CABLE TO SECSTATE FROM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200130008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 12, 1981
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200130008-6 ;
JLUIIL 1 \ IIVVOMIIfG
Departt~zent of State TELEGRAM
PAGE 01 SINGAP 12382 62 OF 62 1466072
ACTION INRD-68
INFO OCT-01 ADS-66 CCO-66 /069 W
------------------312277 1466352 /11 38
O 1216152 DEC 81
FM AME~4BASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1857
INFO A~4EMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
SHOULD MILITARY AID BE CONSIDERED LATER, IT
WOULD BE DONE, AS IN THE CASE OF "AFGHANISTAN...
NOT PUBLICLY. "
8. HE SAID,WITHIN ASEAN, THE MALAYSIANS HELD
THE STRONGEST VIEWS SUPPORTING MILITARY AID
TO SON SANN WITH OR WITHOUT A COALITION;
SINGAPORE AND THAILAND BELIEVED A COALITION
WAS NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE KHMER GOVERNMENT AND THAT AID SHOULD GO
ONLY TO SUCH A COALITION. THE INDONESIANS,
WHILE THEY APPEARED,ON THE SURFACE, TO OBJECT
TO THE "SUBSTANCE" OF MILITARY AID, OBJECTED
EVEN MORE TO THE PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF~PROVIDING
MILITARY AID. HE THEN INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED
THE BASIC ELE~AENTS OF THE NATHAN BRIEFING WITH
REFERENCE TO~ASEAN UNITY ON AID TO THE KHMER.
9. DHANA NOTED THAT AN ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S BRIEFING OF ASEAN AMBASSADORS
ON THE SON SANN VISIT WAS READ AT THE PATTAYA
CONFERENCE. THE MINISTERS FELT THAT THE US WAS
DISPLAYING A MORE POSITIVE POSITION ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF AID.
16. RETURNING TO INTRA-ASEAN DISCUSSIONS AT PATTAYA,
DHANA SAID THAT WHAT CONCERNED THE INDONESIANS MOST
WAS THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION BY ASEAN OF AID TO THE
KHMER, PARTICULARLY MILITARY AID. THERE WERE
ELEMENTS IN INDONESIA WHO FEARED THAT INDONESIA
MIGHT BE DRAGGED INTO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. AT
THE SAME TIME, THERE WAS A CLEAR CONSENSUS AT
PATTAYA THAT ADDITIONAL MILITARY PRESSURE ON ,
THE VIETNAMESE WAS NEEDED. THIS WOULD NOT BE
DONE IF ONLY THREE OF THE ASEANS SUPPORTED SUCH
PRESSURE. THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN
OUT, HE SAID, AND THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT,
ESPECIALLY TO MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, TO KNOW
WHERE THE USG STANDS.
11. DHANA SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH US
IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING WEEK.
12. COMMENT: DHANA MAY HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED
OVER THE LACK OF A MILITARY COMPONENT IN OUR RESPONSE
BUT HE DID NOW SHOW IT. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED,
HOWEVER, IF HIS CONSIDERED RESPONSE (AFTER
CONSULTATION WITH RAJA AND PM LEE) WERE TO
INCLUDE AN EXPRESSION OF A DESIRE FOR SOMETHING
MORE. AS FOR HOW WE OR SINGAPORE HANDLE THE
INDONESIA PROBLEM, WE CAN EXPECT SINGAPORE TO~
MAKE A PROPOSAL NEXT WEEK. IN THE MEANWHILE,
IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR US TO TELL SINGAPORE
ASAP WHAT MOCHTAR TELLS CHARGE MONJO ABOUT THE
INDONESIAN POSITION. END COMMENT. THAYER
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200130008-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200130008-6
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PAGE 01 SINGAP 12592 02 OF 02 1709132
ACTION INRp-08
INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CCO-00 /009 w
------------------035270 1710162 /11
O 1708552 DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC ~IMA4EDIATE 1916
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IM~AEDZATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SINGAPORE 12592
ROGER CHANNEL
THE VIETNAMESE. THIS WOULD GIVE THE KHMER A CHOICE ONLY
BETWEEN THE DK AND THE PRY.. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT
THAT THE KHMER WOULD NOT CHOOSE THE DK. THEREFORE,
HE SAID, "WE CAN'T FIGHT SHY OF THE MILITARY AID ISSUE."
THE K.PNLF CANNOT FIGHT "WITH MEDICAL AMPULES." O'DONOHUE
RESTATED THE VIEW THAT FOR THE USG MILITARY AID IS
"COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY."
NATHAN SAID, " WE UNDERSTAND THIS (USG VIEW) BUT WE CAN' T
PRECLUDE IT (MILITARY AID)."
10. THE ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION ALSO DEALT WITH AID TO
VIETNAM, REMARKS ABOUT SON SANN AND U. S. CONTACT WITH
VIETNAM, ALL OF WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN A SEPTEL.
11. COMMENT: BOTH FROM THIS CONVERSATION AND FROM
GHAZALI'S AIRPORT REMARKS REPORTED BY K.L. IT WOULp
APPEAR THAT SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA, AT THE LEAST, HAVE
NOT ABANDONED THEIR HOPES FOR A U. S, MILITARY AID
INVOLVEMENT. A DEFINITIVE GOS RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS
POSED IN OUR DECEMBER 12 DEMARCHE STILL IS TO COME. WITH
MAHATHIR AND GHAZALI IN TOWN, FVE CAN EXPECT THE CLOSEST
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ASEAN HAWKS.
12. DAS O'DONOHUE HAS NOT SEEN THIS MESSAGE. SMITH
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200130008-6