CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CkTAL
COPY NO.
OCR NO.0278/61
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
4 May 1961
MORI/CDF
202791 Pages 1,
14-15
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
L, DECLASS':FiED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE: L99Q
AUTH: HR 70-2
9 _i o
DATE:______
C F N T A11
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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN N RETUKN ~ TO &SY RECORDS
AFTER USE
CONTINUED CONTROL 30B _ - oa 3
State Dept. review completed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 May 1961
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
With a cease-fire in affect throughout most of Laos
since early on 3 May, Souvanna Phouma is pressing for
further talks with emissaries from Vientiane to discuss
political as well as military issues. The International
Control Commission in New Delhi expects to proceed to
Laos shortly. Premier Sihanouk, disturbed during his
recent visit to Laos by King Savang's remarks on foreign
interference, has announced withdrawal of his sponsorship
of the forthcoming 14-nation conference on Laos, as well
as of an invitation to General Phoumi and Souvanna to
negotiate their differences in Phnom Penh.
Castro's May Day speech emphasizing the "socialist"
character of his government suggests the early imposition
of new totalitarian measures in Cuba. The regime may
already be moving to implement the decision announced by
Castro on 1 May to nationalize all Cuban private schools.
Soviet propaganda continues to dwell on the Cuban theme,
and two recent Pravda "Observer" articles attacked Pres-
ident Kennedy personally for placing the world on the
"brink of war." Cuban May Day celebrations received
wide coverage in the Soviet press, and Pravda published
Page 1
Page 4
a summary of Castro?s speech, including his reference
to the need for a new "socialist" constitution.
25X1 DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Despite the USSR's continuing denunciations of the
US over Cuba, May Day activities in Moscow did not assume
a predominantly anti-American character. Marshal
Malinovsky's address and order of the day were routine
statements singling out West Germany as the "main point
of military" peril in Europe.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Tshomb6ls detention in Coquilhatville immobilizes
the principal opponent of the UN in Katanga, and concil-
iatory feelers have been put out by the Elisabethville
regime in his absence. Contacts between military of-
ficials of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes
are continuing, and the military leaders apparently
are putting pressure on both governments to work for
reconciliation. Relations between Kasavubu and the UN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 May 1961
in Leopoldville remain relatively cordial, but several
possible developments--notably the return of Dayal
as UN representative or an intransigent stand by
Congolese leaders on the Matadi issue--might disrupt
the rapport, 25X1
SOVIET FIRST QUARTER PLAN RESULTS ,, e o o e a o e> v a Page 10
Soviet industry in the first quarter of 1961 con-
tinued its rapid growth, although at a lower rate--9
percent--than during the first quarter of last year,
according to an official Soviet summary, The reduced
rate may reflect the decision announced in January to
cut back on the rate of overfulfillment of some indus-
trial goals in order to achieve a better balance in the
economy and provide additional support for lagging
agricultural production. Industrial growth may also
have been slowed temporarily by the completion during
1960 of the transitions to a shorter workweek in Soviet
industry; during the latter half of the year, two thirds
of the USSR's some 60,000,000 industrial workers began
a 41-hour week, 25X1
Albania's relations with the USSR and the other
European satellites appear to have worsened markedly
during April, By granting Albania a credit of at
least $125,000,000 for its Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65),
Peiping has for the first time assumed a major role in
the Albanian economy and has reduced Moscow's capability
to apply economic pressure on Tirana, There have been
many other indications of Albania's growing isolation.
Relations between Tirana and Warsaw have become in-
creasingly strained, Italian party secretary Togliatti
has made ?penly critical remarks about the Albanian
party, and Moscow has publicly displayed its willingness
to improve relations with Tirana's principal enemy,
Yugoslavia.
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4 May 1961
DISSENSION WITHIN FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . . . Page 16
At the French Communist party's national congress
scheduled for 11 to 14 May, Secretary General Thorez will
probably purge "right deviationists" who oppose his hard
anti - De Gaulle line. Preparations for the congress
have been complicated, however, by the party's rallying
behind De Gaulle during last month's military insur-
rection and by recent indications that the government
may employ against the Communists the emergency powers
it is using to crack down on the extreme rightists
involved in the uprising.
AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The European Common Market (EEC) is seeking to
establish the basis for a new "partnership" with Africa
to replace the 1957 convention which associated the
former French-, Belgian-, and Italian-administered
territories there with the EEC. The Common Market
countries are divided as to what new terms to offer
these or other former colonial countries in Africa.
The question of continued EEC tariff discrimination
against nonassociated territories is particularly con-
troversial. The current intensive review of these
problems is a preliminary to EEC talks with representa-
tives of 16 African states beginning early in June
and looking toward the conclusion of new arran ements
before the end of 1962.
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4 May 1961
PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
The Pakistani Government recently announced that
elections will be held in February 1962, although they
had originally been promised for late this year. In
addition, a report by a Constitutional Commission is
scheduled for publication some time, this month. These
developments will probably cause a more open opposition
to the military regime. President Ayub is determined
to retain firm control through a strong presidential
system,while the political parties--banned since 1958--
still hope to regain some power under a parliamentary
developmental and reform programs.
form of government. Ayub has shown concern over
evidence of dissatisfaction with the slow pace of his
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROMINENT PATHET LAO LEADERS . . . . . .
Page 1
The top leadership of the Pathet Lao has remained
substantially unchanged since the organization was formed
in Vietnam in 1950. This small and diverse group of
Pathet leaders is bound together by common ambition,
by experience of shared dangers and hardship, and, in
most cases, by ideological conviction. They are dis-
ciplined by their long years of dissidence, and their
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4 May 1961
flexibility was demonstrated in 1957-58 when they
shifted from guerrilla warfare to legal political
campaigning with a high degree of success. Although
they profess to be Laotian nationalists who respect
the country?s customs, religion, and monarchy, they
are almost all Communists and the witting instruments
of North Vietnamese influence in Laos.
THE BLOC?S FOREIGN AID PROGRAM . . . . . .
. . Page 7
Sino-Soviet bloc economic and military assistance
extended to underdeveloped areas now totals some $6
billion, about $2 billion of which has been allocated
for arms aid. Thus far, however, only about a third
of all the aid accepted has actually been used. Almost
60 percent of all aid commitments since the program
was launched in 1955 has been made to three countries--
the UAR, Indonesia, and India. During 1960--the pro-
gram's biggest year thus far, with offers totaling
about $1.5 billion--assistance was provided for the
first time to Cuba, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia. So
far this year, new credits have been extended to Mali
and Pakistan and aid negotiations have been started
with Brazil and the Somali Republic.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
LAOS
The cease-fire ordered to
begin early on 3 May by Kong Le
and Pathet Lao commanders ap-
25X1 pears to be generally effective
throughout the country.
=continued skirmishing after
the announcement may be the re-
sult of delays in passing the
word to troops in the'field.
The cease-fire was agreed to by
General Phoumi in a communique
declaring that his commanders
have been instructed to remain
in defensive positions and to
hold fire unless attacked.
Souvanna Phouma, in a 3 May
broadcast over the Xieng Khouang
radio, urged that all Laotian
parties concerned in the present
crisis meet on 5 May in Ban
Namone,.a site acceptable to
General Phoumi, to negotiate po-
litical as well as military is-
sues. Souvanna apparently en-
visages that political and mili-
tary delegations would conduct
separate but simultaneous talks.
He stipulated that the political
issues to be settled were the
formation of a provisional coali-
tion government and a Laotian
delegation to attend the Geneva
conference on 12 May.
Prior to the general cease-
fire orders of both sides,a local-
ized truce had been in effect
in the area of the Nam Lik River
about 50 miles north of Vientiane
as a result of the 1 May meet-
ing between representatives of
the opposing forces in that area.
In the meantime, however, Pathet
- Lao forces elsewhere had con-
tinued active.
The Indian Government in-
formed Ambassador Galbraith
it expected that the Geneva
co-chairmen would issue in-
structions shortly to the In-
ternational Control Commission
(ICC) to proceed to Laos. The
Royal Laotian Government re-'
portedly approves' in. prin-
ciple the return of the
ICC.
Pathet Lao statements
broadcast by the Hanoi radio
have asserted that the ICC.will.
be welcome in Laos, but "has
to cooperate closely with a
joint armistice commission"
that would contain Pathet Lao,
Kong Le, and Vientiane repre-
sentatives. The Pathet Lao -
Kong Le combination will seek
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
O R T
1 _
h
u
.Nara Thai, ?-.. ,.?' :.
Muong Sai: Nam Bac
Samj eu-
Muong-Noun
Luang'Prabang L...... A-._-?O S
Muong Soui Ban .
Pou Khoun loia es
Jor res Xieng Khou
PA K.
BURMA
LAOS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to dominate any such commission
and hamper ICC activities.
Premier Sihanouk, after
returning from the royal funer-
al ceremonies in Luang Prabang,
announced on 1 May that he was
withdrawing his sponsorship of
the 14-nation conference on
Laos and that he would not take
part in it. He also declared
that he has withdrawn an in-
vitation to General Phoumi and
Souvanna Phouma to discuss their
differences in Phnom Penh.
On 28 April, acting as
"premier of the kingdom of Laos,"
Souvanna signed a joint com-
muniqu6 with North Vietnam's
Premier Pham Van Dong agreeing
to the establishment of diplo-
matic relations at the ambas-
sadorial level and the signing
of agreements on economic and
cultural cooperation. Hanoi
on 3 May revealed the details
of these agreements. Under
their terms, Laos and North
Vietnam will establish trade
relations and will extend most-
favored-nation treatment to
each other. A civil airline
will also be set up between the
two countries. Hanoi's inter-
est in assuming a significaht
economic role in Laos is in-
dicated by its commitments un-
der the agreement to build and
repair a number of communica-
tion lines, exchange experts,
and train technicians.
During the past week Peo-
ple's Daily has twice reiter-
at ed the -stipulations made in
Peiping's government statement
on 26 April which insisted
that to "bring about and ensure
a cease--fire," aid to Phoumi
must be stopped; the US and its
aklies must remove their mili-
tary personnel and equipment
from Laos; and the Chinese Na-
tionalist irregulars must be
disarmed and withdrawn. Al-
though the Communists may not
hold to these stipulations as
immutable conditions for a
cease-fire, they clearly regard
them as legitimate points for
consideration in the truce ne-
gotiations.
4 May 61
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CUBA
Cuba's avowed entry into an
"era of socialist construction,"
as proclaimed by Fidel Castro
during the May Day celebrations
in Havana, paves the way for ad-
ditional internal moves which
would bring the Cuban Government
closer to the political struc-
ture of a Communist state. The
announcement goes well beyond
the international Communist de-
scription of Cuba as a "nation-
al democratic state." The proc-
lamation of a "socialist" regime
in Cuba may be an attempt by
Castro to enhance his claim to
further support and protection
from the USSR.
lution avoiding the long road of
capitalist development."
Thus, while placing an ide-
ological stamp of approval on
Cuban internal policies, and
while proclaiming the "duty" of
the socialists to support'hation-
al democratic" revolutions, the
Communist statements suggests
that the USSR would prefer to
avoid the difficult problem of
accepting Cuba as a member of 25X1
the bloc.
Cuban May Day celebrations
received wide coverage in the So-
viet press. Although TASS in its
initial report made no mention
of Castro's claim of having es-
tablished a socialist regime,
Pravda subsequently published a
summary of his speech including
his reference to the need for a
new "socialist" constitution,
reflecting the socialist system
he plans to build.
Castro's proclamation,
which presents the bloc with an
unprecedented situation, creates
ideological as well as practical
problems for the USSR. In order
to provide an ideological frame-
work for governments that support
the Soviet bloc but are not a
part of it, the meeting of Com-
munist leaders in Moscow last
November invented the designation
"national democracy."
In subsequent statements
it was made clear that while
this fitted a number of countries
it applied especially to Cuba.
East German party leader Ulbricht
stated that "undoubtedly the rev-
olution of the Cuban people has
created a national democratic
state which has already fulfilled
the task of national liberation
and democratic revolution and
which now is waging a struggle
for further social progress."
He implied that Cuba had reached
the stage when it would be pos-
sible to carry out a "direct
transformation from original
conditions to a socialist revo-
Moscow has not emphasized
its pledges of general support
for Cuba; and TASS, in reporting
the 26 April press conference of
the chief Soviet delegate to the
UN, omitted Zorin's assurance
that the USSR was prepared to
come to the aid of Cuba if it is
attacked. Moscow does persist,
however, in picturing the Kennedy
administration as preparing "new
warlike adventures" in Cuba.
Pravda "Observer" articles
attackee President Kennedy per-
sonally on 28 and 30 April. The
first interpreted the US failure
to reply to Khrushchev's 22
April letter to the President as
a sign that new aggression is
being planned, and concluded that
the "new master of the White
House" apparently agreed with
the previous administration's
alleged policy of "balancing on
the brink of war"--which can only
bring the United States "new re-
sounding failure."
The second article charged
that the "hypocrisy" of the
President's protestations about
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
establishing "new frontiers" of
US foreign policy, strengthen-
ing peace, and creating an at-
mosphere of trust had become
most evident against the back-
ground of the rebel invasion.
"What talk can there be of
trust," asked "Observer," when
the United States "threatens
the cause of peace" by placing
the world on the "brink of con-
flict." The article claimed
that the President is "reckless-
ly playing with fire" in Cuba
and warned that "he who kindles
a fire fans a blaze."
.urther opportunities for
extended propaganda treat-
ment of Cuba will come when
Castro receives his Lenin Peace
Prize. Castro said he would
like to go to Moscow to receive
the award.
of private schools would be de-
creed shortly. This action seems
aimed primarily at Cuba's 250
parochial schools, which are
presently responsible for the
education of about 65 percent
of the nation's 200,000 private-
ly taught school children. These
parochial schools have been re-
garded by the government as
hotbeds of "counterrevolution-
ary" activity for some tii,me,
The Cuban premier also ob-
served on 1 May that Cuba's 1940
constitution "has been left be-
hind by this revolution" and that
a new "socialist constitution"
was needed. Minister of Industry
Che Guevara told in a 30 April
televised speech of "an economic
plan for the country, a socialist
plan." Guevara's presentation
was devoted largely to explain-
ing the details of Cuba's five-
year industrialization plan,
Castro's 1 May espousal of and he also described future
"socialism" also underlines the bloc material and technical
powerful role the Popular So- assistance projects in support
cialist (Communist) party (PSP) I of the plan.
has come to play in Cuba. Al-
though Castro ordered that all
political parties be dissolved
when he assumed power in January
105-, the P;0P subsequently
emerged as the sole political
organization of importance in {
Cuba. PSP members--estimated
last January to be 18,000 strongy
--occupy most positions of im-
portance in all branches of the
government and in the labor,
education, and public informa-
tion fields. Party leaders,
maintain that the relationship
between Castro and the PSP is
"exceedingly close."
In his 1 May speech, Castro
said that the nationalization
Cuba's rejection of
Costa
''.ica's plea for clemency for those
captured in the landing has oc-
1 casioned a considerable
stiffen-
ing in the Costa
Rican
Government's
attitude toward
Castro.
President
Echandi told the
Costa
Rican con-
gress on 1 May t
hat the
principle
of strict nonint
erventi
on in an-
other country's
affairs
is "out-
dated."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Moscow last week expanded
its attacks on the US over the
events in Cuba to include vitu-
perative criticism of the Pres-
ident personally as well as
broad denunciations of US poli-
cies--especially in the "Obser-
ver" articles in Pravda on 28
and 30 April. WhIT-e-TTie Soviet
leaders are determined to exact
the maximum propaganda gains
from the Cuban developments,
their treatment of the May Day
activities suggests that they
do not plan a long period of
bitter hostility toward the US
such as followed the U-2 inci-
dent. Their statements made no
mention of the U-2 affair of
last May Day, and the official
editorials for this year's cele-
brations and the address by
Marshal Malinovsky were rela-
tively moderate in comparison
with the "Observer." articles
and not predominantly anti-Amer-
ican in content.
Pravda's editorial on 1
May, oFweveer, referred to the
"criminal intrigues of American
imperialism" in Cuba, and
Malinovsky in his order of the
day and speech in Red Square
repeated this line, stating that
"armed intervention" against
Cuba was organized by "7 mper--
ialist circles of the US,"
Malinovsky also warned that the
"aggressive circles of the
imperialist states. . .are re-
sorting more and more frequently
to military action to put down
the growing national liberation
movement" in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America.
The military section of the
Moscow parade differed little
from those in recent years. No
new equipment was shown, and
the emphasis was on missiles and
armor, a common practice for
several years, Malinovsky
claimed at one point that the
USSR now has "perfect weapons
which excel anything an army
has ever had." Although this
could be taken to refer to weap-
ons as yet unrevealed, itis
more likely that he was merely
praising the general quality of
Soviet military equipment. In
Berlin, the East German Army
displayed 21 T-54 medium tanks
and about 15 armored amphibious
tanks, the first seen in its
possession.
Malinovsky's warning that
West Germany is the main point
of military peril in Europe re-
flects the increasing attention
given to Germany by the bloc.
A communique issued on 28 April
at the end of Rumanian leader
Gheorghiu-Dej's visit to Warsaw
called for the "fastest possible"
conclusion of the German peace
treaty and transformation of
West Berlin into a demilitarized
free city. The communique also
warned that the bloc would sign
a separate peace treaty if the
Western powers continue to "end-
lessly delay the conclusion of
a treaty with the two German
states."
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With Tshombe under deten-
tion at Coquilhatville, the Ka-
tanga regime is in the hands of
elements somewhat more favor-
ably disposed toward the UN and
toward limited cooperation with
Leopoldville. Leopoldville of-
ficials apparently believe that
with UN help the Congolese Army
units now directed from Stanley-
ville and Elisabethville can be
put under their control
the principal aim of
the Coquilhatville conference
was to immobilize Tshombe and
put pressure on the Katanga and
Orientale regimes to permit the
disarmament of their forces.
The Elisabethville regime
announced on 2 May that it was
ready to discuss with the UN
disarmament of army elements in
Katanga and the withdrawal of
the province's foreign advisers.
Tshombe's release apparently
is a precondition for this con-
cession, which reflects anti
Belgian sentiment on the part
of Tshombe's lieutenants as
well as a somewhat more coopera-
tive attitude toward the UN than
was evinced by Tshombe and his
Belgian advisers.
Tshombe reportedly is to
remain in Coquilhatville until
the current conference ends on
about 8 May. Leopoldville lead-
ers are reluctant to permit him
to attend the meetings, however.
His continued absence from Ka-
tanga will further weaken his
position in the province and may
lead to his replacement by an
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
anti-Belgian group headed by
Interior Minister Munongo.
Contacts between military
representatives from Leopold-
ville and Stanleyville have
continued. Six officers from
Gizenga's forces attended the
Coquilhatville conference and
reportedly have returned home
to try to persuade Gizenga to
put in an appearance. Gizenga
--backed up by his military com-
mander, General Lundula--con-
tinues adamant that a conven-
ing of parliament is a prere-
quisite for reconciliation, and
the Stanleyville military rep-
resentatives apparently have
insisted that the Stanleyville
officials be included in any
unified government.
Military leaders, who have
consistently favored a unitary
constitution for the Congo, ap-
parently are also exerting pres-
sure on the Leopoldville govern-
ment to this end. Their efforts
are likely to be abetted by For-
eign Minister Bomboko, who has
been the key figure at Coquil-
hatville; they may be opposed by
Kasavubu, however.
the Gizenga regime
is stronger and more stable than
in the past. There
is little internal dissension
within the government; however,
friction still exists between
the Gizenga "central government"
and the moderate Orientale
provincial regime headed by
Jean Foster Manzikala. Economic
conditions continue to deterio-
rate in the province, although
the scarcity of banknotes ap-
parently has been alleviated
and trade across the Uganda
border has picked up slightly.
Relations between Kasavubu
and the UN remain relatively
cordial, but several possible
4 May 61
developments--notably the re-
turn of Dayal as UN representa-
tive or an intransigent stand
by Congolese military leaders
on the Matadi issue--might dis-
rupt the rapport.
In New York, Hammarskjold
believes that kasavubu's agree-
ment with the UN over Matadi,
together with the Leopoldville
regime's apparent willingness
to force the disarmament issue
with Katanga, has put the
Congo problem in a "most hope-
ful" new phase. He told Amer-
ican officials recently that
the action against Tshombd im-
proved the chances of a rapproche-
ment between Leopoldville and
Stanleyville, adding that he
had received confirmation of
the existence of a military
agreement between the Mobutu
and Gizenga forces. He also
indicated that as a result of
the improved situation, he
might be able to shorten Dayal's
stay in the Congo and shortly
to substitute a five-man com-
mission for the post of senior
UN representative.
However, the Congolese con-
tinue to oppose even a brief
return to Dayal.
In addition, Mobutu appar-
ently has unilaterally imposed
restrictions on UN activity in
Matadi which go beyond the re-
cent agreement between Kasavubu
and the UN. Neither the UN nor
the Congolese Seem desirous of
inflating this issue into a ma-
jor conflict; however, incidents
could occur as a result of the
dispute.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FIRST QUARTER PLAN RESULTS
Soviet industry in the
first quarter of 1961 continued
its rapid growth, although at a
lower rate--9 percent--than dur-
ing the first quarter last year,
according to an official Soviet
summary. First-quarter reports
are necessarily sketchy and re-
port on what is usually the
poorest quarter of the year.
The reduced rate may reflect
the decision announced in Janu-
ary to cut back on the rate of
overfulfillment of some indus-
trial goals in order to achieve
a better balance in the economy
and provide additional support
to lagging agricultural produc-
tion. In addition, the change-
over to a shorter workweek for
the final two thirds of some
60,000,000 factory workers and
other employees during the last
six months of 1960 may have
slowed industrial growth tem-
porarily.
Nevertheless, the 9-percent
increase in gross industrial pro-
duction is in accord with the
schedule set by the Seven-Year
Plan (1959-65). In addition,
the basic industrial commodities
registered substantial increases,
although, in general, slightly
less than last year. For ex-
ample, steel production increased
7 percent--as compared with 11
percent last year--but actual
production rose to over 96 per-
cent of that in the US during
the same quarter..
The industrial slowdown was
particularly marked in light in-
dustry. Production of cotton
and linen fabric showed no in-
crease over the same period a
year ago, and the production of
rayon and other synthetic fibers,
while up 8 percent, was still
below the level achieved in the
first quarter of 1959, On the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1st Quarter
1st Quarter
Percentage
Percentage
Annual percentage increase
d
d
hi
1960
1961 increase
planned for 1961
nee
to ac
eve
e
Seven-Year Plan goals
Gross Industrial Production
11.0
nearly
9.0
(percentage increase)
Industrial Labor Productivity
7.0
more than
3.0
(percentage increase)
Pig Iron (million metric tons)
11.4
12.3
7.9
9.4
7.4-8.5
Crude Steel
16.1
17.3
7.5
9.2
6.6-7.4
Petroleum
34.5
39.1
13.3
10.8
10.6-11.3
Coal
129.0
129.0
0
0
2.8-3.0
Gas (billion cubic meters)
11.9
15.2
27.7
34.0
25.3
Electricity (billion kilowatt hours)
65.9
72.4
9.9
12.0
11.7-12.1
other hand, consumer durables--
refrigerators, washing machines,
and furniture--showed impressive
gains.
Petroleum continues to re-
ceive priority in fuel-produc-
tion planning and at the pres-
ent rate the annual plan for oil
output may be overfulfilled by
more than 2 percent. The goals
for natural gas have not been
met for several years, and pro-
duction may fall short again
this year. The program for lay-
ing gas pipelines during 1961
has been reduced, apparently in
order to release materials and
technical support for petroleum
pipeline construction. Coal
output did not increase, ap-
parently in accordance with the
regime's program for that com-
modity.
The reported increase in
industrial labor productivity--
more than 3 percent--is con-
siderably less than the annual
average of 5.5 to 6 percent
called for in the Seven-Year
Plan and was the lowest quarter-
ly gain reported in recent years.
This was probably the result of
a decision made several years
ago to institute a 41-hour work-
week. This schedule was first
adopted in heavy industry, where
productivity could be improved
by altering production arrange-
ments. Labor productivity in
1959 actually increased 7.4 per-
cent. By 1960, conversions to`
the shorter week began in light
industries, where the shorter
hours had to be offset by in-
creases in the labor force or
more capital. The 5.3-percent
rise in labor productivity for
1960 was slightly below plan,
and much of the fall-off took
place in the last quarter of
the year.
The continued overfulfill-
ment of the production plan at
the same time that the labor
productivity goal was underful-
filled indicates that the in-
dustrial labor force during
this past quarter expanded con-
siderably more than planned.
Additional workers include de-
mobilized servicemen, housewives,
former farm laborers, and youths
transferred from full- to part-
time schooling.
The report of a 13-percent
reduction in meat processed at
state slaughterhouses is likely
to stimulate further reports of
food shortages in various parts
of the USSR. The poor agri-
cultural showing during 1960
probably has resulted in some
minor deterioration in the qual-
ity of the diet and temporary
local shortages of some food-
stuffs, but the amount of food
available per capita is consider-
ably greater than even a few
years ago and the first quarter's
meat production was one of the
best on rezoxA-F
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC
Albania's relations with
the USSR and the other European
satellites appear to have wor-
sened markedly during'April,
perhaps as a consequence of a
Soviet-sponsored bloc discussion
in late March of what to do
about the Albanian deviation.
The meeting of the Political Con-
sultative Conference of the War-
saw Pact in Moscow on 28 and 29
March--attended by all European
satellite party leaders except
Albania's Enver Hoxha--may have
agreed to take steps intended to
isolate Albania from the rest
of the Soviet bloc.
On 8 April, Moscow reminded
the Albanians of their obliga-
tions to the socialist camp:
a Soviet broadcast to Albania
noted that the country "is a
member with equal rights of the
Warsaw Treaty" and observed
that the Albanian people's
"great advances" have been
enabled by bloc aid and Tirana's
"extensive and diverse coop-
eration with other socialist
countries."
Political Relations
Soviet-Albanian relations
had reached a low point in Mos-
.cow in November when Hoxha and
Khrushchev exchanged
insults and criticism in front
of the delegations of 81 Commu-
nist parties. The Albanians--
4 May 61
encouraged by Chinese Communist
support--have held to their
foreign policy positions, re-
stating them at the Albanian
party congress, in. Tirana in Feb-
ruary, again at the fifth Al-
banian Trade Union congress in
April, and most recently by
Hoxha on May Day.
At the trade union congress
the Albanians announced their
intention to proceed with trials
of "spies and traitors" involved
in an abortive coup attempt of
last summer which Tirana alleged
was launched by Yugoslavia,
Greece, and the United States.
The proposed trial would.prob-
ably take place over the private
objections of the Soviets, who
presumably suspect that some of
those indicted. would be pro-
Soviet sympathizers who may have
,been behind the coup.
Soviet media have vir-.
tually ignored the congress
and have reported excerpts
only of the speech by the So-
viet delegate.
There have been other in
dicators of Tirana's isolation.
Moscow hailed the meeting in
Athens in mid-April of repre-
sentatives from Rumania, Bulgar-
ia, Yugoslavia, and Greece as
the "first postwar all-Balkan
conference"-despite the fact
that the Albanian delegates were
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unable to attend because Athens
refused to issue visas to them.
Criticism of Albania was
reflected in an article by
Italian Communist party leader
Togliatti in the April issue of
the party journal Rinascita.
In a rare public criticism of
the policies of another Commu-
nist party, Togliatti stated:
"Questions of internal debate
and life within the Albanian
party are posed in a manner
which seem to us wrong and dan-
gerous." This followed the
equally strong criticism of "Al-
banian sectarianism" by East
German leader Ulbricht at a
party plenum in mid-December.
Relations between Tirana
and Warsaw have noticeably
cooled in recent months. The
Polish representative's comments
at the trade union congress were
the only ones not reported by
Albanian media. Previously
the Albanian regime had been con-
spicuous by its singular failure
on the eve of the congress to
send an official birthday greet-
ing to Polish Premier Cyrankie-
wicz. In late March, the Polish
ambassador to Tirana was recalled
and apparently has not yet been
replaced.
Fundamental differences
with the USSR, over policy to-
ward Yugoslavia has been at the
root of much of the Albanian
intransigence. Albanian-Yugoslav
tensions have been growing;I
At the same time that Al-
bania's intense fear of Yugosla-
via has been on the rise and
Tirana has been -?omentin a
crisis with Belgrade
4 May 61
that serious border incidents
are possible--Soviet-Yugoslav
relations have remained normal
and are a source of intense ir-
ritation to Tirana. While the
Albanians were exhorting the
world trade unions to "fight,
expose, and defeat" Yugoslav re-
visionists, a Yugoslav trade
union delegation was arriving
at Moscow at the invitation of
its Soviet counterparts.
Albanian-Yugoslav relations
may come under discussion later
this month when Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Popovic visits Moscow.
The background for the visit
was spelled out in a Moscow
radiobroadcast of 26 April--the
day after the announcement of
the exchange of visits by the
foreign ministers of the two
countries--when it was stated
that relations between the USSR
and Yugoslavia were good, bilat-
eral cooperation could be ex-
panded, and the "attitudes of
the USSR and Yugoslavia coincide
on the main international ques-
tions."
Sino-Albanian Aid Agreement
By granting Albania a credit
of at least $125,000,000 for its
Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65),
Peiping for the first time has
assumed a major role in the Al-
banian economy and has reduced
Moscow's capability for applying
economic pressure on Tirana.
Expressing gratitude for
Albania's "brotherly" concern
for China's "struggle," Peiping
makes clear in the communique
issued on 25 April that the new
aid is Tirana's reward for support-
ing the Chinese in the Sino- 25X1
Soviet dispute.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Chinese publicity emphasized
Peiping's respect for the "rev-
olutionary" spirit of the Al-
banians in opposing imperialism
and Yugoslav revisionism.
The statement in the com-
munique that wino-Albanian eco-
nomic relations "fully embody
the proletarian internationalist
spirit of mutual support and
close cooperation" strongly im-
plies resentment of Soviet eco-
nomic pressures imposed on both
China and Albania and of Moscow's
minimal help in the present Chi-
nese economic crisis. This
hard feeling toward the Soviets
was echoed by Kellezi, who
flaunted the "complete unanimity,"
of Sino-Albanian views, stress-
ing that their mutual support
proved that the Chinese and Al-
banians--by implication, unlike
the Soviets--are "true friends
and comrades under all circum-
stances."
The magnitude of the new
Chinese credit is surprising, in
view of Peiping's own economic
difficulties. Since last autumn
the Chinese have been delivering
increasing amounts of wheat and
other foodstuffs to Albania,
both from China and from non-
bloc sources on Chinese account.
When Soviet deliveries were not
increased sufficiently to meet
Tirana's requests, the Chi-
nese Communists stepped up
their own deliveries to fill the
gap. The new Sino-Albanian
economic agreements indicate
the Chinese will probably
provide the bulk of Albania's
food imports.
The best indication of the
new Chinese role in Albania is
the commitment to construct
some 25 complete industrial
installations and to provide
large-scale technical assistance.
Peiping has similar programs
in all three of the Asian sat-
ellites, where Sino-Soviet com-
petition is already prominent,
but previous Chinese aid to
Albania has consisted almost
entirely of grain and raw mate-
rial deliveries on a credit
basis. The dispatch of Chinese
technicians, machinery, and
equipment to Albania will place
some additional burden on China's
economic resources, but there
is no reason to doubt the regime's
determination or ability to
carry out its part of the bar-
gain.
It is possible that many
Soviet technicians in Albania
will be replaced by Chinese;
this process may have al-
ready begun.
The Chinese credit is
roughly equal to the amount of
aid the USSR and East European
satellites have extended for Al-
bania's new Five-Year Plan. Com-
munist China provided only about
15 percent of the $140,000,000
in credits the bloc provided for
Albania's Second Plan (1956-60).
Moscow, having already concluded
a 1961 trade pact with Albania,
has not offered new aid, but un-
der a long-term agreement signed
in 1959 is committed to provide
credits worth $75,000,000 for
the new plan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DISSENSION WITHIN FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
At the national congress
of the French Communist party
(PCF) from 11 to 14 May, Secre-
tary General Maurice Thorez
will probably purge "right de-
viationists" who oppose his
hard anti - De Gaulle line.
Discussions in the party press
have centered on the "deviation
question, and this concern may
be reflected in the composition
of the new central committee to
be named by the congress.- Prep-
arations for the congress have
been complicated, however, by
the party's rallying behind De
Gaulle in last month's military
insurrection and by some indi-
cations that the government may
employ against the Communists
the emergency powers it assumed
to crack down on the extreme
rightists involved in the up-
rising.
In late January the cen-
tral committee charged Marcel
Servin and Laurent Casanova
with "rightist deviation" for
having advocated qualified sup-
port for, rather than rigid op-
position to, De Gaulle, particu-
larly in connection with the
referendum that month on De
Gaulle's Algerian policy. They
delayed recanting until late
March, and then were criticized
--Casanova in particular--for
"inadequate" self-criticism.
Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont,
who held high government posi-
tions during the immediate post-
war.years and later became
editor in chief of the official
PCF weekly France-Nouvelle, was
added to the list of deviation-
ists for refusing to criticize
the other two before his local'
party federation. A "younger
-generation".French Communist,
he and Casanova are the last
.major representatives in the
party's top leadership of the
wartime underground French
Resistance as Apposed to the
"Moscow Resistance" headed by
Thorez. The other major leaders
of the underground--Pierre Herv6,
Cliarles.Tillon, and Auguste
Lecoeur--were ousted in 1956-57.
Widespread reverberations
among PCF militants
accompanied the condemnation of
Servin and Casanova, who were
ousted from the politburo in
late February, and considerable
unrest seems to have continued
at lower levels in the party.
At the height of the 22-25
April insurrection, the PCF .
leaders' stress.on.the dangers
of the "fascist rebellion" and
the need to "save. the nation"
contrasted sharply with their
criticism of De Gaulle earlier
this year as the greatest danger
to Communists, and left them
open to the same charges of
having erroneously evaluated the
internal French situation which
they have lodged against the
"deviationists."
On 28 April the government
seized issues of the PCF's Paris
mouthpiece L'Humanite, the fellow-
traveling Liberation, and five
provincial Communist dailies be-
cause they published a central
committee statement that the
government, following the col-
lapse of the military rebellion,
would take measures against the
French people. Thorez.publicly
exploited this move as a.spring-
board for another appeal to
leftist and center parties and
to the labor unions to unite in
opposition to De Gaulle's "arbi-
trary personal power."
The impact of this latest.
appeal is likely to be
enhanced by reported resent-
ment in these groups over
De Gaulle's. failure to men-
tion publicly the role of
the massive worker demonstra-
tion on 25 April--sponsored
by all, the major unions in
separate but simultaneous
calls--in convincing the in-
surrectionists that, all was
lost .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET
Issues of considerable eco-
nomic and political importance
to the Atlantic community are
involved in the current inten-
sive review in the European
Common Market (EEC) of its fu-
ture policy toward Africa,
Nearly all interested parties
agree that the development of
new ties--based on equality--
between the EEC and the newly
independent African states in
particular could carry major
advantages for the West. The
EEC countries are divided, how-
ever, on what new "partnership"
terms to offer the Africans. A
further complication is the EEC's
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
AND ASSOCIATED AREAS
O European Common Market (EEC)
EEC Association Treaty signed 30 March 1961
African areas associated with EEC in 1957
Exact EEC status of Algeria has in practice
been unclear. EEC treaty provides for
association negotiations "later" with
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.
4 May 61
Primarily at French insistence, the Cannon Aar-
ket (EEC) treaty of 1957 provided for associating
with the Es'c' the non-Etaropean territories which at
that time had "special relations" with Belgitm2,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands. since then, 17
independent states have emerged from such associated
territories in Africa. All but Guinea retain de
facto association with the ESC and continue to re-
ceive developmental aid administered by the EEC;
several have opened missions to the Couerurn Marhet
at its Brussels headquarters. Discussions toward
a new African-EE convention began at a meeting in
Rome last January and are expected to resume early
in June. A joint parliamentary meeting is ached-
uled to open in Strasbourg on 19 June.
unresolved relationship with
Britain and the various ster-
ling area countries in Africa,
and there is considerable con-
cern elsewhere lest a new Eu-
ropean-African association con-
tinue tariff discrimination
against other developing areas
such as Latin America.
These issues are emerging
because of the expiration next
year of the 1957 convention
linking the former territories
of France, Belgium, and Italy
to the Common Market. In ad-
dition to $581,000,000 in de-
velopmental aid over a five-
year period, the key feature
of this convention is the pro-
vision for an EEC-African pref-
erential system. During the
12- to 15-year transitional
period initially foreseen for
the EEC, exports of the asso-
ciated territord.es are gradu-
ally to obtain tariff-free
entry into the Common Market
and, in theory at least, the
associates are to reciprocate,
In practice, however, the Af-
ricans are permitted to retain
duties for both revenue or
development purposes, and the
resulting EEC-African relation-
ship is roughly that of a free
trade area in which the partic-
ipants retain tariff freedom
with respect to third partners.
While most of tha associ-
ated countries seem interested
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
in retaining links with the EEC,
there are substantial problems
involved, the most complex of
which is whether to revise,
continue, or extend this pref-
erential system. Preferences
have always been of question-
able legality under the GATT,
and some within the EEC itself
have questioned the wisdom of
extending a privileged position
to only a part of Africa. Such
privileges have their histor-
ical antecedents, however; they
are apparently valued by the
African states involved and it
is questionable that either
the Africans or the EEC will
readily give them up.
Various suggestions have
been made for mitigating the
impact of this discrimination.
The Dutch, for example, have
proposed that association be
open to all African states--
perhaps to include even long-
established countries like
Ethiopia and Liberia. Others
have suggested that the EEC
reduce its common external tar-
iff on primary African ex-
ports, or even that it join
with other major importing coun-
tries such as the UK and the US
in eliminating tariffs on all
tropical products. Such tar-
iff-free treatment might be
linked, it is suggested, with
commodity price stabilization
programs of benefit to all
producers.
The trouble with such
schemes, however, is that they
depreciate the political consid-
erations associated with favor-
itism. 25X6
so are there
now elements in the EEC which 25X6
feel that at least a degree of
preference is essential to a con-
tinued African-EEC association.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The accumulating resentment
and frustrations among Pakistan's
politically conscious elements
is likely to be expressed more
openly in the near future. A re-
port by a Constitutional Commis-
sion, scheduled for publication
this month, will provide ammuni-
tion for critics of the Ayub
military regime. Many of them
want a parliamentary type of
government with a greater role
for individual politicians in-
stead of the tighter presiden-
tial system favored by Ayub.
. Critics-are also likely to
seize on the regime's announce-
ment this week that elections
will be held in early 1962, al-
though they had been promised
dynamic leadership, particularly
in economic and political devel-
opment. For example, rising prices
on basic commodities, following
the lifting of price controls on
such items as Cotton and wheat,
are generating discontent, and
Ayub has been showing some con-
cern. There is also growing im-
patience with the slow pace with
which the local government coun-
cils, elected in January 1960,
are being put into operation.
All groups will have to
probe whether and to what degree
the regime intends to continue
to enforce the general ban on
party activity in the light of
the promised elections. The po-
litical groups in the best posi-
by the end of this year. This tion to draw at least initial
delay is reminiscent of postpone-i advantage from the situation are
ments dur.ng the weak civilian the Communists and the militantly
governme :s before the 1958 coup religious Jamaat-i-Islam. The
and will. be ascribed to the same
reason--the government's fear
that it cannot control the bal-
loting.
Behind the essentially po-
litical criticism, however, is
a growing belief on the part of
journalists, lawyers, and stu-
dents that the regime has not
fulfilled its promise of more
Communists, outlawed in 1954,
have had seven years in which
to develop an effective under-
ground organization, while oth-
er parties have been political-
ly inactive since the ban of
1958. The Jamaat has continued
working in social and religious
fields, thus maintaining a
usable structure.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROMINENT PATHET LAO LEADERS
The top leadership of the
Communist-dominated Pathet Lao
has remained substantially un-
changed since the organization
was formed in Vietnam in 1950.
This small and diverse group
of Pathet leaders is bound to-
gether by experience of shared
dangers and hardships, by
common ambition, and, in most
cases, by ideological convic-
tion. They are a disciplined
group, hardened by their long
years of dissidence. Their
versatility was demonstrated
in 1957 and 1958 when they.
shifted successfully from guer-
rilla warfare to legal political
campaigning; several of them
have considerable following
among non-Communist Laotians.
Although they profess to be
Laotian nationalists who re-
spect the country's customs,
religion, and monarchy, the
Pathet leaders are almost all
Communists and the witting in-
struments of Vietnamese influ-
ence in Laos.
Background
The roots of the Pathet
Lao go back to the period im-
mediately after World War II
when a "Free Lao" movement
fought against the reimposition
of French colonial rule. The
French occupied Savannakhet,
Vientiane, and Luang Prabangin
the spring of 1946, and the
members of "Free Lao" fled to
Bangkok, where they remained
until Laos was granted autonomy
in 1949.
During this three-year
period the Vietnamese Communists
(Viet Minh) worked hard to bring
the Laotian independence move-
ment under Communist control.
Most of the Lao leaders were
hostile to Communist ideology
and distrusted any approach from
Vietnam, one of their country's
traditional enemies. A faction
led by Prince Souphannouvong,
then deputy military commander
of "Free Lao," did cooperate
with the Vietnamese and in Feb-
ruary 1949 was expelled from
the movement.
Souphannouvong and 22 of
his followers then formed the
"Lao Liberation Committee,"
shifted their base of operations
to North Vietnam, and on 13
August 1950 established the
Pathet Lao "resistance govern-
ment." Under Viet Minh direc-
tion and training, the Pathet
Lao organization recruited in
remote and sparsely populated
sections in Laos.
On 12 April 1953 the Viet
Minh forces carried out a full-
scale invasion of Laos under
cover of the "resistance govern-
ment" of the Pathet Lao. The
Viet Minh "volunteers" who com-
prised the bulk of the invaders
carried the Pathet Lao organiza-
tion into Laos and established
it in Sam Neua, Xieng Khouang,
and Phong Saly provinces. Two
subsequent drives extended Pathet
Lao control to parts of central
Laos; there were also pockets
in southern Laos. The Geneva
Agreements of 1954 in effect
confirmed the Pathets' de facto
control over Sam Neua and Phong
Saly.
Negotiations with the royal
government began after the
Geneva Conference and culminated
in the reunification settlement
of November 1957, in which the
Pathet Lao traded control of the
two northern provinces for polit-
ical recognition by the government.
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The Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)
had been set up by the Pathet
Lao in 1956 as a broad front
group, and in November 1957 it
became--and continues to be--a
legal political party, nominally
headed by Souphannouvong. A
small Laotian Communist patty
actually controls it, and this
party is in turn dominated by
individuals who also hold mem-
bership in the Vietnamese Lao
Dong Communist party.
Following the reunification
settlement of 1957, a coalition
government was formed in Vien-
tiane with two NLHS members in
the cabinet, and supplementary
national elections were held in
May 1958 to fill the 21 seats
added to the National Assembly
at the time of the settlement.
A right-wing government headed
by Phoui Sananikone took office
the following August, and the
NLHS ministers were dropped
from the cabinet.
A revolt of two Pathet Lao
battalions in May 1959 touched
off a return to guerrilla war-
fare. Souphannouvong and a
number of other members of the
NLHS were imprisoned for ten
months in a Vientiane jail
awaiting trial for treason
until they escaped in May
1960.
Souphannouvong
Although Souphannouvong is
said to be conservative, if
not feudal, in political orien-
tation, his ambition has made
him the instrument of the Viet-
namese-dominated, Communist
movement in Laos. He symbolizes
the dual forces of continuity
and change that operate simul-
aneously in Laotian politics:
while he is at once a stock
igure in a dynastic struggle,
eeking power with the support
of Laos' hostile neighbor Viet-
am, he is also introducing
new forms of political com-
petition as head of a move-
ent employing mass organiza-
ional techniques and subver-
ion.
Most observers see Souphan-
ouvong as a forceful and
intelligent leader.
he ap-
ears to have leadership quali-
ties superior to those of most
of Laos' non-Communist elite.
his was evident during the ex-
eriment with a coalition gov-
rnment in 1957-58. Souphannou-
ong, one of two NLHS leaders
in the cabinet, tended to dom-
inate its meetings.
During this period Sou-
phannouvong shifted easily from
armed struggle to legal politi-
cal competition. Casting himself
as a devout Buddhist and defender
of Lao customs and the monarchy,
he won the enthusiastic approval
of key elements of Vientiane's
uddhist monkhood. This was
ndoubtedly an asset during the
ay 1958 elections, in which
e was returned to the National
ssembly from Vientiane by an
verwhelming majority.
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Souphannouvong?s associa-
tion with the Communist Viet-
namese dates from at least 1945,
when he is reported to have met
Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. Ho con-
vinced him of the advantages of
close cooperation between the
Laotian and Vietnamese anti-
French resistance movements.
During the period 1945-49 Sou-
phannouvong consistently, but
unsuccessfully, urged a merger
of the "Free Lao" and Viet Minh
movements. From 1950 to 1953
his "government" was actually
based in Vietnam, and he was
a delegate to the first meeting
of the Vietnamese Communist
party in April 1951.
Souphannouvong's dependence
on the support and advice of
his Vietnamese mentors continues
today. Despite this close re-
lationship, reports indicate
that the Viet Minh have avoided
vesting full authority in him.
Probably the fact that he is a
royal prince and his rather
eclectic approach to ideology
make him suspect; in any
event he is a very junior,
possibly probationary, member
of the Laotian Communist
party.
Souphannouvong is thus a
figurehead for the small group
of Communists--possibly 17--who
control the Laotian Communist
party. Decisions are often
taken without his being consult-
ed, and there is at least cir-
cumstantial evidence that the
Pathet Lao returned to guer-
rilla warfare tactics in the
spring of 1959 without inform-
ing Souphannouvong, who at that
time was in Vientiane urging
"moderation" and strict ob-
servance of the ground rules
of legal political competi-
tion.
There is nevertheless little
prospect that Souphannouvong
will break with the Communists.
His political fortunes are firm-
ly linked with the.NLHS, which
in turn depends on the disci-
plined core of Communists for
guidance and material backing
in order to remain an effective
political instrument. In 1958,
when legal political competi-
tion was possible, the NLHS
found that many of its members
soon bogged down in apathy and
indifference, and that its
non-Communist cadres were be-
guiled by a desire for money,
status, and life in Vientiane.
It is probable that in a pro-
tracted period of peaceful po-
litical competition, only the
stiffening provided by the Com-
munists would prevent the or-
ganization from slipping into
the prevailing languor of Lao-
tian life.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Phoumi Vongvichit
Second in prominence in
the NLHS is 47-year-old Phoumi
Vongvichit. He too is from the
upper classes and participated
in the anti-French resistance.
He is one of a small number of
NLHS members with the education
and family background--his
father was a provincial governor
--to move easily among the Lao-
tian elite. Many of the other
Laotian Communists have little
status outside the NLHS or are
semiliterate members of tribal
minority groups.
Unlike Souphannouvong,
Phoumi has been fully accepted
by the Vietnamese Communists;
he is a member of the Lao Dong
party and is believed to be a
ranking member of the Laotian
Communist party, At the organi-
zation of the Pathet Lao "re-
sistance government" in 1950,
Phoumi was named deputy prime
minister and interior minister
and now is secretary general of
the NLHS. He was the chief
Pathet Lao negotiator with the
royal government in the unifica-
tion talks and demonstrated
toughness and shrewdness in ex-
tracting concessions from the
government.
Phoumi, as minister of
cults, was the other NLHS repre-
sentative in the 1957-58 coali
tion government. The pro-Com-
munist sympathies of large num-
bers of Laos' Buddhist monks
today is a legacy of Phoumi's
effective use of his office.
The Communists had long recog-
nized the strategic place of
Buddhism in Lao life, coining
the slogan,"Who rules the
pagodas rules Laos." Acceptance
by the clergy has tended to re-
inforce their claims to be a
group of crusading reformers.
Phoumi's experience makes
him a likely choice to head the
NLHS delegation in any negotia-
tions with the Boun Oum govern-
ment. In addition to his proven
abilities as an administrator,
Phoumi has an attractive politi-
cal personality and was one of
the NLHS candidates to win an
assembly seat in the 1958 sup-
plementary election. Phoumi
is described as gentle and re=
tiring but no stranger to vio-
lence;
Nouhak Phoumsavan
The top-ranking Communist
in Laos is Nouhak Phoumsavan.
He is chairman of the Laotian
Communist party and has been
a member of the Vietnamese Lao
Dong party and its forerunners
since 1947. A truck driver and
merchant by trade, he had little
status in Laotian society be-
fore he came to prominence in
the Pathet Lao movement. While
both Phoumi and Souphannouvong
are said to have had some doubts
about the depth of their depend-
ence on Hanoi, Nouhak is con-
sidered a confirmed Communist.
Within the party he has had re-
sponsibility for recruitment,
training, and organization.
Nouhak is one of the more
militant of the Laotian Commu-
nists
In addition to his party
posts, Nouhak served as minister
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of economy and finance in the
Pathet Lao "resistance govern-
ment" from its founding in 1950,
and he took over foreign af-
fairs in April 1954. He has
been a member of the NLHS cen-
tral committee from the time of
its formation. In the May 1958
supplementary elections Nouhak
was elected to the National
Assembly, The fact that he ran
in Sam Neua Province, where
NLHS influence could be expected
to be strong, suggests that the
Communists considered him a
rather weak candidate.
Nouhak is 50 years old and
has had only a primary educa-
tion. He was a member of the
anti-French resistance after
the war, but he has apparently
had only very limited experi-
ence in guerrilla warfare. He
was among the NLHS members who
escaped from prison in Vientiane
in May 1960.
Ka.ysone Phomvihan
Second only to Nouhak in
the Laotian Communist party,
Kaysone Phomvihan is the rank-
ing military leader in the NLHS.
Kaysone is probably in his
thirties. He was a student at
the University of Hanoi when he
joined the "Free Lao" movement
in 1945. Under the sponsorship
of Souphannouvong, Kaysone took
military training in North Viet-
nam from 1945 until 1949, when
he returned to Laos to set up
guerrilla bases. During this
period, possibly in 1946 or 1947,
he became a member of the Com-
munist Party of Indochina and
continues to hold membership in
its successor, the Lao Dong.
Kaysone was minister of
defense in the Pathet Lao "gov-
ernment" until its dissolution
in 1957 and now is a member of
the NLHS central committee. He
was an unsuccessful candidate
for the National Assembly in
1958, but he may have been the
victim of some ballot stuffing
by provincial authorities. In
February or March 1959, Kaysone,
who had been living in Vientiane,
disappeared into the "bush" just
prior to a resumption of guer-
rilla warfare. Presumably one
of the more militant of the
NLHS, he is in any event one of
the inner group of Communists
who make the important decisions.
Singkapo Chounramany
A member of one of Laos'
prominent families, Singkapo
Chounramany was drawn into the
Pathet Lao through his role in
the "Free Lao" movement. He
commanded Lao troops at Thakhek
fighting the returning French
in 1946, and after the defeat
of the Laotian forces he took
refuge in Thailand with Souphan-
nouvong. He has continued to
play primarily a military role
in the Pathet Lao, although he
became a member of the central
committee of the NLHS when it
was established in 1957.
As ranking Pathet field
commander, Singkapo was sched-
uled to receive a commission as
a colonel in the royal army af-
ter the unification settlement.
At the last minute Sngkapo re-
fused the commission
His refusal was
followed by the mutiny in May
1959 which touched off a resump-
tion of guerrilla warfare.
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Non-Lao Leaders
The distinctive contribu-
tion of Souphannouvong to "revo-
lution" in Laos is that he
tapped the discontent of the
country's ethnic minorities and
based the Pathet Lao in inac-
cessible areas populated large-
ly by tribal peoples. The early
"Free Lao" resistance movement
had been led by members of the
Lao elite who drew their sup-
port primarily from towns con-
centrated in the Mekong Valley
and its affluents. In search-
ing for guerrillas to carry on
his fight against the French,
Souphannouvong enlisted the sup-
port of elements of the Kha and
Meo hill people. Distrust and
contempt for the hill tribes had
long been the normal attitude of
the dominant Laos, who comprise
half the country's population but
occupy only a small portion of
its territory.
The Kha (a Lao word mean-
ing slave) are an Indonesian
people who occupied Laotian
territory prior to the Lao mi-
gration of the 13th century.
They are concentrated in the
south but are scattered through
all 12 provinces, where they
occupy the mountain slopes,
leaving the river valleys to
the Laos. Groups of the 350,000
Khas were in revolt against the
French from 1910 until 1937,
when the French killed their
leader Kommadam. His son Sith-
one, 53'years old, is today the
best known'Kha leader in the
NLHS.
Sithone Kommadam commanded
a guerrilla force in the earliest
days of the Pathet Lao. Although
reportedly semiliterate,Sithone was a
minister in the Pathet Lao "re-
sistance government" from 1950
until 1957, and in 1958 he was a
successful NLHS candidate for a
seat in the National Assembly.
He now is a vice chairman of the
NLHS central committee
The Pathet Lao spokesman
for Laos' 100,000 Meos is Fay
Dang. Unlike the Khas, the ag-
gressive Meos, who occupy the
strategic mountaintops of nort:l-
eastern Laos, have been granted
a semblance of political auton-
omy, and a prominent Meo, Touby
Lyfoung, is minister of health
and social action in the Boun
Oum government. Fay Dang, a
personal enemy of Touby, has
been only partially successful
in rallying the Meos to the
Pathet Lao cause. Loyal Meos
have been primarily responsible
for interdicting enemy communi-
cations in the Plaine des Jarres
during the current fighting.
Fay Dang was a minister
without portfolio in the former
Pathet Lao resistance govern-
ment and now is a vice chairman
of the NLHS. He is not known to
be a Communist and is considered
without influence in the formu-
lation of NLHS policy. A younger
Meo, Lofoung, who is a Communist,
probably exercises real control
over the NLHS movement in Xieng
Khouang Province, where most Meos
are concentrated.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE BLOC'S FOREIGN AID PROGRAM
Sino-Soviet bloc economic
and military assistance extend-
ed to underdeveloped areas now
totals some $6 billion, about
$2 billion of which has been
allocated for arms aid. Thus
far, however, only about a
third of the aid accepted has
actually been used. Almost 60
percent of all aid commitments
since the program was launched
in 1955 have been made to three
countries--the UAR, Indonesia,
and India. During 1960--the
program's biggest year thus
far, with offers totaling about
$1.5 billion--assistance was
provided for the first time to
Cuba, Ghana, Morocco, and Tu-
nisia. So far this year, new
credits have been extended to
Mali and Pakistan and negotia-
tions have been started with
Brazil and the Somali Republic.
In its present form, the
bloc aid program is largely
directed and financed by Mos-
cow with close European satel-
lite cooperation. Although
Communist China has not directly
challenged Soviet leadership of
the program, Peiping has pub-
licly questioned and disputed
Moscow's position concerning
the world Communist struggle.
Peiping has objected to large-
scale economic and military
support for such countries as
the UAR and Iraq and apparently
has been upset by Soviet as-
sistance to India and Indonesia
at a time when these countries
were engaged in foreign policy
conflicts with China.
With the exception of aid
extended largely to its neigh-
bors, Peiping in recent years
has displayed a marked tend-
ency to assist only those coun-
tries which appear to afford a
good opportunity for the devel-
opment of Communism; e.g., Cuba,
Guinea, and Mali. In some in-
stances the Chinese have been
quick to offer assistance and
have even attempted to appear
more generous than the USSR by
offering interest-free credits.
In addition to providing cred-
its to Cuba, China is supplying
rice at a time when China it-
self is suffering from famine.
In Algeria and the Congo, where
for logistical and other rea-
sons it is in no position to
provide significant arms aid,
Peiping has provided financial
assistance to rebel regimes.
The methods employed by the
bloc when providing aid to an
underdeveloped country have not
changed greatly since 1955. Most
assistance is in the form of
credits rather than loans or
grants. Bloc tactics are de-
signed to achieve limited ob-
jectives which, in turn, are
intended to result in the de-
velopment of strong economic
ties.
As an opening wedge, the
bloc usually offers to provide
the underdeveloped country with
the kind of aid, economic or
military, most desired and
least obtainable from Western
sources. In recent years the
bloc has also used attractive
trade offers as a means of es-
tablishing economic contact,
particulary in West Africa.
An immediate benefit from
the extension of economic aid
is the usual favorable domes-
tic publicity. The bloc has
also managed to gain a favor-
able press for military aid,
although Moscow has carefully
played down such aid in its own
propaganda and has scrupulously
avoided publicity when actually
delivering arms. Many recip-
ient states are extremely proud
of their acquisitions, however,
and often parade bloc materiel
on appropriate occasions.
More highly advertised
than Western economic aid, bloc
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
assistance often appears to
have been implemented faster
than similar Western programs.
In fact, however, this is not
the case. The tactical advan-
tage held by the bloc is its
ability to extend a line of
credit first and then to nego-
tiate the projects later. Bloc
aid normally is officially ex-
tended after only preliminary
discussions. This approach,
however, has occasionally
proved embarrassing; in some
countries the initial excitement
over bloc aid has been partially
dissipated during the long peri-
ods required to draw up plans
for long-publicized projects.
Aid projects also' en-
able the bloc to cultivate close
technical contacts in the re-
cipient nations through training
programs for native technicians.
As many as 8,000 bloc techni-
cians are now engaged in eco-
nomic and military projects in
BLOC AID EXTENDED TO
THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
1955-1961
(Million US Dollars)
Economic 3,986 , Military 1,917`
Total Aid extended 5,903
.Th;, eg~.< ,.c,.,..1, 16 ,n r.. ,i A..;d .. ,.ten 6.1?e
104 100 111 107 114
44
4 I SO I-
25 5 5 7~2 t B ~i
'rte , e ?? 2J ~Q ~P r rp Q `40 41P QNV
eyr v? Wr1 ~`p ~~v 5 ?J.t ?sv Qo?` OZ ago
Q~? ~ t J`? ~? P ~ 4't
the underdeveloped countries.
They apparently are competent,
tend to limit their associa-
tion with the local population,
and rarely become involved in
situations embarrassing to the
bloc governments. Of even
greater value is the opportunity
to expose potential native pro-
fessional personnel to Communist
ideology. Since 1955, almost
12,000 nationals from the under-
developed countries have had
military or economic training
in the bloc.
The USSR has recently ap-
peared to be making more of an
effort to increase the attrac-
tion of its aid for free world
recipients. It is providing as-
sistance basically designed to
promote good will by playing
on the recipient country's de-
sire to acquire status symbols.
110 96
58 n 55 f-
al a Some rl7 I r 36 41 I I r 1 Some
I
~~ W~ r?~Q
~