INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign t=A_ 9
Assessment
Center
,14
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
DOJ review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP INRR 78-006
15 March 1978
COPY 2 0
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
15 March 1978
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Clamping Down on Drug Proliferation .
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Narcotics Shipments Under
International Convention . . . . . .
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
1. Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
INTERESTING READING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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PORTUGAL: Clamping Down on Drug Proliferation
An epidemic of drug-related deaths and crimes has
prompted Portugal's drug enforcement officials to step
up public information campaigns and eradication efforts.
The renewed effort achieved one spectacular success
last month in dismantling the country's largest drug
ring. Drug crime, however, continues to far exceed
arrests and convictions, and many believe that despite
the large amount of resources and energy being poured
into the fight, real success will not come until some of
Portugal's grave economic and social problems are re-
solved.
A Super Bust
Last month's "super bust" was made by the Criminal
Investigation Police, one of several agencies involved
in the drug war. Seven ringleaders--all Portuguese--were
arrested in various northern and central cities, capping
a nationwide investigation begun last year. The ring
apparently had Far Eastern connections and several kilos
of heroin were confiscated. The bust will probably not
dent the level of Portuguese drug trafficking. Police
are aware of many similar trafficking operations, some
of which serve as transit points for illicit drugs
flowing to other Western countries. Publicity stemming
from the arrests, however, should increase public sup-
port for police efforts.
Drug Control Mechanisms
Portugal recently initiated a two-pronged attack
against the domestic procurement and sale of drugs. The
antiprocurement effort is headed by the Center for Drug
Investigation and Control, while drug sales are watched
by the Center for Studies on Drug Proliferation. A
third national agency has been created to monitor and
coordinate the activities of the other two.
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The Center for Drug Investigation and Control will
collect and disseminate all drug-related information
gathered from local and international sources. It will
also train investigators, review drug enforcement tech-
niques, and may conduct its own investigations in special
situations.
All three agencies will apparently have advisory and
support links to other groups involved in the drug control
effort, but existing organs will retain certain areas of
specialization. Customs officials and border police,
for example, will deal primarily with smuggling problems.
The National Guard will assume special responsibilities
in rural areas. The Public Security Police will continue
to be mostly concerned with small-time local operations
and users, while the Criminal Investigation Police will
specialize in more extensive and sophisticated operations.
It is too early to tell how well the new apparatus
will work. From the scanty information available, how-
ever, it appears that jurisdictional questions may
easily arise, and this coupled with interagency competi-
tion could hurt efficiency. In Portugal's oversized
bureaucracy, accounting and control mechanisms may be
made less effective by the creation of three new agencies.
Patterns of Enforcement
Portuguese police are most often criticized for
their tendency to arrest individual users without appre-
hending large suppliers. Police counter with claims that
arrested users refuse to cooperate and that the public
has not rallied behind law enforcement efforts. They
also claim that their problems are compounded by the
fact that many local drug rings are headed by respected
local citizens. It appears that police involved in drug
control do have a serious morale problem, which could be
associated with the rapid proliferation of illegal drug
sales and consumption even in small communities.
Most of Portugal's drug seizures and arrests are
made by customs and border police, but the volume of il-
legal drugs that slip by is significant. One of the
major problems is that Portugal adopted a more open border
policy after the 1974 revolution. The infusion of drugs
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from abroad, already a problem in the "hermetically
sealed" Portugal of Salazar, increased dramatically after
1974. Increasing numbers of truckers, railroad passen-
gers, immigrants, tourists, and even pilgrims are being
identified as smugglers.
The lack of communications between local authorities
and national agencies more familiar with the ways in which
drugs flow into and throughout the country aggravates
the problem and is a major target of the envisioned cen-
tralized system of control.
Pharmaceutical drugs stolen or otherwise obtained
from legal sources constitute a major portion of Portugal's
illegal drug consumption and sales. A more efficient
system for supervising legal distribution and sales of
such drugs has been devised but is not yet fully imple-
mented. Police regularly seize illegal stocks of phar-
maceuticals at the local level, but there are no signs
that illegal activity in, this area is slowing.
Consumption Habits
Hashish, supplied in part from Pakistan and North
Africa, is the most frequently used illicit drug in
Portugal. It is followed by morphine, barbituates, and
amphetamines, which seem to appeal particularly to young
people. Reports on individuals using or selling cocaine
and marijuana appear less frequently in newspapers, and
they are presumably less of a problem.
Heroin's growing popularity is a matter of great
concern, but efforts to control its use have not met
with much success. When arrests are reported, they
almost always involve only small-time operators and
small quantities.
The Market
In many ways Portugal provides an ideal market for
drug traffickers. Drug enforcement mechanisms are not
yet well developed and, despite increasing antidrug
propaganda, Portuguese citizens seem generally passive.
Portugal has fairly large communities of students and
immigrants clustered around larger urban centers. These
groups not only have abnormally high consumption statis-
tics, but their international contacts and frequent
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travels make them ideal sources for potential carriers.
Their life style and environment seem especially con-
ducive to the drug subculture.
The propensity of these groups to consume and traf-
fic in illegal drugs is enhanced by their precarious
social and economic situations. Unemployment in both
groups is widespread, and with future prospects bleak
they are more inclined than other groups toward uncon-
ventional outlets for frustrations and insecurity.
Growing drug abuse among precollege teens and even young
children has also been attributed in part to the social
disorientation produced by revolutionary upheavals and
postrevolutionary instability.
So far little is being done to remedy the socio-
logical and economic problems that contribute to Portugal's
drug problem. A recent meeting of one of the country's
prestigious professional organizations, however, gave
salience to these factors, suggesting that little suc-
cess can be achieved until the situation of especially
vulnerable groups improves. This may eventually trans-
late into a more comprehensive approach to Portugal's
growing drug abuse problem.
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AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Illicit Narcotics Shipments Under
International Convention
Afghan customs officials appear to have failed in
an effort to impede the illicit shipment of Pakistani
narcotics under Transport Internationale Routiere carnet.
Under the TIR convention--to which Turkey, Iran, Afghan-
istan and almost all European countries belong--a truck
which has been inspected, sealed, and issued the carnet
does not have to be inspected as it crosses international
borders.
Pakistan is not a member of TIR, and so Pakistani
truck shipments are inspected in Afghanistan and issued
the carnet there. The office responsible for the in-
spections, however, has only three officers, and so is
unable to do more than spot check Pakistani shipments.
Because they suspected early this year that narcotics
were slipping through, the Afghans refused to issue any
more carnets for trucks from Pakistan.
The prohibition lasted only three weeks. European
owners of the shipping lines complained, and shipments
bound for Afghanistan were held up. The Afghan Ministry
of Commerce intervened, and shipments are now back to
normal. One or two trucks a day carry goods--and possibly
narcotics--to Europe from Pakistan and bear the Afghan
customs TIR carnet after only a cursory inspection.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's dote: These items, produced for
mother CIA publication, do not deal specifically
%. the international narcotics situation. They
urn. included here, however, because they concern
sevoloping economic and political situations
hu could impact on the international narcotics
.j?_-rol e_'rort. )
TURKEY
Turkey has devalued its lira by 23 percent against
the dollar, bringing the official rate roughly into
line with prevailing black market rates. This latest
move, together with other austerity measures announced
earlier, may meet International Monetary Fund condi-
tions for a standby loan agreement. Ankara's program
was weakened, however, by a decision to subsidize im-
ports of oil and fertilizer to compensate for the
effect of devaluation.
The amount that would be available from the IMF
itself in 1978--$110 million at most--is minuscule
compared to Turkey's short-term debt of $4 billion to
$4.5 billion. But an IMF agreement would open the
door to refinancing of $2 billion to $2.5 billion in
debts currently due and also to credits from other
sources.
Late last month, the recently installed govern-
ment of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit--benefiting from
the experience in IMF negotiations of the former
government headed by Suleyman Demirel--approved the
Fund-recommended import ceiling of $4.85 billion and
passed a 1978 budget in the Fund's acceptable range.
IMF demands for explicit monetary targets probably
will not present a problem, since monetary expansion
is closely linked with the budget deficit. Measures
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announced earlier included interest rate hikes, re-
strictions on forcign travel, and curtailment of duty-
free imports by Turks returning from abroad.
Ecevit apparently chose to enact austerity meas-
ures before resuming talks with the IMF mainly to
avoid the appearance of knuckling under to foreign
demands. Recent measures will interrupt real GNP
growth and aggravate the already serious problems of
unemployment and inflation. They will be difficult
enough to defend without seeming to be a result of
government weakness.
Fund experts will examine the Turkish targets and
estimates closely to determine whether they are real-
istic. In particular, budget estimates for legally
mandated expenditures must be verified, and some re-
visions are likely.
PAKISTAN: The Decisionmaking Process
The US Embassy in Islamabad believes that Chief
Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq's power is being
diluted as the military government evolves into a more
permanent institution.
When Zia seized power last July, his only goal was
to hold an election and surrender power as quickly as
possible, and his government dealt with only a narrow
range of issues. Now, however, the military government
has concerned itself with a much wider spectrum, and
Zia--a weak manager and lacking the intellect and ex-
perience to deal with many issues--is increasingly de-
pendent on his military colleagues, his civilian advisers,
and the bureaucracy in governing Pakistan. None of these
groups, however, provides the political astuteness that
Zia so badly needs from his immediate subordinates.
Zia is also hampered by a lack of popular support.
His coup was welcomed primarily because it ended months
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of disorder, but since then many have become disil-
lusioned with military rule. Particularly among the
literate classes, Zia is characterized as a bumbler
and criticized for his inability to inspire public
confidence. Zia is less inclined than before to make
quick decisions, but occasionally shoots from the hip,
leaving it to the bureaucrats to repair the damage.
Although Zia remains the final arbiter in Pakistan,
the US Embassy notes important changes in the role of
others in the government in the past few months.
The Military Council--composed of Zia and the other
three officers with four star rank--is still in theory
the body that rules Pakistan, but its role has steadily
diminished and it is now inactive and nearly powerless.
The commanders of the six Army Corps remain--as a
group--the most powerful men in the country. Zia
demonstrated his preeminence in the military by changing
commanders of the corps, but the US Embassy believes he
may have had to make some promises to bring about the
changes, and that, in any case, he has to take the corps
commanders' views into account in making decisions. Al-
though his leadership is accepted for the moment, he can-
not count on the continued support of senior military
officers.
The new Council of Advisers--in effect a cabinet--
has assumed many of the day to day responsibilities of
administering the country. A number of the advisers are
technocrats, more expert in their fields than were members
of previous cabinets and clearly more capable than the
soldiers who earlier attempted to fill the posts. Several
of them have been given considerable independence and
authority.
The civil servants distrust Zia less than they did
when he first came to power and openly criticized them,
but they are still keeping their options open. They view
Zia as a temporary ruler, realize he is heavily dependent
on them, andis unable to manipulate the civil service as
former Prime Minister Bhutto did.
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The increased authority of Zia's subordinates has
made it easier for them to impede actions they believe
inadvisable. For example, Zia ordered raids on narcotics
labs in the North-West Frontier Province, but was, in
effect, overruled by local officials.
The US Embassy believes that the military govern-
ment has evolved into a workable system to manage Pak-
istan, but one which will be of little help in the
search for a remedy to Pakistan's political ills. It
may further evolve into a system in which the Army has
a permanent, institutionalized political role, if events,
the politicians, the military, and the public allow
Zia the time and authority to make further changes.
INDIA: Indira Gandhi's Comeback
Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's massive
electoral victories recently in two important
southern states--Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh--rep-
resent a landmark in Indian politics. This first
concrete affirmation of public support for Gandhi since
she and the Congress Party were roundly defeated in
national elections last March has refurbished Gandhi's
image as a winner and clears the way for her to assume
the role of undisputed leader of the opposition.
The legislative elections in five of India's 22
states and a semiautonomous territory also decisively
settled in Gandhi's favor a bitter fight for control
of the "real" Congress Party. Gandhi had precipitated
the split that occurred in January.
In the elections the anti-Indira faction, headed
by two of Gandhi's former cabinet members Brahmananda
Reddy and Y. B. Chavan, was severely beaten in both
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and in neighboring
Maharashtra did slightly better than Gandhi, but still
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failed to win a plurality. Reddy subsequently resigned
as head of his demoralized faction. The group has
chosen Swaran Singh, an old Congress Party stalwart,
as its provisional president while contemplating its
options, which include dissolution, absorption into
Janata, reunification with Gandhi, or retention of a
separate identity. Gandhi apparently will allow de-
fectors to return, but she has made clear she will
exercise absolute control over Congress Party affairs.
The two groups are privately discussing some form of
cooperation in Maharashtra in order to form a majority
there, but Gandhi's insistence on defining the terms
is making negotiations difficult.
The Janata Party's best performances were in As-
sam--one of the three less important areas in the
northeast that held elections--and in Maharashtra,
where it won pluralities. Janata may form a coalition
government with the Communist Party/Marxists in Assam,
and in Maharashtra it is feverishly competing with the
Congress factions in trying to line up sufficient al-
lies to form a majority.
Janata's disappointment at the electoral results
is tempered by the fact that it had no assured base in
any of the states polled and still controls the pop-
ulous states in the Hindi-speaking belt of north India.
Janata leaders campaigned hard, however, hoping to
gain a toehold in the south. A vigorous campaigner
herself, Gandhi succeeded in exploiting the southerner's
traditional resentment of the domination of the federal
government by northerners and in portraying Janata as
a party mostly of Hindi speakers. Gandhi also benefited
from the fact that the south was less exposed than the
north to the harsh measures imposed during her emergency
rule in 1975-77. Center-state tension probably will
increase, and language could again become a very con-
tentious issue.
Janata's viability as a relatively new party will
be constantly tested by the sharp confrontational
politics Gandhi is likely to employ during the remain-
ing four years of Janata's parliamentary term. Janata's
lackluster performance leaves it vulnerable on many
fronts. Gandhi's challenge may foster unity among
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Janata's five constituent parties as it did last fall
when she launched her political comeback, but now it
is more likely to aggravate intraparty tension and
further impede efforts to deal with national economic
and social problems.
NICARAGUA: Deteriorating Situation
President Somoza's announcement that he will retire
in--and not until--1981 and the determination of young
rebels to force change now define a political line that
few Nicaraguans will be able to straddle for long. Guer-
rillas are inciting much of the violence, but it is in-
creasingly obvious that the general public supports
change--a growing number would support even violent
change, if necessary. Somoza still has considerable
resources and a good chance of finishing his term; but
the threat to him is greater than it has ever been, and
the situation could deteriorate quickly.
The explosion of long pent-up discontent triggered
by the Chamorro murder in January radically altered Nic-
aragua's prospects. Even the most contented have been
jolted to the realization that the anachronistic pater-
nalism of the 45-year-old Somoza dynasty must be altered.
Nicaragua is set irreversibly on a path to change,
so that the struggle is between the cautious and the im-
patient. Somoza's ability to convince the public that
an orderly evolution toward a new competitive system is
the better choice is being increasingly undermined by
the rebels' efforts to produce turmoil. Already Somoza
is finding that he cannot ensure tranquility solely with
professions of good will. He has tried to display tol-
erance toward his opponents, offering to reason with
critical members of the establishment. His attempts at
statesmanship nevertheless repeatedly translate into new
provocations to the opposition.
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Every day it becomes more clear that a young gener-
ation of Nicaraguans will not let this moment pass.
They do not trust Somoza, and they do not accept the
transitional political mode that their elders probably
prefer.. Young, bright Nicaraguans will no longer coun-
tenance a Somozaland, with or without the Somoza family.
Nicaragua has maintained a hospitable commercial climate
that has benefited an entrenched entrepreneurial class,
but this is no.longer enough for a public awakened to
its political retardation.
Somoza will not be easy to drum out of office. He
still can count on a loyal and effective security force,
and while his Liberal Party is nervous, this constituency
has not lost faith in Somoza's long-tested judgment and
power of manipulation. Riding out the current assault
on his regime may require draconian measures, but he will
not hesitate to employ them.
If the challenge to Somoza were contained within
Nicaragua's borders, he might be invulnerable. But this
year he has to contend not only with a clear-cut insur-
gency problem, but with an international tide of re-
vulsion against the kind of government he personifies.
The global focus on human rights and the hands-off atti-
tude from the once supportive US combine to weaken
Somoza and hearten, his opponents. In this unfavorable
contest, Somoza's gift for smart politics may be lost.
The possibilities for temporizing may diminish as
the government's energies are consumed in its effort to
survive. A guerrilla campaign of brushfire-type violence
has already taken a heavy toll. Guard forces will prob-
abl.y.be more loyal to the regime--at least in the short
term--now that the restraints heretofore imposed on them
have been loosened. But they will be spread thin and
could become demoralized. The longer the opposition
chips away at Somoza's frontline security forces, the
less staunch will be the remaining loyalty to the regime.
Somoza's response to the current situation is-to
field arms and men to quash the rebels. This may not
succeed. The inevitable casualties will intensify the
.human rights problem and raise Nicaragua to a higher
level of international concern. Concomitantly, some
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besieged townspeople, whether or not they are swayed by
the rebels, will almost surely have new grievances against
the deeply resented Somoza forces.
Somoza's best chances lie with the established
pillars of society, whose vested interests are largely
the same as his. The specter of young radicals shaping
Nicaraguan events may be a threat sufficient to clarify,
even for Somoza's political antagonists, the wisdom of
acceding to his invitation to work together for a con-
trolled transition.
Even so, a considered rational response from es-
tablished business and political groups and the Somoza-
dominated Guard may give way to spontaneous reaction and
finally panic if the revolutionaries seem to gain ground.
While, therefore, the situation has not exceeded Somoza's
manipulative abilities, the possibility for sudden col-
lapse could emerge quickly.
BRAZIL: The Succession Question
President Ernesto Geisel recently designated his
successor, General Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo,
who will begin a six-year term in March 1979. Figueiredo
will be the fifth military president to govern Brazil
since the ouster of leftist Joao Goulart in 1964. There
is little doubt that Figueiredo will take office as sched-
uled, even though some top military men continue to com-
plain that Geisel did not consult them as closely as has
been the case in previous military successions.
The transition process consists of two phases. In
the first, Figueiredo will be "nominated" by the progov-
ernment party at its convention next month. Then, in
October, he will be formally "elected" by an electoral
college consisting of the national congress and delegates
especially chosen from the 22 states. There is no popu-
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lar participation in the process. Each stage is care-
fully planned and closely scrutinized; there is virtually
no chance that someone other than Figueiredo could be
either nominated or elected.
After 1964 the officers almost completely dismantled
the civilian political structure, imposed a series of
sweeping national security laws, and devoted their ener-
gies--and the nation's resources--to rapid economic de-
velopment. They were determined to suppress the give
and take of politics and the pursuit of regional. or
sectoral interests because they felt these only hampered
the drive to industrialize and diversify the economy.
They became completely absorbed in--and unconditionally
responsible for--the conduct of national affairs. Because
of the depth of their commitment and the magnitude of
their efforts to recast the nation's economic and po-
litical life, the officers are highly sensitive to crit-
icism and to the prospect of their disengagement. from
power.
The regime has at its disposal a variety of means
to limit the role of politicians. Mayors of state
capitals and other key cities, for example, are appointed
by the state governors, who in turn are handpicked by
Brasilia and formally chosen by indirect, easily con-
trolled means. One-third of the national senators are
also chosen indirectly. Those candidates for congressional
and local or state posts who are popularly elected are
carefully screened and monitored by the federal govern-
ment, particularly by the National Intelligence Service.
Officials who provoke the regime can readily be removed
and stripped of their political rights under the sweeping
authority of the executive. President Geisel, as well
as his predecessors, have made frequent use of this power.
From time to time the rules governing elections are
changed to guarantee that the government party receives
a majority in Congress or to ensure government control
elsewhere.
Only during the Geisel administration has the re-
gime begun to lessen restrictions on the expression of
dissent and allow civilians to engage in "dialogue" with
the government. By the time Geisel became president in
1974, the justification for continuing stringent security
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measures and tight controls on national politics was
questionable at best, given the absence of a terrorist
threat and the impotence of the left in general. Geisel
was acutely aware of this, and working closely with his
chief political adviser, General Golbery, proceeded to
liberalize the regime somewhat, albeit within definite
limits. Geisel and Golbery, leading members of the
"intellectual" school of army generals, closely studied
their country's complex society and apparently concluded
that Brazilians, ruled by successive unelected generals
and having to cope with a sharply increased cost of
living, needed at least a token "escape valve." To be
sure, Geisel neither promised nor attempted to replace
authoritarianism with populism. But he did relax press
censorship, seek a dialogue with leading liberal clergy-
men, and remove some of the more prominent hard-line mil-
itary men from sensitive positions. Geisel, moreover,
allowed local and congressional elections to take place
relatively unfettered, even though the results were sure
to go against the government.
The subsequent outpouring of criticism from students,
clergy, civil rights groups, and politicians unsettled
the military. The two formerly docile parties the regime
had set up to provide the trappings of representative
government have proved particularly embarrassing. The
nominal "opposition" some time ago began campaigning on
a frankly antiregime platform and made impressive gains
at the polls. Even the so-called pregovernment party is
offering its own civilian presidential "candidate," though
it knows full well that the military's rules preclude
his success.
Most unsettling of all, perhaps, is the fact that
members of the business community, largely based in the
influential state of Sao Paulo, have expressed serious
disillusionment with the regime's economic policies and
have begun to suggest that a civilian government could
do at least as well for them. Businessmen miss the sus-
tained, spectacular economic boom of the late 1960s and
early 1970s--the years of the so-called "economic mir-
acle"--when the growth rate averaged over 10 percent.
Moreover, they are concerned by the growing tendency of
the regime in recent years to stress state participation
in important sectors of the economy, such as steel, oil,
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and communications, and the tendency toward greater in-
terference with market mechanisms. Business and indus-
trial interests were perhaps the most enthusiastic sup-
porters of the 1964 conservative coup and the major ben-
eficiaries of the regime's program of incentives to in-
dustry and aggressive promotion of exports. The ques-
tioning of the regime's worth by Sao Paulo interests
has come as a major blow to the officers.
Uncertainty is the order of the day as Brazilians
increasingly wonder what will come next in the regime's
evolution. This is a natural development, given the
advancing age of the military government and the fact
that its major successes are well behind it. Today's
economic picture is by no means poor, but current in-
flation and growth rates do not compare favorably with
those registered during the "miracle" years. Leftist
terrorism ceased to be a problem after the officers
waged a highly successful campaign against the virulent
guerrilla movement that sprang up in the late 1960s.
Brazil's quest for world power status also is uncertain,
largely because its growing economic competitiveness
and attempts to acquire advanced nuclear know-how have
brought it up against major nations not willing to cede
their privileged positions. Problems in these areas
were only just beginning to appear when Geisel took
office. Now, having experienced a measure of frustration
and disappointment, Brazilians wonder what more the re-
gime can do for them.
Some of Geisel's liberalizing moves did not sit well
with hard-line officers, and public criticism may well
have proved more extensive than he had anticipated.
Whether because of pressure from the hard-liners or be-
cause of his own sensitivities, the President saw fit to
reassert his authority by recessing Congress last spring,
decreeing that one-third of national senators would hence-
forth be elected indirectly, and lengthening the presi-
dential term to six years, beginning with his successor.
On balance, however, the political situation
Figueiredo will inherit is noticeably more open and
considerably more complex than that which'greeted Geisel
when he took over. Students and workers have openly ex-
pressed their grievances without being slapped down.
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Politicians, though discouraged by the regime's rigging
of the rules against them, have in fact been allowed
more latitude than at any time over a decade. It would
be exceedingly costly for the regime to reverse the po-
litical "opening" that has begun, since to do so would
engender serious popular opposition that could not be
contained without resort to force.
Whatever the future holds for Brazil, the fact re-
mains that in the years since the military takeover, the
country has grown impressively and made its presence
felt in more places and in more ways than ever before
in its history, even though major nation status is still
not a reality. Critics contend that this could have
happened even if the military had not intervened.
The officers assert that they saved Brazil from chaos
at the hands of demagogic, unprincipled civilian politi-
cians who served the interests of the left.
However one views the military intervention, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the officers have
neither institutionalized their rule nor begun laying a
firm basis for eventual return to civilian rule. No
two presidential successions have occurred in precisely
the same way. The regime has, with embarrassing fre-
quency, blatantly manipulated the rules each time it per-
ceived a threat to its authority. It justifies its
authoritarian measures on grounds of "national security,"
a concept the officers, even Geisel, stretch to encompass
far more than would be the case in other Western nations.
Because they have carefully manipulated the political
system they have created, that system has developed little
"life" of its own and remains clearly artificial. There
is speculation, fueled by Figueiredo, that the President-
designate will create two or three more parties, clearly
under the close supervision of the government. The net
result of such a move could be to dilute further the
limited influence of the existing parties. The electorate
has had little opportunity to demonstrate that it knows
more now than the military thought it did 14 years ago
about how to choose "responsible" leaders. It is diffi-
cult in this environment to see how the military will de-
cide when Brazil will be "ready" for a return to repre-
sentative rule, which the officers consistently say is
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their ultimate goal. Moreover, with the civilian in-
stitutions weakened, it is difficult to foresee just how
a return to civilian rule will be carried out once a de-
cision is made. For these reasons, it seems certain that
the transition will necessarily be very gradual and sub-
ject to numerous difficulties.
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ECUADOR: NARCOTICS PROBLEM WORSENS. Supreme Council
President Poveda is meeting this week with a team
of Washington officials to discuss bilateral drug
control efforts. In a conversation last week with
representatives of the US Embassy in Quito, Poveda
noted that he chairs his government's domestic coun-
cil and that he will follow "with great interest"
efforts by the Ministry of Government to combat
illicit drug trafficking. Poveda noted that the
narcotics problem in Ecuador is getting worse and
that his country will wholeheartedly support Wash-
ington's "war on drugs." He cited as evidence of
his government's commitment to drug control the re-
cent judicial reorganization which was undertaken
largely to weed out corrupt judges.
COLOMBIA: AIR FORCE TO MOVE AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICK-
ERS. The Colombian Air Force (FAC), in support of
President Lopez' continuing war against drug traf-
fickers, has announced that it will intercept sus-
picious foreign and domestic aircraft in Colombian
airspace. The Colombian Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity is preparing an official "Notice to Airmen"
(NOTAM) warning that the FAC will intercept unauthor-
ized aircraft and, if the intruding planes do not
respond to internationally recognized signals,
the Air Force will fire on them. The US Embassy
in Bogota believes that effective execution of this
policy will have a deterrent effect on the use of
aircraft operating from clandestine strips in nar-
cotics trafficking.
PERU: NEW DRUG-CONTROL LAW NOW IN FORCE BUT SOME PRO-
VISIONS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE. The long-
awaited Peruvian drug control law was finally pro-
mulgated on 2 March, about a week after it was ap-
proved by the Council of Ministers. The new law
provides for an executive office and a multisectoral
committee for drug control. The executive office
for drug control will be created within the Ministry
of the Interior. The major responsibility for the
repression of drug trafficking is given to the In-
vestigative Police. Under the terms of the law,
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commercial coca production will be controlled by
the state and will be gradually reduced as substitute
crops are developed. The new law also provides
stiff penalties for unauthorized coca cultivation
and especially for trafficking in illicit drugs.
The Embassy expects Peru's "ambitious and compre-
hensive" new drug law to impact on at least two
broad areas of US interest in international nar-
cotics control: on the eradication of coca leaf
cultivation, accompanied by a crop substitution pro-
gram; and on international trafficking in coca paste,
cocaine, and possibly opium. The Embassy believes
that the new law, which creates a high level policy
formulation group and a coordinating office, should
make the Government of Peru more responsive to US
overtures. It has expressed reservations, how-
ever, as to how effective the Peruvian Government
will be in enforcing the many provisions of the law.
SWEDEN: GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE AID TO UNFDAC.
Sweden "almost certainly" will contribute
an additional $450,000 to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse
Control in 1978. there are
good prospects for even larger contributions from
1979 on.
IRAN: PRESS CLAIMS BRACTEATUM POPPY TO BE PRODUCED COM-
MERCIALLY. The Iranian English-language newspaper
.Kayhan International noted on 22 January 1978 that
Iran will soon begin producing the "black poppy"--
papaver bracteatum--commercially for medicinal pur-
poses. According to the press, it will be grown
under a project drawn up by the Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank--a government institution--on the recom-
mendation of the Farah Pahlavi Foundation. The al-
leged plan provides for the poppy crop to be cul-
tivated in an area totaling 100 hectares on the
lower slopes of the mountains in western Iran where
a high-grade variety of the plant was discovered
growing wild a few years ago. According to the
press, the actual sowing of the poppy seed will not
begin until September which is the best time of the
year to plant bracteatum poppies. The crop requires
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between two and three years to mature and produces
high-grade thebaine which can be processed indus-
trially to obtain codeine. The advantage, from a
control point of view, is that bracteatum is not
a direct source of morphine which can relatively
easily be converted into heroin. Several countries
other than Iran have been experimenting with brac-
teatum, including the United States, but because of
the current world oversupply of opiates there is
widespread opposition, both bilaterally and through
the UN, to any commercial development of bracteatum
as a new source of opiates. The strength of the
opposition was reaffirmed during the recent session
of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting in
Geneva. The Iranian press probably was a bit pre-
mature in its disclosure of government intent to
begin commercial cultivation of bracteatum; the
relatively small area being considered suggests
that the planned crop probably is part of the gov-
ernment's ongoing experimentation program.
ECUADOR: OPIUM POPPY FIELD DESTROYED. According to in-
formation received from the Embassy in Quito, the
National Police reportedly destroyed an illicit
opium poppy field on 14 February. The alleged field,
about one acre in size, was said to be located about
20 miles from the Peruvian border near the small
town of Sabiango. No arrests were reported, but the
police are said to be looking for the owner of the
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Ecuador is usually viewed as part of the cocaine
problem rather than the opium problem. It has
traditionally been regarded as a major transit
point for shipments of cocain to the'United States
from Peru and Bolivia.
In view
of the extensive opium poppy eradication effort in
Mexico, it would not be surprising if would-be nar-
cotics traffickers experimented with poppy culti-
vation in other parts of Latin America./
As more Western Hemisphere countries
become involved in the international narcotics con-
trol effort, however, there probably will be an in-
creasing number of isolated reports of poppy fields
being cultivated. Until a reliable method for
identification and monitoring over a vast area in
a relatively short period of time is perfected,
poppy cultivation--even to the point of harvesting
the raw opium--will remain a distinct possibility,
especially in remote areas.
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INTERESTING READING
PORTUGAL--Official Discusses Portugal's Drug Control
Problem--TNDD, No. L/7635, pp. 108-110. "Public
Security Police activity in combating drug traffic
and consumption was emphasized during a press con-
ference by the Center for Drug Investigation and
Control. Established in 1976, basically to combat
the drug market on all fronts and not merely from
the standpoint of criminal investigation, the CICD
is an integral part of a tripartite functional sys-
tem to study and find solutions for the drug scourge
and to provide an adequate response to it. CICD's
director referred to 'dramatic drug abuse incidents'
to Pxnlain the activity and coals of the agency."
ARGENTINA--Police Smash Four-Nation Cocaine Ring--TNDD,
No. L/7635, pp. 73-74. "An international drug traf-
ficking ring was discovered (last month) by Argen-
tine police. Investigations indicated that Jorge
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Transla-
tions on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by
JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlin ton, Va. 22201.
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Villarino headed the ring from Milan, Italy, where
he resided while directing the drug organization
which had brances in Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina.
The organization's operational epicenter was in
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. There the orga-
nization had its own crops and laboratories to make
cocaine hydrochloride which was then sent through
various routes to Milan. According to police re-
ports, Villarino was supplied with 110 kilograms
of almost pure cocaine during a 10 month (period)."
HONG KONG--Taking a Hard Line on Soft Drugs--TNDD, No. 11. L/7649, 7 March 1978, p. 51. . . an amendment to
the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance is being considered
to tighten up the law regarding cannabis. Mari-
juana can be dangerous and harmful to the health
and mental well-being particularly of young people.
Its adverse reactions can include anxiety, fear,
rapid heartbeat, labored breathing, crying depres-
sion, suspicion, dissatisfaction, depersonalization,
disorientation, confusion, paranoia, delusion, and
murderous hallucinations."
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ARGENTINA--Official Gives Details of 'South American
League'--TNDD, No. L/7649, pp. 99-101. This article
in the Buenos Aires Clarion is the text of an inter-
view with the Chief of the Federal Police Drug De-
partment concerning current investigations into the
drug ring called the "South American League."
BRAZIL--Rio Police Operation Nets Cocaine, Marijuana,
Ammunition, Boats--TNDD, No. L/7649, pp. 112-116.
"About 400 kilograms of brick marijuana and 200
grams of cocaine were seized by police in a single
operation in January. The marijuana was found at
the bottom of oil drums in the garage."
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