TERRORISM: THE WEST GERMAN RESPONSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000300020012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIA review
completed.
Directorate of
Intelligence
Terrorism:
The West German Response
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Secret
GI 82-10215
EUR 82-10101
October 1982
Copy 3 6 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
25X1
25X1
25X1
Terrorism:
The West German Response
This paper was prepared by
he Office o Ulobal Issues an
the Office of European Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Terrorist Issues Branch,
Operations.
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Secret
GI 82-10215
EUR 82-10101
October 1982
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Secret
Terrorism:
The West German Response
Overview Since the late 1960s, West Germany has fought a running battle with
Information available terrorism-first from the left, then from the right and from abroad. The
as of 27 September 1982 terrorists of the left have been by far the most lethal and destructive and
was used in this report.
have caused dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in property damage.
They have weakened their cause, however, by goading successive FRG
Governments into establishing and refining a counterterrorism mechanism
as sophisticated and capable as that of any democratic country in the
world. 25X1
The primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies in the Federal
Interior Ministry. Its Federal Criminal Office (BKA) supervises and
coordinates the national counterterrorism effort. Its Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (BfV) also plays an important role, as does
its Federal Border Guard, in particular Border Guard Group 9 (GSG-9),
the country's world-renowned counterterrorism strike force. In West
Germany's strongly federal system, state counterparts of the BKA and BfV
conduct most of the investigations and operations through which terrorists
In addition, the FRG has been active internationally:
? The FRG is represented in several regional organizations that facilitate
multilateral cooperation against terrorism: INTERPOL, the Club of
Berne, the Trevi Group, and the Club of Five.
? West Germany has led efforts to forge international legal conventions
that would outlaw certain acts of terrorism and mandate the punishment
of terrorists no matter where they flee 25X1
The biggest danger, especially to US interests,
remains leftist terrorism. The Red Army Faction (RAF) has been inactive
iii Secret
GI 82-10215
EUR 82-10101
October 1982
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since last fall but should not be taken lightly
The Revolutionary Cells (RZ) have not been as deadly or
Rightist terrorists-chiefly unstable individuals acting on their own initia-
tive-will remain a lesser threat; such terrorists only occasionally attack
US interests. As for foreign terrorists, Yugoslavs, Syrians, and Iranians
have been the most active recently, although they have generally targeted
their own countrymen rather than German or US interests.
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Secret
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Counterterrorism Cooperation With Other Countries
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Terrorism:
The West German Response
Since the late 1960s, West Germany has faced a
continuing onslaught of terrorism-first from the left,
then from the right and from abroad. The terrorists,
especially those of the left, have caused dozens of
deaths and millions of dollars in property damage.
Successive FRG Governments have reacted strongly.
Armored vehicles prowl the streets of Bonn and other
major cities. Every post office and railway station
prominently displays posters callin for the ca ture of
the most wanted terrorists.
In one way
at least, West Germany's terrorists have succeeded in
textbook fashion: their acts of violence, destruction,
and intimidation have had effects well beyond the
25X1 objective amount of damage.
Domestic terrorists from both the extreme left and the
extreme right have been active in West Germany, but
the leftists-generally members of the fringes of the
so-called undogmatic new left-have been by far
more numerous, more destructive, and more lethal.
The leftists have concentrated their attacks on the
West German establishment and on US military
personnel and facilities. The rightists have focused on
the large numbers of foreign workers in West Germa-
ny, although they have also found time to indulge
their traditional anti-Semitism. The most destructive
terrorist acts from the left have been conducted by
organized groups, particularly by the Red Army
25X1 Faction and its predecessor organizations and by the
Revolutionary Cells. While organized for political and
25X1 social goals, the rightists, by contrast, have tended to
operate as individuals when engaged in terrorist activ-
25X1 ity.
In addition to domestic terrorism, West Germany
finds itself an arena for violent factional struggles
among foreigners. This brand of terrorism involves
foreign policy as well as public safety concerns. At
present the major threats involve groups from Yugo-
slavia, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Palestine. F
The Red Army Faction
The Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the most prominent
of the West German terrorist groups, has been repeat-
edly crippled by government counterterrorist success-
es, only to rebuild and strike again. Over the years 25X6
many of its most important members have died in
confrontations with police or from suicide or acci-
dents, and many others have been imprisoned. The
group has not committed any attacks since the au-
tumn of 1981, when it set off a car bomb at Ramstein
Air Base and tried to assassinate US Army General
Kroesen in Heidelberg.' This lull has given rise to two
schools of thought among West German counterter-
rorism officials:
? That the capability of the RAF to mount successful
major terrorist attacks is much lower now than in
previous years and that the RAF must carry out a
successful attack against a major target soon-say,
before the end of this year-in order to maintain its
credibility.
? That the RAF is as dangerous and capable as ever
and that no one should be misled by its recent
inactivity, since the RAF has in the past taken as
long as 18 months to plan and set up major opera-
tions. 25X1
'State Police officials in Baden Wuerttemberg, where several
bombings have recently taken place at US military installations,
believe that the bombs were set by RAF sympathizers, not mem-
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of the Federal Prosecutor that only 16 to 20 of the
members prepared to commit assassinations remain at
large, including only four of the hardcore leaders;
they believe that if any two of these leaders were
captured the RAF would be through. They also point
to the fact that logistic support has been weakening as
authorities have taken a harder line toward RAF
supporters and sympathizers, members of the self-
styled "legal RAF." Most tellingly, in their opinion,
the RAF does not seem to have been able to recruit
enough new blood to replace those of its members
imprisoned or killed. 25X1
Officials who hold the second view (prominent in
police circles, according to official statements made
by national and regional police spokesmen) anticipate
another major RAF attack sooner or later, probably
against a high-ranking US military or German politi-
cal figure. They point out that the hardcore member-
ship of the RAF has never been very large and has
always, limited its recruitment to the numbers it needs
to achieve specific goals or mount specific operations.
Furthermore, they argue, the large antiwar, antinu-
clear, antiestablishment community of activists pro-
vides a pool of potential converts.
We tend to agree with the latter view: it is much too
early to count the RAF out, at least in the short term.
The leaders who remain at large are tough, experi-
enced,. clever, daring, and committed. Moreover,
judging by the sophistication of their operation
against General Kroesen, as revealed by the subse-
quent investigation, they have adequate resources. of
money, weapons, and helpful foreign connections.
25X1
We believe, however, that the RAF's chances for
survival over the long term are dubious. Experience
elsewhere in the world suggests that terrorist groups
that do not grow tend to wither away or be supplanted
by more dynamic organizations. Owing in part to
police successes, RAF membership has been shrink-
ing; moreover, the brutality of RAF actions has
deprived the group of meaningful public sympathy.
few West Ger-
mans identify with the fuzzy, millenialist goals of the
RAF or with its perfervid support of radical Third
World grievances and as irations
The latest RAF manifesto
indicate that the RAF realizes that its activities have
repelled a large portion of the general leftist congre-
gation whose support it not only wants but needs. Yet,
judging by its 1981 operations, its members have been
unwilling-or perhaps psychologically unable-to
change their approach. 25X1
Many of the RAF terrorists now in German prisons
were captured in and extradited by other European
countries-Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, and
even Bulgaria. 25X1
The Revolutionary Cells
The Revolutionaere Zelle (RZ) are more broadly
based and diffused throughout West Germany than
the RAF. Also unlike the RAF, the RZ are careful to
tie their terrorist activities to widespread political
grievances, such as opposition to the construction of a
new runway at Frankfurt's Rhein-Main Airport, to
absentee landlords who charge poor tenants high
rents, or to nuclear energy-whether used in weapons
or to generate electricity. Finally, in contrast to the
RAF, the RZ generally try to limit the violence of
1 French traditions regarding the sanctity of political asylum have
been embodied in French law, making it difficult to extradite
foreign terrorists who claim political motivation. French Govern-
ment policy, moreover, appears to offer foreign terrorists a trade-
off: effective asylum in return for forbearance from terrorist
activity on French soil. The tolerance for the activities of Spanish
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their activities to a level their supporters and sympa-
thizers can tolerate. For these reasonsJ
the RZ
may be more dangerous than the RAF in the long
run, even though the RZ have not been responsible for
nearly as many deaths as the RAF.
there was some movement between the ranks of
the RZ and the RAF, but West German police and
security analysts believe there are few connections
now. RZ authors have publicly criticized the RAF as
"boastful and arrogant" and have denigrated its
obsession with Third World causes.
in addition to their terrorist activities, the
RZ participate in leftist demonstrations and other
mass actions, where they foment militancy and incite
violence without disclosing their identities as RZ
members
has blamed instigation by the for the emergence
of the Guerrilla Diffusa, self-recruited terrorists who
lack any ideological underpinnings or strategic aims
but engage in political violence because it is emotion-
ally satisfying-as indicated by slogans such as "re-
bellion instead of revolution" and "self-actualization
through aggression."
ac-
cording to their own published statements, the RZ
lack central organization and direction, although in-
formation and ideas are exchanged at meetings of
leftist groups such as the "Antifa" (antifascists), in
leftist publications (particularly one called Revolu-
tionary Wrath), and at hangouts such as bookstores,
restaurants, and university student facilities. Each
autonomous cell consists of only a few-perhaps
five-members and maintains little or no contact with
other cells. Aside from the few who have been
identified by the police, RZ members do not have to
live underground or abroad, in constant fear of identi-
fication and arrest. Much of the time they live normal
lives, attending classes, holding down jobs, and partic-
ipating in overt, legal political activity; consequently,
some have dubbed them "weekend terrorists." When
an RZ member is caught in the act or otherwise
identified, he can reveal little beyond the membership
They estimate that at present t ere area out
10 cells nationwide, with those in the area of Frank- 25X1
furt and Wiesbaden the most active and dangerous.
(C NF) 25X1
25X1
The attention paid by the RZ to security has opera-
tional drawbacks, since the small, autonomous cells
are limited in the type of terrorist activities in which
they can engage. This is not a problem for them at 25X1
present because their policy is to attack local targets
of opportunity, such as a branch bank, the office of a
firm engaged in nuclear research, or a nearby US
military shopping center. Although the RZ claimed25X1
responsibility for the murder of the Hessen Minister
of Economics (indicating, however, that they meant
only to wound him), in general their attacks have not
caused casualties. Their favorite tactic has been a
time bomb, set to explode during the middle of the
night when no one is likely to be around.)
25X1
The RZ game plan, as revealed in Revolutionary
Wrath, calls for the number of cells to proliferate 25X1
inexorably until there are so many and the support is
so great that they will be able to establish a central
coordinating structure strong enough to withstand
government countermeasures. To this end, most RZ
communiques close with the slogan, "Create Many
Revolutionary Cells!" 25X1
between 25X1
50 and 150 of the 2,000 to 3,000 members of neo-
Nazi and other rightwing extremist groups are capa-
ble of violent terrorist acts. Like their leftist counter-
parts, these extremists appear to have relatively easy
access to weapons and explosives both in West Ger-
many and in neighboring countries. The openness of
their organizations compared with leftwing terrorist
of his own cell.
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organizations, however, has enabled the West Ger-
man authorities to conduct relatively successful inves-
tigations of their activities and to stifle any emergent
terrorist factions before they really get going. Thus,
the West Germans contend, and we agree, the prima-
ry danger from the right lies more in the unpredict-
ability of individual members-or sympathizers-
who act on their own initiative.'
In recent years, rightist offenses of all sorts-ranging
from murders to slogans ("Out with foreigners!")
painted on walls-against foreigners, particularly
Turks, have been growing in number much faster
than offenses against the other traditional targets of
rightists-Jews and leftists. The 11-percent increase
in rightist offenses in 1981 over 1980 was attributable
entirely to the increase in offenses against foreigners,
which more than doubled. (According to the govern-
ment's 1981 estimate, of the country's total popula-
tion of 61.7 million, about 4.6 million-7.5 percent-
are foreigners; 1.5 million are Turks.) Although only a
small fraction of these offenses were terrorist acts, the
trend has disturbed government officials including
Interior Minister Baum, who noted that, "Hostility to
foreigners begins with tasteless and slanderous jokes
at the foreigner's expense and ends with attacks on
people's lives."
The political organizations of the far right do not
directly promote violence against foreigners. Their
publications, however, indicate they believe that in the
current climate of rising unemployment and slowing
economic growth they have found an issue with strong
appeal for many of the German people and that their
drumbeating in favor of measures to hold down the
number of foreigners will bring them increased politi-
cal support, just as the leftists have gained support
through their espousal of popular grievances.
Foreign Terrorists
Yugoslavs. About 600,000 Yugoslavs live in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. Most of them are guest
workers, whose remittances to their homeland are an
' The most recent notable incident of rightwing violence occurred in
Nuernberg in June, when an unaffiliated and evidently demented
sympathizer of rightist causes shot up a bar frequented by black US
soldiers. He killed two Americans and an Egyptian and wounded
three other people before shooting himself to avoid capture by
police. 25X1
The following material is taken from appendix A, a
chronicle of German terrorism during the year 1977.
During September and October of that year, terror- 25X1
ism in West Germany crested at an unprecedented
(and so far unrepeated) level of violence.
2 September; Flensburg
Bombing attack on the courthouse.
Perpetrator: a rightist extremist.
2 September; Bergamo, Italy
Bombing attacks on office of Allianz insurance
firm and Mercedes-Benz showroom.
Claiming responsibility: RAF Kommando Petra
Schelm.
5 September; Cologne
Abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, President of
West German Employers Association; murder of
his driver and three accompanying policemen.
Demand:Schleyer to be exchanged for 11 impris-
oned RAF members, each to be given 100,000
deutsche marks (about $45,000) and flown to
country of his or her choice.
Perpetrators: RAF Kommando Siegfried Hausner.
19 September; The Hague, Netherlands
Discharge of firearms at police officers during
arrest of two RAF members; one policeman seri-
ously wounded.
22 September; Utrecht, Netherlands
Discharge of firearms at police officers during
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arrest of RAF member; one policeman killed,
another seriously wounded; weapon used had been
taken by the RAF in a holdup of a weapons dealer
on 1 July 1977 in Frankfurt/Main.
26 September; Bremen
A bank held up; more than $220,000 stolen.
Currency from this holdup was found 19 January
1978 at a terrorist hideout in Hannover.
2 October; Zurich, Switzerland
Bombing attack on office of Mercedes-Benz.
6 October; Rotterdam, Netherlands
Shots fired at German Consulate.
13 October; Palma de Mallorca, Spain
Hijacking of Lufthansa aircraft with 82 passengers
and five crew members in flight from Palma to
Frankfurt/Main. Circulation of a "Communique
of the Operation Koffre Kaddum " together with an
"Ultimatum to the Chancellor of the FRG" signed
by the "Struggle Against World Imperialism Or-
ganization" and a statement of an RAF Kom-
mando concerning previous ultimatums.
Demands: repeat of demands made by Schleyer
abductors, plus release of two PFLP members
imprisoned in Istanbul, plus payment of $15 mil-
lion, all by 16 October 1977.
Perpetrators: PFLP Kommando Martyr Halimeh.
17 October; Aden, South Yemen
During interim landing, pilot of hijacked aircraft
shot to death by leader of PFLP Kommando.
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18 October; Mogadishu, Somalia
Unit of GSG-9, German counterterrorist strike
force, stormed hijacked aircraft and freed hos-
tages, killing three terrorists and wounding
another.
18 October; Stuttgart/Stammheim
Upon hearing of hostage rescue, imprisoned RAF
members Andreas Baader and Jan Karl Raspe
committed suicide using pistols previously smug-
gled into their cells, and Gudrun Ensslin hanged
herself with the cord from her record player.
19 October; Muehlhausen, France (Alsace)
Body of the murdered Dr. Schleyerfound in trunk
of a parked car, following telephoned instructions
from the killers.
Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando.
21 October; Hannover
Bombing attack on district courthouse.
31 October; Zweibruecken
Bombing attack on State Supreme Court.
Attackers, who did not identify themselves, justi-
fied act as retribution for alleged murder of RAF
prisoners by state security authorities.
Suspects: Group Antifascist Struggle (Antifa)
Kaiserslautern.
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important source of hard currency. But there are also
sizable contingents of dissident emigres, especially
Croats, some of whom are-as in other countries-
actively trying to subvert the current Yugoslav state.
Since the mid-1960s, more than 40 ethnic Yugoslavs
have died in an escalating war of assassination and
reprisal between enemies and supporters of the Yugo-
slav regime. Although most of the emigre victims
have been Croats, in the latest major incident, which
took place in January 1982, three ethnic Albanian
emigres from Yugoslavia belonging to a dissident
group advocating enhanced political status for the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo were assassinated
near Heilbronn.
The Yugoslav Government officially denies that it
employs killer squads or hired assassins to keep its
emigres cowed, and the West German Government
rarely obtains conclusive proof of Yugoslav Govern-
Turks and Armenians. The Turkish Government is
concerned about the potential for anti-Turkish terror-
ism in West Germany, and not only from rightwing
German extremists. In the aftermath of the military
takeover in the the fall of 1980,
The
Turkish Government is even more concerned, howev-
er, about potential Armenian terrorism directed
against Turkish diplomats in West Germany. Al-
though the Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) periodically
murder Turkish diplomats in other countries around
the world, to date they have not attacked any in the
FRG.
IASALA poses a further
threat: if West German authorities captured its opera-
tives during a terrorist incident, we believe that
ment complicity in any particular attack on an emi- ASALA would probably begin targeting West Ger-
gre. Nevertheless, the pattern of events and the thrust man interests, as it has targeted French and Swiss
of available evidence interests in the past
have convinced the Germans that the Yugo- Syrians. In March 1982,
slav security service has been behind many of the
killings.
in the spring of 1981, FRG
Interior Minister Baum met with his Yugoslav coun-
terpart to complain about the activities of the Yugo-
slav service in West Germany. The latter indicated
that Belgrade was unwilling to cease these activities
unless Bonn would take further action to restrict the
political activities of Yugoslav emigre groups. Baum
could only reply that German security officials were
already taking all measures available to them under
the law. 25X1
Stane Dolanc, Yugoslavia's new Interior Minister,
will probably be more responsive to Bonn's concerns.
He has long had close ties to West German Social
Democrats and generally seeks improved relations
with the West. To be effective, however, Dolanc must
succeed in imposing his will over the security service,
which has had a reputation for independent initiative.
three Syrian agents were arrested in the
with handguns, bombs, and other explosives in their
possession. West German authorities believe their
intended targets were members of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, which has established a common antigovern-
ment front in Syria with moderate Sunni Muslims,
one of whose leaders, Islam al-Attar, lives in Aachen,
West Germany. Al-Attar's wife was killed there last
year by Syrian agents who were trying to assassinate
him, evidently in retaliation for Brotherhood attacks
against the Syrian Government and Soviet interests in
Syria.
I The
Syrian Government had great difficulty putting down
the rebellion in Hama earlier this year, owing to the
strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. In numerous
past instances, when the Syrian Government has felt
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and deprive it of leadership.
threatened by an adversary, it has relied on terrorism No More Herr Nice Guy
and assassination to keep its opposition off balance
Palestinians. Terrorists espousing the Palestinian
cause have not been active in West Germany recently,
and they have generally not counted West German
interests among the targets of their frustration and
rage. Nevertheless, if Palestinian terrorists decided to
attack US or German interests in the FRG, the
capability and infrastructure would already be in
place.
Tens of thousands of Palestinians live in West Germa-
ny, particularly in West Berlin. Not all of them are
documented. Many of the major Palestinian political
and terrorist groups-including Fatah and the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)-are
openly represented in West Berlin, although they have
been banned in the rest of the FRG since the Munich
massacre in 1972; consequently, terrorist cells could
be formed in or infiltrated into West Germany with-
out much difficulty. Furthermore, Palestinian terror-
ists could draw on the support of several Arab embas-
sies and consulates if they needed it.
In 1970 Andreas Baader was serving a three-year
term in a West Berlin jail for firebombing a depart-
ment store-his first terrorist act, although certainly
not his first criminal act. Upon receipt of a letter from
a bogus publisher, naive prison authorities agreed to
let Baader perform research in various libraries on
sociological topics for a paper he claimed to be
writing. Taken under guard to such a library, Baader
was rescued by Ulrike Meinhof and some associates,
in the deed that turned her from an activist into a
criminal.
In 1972 Baader, Meinhof, and most of the other
founders of what had meanwhile become the RAF
were back in prison, this time held in solitary confine-
ment under conditions described by their support-
ers-and many medical experts as well-as mental
torture through sensory deprivation. As months
turned into years, both sides argued their causes and
justified their actions in a veritable media circus,
while the authorities leisurely compiled overwhelm-
ing (albeit largely circumstantial) cases against the
prisoners; constructed for their trials at a cost of $6
million a maximum security courthouse at the prison
in Stammheim, near Stuttgart; arrested many of
their lawyers as fellow terrorists and coconspirators;
and dealt with hunger strikes in some cases by
denying the prisoners water or force feeding them
with oversized tubes.
Most of the terrorists began as student activists
hardly distinguishable from the majority of their
compatriots who never graduated to terrorism; fur-
thermore, the earliest terrorist incidents involved
rather minor cases of arson, bombing, and robbery,
none of which caused casualties. The coalition govern-
ment of the period tried various reforms, especially of
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the university system, to address the grievances of the
"extraparliamentary opposition"-partly because
some of the grievances were justified, and partly in
the hope that the violent fringe of the opposition
would wither away once deprived of reasons for
complaint. 25X1
At the same time, however, legislation was passed
that permitted the federal government to declare a
"state of defense" (state of emergency). During such
an emergency, special legislation could be enacted
that would supersede state and federal laws for the
duration of the crisis; the Federal Border Guards
could be deployed throughout the states or anywhere
in them; and certain federal officials would be placed
in authority over otherwise independent state officials.
Actions against the federal constitution or encourage-
ment of such acts, the "glorification of violence," and
public "approval of criminal acts" became criminal
offenses.
In the early 1970s, the terrorists moved from small
bombings and robberies to kidnapings, skyjackings,
and killings, partly (as indicated by their demands) in
efforts to spring their compatriots from prison and
partly (as indicated by their writings) to goad the
government into taking repressive steps that, they
mistakenly believed, would reduce its public support.
(This theory had been popularized by Latin American
terrorists, whose example the RAF was trying to
emulate.) Moreover, terrorist leaders in prison, using
their lawyers as communications channels, continued
to direct the activities of their comrades who were still
free. They also staged hunger strikes and prison
escapes and tried to turn their trials into propaganda
forums. 25X1
To cope with these tactics, the penal code was amend-
ed. Under specific circumstances it became permissi-
ble to exclude certain defense lawyers from particular
trials, to ban contacts between jailed terrorists and
their lawyers, to hold a trial or hearing in the absence
of the defendant, and to remove a disruptive defend-
ant from a courtroom without stopping his trial.
Although aimed at terrorists, the new laws necessarily
applied to everyone in West Germany and therefore
constituted a significant diminution of civil and legal
rights, for which they were criticized in some legal
and liberal circles. 25X1
Several times during the early 1970s, the federal
government traded imprisoned terrorists for kidnaped
or skyjacked hostages. Later, however, the authorities
announced that this approach had merely encouraged
the commission of even more outrageous acts. When
terrorists occupied the German Embassy in Stock-
holm in 1975, the government refused to deal, even
though the terrorists had proved-by killing some-
that they intended otherwise to kill all of their
hostages. Instead, said Chancellor Schmidt, "We'll
have to give it to them this time." When industrialist
Harms Martin Schleyer was kidnaped in 1977, the
government refused to negotiate, even though it cor-
rectly realized he would then be murdered. When,
also in 1977, a Lufthansa airliner was hijacked to
Mogadishu, Somalia, the government negotiated only
long enough to permit a counterterrorism strike unit
to get there and take the plane and hostages back by
force. 25X1
Reacting to criticism of the government's toughening
response to terrorism, Chancellor Schmidt explained
that "A constitutional state can meet its obligations
only if its citizens can entrust it to enforce the law....
Whoever wants reliable protection from (terrorism)
must be inwardly prepared to go the limit of what a
free constitutional state allows and requires." Despite
its willingness to adopt necessary legal measures to
deal with the terrorist threat, however, the Schmidt
government has repeatedly rejected calls by the oppo-
sition to extend police powers over political demon-
strators, even those who resort to violence.
Government Organizations Involved in
Counterterrorism
The West German internal security system that
evolved after World War II reflects the policy of the
Western occupation powers to decentralize the sys-
tem. In 1949 the Allies directed the prospective
federal government to limit its police activities pri-
marily to border control and the establishment of
certain investigative and coordination agencies with=
out substantive enforcement powers. As a result,
although the Federal Ministry of the Interior has the
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? It tasked the LKAs with providing information via
spot reports on the movements and activities of
terrorists and sympathizers under surveillance, as
well as information concerning sightings of wanted
terrorists. It indicated that this information would
be used to update BKA files on persons and instal-
lations in danger from terrorism-chiefly persons
in the judiciary and executive spheres, medical
personnel involved in treating the hunger strikers,
and "symbolic" public figures and facilities.
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BKA tasking and coordination authority in the field
of counterterrorism was demonstrated in 1981 during
a hunger strike by 26 imprisoned terrorists and the
eventual death of one of them, RAF terrorist Sigurd
Ithe BKA anticipated both
25X1 planned and spontaneous disorders in the event any of
the terrorists should die, and as Debus weakened, the
BKA took the following preventive measures:
? It arranged to notify authorities in foreign countries
of the increased threat, using the Foreign Office to
inform German institutions (embassies and the like)
and the INTERPOL network to inform police and
security agencies. It also passed the warning on to
the BND, the BfV the ASBW, the BGS, the
Customs Police, the Main Railroad Administra-
tion, and the Railroad Police (requesting precau-
tionary searches of the main routes), as well as to
foreign security agencies represented in West
Germany.
? It also directed the LKAs and the BGS (as appro-
priate) to prepare to establish traffic control points,
to increase patrols around endangered civilian and
military installations, to intensify search measures
in border regions, and to prepare to cut off public
access to post boxes and baggage lockers in railway
stations and air terminals (to deter bombings).
? It called for the LKAs and the BGS to report by
telex precisely what measures they had taken in
response to the threat and the BKA instructions.
? For its part, the BKA promised to furnish daily
situation reports on the status of the hunger strik-
ers in general, and special reports on individual
cases as circumstances warranted.
Much of this could be viewed as mere muscle-flexing
by the BKA, since the agencies upon which it was
showering orders would presumably be taking most
of these rather obvious steps even in the absence of
specific instructions. Nevertheless, it demonstrates
that in a crisis management situation involving a
terrorist incident, the BKA is well prepared to direct
and monitor the considerable counterterrorism re-
sources of the FRG.
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overall responsibility for the maintenance of public
order, police units of the 10 state Ministries of the
Interior normally execute this mission. Federal in-
volvement with state law enforcement efforts is per-
mitted under the constitution, however, when a crime
is committed on a national level-such as terrorism or
drug trafficking-or when an individual state requests
the assistance of the federal government.
At the federal level, a number of police, security, and
intelligence services share the responsibility for com-
bating terrorism. The Federal Criminal Office (BKA)
supervises and coordinates the national counterterror-
ism effort. Important but clearly secondary roles are
played by the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Border Guard
(BGS), in particular Border Guard Group 9 (GSG-9),
the counterterrorism strike force. Outside the Interior
Ministry, other federal agencies including the Federal
Intelligence Service (BND), the Office for the Securi-
ty of the Armed Forces (ASBW), and the customs,
postal, air, river, and railway police support the
counterterrorism effort.
At the state level, State Criminal Offices (LKAs) and
State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution
(LfVs) perform most of the day-to-day operations
through which terrorists are captured and brought to
justice.'
Counterterrorism Cooperation With Other Countries
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International Legal Agreements
West Germany has been at the forefront of efforts to
close the international legal loopholes through which
some terrorists can escape retribution. Transnational
terrorists have often been able to avoid apprehension
and punishment by exploiting disparities among na-
tional legal systems, political policies, and social
customs. By operating from or fleeing to countries
that welcome, tolerate, or are too timid to confront
them, some international terrorists have been able to
strike repeatedly, almost with impunity.
Owing to fundamental and irreconcilable disagree-
ments over the difference between common crime
(which is crime everywhere) and political crime (which
may not be considered crime outside the country
where it is committed), the world's nations have been
unable to arrive at a consensual definition of terrorism
that could be used to draw up a comprehensive
international law against it. Efforts to get around this
obstacle have taken two forms: identifying specific
acts, such as skyjacking, that most or all countries can
agree are intolerable and must be punished, and
seeking legal counterterrorism agreements in regional
forums, where disparities in political and social values
are smaller and may be overcome.
West Germany has helped to draft many of the
conventions and agreements that have resulted from
these efforts and has ratified all of them that it was
eligible to ratify. Moreover, it has tried to persuade
other governments to do the same and has backed the
use of sanctions against governments that harbor
particular types of terrorists, such as skyjackers..
Judging by the current tenor of public debate, the
West German Government and people have, in large
measure, overcome the ambivalence that character-
ized their earlier attitudes toward the treatment of
terrorists.
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The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft)
entered into force in December 1969. It calls for
states to make every effort to restore control of a
hijacked aircraft to its lawful commander and to
arrange for the prompt onward passage of the air-
craft, passengers, cargo, and crew. West Germany
signed this convention in September 1963 andformal-
ly ratified it in December 1969.
The Hague Convention (Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) entered into
force in October 1971. It requires adhering states
either to extradite skyjackers or to submit them to
local prosecution; in other words, a state could no
longer evade responsibility by claiming that the crime
took place outside its own territory. West Germany
signed this convention in December 1970 and formal-
ly ratified it in October 1974.
The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation) entered into force in January 1973. It
extends The Hague Convention's extradite-or-prose-
cute provisions to acts committed on the ground
against civil aircraft in service and against associated
ground facilities. The FRG signed this convention in
October 1971 and formally ratified it in February
1978.
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons Including Diplomatic Agents entered into
force in February 1977. Modeled after a similar
convention worked out by the Organization of Ameri-
can States, this convention applies the extradite-or-
prosecute formula to acts committed against protect-
ed persons (chiefly diplomats and people who have
been granted political asylum) and their premises and
vehicles. The FRG signed this convention in August
1974 and formally ratified it in January 1977.
The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Safety
of Civil Aviation of 13 October 1977 was a consensu-
al resolution urging all countries to adhere to the
three aviation conventions described above. West
Germany was one of the five countries in the "contact
group" that sent delegations around the world to try
to persuade countries that had not yet ratified these
conventions to do so.
The Bonn Economic Summit Antihijacking Declara-
tion of July 1978 asserted that the participating
countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany-
which together account for more than two-thirds of
the non-Communist world's air passenger traffic)
would halt all air traffic with any country harboring
a hijacker or refusing to return the aircraft and
passengers. This was the first effort to put teeth into
the antiskyjacking conventions; previously there had
been no way to punish countries that violated the
provisions of these conventions.
The Strasbourg Convention (European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism) is an agreement draft-
ed in Strasbourg (at the initiative of France and West
Germany) in November 1976 by the Council of
Europe and signed in January 1977 by all members
of the Council except Ireland and Malta. It entered
into force in August 1978. The convention declares
that-regardless of the motivation-certain violent
crimes, including kidnaping, hijacking, bombing, and
attacks against internationally protected persons, are
not subject to the 'political offense exception" that
might otherwise prevent extradition of the perpetra-
tors; if extradition is denied for some other legal
reason, the denying country must prosecute under its
own laws. The FRG is one of the few countries that
have formally ratified this convention, having done so
in May 1978.
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indigenous German terrorists, particularly of the left,
seem likely to continue their depredations, and foreign
terrorists as well will probably continue to fight some
of their battles on West German soil
nine rightist terrorists and 45 leftist ter-
rorists (mostly members of the RAF and associated
groups) were serving prison terms in West Germany.
Four of the rightists and at least 19 of the leftists were
scheduled to be released during 1982 (11 of the leftists
are serving life sentences).
If upon their release
these prisoners return to active terrorism (as some
jailed German terrorists have done in the past), they
could substantially boost the prospects and capabili-
ties of the RAF. West German police units will watch
them closely, however, and if they do try to resume
their former careers they will find that the operating
climate has become much more difficult.
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1, 8, 16 January;
Frankfurt/Main
3 January; Aachen
and Duesseldorf
4 January; Hannover
4 January; Giessen
5 January;
Basel, Switzerland
24 January; Munich
14 February;
West Berlin
16 February;
Duesseldorf
Appendix A
Following is a chronicle of all significant terrorist events in 1977 in which West
Germans were involved, directly or indirectly, as either perpetrators or victims.
The chronicle is based on statistics compiled by the Ministry of the Interior and
published in 1980 by Der Spiegel. According to the Ministry, "Included are
criminal acts for which concrete evidence exists of their having been committed by
terrorists or their accomplices. In instances where a (listed) criminal act could not
be attributed to a specific person or group, the target chosen as well as
circumstantial evidence justified the suspicion of its origin with terrorist individ-
uals or groups." Not included are any politically motivated acts of violence that
may have been committed by foreigners against foreigners, with no German
involvement. There were an unusual number of major terrorist incidents in 1977,
but that year otherwise well represents the type and extent of terrorism with which
the West Germans learned to cope during the 1970s.
Bombing attacks on urban transit ticket vending machines (part of a protest
against fare hikes).
Suspects: Revolutionary Cells (RZ).
Arson attempts on two cinemas in protest against the showing of a film depicting
the Israeli rescue of the hijack victims at Entebbe.
Claiming responsibility: RZ Fighters for a Free Palestine.
Arson attack on a cinema showing the Entebbe film.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
Bombing attack on a US Army fuel storage tank.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
Exchange of gunfire at border control point; one Swiss customs officer injured.
Suspects: two members of the Red Army Faction (RAF).
Bombing attempt on the editorial offices of National Zeitung (a newspaper of the
extreme right).
A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about $25,000 stolen.
Suspects: members of the 2 June Movement.
A branch of the National Bank held up; more than $100,000 stolen.
Perpetrators: three women, suspected of being RAF members.
Arson attack on car owned by public defender involved in terrorist trials.
Claiming responsibility: an RZ Kommando.
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24 February;
Saloniki, Greece
24 March;
Frankfurt/Main
7 April; Karlsruhe
15 April;
Duesseldorf
16 April;
Dinkelsbuehl
19 April;
Lille, France
21 April; Kassel
21 April;
Barcelona, Spain
30 April;
Milan, Italy
Bombing attack on a German school; slogans painted on walls: "Ulrike Meinhof
lives!" and "Down with German neofascism!"
Bombing attack on editorial offices of National Zeitung, about $4,500 in damage.
Bombing attack on the residence of the Vice President of the Federal Association
of Attorneys; he and his wife injured slightly by glass fragments.
Perpetrators: RZ.
Bombing attempt on offices of South African Airways "in remembrance of the
dead at Soweto."
Claiming responsibility: Group Patrice Lumumba.
A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about $25,000 stolen.
Suspects: RAF sympathizers.
Murder of Federal Attorney General Siegfried Buback, together with his driver
and a court security officer.
Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando. In 11 identical letters the perpetra-
tors accused Buback of being responsible for the deaths in prison of Ulrike
Meinhof, Holger Meins, and Siegfried Hausner.
A branch of the Dresdner Bank held up; about $30,000 stolen.
Suspects: RAF.
A branch of the Deutsche Bank held up; about $50,000 stolen. Part of the money
was recovered 20 April 1978 at a terrorist hideout in Vienna, Austria.
Perpetrators: one man and two women, suspected of belonging to the 2 June
Movement.
Vandalism to billboards advertising a showing of the Entebbe film.
Arson attack on the German Consulate General.
A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about $10,000 stolen.
Suspects: two RAF sympathizers.
Bombing attack on Lufthansa offices.
Claiming responsibility: GRAPO (a Spanish leftist terrorist group).
Bombing attack on a building which housed offices of the Federal Association of
Physicians (evidently in protest of attitude of medical establishment toward
treatment of hunger-striking RAF prisoners).
Claiming responsibility: (RAF) Kommando Petra Schelm.
Bombing attack on Opel automobile showroom.
Claiming responsibility: Revolutionary Action.
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11 May; West Berlin
13 May; Cologne
27, 28 June;
West Berlin
1 July;
Frankfurt/Main
12 July; West Berlin
21 July; Nuernberg
21 July; Hamburg
30 July; Essen
30 July; Oberursel
3 August; Essen
15 August; Stuttgart
Discharge of firearms at police officers during identity check; one policeman
wounded seriously, another slightly; Buback murder weapon recovered.
Perpetrators: two RAF members.
Arson attacks on private cars of a judge and a state prosecutor.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
A branch of the Cologne Bank of 1876 held up; about $120,000 stolen.
Suspects: members of a terrorist splinter group.
Arson attacks on buildings of the Berlin Public Transport Authority.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
Arson attacks on urban transit ticket vending machines.
Suspects: RZ.
Arson attack on state court building.
Perpetrators: RAF sympathizers.
A firearms dealer held up and beaten with blunt instrument; 18 handguns stolen.
Perpetrators: two RAF members.
A branch of the Dresdner Bank held up; about $100,000 stolen.
Acid attacks on three urban transit ticket vending machines.
Suspects: RZ.
Arson attack on a ticket office of the urban transit authority.
Suspects: RZ.
Vandalism to eight subway ticket vending machines.
Suspects: RZ.
Shots fired at the door of a police station.
Banker Juergen Ponto murdered when he resisted efforts to kidnap him for
ransom.
Perpetrators: an RAF Kommando including Ponto family friend Susanne
Albrecht.
A branch of the National Bank held up; one bank customer shot and seriously
wounded; about $210,000 stolen.
Claiming responsibility: the National Front.
Suspects: RAF.
Bombing attack on the law offices of Klaus Croissant, RAF lawyer accused of
complicity in RAF terrorist acts.
Claiming responsibility: Combat Group Siegfried Buback of the National Antiter-
rorist Organization.
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22 August; Nuernberg
25 August; Karlsruhe
26 August;
Milan, Italy
26 August;
West Berlin
28 August; Hamburg
30 August;
Frankenthal
2 September;
Flensburg
2 September;
Bergamo, Italy
19 September;
The Hague, Netherlands
22 September;
Utrecht, Netherlands
2 October;
Zurich, Switzerland
Bombing attack on offices of the MAN engineering firm.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
Attempted rocket attack using homemade launcher on office of the Federal
Attorney General; attack site was private apartment seized by force.
Bombing attack on office of German-Italian Chamber of Commerce.
A branch of the Berliner Bank held up; about $18,000 stolen.
Perpetrators: two men and two women, suspected of being terrorists (female bank
robbers relatively common in terrorist groups, otherwise rare).
Bombing attack on commercial building.
Claiming responsibility: RZ.
Bombing attack on the courthouse.
Perpetrator: a rightist extremist.
Bombing attacks on office of Allianz insurance firm and Mercedes-Benz
showroom.
Claiming responsibility: (RAF) Kommando Petra Schelm.
Abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, President of West German Employers
Association; murder of his driver and three accompanying policemen.
Demand: Schleyer to be exchanged for 11 imprisoned RAF members, each to be
given 100,000 deutsche marks (about $45,000) and flown to country of his or her
choice.
Perpetrators: RAF Kommando Siegfried Hausner.
Discharge of firearms at police officers during arrest of two RAF members; one
policeman seriously wounded.
Discharge of firearms at police officers during arrest of RAF member; one
policeman killed, another seriously wounded; weapon used had been taken in the
robbery of 1 July 1977 in Frankfurt/Main.
A bank held up; more than $220,000 stolen. Currency from this holdup was found
19 January 1978 at a terrorist hideout in Hannover.
Bombing attack on office of Mercedes-Benz.
6 October; Rotterdam, Shots fired at German Consulate.
Netherlands
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17 October;
Aden, South Yemen
18 October;
Mogadishu, Somalia
18 October;
Stuttgart/Stammheim
19 October;
Muehlhausen, France (Al-
sace)
31 October;
Zweibruecken
10 November;
Amsterdam, Netherlands
13 November;
Vienna, Austria
19 November;
Madrid, Spain
20 December; border
area near Delmont,
Switzerland
During interim landing, pilot of hijacked aircraft shot to death by leader of PFLP
Kommando.
Unit of GSG-9, German counterterrorist strike force, stormed hijacked aircraft
and freed hostages, killing three terrorists and wounding another.
Upon hearing of hostage rescue, imprisoned RAF members Andreas Baader and
Jan Karl Raspe committed suicide using pistols previously smuggled into their
cells, and Gudrun Ensslin hanged herself with the cord from her record player.
Body of the murdered Dr. Schleyer found in trunk of a parked car, following
telephoned instructions from the killers.
Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando.
Bombing attack on State Supreme Court. Attackers, who did not identify
themselves, justified act as retribution for alleged murder of RAF prisoners by
state security authorities.
Suspects: Group Antifascist Struggle (Antifa) Kaiserslautern.
Discharge of firearms by two RAF members being arrested; one policeman and
both terrorists wounded.
Abduction of Austrian industrialist, later released in exchange for payment of
more than $2 million.
Perpetrators: three Austrian nationals, with suspected help of members of 2 June
Movement.
Arson attack on district court building.
Discharge of firearms at Swiss customs officers; one officer wounded critically,
another slightly; perpetrators captured.
Perpetrators: members of 2 June Movement.
13 October; Palma
de Mallorca, Spain
Hijacking of Lufthansa aircraft with 82 passengers and five crew members in
flight from Palma to Frankfurt/Main. Circulation of a "Communique of the
Operation Koffre Kaddum" together with an "Ultimatum to the Chancellor of the
FRG" signed by the "Struggle Against World Imperialism Organization" and a
statement of an RAF Kommando concerning previous ultimatums.
Demands: repeat of demands made by Schleyer abductors, plus release of two
PFLP members imprisoned in Istanbul, plus payment of $15 million, all by 16
October 1977.
Perpetrators: PFLP Kommando Martyr Halimeh.
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