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion from its birth in 1960 through the mid-1970s.
Since then, however, SWAPO has undergone a trans-
formation in which moderates have been driven out or
pushed aside, and radicals-representing especially
one subtribal group of the dominant Ovambo tribe-
have solidified their position at the top.
Moderate Origins. SWAPO's origins can be traced to
the Ovambo Peoples' Congress, an organization
formed in 1957 in Capetown, South Africa, to assist
migrant workers from South-West Africa's large
Ovambo tribe. Two years later South Africa deported
its founder, Herman Toivo ja Toivo, to Ovamboland
in Namibia's far north, and Sam Nujoma, the present
leader of SWAPO, took control.
In 1960 the Congress tried to broaden its appeal by
claiming to represent all of the South African protec-
torate's diverse multitribal population. It changed its
name to SWAPO and moved its headquarters from
Capetown to Windhoek. SWAPO's announced goals,
which were then free of Marxist dogma, called for an
end to South African rule and apartheid, and for the
establishment of a unified state.
In 1960 Nujoma fled Namibia into exile, first to Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania, and later to Lusaka, Zambia,
where he established SWAPO-in-exile. He left behind
an internal wing, which continued to operate in
Windhoek. For the next six years, SWAPO attempted
to cultivate support both internationally and inside
Namibia, while it optimistically waited for interna-
tional pressure to force South Africa to vacate South-
West Africa. When the World Court ruled in 1966
that the Namibia issue was outside its jurisdiction,
SWAPO began its "liberation" struggle.
Initially, the focus of the campaign was to gain
international political support. SWAPO soon obtained
recognition by the OAU and later the United Nations
as the sole representative of the Namibian people. It
also began a military campaign, aided by weapons
and training from both China and Soviet Bloc coun-
tries. The results, however, were meager; SWAPO
forces through the mid-1970s probably numbered
only several hundred.
Despite growing Communist influence, geography
and the multitribal makeup of SWAPO's leadership
continued to encourage moderation prior to 1976.
From camps in Zambia-swelled by Ovambos fleeing
South African repression-SWAPO guerrillas were
forced to infiltrate Namibia through territory domi-
nated by the Caprivi tribe. Use of this route through
the Caprivi Strip made it necessary for SWAPO to
emphasize its multitribal composition, despite domi-
nance by the Ovambo in its ranks.
In addition, while SWAPO's rhetoric grew increas-
ingly radical, a significant degree of ideological diver-
sity existed at all levels of the organization. The
inherent conservatism of the Namibians who filled its
ranks and SWAPO's exposure to Western as well as
Communist influence in Zambia contributed to its
moderation
Radicals Gain Control. SWAPO began to transfer its
operations from Zambia to Angola following the
victory in 1975 by the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola. This move emboldened the
radicals, who by 1976 were able to solidify their
power in both the Central Committee and throughout
the rank and file. In addition, bases in Angola enabled
SWAPO guerrillas to infiltrate directly into Ovambo-
land and diminished the Ovambo-dominated organi-
zation's incentive to accommodate other Namibian
tribes. 25X1
The shift to an Angola dominated by Cuba and the
Soviets and away from the more Western-oriented
Zambia also placed SWAPO under the more direct
influence of the Soviet Bloc. The Soviets compelled
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SWAPO to forego assistance from the Chinese, and
Moscow and its allies began to provide dramatically
increased amounts of arms, money, and training.
Soviet influence was also reflected in the sharp radi-
calization of SWAPO rhetoric, which now empha-
sized the socialist goals of its future regime
Moreover, turmoil within SWAPO's leadership even-
tually strengthened the authority of Nujoma and his
radical clique. The first upheaval came in 1976 when
Andreas Shipanga, a relative moderate who was then
third in line in the command structure, and several of
his supporters in the SWAPO Central Committee
were ousted after challenging Nujoma's leadership.'
The Shipanga controversy changed the subtribal rela-
tionship of the Ovambo peoples who dominate
SWAPO. The Ovambos, who comprise over half of
Namibia's nonwhite population, are divided into seven
sometimes competing subtribes. Shipanga and his
followers were largely from the powerful Ndonga
The SWAPO hierarchy's growing indifference to non-
Ovambo tribes became evident in another major
upheaval in 1980. The organization's vice president,
Mishake Muyongo, a Caprivian, was replaced follow-
ing a long period of isolation during which he found
his power eroded by Ovambos. Muyongo had resisted
the shift of SWAPO headquarters that year from
Lusaka, Zambia, to Luanda, Angola, because it made
the eastern Caprivi Strip, his tribal homeland, less
important to SWAPO.
Although there have been no major internal conflicts
since Muyongo's ouster, a number of moderates, most
of whom also were non-Ovambos, have been gradually
squeezed out of positions' of power since 1979:
Information Minister Peter Katjavivi, a moderate
Herero, and for many years a widely respected
SWAPO spokesman in', London, was compelled in
1979 to return to Lusaka and give up his portfolio.
Ovambos assumed his London post and his informa-
tion position; he now holds a seat on the Central
Committee but has no title.
Ernest Tjiriange, the Herero Secretary for Legal
Affairs, was replaced by a more radical Ovambo
from Nujoma's inner circle in 1981.
Ben Boys, a Nama, was removed in 1981 as
SWAPO's chief representative in Lusaka and re-
placed by Nujoma's brother-in-law Aaron Mu-
shimba, a half Kwanyama, half Herero.
? Lucas Pohamba, a Kwanyama stationed in Lusaka
but a competitor with Nujoma and another key
member of the senior leadership, lost his finance
portfolio in 1981 to Mushimba and, along with Ben
Boys, was sent to Eastern Europe for "political
education."
25X1
1
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25X1
a small clique of
A fifth member of the inner circle is Hiuanua
Shihepo, formerly Mueshihange's deputy in foreign
affairs and recently elevated to Secretary of Legal 25X1
Affairs at the expense of a Herero moderate. A
Kwanyama, we believe that he is one of the most
125X1
'25X1
'25X1
five senior figures around Nujoma appears to hold the
real power and operates as a collective leadership.
Nujoma's ultimate authority is unclear. He is held in
low regard by many African leaders, by SWAPO's
Central Committee, and probably even by members
of his own inner circle
he has been shrewd enough to retain power since
SWAPO's formation, mainly by exerting his influence
cautiously through a process of consensus decision-
making.
In the inner circle that surrounds Nujoma, Hidipo
Hamutenya and Kapuka "Niki" Naujala probably
wield the greatest influence, both on Nujoma and on
SWAPO policy. Hamutenya, the Secretary for Infor-
mation and a member of the Executive Council, is a
Kwanyama and one of the few Ovambos with a higher
25X1
Defense Secretary Peter Nanyemba and Foreign Re-
lations Secretary Peter Mueshihange also have high
25X1 level influence. Nanyemba is a longtime associate of
Nujoma; his strength in SWAPO derives from his
power base, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN). Although PLAN has done little more than
plant landmines and stage infrequent terrorist attacks
inside Namibia, his colleagues apparently consider
leftist of the senior SWAPO officials.
One potential SWAPO leader outside the inner circle,
Toivo ja Toivo-founder of SWAPO's parent organi-
zation-has been in a South African prison since
1968. Toivo's prestige probably surpasses that of
Nujoma in the eyes of many Namibians. He belongs
to the Ndonga subtribe, and the Kwanyama-domi-
nated SWAPO leadership probably views him as a
threat. Toivo has refused a South African offer of
release on the condition that he participate only in
South African-sponsored internal Namibian politics.
After independence, or perhaps before, his uncondi-
tional release would in our view be potentially destabi-
lizing to the present SWAPO leadership.
25X1
SWAPO Internal
Moderates have also been purged from SWAPO's
"internal wing" inside Namibia, although the
ideology of their successors is not known. As a result
of the purge and South African harassment, the
internal organization has been moribund since 1979.
Until then, it had operated like some other internal
Namibian parties, maintaining an active political
organization but refraining from participation in
South African-sponsored elections or government.
The internal wing's main contribution to the move-
ment has been to develop support for SWAPO outside
of Ovamboland in Namibia, both among Ovambo
contract laborers and non-Ovambos. It succeeded, for
example, in organizing a successful boycott of the
1978 election among the Ovambos living in the
Windhoek area.
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Figure 15. Police break up
SWAPO demonstration against
SWAPO's internal wing also has produced nationally
well-known leaders including Daniel Tjongarero
(Herero) and Mokganedi Thlabanello (Tswana), both
articulate moderates and Lutheran clergymen. After
a South African campaign in 1979 against the inter-
nal wing and the detention of a number of its
members, Tjongarero closed the main internal office
in Windhoek on his own initiative, declaring that
henceforth SWAPO would operate from regional
offices.
The response of SWAPO's external wing to Tjongar-
ero's unauthorized closure of the national office was
to sack both him and Thlabanello. Its main motive
probably was to jettison two men who were both too
moderate and rivaled the external leadership for
popularity in Namibia. Tjongarero subsequently took
a church position in Namibia and Thlabanello went to
school in the United States. Other members of the
internal wing fled Namibia, went underground, or
tried to pick up the pieces of the organization. Since
1979 the South African Government has arrested
several other members, and the current leadership of
SWAPO's internal wing is largely unknown.
Role of the Churches
Churches in Namibia have long been SWAPO's main
source of support. Lutheran and Anglican missionary
movements have been especially active among the
Ovambos-the largest church in the territory is the
270,000-member Evangelical Lutheran Ovamboka-
vango Church. This church and its sister Lutheran
churches have to some degree diminished the Ovam-
bos' strong subtribal identification and have encour-
aged Ovambos to object to their second-class status in
Namibia.
Both in Ovamboland and among other tribal groups,
church leaders have worked quietly but effectively to
assist SWAPO, which has placed religious as well as
political figures from various tribal groups on the
SWAPO "council of elders." For their part, the South
African security forces have harassed the clergy with
Although worried by SWAPO's radical rheto-
ric, most church leaders apparently accept Nujoma's
private assurances that once in power, SWAPO will
eschew radicalism and prlomote church interests
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SWAPO Representatives Abroad
Addis Ababa
Algiers
Belgrade
Berlin
Cairo
Jesaya Nyamu
Nora Appolus
Estory Embumbulu
Dakar
Des es Salaam
Gaborone/Francistown
Havana
Helsinki
Lagos
London
Lusaka
New Delhi
Paris
Stockholm
United Nations
Andrew Ngihiginua
Helmut Angula
Niki lyambo
Philemon Kambala
Shapua Kaukungua
(Representative)
Peter Manning
(Information Officer)
Aaron Mushimba
Frederick Matongo
Ndugu Kalomo
Jimmy Joseph
their leaders' increasingly radical stance
clique staged a tightly controlled congress that reaf-
firmed their hold on power. Reports of dissatisfaction
among the refugees persisted through the late 1970s
as lower ranking officials expressed disapproval of
No dissent is now evident among the approximately
60,000 SWAPO members in refugee camps in Angola
or the 4,000 in Zambia. Since SWAPO's move to
Angola, however, information from inside the camps
has been sparse. SWAPO youth are thoroughly indoc-
trinated in Marxist ideology and are taught to revere
their leaders. "We are determined that Namibia must
be free," goes one camp song that a Western journal-
ist heard last year. "Marxism and Leninism is our
ideology, founded on scientific socialism.'
Foreign Support
Without foreign support, SWAPO and its entrenched
leadership could not survive. Along with Cuban and
Soviet Bloc military aid, SWAPO receives crucial
assistance from the Frontline States, which provide
camp sites, money, advisers, and political backing.'
Frontline leaders have consistently-if somewhat re-
luctantly-backed Nujoma and his clique against 25X1
challengers from within SWAPO.
Though representatives stationed abroad, SWAPO
solicits and also receives political and economic sup-
Theo-Ben Gurirab port from a wide variety of other sources: West
(Representative) European and Middle Eastern countries, international
Lucia Hamutenya church groups, the Organization of African Unity
(Adviser) (OAU), and the UN. The UN runs the Institute for
SWAPO's Rank and File
The radicalization of SWAPO's membership and the
stifling of dissent below the Central Committee ap-
pears to parallel the radical trend and consolidation of
power in the senior leadership. While they still resided
largely in Zambian camps, at least 1,000 SWAPO
refugees supported Shipanga's call in 1976 for a party
congress. After Shipanga's arrest, SWAPO leaders,
with Zambian assistance, confined the lower ranking
dissidents to special camps while Nujoma and his
Namibia in Lusaka-a school for future Namibian
bureaucrats-that SWAPO dominates.
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Table 5
SWAPO Central Committee
Name a
Tribe (Subtribe)
Position
1. Sam Nujoma
Ovambo (Ngandjera)
President
2. David Merero
Herero
National Chairman
3. Moses Garoeb
Damara
Administration Secretary
4. Riundja A Kaakunga
Herero
Deputy Administration
Secretary
5. Peter Nanyemba
Ovambo (Ndonga)
Secretary for Defense
Deputy Secretary for Defense
7. Peter Mueshihange
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Secretary for Foreign Affairs
8. John Ya-Otto
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Secretary for Labor
9. (Hifikepunye) Lucas
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
10. Aaron Mushimba
Ovambo (half Kwanyama,
half Herero)
Chief Representative in Lusaka
11. Dimo Amambo
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Commander of the Armed Forces
12. Helao Nafidi
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Political Commissar (Armed
Forces)
Comments)
The clique surrounding him limits
his real authority
enough cunning to survive as presi-
dent since 1959.
Fled is in 1975.
Not a key decisionmaker.
Reportedly a doctrinaire Commu-
nist without influence
Young, highly dedicated. Regarded
as a rising star.
Inner circle. Described as compe-
tent administrator, military
hardliner.
Loyalist who stayed behind after
fellow Caprivian Muyongo left. Re-
portedly a leftist, criticized by
SWAPO's internal wing.
~ Inner circle.
loyal leftist. Against
current Western negotiations but
perhaps eclipsed in foreign affairs
role by Hamutenya (see 15 below).
Articulate, said to have charisma,
and a possible competitor of
Nujoma.
25X6
25X6
Reportedly at odds with Hamu- 25X1
Nujoma's brother-in-law.
Has been at odds with Nanyemba.
Received military training in
Moscow.
Reportedly influential. Received
military training in Moscow.
15. Hidipo Hamutenya Ovambo (Kwanyama) Secretary for Information Inner circle. Leftist, but pragmatist.
Studied in Canada; has advanced
degree. Forceful personality and
may rival or surpass Nujoma in real
power.
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16. Hage Geingob Damara Director of United Nations In-
17. Salomon Hawala Ovambo Deputy Commander, Armed No discernable political ambition.
Forces
outside inner circle. 25X1
stitute for Namibia, Lusaka without talent. Increasingly mi i-
Moderate. Former information sec-
retary and London representative;
stripped of post in 1979. Now shunt-
ed aside.
19. Manton Mutongolume Ovambo (Kwanyama) Secretary for Transport Owes position
to long service to SWAPO and 25X1
Nujoma's loyalty.
and likely to be downgraded.
21. Nahas Angula
22. Lucas Stephanus
24. Dr. Amathila Libertine
25. Jiunaja Jesaya Nyamu
26. Nharikutuke Tjirange
27. Kapuka "Niki" Naujala
28. Helao Ndadi
29. Tuli Hiveluah
30. Hiuanua Shihepo
Ovambo (Ndonga)
Secretary for Education/ Removed from information post ? 25X6
Culture 1981
Nama
Deputy Secretary for Education Joined Central Committee in 19725X1
as reward for recruiting work in
Namibia.
Welfare poor administrator. 25X1
Damara
Deputy Secretary for Health Wife of Ben Amathila~
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Chief Representative to OAU,
Addis Ababa
Herero
Secretary for Legal Affairs Returned to Luanda from Lusaka
after being replaced by a more
25X6
radical Ovambo.l
Ovambo (Ndonga)
Secretary to the Office of the Inner circle. Reported rival of 25X1
President Hamutenva. joma.
pro-Soviet
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Director, Voice of Namibia
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Secretary for Youth
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Deputy Secretary for Interna-
tional Relations
Sent to Eastern Europe for political
education. 25X6-
32. Kimon Kaukungwa Ovambo (Kwanyama) Secretary for Elders Council
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Table 5 25X1
SWAPO Central Committee (continued)
34. Ananias Angula
Ovambo (Ndonga)
35. Netumbo Nandi
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
SWAPO representative in
36. Ndali "Che" Kamati
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
SWAPO Representative to In-
ternational Students' Union,
Prague
37. Tauno Hatuikulipi
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Chief Administrative Officer,
Defense Headquarters
38. Ben Namalambo
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
Chief Security Guard at UN
Institute for Namibia in Lusaka
39. Putuse Apollus
South African origin
SWAPO Representative to
Women's League, OAU
41. Dr. Nickey Iyambo
Ovambo (Kwanyama)
42. Mose Tjitendero
Hereto
Senior lecturer, UN Institute
for Namibia
Comments
25X1
Close to her benefactor, Nujoma,
SWAPO members,
Chief adviser to Secretary of De-
fense Peter Nanyemba. Director of
political affairs at defense head-
quarters in Lubango. In charge of
publishing SWAPO's magazine,
Combat.
Has little influence.
Respected in SWAPO.
Lutheran pastor. Former official of
SWAPO's internal wing. Fled Na-
mibia in 1979.
Secret 30
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Politics (Internal)
Even as South Africa participates in the international
effort to negotiate terms for Namibian independence,
it is trying to develop an internal political structure
that it hopes will be sturdy enough to compete
successfully against SWAPO in UN-sponsored elec-
tions. By creating an interim government and foster-
ing a broad-based alliance to run it, Pretoria has
attempted to create a political force that at once
protects white interests and attracts black votes.
Although the experiment has given the trappings of
democracy to the black majority, it denies blacks
access to real power and maintains de facto apartheid.
Consequently, while the political consciousness of
blacks throughout Namibia has been raised, the
South Africans have not yet produced a political
alternative capable of blocking the election of a
SWAPO majority in an independent Namibia.
Interim Government Structure
The current interim Namibian Government, set up in
1980 by the South African-appointed Administrator-
General in consultation with the Namibian National
Assembly, is largely a perpetuation of previously
existing political institutions. Its most prominent fea-
ture is a three-tier system of elected representatives
that divides-indeed, compartments-governing re-
sponsibility between central, tribal, and local authori-
ties. The power of the elected authorities in the first
tier, or central government, is highly circumscribed,
however, and the Administrator-General remains the
dominant governing force over all levels of govern-
ment in the territory.
At the central level, the Administrator-General has
granted the Council of Ministers-a 15-plus member
body drawn from the National Assembly-what he
describes as "full executive authority." These powers,
however, do not extend to foreign affairs, defense, or
the pace of "constitutional development." The main
function of the central government is to allocate
money for national-level development projects and
services such as police, post and telecommunications,
university education, health care, conservation, and
tourism. It also allocates funds to second-tier authori-
ties in lump sum grants. For revenue, the central
government levies taxes on corporations, general sales,
diamond exports, and corporate dividends to nonresi-
dents. It has come to rely increasingly, however, on
various forms of budget assistance from South Africa.
Even within their limited scope of responsibility, the
central government representatives are weakened be-
cause of the semiautonomous power of the second-tier
authorities-separate bodies representing 10 of the 11
officially designated population groups.' At his discre-
tion, the Administrator-General can grant these au-
thorities control over land tenure, agriculture, preuni-
versity education, health services, housing, social
welfare, pensions, local security, and tribal courts.
Although second-tier representatives also have direct
income taxing authority over their population groups,
this produces only trivial sums in nonwhite areas.
They do, however, control how money allocated to
them by the central government is spent.
Whites prosper under this system. They control their
own sizable tax revenue base and receive a highly
disproportionate amount of redistributed national-
level revenues. By pressing the Administrator-General
to maintain the status quo, the representatives of the
white community have thwarted attempts by the
National Assembly to shift some of the second-tier
power to the central government.
The 10 other groups, consisting of Coloreds and
blacks, fare poorly in comparison. They lack sufficient
revenue, physical infrastructure, or managerial talent
to meet the rising expectations of their constituents.
In addition, because the Administrator-General has
the right to determine the functions of the second-tier
' The Bushmen are administered directly by the central govern-
ment. In addition to the officially designated ethnic groups, a 12th
group, classified as "other," is not accorded an opportunity for
political representation.
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Figure 16
Structure of Namibia's Interim Government
South African Appointed
Administrator-General
Minister's Council
5 Functional Administrative
Groups
13 Functional Departments
Ethnic Representative
Authorities
Local (Municipal)
Authorities
authorities, not all of them have equal power. More-
over, second-tier authorities may designate the central
government as their agent to perform social services;
the Ovambo, for example, have done this with
education.
The third-tier authorities-local governments, village
management boards, and the like-provide local serv-
ices and can tax property.
Internal Political Flux
The present political scene has been largely shaped by
the reaction of tribal and political groups to a consti-
tutional conference, held under the auspices of the
South African Government, that met intermittently
from September 1975 until October 1977. The confer-
ence-known as the Turnhalle Conference-produced
a plan for achieving independence through an internal
settlement, which Pretoria eventually accepted and
still retains as an option. It led to the formation of the
multiethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a coali-
tion of political parties and groups that would domi-
nate the political scene inlcoming years. The confer-
ence also, however, polarized preexisting white and
nonwhite political groups and further alienated
SWAPO, which has been excluded.
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The DTA, com-
posed of ethnic parties from among the officially
designated population groups, remains the major
force in domestic Namibian politics but has lost
significant support in recent months. Although
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I.
I
s
Kuaimo Riruako, a Herero, is its president, the DTA
is still controlled by its founding father, white Repub-
lican Party leader Dirk Mudge. It no longer includes
the full spectrum of prominent figures from the white,
Herero, Ovambo, Colored, and Baster power struc-
ture. Such persons represented a moderate to conserv-
ative cross section of Namibian society-whites and
nonwhites with enough stake in the existing order not
to want it swept away through a SWAPO victory, but
with enough vision to realize that Namibia will
eventually have independence and racial integration
thrust upon it, either violently or through gradual
change.
The Alliance had hoped to become a credible political
force capable of competing successfully against
SWAPO in a UN-sponsored election.' So far, the
Alliance has only partially achieved its objective of
dominating all three tiers of Namibia's interim gov-
ernment. It was swept to power in national elections in
December 1978 but failed to gain control of the
important white, Damara, and Baster second-tier
authorities in elections in November 1980. Although
the Alliance continues to hold a position of apparent
responsibility because of its majority in the central
government, its lack of significant power has lessened
its popularity.
The Alliance has suffered not only from its impo-
tence, but also from championing certain government
actions offensive to blacks, such as universal male
conscription. It has also been connected with the
indigenous territorial military forces that
have committed numerous
depredations against the Ovambo. Overall, we believe
the Alliance has become identified in the minds of
most nonwhite Namibians with the South African
Government and apartheid.
The erosion of the Alliance's prestige increased dra-
matically in February 1982, when it lost one of its
major components, the Ovambo-dominated National
Democratic Party headed by Alliance president Peter
Kalangula. Kalangula, one of the few non-SWAPO
`Member parties compete in second- and third-tier elections, but
combine in first-tier voting.
Ovambo politicians with any credible following, bolt-
ed-ostensibly because of Dirk Mudge's determina-
tion to maintain the Alliance's ethnic differentiation.
More generally, however, Kalangula was reacting to
the Alliance's growing unpopularity by seeking his
political fortune independently.
As of June 1982, only five of the 10 second-tier
representative authorities were in the hands of the
DTA. The white, Ovambo, Damara, Colored, and
Baster authorities were in anti-DTA hands.
Other Parties. Other political coalitions and parties,
following the 1975-77 conference, coalesced in opposi-
tion to the emerging Alliance. Some, generally white
parties, believed that the Alliance was moving too
quickly toward independence and a multiracial state.
Others, generally black or Colored parties, thought
that the Alliance was not going far or fast enough.
Although they rejected the South African-sanctioned
political structure, they organized politically for the
day of UN-sponsored elections.
The conservative opposition is dominated by the Na-
tional Party, which has severed its formal ties with the
South African party but still has indirect influence in
South African politics, a factor that gives it political
clout with the Administrator-General. The party rep-
resents largely rural-based Afrikaans speakers. Work-
ing through a front group, the Action Committee for
Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR), it
initially held the support of some nonwhite ethnic 25X1
groups that feared assimilation in a multiracial Na-
mibia, especially one controlled by the powerful
Ovambo tribe. These groups, however, have largely 25X1
drifted away to other coalitions or have remained
independent. Through its control of the white second-
tier government, the National Party has successfully
resisted the efforts of the Alliance-controlled central
government to end many lingering manifestations of
racial segregation.
Farther to the right is the Namibian branch of South
Africa's arch-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party.
Attracting only a small percentage of the white vote,
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it campaigns for undiminished white supremacy and
continued South African control of Namibia..
The "middle parties"-to the left of the Alliance-
have largely untested followings. Most are not willing
to participate in South African-sponsored balloting,
but are ready to compete in a UN election. Many of
their leaders-drawn typically from the Herero and
Colored intelligentsia-have been associated with
anti-South African Government activities since at
least the early 1970s.
One party that the Namibia National Front had
counted on to join it was the SWAPO-Democrat
(SWAPO-D). This party is headed by former senior
SWAPO official Andreas Shipanga, who left
SWAPO after he failed in an attempt to oust
SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma in 1976. Following two
years in Zambian and Tanzanian jails, Shipanga, an
Ovambo, returned to Namibia to form SWAPO-D to
compete with SWAPO in Ovamboland and elsewhere.
The National Front andI,SWAPO-D, however, could
not agree on merger terms in 1980, and efforts by
other Namibian political groups to court SWAPO-D
The Namibia National Front was once the most have failed. Shipanga, while remaining active, has yet
important middle-group coalition but is now largely a to attract a noticeable following.
reflect-
paper organization. Although the Front has been
National Union the mainly , it once South-West Africa A number of other political parties, shared its leader- ing ethnic interests, also dot the landscape generally Namib-
National Union (SWANU), oian domestic politics, but they generally either lack a
ship with the liberal, largely white Federal Party, significant following within their ethnic group, or
which gave the organization significant financial sup-
port. Another party in the Front, the Damara Council their group is too small to have much impact on the
in political scene.
it
y
coalition un
of Chiefs, dealt a serious blow to
1980, when it violated the Front's principle of nonpar-
ticipation in internal elections; it took part in-and
won-a second-tier Damara-authority election. The
Front has recently made an effort to reactivate itself,
and currently appears to consist of SWANU, the
National Independence Party (a Colored splinter
group), the Mbandero Hereros (Herero subtribe), and
probably the Damara Council.
1
J
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Table 6
Internal Namibian Political Groups a
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) Political alliance formed in 1977; it dominates the interim government.
Republican Party Formed from the rump of the National Party, the party is led by Dirk Mudge, who also
serves as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Moderate, largely white, it lost the sec-
ond-tier election in November 1980 to the National Party, 42 percent to 48 percent.
National Unity Democratic Organization The dominant political group among Hereros; it also has some Nama support. Led by
(NUDO) Herero tribal chief Kuaima Riruako and by Katuutire Kaure, a firebrand speaker and
leading spokesman. Formed in 1964, NUDO supports a multiracial state with a federal
system based on area rather than population-a system designed to afford protection
to the minority tribes against the Ovambo.
South-West Africa People's Democratic Unity Damara party, headed by Englehard Christie, who is not highly respected by other
Front (SWAPUF) DTA colleagues. SWAPUF lost second-tier elections in 1980 to the Damara Council, a
political party in the Namibia National Front.
National People's Liberation Front Splinter Damara group, Windhoek based. Led by political veteran Kefas Conradie.
The Front is a newcomer to the DTA.
Headed by Ben Africa, who lost the "Kapteinship"-the head of the unique Baster
state-in 1979. The party lacks majority following even in Rehoboth, the home of the
Basters.
A new Colored party and the latest political vehicle of veteran politician A. J. F. Klop-
pers, who occupies a seat in the National Assembly. Recently formed with defectors
from the Colored Labor Party.
The DTA also has parties and individual representatives from other smaller ethnic
groups in Namibia. Some lack significant following in their constituencies while others
appear to enjoy some local support.
Its current status is unclear. Once a political alliance to the left of the DTA and the
right of SWAPO, it had some promise as a political third force. Currently, it exists
largely on paper, although it is attempting to make a comeback. Member parties once
prominently associated with it are listed below. They operate today as individual
parties.
South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) Largely Herero, but trying to project a multitribal image. Currently headed by Moses
Katjiuongua and Nora Chase, a veteran Colored politician. SWANU was formed in
1959 and was initially more radical than SWAPO. It has become more moderate in re-
cent years, but still describes itself as "socialist." Maintains a small, nonviolent
external wing that has infrequently worked with SWAPO in the UN. Resents UN's ex-
clusive recognition of SWAPO.
Largely white, English speaking, liberal. Led by Bryan O'Linn. Represents some
significant local business interests; once a major funder of the NNF. Calls for South
African talks with SWAPO. Currently outside NNF.
Contrary to NNF principles, participated in second-tier elections in 1980 and won,
thus becoming the controlling Damara authority. Led by Justus Garoeb, who is also
the NNF president of record, although Garoeb quit the NNF in early March 1982. Re-
ported negotiating with Peter Kalangula.
Largely Colored and Namas, it is a splinter of Federal Party. Led by Charlie Hartung
and Otilie Abrahams, both Colored. Seeks Lancaster House-type settlement.
Led by Munjuku Nguvauva II, represents a subtribe of Hereros that wants separate
status from dominant Herero group.
Action Committee for the Retention of the Formed in 1977 to compete against the DTA, its current composition is unclear.
Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR) Initially it had some nonwhite support, but it is now largely a front for the National
Party.
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Table 6
Internal Namibian Political Groups a (continued)
Led by Kosie Pretorius. This white, largely Afrikaner party dominates the white
second-tier government, which is still a major power throughout Namibia. Ready to
accept Namibian independence, but only with powerful, entrenched second-tier
government. Its political strength comes, in part, indirectly through its informal ties to
South Africa's National Party.
Herstigte National Party (HNF) Ultraright, white, the HNF has the support of about 10 percent of the white
community. Headed by Sarel Becker, it opposes Namibian independence and is
suspicious of a South African "sellout" of Namibia's whites.
Namibian Deutsche Interresse German interest group; provides money to AKTUR, and perhaps to other groups. A
Gemeinschaft (IG) point of contact with the West German Government (most Namibian Germans hold
West German passports).
SWAPO-Democrat (SWAPO-D)
Christian Democratic Action Party
Caprivi African National Union
Namibia Democratic Coalition (NDC)
United Namibia's People's Party
Rehoboth Liberation Party
Built around Andreas Shipanga, a former senior SWAPO official who fell out with
other SWAPO leaders in 1976. Despite its early promise and the fact that Shipanga is
an Ovambo, SWAPO-D has not been able to attract a significant following.
Formerly the National Democratic Action Party, it was renamed by its leader, Peter
Kalangula, shortly after he pulled the NDA out of the DTA in February 1982. The
NDA had dominated the Ovambo ethnic government since its founding in 1973.
Led by former SWAPO Vice President Mishake Muyongo. Wants independence for
Caprivi strip and its dominant tribe.
A small umbrella group that serves as the vehicle of Mburumba Kerina, a political op-
portunist seeking ties and financial support in the West.
Splinter group of SWAPO-D.
Conservative Baster group with a fashionable leftist name. Its leader, Hans Diergaard,
as "Kaptein" of the Basters controls Baster government.
The apparent major political group among the dispersed Coloreds, who lack a
designated "homeland." It split from the DTA in March 1982. It is dominant in the
Colored second-tier government, headed by Barney Barnes.
(some of the splin er groups
may have vanished, merged with others, or shifted in or out of a co-
alition. There are about 45 such groups in all.
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Insurgency
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Guerrilla Force
SWAPO's leaders, exiled since a South African
crackdown in the mid-1960s on the organization's
political activities inside Namibia, have relied primar-
ily on their externally based guerrilla force-the
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)-in
their bid to force Pretoria to cede control over Namib-
The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola in
1975 and the emergence of an independent black
government with Soviet and Cuban backing opened
the way for a ma'or buildup of PLAN in southern
Angola.
the total of trained and
armed guerrillas increased from a few hundred in
1975 to about 8,000 by 1982. With its operational and
logistic headquarters in Lubango, Angola, PLAN also
uses as rear bases other sites along the Mocamedes-
Menongue rail line in Angola and near Senanga in
Zambia
Sovfoto m
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Cautious Strategy
PLAN has seldom followed an aggressive strategy.
The bulk of its forces have been held in reserve in
Angola or Zambia. Guerrilla bands usually travel in
groups no larger than 15 and have avoided contact
with South African troops except for ambushes of
patrols and infrequent mortar or rocket attacks on
military bases. Most guerrilla attacks have been on
black Namibians who have collaborated with the
South Africans and, to a lesser extent, Namibia's
white residents. We believe their aim has been not
only to intimidate civilians but to compel Pretoria to
spread its limited military resources over an increas-
ingly wide area. The strategy of prolonged attrition
also motivates the many incidents of small-scale 25X1
SWAPO's military activity has also been responsive25X1
to shortrun political objectives in recent years. In July
1978, when SWAPO leaders agreed in principle to the
Western proposal that a UN task force monitor a
cutting telephone lines and water mains.
sabotage, such as mining roads and rail lines or
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truce and conduct a preindependence election, they
stepped up guerrilla infiltrations in order to bolster
their claims of territorial control and to prepare for
increased political proselytizing. Later, in order to
disrupt territorial elections held by South Africans in
December 1978, SWAPO leaders sent sabotage teams
into white urban areas to place bombs at polling
stations. When UN Secretary General Waldheim set
a cease-fire target date of February 1979, infiltration
was again increased
War in Ovamboland
For the most part, the insurgency has been restricted
to the four ethnic "homelands"-Kaokoland, Ovam-
boland, Kavangoland, and Caprivi-that make up
northern Namibia. Ovamboland has been the prime
area of guerrilla activity since 1976, when SWAPO
gained access to the adjacent sector of Angola for
staging purposes. We believe that PLAN has seldom
had more than a few hundred active guerrillas inside
Ovamboland, although a peak of some 1,000 may
have been attained in early 1979, when implementa-
tion of the UN truce plan appeared imminent. There
is no solid evidence that even the all-out effort in 1979
to establish an effective presence resulted in the
guerrillas holding any fixed bases in Ovamboland-or
anywhere else inside Namibia
Nevertheless, guerrilla incidents reported by the
South African authorities increased in frequency from
only nine in August 1977 to 93 in April 1979. During
the same period, guerrilla action spread from the
immediate border area throughout most of Ovambo-
land. South African statistics indicate that assassina-
tions of "collaborators"-from village headmen to
policemen, schoolteachers, and senior officials of the
autonomous Ovambo government-may have peaked
in 1979.
South African officials claim that civilian casualties
inflicted by landmines are a critical reason for the
purported disillusionment with SWAPO among the
Ovambos. The South Africans also assert that the
substantial social services provided by their military
personnel stationed in Ovamboland have increased
popular tolerance for the South African presence.
However, Ovambo clergymen and European mission-
aries maintain, we believe accurately, that resentment
Table 7
Deaths Resulting From
the SWAPO Insurgency';a
1978' 1979 1980 1981
Security forces 30 31 87 56
SWAPO guerrillas 900 1,000 1,470 1,500 b
Local inhabitants 90 157 99 94
Assassination 24 102 21 30
Landmine explosions 66 55 78 64
a Based on announcements by South African military spokesmen.
b Excludes SADF's rough estimate of 500 guerrillas killed in the
course of "Operation Protea."
of SWAPO violence is more than offset by brutal
behavior on the part of the South African-recruited
local black troops and occasionally harsh treatment
from the South Africans themselves
Beyond dispute is the fact that the South African
administration has failed to provide Ovamboland with
basic physical security- except for the tiny elite
group of Ovambo officials who reside in the conspicu-
ously fortified areas of the principal towns. A wide
variety of sources indicate that the majority of the
Ovambos are continually harassed by both security
forces and guerrillas. Significantly, Ovamboland was
excluded from the elections of "second-tier" legisla-
tures held in November 1980 in the homelands of
seven tribes and in the white areas. SWAPO had
called for a boycott of the elections, and the South
African authorities, we believe, expected that fear of
guerrilla reprisals would' have resulted in an embar-
rassingly low voter turnout
Activity Outside Ovamboland
One of the most notable' SWAPO operations-a hit-
and-run mortar attack on the South African base at
Katima Mulilo-occurred in Caprivi in 1978, but
little guerrilla activity has occurred in this homeland
since then. We believe this reflects the tightened
control that Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed
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Small guerrilla teams have occasionally penetrated
white areas of Namibia since 1978, but their actions
have not yet appreciably affected the modern sector of
the economy despite occasional instances of railway
sabotage. The only apparent results of SWAPO's
efforts to intimidate whites during the election in
December 1978 were three bomb explosions in Wind-
hoek and one in Swakopmund; none of these caused
serious injuries. Guerrilla bands have also periodically
infiltrated the white farming area south of Tsumeb
and killed white civilians. After a year's respite from
this type of activity, SWAPO infiltrated another
group, estimated by South Africa to be at least 100,
into the Tsumeb area in April 1982. This operation
suggests that SWAPO has overcome to some degree
the disruptive effect of South Africa's continuing
presence in southern Angola, and we believe the main
purpose of this offensive was to demonstrate that
PLAN could still operate in Namibia.
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insurgents
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) has exerted over adjacent areas of Angola,
as well as the restrictions that the Zambian Govern-
ment has placed on SWAPO's use of Zambian ter-
ritory.
In early 1981 small guerrilla bands for the first time
began operating for extended periods in Kaokoland
and Kavango, leading the South Africans to augment
their counterinsurgency forces in the two homelands.
One probable reason for this new theater of PLAN
operations was the stepped-up South African disrup-
tion of PLAN infiltration routes in Angolan territory
opposite Ovamboland.
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Chronology
1486 Portuguese navigator Diego Cao first reaches Cape Cross on coast of South-West
Africa (SWA).
1487 Angra Pequena (now Luderitz Bay) discovered by Bartholomew Diaz.
1840 Namas conquer Hereros. First permanent settlement at Windhoek.
1845 Settlement of Walvis Bay and Rehoboth.
1861 Hereros begin successful revolt against Nama rule.
1866 Britain formally claims Penguin Islands, which are then annexed to Cape Colony.
1870 Peace between Hereros and Namas made at Okahandja.
1878 Walvis Bay annexed by Britain.
1880 Ten-Year War begins between Hereros and Namas.
1883 Rhenish missionaries ask for German protection. German traders active in area.
1884 German Protectorate declared.
Walvis Bay annexed by the Cape of Good Hope Colony.
1886 Border with Angola defined by agreement between Portugal and Germany.
1890 Present boundaries fixed by treaty between Germany and Britain. Small changes
made by international arbitration in 1928.
Caprivi Strip defined-provides German access to the Zambezi River.
1892 German Imperial Commissioner appointed.
1904-07 Herero and Nama uprisings crushed by Germans, ending decades of warfare.
1906 Compulsory education introduced for white children.
1907 Karakul sheep introduced from Germany.
1908 Discovery of diamonds in the Namib Desert.
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Outbreak of World War I.
Invasion of German SWA by South African troops under General Louis Botha.
Surrender of German forces. South Africa begins occupation on behalf of the
United Kingdom.
1919 South Africa granted mandate over SWA following Treaty of Versailles, at which
South Africa's proposal that territory be made its fifth province is rejected.
1920 SWA becomes a League of Nations Mandated Territory of Union of South
Africa.
Walvis Bay placed under control of the Administration of SWA, although legally
part of Cape Province.
South-West Africa Constitution Act provides measure of autonomy to territorial
government by creating a Legislative Assembly for whites.
Settlement of Angola Boers in SWA.
South-West African Police merged with South African Police.
Caprivi Strip administration taken over by South Africa. United Nations Charter
enters into force, providing for establishment of International Trusteeship System.
UN refuses request for incorporation of SWA into South Africa; proposes that
SWA be placed under trusteeship system and that South Africa submit such an
agreement.
South Africa informs UN it will continue to administer territory in "spirit of
mandate." SWA eventually becomes only mandated territory not brought under
International Trusteeship System.
Fishing industry established at Walvis Bay.
SWA receives six seats in South Africa's House of Assembly.
International Court of Justice issues advisory opinion that South Africa cannot
modify the status of the mandate over South-West Africa and, although South
Africa has no obligation to place SWA under a UN trusteeship agreement, that
the General Assembly is competent to supervise the administration of the
mandate.
1955 Trade statistics of SWA are incorporated into those of South Africa.
United Nations holds debate on SWA.
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International Court of Justice rules that the UN can supervise the administration
of SWA without South African cooperation.
Ovambo People's Organization formed in Cape Town.
Forced relocation of blacks to new townships in Windhoek provokes demonstra-
tions resulting in killings by police.
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and South-West Africa
National Union (SWANU) founded.
Proceedings begun by Liberia and Ethiopia before International Court of Justice
challenging South African administration of SWA.
Odendaal Plan calls for strategy of ethnic homeland development in SWA.
Successful offshore diamond mining begun.
International Court of Justice decides that Liberia and Ethiopia are not entitled to
bring action for revocation of South African mandate over SWA.
UN General Assembly terminates South Africa's mandate and assumes direct
responsibility for the territory.
SWAPO begins guerrilla war.
UN Council for South-West Africa established as only legal authority to
administer the territory until independence.
UN delegation attempts to enter SWA and fails.
Limited self-government for Ovambos.
Terrorist attacks on northern boundary.
Name Namibia given by the United Nations to South-West Africa; not recognized
by the South African Government until 1978.
UN Security Council declares South African presence in Namibia is illegal.
UN General Assembly orders South Africa to evacuate Namibia. UK, US, and
other powers abstain from vote. Ignored by Pretoria.
South Africa creates South-West Africa Account to function as Namibia's central
budget under Pretoria's control.
Namibian economic statistics are increasingly merged with those of South Africa.
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The United States adopts policy of official discouragement of new US private
investment in Namibia. EXIM Bank credit guarantees no longer available. UN
adopts similar position by calling on member states to direct their nationals to
cease commercial activity in Namibia.
International Court of Justice upholds UN authority over Namibia and declares
South African presence to be illegal. The territory becomes an international
political problem more than a legal one.
1971-73 Strikes and associated riots produce sizable exodus of persons destined to become
future guerrillas and nationalist politicians.
UN officials, including Secretary General Waldheim, visit Namibia, marking the
beginning of direct negotiations on the future of the territory.
The UN General Assembly recognizes SWAPO as the "authentic representative"
of the Namibian people and appoints Sean MacBride as the first UN Commission-
er for Namibia. Security Council ends negotiations between Secretary General
and South Africa.
UN Security Council Resolution 366 demands withdrawal of illegal South African
administration from Namibia. UN Institute for Namibia created, to be established
in Lusaka.
South African Army units begin to supplement and replace police along Namibia's
northern border.
Western veto blocks Security Council motion to "force" South African withdrawal
from Namibia.
South Africa opens its so-called Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, which gives
itself three years to draw up a constitution for "independence." Conference is
condemned by Trusteeship Committee of UN General Assembly.
Angola granted independence from Portugal.
UN General Assembly again adopts resolution demanding South African with-
drawal from Namibia.
UN Security Council Resolution 385 condemns South African military presence
in Namibia, demands free elections under UN supervision.
Cuban-backed movement wins civil war in Angola.
r
Kavangoland, Caprivi, and Ovamboland are declared "security districts" by South
Africa and are placed under a form of martial law.
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Turnhalle Conference sets end of 1978 as target for Namibian independence and
calls for interim government to hold power during the two intervening years. These
proposals are denounced by SWAPO and the UN Council for Namibia.
Uranium production begins.
Andreas Shipanga arrested in Lusaka.
UN General Assembly recognizes SWAPO as the "sole and authentic" represent-
ative of the Namibian people. SWAPO accorded observer status.
Martti Ahtisaari appointed to succeed MacBride as UN Commissioner for
Namibia.
Completion of Turnhalle discussions resulting in draft constitution for interim
government.
South Africa agrees to participate in Namibian independence negotiations with
five Western powers (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France, and West
Germany).
Appointment by South Africa of Judge M. T. Steyn as Administrator-General-
the chief executive authority in the territory.
Return of Walvis Bay to South African jurisdiction under Cape Province
authority.
West German Consulate in Windhoek closed.
South Africa and SWAPO accept proposals by Western Five for SWA/Namibia
settlement, involving UN-supervised elections.
Security Council Resolution 431 embodies Western Five proposal. Resolution 432
calls for reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibian territory.
At Security Council request, the UN Secretary General appoints Martti Ahtisaari
as his Special Representative for Namibia.
Security Council Resolution 435 provides for a UN Transition Assistance Group
to ensure free and fair Namibian elections, and declares unilateral, internal
electoral measures in Namibia to be null and void.
South Africa proceeds with internal Namibian election for a constituent assembly,
but agrees to cooperate in achieving implementation of Resolution 435.
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Namibian Constituent Assembly proposes and South Africa creates a National
Assembly to serve as interim government in Namibia, based on ethnic representa-
tion and with wide legislative powers, but with no power to change international
status of the territory.
UN General Assembly rejects South Africa's credentials and denies it
participation.
South Africa plays for time and blocks further progress in the UN negotiations.
Gradual transfer of budget responsibility, from South-West Africa Account to
Central Revenue Fund under Namibian authority, begins.
Dr. Gerrit Viljoen replaces Steyn as Administrator-General.
SWAPO shifts operations largely from Zambia to Angola.
The National Assembly elects a Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of
Dirk Mudge, which holds limited executive powers. Interim Constitution
introduced.
South Africa accepts, in principle, Security Council Resolution 435 as the basis of
a Namibian settlement.
Danie Hough replaces Viljoen as Administrator-General.
First major South African operation against SWAPO in Angola.
South Africa undermines "preimplementation" talks in Geneva in January.
Three major South African ground attacks in Angola!.
Western Contact Group launches new, phased-negotiation attempt at settlement.
Ahtisaari resigns as UN Commissioner for Namibia, but retains position as the
Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia.
Brajesh Mishra is appointed UN Commissioner for Namibia, over objections of
Western Five powers who feel post should remain vacant.
South Africa stages minor raid on SWAPO base in western portion of southern
Angola.
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Statistical Summary
This summary is based on data available as of 31 July 1982.
Land Area: including Walvis Bay, 824,269 square kilometers (318,261 square miles);
twice the size of California and roughly 3 percent of the African continent.
Coordinates: Between 17? and 29? south latitude and between 12? and 25? east
longtitude.
Land Boundaries: 3,798 kilometers.
Coastline: 1,489 kilometers.
Territorial waters (claimed): 12 nautical miles, plus 200-nautical-mile fishing
zone.
Rivers (perennial): Kunene (325 km), Okavango (400 km), Orange (500 km),
Zambezi (100 km).
Climate: Basically subtropical with dry, sunny winters and warm summers.
Tropical in extreme north and progressively drier to the south. Annual rainfall
averages range from 25 millimeters in Namib Desert to 400 mm in central plateau
region and as much as 700 mm in Caprivi. The overall mean is 273 mm. Main
rains occur from December to February.
Vegetation: Mostly desert except for wooded savanna on interior plateau and
tropical areas along northern border and in Caprivi in the northeast.
People Population: 1,009,900 (May 1981, official estimate). Independent, unofficial
estimates are higher; for example, 1,250,000 (for mid-1982). Over half of
population is under 16 years old.
Population density: Approximately 1.5 per square kilometer.
Average annual growth rate: 3 percent.
Urban population: 15 percent.
Geographic distribution: Over 60 percent of population in Ovamboland, Kavango-
land, and Caprivi.
Ethnic divisions (percent): White (7.5), mixed race (6.9), black (85.6). Over half of
the nonwhites belong to the Ovambo tribe.
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Language: Several African languages. Afrikaans is principal language of about 60
percent of the white population (and of most Coloreds), German of 30 percent, and
English of 10 percent.
Adult literacy: Approximately 28 percent for blacks.
Schools: No universities, two teacher training colleges, one music conservatory,
and one college for vocational education. Department of National Education is
responsible for nationwide syllabuses and inspections for 12 ethnically based school
systems. Private companies operate technical training institutions.
Medical facilities: 152 doctors, 16 dentists. Ethnically based provision of services.
South African military doctors provide virtually the only medical care to many
rural blacks. Over 70 hospitals of all types provide roughly 7,000 beds.
Legal name: Namibia
Capital: Windhoek
Political subdivisions: 10 tribal homelands, with the remainder of the territory
open to white settlement; administrative subdivisions according to tribal group.
Type: Former German colony of South-West Africa mandated to South Africa by
League of Nations in 1920; UN formally ended South Africa's mandate on 27 Oc-
tober 1966, but South Africa has retained administrative control. Interim
government composed of national, second-tier tribal, and local levels. South Africa
retains ultimate authority.
Legal system: Based on Roman-Dutch law and law of custom.
Government leaders: Danie Hough, Administrator-General appointed by South
Africa, has wide executive powers. Dirk Mudge heads the national-level Council of
Ministers of the "interim government."
Suffrage: Ethnic groups have adult franchise for national-level election and for
elections in their own second-tier government.
Elections: Election of Namibian National Assembly, December 1978. Second-tier
elections for some groups held in 1980. National Assembly elections proposed for
March 1983.
Political parties and leaders: The dominant national-level coalition is the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). There are approximately 45 tribally based
parties. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), led by Sam
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Nujoma, maintains a foreign-based guerrilla movement as well as a legal political
structure in Namibia, is predominantly Ovambo but has some influence among
other tribes, and is the only Namibian group recognized by the UN General
Assembly and the Organization of African Unity.
Communists: No Communist party; SWAPO guerrilla force is supported by
USSR, Cuba, and other Communist states as well as the UN, OAU, and various
Western private groups.
Economy GDP: (1981, preliminary) $1,494 million; $1,195 per capita.
GDP breakdown: (1980) Government, 32 percent; mining, 47.7 percent; agriculture
and fishing, 9.6 percent; other, 10.7 percent.
Agriculture: Commercial livestock raising (cattle and karakul sheep) predomi-
nates. Subsistence crops (millet, sorghum, corn, and some wheat) are raised, but
self-sufficiency has not been achieved and food must be imported.
Fishing: Catch of about 212,000 metric tons (1980), processed mostly in South
African enclave of Walvis Bay. Lobstering at Luderitz.
Mining: Exploitation of diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, tin, zinc, salt, and
vanadium. Largest uranium mine in world at Rossing. One of the world's leading
producers of gem diamonds.
Major industries: Meatpacking, fish processing, (fish oil, fish meal, canned fish),
copper and lead smelting, uranium processing, dairy products.
Electric power: Annual demand requires only about 140 megawatts (Mw) of
generating capacity. Existing capacity of over 400 Mw includes the Van Eck coal-
fired thermal station at Windhoek, for standby use (120 Mw), Kunene hydroelec-
tric scheme (240 Mw), and emergency diesel at Walvis Bay (45 Mw). In addition,
powerlines from South Africa provide at least 160 Mw because capacity of the Ku-
nene River fluctuates widely with seasonal rainfall and is vulnerable to sabotage.
Economic aid: South Africa is the only donor. Assistance exceeds $600 million
annually.
Budget: 1982-83 expenditure estimated at $825 million against revenue of $627
million, plus borrowing of $198 million.
Monetary conversion rate: 1 South African Rand = 87 US cents (as of 31 July
1982); 1.15 SA Rand = US $1.
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Inflation rate: (1981) More than 15 percent.
Laborforce: Approximately 500,000 (1981), of whom about 75,000 are unem-
ployed; employment consists of 60 percent agriculture, 19 percent industry and
commerce, 8 percent services, 7 percent government, and 6 percent mining.
Organized labor: No trade unions, although some white wage earners belong to
South African unions.
Transportation and Railroads: 2,607 kilometers of 1.067-meter (narrow gauge) single track connecting
Communications Windhoek and Walvis Bay to the mining centers and integrated with the South
African system.
Bus service: 9,400-kilometer network, serving 105 points.
Roads: 54,500 kilometers; 4,079 kilometers paved, remainder gravel and dirt roads
and tracks.
Ports: Walvis Bay and Luderitz. Walvis Bay is claimed by South Africa and is the
only deepwater port, handling the bulk of exports. It has almost a mile of wharf
space, 110,000 square feet of storage, and 33 harbor cranes. Luderitz has an
artificial harbor suited only to small vessels.
Civil air: Namib Air, a national airline, operates three modest-size passenger
aircraft and several smaller craft on domestic routes and to South Africa.
International carriers provide flights connecting Windhoek to South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Germany, and Britain.
Airfields: 102 usable; 17 with permanent-surface runways. One with runway over
4,500 meters; three with runways over 2,500 meters; 45 with runways 1,000 to
2,500 meters.
Water resources: Over 1,600 boreholes and 600 dams, plus a 300-kilometer canal
system in Ovamboland.
Telecommunications: Undersea cables to Cape Town and London; good urban,
fair rural services. Microwave relay connects major towns, with wire to other
population centers. 50,300 telephones linked to South African network. One local
TV station and 10 FM radio stations-under the control of the South-West
African Broadcasting Corporation. Radio services are in English, German, and
Afrikaans. Shortwave broadcasts are provided by the SWABC in the languages of
the Ovambo, Herero, Damara, and Kavango.
Newspapers: Six local, in English, German, and Afrikaans.
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Secret
Defense Forces Military manpower: Compulsory conscription for blacks introduced in 1980, but
excluding Ovamboland, Kavangoland, and Caprivi.
Major ground units: South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) was estab-
lished in 1980.
Personnel: Total active duty composed of about 3,000 SWATF and about 18,000
South Africa Defense Force (SADF) personnel in Namibia.
Ships: No navy separate from the SADF.
Aircraft: No air force separate from SADF.
Supply: From South Africa.
Military budget: For fiscal year 1981/82, about $63 million. Annual expense of
South African operations in Namibia is well hidden in the SADF budget but is es-
timated at about $400 million.
Intelligence and Security As of 1 September 1980, an independent police force was created for Namibia. It
has its own budget and all the traditional national police functions except for
security (Special Branch) and intelligence which remain under the control of the
South African Government.
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P)rto
A;ecandre
Dk6l nd
Namibia
and Walvis Bay
nternational boundary
---?- Magisterial district boundary
* Capital
- Railroad
Hard surfaced road
----- Loose or unsurfaced road
'r Airport
?1 Major port
Populated places
Windhoek ? 77.000
00 Over 10;000
0 5,00010,000
S Under5.000
spot elevatier.s m meters
Scale 1:4,000,000
50 100 150
K~'0 "e'e s
50 100
~dJ~:cl N'iP5
50 130
S:a!L.e M es
Lambert Conformal Confc Protection, Standard Paral e's 5?and 30?
R
Swakopmurd `
South Afr(ca
(Wafvts Bay?
L))
Walvis Bay
4uto
1 al' Li Y!
m ra(en f /T' Kalk`e c
1 rt(2r~ fb
~,,.
Boonday eprese:^tetio' s
not ?eceesan:y eP'"o? lat.,e
Otjiv~
Port
No?oto
Owarrbo
_;' ~~
ramp
r
ot2 Bce maniand
krootfontetn .'/
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