MOROCCO: PROSPECTS FOR KEY OPPOSITION GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100100005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Morocco: Prospects for
Key Opposition Groups
An Intelligence Memorandum
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F Intelligence
`c
~
\
Morocco: Prospects for
Key Opposition Groups
Information available as of 7 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was prepared by
~of the Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to the Chief, Arab Israeli
Division, NESA~
Secret
NESA 82-10166
May 1982
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Summary
Morocco: Prospects for ^
Key Opposition Groups 25X1
survival of the monarchy.
In the short run, King Hassan II should be able to maintain his tight
control of Morocco's patronage-based political system with little difficulty.
The current calm masks fundamental political and economic problems,
however, that probably will generate frequent outbreaks of civil disorder
and government repression in the mid-1980s. If economic conditions
worsen and Islamic fundamentalists and the Socialist opposition coalesce,
widespread and recurring instability could develop that would threaten the
September 1981 until last March.
its activities severely restricted. Its secretary general, Abderrahim
Bouabid, and two other Politburo members were under arrest from
The King has manipulated, co-opted, or repressed virtually all legal
opposition to his regime and its policies. The Socialist Union of Popular
Forces, in recent years Morocco's only credible opposition party, has had
members have gone underground.
Militant labor and student movements have been undermined. The Demo-
cratic Confederation of Workers, the Socialist-sponsored labor union, has
lost most of its membership and is moribund. Its secretary general,
Noubair al-Amoui, and all members of its Executive Bureau are impris-
oned. The ability of the National Union of Moroccan Students, the
country's largest student organization, to initiate peaceful strikes and
demonstrations has been largely curtailed, and some of its more radical
population.
Relatively strong popular support for the monarchy has inhibited the major
opposition groups, and their short-term prospects are not good. All are
constrained by ineffective leadership, a disorganized membership, and a
fear of government reprisals for even innocuous activities. Morocco's
pluralism enables the King to play off factional differences and to provide a
measure of political freedom to satisfy temporarily most of the
The government has dealt with opposition from Muslim fundamentalists
less harshly than with secular critics. The leaders of Islamic groups have
been spared detention, although some lower ranking activists have been
iii Secret
NESA 82-10166
May 1982
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Such opposition groups will be difficult to control because Islam is an
integral part of Moroccan :ife, and volatile religious sentiments are easily
associated with key secular issues. In economic hard times Islamic
fundamentalists could become the catalysts uniting diverse political, social,
regional, and occupational groups. Such an opposition movement almost
certainly would condemn the United States for supporting what it perceives
as a corrupt monarchy.
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Morocco: Prospects for
Key Opposition Groups
King Hassan faced serious challenges to his regime in two military-led
coup attempts in the early 1970s. He reacted by restricting the movements
and authority of his military establishment. Subsequently he abolished
ministerial-level control of the military and personally directed field
commanders. Through postcoup purges and attrition the senior leaders of
the military disappeared. In their place arose officers whose authority was
highly restricted or whose loyalty to the monarchy was assured.
In the mid-1970s Hassan rallied Moroccan society-with the exception of
the most radical groups-around the issue of Western Sahara and its
incorporation into Morocco. Delegations from all parties participated in
the immensely popular "Green March" in 1975, when 350,000 unarmed
civilians walked into Western Sahara to emphasize Morocco's determina-
tion to wrest control of the territory from Spain.
In June 1977 the government held carefully orchestrated parliamentary
elections, ensuring overwhelming control of the Chamber of Representa-
tives by progovernment parties. Hassan subsequently selected a cabinet
with similar progovernment leanings, excluding the Socialist Union of
Popular Forces (USFP) and other left-leaning representatives. This obedi-
ent parliament and cabinet are still virtually intact.
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Distribution of Seats in the Moroccan
Chamber of Representatives
Misc.-9
USFP-16
MP-44
Party Leader Orientation Seats
Rassemblement National des Ahmed Osman Loose grouping of deputies who are supported 91
Independents (National by and subject to government control.
Assembly of Independents-
RNI)
Rassemblement National des Mohamed A. al-Jadidi Similar to RNI-offshoot of RNI. 53
Independents Democratiques
(National Assembly of
Independents- Democrats
RNI-D)
Oldest and largest conservative political party 51
in Morocco; led Moroccan independence
movement; strong nationalist irredentist outlook;
supports constitutional monarchy, Arabization;
is the most vociferous defender of Morocco's
annexation of Western Sahara.
Mouvement Populaire Mahjoubi Aherdan Rural-based party of Moroccan Berbers; 44
(Popular Movement-MP) subsidized and strongly influenced by the
monarchy.
Union Socialiste des Forces Abderrahim Bouabid Only militant political party of the left; strong 16
Populaires (Socialist Union of proponent of political and economic reform that
Popular Forces-USFP) would substantially reduce King Hassan's
autocratic powers.
Miscellaneous Various Several minor political parties, mostly palace 9
oriented, will be unable to exercise significant
influence, but their presence serves Hassan's
interest in creating the appearance of a broad-
based government. Morocco's small pro-Soviet
Communist party-Party of Progress and
Socialism-is tame, holds only one seat, but does
have a significant following in youth and
intellectual circles.
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The National Assembly of Independents (RNI), the National Assembly of
Independents-Democrats (RNI-D), and the Popular Movement (VIP)---the
parties that make up the progovernment majority in the Chamber-accept
the circumscribed democracy allowed by the King. The promonarchy labor
unions, such as the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) and the General Union
of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), have formed a formidable coalition with
the political parties in support of the King. Even some students are
represented by a group that backs the King.
There are a number of illegal opposition groups that from time to time vent
their unhappiness through foreign media. Their member-
ship apparently is not large, and their activities are monitored by Moroccan
police and security forces. The sentiments of the most well-known groups
are often leftist, antimonarchy, or fanatically pro-Islamic; their ranks are
predominantly alienated youth, and they have programs that are designed
to appeal to the university-educated.'
The Socialist Party: The 16 parliamentary seats held by the Socialist Union of Popular Forces
A Decapitated Force do not reflect the party's potential. The party leadership boasts, with some
justification, that it could win a parliamentary majority if free elections
were held.
There has been a running battle between the USFP and Hassan's
government over a variety of issues. Many activists were arrested and the
party's newspapers shut down for alleged instigation of strikes that led to
rioting in Casablanca in June 1981. Socialist criticism of the removal of
government subsidies on certain foods was a key issue sparking the
protests.
In September 1981 the government responded to published USFP objec-
tions to Hassan's handling of the Saharan issue by arresting party leaders,
including Secretary General Bouabid. The USFP position on the issue is
more hawkish, and perhaps more opportunistic, than that of King Hassan.
He was charged with abusing his authority and advocating a referendum
that jeopardized Moroccan retention of the contested territory. The USFP
also threatened several times last year to withdraw from parliament to
demonstrate the party's objection to the King's circumvention of parlia-
mentary elections in 1981.
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 Abderrahim Bouabid, Secretary General of the
USFP, recently detained for six months for
voicing objections to government policies
Using a combination of patriotic appeals and repression, Hassan persuaded
the deputies to return to parliament in mid-October even though elections
scheduled for September were not held. Moroccan Royal Counselor
Ahmed Guedira appealed to each of the Socialist deputies to attend an
extraordinary session of parliament called to deal with the "national
emergency" caused by Morocco's military defeat by Polisario forces at
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Under the de facto leadership of acting Secretary General al-Youssoufi,
the USFP attempted to regroup toward the end of 1981 and regain
support. These efforts were largely unsuccessful. Efforts to attract mem-
bers from among Moroccan expatriates in France and Spain likewise have
not borne fruit. The de facto party leadership has asserted that.it has
widespread and growing support in Morocco, but it has been handicapped
by the detention of its leaders. A new weekly review was allowed to appear,
but it has not won the full support of the readers of the regular party or-
gans banned last July.
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For Hassan the USFP issue was an internal one that he would handle at
the appropriate time. On the eve of the 21st anniversary of his accession to
the throne, Hassan released three senior USFP leaders, including Bouabid.
It will be some time, however, before the restored leadership can revive the
party.
The Socialist The fate of the Socialist-sponsored Democratic Confederation of Workers
Trade Union: (CDT) is very much tied to that of the USFP. Like their counterparts in the
Disorganized and USFP, CDT leaders were imprisoned some time ago, but the latter remain
Dispersed in jail without trial. As a result of the disorganization of the CDT, the pro-
monarchy Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) and the General Union of
Moroccan Workers (UGTM) have made major inroads among CDT
members.
Morocco's most vocal opposition labor union is thus muted. Concerted
opposition to the regime from other unions is highly unlikely because
workers are not disgruntled enough to risk dismissal or arrest as a result of
protests or illegal strike activity. Fear of losing their jobs to unemployed
workers (who may exceed 30 percent of the labor force in some urban
areas) and the government's repression of open demonstrations critical of
the government have discouraged most workers from demonstrating
against their declining standard of living.
Although antigovernment political activity is a troublesome fact for the
government, the growing ranks of the unemployed, whether or not union
affiliated, present an ominous potential threat. Those out of work and with
little hope for their future could easily be drawn into civil disorders by radi-
cal agitators blaming Hassan and his government for current economic and
social problems.
The Communists: The Party of Progress and Socialism, Morocco's tame Communist Party,
Discreet Opposition has one deputy in parliament and claims the support of about 5 percent of
the voting population. It is believed, however, to have only 2,000 party
members and 5,000 to 6,000 sympathizers. It has confined its activities to
acquiring support from student and labor groups and has deliberately
avoided becoming enmeshed in major controversies that could cause it to
be banned. Before the riots of June 1981 and subsequent arrests and trials,
for example, the PPS attempted to coordinate its activities with the
Socialists in order to expand its influence. After the June events, however,
the PPS put greater distance between itself and the Socialists and gave
only lukewarm support to the USFP and CDT.
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On international issues the party has traditionally followed a pro-Soviet
line. Where this approach conflicts with Moroccan Government positions
on regional issues, such as the use of Soviet-made weapons by the Polisario
in the Saharan war, the PPS supports the government.
The PPS probably will continue as a loyal opposition. It most likely will
gain some following among disheartened Socialists, but it can expect
continued censorship of its daily newspaper, al-Bayane. There is little
potential in the near term for the development of a significantly larger
Communist movement, and in the short run the PPS is likely to continue
kowtowing to the government.
Student Dissatisfaction University students on several campuses, especially in Rabat, Casablanca,
and Fez, were extremely active in the last few months of 1981. The issues
ranged from traditional concerns such as class size, dormitories, and
scholarships, to advocating the overthrow of the regime. Student groups
have engaged in demonstrations, passive resistance, and violent protest to
press these grievances.
In order to prevent campus unrest, the government last fall stationed
armed guards from the Ministry of Education on campuses to prevent
conflict between extremist groups. The guards, however, became an
irritant to moderate and radical students alike, who felt intimidated and
harassed by the guards. This irritant as well as other issues prompted the
National Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM), the country's largest
student organization, to stage widespread strikes in early December that
resulted in the arrest of several hundred students and numerous injuries.
Although only a modest number of students participated in the poorly
coordinated strikes, government overreaction and heavyhanded security
measures resulted in the closing of some schools, the detention of several
student leaders, a hardenirg of resolve by extremist elements, and the
alienation of the generally apolitical student majority.
Trials were held, and 21 persons were convicted for terms ranging up to
three years for disturbing the peace, participating in illegal demonstrations,
and membership in clandestine organizations. The arrest and conviction of
three UNEM Executive Committee members and the resignation of eight
others left only two members of the committee active by mid-January.
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King receiving a gesture of allegiance at ceremo-
ny commemorating his ascension to the throne
Like other key opposition groups, the UNEM is bereft of effective leaders.
Moderates within its ranks and the majority of students who have no
organizational affiliation have assumed a low profile for self-protection.
he failure of the government to address
student grievances or even to open a serious dialogue with students will
continue to alienate Moroccan youth and to increase their volatility over
the next several years.
Muslim Fundamentalists: There have been recent challenges to Hassan's spiritual leadership from
A Formidable Challenge Moroccan Islamic fundamentalists. The Mujahedin Movement, the Is-
lamic Revolutionary Committee, and especially the Islamic Youth Move-
ment under the leadership of exiled radical Abd al-Karim Moti have
directly attacked both the person and the policies of Hassan. Besides
charges of moral depravity, corruption, and extravagance, the King has
been accused of apostasy as a "false god" and as an "enemy of God." Such
charges cannot be ignored as most Moroccans tend to hold strong
traditional religious views. Moreover, the legitimacy of Hassan's role as
monarch is inseparable from and regarded by some as secondary to his
spiritual role as "Commander of the Faithful."
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Government reprisals against extremist Muslims have been milder than
those undertaken against Socialists and students. Some imams (Muslim
prayer leaders) and distributors of antigovernment tracts have been
imprisoned. The top leaders of the Islamic organizations, however, have not
been detained. The King also has supported the establishment of pro-
government religious groups to dilute support for Islamic opposition
movements.
Fundamentalists have been recruiting youth-both students and workers-
and have been linking their religious views to problems of the economy, so-
cial disparities, and what they view as immorality in the government. They
have been encouraged by events in Iran and other Muslim countries where
Islamic activism has been takin place.
The prospects for key Moroccan opposition groups over the next year are
bleak in spite of recent indications that the government may ease its
repression of the USFP and CDT. All are constrained by ineffective
leadership, a disorganized membership, or a fear of government reprisals
even for seemingly innocucus activities. Morocco's "Hassanian Democra-
cy" enables the King to play off rival interest groups and provide a measure
of political freedom to satisfy temporarily most of the population.
The current calm and the disarray among Moroccan opposition groups
probably mask a growing threat to the Moroccan monarchy over the next
several years. Economic difficulties, rising popular expectations, stresses of
modernization, pressures for political liberalization, and the regime's
limited ability to meet these demands could generate more frequent
outbreaks of civil disorder and government repression in the mid-1980s.
Morocco's economic difficulties stem from ambitious government spend-
ing, declining income from phosphate exports in the 1970s, increasing food
imports necessitated by several years of drought, and a diversion of
resources as a result of the seemingly endless war in Western Sahara. Even
with major improvements in these areas, the economy will take several
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years to show substantial growth given Morocco's high rate of population
increase of nearly 3 percent per year which has been sustained over the last
30 years.
The high population growth rate combined with economically induced
migration to urban areas has put tremendous pressures on an already
strained economic and social system. Jobs, schools, public services, and
housing are sorely inadequate, and most indicators suggest that the gap
between the haves and the have-nots will widen.
It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be for serious in-
stability to develop, but it is clear that living standards are declining. The
situation is not irretrievable, but Hassan will have to demonstrate astute
managerial skill to deal with existing economic and social problems.
Hundreds of Moroccans lost their lives or were injured, and more than a
thousand demonstrators were arrested in economic-related riots in
Casablanca in June 1981 when conditions were not substantially different
from the present.
The refusal of the government to permit the Socialist labor union, the
CDT, and its sponsors to participate in May Day celebrations and parades
this year affirms the government's determination to nip potential disrup-
tion in the bud. The cumulative effect of repeated repression and imprison-
ment of leaders and members of legal opposition groups will foster growing
resentment among regime opponents and encourage the growth of covert,
violence-prone opposition.
More than most other civilian dissidents, opposition from Muslim funda-
mentalists has the potential to undermine the regime. The appeal of
Islamic issues-particularly in economic hard times-reaches well beyond
the relatively narrow interest groups that form the traditional opposition
and has the power to unite diverse social, regional, and occupational
groups. Moreover, Islamic activism has special appeal in Morocco, for
despite major adaptations to outside influence, the country has retained a
very conservative and traditional Islamic character.
Closer ties with the United States initially have been well received in
Morocco, but they may eventually become the focus of strong opposition
rhetoric. Many fundamentalists oppose increased Western influence.
They also are likely to condemn the United
States for supporting what they perceive as a corrupt monarchy.
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