REORGANIZATION OF DDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500160024-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 8, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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UPERENCE
OCT 1865
Director of Central Intelligence
Reorganization of Dig
DDI Memo for DCI 8 September 1965, tame
subject
1. This memorandum contains a recommindfttion in
paragraph 20 for your approval.
2. In referenced memorandum, I reported to you on our
studies of the DD/ organization, and made a recommendation
for implementing the first of my two main conclusions. That
memorandum had to do with reconsolidating non-operational
intelligence research and analysis activity under the DDI.
3. This memorandum deals with the second conclusion,
that finished intelligence production components of the DDI,
insofar as functional specialties allow, be placed under
unified direction and organized geographically?with these
area-oriented components closely linked by exchange of staff
with the Area Divisions of DDP.
BACKGKOUND
4. In its earlier days, intelligence production activities
were wholly unified under one direction. -an Office of Research
and Evaluation. The main components of that office were the
regional divisions VWE, KE, EU, FE, LA, and Northern). The
output of these divisions was supervised and coordinated by
three staff components responsible for basic, current, and
estimative intelligence.
5. It soon became apparent that the demands of the
times required a distinct grouping of specialists, first of
economists and soon thereafter of scientists. As these
specialists developed capabilities and were increasingly
called upon to meet the demands upon the Agency for economic
and scientific analyses, they grew in numbers requiring their
organization into separate offices. Regional coverage of both
of these groups was heavily on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
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6. The organization of an Office of National Intimates
came with the advent of the Korean war and of General Smith
as DCI. As first conceived and operated, ONE had the dual
mission of producing NIZs and Current Intelligence, drawing
upon a common staff (looseTY?compartmented into a general,
specialists, and support groups) to accomplish its mission.
The General Group was the immediate support element of the
Board of National Istimates.
7. Sarly in his administration as Chairman of the Board
of National Intimates, Dr. William Langer made clear to the
DCI that he had taken the job with the understanding that he
would concentrate on national estimates and would not be
distracted from that assignment by reason of having also to
supervise current intelligence production and to administer
any staff beyond that needed to produce NIX*. Hence, the
separation of current reporting from On in 1951, and the
basis for the development of OCI as we know it today.
8. While the separation of ONE and XI was made on
rather adventitious grounds* it was supportable on more valid
grounds in view of the actual production of these offices.
XI production scrupulously avoided estimative language,
limiting itself to comments which nerved to help the reader
place the reported item in perspective. ONE largely limited
its production to inter-agency (UIS) papers, NIBs. At first
there were no ONX staff memoranda, and for a long time they
were neither as numerous nor as widely circulated as they now
are. Little coordination between ONX and OC1 was necessarY,
and necommary coordination was easily accomplished under the
aegis of the DDI.
9. In the years since the separation there have been a
number of studies examining the pros and cons of the
reunification of ONI and OCI. Some aimed strictly at achieving
economies or administrative efficiency; others aimed at
producing better intelligence. None conclusively reflected
unanimous views. And since the burden of proof never shifted
from those who wanted unification to those who held for the
status quo, and because the DDI budget never was reduced to
the point making unification mandatory, it did not occur.
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REASONS FOR A NEW LOOK
10. Four factors of significance lead me to conclude that
it is now timely to reopen this question: the changed
character of consumer demand; the expanded scope and nature
of our analytical effort; the need for resilience and reserve
in our production; and, the desirability of regionalization
of Agency organization. As is evident, cause and effect are
merged in these points. This makes them no less compelling.
11. Changed character of consumer demand. With the Kennedy
Administration, and Cuba, came a marked shift in consumer demand
for our intelligence production. International developments
and the Johnson Administration have confirmed and extended
this trend. The demand for defense policy support is reflected
in our expansion of the Military Research Area of ORR, the
Military Division of OCI, and the ONE Military Staff. The
more general change in demand now requires us to produce spot
evaluations over a wide range of subjects. This calls for
expertise over the entire world area as well as competence in
international politics, economics, science, and military
affairs. UN operational information is now considered a
normal ingredient of many of our products, since only by its
inclusion is the consumer provided needed perspective. Often
our spot evaluations, oral or written, are the most important
Agency input to the Government's policy making process.
Indeed, because of the limitations and special purpose of the
NIB, the spot evaluation may be the Agency's only input.
12. Ex ended scope of analytical effort. The collapse
of time ava1Ible for production has-been accompanied by an
expansion of its scope. People want to know more things about
more countries. A demand which was once satisfied by
generalizations has now been replaced by one requiring detail
and interrelationship. This has led to the creation of new
components?a natural byproduct of specialization?and to a
creeping expansion of coverage by each component--n natural
response to a felt need to satisfy demand. Thus scope, content,
reliability, and urgency of intelligence need, whether in the
form of estimates, current items, or even research reports,
tend to compel a component, which formerly took pride in the
uniqueness that justified its birth as a separate entity, to
have its own comprehensive coverage. The advent of photography
as a major data source affecting the work of every component
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has accelerated this trend. In this situation, the requirement
of management for coordination in order to produce an
authoritative pronouncement means that the intelligence product
of today bears increasingly the "chop" of all parties having
either responsibility for its creation or competence to
influence its substantive message.
13. Need for conservation of resources. The manpower and
time requtre ens mu pe a ngo he two- to threefold
increase of incoming information over the past ten years, and
of producing and coordinating the intelligence based upon that
information, have reduced our resilience to meet changing
situations and our reserve to meet added loads below what it
might be if we were operating under new organizational forms.
If many shops handle the same information in order, as the
saying goes, "to look at it from a different point of view and
for a different purpose," we are bound to pay a high price in
manpower. Some of this is unavoidable under any circumstance,
and some desirable even if it could be avoided. But it is
unlikely that the duplicate handling that can and should be
avoided can in fact be eliminated without new tries at
organizational forms designed to do just that.
14. Other management considerations are significant also.
consider, for example, the impact of consolidation upon
flexibility in managing careers and in providing career
opportunities. Now ONE, OCI, OBI, and OCR largely decide
independently if and when to advance one of their analysts
within available headroom. An officer working his way well
up in one office without having had experience in another
finds it very difficult to "lateral over" into a vacant
position under the control of a career service not his own.
Yet it is not uncommon for the DDI to be approached either
by such an officer or his office head with a request that
suitable alternative employment be found for a man still in
mid-career though he may have attained senior grade.
15. Desirability of regionalization of Agerwrganization.
Finally, the steps ocinteeplatea in the merger of i e ONE and
OCI staffs would, When finally carried to their ultimate goal,
provide a largely regional or area-oriented structure which
would facilitate close coordination with the Area Divisions
of DDP and with the key operating components of the Department
of State, which are mainly regional.
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PHASING OP MOVES
10. While I am thus persuaded that our aim should be the
consolidation of regionally oriented staffs, I am mindful that
we should minimize the disruptive affects on personnel and
operations which often attend organizational changes. Hence,
having decided our course, we should evolve toward the goal
and not seek its attainment by revolutionary change. Too much
is good about our present organization to risk its impairment.
In other words, the advantages of change must not be eroded
by the cost of bringing change about.
17. First phase. Our first step, therefore, should be
to place the ONE area staffs and OCI under single management.
This will affect I I people now located organizationally as
follows:
Act ivity
Direction
Administrative
Production Control
NIC
Subtotal
Ooviet Is Eastern Europe
Chinese & Par Last
South Asia & Near East
Western Europe & Africa
Latin America
Subtotal
Total
ONE OCI Total
included are the Board of National Estimates and the
Operations Center. Adjustment has been made for recent
motor of OCI Graphics Division to OBI for merger with
OBI Cartographic Division.
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18. Second phase. Our second step would involve the
development of new machinery for relating meaningfully the
work of area analysts wherever located in DDI (see TAB G:
Comparative Opectra of Geographical Organization). This would
be an extension of what we have begun doing for China: the
organization of a China Intelligence Group, and the selection
of China as the test area for OCR. This phase would
also recognize the interdependence of DDP and DDI by exchanging
representatives between the DDI area divisions and the proposed
DDI area affairs divisions. (Closer organizational ties, such
as a merger of DDP and DDI, seem to me inadvisable, at least
for a long time. The sheer size of any combined group would
make for especially difficult management problems. The validity
of the time-honored separation of the "ops" function from the
evaluations function has in no way been diminished by our
experience in recent years. But closer ties than exist today
are desirable and should work to provide Del with an improved
performance on the part of both DDP and DDI.)
19. Third phase. This step would involve a review of the
implications of moves taken and a modification of our future
course to the extent deemed advisable. If further consolidation
on an area basis was indicated, individual analysts and some
components would be moved from the functionally organized units
of the DDI.
RECOMMENDATION
20. In view of the above considerations, I recommend:
That you approve the timely merger of the ONE
Estimates Staff with the Area Staffs of OC!,
leaving the Board of National Estimates intact
but thereafter drawing its staff support from
the combined staff. I see no reason in this
proposal for any change in the position of the
Board in the Agency organization. It could
report to the WI directly and exclusively,
report exclusively through the DDI, or it could
have a "dotted line" of direct communication to
the DCI as at present.
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L.
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Loco en
That further action required to reorganize DDI
with a greater regional orientation be endorsed
in principle but that specific steps in this
direction be deferred pending an evaluation of
the effects of the On OCI merger.
Deputy Dirctor for Intelligence
para. 20 APPROVED:
irector of Central Intelligence Date
Attachments
0/DDI: A rel:n1:7 October 1965
Distribution;
Orig. - DDI
- IR
1 - 0/DDI Chrono
1 - 'AB Chrono
1 - OiDDI Organization File
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%)E._
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ATTACHNINTS
TAB A: Proposed Grouping of Of ficez Under nrn Direction
TAB B Present Organization of ON*
TAB C: Present Or n z tion of OCI
TAB D: Present Organization of OBI
TAB V:
Proposed National Intelligence Bvaluations and
Intimates Group
TAB G: Comparative Spectra of Geographical Organization
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"(TET
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SECRET
Proposed Grouping of Offices Under DDI Direction
DDI
Imagery
Analysis
Group
49693 9-65 CIA
Information
Services
Group
SECRET
Intelligence
Research
Group
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National Intelligence
Evaluations
and Estimates
Group
SECRET
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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Panel of
CONSULTANTS
Soviet Union/
East Europe
May 1965
51618 6-65
Soviet
Military/
Technical
Director of
National Estimates
..MimmimmOme.
Chairman
Board of
National Estimates
!Deputy Director of
:National Estimates
Board
of National Estimates
ESTIMATES STAFF
Office of the Chief
Western
Europe
Far East
SUPPORT STAFF
Publications
Section
Information
Control
Reading Room
Latin
America
Africa
Near East
SECRET ka-aniLmr?A
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EASTERN
EUROPEAN
SATELLITES
DIVISION
osoece
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR
OF
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL
INDICATIONS
CENTER
? mom. .11.1
CIA
OPERATIONS
CENTER
PRESENTATI ON
STAFF
INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION
STAFF
ADMINISTRATIVE
STAFF
SINO?SOVIET
BLOC AREA
SOVIET
DIVISION
MILITARY
DIVISION
CHINA/ASIAN
SATELLITES
DIVISION
WESTERN
AREA
WESTERN
EUROPE
DIVISION
LATIN
AMERICA
DIVISION
SECRET
ASIA?AFRICA
AREA
FAR EAST
DIVISION
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AFRICA
DIVISION
NEAR EAST
DIVISION
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification
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SEGHT
OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE
Director
of
Basic Intelligence
Administrative
Staff
ICartography
Division
--USSR-Europe
__Far East
--Near East-Africa
--Western Hemisphere
--Technical Support
--All-Source
Editorial
Division
--Chapter I (General Survey)
--Geographic
--Transportation
and Sociological
?Economic
--Military
--Regional
Geography
Division
- Western Hemisphere
--Special Research
-- USSR
--Europe
--Far East-Pacific
--Near East-Africa
Map Library
Division
L-Procurement
LReference
Processing
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Publication
Division
-Publication Proartion
-Publication Review
--Graphics Support
1 Exeludsd !IciTi zat37,2:._
dnr:zrathiv and
1 dedassa:Pla
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Schematic of National Intelligence Evaluations & Estimates Group
of the Directorate of Intelligence
Director
National Evaluations
& Estimates
Production
Control
Presentation &
Coordination
Soviet &
Chinese &
South Asia&
Western Europe
Latin
Eastern Europe
Far East
Near East
& Africa
America
Affairs
Affairs
Affairs
Affairs
Affairs
49213
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Each regional component to initially include staffs for the production of estimates, current
intelligence and basic intelligence, and exchange staff representation with ODP area divisions
In later phases elements' and regional research, and additional basic
components to be integrated also.
SECRET
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COMPARATIVE SPECTRA OF PRESENT GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION
PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE STUDY GROUPS
USSR CHINA FE NE AFRICA WE LA
DO! COMPONENTS
OCI SOy EE/SAT. CHINA 'ASIAN SAT. FE NE AFRICA WE
LA
ONE/STAFF SOV /EE FE NE AFRICA WE
LA
ORR/DI ASIA NE AFRICA WE
LA
ORR/DA USSR EE FE
ORR
/MRA
USSR and CHINA
25X1
USSR EE CENT. EUR. FE NEA WE
LA
25X1
CHINA
OB
/GD
USSR FE NEA EUR.
WH
25X1
USSR/EE ME/AF/WE/LA
SOY BLOC INTERNATIONAL
DDP
DDP SR
EE FE NE AFRICA WE WH
NOTE: Size of block bears no relation to number of analysts
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STAT
Note for the Record:
Per
this is a dead issue.
11 June 1966
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