SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THE ANGOLAN REBELLION AND WHITE UNREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 5, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
a * prli 1963
OCI No. 0274/63B
Copy No. 74
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
THE ANGOLAN REBELLION AND WHITE UNREST
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
SECRET
5 Apr- 1963
THE ANGOLAN REBELLION AND WHITE UNREST
The rebellion in Angola is
entering its third year with no
prospects for an early settlement.
It has stiffened Lisbon's resist-
ance to change and reinforced
the determination of Angolan na-
tionalists and other Africans
to end Portuguese rule. While
Portuguese troops are able to
contain the feuding nationalist
forces for the present, the long-
run economic drain on Portugal
and the rising discontent among
Angola's whites seem likely to
force Lisbon eventually to grant
autonomy to Angola.
Rival Rebel Groups
The two major Angolan politi-
cal forces, the Union of Angolan
Peoples (UPA) and the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), are based outside
the territory and have so far
been incapable of enlarging the
relatively small area of conflict
or of creating a common front.
As exile groups, their role in
the future depends as much on
external support as on dissatis-
faction within Angola. Neither
party is implanted firmly enough
within the country to be assured
a role in an independent Angola.
Both, however, are developing
leadership skills, gaining inter-
national recognition, and obtain-
ing significant support from
African countries.
membership of some 40,000,
largely from among the sizable
Angolan population around Leo-
poldville. It also purports to
have some 5,000 men under arms,
although until recent months
much of the fighting seems to
have been done by men equipped
with only the most primitive
weapons and only vaguely con-
nected with the UPA.
Although it now seeks to
represent all of Angola, the
UPA is primarily a tribal move-
ment of the northern region.
The active revolt has so far
been limited to this area, which
also happens to be the best
suited for guerrilla warfare.
The UPA, the older and more
active of the two, was founded
in 1954 by Holden Roberto and six
other Angolans resident in Leopold-
ville. It claims a dues-paying
SECRET
pop oll
upA ?".
Vila Oa Ponle 1~e Mussu ma'
C.R. Cuanarale
J \
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
SECRET
Most of the party's leaders
are Protestant. Portuguese propa-
ganda emphasizes that these Prot-
estant connections demonstrate
the UPA's minority status in a
predominantly Catholic country
and thereby disprove its claim
to national leadership. Portu-
guese authorities place much of
the blame for the rebellion on
American and European mission-
aries, many of whom they have
arrested and deported. Those
missionaries who take leave out-
side the province are being re-
fused re-entry visas.
The MPLA is the result of
the merger in 1956 of several
factions in Angola. The extent
of its following cannot be deter-
mined, as it has always been
covert within Angola--where many
of its founders remain in jail--
and has little following outside.
Prior to the severe Portuguese
repression which followed the
outbreak of revolt in 1961, the
MPLA had important support among
the tiny educated group in the
cities, but its present claim
of 35,000 active members seems
exaggerated. In any case, the
strength of the MPLA has lain
less in the quantity than the
quality of its members, many of
whom are mulattoes.
The mulattoes have long been
accepted in law as Portuguese
citizens, a status extraordinarily
difficult for a black African to
achieve and one of great impor-
tance, as it separates the "civi-
lized" from the "uncivilized" in
Portuguese theory and practice.
Citizenship tends, however, to
cut the mulattoes off from the
subordinate mass of Angolans
without giving them any real status
in Portuguese society.
The one opportunity it
does offer is education. Whereas
Holden Roberto of the UPA has
the equivalent of secondary
education--acquired in the Congo--
many of the MPLA leaders are
distinguished intellectuals who
have studied in Europe. In
essence, the UPA is a mass organ-
ization with few trained leaders,
while the MPLA has the technically
qualified, prestigious leader-
ship but no mass following.
The MPLA, whose membership
includes some white Portuguese,
has been more a Portuguese
opposition party than an Angolan
nationalist party and has devoted
most of its energies to uniting
all the various resistance move-
ments throughout Portuguese
Africa under its leadership.
The UPA has consistently resisted
efforts to form a common front,
apparently because Roberto fears
that the intellectuals would cap-
ture his organization from him.
In September 1961 the MPLA
moved its headquarters from
Conakry to Leopoldville and
entered into sharp competition
with the UPA for the allegiance
of the resident Angolan popu-
lation. It now is building a
military organization there
and claims credit for a raid
into the Cabinda exclave in
January. A report that UPA
supporters ambushed and killed
12 members of the returning
MPLA raiding party is indicative
of their intense rivalry.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
SECRET
Foreign Ties
In contrast to the Western-
oriented UPA, the MPLA has often
been labeled pro-Communist--par-
ticularly by the Portuguese. In
recent months an internal power
struggle has developed over the
party's future international
orientation. The faction favoring
a more genuine neutrality--led
by party President Agostinho
Neto, who escaped from Portugal
a year ago--has reportedly ex-
pelled several pro-Marxist
leaders and now dominates the
MPLA Executive Committee.
Both the UPA and the MPLA
have been offered Soviet bloc
assistance. While each would
probably prefer Western assistance
and neither desires a commitment
to the Communist world, they
both recognize the limitations
that the NATO relationship im-
poses on Western governments,
and neither party would have
insurmountable compunctions
about accepting Soviet aid if
it were a question of survival.
Both parties recognize the
importance of demonstrating their
militancy to persuade other
African stags to support them.
Morocco, Algeria, nnd Tunisia
have all been symr thetic to
the rebel cause and a number of
Angolans have received guerrilla
training in North Africa.
With the end of Moise Tshombd's
secession, the rebels are eager
to expand their organization into
Katanga, from which they could more
easily sabotage the Katanga-
Benguela railroad--a blow that
would have both economic and
dramatic impact.
Lisbon's Adamant Stand
The Portuguese Government,
still determined to defend Angola
at all costs, has 35,000-40,000
troops there. Its determination
is based both on pride and on
the province's tremendous economic
potential. Recently discovered
oil reserves, for example, are
capable of filling all the petro-
leum requirements of Portugal
SECRET 3
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
NOW SECRET 1. 0 W-4
and its territories. Since
World War II Portugal has relied
on the earnings of its overseas
provinces--of which Angola is
the wealthiest--to balance its
chronic foreign trade deficit.
For decades Angola provided a
source of cheap raw materials
and a market for inferior and
exorbitantly priced goods..
In order to preserve the
market, Lisbon restricted foreign
investment and the production of
goods for local consumption.
The Angolan economy is geared
almost entirely to the production
acrd sale of commodities for
export--the most important being
coffee. Partly as a result,
Angola suffers from the lack of
skills and infrastructure neces-
sary even for a rudimentary self-
sustaining economy. The vital
Benguela railway is vulnerable
to foreign influence, for 75
percent of its revenues could
be cut off by a political decision
in Leopoldville to divert Katanga's
ore shipment and other traffic
through the Congo.
The 1961 rebellion changed
the picture for Portugal. The
cost of the fighting left
Portugal with a balance-of-pay-
ments deficit of $105 million in
19.61, and almost as much last
year. It costs Portugal an esti-
mated $120 million a year just
to maintain overseas the additional
troops to meet the threat of
rebellion in Africa. Thus Angola,
now beset with inflation and
growing European unemployment,
seems to have become a net economic
liability to Portugal.
Apart from the military
campaign, Lisbon's initial re-
sponse to the rebellion was to
announce a series of intended
reforms to broaden African
participation in political and
economic life and to remove
social abuses. Although the
American consul general in
Angola has reported that much of
the legislation seems to be
intended as a facade to fend off
international pressure, certain
of the reform measures are
apparently being enforced, such
as revoking the old six-month
forced labor requirement for
Africans and prohibiting the
participation of administrative
officials in the recruitment
of contract labor.
The legislation boosted
provincial government costs by
nearly 40 percent and required
a 45-percent increase in taxes.
Local employers and administra-
tors say that the cost of imple-
menting the labor reforms would
ruin the local economy: unless
they can compel Africans to
work without pay, the province's
rural roads cannot be maintained.
Nevertheless, Governor
General Deslandes pushed forward
plans for economic development
and social betterment which
seemed to white Angolans to
offer the chance of creating
a genuine multiracial society.
His efforts to raise African
standards were to be balanced
by fresh emphasis on white
SECRET 4
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
Ifte SECRET 'NSVI
settlement--to bring the propor-
tion of whites to at least 10
percent of the population--and
vigorous development of Angola's
economic resources. He proposed
to tax vast tracts of undeveloped
land and planned to start local
university classes.
Last September, in an
apparent shift of policy, Lisbon
dismissed Deslandes. It has
since indicated that it will
no longer be able to finance
the Angolan Development Plan
because of the increasing costs
of the military campaign against
the rebels. The new governor
general's one-third cut in
Angola's 1963 road construction
budget is indicative of this
policy of financial retrench-
ment.
Deslandes' dismissal was
a great shock to Angola and
has done more than any other
single act to solidify white
opposition in Angola. Deslandes
had tended to see the problem
and promise of Angola from an
Angolan viewpoint rather than
from Lisbon's. His dismissal
was widely interpreted as
having been the result of pres-
sure from metropolitan finan-
cial interests and as proving
that Lisbon did not intend to
initiate any meaningful reforms
which would foster a marked
degree of autonomy in the over-
seas provinces.
The frustration engendered
by the belief that Portugal
intends to preserve the status
quo at the expense of Angolan
development may eventually lead
to a demand from Angola's whites
for local autonomy or independence.
The impetus for separation
would probably originate among
the local businessmen and small
landowners, but the key to
success would be the attitude
of the military--whose influence
is paramount in Angola.
The Military Situation
Widespread dissatisfaction
with Lisbon reportedly exists
among the lower and middle ranks
of the Portuguese officer corps
and has exponents among even
the top ranks. Most of these
officers have little economic
stake in the metropole and are
impatient with the backwardness
of their country. Many do have
personal ties in Angola. The
consul general estimates that
as many as a third of the forces
now serving there would be
willing to stay on as settlers.
The military have generally
demonstrated a capacity to
get along well with the natives
and have exerted a surprisingly
effective pacification effort.
The armed forces, however,
are well aware of their depend-
ence on Portugal. They would
be unlikely to support a move
toward independence unless they
believed that Lisbon's overseas
policies were bound eventually
to lose Angola to radical
African nationalists or unless
a change of government in Portugal
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
Nw~ SECRET ?..
made it appear that the army
might lose its privileged
position. As its price for
supporting independence, the
military might insist on a
political solution of the
rebellion through negotiations.
At present, neither the
Portuguese troops in Angola nor
the rebels have the capability
of eliminating the forces of
the other. Although the rebels
cannot engage in major encoun-
ters, they have the men and the
promise of arms to sustain guer-
rilla-type activity. Although
the Portuguese should be able
to contain rebel activity, un-
less major fighting erupts in
other territories, they will be
unable to eliminate the rebel
bases. The Portuguese military
in Angola realize that, without
a drastic change of policy in
Lisbon, a long war of attrition
is in prospect, and that in the
long run they cannot win such
a war.
While the UPAis widely believed
to be racially oriented and firmly
committed to the ouster of all
white influence, there is a
feeling current among all levels
of Angolan society that an even-
tual accommodation is possible
between the whites and the Por-
tuguese-educated intellectuals
who lead the MPLA. This is
likely to determine the approach
which the white population would
have to any negotiations in an
autonomous Angola.
SECRET 6
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5
.QPfIj?FT
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000030002-5