REPORT ON WORKING GROUP ON GORE PROPOSAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600010004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 12, 1958
• Content Type: MF

ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010004-3
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000600010004-3
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December 11, 1958
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psi ga be- I11ordsp WaehloQ Oroupon Disarmament
Qp Uov b.r 19, following a call on the President on November 17,
Senator Qore subxitted a memorandum to the President outlining a proposal
for U.S. action on suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This proposal
sails for a wwr U.S. position at the Geneva Conference on the Sudpension
of ?salear Weapons Tests consisting of a Presidential announcement of
"gnoooditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth's
atmosphere" for perhaps three years, a call for similar action by other
nuclear powers, and a call for the Geneva Conference to proceed immediately
with negotiation of a treaty for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.
Senator Gore's proposal is based on the stated assumptions that:
1. Present U.S. goals at the Conference are unattainable,
2. Nuclear testing to date has caused an "antisocial contamination
of the atmosphere" which has led to world-wide fear of fall-out
which is Russia's most powerful propaganda weapon against the
United States.
3. Present detection systems are technically efficient in the
detection of atmospheric detonations.
The Working Group considers that the Gore proposal would not be a
sound position for the United States to take at this time. Although the
assumptions listed above are inaccurate, the proposal has some elements
which may be useful in developing a fall-back position in the event that
the current negotiations fail.
Conaaent on Assumptions. There is no reason to believe at this time
that U. . ob~actives in the Conference are unattainable, The basic U.S.
objective is a two-pronged one: ;,o obtain an agreement for suspension of
nuclear tests under effective international control, or to expose the
tuYSrillingnoss of the Sovtot Utiio-' to accept international control as the
basis for failure to rtiach agreement if this is the result of the Conference
It is not possible at pre,;ont to gay that ar agreement will not be reached
despite current unacceptable :.oviet posit'?'ns, since serious negotiation
has just commenced and the Soviet Union professes to accept the report of
the Geneva Experts on a control system. We remain confident on the basis
of discussion so far thz;;, if the Confaronce breaks down, the blame will
clearly rest on the Soviet Union
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Gv1I9I1J TI AL
The biked btatV has consistently taken the position that fall-out
ft= ayele r tissue does not constitute a ai.gniticant hasard. mile
troe'1+~Mdde sonoeen over Sall--cot has not been allayed by the statements
d[ tM U.S. and the U.K. or tV the generally reassuring report of the
1Mdtsd lations, a proposal for anything less than cessation of all weapons
tests wooLd be onlirely to have the sispli4d ty which would be necessary to
re oft t esi SS rs, par'ticular'ly since the Soviet Union would iaasedtately
2= at we ware motivated primarily by a desire to evade a suspension.
that
the accelerating Soviet testing has wade the Soviet Union
4scroWngly vulnerable on the fall out issue.
Ow present nuclear test detection system. is not adequate for moni-
toring atmospheric tests. The Geneva technical conference clearly
established the requirement for stations within the Soviet Union if atmos-
pheric bursts down to 1 kiloton are to be detected,
?here is evidence from our latest underground shots that assumptions
soda by the Conference of 8cperts reference the possibility of detecting
underground explosions and based on the limited Rainier data then avail-
abler may have been overly optimistic to a serious degree.
The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position Now. In view of these considerw'
trots it would oe undoeirableo for the Mtia Staten to advance the Gore
proposals at this time. We would give the Soviet Union an excuse to escape
from, showing its true position an acceptance of international controls and
it would be unlikely to have major propaganda value. It would almost
certainly lead to a break in negotiations advantageous to the Soviet Union
and would thus remove such chance as there is of obtaining international
inspection within the Soviet Union.
The Gore Proposal as a Fall-Back Position. If the present negotiations
do break down, the United States may w wish to announce a policy of .
moderation in future testing. Such self-imposed moderation may be prudent
since, even if the blee for the break lies with the Soviet Union, increased
pressure for a cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against
the U.S. and the Soviet Union alike and unilateral. U.S. action would cut the
ground under proposals to this effect.
The ARC, however, believes that should an approach to test suspension
such as the Gaye proposal involving limitations be advanced by the U.S., it
should not be done on a unilateral basis, but in the form of a proposed
international agreement at the time of deadlock or breakdown of the current
Oeaeva negotiations.
Further study mast be given to the proper course of action. It is not
clear at present that underground testing will permit satisfactory diagnostic
measurement, including yields, tc .set important future teat requirements.
Testing in outer space will present even greater and more camplax diagnostic
prohleos.
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