INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 30, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
International
Narcotics Review
DOJ Review Completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP INR 78-003
30 August 1978
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW
30 August 1978
CONTENTS
WEST BERLIN: Narcotics Black Market Favored_by
Obstacles to Customs Controls . . . . . . . . . . .
East Germany, if only to project a more
responsible image, is showing some will-
ingness to cooperate in the narcotics
control effort in East and West Berlin.
Practical and political obstacles remain,
for any effective comprehensive controls
involving both East and West Germany.
PAKISTAN: New Narcotics Law . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The comprehensive narcotics law should
markedly improve the government's ability
to control opium production, although polit-
ical constraints will still hinder enforce-
ment.
COLOMBIA: Military To Move Against Illicit Drugs . . 11
A show of force in drug control in the
Guajira region, a major center for mari-
juana cultivation and cocaine export, may
cause tension with Venezuela.
The articles in this publication are prepared by analysts in the
National Foreign Assessment Center primarily for specialists in
the Washington community who are interested in international nar-
cotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
1. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4. Central and South America. . . . . . . . . . 27
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
FOREIGN MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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WEST BERLIN: Narcotics Black Market Favored by
Obstacles to Customs Controls
Practical and political obstacles to effective cus-
toms controls serve to protect the West Berlin market
for narcotics that some claim has caused that city to
eclipse Amsterdam as the "drug capital of Europe."
These obstacles are rooted in the special status of
Berlin, most firmly in the West German and Western
Allied refusal to treat the boundaries of West Berlin
as international borders. There is currently no pros-
pect that an effective and comprehensive control system
over the smuggling of narcotics into the city will be
developed.
The East Germans have in the past treated the
Berlin drug problem as purely Western, and the laxity
of their controls over foreigners, especially the
Turkish "guest workers" who enter West Berlin via the
East German airport near the city, is advantageous to
smugglers. Recently the East Germans have hinted at
a willingness to cooperate more in the control of inter-
national narcotics movements. The practical results
of this, however, are not predictable. Furthermore, the
portion of the narcotics supply for the illicit West
Berlin market that comes through Schoenefeld airport is
estimated at only 20 percent.
More public focus on Berlin's narcotics problem,
especially as it affects the US forces there, can be
anticipated this fall, when a Congressional committee
looking into drug abuse among US military personnel
plans to hold public hearings in West Berlin.
Berlin as Narcotics Center
Recognition that West Berlin's rate of drug abuse
is serious and rising dates from October 1977, when the
West Berlin Government declared the narcotics "epidemic"
to be the greatest danger to the city, surpassing even
terrorism in its consequences. One month earlier, West
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Germany's Minister of Health had proclaimed West Berlin
the center of West Germany's drug problem and stated
that Turkish workers were supplying the addicts.
The number of deaths from drug overdoses in West
Berlin reached 87 in 1977, up from 54 in the previous
year. The 1977 figure is much higher than the total of
such deaths in the West German cities of Hamburg (16),
Munich (16), Hannover (8) and Stuttgard (5). The West
Berlin figure of 87 is said to represent a mortality of
about 20 per thousand addicts. There has been a steady
increase of drug abuse and deaths from overdoses in West
Berlin since 1970.
The US Embassy in Bonn reported in November 1977
that West Berlin was becoming a major trafficking point
for illicit drugs. Although West German officials then
believed that West Berlin had not yet begun to supply
West Germany with substantial quantities of heroin, they
feared such a development, because the street price in
West Berlin was lower and heroin was more easily, and
more safely, obtainable. In the first quarter of 1978,
the West Berlin police and Customs seized more than five
times as much heroin and arrested over three times as
many persons on drug charges as during the same period
last year. There was a decline, however, in the number
of deaths from drug overdoses to 25 in the first five
months of 1978.
Special Status of Berlin
The special status of Berlin impedes West German
efforts to come to grips with the city's narcotics prob-
lem. Coordination of drug law enforcement in West Germany
is done by the Permanent Working Group on Narcotics, on
which West Berlin is not even represented. Although
there is cooperation with Berlin police on criminal cases,
West German officials are well aware that no federal law
enforcement agency has jurisdiction in West Berlin. The
special status of the city, furthermore, prevents its
government from erecting customs barriers against nar-
cotics smuggling activity at the many entry points to
West Berlin.
The reasons for this are both political and prac-
tical. West Berlin is an island dependent on its links
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to the outside world. It is interested in facilitating
access to the ci,cy to minimizing controls through which
visitors must pass. Any new obstacle to passage is seen
as deepening the division of Germany and strengthening
the East German claim to separateness.
The Western Allies insist, along with the West
German and West Berlin Governments, that the boundaries
of West Berlin are not an international border. This
political and legal view is fundamental to their position
and applies with special force to the sector-sector
boundary running through the middle of the city. Thus
political objections to additional customs controls are
formidable as well as the practical problems such controls
would face because there are many holes in the Wall
where experienced travelers can enter West Berlin with-
out undergoing more than routine identification. By
passing through East German controls--which are cursory,
especially for exiting foreigners--in the main East Berlin
railroad station on Friedrichstrasse, travelers can
board one of several subway or rapid transit lines and
step off at any one of hundreds of stations in West
Berlin without facing further controls. Major resources
would be required to apply a customs barrier in the area
under Western jurisdiction.
The problems of customs control on the western peri-
phery of the city are equally staggering. The main entry
points are highways not only carrying international
vehicular traffic, but also a very large amount of tran-
sit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. After
years of negotiation, the delays at these important entry
points have been reduced to an acceptable minimum. To apply
anything more than occasional customs inspections on the
West Berlin side would entail delays and arouse political
reactions. As many as a thousand trucks a day supply
West Berlin with over half of its goods and materials; a
thorough inspection of a trailer truck takes four or
five hours.
Allied and Soviet Reservations
The French and the British share some of the US
concern over the problem of drug abuse in West Berlin,
and have expressed a desire to be helpful, so long as
damage is not done to important Western political
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interests. They are especially determined to maintain
the position that the sector-sector line through Berlin
is not an international border. The French and British
recently joined the US in approving a request of the West
Berlin Senator for Interior for increased authority in a
search for drug smugglers to control, persons using the
rapid transit lines run by East Germany in West Berlin.
This action has so far resulted only in reopening a
dormant dispute between the Western allies and the
Soviets, who usually feel compelled to back the East
German claim to sovereignty over the Reichsbahn property
it owns in West Berlin. The Western Allies must insist
that East German property in West Berlin is subject to
their jurisdiction and control.
The Soviets have challenged, therefore, the Western
Allied authorization for the West Berlin police to con-
trol passengers on the rapid transit lines and the
Allies have responded by reaffirming their authority.
The political sensitivity of this issue assures that
the additional authority granted the West Berlin police
will be limited. Controls are to be occasional. They
are not to be carried out on a large scale or close to
the sector-sector line unless Western Allied permission
is obtained beforehand. The purpose of this recent
authorization is worthy: the prospect that it will
measurably decrease supplies to the West Berlin illicit
narcotics market is small.
Turkish Connection
The assertion of Bonn's Minister of Health that
Turkish workers supply the addicts and that West Berlin
is the center of the drug problem, while perhaps over-
simplified reflected German understanding of the develop-
ments since 1976. In that year, a joint German-Dutch
crackdown on traffic in "brown" heroin from Southeast
Asia through Amsterdam effectively ended that product's
dominance of the West German illicit drug market. The
void has been filled by "white" heroin from the Middle
East, also the source of hashish and cannabis for Ger-
many. During 1977, according to German police
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information, 75 percent of the heroin used in West Ger-
many's illicit market was of Middle East origin and the
majority of traffickers were Turkish.*
The traffickers, hidden in the large Turkish guest
worker communities of West Germany and West Berlin, are
in a relatively strong position, and West German author-
ities expect the predominance of Middle East heroin on
the market to continue. West Germany has over a million
Turkish guest workers, thousands of whom vacation in
Turkey each year.and hundreds of.whom then-return bearing
small-(l to 3 kilograms) stashes of heroin for sale-in
Germany. This pattern also appears in West. Berlin..
In addition to the colony of Turkish guest workers
in West Berlin which numbers about 75,000, there are also
.an estimated 5,000 Turkish illegal residents.** The
sources of heroin for the West Berlin market are, typi-
cally, individual Turks selling small kilogram quantities.
They travel to and from Turkey mainly by air or by
vehicle. Of the latter, many, if not most, drive
vehicles with West Berlin or West German tags, so that
determination of who comes from Turkey in the heavy
transit traffic to West Berlin requires time for a
thorough passport examination. Air travelers can choose
between the western route that passes through West Germany
or the eastern route that uses the East German airport
at Schoenefeld.
According to West Berlin authorities, much of the
heroin reaching the city from Turkey and the Middle East
seems to.pass through West Germany en route and the
couriers are indistinguishable from legitimate travelers.
It is estimated that about 80 percent reaches West Berlin
via the western route, especially in trucks, while only
about 20 percent comes through Schoenefeld.
*Although the so-called "Middle East" heroin is being smuggled by
Turkish nationals there is no evidence that the heroin was made
from opium grown in Turkey.
**The opium involved may actually come from the sizable amounts
available in Afghanistan and Pakistan and may be processed in clan-
destine laboratories in Iran or Turkey.
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East Germany's Role
The East German regime tends to identify crime with
capitalism and has strong political views about juris-
dictional proprieties in the Berlin area. Both impede
the regime's readiness to act against traffic in illicit
drugs entering West Berlin. When a Bonn Health Ministry
official raised the West Berlin narcotics problem with
his East German colleague, in late 1977, the latter ex-
pressed "astonishment" that a West German would presume
to speak officially on a "purely Berlin matter." At
about the same time, the Governing Mayor of West Berlin
sent the East German Government a letter proposing coop-
eration in combating drug abuse, to which no answer has
so far been reported.
A more practical effort in this direction was made
only recently. The West Berlin police sent East German
authorities the identity and details of the modus operandi
of a Turkish courier expected to bring heroin through
Schoenefeld airport to West Berlin between 4 and 7 August.
Cooperation in making a "major narcotics arrest" was
requested. Nothing has been heard in response to this
message, although the suspect subsequently turned up in
West Berlin, evidently unscathed.
Nonetheless, it is too early to write off the pos-
sibility that East Germany will be more forthcoming on
the drug abuse problem. On 24 August, a Foreign Ministry
official in East Berlin told the US Embassy that his gov-
ernment would like to receive the names of suspected
couriers of narcotics. The offer of such information
had been made six months earlier. Furthermore, there
are factors which should argue for more East German
cooperation. They include evident concern of the regime
about the number of foreigners, especially Turks from
West Berlin, who have been coming to East Berlin in
search of an evening's entertainment. Inevitably they
encounter the disenchanted youth of East Germany and at
least the potential for an expansion of the drug market
is there.
Perhaps a more promising lever is the desperate
East German need for hard currency, which could be some-
what alleviated by pay for services in an agreed East-
West program to control drug abuse. Should the East
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Germans display an inclination to cooperate, West Berlin
interest would presumably focus on the desirability of
more stringent controls at Schoenefeld airport, or at
the Friedrichstrasse railroad station and the southern
crossing point on Waltersdorfer Chaussee used by the buses
from Schoenefeld to West Berlin. These two places are
the logical chokepoints for control of travelers from the
airport. Effective controls there could have a per-
ceptible impact on the illicit narcotics supply but only
on the estimated 20 percent that comes via the eastern
route.
Outlook
There are signs, according to the US Mission in
West Berlin and the US Embassy in East Berlin, that East
Germany may gradually seek to project a more responsible
image by displaying interest in international cooperation
against narcotics traffickers. This is conceivable, but
it is unlikely that cooperation would come about before
the question of hard currency payment arises. In weighing
the benefits of such cooperation, the East Germans will
be influenced by their assessment of what it would mean
to the drug situation in East Berlin. Their ideological
refusal to admit having any domestic drug problem, how-
ever, means there is almost no information on which to
base an estimate of the significance of this factor.
The West Berlin market in illicit drugs seems more
dependent on Middle Eastern, notably Turkish, supply
than that of West Germany, where recent heroin seizures
indicate that the Southeast Asian suppliers are getting
back in business. A control program focused on the
Turkish community of West Berlin, however, would be
politically unacceptable.
Partial measures that could reduce the narcotics
supply are possible: for example, new controls at Wal-
tersdorfer Chaussee, which handles limited traffic
largely of foreigners, would not greatly disturb Berlin
political sensitivities. Such measure, however, would
offer only limited improvements. Special controls on
passengers from Schoenefeld at Waltersdorfer Chaussee
and Freidrichstrasse railroad station would, in time,
drive smugglers to make use of other crossing points
along the Wall, notably Checkpoint Charlie. This would
pose new political problems.
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Any new control program comprehensive enough to
bring about a major and lasting reduction of the traffic
in narcotics to West Berlin risks blocking traffic in a
manner that would irritate the Berliners. It also could
not be brought into force without extensive inter-Allied
coordination.
West Berlin's drug abuse problem will be highlighted
by Congressional committee hearings now planned there in
November. Although focused on the problem of US Forces,
the hearings will arouse public concern about the drug
abuse situation in West Berlin. Whatever resolve to
deal with the problem might be stimulated there by, it
will not be forceful enough to override the local and
international political considerations that militate
against a comprehensive drug control program. The French
and British have insisted that there is no noticeable
drug impact on their military forces in West Berlin.
And the Berliners are, by history and experience, con-
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PAKISTAN: New Narcotics Law
A comprehensive narcotics law, which should signif-
icantly improve the government's ability to control il-
licit opium production and trafficking, was expected to
be promulgated in Pakistan early this week. The law was
to take effect immediately, although it will not become
a permanent law until approved by parliament after mili-
tary rule ends.
The new law appears to be similar to the law
drafted five and a half years ago with UN assistance,
but never enacted because of political pressures, bu-
reaucratic infighting, and the low priority government
leaders give narcotics control. The basic legislation
on narcotics has been contained in three laws--enacted
in 1847, 1878, and 1930--which treat narcotics primarily
as a revenue problem.
The major change in the new law will be the
strengthening of the role of the federal government. Al-
though political constraints will still hinder enforce-
ment, the pressures will be less effective than when
provincial governments had the main responsibility for
narcotics control. Opium is grown in only one Pakistani
province, the northwest frontier, where it is an impor-
tant business. The provincial government traditionally
has been far more concerned with avoiding trouble with
the poppy growers than it has about doing anything to
control the illicit opium traffic.
Under the new law, the federal government will have
control of the production of drugs manufactured from
opium, operations at the frontiers, and any foreign
dealings in narcotics. Provincial governments, however,
will still control the transport, sale, and possession
of opium domestically. With enforcement responsibili-
ties divided, jurisdictional disputes and gaps in en-
forcement seem likely, but the situation should never-
theless be improved.
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The role of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
has been strengthened. The PNCB has been in overall
charge of narcotics control, but its authority over both
provincial officials and other federal agencies has been
limited and far from clear. Under the new law, the PNCB
is the primary control agency, will coordinate and super-
vise an interagency committee, and will have the power
to make arrests. The effectiveness of the PNCB in its
new role will depend, however, on both the budgetary
support it receives and the willingness of senior offi-
cials to protect it from political pressures.
Penalties for narcotics offenses have been in-
creased. The maximum penalty under the old laws was two
years' imprisonment. The new law provides for up to
seven years for the manufacture, production, or posses-
sion for sale of narcotics; 10 years for the import or
export of narcotics; and up to 14 years for repeat of-
fenders. The government will be able to define psycho-
tropic drugs as manufactured drugs, greatly enhancing
its ability to deal with the hashish traffic.
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COLOMBIA: Drug Control Effort May Lead to Border Tension
The Colombian Government has requested US logistic
support to carry out its drug control operations in the
Guajira region of northeastern Colombia. In a recent
meeting with US Ambassador Asencio, Defense Minister
General Camacho reiterated the intention of the new ad-
ministration to act forcefully against drug trafficking.
He repeated President Turbay's proposal to Secretary
Blumenthal for a dramatic show of force by interdicting
or destroying aircraft illegally entering the Guajira
Peninsula. He added that a battalion of troops was
available to carry out the operations in the region but
that the government needed fuel, spare parts, and so-
phisticated communications and radar equipment. Camacho
assigned the armed forces commander, General Sarmiento,
to work with US personnel. in drawing up a program of
action and a budget.
The Colombians are obviously intent on demonstrating
their commitment to curb drug trafficking in an area
that has become a major center for marijuana cultivation
and cocaine export. They do not appear to be taking
into consideration, however, the reaction of neighboring
Venezuela to what, in effect, would be the militariza-
tion of an area that figures prominently in a longstand-
ing and emotional border dispute between the two nations.
The Guajira Peninsula and adjacent offshore territories
have been the subject of conflicting claims since the
late 1880s and the ill-defined border area has frequently
been the scene of minor skirmishes.
The Venezuelan military have traditionally viewed
their Colombian counterparts with suspicion. Many
Venezuelans accept as an article of faith that Colombia
harbors aggressive intentions on oil-rich western Vene-
zuela. They will regard any abnormal increase in mili-
tary strength along the border as potentially hostile.
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Colombia: Major Marijuana Growing Area
CANAL
ZONE
ECUADOR
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Moreover, Venezuela is now in the throes of a
closely fought general election campaign that could
provide a forum for a renewal of anti-Colombian feelings,
particularly if one of the major parties senses that
political capital could be made.
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Narcotics Growing Areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA
publications, do not deal specifically with the inter-
national narcotics situation. They are included here
because they concern developing situations that could
impact on the international narcotics control effort.)
AFGHANISTAN: The Pathan Tribes as a Military Force
This year Afghanistan is expected to produce between 300
and 400 tons of illicit opium, about two-thirds of which will be
grown by Pathan tribesmen. In neighboring Pakistan--where produc-
tion could run as high as 600 tons--almost all opium is grown by
Pathans, and much of it is exported through the Pathan areas of
Afghanistan. Thus the degree to which the Afghan Government can
control the Pathan tribes is an important factor in determining
the success of narcotics control efforts in both countries. The
following article is addressed primarily to the question of whether
the tribes can overthrow the government, but it also indicates the
weakness of central government authority in tribal areas.
The Pathan tribes have been a major problem for all
Afghan governments. A proud and independent people, the
Pathans have long resisted outside control--even from
other Pathans in Kabul. At least two of the many tribes
have rebelled against the Taraki government, and it is
likely that others will do so. There are widely varying
estimates of Pathan military capabilities, partly because
of the lack of good information, but also because of the
many variables that affect tribal military strength.
No census has ever been taken in Afghanistan, but
there are probably about 8 million Afghan Pathans--about
half the population. Some--such as President Taraki,
presumably from the Taraki tribe--have lost any real
identification with their tribal origins. Others do not
speak Pushtu, usually the test of who is a Pathan. Some
groups of Pathans have moved either voluntarily or under
compulsion out of the traditional tribal areas. Most.
Pathans, however, consider themselves members of specific
tribes, live in southern and eastern Afghanistan (or in
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northwest Pakistan), and speak one of the many Pushtu
dialects.
The Command and Control System
A coordinated military campaign by the Pathans seems
almost impossible. There are three main tribal groupings:
the Durrani in southern Afghanistan, the Ghilzai in east-
ern Afghanistan and extending into Pakistan, and the
Yusufzai mainly in Pakistan. Each of these groups con-
tains about a half dozen tribes. The exact count de-
pends on what is considered a tribe and what a subtribe.
In addition, there are more than a dozen tribes that do
not belong to any of the larger groups.
The Durrani are the most cohesive of these groups.
Members of Durrani tribes tend to have a highly developed
group identity, and fighting among the tribes is rela-
tively rare. The Ghilzai, on the other hand, frequently
fight among themselves, and some observers believe Ghilzai
is a concept invented by outsiders with no real basis in
the loyalties of the tribesmen.
Even within a particular tribe there is likely to
be little unity. The Mangals--one of the tribes now re-
belling against the government--have generally been dis-
united, and in most of their frequent conflicts with
central authority some tribesmen have remained neutral
and others have sided with Kabul. On the other hand,
the Mohmands, the other rebel tribe, are exceptional for
their unity, and tribal leaders exercise a good deal of
authority over the tribesmen.
Barring the emergence of an extremely strong leader--
such as Nader Shah, who in 1929 led the Mangals and others
in a rebellion that put Nader on the throne--any large-
scale tribal rebellion is likely to be an uncoordinated
affair. Authority would be fairly firm only at the low-
est level--the village, the extended family, or an ad hoc
raiding party. Few of the tribes would act as a single
unit, and coordinated action by one of the larger groups--
even the Durrani--is highly unlikely. Each tribe--or
faction of a tribe--would decide for itself when to fight,
when to advance, when to retreat, when to drop out of the
war, and when to change sides.
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Personnel Strength
In a maximum effort, according to different estimates,
the Pathan tribes can put between 50,000 and 2 million
men into the field. The wide variation is due in part to
sketchy information--the Mangals, for example are esti-
mated to have anywhere from 5,000 to 20,000 fighting men.
There are, however, other factors that make realistic
estimates difficult.
The 2 million man force is probably an accurate
estimate if all Pathans of fighting age decided to fight
against the government at the same time. It would, how-
ever, include Pakistanis. The Afridis, perhaps the best
known of the tribes because of their many encounters with
the British Indian Army, might be able to put 50,000 men
in the field. They live in Pakistan, however, and their
contribution to an Afghan rebellion is more likely to be
a handful of men hoping for loot and excitement. The
10,000 or so Waziri fighting men in Afghanistan would
have a better chance of receiving help from Pakistani
Wazirs, but probably much less than the 50,000 the Pak-
istani Wazirs might be able to raise. The half of the
Mohmand tribe living in Pakistan, however, might well
give strong support to the Afghan Mohmands, raising their
strength to the neighborhood of 20,000 men.
Despite the popular picture of the Pathan as a gal-
lant nomad eager to fight for his honor, his religion,
or profit, some of the tribes are not particularly war-
like and probably would make little contribution even in
a widespread rebellion. Tribes such as the Ishakzai and
Popolzai (both Durrani) and the Ghilzai Hotaki are set-
tled farmers and generally regarded as peaceful. Other
tribes, such as the Ghilzai Nazir, are impoverished and
would have difficulty equipping or sparing men for a re-
bellion.
Even among the warlike tribes, many men would have
to remain home to protect the sheep, women, and other
property from neighboring tribes. Others inevitably
will have no interest in a campaign against the govern-
ment. Fighting within or among the tribes will. also re-
duce tribal strength, although there has been a tendency
to ignore local differences during fights with outsiders.
The Mangals may have been joined in the present rebellion
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by two smaller tribes despite longstanding disputes, and
the Mohmands have often had the backing of their tradi-
tional enemies, the Shinwaris, when they were fighting
the government.
Equipment and Logistics
In the more warlike tribes probably every adult male
is armed, usually with a firearm. The weapons vary, how-
ever, from the most modern automatic weapons to rifles
and muskets more valuable as antiques than as weapons.
Some of the weapons are locally manufactured copies,
sometimes down to the serial number. These copies work
fairly well, although because of inferior metal, they have
a tendency to blow up. Ammunition may be stolen govern-
ment issue, commercially purchased, or homemade. A
Pathan fighting man might be better armed than an Afghan
soldier, but he is more likely to have far inferior equip-
ment.
In past fighting against the gov-
ernment, the tribes have appeared to have no defense
against aircraft. Should Pakistan or Iran decide to
supply the tribes with weapons, the tribesmen could
probably use modern rifles with little or no training,
but would have little capability to operate or maintain
more sophisticated arms.
There is no logistics system. A tribal army would
expect to live off the country, which would seriously
limit its size and its ability to move outside the tribal
areas.
A Pathan tribal rebellion--even if it involved most
of the tribes--would appear to present little direct
threat to the government. The tribesmen--as they have
for generations--might successfully resist government
forces through guerrilla war, making an attempt to im-
pose control in the tribal areas both costly and futile.
They would, however, have little capability to take any
major cities or fight the Afghan Army outside the tribal
areas.
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A major tribal rebellion would, nevertheless, pose
a significant indirect threat to the Afghan Government.
Almost all military officers and many of the enlisted men
are Pathans and are already unhappy at the limited fight-
ing under way against tribesmen. If ordered to suppress
a widespread tribal rebellion, they might well move
against the government instead.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
IRAN: Formation of New Government
The formation of a new government in Iran just be-
fore Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng's visit on 29 August
is an indication of the seriousness with which the Shah
views the continuing political unrest that has beset the
country since January. The appointment to the prime
minister's post of former Senate President Jafar Sharif-
Emami, 68, a traditionalist who is well regarded in the
religious community, was intended as a gesture of con-
ciliation to Muslim leaders who have been in the fore-
front of opposition to the Shah's rule. The Shah's re-
moval in early June of General Nematollah Nasiri, who
had been identified with a hardline approach in dealing
with dissidents, as head of the National Intelligence and
Security Organization (SAVAK), was an earlier attempt to
placate religious leaders.
Sharif-Emami, in his first public statement in office,
said that his first order of business will be to damp down
Iran's volatile political environment by building bridges
to alienated Muslim fundamentalists. During his brief
tenure as a transition Prime Minister in 1960-1961, he
acquired the reputation of acting independently of the
Shah. He has for years, however, remained a member of
the Shah's inner circle of advisers and would be a likely
choice to serve as the Shah's intermediary with major
Muslim leaders. Outgoing Prime Minister Amuzegar's one-
year tenure was a mixed success. He curbed inflation
and reduced the cost of housing, but he lacked the skills
in political brokerage needed to cope with an increasingly
active religious and political opposition. It has been
the Court, not the government, that has begun a tentative
dialogue with religious leaders.
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It remains to be seen whether religious leaders are
now ready to accept the compromises necessary for a politi-
cal settlement with the Shah. The Shah's appointment of a
new cabinet could be interpreted by some Muslim clergymen
as a capitulation to their demands. This could encourage
Muslim leaders to push for further political concessions,
such as the right of the Muslim clergy to veto parliamentary
legislation--something the Shah is certain to reject.
New appointees hold about two-thirds of the minis-
terial posts in the government. One is Foreign Minister
Amir Khosrow Afshar-Qasemlu, a veteran career diplomat
with wide experience in a number of foreign posts. The
appointment of a military officer, General Abbas Karim-
Qarabaqi, as minister of Interior breaks precedent with
the civilian hold on the post and was probably intended
by the Shah as a message that he will continue to deal
firmly with opponents who go beyond accepted limits of
political dissent.
The Shah will continue to formulate the broad out-
lines of Iran's domestic and foreign policies. The
formation of the new government presages'no sharp de-
parture in policy toward the United States or in Iran's
relations with other major powers and its neighbors.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
SRI LANKA: Moderation of Tamil Separatist Demands
After a spate of terrorist activity earlier this
year, the momentum of the Tamil separatist movement has
slowed considerably. Whatever the expectations of the
militant youth behind the terrorism, broad-based support
within their own community for an independent Tamil home-
land has not materialized. The use of politically moti-
vated assassination and terror, as espoused by the edu-
cated and unemployed younger generation, has not been
accepted by their more conservative elders as the desired
means to achieve minority rights. Although continuing
to pay lipservice to the possibility of an independent
state, Tamil moderates are actively backing efforts at
compromise through institutional changes to improve and
protect their status in an overwhelmingly Sinhalese-
Buddhist society.*
With tensions on both sides still strong in the
aftermath of communal riots in August and September 1977,
the murder of five police officers investigating the
separatist activities of the youthful Tamil Liberation
Tigers (TLT) in April and May of this year could have
easily led to another round of communal violence. Presi-
dent J. R. Jayawardene's adroit handling of the problem,
however, prevented a new outbreak of Tamil-Sinhalese
clashes. The Jayawardene government, in contrast to the
heavyhanded repression employed by previous regimes (in-
cluding sweeping emergency powers accompanied by intensive
*The Sinhalese, about 80 percent of the population, are the dominant
group in Sri Lanka. The Tamil community, predominantly Hindu, is
divided into two distinct groups which together make up 20 percent
of the population. The Sri Lankan Tamils trace their origins back
more than a thousand years to Tamil kingdoms centered around Jaffna
in the north. The other group, the Indian Tamils, came in the mid-
19th century to work on plantations in the Central Highlands. In-
dian Tamils are only peripherally involved in Tamil politics.
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use of the Army and the police) merely passed a bill that
proscribes the TLT and any other group advocating violence
to achieve its ends. Limited to one year, the bill also
permits press censorship of material dealing with banned
organizations--another effective method for controlling
volatile Sinhalese-Tamil relations. Use of the military
and police forces in the predominantly Tamil northern and
eastern provinces has been limited to a modest complement
of 600 men.
Since June, activist Tamil youth have remained quies-
cent with the exception of the assassination of a retired
Tamil police officer in Jaffna, an act that received scant
press coverage. This period of relative calm is attribu-
table in part to the extensive manhunt conducted after
the May murders as well as the arrest of more than 30
young Tamil militants--most of whom have since been re-
leased. Communal peace is also sought by many Tamils
living in predominantly Sinhalese areas who see them-
selves as hostages to threats of Tamil militants in the
north.
Risking censure from the Sinhalese majority, Jayaward-
ene's ruling United National Party (UNP), has instituted
linguistic, administrative, and economic reforms designed
to placate moderate elements within the Tamil community.
Sinhala, under the new constitution promulgated on 16 Au-
gust, will be the official language, but both Tamil and
Sinhala will be recognized as "national" languages. The
exclusive use of Sinhala in the civil service has been
modified. Civil administration as well as the courts in
the Tamil north and east will be conducted in the Tamil
language. The setting of quotas for university admis-
sion according to the percentage of each community in
the population has been scrapped--presumably to the ad-
vantage of the Tamils. Aspirations for more regional
autonomy, while falling short of a federal relationship
or a separate state as called for by the Tamils, have
received indirect attention in the new constitution which
provides for District Ministers who will promote the in-
terests of each locality. Since the program will be in-
stituted islandwide, it is not seen by the Sinhalese as
a dangerous concession to the Tamils.
The drawing back of the Tamil community from serious
confrontation with the majority community in recent months
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was further emphasized during the second annual meeting
on 29-30 July of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)--
a coalition of several Tamil parties and the primary op-
position organization in parliament. Aresolution sub-
mitted at the conference calling for continued struggle
to establish a separate state, while following traditional
rhetoric on the issue, was moderate in tone and vague re-
garding a timetable for independence. Tamil political
leaders must tread a narrow line between their own mili-
tant youth and Tamil moderates in order to maintain their
hold within their community.
In urging. restraint at this time the Tamil leader-
ship has signaled the UNP that they are willing to wait
to see if the promises of reform will be implemented.
The Tamils are also watching UNP efforts to revive the
economy and decrease the exceptionally high unemployment
rate among the educated younger generation of both com-
munities. Lack of economic opportunity has been viewed
by the Tamils as a deliberate attempt by the Sinhalese to
suppress the minority community. Years of neglect of
economic development within the Tamil region have been
somewhat rectified by the beginning of construction, in
May 1978, of a flour mill that will eventually be one of
the largest in the world.
As part of the recent trend toward mutual accommoda-
tion, the Secretary General of the TULF, A. Amirthalingam,
in discussions with the US Embassy in Colombo acknowledged
meeting with Jayawardene to discuss Tamil concerns and
possible compromises. Amirthalingam and the TULF are ap-
prehensive about the manner of choosing District Ministers.
It is not clear from the wording of the constitution
whether these posts will be given to Tamil members sitting
in parliament or will become political plums awarded to
UNP loyalists. If the latter occurs, Tamil hostility
would negate the purpose of the program--a development
Jayawardene wishes to avoid at all costs.
There are too many longstanding grievances between
the two communities to yield sudden results from compro-
mises--a situation that both Jayawardene and Amirthalingam
appreciate. New problems continually arise. For instance,
the Tamils believe the government's present resettlement
program, which provides vacant farmland in an area long
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considered an integral part of the Tamil heartland to the
Sinhalese settlers, to be particularly threatening, and
the TULF has asked that the program be ended. In this
case, however, the President has taken the stand that the
island is one country with equal rights for all citizens,
and any resettlement scheme cannot favor one group over
another.
Despite the pitfalls and problems facing reconcilia-
tion between the Tamils and Sinhalese, mutual accommoda-
tion and compromise have a good chance of continuing to
govern communal relations for the foreseeable future. The
moderates among the Tamils appear satisfied with the
stated intent of the UNP government to rectify inequities
and seem willing to wait and see if the proposals can be
successfully implemented.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA: Sources of Illegal Migration*
Illegal migration to the United States from Central
and South America is growing more rapidly than from any
other area. Such migration--almost nonexistent two decades
ago--is now estimated at 90,000 persons annually, and the
region may soon overtake the Caribbean area as the second,
to Mexico, most important source of illegal aliens in this
country. At any one time, roughly 15 percent of the 3
million to 5 million illegal migrants residing in the
United States are of Central or South American origin.
Most of the illegal flow comes from a few countries
in Central America and on the west coast of South America.
The five most important source nations--El Salvador
(25,000 illegals per year), Guatemala (15,000), Colombia
(14,000), Ecuador (9,000), and Peru (6,000)--account for
three-fourths of the flow with only one-fourth of the
region's population. If Honduras (4,000) and Chile
(4,000) are added to the list, we find that seven
countries with 30 percent of the area's population
supply 85 percent of the illegal migrants.
In a typical year, the six countries of Central
America are the source of more than one-half of the
illegal flow. The average Central American illegal
resembles his Mexican counterpart in many important
respects.
-- He is likely to have a rural background.
-- He probably entered the United States by land,
without use of real or forged documents.
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Central and South America:
Main Sources of Illegal Migration to the United States
UNITED STATES
n - (ifl(h tJ ik i1..C~'
MEXICO
CUB
B~LIZE
'HONDURA -
S
GUATEMAL L - -
EL SALVADO" NICARAGUA
COSTA
RICA I PANAMA,
PACIFIC OCE
NORTH ATt Aft?n
RINIDAD & TOBAGO
- GGUYANtA
30 August 1978
A DOMINICAN
HAITI REPUBLIC
JAMAICA
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--
He often sees migration to the United States as
an alternative to migration to a large city in
his own country.
--
Although
of his
of his
relatively uneducated by the standards
country, he is not from among the poorest
society.
-- He has friends or relatives who have already
migrated to the United States legally or
illegally.
-- He has been recently employed and is more likely
to be seeking greater economic opportunity than
fleeing unemployment.
In other respects, however, he differs from his
Mexican counterpart. Most importantly, he plans on
staying in this country for an extended period, whereas
the Mexican illegal typically works only a few months
before returning to Mexico. Some Central Americans, none-
theless, work only long enough to save the money needed to
start a small business in their home country. Given the
more usual goal of making good in this country--however
making good may be defined--the Central American illegal
is less willing than the Mexican migrant to take disagree-
able, dead-end jobs. He is also much less likely to seek
rural or agricultural work.
The South American illegal differs markedly from the
typical Central American. The South American tends to be
a relatively well educated skilled worker or semipro-
fessional. He may speak fair to excellent English, comes
from an urban area, and definitely considers himself a
part of the middle class. Indeed, his annual earnings
before migration, while very low by US standards, probably
place him among the upper 20 percent of wage earners in
his country of origin. The South American illegal usually
enters the United States by air. Given his education and
financial position, he has little trouble obtaining a non-
resident visa, which he subsequently abuses. Even more
than the Central American or Caribbean migrant, the South
American illegal has come to this country to stay.
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There are some exceptions to the above description.
A fairly large minority of Ecuadorean illegals, for ex-
ample, follow the Central rather than the South American
pattern--they are relatively uneducated, have rural back-
grounds, and probably make almost all of their trip to
the US border by land. A smaller minority of Colombian
migrants also fall into this category. In the case of
Colombia, a few cocaine-smuggling 'mules" individuals
hired by narcotics traffickers to bodily carry a kilo
or two of cocaine into this country in return for air
fare and a small fee--apparently cash in their return
tickets and remain here as illegals.
It is difficult to say why some countries are major
sources of illegal migration and others are not. Almost
all South American illegals come from the Andean nations
of the west coast: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile,
with 25 percent of the continent's population, provide
more than 80 percent of South American illegals. The
relatively rigid social structure of the Andean coun-
tries--with its sharp division between the middle and
upper classes--appears to be a major factor. The am-
bitious and educated member of the middle class in these
countries has less "headroom" than his counterpart in the
more fluid societies of the east coast. Headroom is
further increased in those countries such as Brazil,
Venezuela, and Argentina where there is rapid economic
growth and/or already high per capita incomes. Popula-
tion densities also tend to be lower in the east coast
countries. Distance, small populations, and poverty
sharply limit the source potential of Bolivia and Para-
guay.
The case is simpler in Central America. Here illegal
migration is roughly proportional to population, once dis-
tance is factored in. El Salvador is the only exception
to this rule: with 20 percent of Central American popula-
tion, it supplies 50 percent of the area's illegal flow.
Explanatory factors, aside from distance, include popula-
tion density (more than six times the average in other
Central American countries) and per capita income (80
percent of the average elsewhere in Central America).
Relatively slow economic growth and a more rigid social
structure than in most Central American nations act as
added incentives for migration.
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On balance, we believe that illegal migration from
Central and South America will continue to grow over the
next two decades. The pool of potential migrants is
large and expanding. Many in the under-20 population
bulge that emerged in the early 1970s are now entering
the migration-prone 20- to 30-year age group. Of equal
importance, the demonstration effect of past successful
illegal migration will be increasingly felt. In both
Mexico and the Caribbean a tradition of illegal migra-
tion and the existence of friends or relatives in the
United States are major factors in an individual's
decision to migrate. In 1960 these factors were almost
nonexistent as far as Central and South America were
concerned; now they are strong.
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PAKISTAN: INTERIOR MINISTER PESSIMISTIC ON OPIUM POPPY
ERADICATION IN NEAR FUTURE. In the US Ambassador's
initial call on Mahmud Haroon, who was appointed
Pakistani Interior Minister in early July, the Minis-
ter was surprisingly well informed on the opium prob-
lem. He said he would do what he could to eliminate
both production and trafficking, but most of his com-
ments seemed to indicate that he sees little that can
be done. In addition to familiar arguments against
enforcement such as low incomes in the producing
areas and the special status of tribal areas where
much of the opium is grown, the Interior Minister
also raised Pakistan's problems with the new Afghan
Government. He argued that the extreme sensitivity
of relations with Kabul militates against any actions
likely to antagonize the opium-growing tribes along
PAKISTAN: ILLICIT OPIUM DEALERS OPERATE OPENLY. Addi-
tional information from DEA sources makes it even
clearer that Pakistani illicit opium dealers in
Landi Kotal, near the Khyber Pass, operate as if
they were in a legitimate business with no pressure
or threats from enforcement officials. The sources,
who posed as buyers, talked with 16 major opium
dealers, a higher number than had been previously
reported. The dealers keep a total of about 38 tons
of opium on hand, and some have a turnover of two
to five tons a week. Most opium is purchased by
Afghans and Iranians for shipment to Iran, but some
is shipped through the port of Karachi. Delivery
reportedly is ensured by set payments to government
officials. The Landi Kotal dealers see themselves
as professional businessmen dealing in an everyday
commodity.
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Despite Burma's persistence in pursuing nar-
cotics traffickers, the main effect has been to
force structural changes in the opium trade, in-
cluding a decline in the use of large caravans.
There as yet has been little lasting effect on
total opium production and no significant reduction
in the flow of opium out of the Golden Triangle
area into illicit world markets.
THAILAND: OPIUM ADDICTION RATE HIGH. An estimated 6 to 8
percent of the population of Bangkok are addicted to
hard drugs, according to Dr. Khachit Chupanya, head
of the city's Drug Prevention and Rehabilitation
Section. He told the press recently that, based on
the number of persons seeking treatment for drug-
related ailments, he estimates that between 300,000
and 400,000 of Bangkok's population of 5 million are
addicted. Most of them reportedly are addicted to
heroin No. 4, the purest grade available on the
street. Dr. Khachit has published a report which
claims there are about 500,000 drug addicts in all
of Thailand; Bangkok press sources regard this
figure as probably conservative.
PERSIAN GULF: THIS AREA HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A
MAJOR NARCOTICS TRANSIT ROUTE. The Persian Gulf
states face a real threat of becoming a major
transit area for narcotics trafficking from Asia
to Europe and the United States, according to
American observers in Tehran. This threat will be
increased when the 24-mile causeway connecting the
island of Bahrain with the Saudi mainland is com-
pleted, probably sometime in 1980. This new road
link will give Bahrain road access to Europe by way
of the Middle East and Turkey.
Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf states of Qatar,
Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are
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experiencing an increase in drug abuse, but, according
to the Embassy in Tehran, it remains a relatively
minor problem confined, thus far at least, primarily
to foreign workers, especially Iranians, Pakistanis,
and Indians. The hashish and opium being smuggled
into the area, primarily for local consumption, are
of Pakistani and Iranian origin.
SRI LANKA: POSSIBLE TRANSIT CENTER FOR NARCOTICS OPERA-
TIONS IN THE EAST. Narcotics traffickers from
Nepal, Afghanistan, and the Golden Triangle are
operating via Sri Lanka to avoid detection in the
West, according to a spokesman for the Police
Narcotics Bureau. He claims that because suspected
narcotics couriers flying directly from Malaysia,
Bangkok, Singapore, and Hong Kong are thoroughly
checked for drugs at western airports, more and
more traffickers are beginning to fly by way of
Colombo. Sri Lankan police officials are concerned
that international narcotics traffickers in the east
may be planning to move their center of operations
to Sri Lanka. At least one Sri Lankan national
living abroad is suspected of being involved in
international narcotics trafficking operations
through that country.
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FOREIGN MEDIA
AUSTRALIA--Drug Smuggling Operation Allegedly Financially
Backed by Two Parliamentarians--TNDD,* No. L/7962,
16 August 1978, pp. 10-11. The new South wales Com-
mission investigating drug trafficking in that part
of Australia was told by one witness that two par-
liamentarians had financed the smuggling of a large
quantity of heroin into Australia. It was further
alleged that a diplomatic courier had brought the
heroin into Brisbane. The witness who gave the
testimony, identified only as "Mr. AC," admitted
that he received the unconfirmed information from
his partner in the heroin operation. The names of
the others allegedly involved in the scheme were not
disclosed.
AUSTRALIA?Substitute for Marijuana--TNDD, No. L/7972,
23 August 1978, p. 10. A marijuana substitute has
appeared on a local drug market in Australia. The
substance has been given the name "stash," and, be-
cause it is a mixture of herbs that are legally sold,
it is not classified as illegal. The new drug re-
portedly produces a sensation similar to low-grade
stalky marijuana. The herbs and ingredients listed
on the packet are lobelia, wild lettuce, hyssop,
kava-kava, skullcap, and damiana.
BELGIUM--Turks Arrested with 6.8 kilos of Heroin in
Antwerp--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 73-75. within 15
days of the discovery in Antwerp of a cocaine
trafficking network between Colombia and Antwerp,
at which some 2 kilograms of cocaine were seized
and nine persons arrested, investigators seized 6.8
kilos of high-grade heroin and arrested a Turkish
national as an international narcotics trafficker.
The Turk had been under surveillance for some time
and when arrested was involved in an exchange of
parcels with another Turk who was accompanied by
his Dutch wife and their four children. According
to the article in the Belgian newspaper, it is
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road
Arlington, Va., 22201.
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believed that the heroin was destined for the US.
The Turk had been under suspicion since last November;
the arrest occurred in June.
BRAZIL--Deputy Claims 1 in 10 are Drug Addicts--TNDD, No.
L/7972, p. 62. The Brazilian official claimed that
cocaine and heroin were brought into Brazil from
Bolivia, and much of the marijuana is smuggled in
from Paraguay. He affirmed that the causes of drug
addiction are complex and warned that only a national
mobilization, including teachers, legislators, and
civilian and religious leaders, could "erect a
barrier."
COLOMBIA--Militarization of La Guajira To Be Discussed--
TNDD, No. L/7962, p. 48. The Governor of Guajira
Province, speaking in Bogota recently, said she dis-
agrees with the proposal to militarize La Guajira as
a solution to the rampant marijuana trafficking
problem. The proposal has been under discussion by
top government officials, however, and the outgoing
president announced in early August that military
surveillance in the region will be reinforced as
part of an overall plan to fight illicit marijuana
trafficking in that part of the country.
DENMARK--Would-be Drugs Manufacturer Bought Ephedrine
Openly in West Germany--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 77-78.
The discovery of a narcotics laboratory in an apart-
ment in Amagar was a source of great concern for
the police; a spark, even from the doorbell, could
have caused a catastrophic explosion. A 23-year old
chemical engineering student was charged with the
violation under the strict narcotics code as well
as with placing lives in danger. The student was
producing a stimulant drug in his apartment; and
the police estimated there were enough chemicals to
produce about $700,000 worth of illicit drugs. When
the police entered the suspect's apartment, they
found distilling apparatus bubbling and simmering
in the kitchen and living room and 5 liter cans of
ether standing around the rooms. During the in-
vestigation, it was determined that the student was
also very interested in experimenting with explosives.
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DENMARK--Arrests in Pakistan Morphine Case--TNDD, No.
L/7962, p. 86. Pakistani morphine tablets, worth
between $4-500,000, have been sold from rooms in
four large hotels in Copenhagen during recent months,
according to an item appearing in the Copenhagen
press. The police found 1,341 morphine tablets in
the hotel room where they arrested the narcotics
pusher, who admitted to receiving between 1,000 and
1,500 tablets twice each week which he sold to in-
termediate dealers in other hotels. He claimed
that he had sold a total of between 20,000 and
30,000 of the morphine tablets. According to the
press item, the 21-year-old pusher was jailed "for
14 days."
INDONESIA--Hard Drug Abuse, Change in Smuggling Route
Reported--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 23-25. Prescription
drugs are being substituted for morphine by drug
abusers not only in the cities but also in the
villages. The press item noted that the narcotics
syndicate continually alters the route of its opium-
smuggling to prevent interception by the authorities.
The route of entry to Indonesia was, at the time,
from Riau and West Borneo. According to an Indonesian
police official, international traffickers in South-
east Asia look upon Indonesia both as a market for
narcotics and as a way-station in black market drug
traffic to other areas. Indonesia was being viewed
as a thoroughfare for narcotics being smuggled from
Thailand to Australia.
ITALY--Drug Arrests in Rome, Apulia, Florence--TNDD, No.
L/7962, pp. 94-96. An organization, operating in
tandem with "kidnapings anonymous," was investing
the ransom money obtained in the acquisition of
business and apartments, but principally in large
consignments of narcotics. The investigation of
31 persons arrested last spring uncovered a vast
business network which included several Sicilian
and Calabrian Mafia groups. The acquisition of
large quantities of narcotics is one of the preferred
investments for those involved in the "kidnaping
industry" because this type of operation facilitates
the rapid multiplication of funds while entrusting
the laundering of "dirty money" to the underworld.
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JAPAN--Japan and Hong Kong Police to Cooperate on Drug
Affairs--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 28-30. Last month
the Japanese National Police Agency solidified a
policy to establish a full-fledged international
investigative cooperation structure with the Hong
Kong police, aimed at the "annihilation" of inter-
national narcotics smuggling organizations.
According to the agency, the inflow of drugs from
overseas is a little over 2 tons per year. Of
this amount, 1 ton is from Korea and 1 ton is of
West German manufacture and comes in by way of
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Macao.
NEW ZEALAND--Heroin Remains Big Drug Abuse Problem--TNDD,
No. L/7972, p. 42. According to a recent report
given in Parliament, heroin offenses increased last
year from 127 to 235, and a total of 835.75 grams of
heroin was seized. The report notes that there has
been a reduction in the amount of imported cannabis
sticks as heroin is more profitable and less bulky
to handle. The report states that drug offenses in
New Zealand increased 15.3 percent during 1977.
SOUTH AFRICA--Millions Worth of Marijuana Confiscated--
TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 70-72. over one million dol-
lars worth of marijuana was confiscated in a 3-day
period according to a Johannesburg newspaper. The
marijuana, the quality of which was described as
"the best ever to come into the country," reportedly
came from Lesotho, and was contained in 205 bags.
According to a police spokesman, it appeared that
those involved were connected with an organized
syndicate.
SWEDEN--Interpol Warns Police of Drugs Smuggled in
Condoms--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 97-98. According to
a Stockholm newspaper, this method of smuggling low
volume narcotics, such as heroin and cocaine, is
becoming more and more common since it is difficult
to detect. Narcotics are placed in condoms which
are then swallowed by the smuggler before crossing
the border. According to the article, the record
of those detected is 55 condoms or 1.5 kilograms in
one stomach. The intensified battle against nar-
cotics smuggling in Sweden and abroad has forced
the smugglers to use a variety of methods. There
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has also been a marked increase in the volume of
cannabis drugs entering Sweden. According to Inter-
pol, a total of 70,000 kilograms of cannabis, in-
cluding cannabis oil, were seized in Europe last
year--an increase of more than 100 percent over the
previous year.
TURKEY--Heroin Seized--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 118. Police
forces in Bursa, about 60 air-miles southeast of
Istanbul, recently seized 5 kilograms of heroin worth
about $240,000. Security officials claimed that the
heroin had been smuggled into Turkey across the
Turkish-Iranian border. The seized heroin had been
found hidden in two specially prepared compartments
during a search of a car parked on the street in
Bursa. Two persons have been taken into custody and
another is being sought in connection with the inci-
dent.
UNITED KINGDOM--British Police Seize Large Quantity of
Heroin--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 119. British Customs
officials and Scotland Yard drug squad officers re-
cently seized 3.5 pounds of heroin in a raid on a
house in London. The seizure is regarded by British
authorities as a "major breakthrough" in the attack
on the smuggling of Southeast Asian heroin to Britain.
A Malaysian and two Chinese are under investigation
in connection with the case.
WEST GERMANY--Heroin Addiction, Deaths Increase in Frank-
furt--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 101-103. Twenty-three
heroin addicts already have died of drug overdoses
in the Frankfurt area this year; this is more than
the total of 18 for all of last year. Frankfurt
drug authorities regard the rising death toll as an
"inevitable development" as more and more users move
from the experimental stage to hard core addiction.
There has been a 50 percent increase in the number
of drug addicts in the Frankfurt area in the last
two years.
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