CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO. 72
OCR NO. 03'01/61
12 October 1961
DIA review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1XI It- I? ENTIAL 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Statements by top Soviet and East German leaders on
the occasion of the East German anniversary celebrations
omitted references to a year-end deadline for a German
peace treaty. The implication that the deadline may be
withdrawn has been accompanied by suggestions from bloc
officials that the Berlin issue will be resolved in nego-
tiations and that Gromyko's talks were an initial step
in this direction. The position taken by Gromyko in his
talks in the US was reflected in Ulbricht's statement on
6 October that, before a peace treaty is signed, agree-
ment should be reached on "special arrangements" for a
Berlin settlement and. on the "requisite declarations" of
guarantees for Berlin, which would become part of any
treaty.
REACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE TO THE BERLIN CRISIS .
Most East Europeans appear to have reacted nervously
to the East-West crisis over Berlin. The Communist re-
gimes have taken steps, with only limited success, to re-
assure the public. Overt expressions of popular concern
in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary appear to have di-
minished in the last two weeks; in Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria, they appear to be continuing.
SUSPECT ELEMENTS MOVED FROM EAST GERMAN BORDER ZONE .
. . Page 4
In a one-day operation, the East German regime on
3 October evacuated residents it deemed politically un-
reliable from a five-kilometer-wide belt along the 856-
mile East-West German frontier. The evacuation, carefully
planned for several weeks and executed on the ground that
it was necessary to secure the frontier against West Ger-
man provocations, proceeded smoothly, with no reports of
serious resistance. For the time being, the regime ap-
parently plans no further measures in the area.
King Savang is expected to designate Souvanna Phouma
soon as premier of a provisional coalition government.
Still to be negotiated are the major problems regarding
the balance within the "neutralist" center group of the
cabinet, the apportionment of specific portfolios, the
timing and method of reducing and integrating the armed
forces, and the scheduling of national elections. The
military situation, meanwhile, remains generally quiet.
At Geneva, the conference cochairmen are still at odds
over the future role of the International Control Com-
mission in Laos.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Communist forces continue efforts to expand their
areas of control in South Vietnam. The level of Commu-
nist activity reached a new high in September, and the
appearance of large bands over a wide area indicates a
trend toward use of more conventional military units.
The apparent Communist effort to build up a stronghold
north of Saigon near the Cambodian border, as well as the
increased Viet Cong capability farther to the north;prob-
ably reflects stepped-up support from North Vietnam via
Laos. Further Viet Cong attacks on an increasing scale
can be expected.
Page 7
Page 9
The new government in Syria appears firmly established
and has received general international recognition. Prime
Minister Kuzbari's most difficult job during the next few
months prior to elections will be to resist pressures from
Syria's varied political groupings for special considera-
tion. In Lebanon, the aftermath of the Syrian revolt may
be a cabinet change, with moderate Moslem Husayn al-Uwayni
taking over from the more pro-Nasir Saib Salam. Jordan's
King Husayn believes the Syrian coup has blunted N '
threat to his country; however,
e blatant rigging of parlia-
mentary elections scheduled for 19 October has also con-
tributed to the unsettled conditions.
CONGO < < < . . . . < < . < < < < . < < Page 11
The UN and Western powers are continuing efforts to
bring about talks between Tshombd and Premier Adoula.
An exchange of conciliatory messages between Elisabeth-
ville and Leopoldville may lead to increased contact be-
tween the two groups. The cease-fire in Katanga is still
tenuous; neither the UN nor Katanga appears anxious to
resume hostilities, but each side is taking steps to im-
prove its military position.
De Gaulle plans to visit Algeria before mid-November,
presumably to make some move toward instituting a pro-
visional executive body to supervise a referendum. The
rebel provisional Algerian government (PAG), which has
been meeting this week to consider its position in nego-
tiations with Paris, is dubious about De Gaulle's abili-
ty to control European extremists and the army, and to
implement a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile, in what
appears to be a trial balloon for the benefit of both the
PAG and the French public, a Gaullist leader has argued
that the only feasible solution now is to partition Al-
geria into three autonomous regions which night eventual=
ly federate.
UUULUAjIAL
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Recent announcements by the Chinese Communist regime
indicate that it will continue through 1962 a redirection
of industry to more conservative policies aimed at bring-
ing output, quality, and costs into proper balance--fol-
lowing tae excesses of the "leap forward." While the
theories of mass action advocated by Mao Te-tung and
Liu Shao-chi during the "leap forward" period (1958-60)
still receive lip service, they are in practice being
set aside by economic planners in both industry and agri-
culture in favor of more orderly planning and administra-
tion. This should facilitate,industrial recovery in 1963
if agricultural problems are no longer a major obstacle.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS REPLACE PARTY LEADERS IN PROVINCES . . Page 15
About one fifth of the provincial party bosses in
Communist China have been replaced during the past year.
The regime's shift to a more conservative economic pro-
gram appear to have been a factor in the replacement of
some first secretaries who were overzealous in implement-
ing "leap forward" policies. Ethnic minority unrest
probably played a part in other personnel changes. The
situation in this respect may be particularly bad in
Tsinghai Province, where a former vice minister of public
security has been named acting first secretary.
The deadlock between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues
as each waits in the hope that Washington will move to ob-
tain concessions from the opposing side. Afghanistan re-
mains firm in its refusal to use the Pakistani route for
foreign trade, and both countries are taking steps which
will speed the diversion of nonbioc trade with Afghanistan
to the Soviet route. Moscow appears to be exploiting the
crisis to encourage greater Afghan reliance on Soviet eco-
nomic cooperation,
Finland's President Kekkonen, who begins an official..
visit to the United States on 16 October, appears to be
getting increasingly open support from the USSR for re-
election next January. Soviet President Brezhnev on his
22-30 September visit to Finland singled out Kekkonen as
the man best suited to maintain good Finnish-Soviet re-
lations. Moscow probably hopes to exploit Kekkonen's
policy of maintaining cordial relations with the USSR
to gain Finnish participation in a peace conference to
Page 17
Page 17
sign a bloc treaty with East Germany.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1.2 October 1961
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
The pace of political development in East Africa has
been accelerated with the announcement in London that U-
ganda is to achieve independence in October 1962. This
announcement will increase agitation in Kenya and Zanzi-
bar for early independence. However, in these states
as well as in Uganda itself, basic racial and tribal ten-
sions have not been relieved, and London must contend
with internal African factionalism as well as the prob-
lems of white and Asian minority groups before bringing
these territories to independence.
POLITICAL UNREST IN ECUADOR
A Communist-promoted general strike which began in
Ecuador on 4 October was only partly effective but ei-
erated violence in three northern provincial cities which
caused President Velasco to place these areas under mili-
tary rule. The strike, which was the most serious threat
he has faced since taking office in September 1960, has
now subsided; but, partly as a result of pressure from
military and other right-wing elements, Velasco is ap-
parently considering a crackdown on the activities of
the Communist party and a diplomatic break with Cuba.
. Page 20
Page 21
Growing unrest and an abortive rebellion by a small
army unit led the government to extend the partial state
of siege to all 17 departments on 11 October. The gov-
ernment is concerned about the recent capture of a unit
of marines by a sizable pro-Communist guerrilla force
in eastern Colombia and the possibility of new violence
in this remote area which could spill over into neighbor-
ing Venezuela. The centers of the rural violence--which
has caused an estimated 250,000 deaths since 1948--have
shifted periodically, but in recent months it has been
concentrated in the central-western part of Colombia.
The government believes the unrest is directed by Com-
munists and that they plan to extend the movement west-
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Bolivia's continuing political instability is re-
flected in new violence earlier this month in Santa Cruz.
The chronic danger of disorders and rioting by labor and
peasant groups has been increased by the release from
prison last month of some 30 Communist. labor agitators.
However, the long-term downward trend in the Bolivian
economy which has been a deep-seated cause of insta-
bility shows some signs of being reversed.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS . . , . . . . , . . . Page 1
The pattern of Soviet actions over the past three
months in the Berlin crisis underscores the dilemmas con-
fronting Khrushchev which have led him to place growing
reliance on tactics of blackmail and intimidation. His
efforts following the Vienna meeting with President Ken-
nedy in June to convince the West that he was deadly seri-
ous in his intention to bring the Berlin situation to a
head before the end of the year had the result of in-
creasing the refugee flow from East Germany and of stiffen-
ing the American attitude. The timing of the resumption
of nuclear testing reflected Khrushchev's serious concern
that his Berlin strategy had been jeopardized by the clo-
sure of the Berlin sector border and by the failure of
earlier demonstrative military moves to produce a change
in the Western attitude. Khrushchev appears, however,
to recognize the dangers of a situation in which both
sides might feel themselves confronted with the alterna-
tives of a humiliating retreat or a dangerous showdown.
He now is seeking a way out of this impasse by hinting
at a compromise solution on Berlin which would preserve
a Western position in the city and, at the same time,
facilitate the signing of a separate peace treaty with
East Germany.
THE FORTHCOMING SOVIET ?ARTY CONGRESS
The 22nd Soviet party congress is scheduled to con-
vene in Moscow on 17 October. Khrushchev not only will
deliver the major speech--the report of the central com-
mittee--but will also present the new party program, a
broad outline of policy to guide the party over the next
20 years. It will afford him the opportunity to expound
Soviet foreign policy and may give the West a better idea
of the course of action he plans to take on the Berlin
question.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 October 1961
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN SPAIN
While Franco's opponents appear to have no prospect
of attaining power in Spain so long as he remains on the
scene, his regime continues unpopular, and opposition
elements are making some progress toward reconciling fac-
tional differences. In recent months some of the non-
Communist left-of-center parties have shown a willing-
ness to facilitate joint action by agreeing in principle
to restoration of the monarchy. Such collaboration would
i
ncrease the chances for these moderate groups to play an
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The bloc has maintained
a reserved attitude on Berlin,
probably pending an assessment
in Khrushchev's report to next
week's Soviet party congress on
Gromyko's talks in the US and
the UK. The statements of So-
viet and East German officials
during the celebrations East
Germany's 12th anniversary on
7 October were notable for the
failure to reiterate the year-
end deadline for the conclusion
of a German treaty. While bloc
pronouncements maintained a
sense of urgency and threatened
a separate East German treaty,
the terminology employed was
purposely ambiguous.
on 8 October said a separate
treaty would be signed "this
year."
Although Soviet press coverage
of the East German anniversary was
considerably heavier than last
year, the speeches and editorials
printed by Moscow also omitted
any time limit. A Pravda editorial
of 7 October mentioned the "im-
mediate conclusion" of a German
treaty, and presidium member Suslov
said that the question is not
whether a treaty will be signed,
but only whether both German
states will sign it.
The Soviet party's message
of greeting to East Germany
stated that the treaty would be
signed in the "very near future,"
but First Deputy Premier Mikoyan,
who headed the Soviet'delegation
to the celebrations, merely
asserted that the bloc was
"'vigorously pressing for a
treaty." In impromptu remarks
at Karl-Marx-Stadt on 8 October,
Mikoyan went so far as to say,
"We are not in a hurry, but we
du not wish to.clelay the signing
of a peace treaty." In his ma-
jor address Ulbricht also omit-
ted any mention of a deadline.
However, the Czech and Pol-
ish delegates both used the
usual warning of a separate
treaty "before the end of the
year," and Erich Correns, presi-
dent of East Germany's'national
Council, stated that the cele-
brations were being held "a few
weeks before the conclusion of
a German peace treaty." Gomulka
The implication that the
deadline may be withdrawn has
also been accompanied by con-
tinued suggestions that the Ber-
lin issue can be resolved through
negotiations. One of the main
themes of Soviet press reporting
on the East German anniversary
was that Gromyko's talks in the
United States represented an
initial step in a process which
would lead to a peaceful resolu-
tion of the Berlin problem.
Mikoyan, in his major speech in
East Berlin, picked up this
theme by stating that world
opinion was urging talks be-
tween East and West on a "peace-
ful adjustment of pressing
international problems," and
that the Soviet Government is
ready to take part in such
talks. Gomulka in a speech on
8 October stated that formal
negotiations should follow the
talks in the US.
Bloc acceptance of the US
willingness to participate in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
constructive negotiations, how-
ever, is qualified. Pravda
stated on 7 October that in the
"governing circles of the Western
powers the desire to consider
the question of a German peace
settlement does not exist."
Ulbricht took a similar line,
stating that while "we positively
assess" President Kennedy's
readiness to negotiate, "he
avoids the main question" of a
German settlement. On the other
hand, both the Soviet and East
German press assert that the
West is becoming increasingly
aware that the two German states
exist and must be recognized.
In his informal remarks
upon arriving in London for
talks with Prime Minister Mac-
millan and Lord Home, Gromyko
told the press that as a re-
sult of his talks in the US,
":here is a possibility of a
peaceful Berlin settlement."
Moscow's only direct comment on
Gromyko's talks with the Presi-
dent took the form of a TASS
report in Pravda quoting Secre-
tary Rusk as having said that
Gromyko's talk with the Presi-
dent was conducted in a good,
constructive atmosphere, al-
though there was still no indi-
cation of what possibilities
existed for reaching agreement
on the conditions of formal
negotiations.
Public statements by vari-
ous bloc spokesmen have begun
to reflect the position taken
by Gromyko in his talks in the
US. Ulbricht on 6 October
acknowledged that the Western
powers have a "certain interest"
in the Berlin question and that
the bloc wv`;s interested in ar-
ranging gradual transfor-
mation of Nest Berlin into a
demilitarized free city, as far
as possible in agreement with
the Western powers." He said
that both sides had an interest
in agreeing on "special arrange-
ments" for a solution of the
Berlin problem and in arranging
the "requisite declarations"
containing guarantees before
the conclusion of a peace treaty
--such arrangements then becom-
ing a part of a peaty treaty and
thus attaining "validity under
international law." Ulbricht's
reference to "declarations" to
be incorporated in a peace treaty
suggests that the bloc may be
prepared to accept something
less than East German signature
of an accord on Berlin.
In addition, the reference
to a "gradual transformation of
West Berlin into a demilitarized
free city" suggests that the
bloc will bargain over the ques-
tion of a time limit on Western
presence in Berlin. In this
connection a West German news-
paper quoted Soviet sources in
East Berlin as stating that the
USSR would give permanent guaran-
tees for Berlin only if the West
agreed to recognition of the
division of Germany and the
creation of a thinned-out mili-
tary zone in Germany.
Ulbricht also stated that
if West Germany refused to sign
a treaty, a separate bloc treaty
would nevertheless still be open
to Bonn's accession at a later
date. While the original 1959
draft treaty included this pro-
vision, Ulbricht's mention of
it at this time suggests that Mos-
cow may be moving toward a short
or truncated treaty which would
leave open certain military
questions for future negotia-
tions. This would be in line
with the renewed emphasis on
the question of partial disarm-
ament steps in Central Europe
and the stress on agreed pro-
hibition of the possession or
manufacture of nuclear weapons
by either German state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY $' I%*A
REACTION IN EAST A.RN .EUROPE TO TII 2, BERLIN CRISIS
Most of the East European
peoples appear to have reacted
nervously to the East-West
crisis over Berlin. The Com-
munist regimes have taken steps,
with only limited success, to
reassure the public.
Because of the governments!
support for the USSR' j :`)o;3-it .oa
on Berlin, long-dormant popular
attitudes and fears have come to
the surface. Czechoslovaks and
Poles, in particular, doubt that
they would survive an East-West
conflict, especially the fall-
out from nuclear weapons used
in Europe. The regimes also
face the problem that their
populations are basically hostile
to the Communist cause.
In the first two weeks of
September, the Polish and IIun-
garian regimes, admitting for
the first time the existence of a
war scare, sought publicly to
item manifestations of it. Pol-
ish Foreign Trade Minister Tramp-
czynski on 5 September admitted
to US Embassy officers that Poles
in certain outlying districts
had been scare-buying, and added
that the sale of sugar and flour
had been limited to two kilograms
per customer. Embassy officers,
while noting no such restrictions
on sales in Warsaw, reported
evidence of scare-buying in
several other areas in Poland.
A near riot ensued in a
Warsaw district when police on
9 September attempted to arrest
suspected black-marketeers near
a market crowded with hoarders.
Wide-scale bank.. withdrawals were
also reported. Polish party
leader Gomulka, in an attempt
to cap the situation, told the
Polish people on 10 September
that although military prepara-
tions were necessary, there was
no reason to hoard.
War fears and panic buying
apparently began quite early
in the Hungarian countryside.
A local paper on 24 and 29
August denounced panic-mongers
who cause hoarding of foodstuffs.
Similar indications have also
come to light in at least two
other provinces. Central com-
mittee member Szakasits, just
returned from :mast Germany, spoke
over Radio Budapest on 13 Sep-
tember reassuring the Hungarian
people that no one in East Ger-
many is buying up salt, kerosene,
candles, or canned goods. He
denounced the apparently wide.y hold
view that saline baths are an
effective antidote to atomic
radiation.
US Embassy officers in
Czechoslovakia have concluded
from reports reaching them that
there has been a war scare in
that country since the first
days of the Berlin crisis. This
may be due in large part to
the early and rather extensive
Czech military preparations.
According to a report of early
September, fear of war was
greatest along the West German
border, where Czechs believed that
the West Germans would reclaim
real estate formerly German owned
in the event of a successful
Western Invasion. Hoarding and
a general war scare that were
hampering the harvest had become
so marked by the end of September
that politburo members fanned
out over the country on 1 October
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to "e:>plain" the Berlin crisis
to the people.
There are several reports
of poor morale in Bulgaria due
both to rumors of mobilization
and to food shortages. Flour
and sugar allegedly are in
short supply, and bread is being
rationed in the countryside,
The US Legation, commented, how-
ever, that the shortages may
be due to stockpiling rather
than to scare-buying.
All of the regimes in East
Europe have undertaken campaigns
in which party agitators have
gone out among the people to
deal with these problems. The
Hungarian daily Nepzabadsag,
for example, on 21 September
called For youths, women, and
candidate party members to be
pressed into service along with
full. members in the indoctri=
nation task, Some activists,,
however, apparently have over-
sold their case and succeeded
only in antagonizing rather than
persuading those "whose intentions
are good but who do not see
clearly on a question of policy."
Rumanians have exhibited
little concern. The US Legation
in Bucharest has noted no hoarding
and has reported only "desultory"
discussions of civil defense and
"the dangers of West German mili-
tarism." There have been no
reports on the reaction of the
Albanian people to the inter-
national situation.
The success of regime Counter-
measures in East Europe has
been mixed. Overt expressions
of popular reaction in East Ger-
many, Poland, and Hungary appear
to have diminished in the last
two weeks; in Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria they appear to be
continuing.
SUSPECT ELEMENTS MOVED FROM EAST GERMAN' BORDER ZONE
On 3 October, hand-picked
teams of tarty stalwarts, aided
by the People's Police and units
of the armed workers' militia,
evacuated the five-kilometer-
wide East German border zone of
residents and their families
deemed nolitically unreliable by
the Ulbricht regime. The evac-
uation proceeded smoothly and
was completed for the most part
in one day Ender the on-the-
Scene supervision of central
committee functionaries and
district party officials and the
over-all direction of Erich
I ionecker, party secretary for
security affairs.
There were only isolated
incidents of overt resistance
:Prom the intimidated population.
There are no estimates of how
many were affected or reliable
indications of hav far into East
Germany they were transported.
The deportees and their house-
hold Foods wore. 971nyPcI his tv.inlr
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ZU'MMAR.Y
at the extreme easternmost part
of their local counties or in
nearby localities.
The evacuation followed
several weeks of methodical
preparation. The regime on 14
September ordered police-re-
registration of all inhabitants
of a five-kilometer-wide belt
on the eastern side of the East-
West German border, stretching
356 miles from Gutenfurst-Hof
in the south to3choenberg-
Luebeck in the north. As part
of the re-registration, personal
identity cards for residents of
the zone were invalidated as of
30 September and new cards were
issued valid only for 90 days and
presumably renewable four times
a year. Local party and gov-
ernment officials apparently
were not told the true purpose
of the re-registration. District
party officials,
wor
king with
employees of the
cen
tral com-
nittee, drew upon
po
lice dossiers
and information obta
ined during
the re-registration
to compile
lists of those to be evacuated.
During the night of 2-3
October, border zone villages
reportedly were surrounded by
police and militia;4trucks as-
sembled from all over East
Germany were parked on the
outskirts of the villages, while
district party officials woke
local party secretaries and
told them that the evacuation
was to begin. Those who were
to be moved then were given two
hours in which to pack their
household possessions and other
belongings.
According to the West Ger- 25X1
man Ministry for All-German
Affairs, which released what 25X1
purports to be the text e: a 14
September East German Ministry
of Interior directive governing
the evacuation, residence within
the five-kilometer belt now is
restricted to those "whose at-
titude in the past guarantees
that the security of the border
areas is not endangered." It
is automatically denied to re-
turnees from West Germany and
'West Berlin, foreign nationals
or stateless persons, former
felons, evacuees from other
areas, "former members of the
S.S. and incorrigible Nazis,"
and others whose loyalty to the
Ulbricht regime is suspect for
any aac-:i.
No one. is to be permitted
to live within 500 meters of the
border, and permission to work
within the 500-meter belt will
be determined "by a particularly
strict yardstick, especially with
regard to persons under 25 and
persons whose next of kin have
Illegally left the GDR." No
motor vehicles will be permitted
within the 500-meter belt, and
only in exceptional cases will
they be allowed in the wider
five-kilometer "closed zone."
On 5 October, the local
East German press published a
Ministry of Interior announcement
that "a number of citizens who
up to now have lived in the five-
kilometer restricted zone" had
been moved in order to "nrotect 25X1
the peace and protect their
lives" against West German prov-
CONFIDENTIAL
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lv..1 VVIY i~ UG1V 1 1/`1{. %Ole
Boun Oum, Souphannouvong,
and Souvanna Phouma agreed on
8 October that Souvanna should
head the new coalition govern-
ment. Agreement was also
reached on the establishment
of a cabinet consisting of a
""neutralist" center group with
eight members and two four-
member groups representing
Vientiane and the Pathet Lao.
Souvanna and a deputy premier,
yet undesignated, are to hold
two of the cabinet portfolios.
On 10 October, General
Phourni informed King Savang
in Luang Prabang of the princes'
decision and requested an audi-
ence for Souvanna, at which
time the King could formally
designate him formateur of the
new government. The King granted
the request and invited Souvanna
to visit the royal capital at
his convenience. Souvanna has
proposed that the audience be
made a state occasion, with the
three princes and the diplomatic
corps in attendance.
The agreement on Souvanna
as premier-designate eliminates
only one of several obstacles to
the creation of a genuinely neu-
tral Laotian, government. Major
issues still to be negotiated
by the princes include the
balance between members of Sou-
vanna's coterie at Xieng Khouang
and other "neutralists" in the
eight-member center group, the
apportionment of specific port-
folios, the timing and method
of reducing and integrating the
rival armed forces, and the
scheduling of national elections.
Royal Laotian Government
forces continue limited patrols
in northern Laos, while further
patrol operations are scheduled
for the central and southern
zones.
The focus of the Geneva
conference during the past week
has been the bilateral conversa-
tions between the two cochairmen
on fundamental questions relat-
ing to the International Control
Commission (ICC) in Laos. Soviet
delegate Pushkin stated that
agreement might be reached to
allow mobile ICC teams to in-
vestigate a reported cease-fire
violation but that they would
have to return to Vientiane when
their investigation was complete.
The West maintains that the com-
mission must have free and unre-
stricted access to all parts of
Laos and that permanent ICC in-
spection posts must be established
throughout the country. Pushkin
has refused to discuss this lat-
ter proposal except in connection
with the ICC's supervision of the
withdrawal of foreign personnel
from Laos.
On 9 October the Soviet
representative told Ambassador
Harriman that US insistence on
the issue of permanent ICC posts
throughout Laos could lead the
conference "to a dead end."
Pushkin said that the Chinese
had shown special concern in
opposing this Western demand
and went on to assert that the
US could not have the ICC take
preventive measures in antici-
pation of a violation by the Viet
Minh and>still expect the latter
to sign any accord at Geneva.
In a 4 October conversation
with the chief UK delegate at
Geneva, Pushkin reiterated his
conviction that final agreement
would be, reached at Geneva. How-
ever, it is becoming increasingly
apparent that the USSR intends to
stall on all questions relating to
the powers and functions of the
ICC until a full discussion of the
voting procedure has been aired.
On this matter,. the Soviet repre-
sentative has so far been adamant
that the bloc's demand for una-
nimity must be met; he claimed that
it was because of the majority pro-
vision for voting that the ICC
had been forced to leave Laos with
disastrous results in mid-1958,
While Pushkin told Ambassador
Harriman on 9 October that the USSR
might accept a majority vote on
procedural issues if matters of
principle would require unanimous
decisions, he strongly objected
to the idea that undertaking of
investigations by the ICC would be
only a procedural matter. He in-
sisted-that the ICC must , be: con-
sidered . a "unitary. organ" for the
purpose of investigations and
reports.
COTIAI
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CURRENT INTELLIGNECE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The level of over-all Com-
munist activity--attacks, sabo-
tage, terrorism, political dem-
onstrations--in South Vietnam
set a new high in September over
the previous record of last July.
The Communists also operated in
larger bands over a wide area,
indicating a trend toward great-
er use of units of the conven-
tional army type,
Although Viet Cong activity
continues to be concentrated
primarily in the southern por-
tion of South Vietnam's Third
Corps military zone, the Com-
munists appear in recent weeks
to have been building another
stronghold relatively secure
from government countermeasures
to the north of Saigon. The
most striking example of this
was the Viet Cong's temporary
capture on 18 September of Phuoc
Vinh, capital of Phuoc Thanh
Province. This build-up would
re-create near the Cambodian
border a strategic base used
by the Viet Minh against the
French.
The appearance of battalion-
size units during September in
this area and in the First and
Second Corps military zones
bears out reports, prevalent
during a slack period of Viet
Cong activity in early 1961,
that the guerrillas were re-
grouping and retraining. There
is also a strong possibility
that the improved strength, or-
ganization, and direction of
the September attacks in the
northern region in particular
are due to stepped-up infil-
tration through Laos and to
the possible employment of
regular North Vietnamese units
operating from southern Laos.
Further Viet Cong attacks on
an increasing scale can be ex-
pected.
Government forces are con-
tinuing combined sweeps in the
southern provinces, where they
scored some dramatic successes
this summer, At the same time,
President Diem's efforts to
promote civic improvement pro-
grams in rural areas in recent
months have not yet rallied
significant popular support.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Quang Tri.
?, Hue.
Communist Guerrilla Activity in South Vietnam
?%%,NORTH VIETNAM
L A 0
THiAI LAND
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
C A.M B O_D I A
lr-Loc Ninh
PHNOM PENH;
ay 41, h
=-}uocVinh.
SPECIAL
Phan Rang.
$a ~J yen Major areas of Viet Cong
a Mau concentration
Corps military boundary
VIETNAM
1a
J Song Cau.
Chea Rea
SOUTH VIETNAM
Ban Me Thuot
CAPITAL ZONE
?Cap Saint-Jacques
CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Egypt-Syria '
The military-civilian regime
in Damascus appears firmly
established and has received
general international recogni-
tion. Nasir's conciliatory
speech of 5 October---disavowing
any opposition to Syrian accept-
ance Into the UN and the Arab
League--appeared to most coun-
tries to be an invitation to
establish normal relations with
the new Syria without risking
alienation of the UAR President.
Although the new regime might
have been expected to receive
Nasir's statement with relief,
the official reply was a stiff
contradiction of Nasir's por-
trayal of his three-and-one-
half-year rule over Syria and
resentment of his "patronizing"
air.
Mamun Kuzbari, at first
designated "premier" but now
titled "Executive Council presi-
dent," apparently welcomed
Nasir's speech at first, but his
initial ,remarks were officially
withdrawn and tae: uncompromising
final response s.uhstitutede The
Cairo press q j;ickl,y. -called a?t
tention to this,;,c.4.,x?:i.ous m
,.neuver
as ref lecting friction between
the civilian Kuzbari and the
military clique which brought
off the coup of 28 September.
A military spokesman has already
stressed the fact that the
revolutionary movement was
planned and executed by military
officers alone. The revolution-
ary decree appointing Kuzbari---
and perhaps the dropping of the
title "premier"--emphasized that
he was to serve only until the
"restoration of constitutional
conditions."
Kuzbari's most difficult
job during the next three or
four months will be to resist
pressures from Syria's varied
political groupings for special
consideration from his interim
government, particularly pressure
for the reversal of some of the
social and economic changes set
in motion during the Nasir years.
CONFIDENTIAL
Besides having to contend
with such demands from business
elements, Kuzbari will have to
reconcile the varying views of
the socialistic pan-Arab Baath
party, the old-line conservative
Nationalist and Populist parties,
Communists, and the trade unions.
The Syrian Army will also re-
main ready to act again if its
desires are not fulfilled; be-
tween 1949 and 1954 it carried
out five coups against civilian
governments which it believed
were threatening its position.
The sizable residue of pro-
Nasir feeling that remains in
some segments of the above
groups--excluding the Communists?
will also be a latent threat to
the new regime. Despite Nasir's
overtly conciliatory behavior,
he is unlikely to miss any op-
portunity that promises hope of
bringing down the Damascus
government, which the Cairo, radio
and press continue to label
"secessionist and reactionary."
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lebanon
Considerable political
turmoil has occurred in Lebanon
in the aftermath of the Syrian
revolt. Moslems tended to back
Nasir, while Christians support-
ed the new Syrian regime. Pro-
Nasir demonstrations were al-
lowed full play by Moslem Prime
Minister Saib Salam until
threats by Christian ministers
and pressure from President
Shihab led the government to
ban all demonstrations, suspend
licenses for carrying arms,
and forbid the display of pic-
tures of non-Lebanese political
leaders.
President Shihab, who has
been displeased with Salam for
some time, probably will carry
out a cabinet change in the
near future. Although Salam's
arch-rival Rashid Kara,mi ex-
pects to become prime minister,
it appears that the President
has Husayn al-Uwayni in mind.
Shihab may feel that Uwayni, a
moderate Moslem leader with a
long association with King Saud,
is the best choice at a time
when Lebanon must tread warily
between friendship with Nasir
and the necessity of doing busi-
ness with its neighbor Syria.
Jordan
King Husayn's elation over
the breakup of the Egyptian-
Syrian union obviously reflects
his belief that Nasir's threat
to Jordan has been blunted.
However, the King's haste in
being the first to recognize
the new Syrian regime has antag-
onized the numerous pro-Nasir
elements in Jordan, especially
in Palestiniap West Jordan,
Most Palestinians have regarded
Nasir as the leading champion
CONFIDENTIAL
of their cause against
Israel.
Jordanian Palestinians, more-
over, have long resented what they
regard as their insufficient repre-
sentation and influence in Amman,
a grievance which currently is
highlighted by the government's
blatant rigging of the parlia-
mentary elections scheduled for
19 October,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The UN and Western powers
are still trying to bring about
talks between Tshomb6 and Premier
Adoula. Both UN and Katangan.
forces have received reinforce-
ments during the current cease-
fire, but each side has avoided
extreme provocations. An ex-
change of conciliatory messages
between the Leopoldville and
Katangan governments in early
October indicated that direct
contacts between the two groups
may soon take place.
Relations between Leopold-
ville and Katanga appear to have
reached a nadir in late September,
following Adoula's blunt rejec-
tion of Tshomb64s offer to meet
him in neutral territory for ne-
gotiations. Adoula's attitude
appears to have stemmed in part
from Gizengist pressure to "de-
stroy" Tshomb6, and his statement
was followed by rumors that Congo
Army forces had crossed into
northern Katanga. On 5 October,
Adoula stated that he was pre-
pared to guarantee Tshomb6's
safety should he come to Leopold-
ville. Tshomb6, however, has
continued to procrastinate, and
to seek assurances of protection
from the UN and from Western
powers. On 9 October, Adoula
advised Tshomb6 that he "sin-
cerely wished" to meet with
Tshomb6 or his emissaries, and
some form of contact now appears
likely.
Despite the conciliatory
statements by both sides, early
agreement on Katanga's reinte-
gration with the Congo appears
unlikely. Tshomb6's posture
concerning the holding of talks
is consistent with his desire
to appear the injured party in
his dispute with the UN; Tshomb6
has, however, shown no sign of
departing from his past insist-
ence on virtual autonomy for
Katanga within any Congo confed-
eration.
Militarily, the cease-fire
in Katanga remains tenuous.
The pressure of more than 30,000
anti-Tshomb6 refugees in camps
near Elisabethville poses a con-
tinuing security threat to the
Tshomb6 regime. Although both
the UN and Tshomb6 appear anxious
to avoid the onus for any new
round of fighting, each has re-
ceived significant reinforcements
and each appears to regard itself
as the stronger militarily. In
an attempt to neutralize Tshomb6's
Fouga jet, the UN requested and
has received jet fighters from
Sweden and Ethiopia. Tshomb6.,
in turn, has benefited from a
continued influx of white volun-
teers
According to press reports,
white volunteers are continuing
to cross the Rhodesian border
into Katanga to serve with
Tshomb6's forces. Although
Tshomb6, under considerable
pressure from the UN, "dismissed"
his mercenaries on 30 September,
CONFIDENTIAL
,cam
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
few are believed to have left
Katanga permanently. While
some were repatriated by the
UN in early September, the total
number of white volunteers ap-
pears to have risen from around
500 to at least 600. The largest
number of those repatriated by
the UN were Belgians, while 25X1
their replacements have tended
to be Rhodesians and South
Africans.
Do Gaulle plans to go to
Algeria before mid-ivovember'.
He will apparently confine his
vi -sit to Rocher-Moir, the new
administrative capital about
30 miles east of Algiers, to
which Delegate General Morin
and his ranking subordinates
moved last month.
De Gaulle is reportedly
expected during his visit to
install a "consultative commit-
tee," which an official spokes-
man told the press last week
would be the forerunner of a
Moslem-European provisional
executive charged with prepara-
tions for the self-determination
referendum. Minister for Alge-
rian Affairs Joxe was again-in
Algiers on 7 October to recruit
members for the executive; this
effort was delayed several weeks
ago when prospective Moslem
members demurred, presumably
because the rebel provisional
Algerian government (PAG) had
refused to acquiesce in their
participation.
25X1
the PAG
met in Tunis nis week to con-
sider its position in negotia-
tions with Paris amid persistent
reports that secret talks have
already produced agreement on
many problems. However, there
are indications that the PAG
may raise another stumbling
block by insisting on the re-
lease of Vice Premier Mohamed
Ben Bella and other rebel leaders
detained in France as a precon-
dition for resuming negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY FJMMARY
There have also been indications
that the increasingly effective
activities of the anti-Gaullist
Secret Army Organization (OAS)
in Algeria are causing the PAG
to question De Gaulle's ability
to control the army and the
European settlers and to imple-
ment a negotiated settlement.
The American consul general in
Algiers reports that Europeans
there are already uneasy over
the prospect of a 50,000-man
Moslem force.
The incentive for early
OAS action may have been increased
by Paris' success in persuading
Spanish authorities to detain
17 French rightist exiles--among
them Lagaillard and Ortiz, lead-
ers of the Algiers rising of
January 1960, and ex-colonels
Lacheroy and Argoud, leaders of
the military insurrection last
April. Official French nervous-
ness over the situation seems
evident by the appearance off
Oran this week of elements of
the French Navy.
Security officials are dis-
playing apprehension over De
Gaulle's proposed visit on the
grounds that it will almost cer'
tainly precipitate serious Euro-
pean demonstrations in urban
centers. His tour of Algeria in
December 1960--which did not in-
clude Algiers or other major
cities--touched off settler riots
and the first major Moslem counter-
demonstrations, all of which had
to be forcibly suppressed by
security forces. The security
situation will be further compli-
cated during this period by the
PAG's announced plans for a
"national day" in Algeria on 1
November--the seventh anniversary
of the rebellion.
If the PAG refuses to concur
in establishment of an interim
executive, De Gaulle may try to
mollify army and European settler
opponents of his Algerian policy
by trying to impose a permanent
partition plan. In what may have
been a trial balloon,, a leading
Gaullist National Assembly deputy
published a series if articles in
the Paris daily Le Monde at the
end of September-proposing osing estab-
lishment of separate independent
Moslem and European political en-
tities which would be encouraged
to federate with an independent
Sahara when current passions have
subsided. The deputy estimated
that less than a million people
would have to be moved under this
plan and noted that this is less
than half those already displaced
in Algeria.
The PAG would probably op-
pose such a solution violently,
and French officials have tended
to dismiss partition as infeasi-
ble. Nevertheless, various
political elements in France
have recently expressed increas-
ing concern over the rights of
Europeans who would face Moslem
domination or deportation, and
army spokesmen have long cited
their commitments to both Euro-
peans and pro-French Moslems
that France would not abandon
them to the PAG.
CONFIDENTIAL
.AGBW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent announcements by
the Chinese Communist regime
indicate that it will continue
through 1962 a redirection of
industry to more conservative
policies aimed at bringing
output, quality, and costs
into proper balance--following
the excesses of the "leap for-
ward." While the theories of
mass action advocated by Mao
Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi
during the "leap forward"
period (1958-60) still re-
ceive lip service, they are in
practice being set aside by
economic planners in both
industry and agriculture in
favor of more orderly planning
and administration. This
should facilitate economic
recovery in 1963 if agricultural
problems.are no longer a major
obstacle.
Announcements during the
recent National Day celebra-
tions at Peiping generally
repeated the line of industrial
development taken at the plenum
last January, when industry
was ordered to "consolidate,
fill out, and raise standards."
A recent People's Dail] edi-
torial haX added that the re-
maining two years of the Second
Five-Year Plan (1958-62) will
be devoted to carrying out
this policy. In this article
the main tasks of industry
were given as:(1) strengthening
the assistance to agriculture
by devoting more production to
agriculture; (2) increasing the
supply of consumer goods by sup-
porting light industry; and (3)
coping with raw material short-
ages by increasing the produc-
tive capacity of the mining and
lumber industries, with special
emphasis on boosting the quality
and quantity of coal output.
Current difficulties are
being soft-pedaled in public
statements which stress claimed
achievements of the leap forward
period. The vice chairman of
the State Planning Commission
argues in the Workers Daily of
30 September that the regime
achieved its principal industrial
CON
targets for the Second Five-Year
Plan by 1960, leaving ample room
in the remaining two years to
"increase the variety of prod-
ucts, raise their quality, and
muster greater aid to agricul-
ture." He further defines the
key objective of industry this
year as aiding agriculture by
enlarging the manufacture of
farm implements and machinery,
chemical fertilizer, and insec-
ticides.
In pursuit of their indus-
trial objectives there is evi-
dence that the Chinese are in
fact overhauling equipment,
instituting more effective sys--
tems of quality control, re-em-
phasizing technical managerial
skills as opposed to political
qualifications, and returning
to central authority the con-
trol over allocation of materials.
By retreating from the policy
of encouraging each plant to
produce at mximum capacity re-
gardless of the strain on equip-
ment, state of the raw material
supply, or usefulness of the
product, the regime is reassert-
ing its responsibility over the
allocation function. Instead
of forcing plants into a competi-
tive race for purely quantita-
tive goals of output, the new
1961 policies may curtail the
operations of a plant because
its equipment is due for a major
overhaul, because it fails to
meet the new standards of costs
and quality, or because the cur-
rent demand for its product is
less than its capacity.
This new approach to the
policy of allocation helps ex-
plain the many reports that
plants throughout China are sus-
pending or curtailing operations
during 1961. The most common
explanation--shortages of raw
materials--is clearly applicable
in the case of light industrial
plants, where the shortage of agri-
cultural products is obviously a
crippling factor. In addition to
the shortages of coal and iron ore
widely reported in China, some
plants in heavy industry are also
squeezed by scarcity of materials
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE i',TEEKLY SUMMARY
that are difficult to obtain
readily either at home or
abroad; a case in pointa.is the
dearth of cold rolled steel,
apparently affecting production
at China's Changchun truck plant.
For many plants in heavy
industry, however, reported
"shortages" may reflect not only
the irtabil.i;ty..:of.;the :econ,omy. to
furnish the materials but also
the unwillingness of the authori-
ties to allocate materials to
that articular o eration.
production of
new freight cars was allowed to
drop well below capacity in late
1911".`J and the first half of 1961,
at the same time that priority
was given for repairing and
rebuilding old freight cars.
25X1
I producer goods in general
would receive low priority in
1961. 25X1
heavy machine-building 2bAl
factories designed to produce
metallurgical equipment are also
operating below capacity.
It thus appears that Pei-
ping is taking action in the
industrial field to back up the
recently reiterated dictum that
"socialist economy is planned 25X1
economy; there must be a high
degree of centralized and uni-
fied leadership." Only the ex-
cesses of the officially en-
dorsed "leap forward" would seem
to make. such a repetition neces-
sary. F 25X1
CHINESE COMMUNISTS REPLACE PARTY LEADERS IN PROVINCES
Information recently pub-
lished in the Chinese Communist
press reveals that the party
first secretaries have been re-
moved in Honan, Tsinghai, and
Kansu provinces and in the
Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous
Region. The known dismissals
bring to five the number of
first secretaries who have been
replaced in the past year.
Like Shu Tung, the First .
Secretary of Shantung Province
who lost his position last
autumn, Wu Chib-pu in Honan was
an articulate advocate of the
regime's more extremist poli-
cies; he was appointed first
secretary after his predecessor's
more moderate views had been
denounced. The first intimation
that Wu might be in trouble was
his long absence from the public
scene--he had not been noted in
public for about a year. Then,
Honan Daily on 26 August pub-
'l hs ed an article which was
strongly critical of "leader-
ship cadres and offices" that
made unrealistic plans in disre-
gard of objective limitations.
This was in marked contrast to
the usual practice of blaming
those at lower levels for mis-
understanding or misapplying
"correct" party policy. De-
teriorating morale among the
party rank and file has ap-
parently led Peiping to place
the onus at a higher rank.
Wu was not expelled from
the provincial party apparatus;
instead he has been demoted to
"second" secretary. The re-
assignment as second secretary
reflects the regime's shift
toward more moderate economic
policies, but suggests that the
party does not regard his errors
as overly serious.
In Tsinghai Province, Wang
Chao was identified as "acting
first secretary." Wang served
as vice minister of public
security in Peiping until 21 July,
when he was apparently reassigned
to Tsinghai. Tsinghai is one of
China's "outer provinces" with a
large minority nationality popu-
lation--mostly Tibetan--which
has often resisted rule by the
Chinese, especially in times of
economic hardship. The last
known fighting took place in 1958.
Although there is no present
CONFIDE L 15 d 23
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S6 @Rf
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
First Secretaries unreported recently.
h., r 4'h
SINK/A Nr_ /
COMMUNIST CHINA
First Secretaries replaced in past year.
U/GHD/?
N 0MOus
?mac G/0N
ULAN
BATOR
INNER' M ~PFIgING 1
rIBEr
~~A7,L7A~11t ~1'L, T1. \~
\ NINUSIA~
: I
r r:a
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VIEUNAM ~J~ pylLLlppLNEB
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.?~ _ N.,, ..d 6v . US Go~
evidence of open rebellion in
Tsinghai, the assignment of a
public security man to head
the provincial administration
suggests the regime's concern
over public disorders.
Minority problems may
have played a role in the re-
placement of the party first
secretary in Kansu Province.
The Moslems have given the
Chinese Communists considerable
trouble; purges of "local
nationalists" took place in
both 1958 and 1960. There is
no direct evidence that the
first secretary of Kansu was
removed for his inability to
cope with minority problems,
but his replacement, Wang Feng,
is one of the regime's leading
experts in this field. Wang has
served in Tibet, Ningsia Hui, and
Tsinghai and is a vice chairman
of the party's united front de-
partment.
Ethnic minorities constitute
37 percent of the population of the
Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region,
where the first secretary has also
been changed. Areas where party
first secretaries have not been
reported as attending recent func-
tions include Kweichow and Hopeh
provinces and the Ningsia Hui Au-
tonomous Region. High-level shifts
of personnel could have also taken
place in some of these areas as
well as in Shansi, where the provin-
cial leader has been mentioned re-
cently but without his party title.__
nli~w'w
CONFIDENTIAL
'~. I" KWANG5I CHUANG'1"'~ AN~,II
/
'~( ~ AUTONOMOUS REGION KW }' t N N :1
( ~. H [1 R M A /v.Mlw' FoNrH ? `
Pe v aM {_ oa
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI DISPUTE
The deadlock between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan continues as
each waits in the hope that
Washington will move to obtain
concessions from the opposing
side. Afghanistan remains firm
in its refusal to use the Pak-
istani route for foreign trade,
and both countries are taking
steps which will speed the di-
version of nonbloc trade with'
Afghanistan to the Soviet route.
Moscow appears to be exploit-
ing the crisis to encourage
greater Afghan reliance on So-
viet economic cooperation. The
Soviet transit route is appar-
ently now being made as economi-
cally feasible for nonbioc
shipping as the Pakistani route
had been before Afghanistan
closed its hcordpr with pakictan
Soviet POL deliveries to
Afghanistan have been resumed,
at least for the time being.
This will assist Afghan truck-
ing, which forms the backbone of
the country's transportation
system, to return to nearly
normal operation. It will also
increase Afghanistan's military
capability.
Moscow may urge Kabul to
depend almost entirely on the
USSR for the Afghan Second Five-
Year Plan's foreign assistance
requirements, since American aid
projects now seem endangered by
the disruption of supply lines
through Pakistan. An Afghan
economic delegation arrived in
Moscow on 4 October to negotiate
a new Soviet aid agreement. Kabul
has been counting on several
hundred million dollars worth
of assistance from the USSR for
the plan, scheduled to begin in
early 1962.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has re-25X1
quested nonbloc shippers:ta..Stop
sending goods bound for Afghan-
istan to Pakistan until the
present congestion of transit
facilities is relieved, warning
that it will soon be obliged to 25X1
auction off uncleared' goods if
Kabul refuses to open the
border.
FINNISH-SOVIET RELATIONS
Finland's President Kekkonen,
who begins an official visit to
the United States on 16 October,
appears to be getting increas-
ingly open support from the USSR
for re-election next January.
Moscow probably hopes to exploit
Kekkonen's policy of maintain-
ing cordial relations with the
USSR to gain Finnish participa-
tion in a peace conference to
sign a bloc treaty with East
Germany.
Soviet President Brezhnev,
during his 22-30 September visit
to Finland, made many laudatory
remarks about Kekkonen and
clearly indicated that the USSR
regards him as the leader best
suited to preserve good rela-
tions between the two countries.
The Finns and the Russians are
negotiating an agreement which
will enable to Finns to lease
and use the Soviet portion of
the Saimaa Canal connecting the
CONF 1DENTIAL
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_WN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
lake ?;-stem of eastern Finland
with the Gulf of Finland, and
there are indications that
Kekkonen may visit Moscow in
order to sign the agreement
before the January election.
Such an agreement would enhance
the claim of Kekkonen's sup-
porters that he is the man who
can best manage Soviet-Finnish
relations and also increase his
popularity with the farmers of
eastern Finland.
in two for-
mal speeches rez nev advo-
cated a peace treaty with East
Germany, adding that the So-
viets "rejoice that our neigh-
bor and friend Finland gives
its valuable contribution to
the cause of strengthening
peace." The USSR has listed
Finland among those to attend
a German peace conference; but
the Finns, who have been reluc-
tant to recognize East Germany,
could claim that since they
were not at war with Germany
they need not participate. Fin-
land was nevertheless one of
the few non-bloc countries to
be represented at the recent
celebration of East Germany's
twelfth anniversary.
Brezhnev also reportedly
encouraged Kekkonen to raise
the idea of a Scandinavian and
Central European neutral zone
during his visit to the United
States. Many influential Finns,
including Kekkonen, subscribe
to this long-standing Soviet
objective, since any enlarge-
ment of the area of neutrality
would increase Finland's pros-
F_
FINLAND
HELSINKI
PREWAR ~
INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY
7 Vyborg
Leninrad
U S S R
pects for maintaining its own
neutrality.
The USSR places much prop-
aganda value on good Finnish-
Soviet relations as an example
of peaceful coexistence. At
the same time, the USSR has not
hesitated in the past to employ
economic coercion, and it is now
in a position to do so again
since negotiations for a 1962
trade protocol are scheduled to
begin this month. Finnish-Soviet
trade in 1960 amounted to $291;
000,000; although the Soviet
Union's percentage of Finnish
trade has declined in recent
years--to 14.7 percent of Finland's
imports and 14.2 percent of its
exports in 1960--Finland obtains
most of its oil from the USSR and
markets it high-cost ships there.
In 1958 the USSR toppled the Fager-
holm coalition government by re-
fusing to negotiate a trade pro-
tocol for 1959 until the Fagerhoim
cabinet was replaced with one more
to Moscow's lik?
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
r_4 U-71IM-1
12 Oct 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1S of 23
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-- . . ^ ON ^i-.
CURRENT'INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
The pace of political de-
velopment in !?a, t A N ica has
been accelerated with the an-
nouncement in London that
Uganda is to achieve independ-
ence on 9 October 1962. This
announcement is likely to in-
crease Kenyan agitation for
early independence, as well as
to renew similar pressure by
Zanzibari Arabs. However, if
London had resisted the growing
African pressure for independ-
ence, widespread violence would
probably have resulted. Brit=
ain's trust territory of
Tanganyika is scheduled for in-
dependence on 9 December 1961.
who, while officially remaining
aloof from either part,,, is con--
tinuing his pressure on both (.-)them to merge under his leader3hip.
Announcement of the early date for
Uganda's independence will proba-
bly increase pressure on nation-
alist leaders--particularly in
Mboya's party--to demand a rapid
end of British control. It may
also furnish prominent ex - Mau
Mau detainees who have recently
Joined this party a ready-made
issue to use against Mboya's lead-
ership.
In Zanzibar, where racial
tension has abated somewhat since
the riots in June following the
Constitutional talks between
British representatives and del-
egates from Kenyan and Ugandan
nationalist groups have not gen-
erally been harmonious because
of factional infighting among
the Africans. In Uganda the
chief difficulty has been the
status of the rich province of
Buganda, which has long demanded
autonomy or at least a federal
r? :lationship with Uganda. A
compromise has apparently been
reached which will permit Uganda
to evolve under an African-domi-
nated central government with
internal self-government next
March and independence in October
while guaranteeing the tradi-
tional position of the Buganda
King in his province. However,
any such arrangement remains
tenuous.
In Kenya, the African
nationalists could obtain early
independence if the two main
contending African parties--
which are based on mutually sus-
picious tribal groups--could
agree on a common government and
policy. Talks have been broken
off following a stalemate caused
by the refusal of Tom Mboya's
party--which has the largest
electoral appeal among Kenya
Africans--to join the governing
party on the latter's terms,
which include a guarantee of
minority tribal rights.
Overshadowing the leaders
of both parties is Jomo Kenyatta,
S U D\A N
/` t -Kamp.la
tiC 1, Entebb.,WN1-
REPUBLIC ~?r \ PR ?K ti
/ L. ZANZTBAB
D. ea Salaam}`,
electoral victory of the minority
Arab nationalists, the announce-
ment of Uganda's forthcoming inde-
pendence is likely to stimulate the
Arab-controlled government to seek
independence before the African
popular majority can gain power.
Arab leaders have indicated their
opposition to any federation with
the mainland territories until
they are in position to safeguard
the Arab minority position.
Of Britain's four East African
territories, only Tanganyika, under
the leadership of moderate Prime 25X1
Minister Julius Nyerere, is ap-
proaching independence with no
serious internal problems.
NOR
12 Oct 61. WEEKLY REVIEW
CONFIDENTIAL
Nairobi*
Merv.. ; of
~Mombasa
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SULILIARY
POLITICAL UNREST IN ECUADOR
A Communist-promoted gen-
eral strike attempt, which be-
gan in Ecuador on 4 October and
now has subsided, developed into
the most serious threat Presi-
dent Velasco had faced since
taking office in September 1960.
Partly as a result of pressure
from the military and other
right-wing elements, Velasco is
apparently considering a crack-
down on the activities of the
Ecuadorean Communist party and
a diplomatic break with Cuba.
A reversal of Velasco's previous
pro-Castro attitude might
strengthen the chances for some
joint action in the hemisphere
against extracontinental inter-
vention in Cuba.
The strike was called by
the Communist-dominated Con-
federatidn of Ecuadorean Workers
(CTE), the country's largest
labor organization, ostensibly
to protest proposed new taxes.
Although some of the GTE' s af-
filiates refused to participate,
the confederation has demonstra?t-?
ed its ability to provoke vio=
fence and can now be counted
among Velasco's leftist enemies..
Strike violence erupted in
three northern provincial
cities--Ibarra, Tulcan, and
Esmeralda--all.. of' which were
placed under-military rule.
Quito and Guayaquil, centers of
the nation's political and eco-
nomic life, have been relatively
.calm. Even though only partly
successful, the strike is likely
to have adverse effects on Ecua-
dor's depressed economy and
hinder government efforts to
check the sharp decline in for-
eign exchange reserves, reduce
the current budget deficit , and
restore business confidence.
Velasco's position was shaky
before the: -strike was launched.
Frequent ..cabinet changes and
extensive shuffling of top mili
terry positions reflected his
concern with opposition from
rightists, including some mili-
tary plptting. Velasco broke
recently with his pro-Communist
former minister of government--
the leader oh pro-Castro elements
In Ecuador--and is also at odds
with Vice President Arosemena,
another long,-tame political ally.
Arosemena apparently aspires
to replace the President as head
of leftist "reform" groups and
could cause a split in Velasco's
own heterogeneous following.
The military are believed
loyal to Velasco but have prob-
hbly- impressed upon him the need
to adopt strong anti-Communist
measures and to change his pro-
Cuban policy--possibly in ex-
change for their continuing,
support. A high-ranking officer
advised the US army attache in
Quito on 6 October that the
President is convinced he must
break relations with Cuba and
is trying to obtain documen-
tary evidence of Cuban inter-
vention in Ecuador to justify
this move. His. need for US
financial aid and for mili-
tary equipment to control riots
is probably a further influence,
toward a change in his Cuban
policy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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"URRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY'
COLOMBIA
The Colombian Government
was o erted to the danger of a
potential new area of rural un-
rest when a unit of marines was
captured on 27 September with
all its equipment by a sizable
pro-Communist guerrilla force in
the eastern part of the large
plains area known as the Llanos.
The marines were later released
and government control was re-
established, but the guerrilla
band`, which melted away with its
arms, could reappear elsewhere
and possibly spill over into
neighboring Venezuela.
Rural violence has plagued
Colombia since about 1948. it
includes banditry and smuggling
as well as guerrilla warfare,
and has resulted in the deaths
of more than 250,000 people and
probably has displaced more than
1,500,000 peasants during the
past 13 years. On the decline
during the first two years of
President Lleras' admi.k..:tra-
tion, it began to increase in
mid-1960. About 1,750 persons
were killed in the first seven
months of 1961, as compared with
about 1,500 for the same period
of 1960.
Lleras considers the vio-
lence the most pressing problem
of his administration, and,
after an abortive rebellion by
a small army unit on 11 October,
extended the partial state of
siege throughout the nation.
The causes of the violence are
complex and includ long-stand-
ing antagonism between the
Liberals and Conservatives often
resulting in brutal party vendet-
tas, the breakdown of law en-
forcement in rural areas, the
adoption of banditry as a way
of life on a full-time or part-
time basis by large numbers of
peasants, and the revival at the
local level of "chieftain" rule--.
military-style "bossism" tra-
ditional to Latin America.
The centers of the violence
have shifted from time to time,
but in recent months it has been
CONFIDENTIAL
largely concentrated,;,,4.n the
agriculturally importgnt coffee-
producing departments in the
central-western part of,? the
country. The western T;.lauos,
a focal point of guerrilla
operations in the early 19501?,
has been relatively peaceful in
recent years.
The Colombian Government
believes the violence is drect-
ed by Communists, and ghat', .they
plan to extend the moverhett '
westward across the Llapos.'?The
Communists have long maintained
exclusive control of small rural
enclaves in ' central ?Co1Ibmbia,
but their policy in'these ?areas
has been largely defez'sive. -Their
role in rural violenbe:fn?.a, na-
tional scale is uncldarl, although
there is evidence that they are
becoming increasingly: aggressive
in exploiting and sprleading the
problem in collaboration with
leftist agitators.
COLOMBIA
2 ,i*PANAMA
*QUITD
E C U A D O R . 1
r
Santa Marta
9ananauBla,
Manizeles BOGOTA S
yie ?
Ihague 0
Communist 'VUI.c c~em
controlled c
cah? enclaves pSumapoz
Nel'J, ?
C:ate;a:
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ? EK:+.,Y SUMMARY
Bolivia's continuing polit-
ical instability is reflected
in new violence earlier this
month in the provincial capital
of Santa Cruz.
Petroleum workers have
been threatening a strike in
support of the Sandoval forces.
The release during Septem-
ber of some 30 of Bolivia's
most effective Communist agita-
tors after three months in
prison has enhanced the possi-
bility of disorders in
areas.
The long-term downward
trend in the economy which has
been a deep-seated cause of
instability shows some signs,
however, of reversing itself.
Petroleum production came to
1,500,000 barrels for the first
half of 1961--approximately the
level of recent years and suf-
ficient for national consumption
as well as minor exports. In
recent months, delays in pro- 25X1
curement of the new equipment
for the government-owned compare;'
has resulted in a decline, but
hope for a substantial increase
in over-all production has been
encouraged by the Bolivian Gulf
Oil Company's discoveries near
Santa Cruz during the past year.
Although Bolivian Gulf's local
staff is cautious because no
large oil field has previously
been found in a similar geologi-
cal formation, the company has
ordered preliminary planning
for a $25,000,000 connecting
pipeline to move production to
the west coast of South America.
There are also indications
that Bolivia's tin production,
which has fallen precipitately
over the past 15 years, may
now be increasing. Output of
the nationalized and independ-
ent mines for January _,May, 1961 25X1
showed an increase of 18 percent.
in volume and 23 percent in value
over the first five months of
1960. A possibility of longer
term improvement in production
of minerals rises from the ini-
tiation in late August of the
"triangular plan" to rehabilitate
the mines with aid from the West
German and US governments and
from the Inter-American Bank.
Sg
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
Soviet leaders were confi-
dent that Khrushchev's meeting
with President Kennedy at
Vienna last'June would open
the way for a new round of East-
West negotiations on Berlin and
Germany. They embarked on a
program designed to induce the
West to take the initiative in
proposing negotiations and to
create the most favorable con-
ditions for extracting Western
concessions.
In speeches on 15 and 21
June, Khrushchev moved to
sharpen the sense of urgency
surrounding the Berlin ques-
tion by declaring that the
USSR would sign a separate
peace treaty with East Germany
if there were no East-West
agreement by the end of 1961.
He also warned that the Soviet
Government might be obliged to
increase defense allotments
and strengthen its armed forces.
To lend substance to this warn-
ing, he announced on 8 July the
suspension of force reductions
planned for 1961 and an increase
of over 3 billion rubles in de-
fense allocations. Soviet of-
ficials stated privately at
this time that Khrushchev's
new deadline was aimed only at
overcoming the West's "delaying
tactics" and forcing it into
negotiations by the end of the
year.
Moscow's attempts to im-
press the West with Soviet
strength and resolution pro-
duced extreme alarm in East
Germany which was registered
in a sharp increase in the num-
ber of refugees fleeing to West
Berlin. The July figure of
30,444 was the highest for any
month since 1953. The refugee
flow reached near-panic propor-
tions in the first week of
August and sent Ulbricht off
to the USSR for hurried consul-
tations.
Soviet leaders previously
had been reluctant to sanction
East German action to halt the
refugee flow because they real-
ized this would advertise the
weakness and vulnerability of
the Ulbricht regime and damage
the Soviet position in negotia-
tions on Berlin and Germany.
Sealing of the borders around
West Berlin had long been
planned as one of the conse-
quences of a separate peace
treaty with East Germany. The
flood of refugees, however,
forced the hands of the Soviet
and East German leaders and
compelled them to alter the
timing of this action. They
recognized that the only way
to salvage some vestige of
authority for the East German
regime and possibly to avert
its eventual collapse was to
apply extreme measures to close
the sector border.
It seems likely that these
measures--as well as subsequent
Soviet military moves, including
the resumption of nuclear tests--
were formally set forth at the
meeting of the first secretaries
of the Warsaw Pact Communist par-
ties in Moscow from 3 to 5 August.
CONFIDENTIAL
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wa=
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Reaction to US Position
The period in late July
and early August when Khrushchev
was forced to deal with the ref-
ugee problem coincided with a
new shock from the US in the
form of President Kennedy's ad-
dress to the nation on the Ber-
lin problem on 25 July. This
address had a deep impact on
the Soviet leadership. Khru-
shchev's reaction suggests that
he interpreted the address as
indicating that the United
States would be willing to ne-
gotiate only on the basis. of
existing Allied rights in West
Berlin and that it would reject
any solution which implied a
change in the present legal
basis of the West's position in
the city.
Khrushchev told the Soviet
people in a radio-television
speech on 7 August that Pres-
ident Kennedy "did not stop at
presenting to us something in
the way of an ultimatum." He
declared that "it must be said
frankly that at present the
Western powers are pushing the
world to a dangerous divide,
and the emergence of a threat
of an armed attack by the im-
perialists on the socialist
states cannot be excluded."
Khrushchev responded to the
"challenge" by strengthening his
commitment to ;Sign a German
peace treaty. He asserted that
if the USSR renounced the treaty,
the Western powers "would re-
gard this as a strategic break-
through and would widen the
range of their demands at once."
Although Khrushchev thus felt
obliged to adopt an even more
militant and unyielding attitude,
he evinced concern that this
process of East-West demonstra-
tions and counterdemonstrations
would tend to transform what he
had consistently tried to rep-
resent as strictly a political
and legal issue into an undis-
guised test of national will,
prestige, and power. In a
speech on 11 August, the Soviet
premier took pains to hold the
door open to negotiations and
said the Berlin question itself
would not be so difficult to
solve, provided the issue was
not turned into a "trial of
strength."
Resumption of Nuclear Tests
Khrushchev's willingness
to accept the incalculable po-
litical and propaganda costs
entailed by the resumption of
nuclear tests is a good measure
of the seriousness of his con-
cern that his whole Berlin
strategy had been placed in
jeopardy by the closure of the
Berlin sector border and by the
failure of his earlier demon-
strative military measures to
produce a change in the Western
attitude. He recognized that
the drastic action to halt the
refugee flow had severely dam-
aged Soviet efforts to present
the Ulbricht regime as a sov-
ereign and respectable nego-
tiating partner and that, as a
consequence, his aim of extract-
ing Western concessions imply-
ing at'least de facto recogni-
tion of East Germany had been
seriously compromised.
In this situation, Khru-
shchev invoked the weapon of
nuclear intimidation as a more
forceful means of demonstrating
the USSR's military strength
and determination to force a
change in the status of West
Berlin. He probably calculated
that a resumption of tests
would place the USSR in the
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
strongest possible position to
carry out the long-threatened
action to sign a separate peace
treaty in the event the Nest
refused to enter negotiations
or rejected Soviet terms for
a settlement.
Moscow sought to enhance
the effect of the testing an-
nouncement by stating on 1 Sep-
tember that military exercises
using advanced modern weapons
would be conducted by the North-
ern Fleet, jointly with the
Rocket Troops and the Air Force,
in the Barents and Kara seas in
September and October. The r'dar-
saw Pact defense ministers fol-
lowed this with an announcement
on 10 September of their deci-
sion to work out "practical
measures" to strengthen bloc
defense. On 25 September, Mos-
cow announced that Warsaw Pact
forces would conduct exercises
in October and November.
Moves to End Impasse
After setting in train
this bloc-wide series of mil-
itary demonstrations, Khru-
shchev began to shift his
political line back to a more
flexible and positive attitude
toward negotiations. He ap-
peared to recognize the dangers
of a situation in which both
sides might feel confronted with
the alternatives of a humiliat-
ing retreat or a showdown which
could escape control. Khrushchev
now is seeking to work his way
out of this impasse.
In a speech at Stalingrad
on 10 September, he went to some
lengths to attribute to each of
the Western leaders a willingness
to begin negotiations and con-
cluded that "glimpses of hope
now have appeared" for "peace-
ful talks." In private talks
with free-world leaders,includ-
ing Ins'ian Prime Minister Nehru,
Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio, and Belgian Foreign
Minister Spaak, Khrushchev
stressed the USSR's willingness
to accommodate the West by pro-
viding some form of Soviet guar-
antee of YVestern access to West
Berlin in connection with a bloc
peace treaty with East Germany.
Khrushchev suggested to
Subandrio that Western access
rights to Nest Berlin might be
guaranteed in documents signed
by the U3SR and East Germany
which would be attached to
the treaty. This approach
was spelled out in greater de-
tail in a speech on 6 October
by Ulbricht, who proposed that
both sides agree on "special
arrangements" for a Berlin
solution and on "declarations
containing guarantees before
the conclusion of a peace
treaty." These arrangements,
he said, would then be incor-
porated in the peace treaty
with East Germany.
This formula for a separate
four.-power agreement on Berlin
and a Soviet guarantee of East
German performance in executing
access controls is clearly de-
signed to meet Western objections
to a unilateral transfer of con-
trols by maintaining an outward
appearance of the status quo and
continuing Soviet responsibility
for Allied access. Khrushchev
probably hopes thus to persuade
the West that negotiations could
lead to a compromise which would
protect the Western position in
Berlin but at the same time al-
low the Soviet Union a free hand
to proceed with a peace treaty
with East Germany. He probably
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feels that incorporation in a
separate treaty of a four-power
agreement and a Soviet guarantee
of access would greatly reduce
the risks of signing a separate
treaty and could even be rep-
resented as at least tacit West-
ern consent to this treaty.
This formula would also
allow the bloc unilaterally to
declare West Berlin a free city
after the signing of the sep-
arate treaty but at the same
time permit the West to inter-
pret the agreement as an endorse-
ment of the existing status.
Khrushchev's proposed compro-
mise, however, would in fact
require the Western powers to
concede the USSR's fundamental
demand for a change in the sta-
tus of West Berlin and an end
to the Western "occupation re-
gime."
Position on Separate Treaty
Khrushchev is personally
deeply committed to signing a
treaty with East Germany, which
he desires not only as an Im-
portant step toward general in-
ternational recognition of the
East German regime but also to
establish a better legal basis
for the definitive acceptance
of present German frontiers.
He can therefore be expected
to press hard for any arrange-
ments with the West which he
judges will free his hands for
proceeding with the separate
treaty.
While it is too early to
exclude the possibility that
Khrushchev, as a fallback po-
sition, might again defer a
separate treaty and settle for
some form of interim agreement
that placed a definite time
limit on existing Western rights
in West Berlin, his present pro-
gram apparently cells for going
through with a separate treaty
unless he should come to believe
that the Western attitude would
pose unacceptable risks of war
for such a course. He is now
much more deeply committed to
signing a treaty with East Ger-
many than he was in the earlier
phases of his Berlin operation
in 1959 and 1960. He would
find it difficult to represent
as a major victory in 1961 an
interim solution along the lines
of Soviet proposals at the
Geneva foreign ministers' con-
ference in 1959.
Soviet View of West's Intentions
The Soviet leaders appear
confident that the recent ex-
changes between Secretary Rusk
and Foreign Minister Gromyko will
open the way for formal East-
West negotiations before the end
of the year. They are still re-
lying, however, on the combina-
tion of pressures and inducements
to bring the West to the bargain-
ing table under conditions favor-
able to the USSR. At a public
lecture in Moscow on 26 September,
the speaker stated categorically
that the Rusk-Gromyko talks
would be followed by negotiations.
He expressed optimism that a
peaceful solution would ensue
and cited the US-Soviet agree-
ment of 20 September on a state-
ment of principles for disarm-
ament negotiations as an indica-
tion that the Berlin question
would be resolved peacefully.
Soviet spokesmen are also
still expressing confidence that
the West will eventually agree
to a Berlin settlement rather
than face the risks of an East-
West conflict to maintain the
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status quo in Berlin. Khru-
shchev told Yugoslav Foreign Min-
ister Popovic in July that the
chances of war were not more than
5 percent and that when the West-
ern powers discovered that the
separate treaty would not intro-
duce any really substantive
changes in access prodedures,
"they will swallow it." In his
interview with New York Times
-~ zbFr_ger_on "5
correspondent SI
September, Khrushchev again
predicted that the West would
not go to war over the signing
of a peace treaty and remarked
that America's Western European
allies are, "figuratively speak-
ing, hostages to us and a guar-
antee against war."
Gromyko, in his speech to
the UN General Assembly on 26
September, expressed skepticism
in regard to Western willingness
to resort to force, saying,"There
is a great difference between
statements about-readiness to
use force and the actual use of
force, if account is taken of
what such a use of force would
mean . . . . t,
Despite these continuing
expressions of confidence that
the West can be pressured and
induced to make negotiated con-
cessions, it seems likely that
the ULc attitude on Berlin has
caused Khrushchev to raise his
estimate of Ame_ican willingness
to defend the Western position
and of the risks carried by
unilateral Communist :actions.
The firm US position has sharp-
ened Khrushchev's dilemma in
managing his Berlin policy. He
can have no illusions that he
could escape serious damage to
his personal prestige and author-
ity in the Communist bloc, the
international Communist move-
ment, and throughout the world
if he should retreat or abandon
his Berlin demands. Khrushchev
is under heavy pressure to
achieve a success on Berlin which
he can use to demonstrate the
effectiveness and correctness
of his entire strategic line
in dealing with the West.
It was this strategy which
produced the bitter collision
with the Chinese Communist's, be-
cause Khrushchev's policy of lim-
ited detente and negotiations
in 1959 and 1960 cut directly
across Peiping's interests, which
demanded unremitting hostility
to the West. The Sino-Soviet dis-
pute has substantially narrowed
Khrushchev's field of maneuver
and has created constant pres-
sure on Moscow for bolder, more
militant actions in the foreign
policy field. Any suggestion
that Khrushchev's tactics on
Berlin and a separate peace
treaty were mere bluff or that
he was backing down in the face
of Western demonstrations of
military power would inflict
irreparable damage to his posi-
tion as leader of the Communist
bloc.
Khrushchev's actions ap-
pear to be strongly motivated
by an awareness that time is
running out on his Berlin opera-
tion and that considerations of
personal prestige and authority
will rule out any further pro-
longed delays in bringing the
whole matter to a head. Under
these circumstances, Khrushchev
probably would not hesitate to
undertake even more threatening
and increasingly risky tactics
should he be confronted with
further manifestations of West-
ern strength and firmness on
Berlin. If his recent gestures
toward working out a compromise
Berlin accord along the lines
of his remarks to Spaak failed
draw a favorable Western response,
he would almost certainly feel
compelled to intensify the war
of nerves in a final effort to
prevent the West from forcibly
opposing unilateral Communist
action following the conclu-
sion of a treaty with East Ger-
many.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE FORTHCOMING SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
On 17 October the Soviet
Communist party will convene
its 22nd congress--the third
such meeting since Khrushchev
became first secretary of the
party in 1953. Essentially a
policy-propagating organ--one
that gives formal approval of
the programs of the leadership
--the congress will hear re-
ports on foreign and domestic
policy and the status of the
party. It will also elect a
new central committee, the com-
position of which will already
have been decided by higher
authority.
Khrushchev apparently
sees this congress as the high
point of his career, and he
will certainly dominate its
proceedings. He will deliver
the major speech, the report
of the central committee; he
will also present the new party
program--a broad policy outline
supposedly to be followed over
the next 20 years. For the
short run, however, the most
important aspect of the con-
gress is that it will give
Khrushchev ample opportunity
to expound Soviet foreign policy
and may give the West a better
idea of the course of action he
plans to take on the Berlin
problem.
Functions of the Congress
The congress, described
in Soviet literature as the
"indisputable authority of
party power," is the formal
apex of the party's hierarchi-
cal organizational system.
Composed of delegates ostensi-
bly elected in a democratic
manner at regional convocations
of delegates from district meet-
ings, the congress is supposed
to express the wisdom, will,
and experience of the whole
party.
During the early years of
the Communist regime the congress
did participate actively in
policy making; it acted as a
consultative and ratifying body
and supreme arbiter of disagree-
ments on policy. However, Stalin
convened only four congresses
after 1927, and the body degener-
ated into a rubber-stamp organiza-
tion with the primary function of
clothing the acts of autocratic
dictatorship with an aura of dem-
ocratic legitimacy and to propa-
gate the broad lines of regime
policy. Although the party lead-
ers after Stalin observed the
statutory requirement that the
congress meet at least once every
four years, its role and opera-
tions have not perceptibly changed.
Nevertheless, the convoca-
tion of a party congress is an
event of great importance in
Soviet political life. It is
the occasion for summing up and
distilling the experience gained
and for authoritatively defining
and highlighting the basic ele-
ments in regime policy. The
congress thus serves as a primary
reference point in Communist de-
velopment. Pronouncements issued
through the media of the 20th
congress in 1956 and the 21st con-
gress in 1959 are still used as
basic guides in the execution
of policy.
The convening of a congress
also serves to bring to a focus
the crosscurrents of political
maneuvering and policy disagree-
ments which exist among the top
leaders. With the periodic re-
constitution of the ruling presid-
ium (Khrushchev ai.d his top
aides), secretariat, and central
committee in the offing, a reas-
sessment of all individuals in
the upper echelons of the party
takes place. Rivalries tend
either to come to a head or to
subside temporarily. Efforts
of the top leaders around the
party first secretary to place
their friends and proteges in
positions of honor and influence
are intensified, because a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ELECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
INSPECTS
PARTY CONGRESS
22nd-About 4,000 Delegates
Previously 1,300-1,400 Delegates
DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED
BY LOWER PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
SUPREME PARTY BODY
PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE
Size Unknown
CENTRAL APPARATUS
About 30 Departments
(Approximately 3,500 People)
SELECTS
ADVISES
PRESIDIUM
Currently 14 Full (voting) Members
9 Candidate Members
PRESIDIUM
Currently 14 Full (voting) Members
9 Candidate Members
KHHUSHCHEV AND HIS PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS
VIRTUALLY SE I F PE HIE T UATI NG
EFFECTIVE SOURCE OF ALL TOP
POLICY DECISIONS FOR THE USSR
MEETS AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK
SECRETARIAT
Currently 5 Members
(NHRUSNCHEV AND EIGHT
OF HIS LIEUTENANTS)
DIRECTS DAY TODAY ACTIVITIES OF
THE PROFESSIONAL PARTY MACHINE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
22nd - ?
Currently 120 Full (voting) Members
I I1 Candidate Members
TORUM FOR DISSEMINATING AND
EXPLAINING MAIOR CURRENT
POLICY DECI5IONS
PARTY CONGRESS
22nd-About 4,000 Delegates
Previously 1,300-1,400 Delegate
FORUM FOR PERIODIC PROPAGATION
OF DISTILLED ExPERIENCE OF REGIME.
ITS BASIC POLICIES,- TASKS SET
FOR THE FUTURE
CENTRAL
AUDITING COMMISSION
Currently 57 Members
CHECKS UP ON SPEED AND CORRECT-
NESS OF ACTIVITIES OF CENTRAL
PARTY BODIES AND CONOI TEN OF
PARTY FINANCES
MEETS AT ITS OWN DISCRETION,
i y 1
CENTRAL APPARATUS
About 30 Departments
(Approximately 3,500 People)
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PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE
Size Unknown
SECRETARIAT
Currently 5 Members
DIRECTS CURRENT WORK OF TIE PARTY
CmEFLY AS CONCERNS CHECKING ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY DECISIONS
AND SELECTION OF PERSONNEL
CENTRAL
AUDITING COMMISSION
Currently 57 Members
O FORMA CHECKS ON
SPE[OR NO CORRECTNESS OF ACT IV
HIES OF CENTRAL PARTY BODIES AND
CONDITION OF PARTY FINANCES
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S
congress tends to solidify
political relations, if only
for a short time. These re-
lations, however, are estab-
lished in the months preced-
ing the congress. Emphasis at
the congress itself is on unity.
Planning and controls are so
rigid that a serious effort
to alter political relations
at the congress could be made
only if the presidium were
hopelessly divided.
The decline in the role
of the congress in the Stalin
period was accompanied by a
steady increase in membership.
In 1918, shortly after the
party came to power, the con-
gress consisted of only 104
delegates. About 1,400 dele-
gates attended each of the
three congresses held since
World War II, however, and
more than 4,000 delegates will
attend this one. This latest
sharp increase in number of
delegates constitutes an attempt
by Khrushchev to magnify his
prestige and provide a fitting
forum for the official launch-
ing of his new program for
building Communism. A new
conference hall with a seating
capacity of over 6,000--largest
in the Soviet Union--has been
rushed to completion for the
congress.
The lists of delegates
available thus far indicate
that an overwhelming number
will be attending a party
congress for the first time.
Apparently fewer than a fourth
of the delegates to the 21st
congress (January 1959) have
been re-elected to the 22nd,
whereas over one third of those
at the 20th congress (February
1956) were re-elected to the
21st. This sharp influx of new
delegates is indicative of the
wide changes which have taken
place in the party in recent
years, particularly the exten-
sive purge of "incompetent" and
"corrupt" officials which fol-
lowed the central committee
plenum on agriculture last Jan-
uary.
The full meaning of these
changes for the balance of power
among Khrushchev's lieutenants
is not yet clear. The first
clues will be provided by the
lists of delegates on the stand-
ing committees of the congress.
"Election" of these committees
will be the first item of busi-
ness.
Political Situation at the Top
Before the congress con-
venes, Khrushchev will already
have approved the membership
list of the new central commit-
tee and will have decided on
any changes to be made in the
composition of the presidium
and secretariat. These then
are the days of reckoning for
some of the younger party career-
ists; these are also the days
when the powers of the first
secretary are probably strongest.
While the top rung of the
party ladder is obviously strong,
some of the rungs immediately
below seem to have weaknesses.
In the presidium, for instance,
there is a group of old retainers
--including Kuusinen and Shvernik
--who seem to have outlived their
usefulness. There are others--
such as Aristov, Pospelov, and
Pervukhin--who have gone out of
favor. Actually, as many as ten
fullmembers and candidate mem-
bers of the presidium may be
removed.
There now are 22full and
candidate members, but only
about four or five are given
the heavy responsibilities of
leadership. Of this latter group,
the special favorites are Kozlov,
Khrushchev's First Deputy in the
party hierarchy; Kosygin, Khru-
shchev's alter ego in the govern-
ment Council of Ministers; and
Polyansky, 44-year-old premier
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR).
The situation in the secre-
tariat appears to be even more
pressing. Here, where the top
administrative work of the party
is handled, the membership now
is reduced to five. Kozlov
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BURY
seems to have the lion's share
of the work in spite of a seri-
ous heart attack last spring.
Business of the Congress
The general state of the
nation, as seen by the top lead-
ership, will be taken up as soon
as the business of electing
standing committees is disposed
of. As first secretary of the
central committee, Khrushchev
will deliver the customary
"accountability report," which
purports to justify to the
party's theoretically highest
body those actions taken by
the central committee since
the last regular party congress
--since the 20th congress of
1956,in this case; the 21st
congress was a special session.
The central committee's
report, traditionally the key-
note address at a party con-
gress, reviews past developments
and summarizes the Soviet Union's
status. It is usually divided
into three major portions; the
international situation, domes-
tic affairs, and the condition
of the party. In order to
maintain the facade of democ-
racy, presentation of the re-
port is followed by discussions
which ostensibly determine
whether or not the report is
to be accepted. That the re-
port is unanimously "approved"
by the delegates is a foregone
conclusion..
Khrushchev will probably
use the final portion of the
central committee report to
set the stage for his presen-
tation of the proposed new
program for the Soviet party.
This event, and the subsequent
adoption of the program by the
congress, is clearly to be
treated as a milestone in the
development of the USSR.
The party program is essen-
tially a statement of long-range
objectives--political, economic,
and social--to be achieved as
the nation gradually moves to-
ward the ultimate goal of
Communism. Khrushchev let it
be known last spring that he
personally would write most of
the new program, and his working
vacation during most of April
was ostensibly devoted to that
purpose. Certainly the draft
was prepared under his close
direction, and he intends that
it be associated with his name.
Just as Stalin is credited with
building socialism, Khrushchev
quite evidently wants to be
remembered as the architect of
Soviet Communism.
The proposed draft program
was published for mass "discus-
sion" on 30 July. Although it
is not a timetable, it does
combine the elements of a 20-
year economic development plan
with a sweeping doctrinal mani-
festo which maintains that, in
general, the building of Commu-
nism in the USSR will have been
completed by 1980. The attain-
ment of this goal is predicated
on a continuation of policies
and practices instituted under
Khrushchev since the 20th party
congress and on a vast and rapid
expansion of the Soviet economy.
The congress may elaborate
on the economic measures con-
tained in the draft program,
but the basic outline is not
likely to be changed. The
program conveys promises of a
grandiose welfare state based
upon a high rate of industrial
and agricultural development.
Stripped of its propaganda, it
continues to give primacy to
the growth-producing elements
of the economy--heavy industry--
at the expense of the consumer,
and amounts to a restatement
of policies and programs already
in existence.
The general context of
Khrushchev's statements on
foreign policy, except on cur-
rent issues such as Berlin, has
already been established by the
international sections of the
party program. Since the pro-
gram does not contain any signs
of a major shift from the
main lines of Soviet policy
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`w l,U 1117 11 '.`ll ML
laid down by Khrushchev at the
20th and 21st party congresses,
it is unlikely that Khrushchev's
report will develop any new
doctrinal positions. On the
contrary, his main purpose will
be to underscore those general
propositions which he considers
the basic tenets of his foreign
policy.
The program makes it clear
that Khrushchev regards the
achievement of his domestic
program as closely tied to the
successful implementation of
his peaceful coexistence strat-
egy, which the program reaf-
firms as the "main aim" and
"central principle" of Soviet
foreign policy. However, since
the program's justification of
this over-all international
strategy is extremely general
and is sufficiently flexible
to accommodate either an aggres-
sive or a conciliatory interpre-
tation, it is unlikely that
Khrushchev's report will pro-
vide a very clear guideline to
any specific trends in Soviet
tactics over the next several
years. Although Khrushchev
is bound by the general outline
of the program, the variations
in emphasis and the nuances
which he chooses to develop may
serve as an indication of the
state of intrabloc relations,
particularly Sino-Soviet affairs.
There have been a number
of indications that the con-
gress will mark a turning point
of sorts for bloc maneuvering
on Berlin and Germany. Khru-
shchev. has privately assured
Western diplomats that a sepa-
rate peace treaty with East Ger-
many would be deferred until
after the party congress, and
a number of Soviet spokesmen
have stated that Moscow con-
sidered the six weeks or so
preceding the congress to be
a decisive period in which
Khrushchev would have to make
basic decisions. Khrushchev's
general line on Berlin will
probably be greatly influenced
by his evaluation of Foreign
Minister Gromyko's recent talks
with Secretary Rusk and Presi-
dent Kennedy.
Other than Khrushchev, the
only major speaker scheduled is
central committee secretary Koz-
lov, who will deliver the report
on the proposed new party statutes
--the bylaws which govern all party
organizations and activities. The
only significant change from pre-
vious years is the provision for
systematic turnover in party bodies,
which the draft statutes spell out
in detail.
The last item of business
at the congress is the election
of the central committee, which,
in the make-believe system of
Soviet party democracy, is the
body formally empowered to act
for the coagress when the latter
is not in session. As in the
selection of delegates to the
congress, election of the cen-
tral committee simply means formal
approval of a slate already pre-
pared by Khrushchev and the other
top leaders.
The central committee is
one of the major prestige bodies
in the Soviet system. Nearly
all the more important and in-
fluential officials at the time
of the congress--leading govern-
ment executives, military lead-
ers, and provincial party bosses,
as well as the national party
leaders--are included. Its mem-
bership thus initially mirrors
the relationships established
in behind-the-scenes political
maneuvering. With the passage
of time, however, it becomes
"out of date" as members die or
lose their high political stand-
ing and new political relation-
ships are established.
Over 40 percent of the 255
members elected at the 20th con-
gress in 1956--no election took
place at the special 21st congress
--will probably be replaced at
this congress. This is consider-
ably higher than the replacement
levels in 1956 and is well above
the one-fourth turnover required
by the renewal provisions of the
new party rules.
The number of new members
will be even higher than these
figures indicate if an expected
expansion in the size of the
central committee takes place.
If the increase is comparable
to that of the provincial party
committees since 1956, the total
number of new faces on the cen-
tral committee will be well
over 200.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While Franco's opponents
have no prospect of attaining
power in Spain as long as he
remains on the scene, his re-
gime cor;,inues unpopular, and
opposit-von elements are making
some progress toward reconcil-
ing factional differences. In
recent months some of the non-
Communist left-of-center parties
have shown a willingness to
facilitate joint action by
agreeing in principle to res-
toration of the monarchy. Such
collaboration now would increase
the chances for these moderate
groups to play an important
role in the post-Franco era.
The Falange, Spain's only
legal party, has been losing
influence in recent years.
Nevertheless, its monopoly on
politics and Franco's prohibi-
tion of political activity have
prevented the development of
potential opposition leaders
of national stature.
The non-Communist opposi-
tion comprises relatively small
groups. On the one hand there
are the Monarchists and other
conservatives, who have become
increasingly concerned over
Fraxco's failure to provide for
an orderly transition of power.
The Socialists, on the other
hand, favor an eventual restora-
tion of the republic based on
a popular referendum. These
groups count on the army to
maintain public security on
Franco's demise, but they would
like, as the only hope of long-
term peace, to achieve a coali-
tion of moderate forces capable
of offering an acceptable alter-
native to the elements identi-
fied with Franco.
Christian Democrats
Two men who were cabinet
members prior to the civil
war head the divergent wings
of Christian Democracy, one
of the three principal oppo-
sition movements. The leader
of the center-right Social
Christian Democrats (DSC), 62-
year-old Jose Maria Gil Robles,
is probably the only antiregime
politician of national stature
who might achieve sufficient
opposition unity to establish
a government. He favors a
constitutional monarchy under
the main pretender Don Juan--
the only solution likely to
be acceptable to the army.
While he has apparently moved
considerably to the left in
his efforts to reach accord
with other groups, Gil Robles
has had no success in his at-
tempts at a merger with the
Christian Democratic Left (IDC),
headed by Manuel Gimenez Fernan-
dez, 65-year-old professor at
the University of Seville.
Gimenez Fernandez favors
closer relations with the
Socialists and several small
moderate leftist groups. The
IDC tends to draw on the middle
class for support rather than
try to attract workers and youth
groups. To the extent that it
is interested in attracting
labor, it reportedly favors the
Workers Brotherhood of Catholic
Action as a base for developing
a Christian syndicalist movement.
Socialists
While the Spanish Socialist
Workers party (PSOE) maintains
nominal unity, a long-standing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
split has been deepening be-
tween the membership in Spain
and an exile group based in
the French city of Toulouse
and led by 66-year-old Secre-
tary General Rodolfo Llopis
Ferrandiz. Llopis is op-
posed to collaboration with
the Communists--for which party
members in Spain have been press-
ing because they see in them
a potentially dangerous rival
for labor support. He is also
against restoring the monarchy
unless it is approved by a
plebiscite.
Some Socialists within
Spain want to cooperate with
right-of-center groups under
Gil Robles, but there is
strong resistance to this from
a group led by 42-year-old
Antonio Amat Maiz. Amat Maiz,
who has been the Socialist con-
tact with the Toulouse-based
group,, recently served a two-
and-a-half..year prison term
on charges of participating
in illegal propagandizing activ-
ities. He is regarded by
some, including Gil Robles,
as the most important of the
Socialists within the country.
His group reportedly rejects
any pacts with the opposition-
ists of the center or right;
it wants attacks on the Spanish
Communists terminated and advo-
cates a neutralist policy. It
opposes NATO and US bases in
Spain.
Llopis has so far managed
to retain control of the party
organization, but most Social-
ist activity in Spain has been
conducted through a university
association reportedly pene-
trated and influenced by the
Communists. He is considered
too out of touch with present-
day Spain to be capable of
leading a united Socialist
movement.
Monarchists
The Monarchists, the third
major opposition element,
have two main groups--the Alphon-
sines, who support Don Juan's
claims to the throne, and the
Carlists, a waning collection
of ultraconservatives who sup-
port the representative of
another branch of the Bourbon
family, Don Javier de Borbon
Parma. Many Monarchists favor
collaboration with the regime
and the eventual formation of
a monarchy in the traditional
Spanish style with strong church
influence.
Some progress toward Monarch-
ist unity was achieved in 1958
when the Spanish Union (UE) was
founded. Its leaders range from
Joaquin Satrustegui, an aristo-
crat and wealthy lawyer, to Tierno
Galvan, a former University of
Salamanca law professor with So=
cialist sympathies. It wants a
monarchy restored by popular will,
supports Don Juan as monarch, and
calls for freedom of religion;
for freedom to organize political
parties, except totalitarian
parties of the left or right; and
for genuine popular representation
in the lawmaking machinery. It
has 25X1
been unsuccessful in obta ning col-
laboration with center-left opposition
groups.
Communists
The most cohesive group,a-
mong the opposition is the small
Spanish Communist party (PCE),
Ww Willi
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under Secretary General Santiago
Carrillo Solares. Its main
strength is in the Basque prov-
inces, Madrid, and Seville, as
well as in Barcelona, where it
has a special branch--the Uni-
fied Socialist art of Cata-
lonia,
The
PCE professes to favor peace-
ful methods for overthrowing
the regime. It has established
contact with most of the op-
position groups of the left
but has failed to secure their
collaboration.
Terrorist Groups
Aside from a few bombs
exploded by Basque national-
ists in northern Spain in Novem-
ber 1959, the only recent ter-
rorism is traceable to the
Iberian Revolutionary Directo-
rate of Liberation (DRIL), an
association formed in 1959 by
Spanish and Portuguese exiles
based in Cuba and Venezuela.
Intermittent activities by
this and other terrorist
groups are unlikely to offer
a serious threat to Franco.
Opposition Pact
A significant step toward
oppositionist unity of action
was taken in Paris in June 1961
when an agreement forming the
Union of Democratic Forces
(UFD) was signed by Gimenez
Fernandez' Christian Democratic
Left and the Toulouse-based
Socialists, together with a
number of smaller center-left
groups: the Basque Nationalist
party, Basque Nationalist
Action, Republican Left of
Catalonia, Spanish Republican
Democratic Action, the Social-
ist General Labor Union, and
the Basque Workers' Solidarity.
25X1
The UFD believes that only
united action could achieve
Franco's overthrow and avoid
subsequent chaos. The parties
agreed to combat the present
regime in every way, reject
collaboration with totalitar-
ianism of the right or left,
and, when the opportunity a-
rises, to create a provisional
government. However, they
have not yet defined the insti-
tutional form of such a govern-
ment. They also pledged to
restore political liberties,
hold elections to determine
the kind of future government,
and orient Spain's foreign
policy toward solidarity with
the free peoples of the world.
A major weakness of the UFD
is Basque and Catalan pressure
for autonomy.
Even though most center-left
groups have joined in the UFD,
further progress toward unity is
hampered by the difficulties
these groups encounter in trying
to formulate a specific program.
It is doubtful, moreover, if the
UFD will be acceptable to the
Alphonsine Monarchists and Gil
Robles' followers. The pact
does not, therefore, represent
a true cross section of popular
opinion. Absence of the Monarch-
meet.
ists, moreover, probably ensures
apathy on the part of the mili-
tary, who will be the determin-
ing factor in establishing sup-
port for any post-Franco govern-
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