CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010051-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
I2
National Intelligence
Bulletin
OSD Review Completed
? State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
April 29, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
April 29, 1975
The US has begun the emergency evacuation of remain-
ing Americans from South Vietnam. The effort encountered
some problems initially. The communist assault on Saigon
has closed Tan Son Nhut airfield and led to panic and
chaos throughout the capital area.
The first US helicopters from a naval task force
off the coast landed at Tan Son Nhut with a US marine
security force shortly after 2 a.m. EDT. The US commander
of the evacuation operation reported that some Americans
in downtown Saigon had been unable to reach an evacuation
point, but later reporting indicates a large number of
Americans had arrived at the US defense attache compound.
According to a late report more than 2,000 people,
including several hundred Americans, now have been safely
evacuated.
The evacuation of Americans from Can Tho has en-
countered resistance from South Vietnamese forces. The
US consul general, together with 22 other Americans plus
Filipinos and Vietnamese civilians, tried to flee down
the Mekong by boat, but were attacked by South Vietnamese
helicopter gunships. Late reports indicate they too have
been rescued.
Communist forces began their attack early this morn-
ing with massive artillery and rocket bombardments of
Tan Son Nhut airfield. Many South Vietnamese aircraft
were destroyed on the ground, but others managed to take
off despite the rubble and heavy groundfire. Some air-
craft participated in the defense of Saigon, while others
flew to Can Tho. A number of government aircraft and
helicopters flew to US ships off the coast or to bases
in Thailand. At least three South Vietnamese aircraft
were shot down over Saigon by SA-7 missiles.
The communists followed the Tan Son Nhut assault with
a spate of small attacks in the suburbs of the capital.
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SAIGON
STATUTE MILES
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AREA OF MAP
Bien Haa
fir Base
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
Government units just northwest of Saigon abandoned
their positions, and a number of government outposts
were lost as the result of ground attacks. North Viet-
namese sappers also penetrated the southern edge of
Saigon and attacked a large military communications
site.
North Vietnamese forces also launched large-scale
attacks west and southwest of Saigon. A large communist
force supported by tanks attacked the South Vietnamese
25th Division at Cu Chi
He avy fig ing
as occurring a ong Rou e sout west of Saigon, and the
communist forces attacking in that area could reach Cho-
lon and the outskirts of the capital within hours.
The North Vietnamese assault on the capital came on
the heels of the communist rejection yesterday of Presi-
dent Minh's call for negotiations. North Vietnamese and
Viet C:ong media have characterized the new Saigon govern-
ment as just another "reactionary administration" and
reiterated earlier demands that the government adminis-
trative structure "be abolished," its "war machine" dis-
mantled and that the US leave immediately.
In a desperate effort to meet some of these de-
mands, the Minh government today requested that all
American personnel leave the country within 24 hours and
announced plans to overhaul the governmental apparatus
and legalize the Communist Party. In another desperate
gesture of reconciliation Saigon Radio today referred to
the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong as "our brothers
of the other side."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
In his acceptance speech. two days ago, President
Minh asked for a cease-fire in order to arrange a "po-
litical solution within the framework of the Paris Agree-
ment" and called upon the South Vietnamese military to
"defend the remaining territory." it now seems clear,
however, that Hanoi has rejected the gradual transfer
of power and negotiations on a co-equal governmental
basis implied by Minh and is determined to accept
nothing short of surrender.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Khmer communists intend to keep Prince
Sl. ariouk as nominal head of state. (Page 1)
NORTH KOREA - CHINA: Joint communique following Kim's
visitmo erate in tone. (Page 3)
USSR - MIDDLE EAST: Moscow hosts Arab visitors in prep-
aratioln for resumption of the Geneva peace conference.
(Page 7)
YUGOSLAVIA: Soviet military assistance to Belgrade has
been increased. (Page 10)
ANNEX: The French Arms Industry
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 29, 1975
The Khmer communists have finally confirmed their
intention to keep Prince Sihanouk on as nominal head of
state. In a communique broadcast by Phnom Penh radio
yesterday to mark the completion of a "special national
congress," Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan--who him-
self read the communique over the air--announced that the
congress had "decided" that Sihanouk would remain on and
that Penn Nouth would also be "allowed" to remain as
prime minster.
The announcement leaves little doubt about the
severely circumscribed role that Sihanouk and Penn Nouth
will play. Samphan's reference to "thorough review and
debate" suggests, however, that the decision to allow
the Prince and Penn Nouth any role whatsoever was a
bitter pill for some communist leaders to swallow. In
this regard, Samphan hinted that other non-communist
figures--such as Foreign Minister Sarin Chak--may be on
their way out by saying that they would be "rewarded
according to their respective contributions and abilities."
Samphan introduced a note of caution to the commu-
nists' previously stated willingness to accept "all uncon-
ditional aid." He made allusions, instead, to "foreign
interferences...under the form of humanitarianism." At
the same time, however, he spoke of "striving to develop
unity with...people throughout the world," including
"peace- and justice-loving Americans," and. again stressed
a "nonaligned and neutral" foreign policy.
In addition to the communique, Phnom Penh radio over
the weekend broadcast its first postwar "editorial."
A relatively new art form for communist propagandists,
the editorial was noteworthy for its references to "the
great Cambodian revolutionary organization" that achieved
victory through its "clear-sighted and correct line."
However oblique, this is the first public acknowledgment
of the dominant role played by the covert Khmer Communist
Party.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 28, 1975
The US defense attache in Bangkok indicates that
press reports of a Cambodian come unist buildup along the
Thai border are exaggerated. Although Thai officials have
expressed anxiety over the proximity of Khmer communist
forces to Thailand, there is no evidence to substantiate
reports that the communists are massing troops along the
border. The Khmer communists reportedly are under instruc-
tions not to cross into Thailand, except in cases of hot
pursuit. Communist forces are still attempting to conso-
lidate their control, and alleged border violations rte obabl
involved the pursuit of fleeing Cambodian refugees
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 29, 1975
NORTH KOREA - CHINA
The joint communique ending the visit of North
Korean President Kim 11-song to Peking struck a moderate
and restrained tone.
The document was, in fact, remarkable in its routine
treatment of the Korean reunification issue, which must
have occupied a central place in bilateral discussions.
China reaffirmed support for "peaceful reunification" of
the peninsula on the basis of Kim's earlier five-point
proposal.
Unlike some of Kim's threatening rhetoric during the
early stages of the visit, the communique barely criti-
cized Seoul and the US. The document briefly reiterated
long-standing demands for a complete US troop withdrawal
and the dismantling of the UN command, without spelling
out a time frame for these actions. The two sides termed
recent developments in Indochina encouraging and of "far-
reaching influence" on the world situation, but the commu-
nique drew no direct link between Indochina and the situa-
tion on the Korean peninsula.
Although senior military officers were prominent
on both sides during substantive talks and military assis-
tance was almost certainly discussed, the communique
omitted any mention of Chinese economic or military aid.
If differences exist between Pyongyang and Peking on re-
unification strategy, they were not apparent in the
communique; it said the visit was a "complete success"
and that the two reached "completely identical views on
all. the questions discussed." While the communique and
the closing banquet speeches by Kim and Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping were all moderate in tone and lacked new sub-
stance, new North Korean diplomatic initiatives or even
contained and controlled military probes remain possible.
China's view of developments in Korea is heavily in-
fluenced by the effects they might have on Sino-US rela-
tions, which remain important to Peking.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 29, 1975
USSR - MIDDLE EAST
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the USSR
last week marked a continuation of Moscow's efforts to
prepare for a resumption of the Geneva peace conference.
The communique issued at the end of the visit on
Friday, however, left unclear whether the Soviets made
substantial progress on. Geneva with the Syrians, partic-
ularly over the issue of representation for the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization. The Syrians are strong ad-
vocates of early participation at Geneva by an independent
PLO delegation. The Soviets support the "equal" participa-
tion of PLO representatives, but they have been ambiguous
about. the timing of Palestinian attendance and have kept
open the possibility that the PLO might attend as part of
another delegation.
The Palestinian issue will be discussed during the
visit: to Moscow, which began yesterday, of a PLO delega-
tion headed by Yasir Arafat. Foreign Minister Gromyko
also is apparently planning a trip to the Middle East
next month to continue discussions on resuming the Geneva
conference.
The Syrian-Soviet communique was markedly warmer on
bilateral issues than the one issued three days earlier
after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit. In what
may be an effort to signal their continued displeasure
with Cairo, the Soviets once again stated their commit-
ment to building Syrian military strength and praised
Syria's political policies.
A four-day trip to Damascus by Soviet Deputy Defense
Minister Kulikov coincided with Khaddam's stay in Moscow
and may have been designed to underscore continuing Soviet
military support at a time when Moscow was pressing Khad-
dam on Geneva. Kulikov met with :President Asad and Syr-
ian military leaders and probably checked Damascus' use
of Moscow's substantial military aid.
Syria's dispute with Iraq over the Euphrates River
ikel discussed in Moscow.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 29, 1975
YUGOSLAVIA
Moscow is assisting President Tito in his efforts
to modernize the Yugoslav armed forces, despite strains
in political relations during the ast year
On
April 10, an attaches source saw a radar, probably the
Low Blow--the tracking and missile-guidance radar for
the SA-3--at a SAM site near the same airfield. Excava-
tions for an SA-3 site had been noted earlier near a
site in northwestern Yugoslavia.
Rehearsals for the Victory Day parade on May 9 in
Belgrade have provided additional first-time sightings
of modern Soviet weaponry there. On April 24, army
troops were observed carrying the SA-7 Grail surface-to-
air missile, and on April 27 eight SA-6 Gainful surface-
to-air launchers with missiles were seen. More parade
practices are scheduled for the next several days, and
other items of advanced Soviet military equipment may
thus be seen.
The new arms probably were supplied under a large
supplemental Soviet credit, reportedly agreed on in De-
cember 1973. There are indications that Belgrade has
also been provided with plans for manufacturing rocket
munitions, and there are signs that Yugoslav rocket units
are training at firing ranges in the USSR.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
Belgrade has been trying to develop military con-
tacts with the West. Increased Soviet-Yugoslav military
cooperation and the appearance of this advanced military
equipment suggest, however, that Moscow is continuing
to play a major role in Yugoslav defense efforts.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
The French Arms Industry
The French arms industry is booming. Export orders
reached a record high in 1974, and French armament and
aeronautic manufacturers are optimistic that exports will
continue to expand over the next several years. We es-
timate that French arms makers took orders last year for
at least $2.5 billion from Third World nations, France's
principal customers. These orders put France about on a
par with the Soviet Union, which is believed to have
signed arms agreements for about $2.7 billion in 1974.
US arms sales for the year ending in July 1974 totaled
around $8 billion.
The French government works hard for these sales be-
cause of the positive effect they have on France's balance
of payments and on domestic employment. Money for addi-
tional equipment to modernize the French armed forces is
limited these days, so the arms industry is especially
dependent on export sales to stay healthy.
France can produce virtually all types of modern
military equipment. Since 1966, French arms manufac-
turers have exported to some 30 countries nearly 700
modern jet fighters, about 300 light and medium tanks,
more than 1,100 armored personnel carriers, and some
70 self-propelled artillery pieces.
The French arms industry does have its limitations.
It cannot rapidly supply customers with large quantities
of major items such as tanks and aircraft. France does
not stockpile military equipment for later sale, and
when major new sales are made, the items must be fitted
into future production schedules.
The Dassault-Breguet aircraft company avoids peaks
and valleys in company employment by setting a fairly
low production rate. Dassault now has orders and options
that will keep the plant running at its current rate--
about 15 fighter aircraft a month--at least through 1977.
This figure does not include any of the Mirage Fl orders
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
from the Middle East that are pending or orders for the
improved Fl/E multipurpose fighter, should this aircraft
go into series production. If Dassault needed to increase
production at a future date, it probably could double the
capacity of existing facilities by adding additional
shifts of workers.
Dassault is now clearing a backlog of orders for
some 230 Mirage IIIs and Mirage 5s and is turning them
out at a rate of 11 a month. At this pace, the produc-
tion run will last until about December 1976. In addi-
tion to Mirage IIIs and 5s, Dassault currently is pro-
ducing about four Fls a month. The output of Fls could
be doubled or even tripled, once the Mirage III and 5 are
phased out. Dassault has export orders for at least 75,
and perhaps, as many as 130 Fls. Dassault still has about
50 Fls to go on a French air force order of 105.
If necessary to close a new contract, Dassault prob-
ably would be willing to manipulate delivery schedules to
provide a new customer with at least a few aircraft at
an earlier date. The company has been averaging about
28 months from order to first delivery.
Mirage 111/5 and F1 parallel production lines at Dassault-Breguet
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
A Better Position
The French are now in a better export position on
tanks than on aircraft. The French army recently com-
pleted supplying its units with AMX-30 tanks,, and, except
for small numbers of replacements and spare parts, all
AMX-30 tanks now being produced could be exported.
France could probably turn out up to 35 a month, although
production reportedly now stands at about 22 a month.
Monthly production rates for other hardware vary
sharply; in several items, production is well below
plant capacity. The US defense attache in Paris reported
in February that Aerospatiale is tooling up to produce
a new wire-guided, heavy antitank missile, the Hot.
By next April, the company will be producing the missile
at a rate of 50 a month. The company plans to reach a
capacity of 500 a month by August 1977. Paris hopes to
find as good an export market for this system as for
other antitank missiles produced in France--the SS-11,
SS-12, Entac, and Milan.
Although the French have been willing in the past
to slow the flow of equipment to their own forces in
favor of foreign customers, manipulation of production
and delivery rates could become difficult as more pro-
duction is devoted to foreign consumers. France could
well get involved in having to choose between two coun-
tries competing for preferred treatment in the delivery
of airplanes or tanks.
Paris would try to persuade the competing customers
to apportion production. Thus, the Turks are negotiating
with France for the rapid delivery of a number of Fl
fighters; the French have suggested that Ankara sound out
Libya to see if Tripoli would agree to Turkey's getting
first delivery of the planes.
Another possible solution would be to license the
production of French arms in foreign countries.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975,
---More than 250 Mirage IIIs and 5s have already been
assembled in Australia, Switzerland, and Belgium
under French license.
---South Africa is assembling some of the 48 Fls it
purchased from France.
---Pakistan is negotiating to assemble Mirage fighter
aircraft.
---Spain is assembling AMX-30 tanks.
Arab Buyers
The French sell a wide range of arms in Western
Europe and the US, but in recent years they have turned
more to the Third World. They have had success in Latin
America because of US arms embargoes. Since the Middle
East war in the fall of 1973, they have been especially
successful in selling arms to the Arabs, who placed
orders worth nearly $2 billion last year.
Using aggressive sales tactics, Dassault has kept
its family of Mirage fighter planes at the forefront of
these sales. Despite French efforts to sell the Mirage
Fl/E as the F-104 replacement aircraft in Western Europe,
Dassault's prospects appear tied to the Third World,
especially Arab markets.
As sales of the Mirage III and 5 wind down, interest
in the Fl is rising. Deliveries of Fls to Spain and
South Africa have begun, and initial deliveries to Greece
are scheduled in the next few months. Arab purchasers
will probably begin getting Fls sometime next year.
In 1974, Kuwait ordered at least 16--and possibly
as many as 36--F1s. Major new sales of the Fl appear
certain, following French agreement in January to provide
Egypt with new militar hardware.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 29, 1975
Libya is currently negotiating for 39 Fls, and Iraq has
mentioned an interest in purchasing at least 50 Mirage
jets.
Egypt recently received the first 9 of 38 Mirage 5
fighter-bombers purchased for Cairo by Saudi Arabia in
1973. The delivery schedule calls for three planes a
month. Egypt has also signed a contract for some 42
Anglo-French Gazelle helicopters. Delivery of these
all-purpose, lightweight helicopters is scheduled to
begin in the fall.
France sold significant amounts of ground forces
equipment to the Arab nations in 1974. Important sales
were 100' AMX-30 tanks to Saudi Arabia and 50 to Morocco.
Abu Dhabi recently signed a contract for over 150 Panhard
armored cars fitted with 90-mm. guns, plus enough armored
personnel carriers for an infantry brigade and a smaller
but unspecified number of armored personnel carriers
fitted with 20-mm. guns.
Bright Outlook
Arab states also is bright.
Sales of French naval equipment have not kept pace
with air and ground forces equipment. Nevertheless,
France does have prospects, especially for fast missile
patrol boats and electronics equipment.
A5
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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