MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 22, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

SEC.=
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
- Yrs-31 I d Li
?
WASH ilqq70N
December 22, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE :ALEXANDER M. HAIG,. JR.
? The *Secretary of State.
SUBJECT:
THE HONORABLE EUGENE V. ROSTOW
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
/addle East Nuclear "Weapon Free Zone and
Other Middle East Arms Control Issues
?
I have considered your views on the above subjects, as
forwarded by your memoranda of November 9 and 5 respectively. -
I- have decided that a review of policy issues involved in
United States approaches to arms transfer, arms control,
non-proliferation and related-matters in .the Middle East
should be prepared for :future NSC deliberation. This review
should be prenared.by the Department of State an conjunction
with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency andcoordin4ted
with other responsibleagenciep and the NSC staff. Pending
the outcome of this review, the United States should refrain
from linking Israeli adherence to-the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(or the equivalent such as a Middle East Nuclear weapon Free'
Zone) to Middle East peace.
?
410
cc: The Vice President
The Secretary of Defense
Counsellor to the Presiderit
The Director of Central Intelligence
Chief of Staff to the President
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSC review completed.
State Dept. review completed.
?
SECRET
view on 11/23/87
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
2 / 1 /82
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Middle
East Arms Control Issues
I. Pur-oose
This paper responds to the President's memorandum of
December 22, 1981, which directed that a review of policy issues
involved in United States approaches to arms transfer, arms
control, non-proliferation and related matters in the Middle
East be prepared for future NSC deliberation.
II. US Objectives in the Middle East
United States approaches to arms transfer, arms control,
non-proliferation and related matters in the Middle East
must, by definition, be designed to support fundamental United
States interests and objectives in the region. A number of
these objectives are mutually reinforcing. At the same time,
however, there is a risk that approaches in these policy areas
will support certain U.S objectives to the detriment of others.
Therefore, any decisions on arms transfer, arms control, and
non-proliferation issues should be made within the context of
our broad regional security interests. Our major security
objectives in the Middle East are as follows:
1. Prevention of the spread of Soviet
influence
It is a vital national interest of the United States to
prevent Soviet domination of the Middle East. The Soviet
Union continues to threaten the stability of the-region by using
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
- Approved For Release 2009/04/08 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
its military military forces for direct intervention, by promoting
insurgent movements, and by supporting client and proxy
states in activities hostile to regional stability. The
most flagrant example of direct Soviet force projection is,
of course, the occupation of Afghanistan. Soviet capabilities
for further force projection into the Middle East/Southwest
Asian region remain high. In addition, extensive Soviet
military supply to South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya -- which
have joined together in a treaty of cooperation -- has
increased the potential for major regional conflict. The
Soviets have persistently sabotaged the effort to achieve
peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Major Soviet
support for Syria and the PLO provides the USSR with leverage.
on the peace process and has enabled those clients to pursue
policies in Lebanon hostile to Western interests. Soviet
efforts to draw closer to Iran are also a cause for great
concern. A Soviet thrust for Iran would have catastrophic
consequences for our interests in the Persian Gulf and
Turkey.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M009,14R002100110033-5
SECRET
-3-
2. Prevention of outflanking of Europe
Prevention of Soviet domination of the Middle East
is also vital to the security of the southern flank of
NATO. Such domination would provide Soviet access to air
and naval facilities from which Soviet power could be
projected into southern Europe; it would bring pressure
upon our NATO allies to accomodate to the-new;-"correlation
of forces" by withdrawing_ from the military arm of NATO;
and it would deny the energy resources needed to turn
the wheels of industry in Europe. Historically, Europe
has always recognized the danger of allowing the Middle
East to fall into hostile hands. Under contemporary
circumstances, that strategic consideration applies as
well to the interests of the United States, Japan, and.
many other countries.
3. Stable and secure access to regional oil supplies
Secure access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf,
particularly those in Saudi Arabia, is critical to the United
States and its major allies. The Persian Gulf is the major
source of the world's oil exports. Loss of Saudi.oil to the
Soviet Union or other hostile powers would undermine our security
world-wide and risk splintering the NATO alliance. These oil
resources are highly vulnerable to military threats arising
out of the Iran/Iraq conflict, from radical states in the area,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
? Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
4 -
and especially from Soviet or Soviet-inspired direct and
indirect military action. It is clearly in the US interest to
deter any such attacks.
3. Improving US military posture in the region,
including access to military facilities
The direct Soviet threat in the Middle East makes it
essential that the United States cooperate. closely with
friendly countries in the area to deter Soviet aggression.
In addition to the provision of security assistance, a stronger
US presence in the area will be required if the US is to pro-
ject sufficient military capability to deter Soviet aggression.
It is therefore in the US interest to maintain a strong naval
presence in the area, to obtain access to strategically located.
bases and staging areas, to pre-stock equipment, and to develop
a military command, control and communications, and logistics
infrastructure which would be compatible with US tactical force
capabilities if we have to respond in a crisis. In the longer
term, it Would be desirable to have a permanent military presence
in the area.
4. Security of Israel and other friendly
states in the region
The United States is fundamentally committed to the
protection of Israel's security and to the preservation of
Israel's qualitative edge and its ability to defeat any combi-
nation of hostile forces in the region. A strong and secure
Israel is essential to regional peace and stability, and an
integral part of the strategic consensus necessary to deter
Approved For Release 200970-4707 CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
- 5 -
Soviet aggression in the Middle East. At the same time,
it is in our interest to cooperate with friendly Arab countries
in maintaining their security, and to be perceived by these
countries as a reliable security partner, in order to deter
aggression by the Soviets and their proxies. Israel is vital
to our security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and
Saudi Arabia to our interests
commitment to the security of
region is essential if we are
toward a peace settlement.
in the Persian Gulf. Our
all of the friendly states in the
to succeed in influencing them
5. Enhancement of the peace process
The achievement of peace between Israel and its Arab
neighbors has been a major goal of US policy in the Middle
East since 1948, and continues to be so. The framework for
the peace process is UN Security Council Resolution 338, Which
makes Resolution 242 mandatory and orders the states of the
region to sit down "immediately" and negotiate peace in accordance
with the principles of Resolution 242. Thus, the peace process
in the Middle East consists of our effort to get the Arab
countries to carry out their legal obligations by.following the
lead of Egypt in complying with Resolutions 242 and 338. As one
part of this process, we seek to implement the Camp David agree-
ments, which restore peace between Israel and Egypt and contemplate
the possibility of five-year transitional arrangements for the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The extension of the peace proceSs-
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 -
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
6 -
to include other Arab states will continue to be essential if
Western interests in the region are to be protected.
6. Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The further proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the
Middle East or elsewhere, constitutes a serious threat to
United States security interests and international peace and
security. The potential for proliferation is both a symptom and
a cause of tension in the Middle East. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons by unfriendly regional states would not only
directly threaten US security (e.g., access to oil),, but seriously
- complicate the search for peace in the region and increase the
risk of a nuclear confrontation with the USSR. Thus, preven-
tion of the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of
the capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices
remains a major US objective. To this end, the United State.
has encouraged states in the region to adhere to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to accept expanded
IAEA safeguards coverage. In addition, we have supported UNGA
Resolutions. endorsing the principle of a Middle East Nuclear
Weapon. Free Zone (MENWFZ) and have sought to cooperate with
other suppliers of nuclear materials to ensure that any-nuclear
exports into the region do not contribute to instability.
7. Even-handed approach to Israel and the
Arab countries
In order to exert our influence effectively in the Middle
East, it continues ? to be in our interest to pursue an even-
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
- 7 -
handed approach toward Israel and friendly Arab countries in the
area. In order to develop the strategic consensus necessary
to protect the region and its resources from penetration by the
Soviets and their proxies, and in order to advance the peace
process, it is essential that the United States be perceived
by both Israel and friendly Arab states .of the area as equally
concerned over, and committed to, their security. It is
particularly important that we avoid any actions which would
increase the insecurity of Israel.
III. Current United States Strategy
The United States is pursuing these objectives in a
region where the Arab-Israeli dispute divides our close
friends and where the Soviets and their proxies threaten
our vital interests. United States strategy in the Middle
East is to seek both peace and security simultaneously,
un,:ler the assumption that progress toward each of these
goals supports progress toward the other. If our friends
are more secure they will be more able to take risks for
peace and if there is progress toward peace, the cooperation
that is vital for security will be easier.
During the past year we have been working to-develop a
consensus among Israel and the Arab states aimed at preventing
the growth of Soviet influence in the area and at providing
a foundation for bridging traditional hostilities between
our friends. A recent example of this policy is in Lebanon
where, in cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia, we have
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For For Release 2009/04/08 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
succeeded in arranging a ceasefire. which, however fragile, reduces
somewhat Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union.
The most important ongoing aspect of the peace process in
the Middle East today is the cooperation between Israel and Egypt.
President Reagan has affirmed his personal commitment to the Camp
David agreements and the process they have set in motion. We
believe the decision by Egypt and Israel to resume autonomy talks
is a necessary step to further this process. At the same time,
we must recognize that these talks cannot in themselves lead to?
peace, butcacikeep theprocessalive in the interim until Jordan is
ready to make peace.
Our policy is also designed to support the independence of
the nations in th'e Middle East, and to support positive regional
security arrangements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council. To
implement-this policy, we have been placing more emphasis on security
assistance, including transfers of some of our modern military
equipment to both Israel andthe7i.rab countries. In Saudi Arabia,
the air defense enhancement package is intended to provide better
protection of Saudi oil fields, improve US leverage in encouraging
the Saudis to support the peace process, and increase US ability
to respond rapidly to military events in the region. Saudi Arabia
has been by far the largest single purchaser of US military equip-
ment, services, and construction. Saudi purchases will increase
even further over the rest of the decade, primarily as a result of
the recently-approved $8.5 billion air defense enhancement package.
. SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
? Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
- 9.-
To strengthen both Egyptian will and capability to.support
the peace process, to help Egypt defend itself against Libyan
adventurism, and to improve' US7Egyptian relations, the US has
committed itself to a major program of security assistance,
including several hundred tanks, up to 80 or more advanced
fighter aircraft, air defense missiles, naval patrol craft,
and significant logistic support. In fiscal year 1982, we
are making available about $900 million in military sales
credits to Egypt, of which about $200 million is in the form
of forgiven loans. For fiscal 1983, we plan to provide
about $1,300 million in military sales credits. This assistance
is being accelerated as much as possible to demonstrate continued
? US support following the death of Sadat. Our assistance to
Egypt helps to solidify resistance to pressures from radical Arabs
seeking to disrupt the relationship with Israel. Egyptian
ability to withstand such pressure depends in large measure on
its confidence in US support. Failure to establish a basis for
this confidence opens opportunities for the Soviets, their
proxies, and other radical elements to increase tensions and to
break up the consensus of interests necessary for achievement
of US objectives in the region. Despite US efforts, Egyptian
military leaders are frustrated by what they see as too slow a
process of modernization and over-dependence on the US as-?a
sole supplier.
The United States also continues to be the largest source
of military support for Jordan. In fiscal year 1983, we plan
to provide $75 million in military sales credits-, a substantial
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
- 10-
increase over fiscalyear 1982. We have also recently agreed.
to release to Jordan planning and review (P&R) data on F-16
aircraft. In addition, US arms sales to a number of Other
friendly _Arab cb-antries in the Persian-Gulf'and North'Afrita
have been
US strategy in the Middle East depends to a major extent
upon 'the creation of an infrastructure of military facilities
which we could use if US forces are called upon in a crisis.
These facilities must be complemented with pre-stocked equip-
ment and logistic support. In addition, the effectiveness of
the combined US and local forces will be significantly increased
if all major components of the system are compatible.
For these reasons, we have reached agreement with several
nations, and are pursuing negotiations with others, to provide
us access to regional facilities during crises or for routine
training exercises during peacetime. In some cases, it has been
necessary to improve the existing facilities and infrastructure.
Construction of these sites was initially funded in FY 1981-82
and is scheduled to be completed by the end of FY 1985. Our
Program provides nearly $1.4 billion in military construction
funding over the next three years, a 30 percent increase over
previously programmed levels. We are not creating any new US
bases, per se. Rather,we are improving existing facilities that
-6
we might use in crises or peacetime exercises and are arranging
for prompt access when needed.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-11-
Egypt has offered to permit our forces access to its
facilities at Ras Banas on the Red Sea, where we have undertaken
a three-year construction program to build the capability needed
to support surge operations. Improvements will include upgrading
the airfield and port facilities and constructing a division-
sized cantonment. Once construction is completed, access to
Ras tanas in time of crisis may allow us to.deploy forces near
a potential conflict area, much sooner than if we had to wait.
until we could directly enter the affected country.
Apart from routine exercises with Egyptian forces, however, we
plan to maintain no peacetime military presence in Egypt
? because of Egyptian sensitivity that an excessive US presence
could he exploited by Mubarak's opponents.
We have reached agreement with Oman permitting the improv-
ment of selected facilities for our use, primarily during crises
but also in peacetime. These improvements include upgrading
runways, taxiways, and aprons; constructing support facilities
for personnel and maintenance; and prepositioning POL and muni-
tions. Omani facilities could be very important for sea control
and support of naval forces and could serve as staging bases
for land-based tactical fighter and mine countermeasure opera-
tions to protect the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea.
The Government of Kenya has agreed to allow US forces
access to its airfield and port facilities at Mombassa. We
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-12-
have been permitted_limited use of the airfield-to
support operations by maritime patrol and fleet support air-
craft, and will dredge the harbor channel to provide access
for our aircraft carriers. Mombassa is useful for maintenance
and refueling of our ships as well as for crew rest and liberty.
In fact, it is the only significant liberty port currently
available for our forces in the Indian Ocean.
. We have reached an agreement with Somalia that gives
?us access to Mogadiscio and Berbera, a port with excellent
growth potential near the strategically Important outlet of .1.1e
Red Sea at the Bab Al Mandeb. The agreement provides facilities
for routine fleet support and maritime surveillance operations,
and possibly a staging area for contingency operations.
The US has also supported overstocking of equipment in
Saudi Arabia so that it would be available to US forces if they,
were called to action in that country. Both the US and Saudi
Arabia have actively sought to establish an interoperable air
defense structure for the lower Gulf states.
To balance this system of Arab facilities and strengthen
the regional strategic consensus, the US has also initialed a
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation with
Israel which provides for use of Israeli facilities in an
emergency as well as pre-positioning of equipment and supplies.
We have delayed implementation of the MOU for the present, but
plan to lift the suspension by April.
. SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET .
13
The United States is fundamentally committed to the
security of Israel. Assistance to Israel is an important
part of our attempts to develop a regional strategic consensus.
In fiscal year 1982 we are providing Israel with some $1,400
million in military sales credits, of which $550 million will be
forgiven. For fiscal year 1983 we plan to provide $1,700
million, of which $500 million is to be forgiven. These
amounts represent our largest single military credit program.
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Israeli raid on the
Iraqi reactor at OSIRAK, the US took a number of actions, some
of which were directed against Israel:
(1) We temporarily suspended shipment of four
F-16 fighters to Israel.
(2) We joined a UN Security Council condemnation of
the Israeli action.
(3) We successfully lobbied against the suspension of
Israel from the IAEA, but unsuccessfully attempted to prevent
a resolution which suspended technical assistance to Israel,
condemned the Israeli 'act of aggression" against Iraq, and
called for further consideration of actions against Israel at
the 1982 General Conference.
(4) ?The US also unsuccessfully opposed at last'. fall's ONGA
an Iraqi resolution which declared that the Israeli attaA on OSIRAK
had adversely affected the prospect forestablishing a MENWFZ and
called on Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
-14-
immediately. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 107-2.
(Israel, US)-with 31 countries abstaining.
(5) The US redoubled its efforts to strengthen IAEA
safeguards and reexamined the prospects for establishing a
NWFZ in the region.
(6) The US proposed to principal nuclea'r supplier
coun-Eries several guidelines that should govern nuclear
trade to the Middle East to reduce the chances that such exports
would contribute to the potential for proliferation.
In reacting to Israel's extension of civil law to the
Golan Heights, the United States worked against a UN Security
Council resolution of sanctions and ultimately vetoed it.
However, action was taken to delay implementation of the
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation and to
hold off on discussions of defense trade proposals potentially
beneficial to Israel's defense industry. These include:
-- Allowing Israel to use up to $100 million in FMS
credits annually to purchase defense-related goods
and services produced in Israel;
-- Promoting up to $200 million annually in purchases
by DOD of Israeli military equipment and services; and
-- Permitting third countries receiving U.S. FMS
credits to use those credits to purchase Israeli
produced items.
The US had made it clear that these actions in no way affect
our security and ecconomic assistance support for Israel or
military equipment deliveries. Lifting of the suspension of
the MOU is tentatively planned by April, when Israeli doubts
about withdrawal from the Sinai and the efficiendy of the
Peace process are likely to be the greatest.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 .
' Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
?15?
Because of its enormous impact on regional stability, the
issue of nuclear non-proliferation and a Middle East Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) i.s generally accepted as an 'important com-
ponent.of any lasting peace. The existing nuclear situation in
the Middle East clearly favors Israel, with Arab capabilities
considerably less advanced. It is understandable that Arab
states would view the establishment of a MENWFZ ambiguously.
It offers the prospect of constraining the Israeli nuclear
program, but also would involve direct negotiations with the
Israelis (which is the current Israeli and US position). For
? the present, the Arabs believe that the price of Israeli
. recognition is not worth the benefit of obtaining Israeli
acceptance of a NWFZ. In addition, however, an unconstrained
? Israeli nuClear program does provide a justification for the
? Arabs to match the Israeli nuclear capability. The Arabs would
like to neutralize the
prepared to take steps
for the Israelis to be
the MENWFZ.
program by
their part,
tions with
Israeli nuclear deterrent, but are not
toward peace that would be necessary
willing to adhere to the NPT or accept_
Some Arabs. would prefer to neutralize the Israeli
obtaining a comparable nuclear capability. For
the Israelis appear willing to enter MENWFZ negotia-
no preconditions, but have made clear they would not
over their nuclear program until there is peace.
accept controls
The MENWFZ issue arose last year in connection with the
annual Egyptian-sponsored resolution at the UN when
the Egyptians refused to include language suggested by the US
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 ?
. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-16-
stating that a MENWFZ could not be achieved until after a
peace agreement had been concluded. The US did not ultimately
insist on this language, nor did the Israelis.
On December 22, 1981, the President directed that
pending the outcome of study, the US would not link
the establishment of a MENWFZ to the peace process. While
all accept that a MENWFZ is inconceivable until there is
peace, the US did not press this position with the Egyptians
during last fall's UNGA. (The Egyptians agree with us in
principle, but were concerned that acceptance of this view.
in the resolution would have called into question the
sincerity of their present efforts to promote progress on
a MENWFZ; and would have given the impression that states
in the region were free to pursue whatever nuclear goals
they may have pending the establishment of a MENWFZ.) In
addition, those who support our current position believe
that suggesting any linkage could result in efforts by others
to impose a MENWFZ as a precondition to peace -- and further
complicate existing efforts to implement UNSC Resolutions
242 and 338.
p.
TV. Effects of Current Strategy
Through our arms transfers to friendly Arab states
and arrangements for increased access to military facilities
in a number of these countries, we have significantly improved
our ability to prevent the Soviets and their 'client states from
SRC=
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 ?
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
?17-
extending their influence in the Middle East. We have also
improved our ability to maintain secure access to Middle East
oil. However, in the course of pursuing these objectives,
US actions have raised Israeli fears that we have abandoned
our commitment to an even-handed policy in the Middle East,
increased the risk of Arab-Israel hostilities', and jeopardized
the Peace process. While we have taken a number of actions
against Israel in response to Israeli moves which we perceived,
as threatening to the sedurity of Arab states ana-the peace
process, we have made no sustained effort to encourage Arab
states not involved in the peace process to comply with the
provisions of.UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
requiring termination of states of belligerency and acknowledg-
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence
of every state in the area. In the pursuit of our nuclear non-
proliferation objectives, we have not exerted our influence to
insure that the Egyptian proposal for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone be linked to the peace process -- a necessary pre-
requisite for Israeli acceptance of such a zone. In our efforts
to advance the peace process itself, we have concentrated our
attention on the Camp David agreements in relative isolation
from the broader framework for peace envisioned in .Security
-
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Before discussing our overall approach to Middle East
peace, we should examine briefly the issue of linkage between
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 ?
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
. SECRET ?
-18'-.
MENWFZ and the peace process. Our current position does
not recognize the basic interaction between these two issues.
Israel will not place Dimona under IAEA safeguards or adhere
to the NPT in the absence of a Middle East peace concluded
pursuant to Securi!ty Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The
Israelis have told us that they would not take these steps
in .the abserice of such a peace agreement, and the unwillingness
of the US to accept this position could over the long run
undermine Israeli confidence in US support for its security.
Further, our current position fails to impress upon Arab
states that they must make peace with Israel if they expect
Israel to accept constraints on its nuclear program. On the
other hand, it is possible the Arab states will not sign
a peace treaty as long as Israel retains a nuclear deterrent.
This does not mean that Israeli nuclear concessions must be i
precondition for peace, but that the issues of peace and
non-proliferation may have to be resolved at the same time.
Our current position of opposing any linkage between non-pro-
liferation and the peace process fails to recognize the
fundamental relationship between these two objectives; and
that resolving the nuclear question will be essential in the
context of arriving ata-peace settlement pursuant to UNSC
Resolutions 242 and 338 -- whether the nuclear question is
resolved after a peace agreement or simultaneously with such
an agreement.
The US emphasis upon the Camp David Accor-ds was certainly
merited in the context of the Israeli-Egyptian rapproachment.
crv-v=m
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-19-
Under current conditions, however, it is imperative that we
focus on the success of Camp David as but the first step in
what ultimately must become a comprehensive settlement of
the legal status of both Israel and the Palestinian Arabs
on the West Bank and in the Gaza
fundamental issues which prolong
for conflict in the Middle East,
Strip. These are the
and exacerbate the potential
and these are the issues
which must be addressed in a broader framework, taking into
account the interests of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,
Egyvt, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Palestinian Arabs on
the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. While it may not be
possible to draw some of these into the peace process, it is
essential that at least Israel, Jordan, and Egypt participate.
This was the concept envisioned in the Camp David Framework
for Peace in the Middle East, and it is to this concept that
we must now return.
The objective realities upon which this proposition is
based are as follows.
First, hopes for an autonomy arrangement
under current conditions are fading.
be completed April 25, at which time a
Israeli-Egyptian cooperation will have
-? .
The Sinai withdrawal will
major incentive for
been removed.
since the autonomy talks ad Currently being conducted
only Israel and Egypt, and since significant progress
issue was not forthcoming in the best of times, it is
unlikely that significant progress can be made in the
narrow forum..
SECRET
Furthermore,
include
On this
highly
present
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
? Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-20--
It is therefore essential that peace talks be expedi-
tiously expanded to include Jordan and perhaps some other
Arab states and that the United States make every possible
effort toward this end. New American initiatives in this
direction will go far to convince both the Arabs and the
Israelis that the US is serious. Failure to do SQ will mean
business as usual, with the very real possibility that the
momentum of the peace process will be lost, perhaps forever.
The second reality underlying the urgent need for a
broadened peace initiative centers on the kind and duration of
peace we seek to achieve. Peace in the Middle East this past
nine years has resulted first and foremost from the strength
of Israel. US security assistance to Israel has, in turn, been
part and parcel of the sinews of Israeli military capability
upon which this peace is based. An Israel clearly superior in
conventional military capability has served
war in the Middle East.
The problem with the current situation
as a deterrent to
is
that an
truce is no substitute for serious peace negotiations.
armed
The
clear superiority which Israel currently enjoys, including
that in the nuclear area, may not always be there -- a fact
-
which Israel perceives better than anyone else and which was
a factor in extension of civil law and administration to the
Golan Heights and its continued occupation of the West Bank.
The political costs of the current armed truce put the United
States in a difficult position with respect to the Arab world.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
qrcpprrt
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
A third reality necessitating expanded autonomy talks is
heightened Israeli apprehension under current conditions. One
measure of Israeli insecurity is the continuing allocation of
one-third of its budget to defense. Another is indicated by
the military actions recently deemed necessary for security,
such as the raids on Iran, Syrian missiles, and the PLO Head-
quarters in Beirut. Finally, it must be recognized that Israeli
nuclear activities reflect grave concern that this Utima Ratio
Regis, may be necessary. These Israeli attitudes reflect a lack
of confidence in the existing situation, and especially the degree
to which they can rely upon the United States.
The aftermath of the Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor
is a case in point. The suspension of the F-16 shipment and US
support for the Security Council resolution were strongly resented
by the Israelis, who maintained that the strike on OSIRAR was vital
to their national security. Israel was offended by what it perCeived
as the lack of US support during a critical period. The US had in
fact shared its concern over the Iraqi nuclear program in confidential
exchanges with the Israelis in late 1980. Although the President
pointed out in his June 16 press conference that Iraq had never
recognized Israel, the UNSC resolution did not mention Iraq's
failure to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a
Middle East_ peace: The PreSident also stated that Israel.may have
genuinely believed the attack was a defensive move. Howemer, the
UNSC resolution failed to reflect this point. In addition, the
UN action repudiates the legal theory justifying US behavior during the
?
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
? Approved For: Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
? SECRET
? -22-
1962 Cuban crisis. In that case, the US based its actions
on the right of legitimate self-defense against a perception
of threat, even though the Soviets did not conduct an armed
attack against us. The US did support Israel on this issue
at the IAEA and during the fall UNGA, b:ut this was not suffi-
cient to offset the sting of the F-16 suspension and the June
Security Council condemnation. Although theUS/Israel relation-
ship remains strong,. the long-term consequences of such Israeli
views may be negative for a number of US interests, such as
Israeli acceptance of non-proliferation measures (e.g., NPT
adherence, expanded IAEA safeguards, establishment of a MENWFZ)
and enhancement of the overall peace process. The Israelis
certainly do not view our response as even-handed.
The net effect of recent US actions has been to deepen
Israeli fears and suspicions. A growing bipartisan group in
Israel perceives a dramatic change in US policy amounting to
a reversal of alliances. In its extreme form, this appears as a
virtual sell-out of Israel in favor of the Arabs. In view of
their own history, and repeated Arab statements that Israel
is the primary enemy, it is difficult for the Israelis to
interpret US security assistance to Arab states as part of a
strategic consensus defending against the Soviet Union. Ata
time of growing Arab military strength and of increasin-?- Israeli
isolation at the United Nations, these misperceptions of US
intentions have produced a volatile atmosphere: surrounding
Israel's relations with the Arabs. Under these conditions,
there is a real possibility that the Israelis will make
desperat-p nrn-F=r4.-
? Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 means-
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-23-
The final reality necessitating intensified comprehensive
peace efforts is the fact that, despite 135 efforts to date,?
no Middle Eastern state save Israel and Egypt has committed
itself to the UN-mandated peace process, although the Fahd
peace plan had certain promising aspects. 'In our reactions
to this plan, however, we never tied the Saudi proposal back to
UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Instead we have continued to
place heavy reliance upon implementation of the Camp David
Accords establishing peace between Eaypt and Israel, while
neglecting to vigorously pursue both Resolution 338 making
mandatory Resolution 242, and those provisions of Camp David
dealing with the broad framework of peace in the Middle East
based on those resolutions. It was also felt that in providing
arms, including some of our most advanced weapons, to the Arab
countries, we would contribute to their sense of security
and thereby provide them sufficient confidence to engage in
the peace process. This aspect of our policy has not yielded
dividends. In view of these realities a reconsideration of our
strategy is essential.
V. A Proposed Strategy
3.n: order to :inaxiiaize our ability to achieve our national
objectives in the Middle East, it is essential that we-enhance
our capability to counter direct or indirect aggression by
the Soviet Union. Since the time of President Truman, every
President of the United States, with the full and repeated
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 ?
? Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-24-
backing of the Congress, has declared that it is a vital
national interest of the United States to prevent Soviet
domination of the Middle East. The United States is
committed by the Middle East Resolution of 1957, the Eisenhower
Doctrine Resolution, as amended, to use armed force as the
President deems it necessary to protect the territorial
integrity and political independence of all the states in the
area against the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union.
The guaranty of the Eisenhower Resolution has been invoked
several times in behalf of countries in the region, and
American armed forces have been stationed there at intervals
in order to deter the threat of armed attacks. The North
? Atlantic Council has also declared on several occasions that
?
Soviet hegemony in the Middle East would threaten the security
of NATO.
At the same time, it is also essential that we make every
effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, which the Soviet
Union is attempting to exploit and which jeopardizes our
fundamental interests in the area. As long as Israel's right
to exist is questioned by most of its neighbors, and as
long as the future of the Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank
and Caza Strip is unresolved, tensions will continue to exist,
and could increase to the point of war, even to nuc1ea war.
If we are to prevent a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities,
we must pursue a strategy which more closky integrates our
apIproaches to arms transfers,. arms control, and non-proliferation
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-25-
with the peace process. Our approaches in these areas should -
not be treated in isolation and must be based on the fundamental
principles on which US policy was orginally based if we are
to minimize the risk that decisions will be made on the basis
of expediency. Under this integrated strategy, priority
attention must be focused on the achievement of an Arab-Israeli
peace settlement based on compliance by all Middle East countries
with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We should
work closely with Arab countries which put forth their own
peace plans, such as that of Prince Fahd, in order to encourage
them to negotiate their positions with the Israelis pursuant
to the Security Council mandate.
? US approaches to non-proliferation and arms transfers to
the region should be integrated with the effort to move the peace
process forward and designed to advance this process. -This -
strategy is based on a recognition that unless there is steady
forward movement beyond the implementation of the Camp David
agreements to involve other Arab countries in the peace
process, there is a very real risk that Egyptian interest in
actively pursuing a broader peace settlement after the return
of the Sinai in April 1982, will not be sustained. The key to
settlement of the Palestinian problem' is the participation of
Jordan. Working together, Israel and Jordan could solve
the problem. Experienced observers believe that Saudi
participation is not impossible, and that, in the end, even
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-26--
the Syrians will join in the process. Without further
progress in the peace process there is a greatly increased
risk of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Arab
countries. Such hostilities would seriously jeopardize,
if not destroy, our ability to achieve other major United
States interests in the region -- prevention of Soviet
penetration, secure access to oil resources, improved US
access to military facilities, and the prevention of the use
of nuclear weapons in the region.
Under this integrated strategy, our approaches to non-
proliferation and arms transfers with respect to Israel and the
Arab states will be measured against the same standard -- the
extent-to which the actions of these countries advance or
inhibit the peace process. Only then will our actions meet
the test of being balanced and even-handed.
In the area of non-proliferation, we must recognize that
resolving the nuclear problem is necessary to establishing a
permanent peace in the Middle East. We should declare that
the actual establishment of a MENWFZ could not precede the
conclusion of a final peace settlement. We should encourage
the Israelis to condition their willingness to take steps
toward negotiating a MENWFZ on Arab states' willingness to
participate actively in the peace process. We should also
emphasize to Arab states that negotiating peace with Israel
is the best approach to obtaining Israeli adherence to a
MENWFZ.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5
SECRET
-27-
We must continue to provide conventional arms required
by Israel and Egypt for their self-defense as long as they are
committed to the peace process. At the same time, new sales
of major weapons systems to Arab countries not supporting the
peace process should occur only when such sales contribute to
regional stability and are balanced with respect-to our support
for Israel. We must make clear to the Arab states that new
sales of major systems will depend heavily on their willingness
to participate actively in the peace process, leading to an
explicit acknowledgment of UN Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338. The application of this approach will require a high
degree of sensitivity to conditions in each of the Arab states
and appropriate differentiation in terms of the particular
weapons system and the particular country. We will have to
guard against the possibility that, if pressed too hard, thii
approach could lead the moderate Arab countries to turn to other
arms suppliers, or even the Soviet Union. The approach
must be most stringently applied to Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
since the participation of these two countries is most
critical to further progress in the peace process. The Lower
Gulf states -- Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait -- are likely .
to be strongly influenced by the actions of Saudi Arabia.
While efforts should be made to engage Morocco, Tunisig, and
Somalia in the peace process, they have little influence on
events in the Middle East, and their attention is focused on
their own local disputes.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110033-5 ?