US SUPPORT FOR NON-COMMUNIST KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200130006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 21, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200130006-8 `~,~,~~
va~vawi
State Dept. review completed
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Notional Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
.Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Richard Lehman ti~~-
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT US Support for Non-Communist Kampuchean Resistance
1. The captioned subject is on the agenda for your breakfast
meeting Tuesday with Secretary Haig.
2. State has informed ASEAN that subject to a Presidential Finding
and Congressional Committee approval, the US will give financial support
to the Resistance. State acted in response to requests from Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand. The amount of financial support is very small,
about $3M. Pertinent State cables are at Tab A, with important portions
scored in yellow. Tab B is a paper on the same subject prepared for
Secretary Haig by his staff.
3. Although State told ASEAN that a Presidential Finding is required,
ASEAN may not have been listening. Therefore, CIA should decide as soon
as possible whether to request Presidential approval. In reaching a
decision, we should recognize that the initial request for $3M in financial
support is only a beginning: ASEAN will be back within two or three
months for more, and ultimately Singapore and Malaysia will press us to
provide military aid as well. Thus our decision to seek Presidential
approval should be coupled with a decision on how far we are willing to go.
4. I recently discussed this subject in Bangkok, where I stopped
briefly during a trip to East Asia. John Dean sends his regards to you. He
believes that modest financial support is the only alternative .to two
Deriv C1 By Signer
Rev on Dec O1
All Portions Secret
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unacceptable options: support the Communist Democratic Kampuchean Resistance;
or accept a permanent Vietnamese presence on the Thai border.
25X1
agrees, but is not optimistic that the Resistance will
25X1
use our support effectively. I agree with both of them -- although the
prospects for success are limited, we have little choice. Back in Washington,
I talked to former Ambassador Mort Abramowitz. Although he believes the
Resistance movement ultimately will force the Vietnamese into a political
accommodation, Mort doubts the US will be able to limit intervention to
occasional small-scale financial contributions. Mort's concern is that what
starts small often ends up big.
5. has read this memorandum and agrees with the contents.
Tab C is a contribution to this memorandum prepared by his staff.
Attachments
As Stated
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Depar-tnzerzt of State TELEGRAP
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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SCCSTATE WASHDL IMMEDIATE 8816
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA 1DMPDR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY MANILA
EO 12065: RDS-1 12/16/81 D)'DONOHUE, DANIEL A.)
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, Vn
SUBJECT: KHMER RESISTANCE
2. AS INSTRUCTED, DAS O'DONOHUE BRIEFED ON HIGHLY CON-
FIDENTIAL BASIS KEY G01 OFFICIALS 017 OUR RESPONSE TO RE-
QUEST FDR USG ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE.
(t10CNTAR VAS OUT OF TOWN.) IN SEPARATE MEETINGS VITN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL nUNAVIR AND ASIA
DIRECTOR (AND INTELLIGENCE GENERAL) SATARI, O'DONOHUE
EXPLAINED THAT VE HAD RESPONDED LAST VEEKEND TO THE TNA1,
MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPOREAN REQUESTS FOR U. S. ASSISTANCE TO
THE KHMER. OUTLINING SALIENT POINTS RFF F O'DONOHUE
SAID THAT VE HAD INDICATED OUR VIIlING11ESS TO CONSIDER A
LIMITED PACKAGE OF NON-MILITARY, NIInANITARIAW AND FINAN-
CIAL SUPPORT TO SUPPLEMENT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES OVN EFFORTS
VITN THE KHMER RESISTANCE. THIS PACKAGE WOULD BE IN THE
MEI6MBORMOOD OF 3-1 MILLION DOLLARS AND VOUID BE USED FOR
FOOD, MEDICINES, OTHER NON-LETHAI MATERIAL AND ADDITIOIIAL
ADMIpISTRATIYE ACTIVITIES. VE BAD EXPLAINED TO THE THREE
ASEAN GOVERNMENTS THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES MUST REMAIN IN
THE FOREFRONT AND TN AT ANY USG PROGRAM VDUID BE IN SUPPORT
OF THEIR OVN EFFORTS. WE ALSO -OINTED OUT THAT ANY U. S.
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT INClU01NG MILITARY ASSISTANCE 110ULD
RE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE INTERNATIDNALLY AND CAUSE DOMESTIC
rROBLCnS IN TERMS OF SUPPORT FDR USG PDLICY IN,THE AREA.
3. O'DOIIONUE SAID THAT WE HAD EXPLAINED TN AT NO FINAL
OECISIOItS HAD BEEN MADE AND TN AT WE VOULO NEED A PRESI-
DENiIAI DECISION AND CONSUL-ATIONS VITN KEY CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES. VE ALSO TOLD THE iNRCE ASEAN 60VERNMCNTS THAT
REFORC PROCEEDING TO OUR OVN DECISION VE VOULD NEED A
CIE AR PICTURE Of THEIR OWH PROGRAMS AND AN ASEAN CONSENSUS
INCLUDING AT (EAST TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY INDONESIA AND TNF
rNIIIPPINES. THE INITIAL MALAYSIAN, TXAI AHD SINGAPOREAN
REACTION VAS FRVORABIE AND WE ARE NON AYAITING A MORE
SPECIFIC R[SPONSE FROM THEM.
~, tN MEETING VITN SATARI, NE SAID NE VAS NAPPY THAT VE
NAD NO1 INCLUDED MILITARY AID AND NE NAD NO PROBLEM VITN
OVR OFFERING NOk-MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS LONG AS IT VAS
'MOT OM AM ASEAN BASIS.' NE EXPRESSED NIS APPRECIATION
i0R OVR KEEPING Nln INFORMED AND SAID, IN ADDITION TD
MOCNTAR, NE VOUlO DISCUSS THE MATTER ONLY VITN GENERAL
BENMT MURDANI IN THE INTEIIIGENCE FIELD. SATARI MADE
CLEAR THAT NE YIEYED ANY U. S. MIIITARI ASSISTANCE AS A
MISTAKE AND VAS CLEARLY RELIEVED THAT Wf NAD NOT INCLUDED
A MIl17ARY ASSISTAtiLE COMPOIIENi.
SECRET
THAILAND, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE, STATING THAT IN HIS
OPINION IT WAS 'JUST RIGHT.' NE SAID THAT G01 NAD BEEN
QUITE UPSET WITH RAJARATNAM'S REFERENCE TO TMF POSSIBILITY
OF RSEAN'S PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY '
SINCE THE GOS VAS VEIL AVARE OF .INDONESIA'S AND THE
PHILIPPINES' NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. MUNAWIR
ADDED THAT nOCHTAR HAC AGREED THAT, SHOULD THE USG ASK
INDONESIA'S OPINION ON OUR GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE,
THE G01 VOULD REPLY THAT IT NAD 'NO OBJECTION.' HOWEVER
INDONESIA'S DO NOT BELIEVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE A GOOD
IDEA AND ANY SUCH USG INVOLVEMENT VOULD BE COUNTER-
PRODUCIIYE IN GOI VIE V. nUNAVIR REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES
THAT IT VAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFYING TO HIn TN AT THE USG
AND G01 SHARE SIMILAR VIEWS ON NOT INCLUDING MILITARY
ASSISTANCE. FURTHER, HE NOTED THE GOI IS CONSIDERING
WHETHER IT SHOULD GIVE TOKEN NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
SON SANN. IN COGCLUSION MUNAVIR ASSURED US THAT NIS
POSITIVE REACTION TO OUR LIMITED, NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE REFLECTED AN OFFICIAL G01 VIEW.
6. COMMENT: IN BOTH DISCUSSIONS O'DONOHUE STRESSED
CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR RESPONSE AND tIEED TO AVOID
PUBLICITY. BOTH MEN AGREED COMPLETELY, INDICATING THAT
THEY HAD MADE THE SAME POINTS iN PATTAYA TO OTHER ASEAN
PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY SINGAPORE.
7. SATARI (THE INTEIIIGENCE COMMUNITY) AND MUNAWIR
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS CDMMUNITY) VERE ALIKE IN EX.?RESSING
GREAT APPRECIATION AND RELIEF THAT VE ARE NDT CONTEn-
PIATING GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST
KHMER RESISTANCC. THERE WAS A BEGRE[ OF DIFFERENCE,
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FM AMEMBASST SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE VASNDC IMMEDIATE 1915
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12865: RDS-1 12/11/81 lSMI1H, MORTON S.1 OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, YN
SUBJ: Oi) AID TO KHMER: DISCUSSION VITN MFA
2. SUMMARY: OAS O'DONOHUE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE U. S.
NON-MILITARY AID TO THE KHMER VITN PERMSEC OF MFA
DECEMBER 17. O'DONONUE REPORTED POSITIVE REACTION OF
INDONESIANS TO PROSPECT OF NON-MILITARY U. S. AID. NE
DESCRIBED THE U. S. EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES
YHICN VOULD i0ll0V A DEFINITIVE ASEAN RESPONSE TO OUR
PROPOSALS. THAT ASEAN RESPONSE AND A DESCRIPTION OF
iME MODALITIES OF ASEAN PLANNING REMAIN TO BE DEVELOPED.
MATNAN ACCEPTED UNDESIRABILITY OF U. S. MILITARY AID AT
PRESENT BUT BELIEVES KPNLF VILL NEED MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FROM SOME SOURCE i0 DEFEND ITSEIf FROM DK AND
VIETNAMESE. END SUMMARY
3. DAS O'DDNOHUE ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE CALLED ON MFA
-ERMSEC S.R. MATNAN DECEMBER 17. ALSO ATTENDING FROM
MFA VERE LEE CNIONG GIAM 011RECTOR OF REGIONAL AND
ECONOMIC AFFAIRSI, KISNORE MANBUBANI UIEPUTY POLITICAL
DIRECTOR FOR COMMUNIST AFFAIRS), IIIINARI KAUSIKAN
EAMERICAN DESK OFFICERI.
1. O'OONOHUE, HAVING JUST ARRIVED FROM JAKARTA,
SUMMARIZED THE REACTION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT
TO THE U. S. DECISION TO CONSIDER PROVIDING LIMITED MON-
MIIITARY ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST KHMER. THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF DEPLU, MUNAVIR, PROVIDED THE 601
YIEY, IAIICN O'DONONUE TEAMED POSITIVE AND 'RELIEVED'
THAT THE USG PROPOSAL DID NOT INCLUDE A MILITARY
COMPONENT. YNEN MATNAN ASKED NOV COI. SATpRI REACTED,
O'DONONUE SAID NE VAS MOT ENTHUSIASTIC BUT NE ACQUIESCED.
THE 601, NE SAID, NAS ALONG RANGE YIEV OF VNERE IT
RELIEVES IT AND ASEAN SHOULD GO VISA-VIS VIETNAM AND
SINCE THE 601 BELIEVES VIETNAM IS NO SERIOUS THREAT TO
INDONESIA IN THE NEAR TERM THE 601 NAS DECIDED TO STAY
OM TNF CURRENT COURSE VITN ASEAN. NATHAN SAID THAT
THOSE SCURRYING ABOUT TRYING TO CONE UP VITN NEW
CAMBODIAN SOLUTIONS ONLY GIVE THE SRV THE IMPRESSION
THAT 'ASEAN IS SUING i0R PEACE.'
S. RE YEICOMED THE RE-ORT OF INDONESIAN ACQUIESCENCE
AND SAID ME VOUID -ASS IT QUICKLY TD FONMIM ONAMABALAN
YND VOULO RE MEETING VITN GMAZAII IN THE COURSE OF THE
TVD DAY VISIT OF MALAYSIAN PM MANATHIR VHICN STARTED
TODAY.
~. O'OONONUE NO1ED THAT NE VOULD BE BRIEFING PRESIOEMi
MARCOS AND FONMIN ROnUlO ON THE MATTER ALSO THEREBY
ENSYRING, AS pNAMABALAN NAD SUGGESTED, THAT All FIVE
SECRET
TELEGRAM
ASEANS VERE AVARE OF U. S. INTENTIONS. OUR OR161NAL
INSTRUCTIONS 10 BRIEF OIIIY THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND
i1NGAPDRE STEMMED IRON OUR DESIRE NOT TO INJECT OURSELVES
INTO ASEAN'S INTERNAL DEBATE OVER ASSISTANCE TO THE NNMER.
7. MAIHAN ASKED ABOUT THE TIME FRAME FOR THE U. S.
AID PACKAGE. O'OONONUE SAID AFTER RECEIVING THE ASEAN
RESPONSE VE COULD MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY. NE OUTLINED THE
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH PROCEDURES INVOLVED.
NATHAN VAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT YHETHER THE CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL REQUIRED VOULD BE PUBLIC. O'DONONUE STATED
THAT THE PROCESS INVOLVED VEIL-ESTABLISHED, CONFIDENTIAL
CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES VITN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
OF THE CONGRESS. NATHAN VAS VISIBLY RELIEVED AND
IMPLIED TN AT OTHER ASEANS HERE SIMILARLY FUZZY IN THEIR
UNOERSIANDING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE.
i. O'DONOHUE ASKED VHAT THE ASEAN PROGRAM FOR
CAM6001AN ASSISTANCE 100NED LIKE. NATHAN SAID IN All
IIKEIINDOD ASEAN VOUID SET UP A SMAIt VORNING-IEYFI
GROUP TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES. THEI Y
GENERAL iN THE BORDER REGION
YOUID NAYF THE BEST IDEA
OF NOV 10 PROCEED, NAINAN SAID. O'OONONUE TWICE MORE
DURING THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION ASKED THAT ASEAN
TELL US NOV THEY PLAN TO PROCEED.
9. MATNAN RETURNED TO THE AiD ISSUE LATER IN 1HF MEETING
AND SAID FOR THE MOMENT THERE COULD BE NO MATERIAL
N11l1TARYl AID FROM iNE U. S. :BUT WITHOUT MILITARY AID
lAl NOV VILI THE KPNIF STAND UP TD THE DK, ANO O11 CAN
THE KPNIF FIGHT OFF A VIETNAMESE ATTACK? 1NE DN, NE
SA10, VOUID BE HAPPY TO SEE A THIRD FORCE ERADICATED BY
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0 1230152 DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE VASNDC IMMEDIATE 1856
INFO RMEMBASSY BANGKO{i IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKACTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12865: RDS-1 12/I2/B1 LTHAYER, MARRY E.T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, C6, US, VM, SN
SUBJ: lS1 KHMER RESISTAItCE
Z. SUMMARY:. 1 CONVEYED INSTRUCTED POINTS ON AID TO
1HE KHMER TO FONMIN DHANABALAII DECEMBER 12. DHANA
OFFERED PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND l'Ill AMPLIFY NEXT
VEEK. NE SAID USG SHOULD CONSIDER MAY,ING SAME
APPROACH TD THE FIVE ASEAIJS SINCE THEY All NAVE
MOV AGREED, AT PATJYA,.ON THE NEED FOR NON-
MILITARY ASSISTANCE. I SAID THAT SINCE THREE
ASEAIIS SEPARATELY ASKED US TD A10 THE KHMER NE
VERE RESPONDING SEPARATELY TD EACH. DHANA WILL
MAKE PROPOSALE HE XT VEEN ON NOV TO HAtIDIE
INDONESIA. ENG SUMMARY.
3. I MET VITH FONMIN DHANA6ALAN DEL. 12 AFTER
RECEIIING PERMSEC NATHAN'S BRIEFING ON THE PATTAYA
MEETING OF THE ASEAN FONMINS REPORTED IN REFIEL B.
I EXPLAINED THAT VHILE I NAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED
THE MEETING BECAUSE OF MY DEPARTURE FOR VASHINGTON
tONSULTATIONS, i NAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS
RESPOtIDING TO THE GOS REQUEST FGR AID TC THE
KHMER. I THEN PRESENTED THE SUfiSTANCE OF REFTEL A
IN DETAIL. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING VERE THE
DCM, THE MFA ASSISTANT POLITICAL DIRECTOR FOR
COMMUNIST AFFAIRS RAYMOND VGNG AND AMERICAN DESK
OFFICER BILINARI KAUSIKAN.
~. AFTER PRESENTING OUR POSITION, I NOTED THAI MY
INSTRUCTIONS PRESUMBABIY VERE PREPARED PRIOR i0 THE
CONCLUSION OF THE PATTAYA CONFERENCE AND THAT
NATHAN'S JUS1 CONCLUDED BRIEFING NAD HELPED
ANSVER SOME OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN MY
INSTRUCTIONS. 1 NOTED ALSO THAT I OBVIOUSLY
COULD NOT SPECULATE BEYOND THE LANGUAGE OF THE
INSTRUCTIONS BUT VOUID VELCOME ANY IMMEDIATE
COMMENT THE MINISTER MIGHT NAVE.
5. DHANA SAID NE VOUID HAVE TO STUDY OUR YIEVS
MORE CLOSELY BEFORE COMMENTING DEFINITIVELY. MIS
IMMEDIATE REACTION, NOVEYER, CENTERED ABOUT AN
INFERENCE NE FELT O~IE LaN DRAY FROn iNE INSTRUCTIONS.
IT APPERREO, NE SA10, 1NAT THE USG ASSU!tES ASEAN
VOUlO NOT BF UNITED IN BEING AGREEABLE TO THE
USG EXTENDING NON-MILITARY AS YELL AS MILITARY
AID 10 THE KHMER. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE WAY
OUR INSTRUCTIONS DISCUSS NAlIDLING THIS ISSUE
VIIHIN ASEAN IMPLY THIS. HE VENT ON TO SAY THAT
111E GOS VDULD NOT DISCUSS OUR DEM:RCHF VITH
INDONESIA OR ANrONE ELSE RIGHT NOV. pNANA
SECRET
SINGAP 12382 BI OF B2" ~116Z
FELT, NOVEVER, THAT SINtf THE USG VAS PREPARED
TO COtdSIDE6 N01+-MILITARY AID AND SINCE ALL
ASEANS AGREED ON THE NEED FOR THIS TYPE OF
AID FOR THE KHMER, PERHAPS IT VDULD BE DESIRABLE
FOR THE USu TO HARE THE SAME DEMARCHE TO ALL
FIVE ASEAIIS. HE NOTED TNA7 VE NAD ALREADY TOLD
ALl OF THE ASEANS OF OUR PREVIOUS HUMAtIITARIAN 0.WD
FMS ASSISTANCE AND VONDERED VHY ESSENTIALLY THE
SAME TYPES OF AID SHOULD NOT AGAIN BE DISCUSSED
WITH All OF THE ASEANS. THE INDOIIESIAIIS MAY
YONDER VHY THEY VERE LEFT OUT AT THIS EARLY
STAGE.
6. I TOLD HIM THAT SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND
THAILAND NAD REQUESTED AID TO THE KHMER FROM
US AND THAT VE DID NOT VAUT TO COMPLICATE THEIR
REIATIDNSHIPS VITH INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES
BY, IN EFFECT, AI:S~RING THOSE BILATERAL REQUESTS
IN A MULTILATERAL MANNER. REFERRING TO THE
'COORDINATION" LANGUAGE IY. MY II!STRUC?IOt:S, I
SAID VE VOULD VELCOnE HIS YIEVS OF HO'w EE ST
TO HANDLE THE MATTER VITH THE IY.DOhFSIANS.
DHANA SAID NE VOUID GET BACK TO US ON THIS AND
AGREED THAT AT THIS POINT VE SHOULD KEEP THIS
A BILATERAL ISSUE.
7. COMMENTING FURTHER ON MY PRESEN1AlI0N, DHANA
SA10 TM AT IT VAS 'UNREAliSTIC" TO EXPECT THE
ADMINISTRATION TD START PROVIDING MILITARY AID
TO THE KHMER 'FIGHT AVAY' AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT,
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F% AIL NBASSY BANGKOK
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INFO ANE%BASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AME%BASSY KUALA IUNPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY %ANILA 1%%EDIATE
AME%BASSY SINGAPORE I%MEDIATE
EO 12865: RDS-1/3 12/15/BI 0)EAN, JOHN GUNTNER) OR-%
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, Y%
SUBJECT: KNIfER RESISTANCE "
REF: STATE 3281)8
2. THE MORNING OF DECE%BER 15 1 MET YITH THAI FOREIGN
MINISTER SITTHI TO DISCUSS WITH HIM NOY YE PLAN i0 RESPOND
TO THE APPEALS OF SOME ASEAN STATES FOR U. S. SUPPORT TO
THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS UtEFTEL). AFTER LISTENING TO MY
PRESENTATION, FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI RE PIiED AS FOLLOVS:
--(A) AT THE PHATTHAYA CONFERENCE, THE ASEAN FOREIGN
MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO PROVIDE NON-MILITARY AID TO THE
NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS BUT LEFT THE KATTER OF MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. THIS FORNUTA IS
SUFFICIENTEY FLEXIBLE TO %AINTAIN ASEAN UNITY VHILE ALSO
C,ECTIMG THE SPCCiFIt YIEVS 0' IHDIVIDL'AL ASEAN PEMBERS.
-- 03) '1T VOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
YDULD NDT IIMiT THE DISCUSSIONS OF U. S. INTENTIONS TO
SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND, BUT YOUID ALSO HEEP THE
-NIIIPPINES AHD INDONESIA INFORMED. SUCH ALTI011 BY THE
U. S. MOULD FACILITATE COOPERATION AHONG THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
AND HELP TC MAINTAIN UNITY AMDNG ITS MEMBERS ON A POTEN-
TIALLY DIVISIVE 'ISSUE.
--IC) THE INDONESIANS DO NOT WISH TO TAKE A PUBLIC
POSTURE VHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN 'ASEAN PROVOCA-
TION'. HENCE THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS AT PHATTHAYA OH NON-
%ILITARY ASSISTANCE. YHILE PUBLICLY AVOIDING ANY
REFERENCE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CA%BODIA BY ASEAN
COUNTRIES, SITTHI CLAIMED THE INDONESIANS ARE SECRETLY
PROVIDING NIIITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE.
THIS SHOVED, IN HIS VIEW, THAT THE INDONESIANS COULD BE
VERY RE AIISTIt AND UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE U. S. NOT
TO KEEP INDONESIA IN THE DARK CONCERNING OUR INTENTIONS
ON HELPING THE KHMER RESISTANCE.
-- 071 THE NON-NIIIiARY SUPFORi PROVIDED BY ASEAN TO THE
NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS Will BC CHANNELED THROUGH THAILAND.
SITTHI TN OUGHT EVERYBODY HAG AGREED OI7 THIS PRINCIPLE
Ai PHATTHAYA, BUT NO DETAILS MERE DISCUSSED.
--tE) THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DID NOT DISCUSS AT PHATTHAYA
NOV NIIITARY AID BY THE INDIYIDUAI COUNTRIES MIGHT BE
CHANNELED TO TMF NON-COM,%UNITT KNMEP. RESISTANCE.
--IF) IN A SIDE COIIYERSATION AT PHATTHAYA, SITTHI HAD
DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF NIl1TARY AID WITH NIS
MALAYSIA!! AND SII:GAPORAN COLLEAGUES. SITTHI FFEIS )NAT
SINGAPORE ANC THAilA6D NIGH' END UP VITH A JOINT
MECHANIS% i0R HANDLING MIl11ARY ASSISTANCE P60VIDED BY
SECRET
INDIVIDUAL ASEAN COUNTRIES, BU1 TNIS IDEA Vlll NEED
FURTHER DISCUSSION.
--lG) ON DE CE%BER 22 NAIAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHA}Alt
Yll! MEET JOINTLY IN BANGKDK YITH GENERAL SAIYUD ITHAI
SUPREME CDH%ANDER) AND FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI TO DISCUSS
DETAILS ON HOW 10 SUPPORT THE NON-CO%NUHIST KNNER. IN
)NIS CONNECTION SITTHI EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT ANY ASSIS-
TANCE TO THE NOh-CONNUHIST KHMER %UST TRANSIT TNAIlANO,
YHICN GI YES THE THAIS A SPECIAL ROLE IN CHANNELING TNIS
AID iD ITS DESTINATION.
-- 01) SITTHI FELT HE NEEDED TO CONSULT SO%E OF HIS ASEAN
COLLEAGUES BEFORE ANSVERING THE OUESTIOII OF NOV U.S.-
PROVIDED ASSISTANCE SHOULD 6E NAI;DLED. NE SAID HE FULLY
UNDERSTANDS THE NON-%ILITARY NATURE Of OUR RESPONSE TO THE
APPEALS OF SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND FGR U. S.
ASSISTANCE.
--111 SITTHI ALSO TOUCHED 6RIEFLY ON THE MATTER OF
YHETHER U. S. NOH-NIlI1ARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD 6E IINHED
TO THE FORMATION OF A COALITIOK AMONG THE THREE KHNEP,
FACTIONS. SITTHI THOUGHT A 'BEST EFFORT' SHOULD 6E MADE
TO BRING ABDUT SUCH A COAliTION, BUT EVEN If TNIS DID NOT
OCCUR, 'THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER MUST NAVE THE SUPPORT Of
THEIR FRIENDS.'
-- U1 SITTHI PLANS TO INFORM PRIME MINISTER PREH ON
DECEMBER 15 OR 16 OF ANERICAII THINNING ON SUPPORT FOP.
THE KHMER RESISTANCE. HE VILE AI SO DISCUSS kITH PREH
GNAZAII'S FORTHCOltIpG VISIT FO BANGKOk. IN AHY CASE, THE
OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE THAT Ylll GOVERN THAI POLICY ON YNIS
SUBJECT Yllt BE TC YORK IN NARNONY VITH ITS ASEAN
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COPY Depczrtnzejz.t of State TELEGP-A.Pr1
PAGE BI KUALA 88232 12B92BZ
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0 120bD52 DEL 81
fM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR.
10 SECSTATE WASH DC IMMEDIATE 1167
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEM6RSSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12865: RDS-1/3 12/1.2/81 1PALMER, RONALD D.1 OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, YN, MY
SU6JECT: 1S) KNMFR RESISTANCE '
2. AS INSTP.UCTED REFTEL, I YE NT IN TO SEE FOREIGN
MINISTER GHAZALI THIS MORNING (DECEMBER 72). HE AND
MFR SECRETARY GENERAL ZACNARIA AND GHAZALI'S PRIVATE
SECRETARY HASMIM RECEIVED ME. I INFORMED GNAZAII MY
60YERNYJ:Ni HAD RESPONDED TO THE PLEAS HE AND OTHER
ASEAN IE:.DERS HAD MADE FOR US ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST
KHMER RESISTANCE, BUT 1 NOTED I COULD NOT GO
BEYOND THE POINTS 1 WOULD OUTLINE. I AI SO SAID I AND
OTHER US CHIEFS OF MISSIOI; IN TNE ASEAN REGION WOULD BE
TNE PRINCIPAL POI ICY CONTACTS ON THE PROJECT, WITH OUR
INTEIIIGENCE LIAISON PEOPLE Cc ACING WITH ITS
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS, AFTER RESPONSES TO CERTAIN
OUESTIORS YE RE OBTAINED, AND REQUISITE PRESIDENTAL
AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WERE OBTAINED.
3. RF1ER OUTLING THE INTRODUCTORY PORTIONS OF
PARA 2 REFTEL, 1 READ ALOUD TNE RELEVANT TALKING
POINTS IN PARR 2, NHIIE THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE
MOTES. YHEN 1 FINISNEG MY PRE SE NATION, NE SAID,
IN [SSENCE, THE US HAS AGREED TO MAKE A NOIJ-LETHAL
PACKAGE CONTRIBUTION, SUBJECT TO RECEIVING ANSWERS
TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS, AND FURTHER CONSULTATION
YITH AHD APPROVAL BY TNE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.
I AGREED ON TNE THREE KEY POINTS, GNAZAII SAID
1i RE ASEAN COIJSENSUS ON A US ROLE IN ASSISTING THE
NON-COMMUNIST KY.MER RESISTANCE, SUCH CONSENSUS
RMONu MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND HAD BEEN
OBTAINCD A7 TNE DECEMBER 10 PATTAYA ASEAN FOREIGN
MINISTERS MEETING AND THE ?ACOUIESCENCE' OF TNE
PNIlIPP111ES AND INDOIJESIA IN SUCH A US ROLE HAD A150
BEEN OBTAINED; 2I RE WHAT ASEAN INTENDS TO D0, GNAZAII
SAID NE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING PRIME MINISTER MANATHIR
TO SINGAPORE IN TNE COMING WEEK RND MOULD TALK VITN
NIS SINGAPOREAN COLLEAGUES. ABDITIDNALIY, NE WILL
BE"IN BANGKOM. ON DECEMBER 2B AND INTENDS TO SIT DOWN
TOGETHER WITH BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI A!ID THE
FOREIGN MINI'aTRY GROUP AND GEaERAI SAIYUD AND
THE SUPREME COMMAND GROUP IN ORDER TO 'BUNDLE UP'
THIS QUESTION AND GET A COORDINATED RESPONSE
BACK iD THE US; 31 RE AN AGREED MECHANISM FOR
HANDLING RSSISTANCE, GNAZAII SAID THIS YAS THE MOST
IMPOR1At1T QUESTION. THE MOST EFFICRCIOUS MAY
TO GE1 TNE MRTERiALS TO TNE KPNLF MUST BE FOUND
TO M-KE CERTAIN TNE MONEY IS NOT WASTED OR TURNED TO
IMPRO?ER USES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT
IMSOFAk RS TMF MCNIiORING AMD CHECKING OF US
SECRET
ASSISTANCE Y4S CONCERNED, MALAYSIA ITSELF CAN
6UARRNTEE TO SEE THAT YHATEVER THE US PROVIDES Wlll
ACTUALLY GET TO THE KPNIF. HE SAID HE DID NOT RECOMMEND
THAILAND AS THE CONDUIT At7D LAUGHED THAT CERTAIN
THAI LEADERS HAD RECOMMEtJDED AGAINST US ASSISTANCE z
BEING CHANNELED THROUGH THAItAHD 'BECAUSE SOME OF IT
MIGHT NOT REACH THE TARGETS.' GNAZALI SUMMED UP BY
SAYING THAT HE YOUID 6E WORKING WITH THE OTHER ASEAN
60VERNtiENTS TO GIVE TNE US THE RESPONSES IT DESIRED.
1. IN REACTING TO THE PROPOSED US ASSISTANCE, THE
FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED FAVORAB!Y THAT THE US PROPOSED
TO CONTINUE EXISTING HUMANITARIAN AID 10 THE KHMER
AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND.
ON THE SPECIFIC PACKAGE ITSELF, HE SAID, 'ANYTHING
IS BETTER THAN NOTHING BUT NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE
SUCCESS; SO YE NAVE TO MAKE THIS THING A SUCCESS.'
6NAZAlI SAID, ADDITIONALLY, NE 'VERY MUCH APPRECIATES
THE US OFFER AND UNDERSTANDS IfHY THE US HAS PUT
THE MATTER THE WAY IT HAS. I MILL YORK YITH TNE
OTHERS PARTICULARLY ON THE MODALITIES.'
S. I WILL BE REPORTING BY SFPTEI GNAZAII'S
COMMENTS ON RECENT MALAYSIAN CONTACTS YITH HANOI.
6. COMMENT: FOREIGN MINISTER GNAZAII YAS CLEARLY
PLEASED BY USG RESPONSE. HOWEVER; NE DID SEEK TO
PROBE ME ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES {COULD DO
AFTER THE NON-COMtIUNISTS MADE SUFFICENT PROGRESS;
1 DID NDT RESPOND, CITING MY INSTRUCTIONS TD NDT
60 BEYOND THE POINTS I HAB AI READY MADE.
7. 6HA2All YAS COMPLETELY APPRECIATIVE OF NEED TO KEEP
THIS MATTER CLOSE HOLD BUT NARKED THAT WE WOULD NAVE
TO Bi CAREFUL VITN SON SANK BECAUSE ?THE PROBLEM OF
PUBLICITY MOULD COME FROM THE KPNLF.?
PALMER
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 - the pose coalition. Tbey also a reed t at ASEAN as
an organization would not rovide mi to ass stance to the
- Khmer, but as indivldua states, eac was ree to o so or seek
third country assistance.
The guidance, which you authorized, on possible U.S. support
to the Khmer resistance reached the capitals immediately after
the Pattaya meeting. It was extremely helpful in responding to
renewed requests after the meeting for the USG position by Thai-
-- land, Singapore and Malaysia and was very timely.
agreed to urge China and others to get the Khmer Rouge to join
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POSSIBLE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER RESISTANCE
25X1
AB B
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reached again a consensus on Kam-
puchean strategy during t eir December 10 meetin in Pattaya,
Thailand. The Ministers assuaged Indonesian rritation oyez
Singapore's earlier handling of the coalition talks and Rajarat-
nam's public mention of military assistance from RSEA2~.to the
Khmer, and Indonesia is again comfortably on board ~ritti other
ASEAN's.
The Ministers supported the "loose coalition" approach and
Our positive approach produced a positive reaction in all ----
three capitals, and in Jakarta, where we provided a more limited
briefing. Malaysia and Singapore (with Ghazali Shafie particu-
larly pleased) acce ted our a roach, but made clear that the
hope eventually for U. military assistance by the U.S. as well.
The Indonesians were somewhat surprised, but pleased that we do
not intend to provide military assistance, which they would regard
as counterproductive. We do not et have the Fili ino reaction.
but Deputy Assistant Secretary O'Donohue riefe President Marcos
late last week. The~Fili inos should welcome our a roach.
Ambassador Hummel also riefe December C inese Vice Foreign
Minister Zhang Wen Jin, who responded that Chine d consistently
supported efforts to help any Khmer faction opposed to the Vietna-
mese occupation.
Our approach thus was constructive and avoided exacerbating. the
divergencies within ASEAN. The quick response following the Pattaya
meeting appears to have been just the right response at just the
right time.
we made clear that our proposal was tentative and did not re
resent 'a USG decision. Following receipt of a more integrates re-
sponse from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore), which spells out
what ASEAN plans to do, how our efforts might integrate with theirs
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
and through what mechanism we mighoversieht~concurrenceeinaouresi-
dential finding and congressional 9
proposal. We anticipate a considered response from the'three
ASEAN' s -soon . ~_ ,
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
TALKING POINTS
-- OUR INITIAL CONVERSATION WITH THE THAIS, SINGAPORE AND
MALAYSIA WAS TIMELY AND PRODUCED A POSITIVE REACTION IN ALL THREE
CAPITALS. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE (FOREIGN MINISTER GHAZALI
SHAFIE _ ENTHUSIASTICALLY)ACCEPTED OUR APPROACH, BUT
MADE CLEAR THAT THEY HOPED EVENTUALLY FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
-- INDONESIANS AIv'D PROBABLY THE FILIPINOS WERE COMFORTABLE WITH
OUR APPROACH_AND PLEASED THAT WE DO NOT INTEND T4 PROVIDE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE.
-- THE CHINESE WELCOMED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUPPORT.
-- OUR QUICK RESPONSE FOLLOWING THE PATTAYA MEETING TO RE-
HEWED APPEALS BY THAILAND, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA, _ 'APPEARS
TO HAVE BEEN THE RIGHT RESPONSE AT JUST THE RIGHT TIME.
-- WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS TENTATIVE AND DID
NOT REPRESENT A USG DECISION. WE ANTICIPATE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE
SOON FROM 3'HAILAND, MAZ,AYSiA AND SINGAPORE TO SPELL OUT THEIR
OWN PLANS, HOW OUR EFFORTS MIGHT INTEGRATE WITH THEIRS AND
WHAT CHANNEL THEY PROPOSE THAT WE USE.
-- AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THEIR RESPONSES, WE SHOULD STUDY ZT
FOR ACCEPTABILITY
PROCEED TO SEEK A PRESIDENTIAL
FZNPIr:G A:~1D, ON YOUR ?ART, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT CONCURRENCE .
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1. Secretary Haig will raise the issue of US assistance to the
non-Communist Khmer resistance. Since this matter was last discussed in
November, East Asia Division officers have been in close touch with
Assistant Secretary Holdridge and the Department's East Asia Bureau.
Final steps are now underway to obtain information from ASEAN, notably
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, necessary for the drafting of a
Presidential Finding submission. It is expected this can be put together
in early January 1982.
2. Division officers met with Secretary Holdridge and his associates
on 24 November. It was agreed that a limited, non-military aid package
3. Preliminary replies appear to be positive. Malaysia and Singapore
welcome the approach but made clear that they hope eventually to have the
US provide military assistance. Indonesia has expressed relief that military
assistance will not be included, which Jakarta believes would be counter-
productive. The Philippines have not yet responded. Briefed about the
US intention on 18 December, the PRC Vice Foreign Minister stated that the
Chinese consistently support efforts to help any Khmer faction opposed to
the Vietnamese occupation.
4. The Department is now awaiting a more detailed response from
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore which will identify precisely what ASEAN
plans to do and how the US effort can be integrated. After this is received
we will again meet with Assistant Secretary Holdridge to react concurrence
the content and scope of the Presidential Finding submission.
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