LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION IN FOURTH COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 24, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~4 May 1957
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR CF Ct::NT1~AL INTc.LLiGr:NCE
SUBJECT : Likelihood and Consequences of Nuclear Weapons
Production in Fourth Countries
Note. -- This memorandum has not been coordinated and is
b eas d on the JAEIC contribution to Part I of NIE 100-6-57,
"Nuclear Weapons Production in 'Fourth Countries--
Likelihood and Consequences," and on the departmental con-
tributions to NIE 100-4-57, "Implications of Growing Nuclear
Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World."
A more thorough and coordinated analysis of this subject will
be forthcoming in NIE 100-6-57 now scheduled to reach' the
IAC on 18 June.
.A. Factors Affecting Likelihood
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1. According to current JAEIC estimates, the following
countries could, in the time shown, produce their first nuclear
weapon using only native resources:
a. Canada - within a year from time of decision
b. France - in 1958
c. Sweden - in 1961
]fin addition, West Germany could--if given access to high-grade uraniurrl
sources--commence weapons production within five years from the date
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of decision, possibly in less time if this activity received an extremely
high priority. In any event, West Germany could probably commence
weapons production withia 10 years without foreign assistance.
2. Belgium could satisfy the requirements and commence weapons
production without foreign assistance within 10 years. Japan could
also produce weapons if it were able to exploit recently reported uranium
deposits to provide reactor fueis. India, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany could do so only by extraordinary efforts and by as-
signing the highest priority to a weapons program.
3. Communist China, Australia, Israel, and Poland all lack
some of the requirements for a successful program and would require
significant foreign assistance. The early steps in a nuclear energy
development program are already underway in Communist China with
Soviet assistance.
4. At the moment only France, Sweden, and possibly Communist
China are seriously considering at the official level a nuclear weapons
production program. There is substantial support for such a program
in France and within the Swedish government. We have no evidence
of Chinese Communist weapons-directed activity, but we believe that
the leadership will feel it essential to have their own weapons supply.
In Canada there is a growing desire to acquire nuclear weapons for
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air defense but no pressure yet for domestic production. The West
German government tends privately to favor the acquisition of weaponef,
in the absence of nuclear disarmament, bC~t there is still strong popular
opposition and no plan for productioti. At the present time the Japanese
public is overwhelmingly opposed to the production or possession of
nuclear weapons. but there ire indications of interest among defense
officials in obtaining nuclear weapons.
5. In the absence of some effective deterrent, we believe that
France will undertake a nuclear weapons production program within
the next pear or so, and that Sweden will do so around i 961 when
sufficient plutonium becomes available from its reactor program.
Assuming that France initiates weapons production on a unilateral
basis, it is almost certain that West Germany would fallow suit, despite
existing agreements to forego such production. Communist China will
almost certainly seek to develop a weapons production program within
the aext decade, and Japan wi21 probably do likewise. Israel might in
time obtain weapons-grade material from another power, such as
France, or through development of a reactor pragram.
6. In general, fourth countries desire to produce nuclear
weapons in order to augment their own relative power position and to
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protect their own national interests in the period of growing nuclear
capability of the US, the UK, and the USSR. These considerations
will probably be the chief determinants in the French and Gerrnaa
decisions to initiate a nuclear weapons program. Other countries,
such as Sweden and possibly Japan, will regard such a program pri-
marily as a means of enforcing their neutrality.
7. Fourth countries might be deterred from weapons production
by either of two general developments.
a. Any disarmament agreement between the US, the
UK and the USSR which was popularly regarded as a "first
step" toward more extensive and lasting controls would
create formidable popular expectations and strong pressures
against any weapons programs that appeared to run .counter
to the spirit of the day. However, this effect would be
transitory unless followed fairly quickly by effective con-
trols ov tie testing, production, and use of nuclear weapons.
'~If, as the present Stassen proposal envisages, a UK-US-USSR
agreement invited the adherence of fourth countries, then
conceivably very great pressure would be built up for France
and other possible fourth countries to adhere. However, this
would raise immediate problems about Communist China. More-
over, nations such as France might well qualify their adherence
by making it valid only so long as the three present nuclear powers
did in fact proceed with nuclear disarmament.
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(1) We believe that France would not be delayed
significantly by a "limited" first step agreement and
probably only for a few years, at beat, by more sub-
stantial controls on nuclear weapons. France would
recognize that under any conceivable disarmament
agreement the US, USSR, and the UK would retain
possession of large numbers of weapons. In time the
considerations now at work would probably prevail to
impel France to produce its own weapons.
(2) In all probability the Chinese would still want
to go ahead within the next decade, and it would be
most difficult for the USSR to withhold the necessary
assistance.
b. Agreement by the US to supply nuclear weapons to
its allies in various sizes and in some quantity would probably
tend to deter production by these countries. Such a deterrent
would almost certainly be effective if the weapons were pro-
vided without restriction on use. Short of supplying nuclear
weapons on as unrestricted individual Gauntry basis, allied
desires might be satisfied for some time by the establishment
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of a NATO pool in which all members had a voice over use.
c. The combination of a limited disarmament agreement
with some provision for US supply of nuclear weapons on a
NATO pool basis might serve to deter French production for
a substantial period. However, France would remain tech-
nically capable of producing weapons on only a few months
notice conceivably without testing, and the psychological
impulse for such production might become extremely strong
if there were further serious divergences between the US and
France.
8. Over the longer run, to the degree that fourth countries
acquire supplies of fissionable materials free for weapons use, the
likelihood of fourth power production will increase despite the imple-
nnentation of either a or b above. So long as the US, UK and the USSR
nnaintain substantial stocks of nuclear weapons and orientate their
strategy towards the use of such weapons, pressures will inevitably
grow among other nations to develop their own weapons.
B'?. Consequences of Fourth Power Production
9. Fourth power production in non-Communist areas would not
greatly increase the deterrent felt by the USSR against initiating
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general war, but it might lessen susceptibilities of smaller nations to
Soviet threats against them, thereby narrowing the possible area of
Soviet maneuver and pressures.
10. The initiation of fourth power production in non-Communist
states would almost certainly incite more threats from the USSR and
generally increase tensions. In particular, the initiation of nuclear
weapons production by West Germany (necessarily with national freedom
of used would probably cause a violent threatening reaction from the
USSR. At the least, the Soviets 'abuld intensify their controls in the
~Satellitea and would oppose even more rigidly any reunification of
i;ermany. We believe, however, that the acquisition of nuclear
~~,eapoz~s by` fourth countries would not in itself cause the USSR to take
armed action against these countries or to precipitate a general war.
I1. Perhaps the most important consequence of fourth country
nuclear production would be the tendency of fourth countries to take
snore vigorous action in support of individual national interests. These
powers might be more inclined to become engaged in disputes which
Haight eveatuelly involve the interests of the USSR and the US. Thus,
the danger would be increased that local disputes could erupt into armed
conflicts and lead inadvertently to general war.
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12. Within the Soviet Bloc, the initiation of nuclear weapons
production by France, West Germany, Sweden, etc. , would increase
Communist Chinese pressure on the USSR for both an interim supply
of weapons and further assistance to start its own weapons production
program. These developments might, also create a desire in the
Earopean Satellites for a supply of weapons, but we believe the Soviets
could meet this desire--bar a basic chan;e in present Soviet-Satellite
relationships--by some form of transfer to the Warsaw Pact command
which in fact would preserve complete Soviet control.
13. Thus, we do not believe that the prospect of European
Satellite pressure for weapons is a significant element in the Soviet
attitude. The Soviets probably are concerned by the fourth-country
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problem, to some extent because of the prospect of increased Chinese
Communist pressures on them, out more because of the possibility of
the increased use or threat of atomic weapons in local conflicts, and
above all because of possible West German production.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: