STATEMENT BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 36TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK OCTOBER 21 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002300020004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 21, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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V' r-I N I \ " " Y 8('0
U S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGT? N1, D.C., 20451
STATEMENT BY
EUGENE V. ROSTOW
DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES .ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 36TH,GENERAL ASSEMBLY
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
OCTOBER 21, 1981
State Dept. review completed.
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Mr. Chairman:
The United States Delegation and I, personally, are pleased
to see you, Ambassador and Secretary Golob, as Chairman of this
important committee and we warmly congratulate you on your selection.
Your career attests to your distinguished qualifications for this
high and delicate mission and we are gratified that your selection
is also a tribute to Yugoslavia -- a staunch symbol' of national
independence throughout the world. Yugoslavia has mastered the
important secret of achieving harmony among the peoples who are its
citizens. The United States Delegation is earnestly committed to
providing you with full support and assistance in the discharge
of your.important tasks.
It is a privilege for me to address the First Committee of
the General Assembly, in order to present the views of my Government
on arms control and disarmament, both the major items on the-arms
control agenda of the United Nations, and some related problems
as well. If you will permit me a personal note, I have long been
involved in United Nations affairs. I served in the Secretariat
years ago, and look back to that experience with pride. And a
considerable part of my-scholarly work has been devoted to the
study of the United Nations"as a peacekeeping institution-
The people and government of the United States have
always viewed the Charter and the institutions of the United
Nations as critically important elements of the world political
system. The American people know that the United Nations is part
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-2-
of the skeleton and the central nervous systen of world politics.
And they look to it with hope. The Charter embodies an agreed code
of values which define the necessary terms of international
cooperation -- the rules which should guide and animate the
behavior of states, and unite the members of the United Nations,
for all their differences, into a single society.and polity.
The code of the Charter has grown out of nearly two hundred years
of trial and error in the long struggle of the enlightenment to
conquer or at least the tame the aggressive instincts of man. If
the Charter rules -- and especially its rules dealing with the
international use of force -- should finally disappear as an
influence on the behavior of states, world public order would
collapse into anarchy, and general war would inevitably ensue.
The First Committee is the designated forum for discussions
of arms control, disarmament and international security issues.
Its authority derives not only from its mandate but from the
distinction of its past achievements. It is, surely, the premier
forum in which the nations can consider what they should do to lift
the crushing burden of arms and the threat of war from the backs
and minds of their people.
The United States approaches the problems of arms control
not as isolated abstractions but as components of the larger problem
of international security and stability. After all, arms control
initiatives are meaningless unless they are viewed as aspects of
a comprehensive strategy to achieve and to maintain peace.
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The traditional discussion of many hardy perennials on the UN
arms control agenda often has an air of unreality, to say the
least.. The reason for this tone of unworldliness at the UN is
that it has become a habit among us not to talk about the central
issues in any examination of the problem of peace -- the declining
influence of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the behavior of
states. The Charter says, and I quote, "All members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use-of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes.
of the United Nations."
The last two decades have witnessed a rising tide of-threats-
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions -- actions
which involved the use or the threat of force against the
territorial integrity or poltical independence of states. Far
too often, in the UN and elsewhere, we write and talk as if peace
could be secured through the adoption of an aseptic formula for
limiting or abolishing nuclear tests, or controlling international
arms transfers, or declaring our undying faith in the principles.
of universal disarmament. We make such speeches and draft such
resolutions while the manufacture of arms sets new records
every year as th leading growth industry throughout the world;
while state after state around the world is under threat or under
attack; while unprovoked invasions occur without even the
pretense of the excuse of self-defense; and while armed bands
and terrorists cross internationalfrontiers_to assault the political
independence of states.
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As the fever of aggression spreads, the world corv*unity does
less and less to vindicate the basic principle of Article 2(4),
the principle of the equality and integrity of all states, the
rock on which the Charter and the state system rest. As a
distinguished American scholar has commented, the world community
now treats such events with a "normative silence" which is "deafening
and ominous. As a result, more and more states live in fear and
trembling. They turn to arms, even to nuclear arms, to assure
their survival. Somehow or other they find arms, despite our
rules.
Unless we confront these facts and restore general and
reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2(4) of
the Charter, the slide towards anarchy will engulf us all.
Achieving peace is not a simple matter, to be settled on the
cheap, and without tears. Peace requires more than the drafting
of treaties and resolutions, however worthy. Until we take
effective steps to see to it that the Charter, the arms control
treaties and the legally binding decisions of the Security
Council are obeyed; until we can verifv and assure compliance with
their-terms, much of what passes for arms control will be a sterile
exercise at best and often, alas, no more than a charade.
My first point todav,therefore?is to assure you that in this
forum and in all other fora my government will urge that we
examine the problems of arms control and disarmament on our
agenda in the full light of reality. To that end, we shall propose
and support a series of initiatives designed to focus attention
systematically on the principal problems of
establishing peace.
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The underlying cause of the declining influence of
article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse
of a=--..s control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet
Union, and the extraordinary military buildup on which it is
based. The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence
in the world. A great deal occurs because of other factors.
what the Soviet Union does is to exploit and manipulate
regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its own sphere
C- dominance.
I make this gc;_ment not to engage in idle polemics , but
-?-_ -v to state a self-evident fact known to everyone in tai s
rccm. is a =act of Critical importance, which: is fundamental
to the decisions which my Government has had to t--{e and which
we are other C^1ier-. ntS a"taking as well -- decisions to restore the
al :nce power, to deepen the Soli a=_L;7 of our alliances
and other friendly relations of security. cooperation, and to
_? low the cc::=u_ ity of nations to live in peace. in our ae-
'_atiors :r t.. tze Soviet union, we must insist or. the only possible
true detente, that of scrupulous and reciprocal respect
_^.= =e _ 3visio _S C= the Cnite~C rations C are e~ ~eC~~C_. e
use of force.
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6.
Over the past decade, the world has endured the shock of
the Soviet Union's accelerating drive for dominance, based
upon an extraordinary allocation of its resources for military
purpose. That drive is a clear and'present danger to world
peace and human freedom.
The goal of the Soviet Union's military buildup is to
attain military superiority, superiority in both the destructive
power of its nuclear forces and in the Global reach of its con-
ventional forces. As the British and ;Urnerican. governments
pointed out some years ago, and as all the independent studies
of the subject agree, the Soviet buildup cannot be explained
solely in terms of defense, however broadly the concept of.
de ense is interpreted. The record speaks for itsel- as
? bassador Adelman pointed out yesterday.
Soviet expansionism is aimed at destroying the world
balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends.
This drive is being carried on by methods openly in violation
of the principles of the u';`7 Charter. The instabilities thus
created have impelled many developing nations to seek and acquire
weapons with which to protect their perceived nationa? interests.
T .'-*,;s far, I have -recalled for you only the : isible manifes-
rations the Soviet drive for power __. tae hir ;oriel -- ? L
_ues = for client states and strategic pcsitons ,, and i cs
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tendency to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its
domain by the use of proxy forces, military' assistance, sub-
bersion, or terrorism.
I should now say a few words about the issue of nuclear
arms and nuclear arms control which are at the center of
Soviet strategic doctrine. T the i he United States views the: ory
..
to bring the nuclear weapon under international control as the
most important task of those who seek to realize the promise of
peace. Without success in this effort, no other success in the
field of arils control will be possible.
A basic delis-.-a has haunted nuclear arms control negotiations
from their beginning. For many years the United States assumed
that the Soviet Union shared its view that the objective of
arms control necotitions should be to allow each Side the same
right to maintain deterrence, a retaliatory capacity, and sta-
b ility.
There have been occasthns where East and West have had t -he
same approach to an arms control problem; for example, on the
question of nuclear weapons -proliferation. The von-Proliferation
Treat": of 1968 demonstrated how real gains in security can result
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8.
when the Soviet Union recognizes its fundamental national
interest in the stability of the state system. It is no longer
possible to assume a mutuality of interest. The United States
and the Soviet Union have different policies with regard to
nuclear and conventional weapons. Therefore they have different
objectives in negotiating to limit the spiral of nuclear and
conventional arms accumulation.
SALT is a case in point. United States nuclear doctrine is
clear. Our goals are deterrence and stability. Our nuclear
arsenal exists to make certain that neither the Soviet Union
nor any other country can use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons for aggressive purposes, or threaten the ultimate
interests of the United States by any other means. Our
purposes is to maintain a credible second-strike nuclear capa-
bility so that the United States, its allies, and its other
interests are protected at all times. Facing an assured American
second-strike capability, no potential nuclear aggressor will
feel free to use military force against the United States, our
NATO allies, the nations of the western hemisphere, Japan, or an'F
other strategically critical nation, and we could not be deterred from
using conventional force in defense of our interests if it
became necessary to do so. This is and must remain the goal of our
nuclear arsenal and, therefore, our minimal goal in nuclear
arms control negotiations.(
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The Soviet Union has not yet adopted a parallel position.
On the contrary, the mission of its nuclear forces is intimi-
dation and coercion -- and, if necessary', victory in nuclear
war. I need not recite the list of the new weapons deployed
by the Soviets in the last ten years. The Soviet Union has
been anA is still adding ICBMs, large medium-range missiles,
nuclear weapons submarines and bombers to its arsenal in an
obvious effort to create and maintain a nuclear advantage.
The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed not at achieving
and preserving strategic stability, but at creating and aggra-
v a-. ? ng strategic instability. Soviet strategic programs are
designed to threaten t e survivability of our strategic forces.
This e_tahas i s i n Soviet military doctrine and action is in itself:
a _enudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction
est_. on m tual JL:I_''.e'_ability, which many -nericans thought
both Sides had adopted _n 1972. The Soviet lead in heavy and
acc,,_-ate IC3_is capable of destroying a large part of our IC3 k
force in a first strike, undermines the basis for stability
and reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a situation is a
recipe for nuclear blackmail. We cannot emphasize too often
that the p_ _nc; pal danger =acing the world is not nuclear war
but =c__.._cal coercion based on t e credible threat of nuclear
War.
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In this situation, what is the position of my government
towards arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? The
profound changes in the strategic environment since.1972 have
required the United States to review its arms control policies
which have failed, and to devise new policies adapted to the
world as it now is. That process of review is proceeding rapidly
and at a high level.
Apart from these indispensable preparations and the intel-
lectual effort they require, the United States has established
no preconditions for arms control negotiations with the Soviet
Union. We are not waiting for a military balance to be
restored before we parlay with the Soviet Union. And we
are setting no political condition, either, despite our deepest
concern regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan
and its expansionist activities in other parts of the world.
The United States is, of course, taking steps to restore
its deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. These
steps are indispensable in themselves from-the point of view of
security.. In the world.of reality, fair and balanced arms
control agreements would be' inconceivable without a firm American
commitment to maintain a credible deterrent.
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on nuclear arms control issues with the Soviet Union.
We shall,be seeking arms reductions and arms control agree-
ments which would ensure an. erual deterrent capacity for both
sides at lower levels of armament, and which would require both
parties to cooperate in assuring compliance.
We have already begun the first phase of substantive talks
August we proposed informal talks on problems of verifying
compliance with arms control agreements, on the provision of
data, and on certain other general subjects which would arise
' in arms control negotiations. We told the Soviet Union that we
thought cooperative procedures would be necessary to supplement
national technical means in a number of areas, and invited
Soviet ideas about how best to proceed -- through diplomatic
channels, through special meetings of experts, or through the
negotiations themselves. We have not yet had a response to this
proposal.
US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces
will begin in a few weeks -- on November 30. We welcome the
commencement of these talks. We expect to be ready to propose
that the companion talks on. the reduction of strategic nuclear
forces should begin early in 1982.'
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III
I should now like to turn to the specific subjects
under discussion in this Committee and at the Committee
on Disarmament.. Let me state at the outset that the United
States Government is strongly committed to the work of the
C. I intend, despite the demands of the nuclear arms
problem, to take a sustained personal interest in the matters
to be discussed here and in Geneva. I expect during
the months ahead that the United States will propose
a n ben of initiatives in the Committee on Disarmament,
in order to take full advantage of the Committee's capacity
for seriously considered and deliberate action.-
On_e area in which we hope and ex_ ect this Commnittee and the
Coorzitt_e on Disarmament to take a strong lead is in addressing
=. questions of monitoring and verifying compliance with
arms control agreements, new and old. New procedures are
needed to make verification p recesses more L_=rough
and more
re2.4 The cause of_peace cannot be advanced if the
nations have little confidence that arms control agreements
L
are_ being complied with. In certain areas -- those concerned
with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, for example --
ccmp=lance can be quite literally a :matter of life and
d=a= .?:o nation can be expected to respect an arms conc_ol
agreement unless it can be
sure that other signatories are
ccmp.1v~ ^c with it.
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In this perspective, I should mention the use
of lethal and incapacitant chemical agents in Southeast Asia,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This is a matter of deep
and continuing concern to my Government. The use of chemical
agents and toxins in Southeast Asia makes clear the need for
concrete international action to restore confidence in the 1925
Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention and
associated rules of customary international law.
The U.S. supported UNGA Resolution 35/144C which initiated the
ongoing experts investigation of reports on the use o= cne_micas
weapons. We regret that some nations felt obliged to oppose it-.
We do not understand such opposition. The new evidence concerning
the use of toxins makes the work of the M'xperts Group all the
more important. My Government looks forward to the findings
of the Experts Group in light of all the evidence before it,
including the new evidence.
This issue is a matter of critical importance in many
dimensions. It requires the full attention of this Committee
and of the General Assembly, both because of- the implications
for the relevant international prohibitions on the possession
and use of such weapons,and because of the broader issues
raised by their use.. People are dying. This is not an East-
West issue, nor is it a IN-ort':-South issue. Rather, it is an
issue which concerns the security -- present and future -- of
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all nations alike. Once more such weapons are being used --
weapons regarded with loathing and revulsion throughout the
world. These weapons are not being used on animals but on
human beings in small defenseless countries. If the nations
are not willing or able to - take concrete and effective actions
to deal with this problem and enforce compliance with the 1925
Geneva Protocol and, the Biological Weapons Conventions, then
the prospects for any arms control initiative will be seriously
undermined.
I wish to emphasize two of the principles which will guide
our thinking on problems of verification in both bilateral
and multilateral agreements. First, we shall not confine-our-
selves to negotiating only about those aspects of a problem
which can be resolved by resorting to national technical means.
In the case of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall
begin ^y offering substantial limitations that are strategically
S_gnipicant, and then construct the set df measures necessary
to ensure veri_iability. These may well include cooperative
p roced?; "es between the United States and the Soviet Union, such
as detailed data exchanges and .provisions to enhance the confi-
dence of each side in data dbtained by national technical means.
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Second, we shall seek verification provisions which not
only ensure that actual threats to our security resulting
from possible violations can be detected in a timely manner,
but also limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing,
Ambiguity can never be eliminated entirely from documents
drafted by men, but we shall do our best to keep it to a mini-
mum. Ambiguous provisions result in compliance questions and
compliance questions lead to compliance complaints which, even
if ultimately resolved, strain the atmosphere for arms control
negotiations.
Given the importance of verification for the viability
of arms control across the board, Soviet acceptance of
cooperative measures to improve the verifiability of
specif.jc limitations may be the best test of its commitment
to serious arms limitations on both a bilateral and
multilateral basis.
Let me now turn to the important issue of nuclear non-
proliferation. The, position of the United States is clear.
President Reagan has identified this problem as-'one of the
most critical challenges faced by the-world community.
-It'is the premise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that a
halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons serves the
interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.
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It is manifest that, in a world where many nations have nuclear
weapons, international politics would be nearly unpredictable
and volatile to the point of explosiveness. President Reagan has
recognized that political instability can be a cause as well
as a consequence of nuclear proliferation. He has pointed
out that global and regional stabilization are necessary but *idt sufficient -- conditions for success in the effort
to carry out the policies of the von-Proliferation Treaty.
In addition, both supplier and consumer nations must work
together to ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation, an
? essential factor in meeting global energy needs, is not
misused.
In the context of regional. approaches to non-proliferation,
I am Pleased to announce that the Senate
Foreign Rez _at`ions
C0=44-tee has favorably reported Protocol 1 of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco and the Senate is expected shortly to give its
advice and consent for ratification. President Reagan will,
a= sure, move promptly to deposit our instrument of ratifi-
Ca S t'rnaty rcas a farsighted initiative of Latin
A erican. countries that has contributed significantly to
hemispheric security. while the regime envisaged by the treaty
is not yet complete, we?hope all nations in the region will
make ever % effort to ensure the 'full success o this important-
::_e?rem erz.
CC=
--ee l on c
has its a enda items relating to establishing
ot_ er nuc? ear-freo -
zones. The United States Government rigs taker,
a keen interest in supporting the #
9 -Egyptian-initiative
to establish
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a Fiddle Eastern Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The proposal has
great promise, which can be realized only if the states of the
region work together to fulfill it. Many problems will have
to be solved by those states before the dream of the Middle
East as a nuclear weapons free zone can become a reality.
The-united States stnads ready to assist the states of the
region, if they wish such assistance, in studying these thorny
issues, and in resolving them. We hope that this General
Assembly will encourage the project and give it further impetus.
The United States is prepared to participate construc-
tively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view
to concluding successfully the nego iation o a convention pro-
hibiting radiological weapons. We also believe that the iiapor-
tant work of that body in the area o chemical weapons should
be continued.
salting nuclear tests has been an issue before this
Co ttee, the CD, and its predecessors for .::any years. High
hopes have been attached to the proposal, and no one can question
the -cal it is designed eventually to achieve. Of , the
course
United States Ggverr..ment supports that. long term goal. But a test
ban care of of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
.e s~.all cooperate fully in appropriate procedures to examine
- =e ?robl==s the propcsal presents. rowe-ver, international
CO:.d .lions have not been propitious and are not new prop' tiouS
for i edia_e ac_icn on this worthy project.
J
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As we consider the question of a nuclear test ban, we
should keep in mind that in order for such a ban ultimately
to be effective, it must be verifiable. And it must be
concluded under conditions which ensure that it would
enhance rather than diminish international security and
stability.
The Committee is discussing the possibility of further
arms control measures for outer space, a question which the
CD might wish to discuss further. The J.S. has supported
efforts to control arms in space in the past through such major
61 international agreements as the Outer Space Treaty and the
Limited Test.3an_ Treaty.. Moreover, US military use of space
has been non-aggressive in nature and has been conducted with
.great restraint. Further steps in space.arms control are
-eatly -
co::,plicat ? ed b the `ac: that the Soviet Union has ~many years been testing an anti-satellite wea -
pon -- a space
s ?stem designed for the sole purpose of attackinc other
nations' satellites -- and maintains a continuing operaticna_
capacity to use this weapon.
As the -First CCIur_,ttee conducts its work, it is important
to keep in mind that aious rhetoric and vacuous resolutions
do nct constitute ar:^s -control. _?!oreover, the United
states IS i_=III C^.~Csed
al! C:J_n7 a.-,-''.S COI? __?-'_
-ecot_aticns,
cst sersous issue nation
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can address, to be.abused for purposes of political warfare.
The serious effort to deal with matters of concern to this
body or the specialized Agencies of the UN must not become
the victim of-political disputes which can be considered
on their merits in the appropriate United Nations bodies.
I. hope that members of this Committee will reject propaganda
resolutions which tend so -often to frustrate our deliberations
about serious issues. This would provide a better atmosphere
next year for the Second Special Session of the UNGA devoted
to Disarmament. I want to emphasize the strong support of
the U.S. Government for the Special Session and pledge our
cooperation to ensure its success.
Let me conclude by returning to the therie with which
I began: that arms control is not a magic formula through
which differing views of the international scene can be
reconciled. Without fundamental agreement on the basic
premises which underlie the UN Charter, the prospects for
substantial progress in arms control will be dim-indeed.
Limitations on nuclear arms will not have much chance of
success until'the Soviet Union accepts the view that it too
must abide by Article 2 (4). This century, bloody as it has
been,has, in most areas of the world, seen the rise of a
state system in which self-determination and a tolerance of
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different political and social systems has become the norm.
Most dreams of militarism, empire, and expansionism have been
abandoned- The great question which remains to be answered is
whether the last remaining traditional colonial empire is pre-
pared to join with the rest of us in seeking the newer and better
world order anticipated by. our charter.
In the nuclear, age there can be no doubt that peace
is indivisible. The world community cannot and will not
long accept a double standard, as President Reagan has pointed
out. We in the West have been patient, and we are slow to
anger. But no one should take our patience for blindness or
passivity. Secretary of State Haig summed up the position of
the United States a few months.ago in these terms:
"What do we want of the Soviet Union? We
want greater Soviet restraint in the use of force.
We want greater Soviet respect for to independence
of others. And we want the Soviets to abide by their
reciprocal obligations, such as those undertaken in
the Helsinki Accords. These are no more than we
demand of any State, and these are no less than are
required by the UN Charter and international law.
The rules o the Charter governing the international
use of force will lose all of their influence on the
behavior of nations if the Soviet Union-continues
its aggressive course."
The United States and the Soviet Union, possessing
very large nuclear forces, are locked into an extraordinary
relation. In a famous article, it was once characterized
as the relation between two scorpions in a bottle. I
prefer another metaphor.
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There are marriages of love and marriages of convenience.
There are also.marriages of necessity. The Soviet policy of
expansion, fueled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet
armed forces and particularly of its nuclear forces, has
produced?a situation of growing tension and instability in
the world political system. The efforts of the Soviet Union
to split the West and to prevent Western improvement of its
defenses will surely fail. As a consequence, the Soviet
Union should join the United States and its allies and
accept the necessity of cooperation as the only way out of
the dileI la both camps now confront. Only on that footing
can they hope to achieve conditions of peaceful coexistence,
as Secretary of State Haig defined the concept in the speech
from which I have just quoted.
As President Reagan sees it, the bilateral nuc ear arms
co trot^.egCtiations which have already begun, and which will
soon enter their more formal stage in Geneva, should, if
successful, be a long step towards the goal of restoring
world public order. Our work here and in the Committee on
Disarmament is equally im-portant, and if conducted in a spirit
of realism, can also contribute greatly to that end.
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