CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003000020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 23, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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I TIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO.
OCI N0. 5490/60
23 November 1960
DIA review(s) completed.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I 1
I ! DECLAS"1;=1ED
CLASS. CHANCED Tv: TS S
DOCUMENT NO.
AUIH R
DAT I EVILWEF~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
STAT
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MOSCOW MEETING OF COMMUNIST LEADERS. . .
. Page 1
The meetinW of world Communist leaders have ap-
parently been prolonged beycrdtheir original schedule
by the continued inability of the main participants either
to agree or to find a formula which will maintain a facade
of unity while satisfying their opposing ideological posi-
tions. Even while the talks are progressing, Moscow and
Peiping have publicly reiterated several of their conflict-
ing views. Peiping's recent pronouncements suggest that
ven if a formal declaration of unity is achieved, it will
continue to interpret the document to suit itself.
De Gaulle's rapid moves toward a separate Algerian
administration have provoked sharp hostility from pro-
ponents of a French Algeria. Settler discontent has been
smoldering since De Gaulle's reference to an "Algerian
Republic" on 4 November and his subsequent announcement
cif an pa.rly refprsnrl"m nn RAnaratA A1yArinn irectit4'tic"ng
. Page 3
CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS o o a o o. o. o a o o. Page 5
Guatemalan President Ydigoras has enhanced his per-
sonal prestige by his active part in putting down a revolt
by dissatisfied military officers, but the uprising has
emphasized the need for changes in top army positions.
In El Salvador, Communist-influenced groups now are openly
challenging moderates for control of the provisional
government.
a o o v o Page 7
Troops from Vientiane, including some of Captain Kong
Lees paratroopers, are reportedly moving northward from
Vientiane in preparation for a possible attempt to retake
Luang Prabang, Souvanna Phouma meanwhile is making a
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
PART I (continued)
fresh attempt to induce General Phoumi's Savannakhet
group to enter into negotiations for a coalition govern-
ment including the Pathet Lao. When, as is likely, this
attempt fails, Souvanna may move ahead rapidly to imple-
ment the government's agreement with the Pathet Lao on
acceptance of aid from Communist China and North Vietnam.
This agreement will provide Hanoi and Peiping with an
opportunity to assist legally the Souvanna government
and the Pathet Lao in their struggle with Phoumi. Both
capitals have responded cautiously but favorably to the
development. Soviet Ambassador Abramov has arrived in
Vientiane from Phnom Penh, possibly intending to offer
specific aid to Souvanna,
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Recent events in Leopoldville have enhanced Mobutu's
prestige at the expense of ousted premier Lumumba. Mobutu's
success in forcing the expulsion of Ghanaian President
Nkrumah's personal representative from Leopoldville has
given some substance to his claim to sole control of the
army. However, most of the army appears willing to submit
to him only to obtain some definite short-term goal. The UN
vote on 22 November to seat Kasavubu's delegation revealed
deep cleavages among the African delegations on the question.
PART I I
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KOREAN REUNIFICATION . . . . . .
The Pyongyang regime in North Korea appears convinced
that many South Koreans have become more receptive to re-
unification appeals since the fall of the Rhee regime, and
has sharply increased propaganda calling for "peaceful"
reunification. Pyongyang is coupling this with calls
for close economic cooperation between North and South
after all UN forces are withdrawn. A vocal minority in
South Korea now believes that Korea can be neutralized
and unified on the pattern of the Austrian settlement--
a concept promoted by the Indian United Nations dele-
gation. The South Korean Government has denounced
such suggestions and has expressed qualified support
for Korea-wide elections supervised by the United
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THE WEEK TN RRTFF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
KHRUSHCHEV LAUNCHES SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR UNDERDEVELOPED
AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Khrushchev's recent speech at the People's Friendship
University in Moscow gave a boost to this institution, one
of the more dramatic examples of Soviet aid to under-developed
nations. Publicity on the university has recently been
slight, suggesting that difficulties were encountered in
the opening weeks of its first session.
for comsumer goods. Failure to reach a new interzonal
trade agreement with West Germany for 1961 would compel
EAST GERMAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
A lag in the East German investment program has
further reduced the chances of achieving the ambitious
goals for industrial production set forth in the Seven-
Year Plan (1959-65) and could postpone efforts to estab-
lsih large-scale farming more firmly. Delays in the
production and imports of machinery and equipment, poor
results in construction, and an unexpectedly heavy exodus
of workers to the West have combined to unbalance East
Germany's 1960 plans for economic development. As a re-
sult, the regime has cut back the 1961 investment plan,
but appears to have made no move as yet to revise goals
East Germany to revise its plans further.
REORGANIZATION OF POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY. . . . . . . . . Page 4
What appears to be a major reorganization of the Pol-
ish Foreign Ministry probably reflects a new emphasis,
if not a redirection, in Polish foreign policy. Greater
efforts are apparently to be made to penetrate the under-
developed and neutralist nations and to improve economic
relations with the Western countries which are capable
of aiding Poland's economic programs. As a result of
organizational changes made thus far, the position of
pro-Western elements in the ministry has been strengthened,
although their activities will probably be carefully con-
trolled by pro-Soviet officials.
CZECHS SEEK AIR ROUTES TO CUBA .
The Czech Airline (CSA), in seeking two routes to
Havana, is leading the bloc in its first concentrated ef-
fort to establish a civil air route to Latin America.
Czech success would facilitate travelfDr the increasing
number of bloc personnel going to the area on military,
economic, cultural, and political missions. CSA has al-
ready received the necessary approvals for technical
stops and overflights at Shannon and Bermuda and probably
will soon receive .Permission for stops at Gander and the
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. Page 6
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
are likely to continue so.
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iv
THE CUBAN MILITIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
As the Castro regime continues to tighten its control
over Cuba, it is using as one of its primary instruments
a militia of some 200,000 "volunteers" being organized
throughout the island. Penetrated at all levels by the
Communists, the militia serves not only as a force for
police control, but also as a means of subjecting a
large number of Cubans to military discipline and politi-
cal indoctrination and of providing the regime with a
cheap labor force. Its similarities to the Chinese Commu-
nist militia, along with Che Guevara's statements during
his present visit to Peiping, provide further illustra-
including demonstrations against US Ambassador Strom.
With no prospect of a significant early increase in
foreign exchange receipts, Paz has also decided to send
a credit-seeking mission to Czechoslovakia and the USSR,
tions of China's influence on Cuba.
BOLIVIAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
In an apparent effort to control mounting unrest over
Bolivia's nearly bankrupt economy, President Paz Estens-
soro declared a state of siege in the Cochabamba area on
19 November. Labor trouble and clashes with government
forces had contributed to disturbances a few days earlier,
as well as to Western Europe.
LEFTIST AGITATION IN CHILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Chilean leftist groups are trying to exploit the
marked economic deterioration of recent months with an
eye to the March 1961 congressional elections. The world
price of copper, the country's chief export, has fallen
three cents a pound since early October, and the infla-
tionary spiral, which slowed somewhat last spring, has
regained momentum. The conservative Alessandri govern-
ment's refusal to allow comparatively small wage increases
led to violent street demonstrations early this month,
and troops in Santiago were placed on an alert status.
Leftist elements have been more aggressive than at any
previous time in Alessandri's two years of office and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DENMARK . . .
Page 11
The outcome of the 15 November election reflects
Denmark's satisfaction with the full employment program
and pro.-NATO foreign policy followed by Social Democratic
Premier Kampmann's coalition government. The gains by the
recently formed Socialist People's party--a "national"
Communist faction--which campaigned on a platform practi-
cally identical with the Moscow-oriented Communist party--
has, however, injected a new element of instability into
the political scene. Kampmann's new coalition formed on
18 November will generally continue his previous policies.
. . Page 12
Portugal's concern over recent developments in Africa
has been reflected in growing expressions of dissatisfac-
tion with the UN and some resentment toward its NATO
allies for not opposing a recent UN resolution requesting
Lisbon to report on conditions in its overseas territories.
While not likely to go through with a recent threat to
withdraw from the UN, Portugal will probably prove less
cooperative in NATO matters, particularly on the renego-
tiation of the Azores base agreement which expires in
1962.
INDIAN CONCERN OVER HIMALAYAN BORDER STATES .
. . Page 14
Widespread Indian concern over the situation in the
strategic border areas of Bhutan, Sikkim, and northeastern
India has prompted a recent flurry of Indian activities
designed to improve the nation's defensive posture there.
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
PART II (continued)
CHINA'S POPULATION AND ITS ECONOMIC GROWTH . . , . . . Page 4
Communist China's population is growing At the rate
of about 2>5 percent annually, and will be 700,000,000
by the and of 1960. With roughly 30,000,000births and
only 13,000,000 deaths during the year, the country will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
trialization.
add around 17,000,000 to its population. While the
Chinese economy is in no immediate danger of being over-
whelmed by these numbers, continued growth of the popu-
lation At this rate would force the regime to divert
resources from industry to agriculture and retard indus-
NEHRU AND HIS HIGH COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Political power in India is concentrated in a small
group of Congress party politicians; known as the "High
Command." Nehru remains the undisputed chief, and his
towering presence still inhibits effective leadership by
others. Nehru has never ruled alone, however, and
growing criticism of the manner and direction of his
leadership apparently is resulting in other top govern-
ment and party officials being given a somewhat greater
share in policy making. Three moderately conservative
politicians--Pant, Desai, and Patil--have gained in-
creasing power in the High Command.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOSCOW MEETING OF COMMUNIST LEADERS
The meetings of world Com-
munist :Leaders which began in
Moscow shortly after the com-
pletion of the 7 November cele-
brations of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution have apparently been
prolonged beyond their original
schedule by the continued ina-
bility of the main participants
to reach agreement or to find
a formula which will maintain
a facade: of unity while sat-
isfying their opposing ideolog-
ic21. positions. Even 'while
the talks are progressing,
Moscow and Peiping--with
Peiping adopting the more ag-
gressive tone--have publicly
reiterated several of their con-
flicting views.
The meetings probably were
expected to end by 19 November.
Czech President Novotny left
Moscow on 19 November in order
to be in Prague on time to meet
the Cambodian chief of state,
but there is no indication that
any of the other leaders en-
gaged 'in'the talks have'
left.
On 21 November, Khrushchev
and other Soviet presidium
members turned out to greet
Finnish President Kekkonen, who
has come to Moscow for trade
talks. It seems unlikely that
the Soviet leaders planned to
be still deep in discussions
during Kekkonen's visit. On
22 November, Pravda announced
that a conference of health
workers, previously"scheduled
in the Kremlin for 24 to 26
November, would be held from
6 to 8 December. The postpone-
ment of the conference is pre-
sumably caused by the unexpected
duration of the current meetings.
The adamant stands that
both Moscow and Peiping must
be taking in the talks are re-
flected in the continued publi-
cation of their disagreements
in undiluted forma The lat-
est issue of the bloc journal
Problems of Peace. and Socialism,
issue n-9osco o rli Novem-
ber, contains a feature article
which vigorously attacks Chi-
nese ideas on internal economic
development, concentrating on
the commune concept. In con-
trast to previous practice,
Soviet censors passed reports
on the article by Western cor-
respondents which clearly iden-
tified the Chinese as dogma-
tists and described the article
as highly critical of the Chi-
nese.
In a speech on 18 November
in Peiping at a recption for
Cuban National Bank President
Guevara, Chou En-tai appeared
unregenerate. He praised the
Cubans for "waging a struggle
directed squarely against US
imperialism" and stressed that
the Chinese "have never bowed
to difficulties and never en-
tertained any illusion about
imperialism." The Peiping
press used the occasion of the
arrival of the Guevara delegation
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to restate several familiar
ideological themes. Among these
was the warning that "the ag-
gressive nature of US imperial-
ism will never change, that it
will never lay down the cleaver
of its own accord...."
Using conclusions reached
at the meeting of Communist
parties in 1957 to support its
arguments, a long People's Daily
editorial of 21 November elabo-
rates on Mao's "correct" assess-
ment of the need for a militant
revolutionary line in the pres-
ent world situation, implicitly
criticizes Soviet overestimation
of the strength of the imperi-
alists, cites the continuing
-possibility of war, and empha-
sizes the danger from Communism's
main enemy--"'revisionism."
Continuing what has become
the central issue of the contro-
versy in recent weeks, the ed-
itorial argues in effect that
revolutionary methods must be
promoted in any struggle for
peace. In developing this the-
sis, the editorial declares
that the balance of forces now
is favorable for a forceful sei-
zure of power and that any view
that overestimates the strength
of the imperialists and under-
estimates the strength of the
people is incorrect.
Attacking the revisionists
for having "deliberately stood
things on their heads," the
editorial argues that world
peace can be guaranteed only by
waging a joint struggle of all
"peace" forces against the im-
perialists. In a direct appeal
to traditional Communist views,
the Chinese editorial declares
in conclusion that the revolu-
tionary spirit is the soul of
Marxism-Leninism and that to
follow the revisionists is to
emasculate this spirit.
Apparently in reply to the
People's Daily editorial, Pravda
on 23 vember also editoria -
ized on the 1957 declaration,
but stressed those aspects of
the document which correspond
to Soviet views. While stating
that "revisionism" is the main
danger to communism under to-
day's conditions, the editorial
insisted that "dogmatism and
sectarianism, .. could also rep-
resent a basic danger at indi-
vidual stages of development
of one party or another.
Firmly supporting the
"Leninist principle of peace-
ful coexistence," the edito-
rial proclaims as "creative
Marxism" the conclusions reached
at the 20th and 21st party con-
gresses on the preventability
of war. Other Soviet positions
with which the Chinese have
quarreled are also reiterated.
The editorial shared the front
page of Pravda with a long re-
affirmation by Khrushchev of
the Soviet Union's views on
disarmament--views which the
Chinese had previously condemned25X1
as "illusory."
[talks between t e
Communist leaders got off to a 25X1
bad beginning with the Chinese
insisting that preliminary
work be scrapped and that the
high-level delegates start
fresh on their attempt to for-
mulate a meaningful statement
which would embrace all the
conflicting views.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The public statements
now emanating from Peiping,
and particularly the People's
Daily editorial, suggest m tat
Peiping"s continued determina-
tion to get some of its
hard-line views incorporated
in the final communique have
.increased the difficulty of
achieving even a formal, if
empty, declaration of unity.
The inflexible tone of the
People's Daily editorial may mean
That t He con erence is not going
Peiping's way and that the Chinese
have decided to put their minority
views on the record before the
publication of an official com-
munique. Peiping's stance indi-
cates that even after such a dec-
laration is promulgated it will
continue to interpret the docu- 25X1
ment to suit itself.
De Gaulle's rapid moves
toward a separate Algerian ad-
ministration, climaxed by his
22 November designation of a
liberal and loyal Gaullist,
Louis Joxe, to implement these
plans, have provoked sharp hos-
tility from proponents of a
French Algeria. Settler discon-
tent has been smoldering since
De Gaulle's reference to an
"Algerian republic" on 4 Novem-
ber and the government's an-
nouncement that a referendum
will be held in early January
on separate Al Brian institu-
hand, the regime announced the
appointment of Jean Morin, tough
superprefect of the Toulouse
region, to replace Delegate Gen-
eral Delouvrier in Algeria.
Joxe, former French am-
bassador to Moscow and recently
minister of education, was ap-
pointed to the newly created
position of minister of state
for Algerian affairs. In this
post lie will be the direct
link between De Gaulle and the
Algerian administration. In
another move to strengthen its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Although the FAF held aloof
from the Armistice Day rioting
in Algiers, it has since stated
that it would use illegal means
if necessary to oppose the forth-
coming referendum. Rightists
both in France and Algeria no
doubt feel they must act before
De Gaulle can hold a referendum.
The government, which ap-
pears to be well informed con-
cerning rightist plotting, rushed
important security police rein-
forcements to Algeria last week
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In France, parliamentary
opponents of various De Gaulle
policies--from foreign policy
and economic conditions to Al-
geria--again took advantage of
the independent nuclear strike
force issue to try to censure
the Debre government; they man-
aged to get 214 of the 277 need-
ed to displace Debre. In Octo-
ber a similar censure motion
gained 207 votes. Although De
Gaulle's public threat to dis-
solve the assembly if it voted
censure probably kept the total
below the required number, this
evidence of increasing opposi-
tion will probably further en-
courage rightist opponents of
his Algerian policy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS
In Guatemala, the govern-
ment has suppressed the revolt
launched on 13 November by
dissident army officers. Although
some armed insurgents are appar-
ently still at large in the
countryside, most have either
been captured or have fled
across the Honduran border.
President Ydigoras has apparent-
ly emerged with enhanced per-
sonal prestige because of his
energetic direction of opera-
tions against the insurgents.
The American ambassador reported
on 18 November-that the Presi-
dent seems "completely confi-
dent,"
It is evident that one of
the major immediate causes of
the revolt was dissatisfaction
in the military over conditions
in the army and particularly
over the defense minister, Colo-
nel Gonzalez Sigui, who is
highly unpopular among his col-
leagues. Ydigoras now apparent-
ly realizes that Gonzalez will
have to go but prefers to wait
about 60 days lest a change now
be taken as a sign of weakness.
The chief of staff told the
American army attache on 17
November that "many changes"
are necessary in the army as
a result of the revolt.
The state of siege imposed
at the outset of the revolt
remains in force in five of
Guatemala's 22 d?epartments, but
the government has moved cur-
few time in the capital up to
midnight. Communist and pro-
Communist elements, which be-
latedly sought to exploit the
revolt, have been relatively
inactive since 18 November, and
many of them have been ar-
rested.
Ydigoras' sensitivity on
this issue was revealed in the
brief arrest of an American
newsman and his reprimand per-
sonally by the President on 18
November for writing a story
indicating that the revolt re-
sulted from army dissatisfaction
and not, as Ydigoras proclaims,
from Castro-Communist plotting.
The newsman immediately left
Guatemala.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
S
BRITISH
HONDU
CAR/BBE
Puerto Barrios
GUATEMALA
Zacapa .
?Guatomala City
EL SALVADr R
PACIFIC OCEAN
In El Salvador, moderates
and other anti-Communists are
facing an open challenge from
Communist and Communist-influ-
enced groups which have moved
rapidly to consolidate their
positions in the provisional
government and in the political-
ly potent student and labor or-
ganizations. These groups,
which a fairly reliable source
of the American Embassy believes
are being financed from Cuba,
are bringing peasants from the
countryside into the capital to
swell their ranks.
The moderate Colonel Es-
camilla, minister of interior,
admitted privately on 19 Novem-
ber that he is very disturbed
at the situation but feels
that a crackdown now would lead
to a bloody revolution. A siz-
able demonstration addressed by
leading Salvadoran Communists
on 20 November pledged
its support to the
government and con-
demned antiregime plot-
ters, "reactionaries,
and big landowners,"
and attacked "foreign
intervention by an
embassy which is using
nonrecognition as black-
mail," a reference to
the United States.
Although the gov-
ernment claims to have
suppressed a counter-
coup plot on 16 Novem-
ber, highly placed
army officers are prob-
ably still considering
drastic action to re-
store the army to its
traditional role as
political arbiter.
The army is weakened,
however, by internal
dissension.
The Nicaraguan military,
with the cooperation of Costa
Rican forces, continues to mop
up remnants of the small rebel
groups along the southern fron-
tier following the abortive
rebel attacks of 11 November.
Meanwhile, the 18 November de-
cision of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) awarding
long-disputed territory along
the northern border to Honduras
has been a bitter blow to the
Nicaraguan Government. The
Somoza regime, which will be
blamed by its oppostion for
"losing" this territory, has
nevertheless indicated that it
will abide by the court's de-
cision.
In Honduras, where the
court decision was greeted with
jubilation, President Villeda
Morales said on 18 November
that he is ready to work closely
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
with Nicaraguan authorities for
an orderly transfer of the terra
tory. He assured the American
Embassy that he would prevent
any move into the formerly dis-
puted territory by overenthusi-
astic Honduran groups which
might prompt clashes with Nic-
araguan outposts still there.
Villeda's restraint, in
the face of domestic pressure
for a more precipitate takeover,
should help the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment weather the defeat with
less adverse internal reaction
than had been feared. There
still remain, however, delicate
negotiations, particularly
with respect to the scattered
Nicaraguan schools and other in-
stallations in the generally
undeveloped and sparsely popu-
lated area, and regarding the
exact delineation of the border
not clarified in the 1906 arbi-
tral award upheld in the recent
ICJ decision.
Premier Souvanna Phouma's
threat to retake Luang Prabang
by force has been underlined by
the reported departure from
Vientiane of a force of about
400 men on 20 November.
In the meantime, Souvanna
has been increasing the pace of
his wide-ranging and intricate
maneuvers aimed at retaining the
premiership and fostering his
panacea for Laos' problems--a
coalition government embracing
the entire spectrum of political
life, from the pro-Communist
Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) to General
Phoumi's Savannakhet group. In
a joint communiqud of.17 November
issued by government and Pathet
Lao teams which have been nego-
tiating in Vientiane for six
weeks, it was announced that the
two sides had agreed to the for-
mation of a coalition government,
the acceptance of aid from Com-
munist China and North Vietnam,
the opening of the Chinese-Lao-
tian border, and the establish-
ment of some sort of ties with
Hanoi and Peiping.
On 18 November, Souvanna
flew to Sam Neua for two days of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
talks with his half brother,
NLHS leader Prince Souphannou-
vong. The premier told Ambassa-
dor Brown after he had returned
to Vientiane that he had ob-
tained Souphannouvong's agree-
ment to work in a coalition gov-
ernment with representatives of
the Savannakhet group, excluding,
"of course," Phoumi himself and
the co-leader of the Revolution-
ary Committee, Prince Boun Oum.
Souvanna is now pressing for a
conference in Luang Prabang
under the King's aegis looking
toward formation of a coalition
government and including him-
self, Phoumi, and Souphannouvong.
It seems highly un-
likely, however, that
such a meeting will
materialize.
The premier's
political and military
maneuvers appear to be
having little effect
on Phoumi, whose con-
fidence of eventual
victory on his own
terms seems to be in-
creasing daily. Dur-
ing a recent tour of
Champassak Province,
Phoumi proclaimed to
various village audi-
ences, "Victory is
ours." In any event
it seems certain that
Phoumi will refuse
any negotiations with
Souvanna, whose main
agenda item is a
coalition with the
NLHS.
Souvanna may stall
on implementing his
accords with the Pathet
Lao until he realizes
Phoumi does not intend
to negotiate. Then
he may move rapidly
to enlist Sino-Soviet
bloc support in his struggle
to stay in power. As the re-
sult of his agreements, Pei-
ping and Hanoi now are in
position legally to assist
the Vientiane government, in
alliance with the Pathet Lao,
in the struggle against Phoumi.
Although the opening of the
border would permit limited
local trade across the frontier,
the bulk of any aid Peiping
might choose to send Souvanna
would probably be flown directly
to Vientiane.
North Vietnam and Communist
China have responded favorably
PHONG
SALY
I' T N A'ti
Sam Neua
LUANG PRABANG
Luang Prabang
XIENG
KHOUANG
I uong
SAYABOURY
INDONESIA
SECRET
O
TH AI LAND }" .. sen''~o^^-^
Sava nnakhet'' SAVANNAKHET
(ATTOPEO
CHAMPASSAK Attopeu
CAMBODIA
GULF
OF
TONKI N
KHAMMOUANE
\ Thakhek
0 STATUTE MILES 200
31379
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
`-~' La4EPavoid
op ldviile
I
'RUANDA
-URUNDI
22 November accused
Ghana of engineering
the events which led
to the recent fighting
between UN troops and
Mobutu's army as part
of a scheme to delay
action in seating Kasa-
vubu,
The UN action
seating Kasavubu'may
clear the way for a move
by Kasavubu either to
reconvene parliament or
to call a round-table
conference of Congolese
political parties.
Such a move in the
direction of restoring
civil government would
probably be acceptable
to Mobutu, who has
declared. his will-
ingness to give up his
caretaker role at the
end of the year.
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
Meanwhile, on 22 November
the UN General Assembly voted
53-24, with 19 abstentions, to
seat the Kasavubu delegation,
after defeating another at-
tempt led by Ghana and sup-
ported by the Soviet bloc to
postpone consideration of the
question. Debate on this is-
sue has brought into the open
the strong divisions among the
Africans themselves about the
legal government in the Congo.
The Cameroun UN.delegate on
The status of the 15-na-
tion UN Conciliation Commission
remains unclear. Guinea and
Mali have indicated that, in
view of the seating of Kasavubu's
delegation, they will not par-
ticipate in the commission. Al-
though some other nations, such
as Ghana, may follow suit, some
form of rump commission
will probably reach Leopold-
ville in late November,
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to Vientiane's announcement of
willingness to receive their
aid, exchange economic and cul-
tural delegations, and establish
postal and telecommunications
between Hanoi and Vientiane.
Both bloc capitals have been
most cordial, but neither has
so far publicized any specific
details.
Radio Moscow has reported
without elaboration the agree-
ment reached between Souvanna
and the Pathet Lao. In an ef-
fort to lend; propaganda support
to Souvanna Phouma, however, the
USSR has stepped up its attack
on American involvement in the
Laotian conflict. A strongly
worded article in Pravda on 16
November charged the United
States with open support for the
Phoumi rebellion and warned that
recent events in Laos had taken
a "highly dangerous turn."
Soviet propaganda continues to
stress the legal base of the
Souvanna Phouma government and
strongly criticizes the recently
concluded SEATO meeting in Bang-
kok as being American "prepara-
tion for wide-scale armed in-
tervention" against the lawful
Laotian Government.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov,
accredited to both Vientiane
and Phnom Penh, has apparently
postponed a trip to Moscow, in
connection with the forthcoming
arrival of Cambodian Prince
Sihanouk, in order to make a
flying visit to Vientiane. Abra-
mov's hurried trip probably in-
dicates a Soviet effort to lend
additional diplomatic support to
Souvanna and may result in a
specific offer of assistance as 25X1
a follow-up to the general aid
offer accepted by Souvanna "in
principle" on 28 October.
Recent events in Leopold-
ville have enhanced Colonel
Mobutu's prestige. The order-
ly parade of Congolese troops
on 17 November, followed by
his success in forcing the ex-
pulsion of Ghanaian President
Nkrumah's personal represent-
ative on 22 November, has given
some substance to Mobutu's claim
to sole control of the army.
However, his control remains
limited, and most of the army
appears willing to submit to
him only to obtain some def-
inite short-term goal.
After Mobutu's troops had
engaged in a battle of several
hours with UN forces around
Accra's embassy, UN and Ghanaian
officials agreed that Ghanaian
representative Welbeck should
leave the Congo. After Wel-
beck's departure, Congolese of-
ficers lost control of their
troops, who then arrested and
manhandled UN officials in re-
taliation for the loss of some
of their officers.
Ousted premier Lumumba re-
mains isolated in the premier's
residence, and his position
has suffered compared with
that
of Mobutu. His supporters
are
continuing their efforts
to
es-
tablish a haven for him
in
Stanleyville. However,
the
de-
gree of their success in estab-
lishing a Lumumba redoubt in
eastern Congo remains unclear.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
Anticipating the annual
United Nations consideration of
the Korean question, North Korea
has sharply increased its propa-
ganda clamor for "peaceful reuni-
fication." This year, the re-
gime apparently believes its
efforts will find a more recep-
tive audience in South Korea.
and among some non-Communist UN
members,
Reunification has a contin-
uing powerful attraction for all
Koreans, and the fall of the
Rhee regime has been followed by
freer public discussion of the
problem, particularly among stu-
dents, some of whom have advocat-
ed that Korea be neutralized and
unified on the pattern of the
Austrian settlement. The Chang
Myon government also recently
announced its qualified support
of the UN's long-standing posi-
tion;tha.t UN-supervised elec-
tions beheld in both North and
South Korea.
Reports of these Korean
activities apparently are the
basis for the effort the Indian
UN delegation is making to or-
ganize support, especially among
the Afro-Asian nations, for a
neutralist solution of the Ko-
rean problem, This Indian initia-
tive is almost certain to further
stimulate a strong and vocal
minority among South Korean in-
tellectuals and students which
believes reunification can be
achieved by neutralization.
While public interest in
the discussion of reunification
appears likely to grow in South
Korea, the government is aware of
the subversive potential of such
agitation, and Prime Minister
Chang has said that suggesting
SECRET
KOREAN REUNIFICATION
neutralization is tantamount to
advocating the communization of
Korea. Seoul has consistently as-
serted that any all-Korean elec-
tions must be completely free
and in accordance with South Ko-
rean constitutional procedures.
The government and the majority
of informed South Koreans publicly
opposed neutralization, and most
students appear similarly disposed.
Representative of Pyongyang's
recent propaganda is a lengthy
memorandum, issued on 11 November,
condemning the US and UN and
calling once again for a settle-
ment by "the Korean people them-
selves." Couched in terms of a
critique of a recent report by
the UN Commission for the Unifi-
cation and Rehabilitation of Ko-
rea, the memorandum is designed
to convey the impression of a
fresh approach. Actually, how-
ever, it does little more than'
repeat the call for a withdrawal
of UN forces and reiterates Kim
I1-sung's 15 August proposal for
a loose federation of North and
South as a transitional measure.
As could be expected, Peiping,
Hanoi, and Ulan Bator have treated
it as a major contribution to the
problem and have issued resound-
ing endorsements,
North Korea, remaining ada-
mant in its refusal to permit UN-
supervised elections, would like
to convey the impression of
reasonableness and flexibility.
At the opening session of North
Korea's Supreme People's Assembly
on 19 November, presidium chair-
man Choe Yong-kun offered a new
gambit; a plan whereby Pyongyang's
iron, steel, coal, and electricity
would be made available to Seoul
in-return for the latter's agree-
ment to a Communist-style land reform.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
Economic overtures with
strings attached have been made
before, and it is unlikely the
North Koreans anticipate a favor-
a:bl a reaction from the Chang
Myon government, Pyongyang, how-
ever, probably feels that time is
working in its favor and that
sentiment for some accommodation
will grow both in South Korea
and abroad.
UN General Assembly debate
on the Korean question is not
expected to begin before late
December, The West agrees that
the basic objective that must
be maintained in any resolution
is the provision for free and
impartial elections under ef-
fective international supervi-
KHRUSHCHEV LAUNCHES SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
Khrushchev's speech at the
People's Friendship University
in Moscow on 17 November gave a
boost to this institution, one
of the more dramatic forms of
Soviet aid to underdeveloped na-
tions. Publicity on the univer-
sity has recently been slight,
suggesting that difficulties have
been encountered in the opening
weeks of its first session.
Khrushchev announced the
creation of the new university
last February during his visit
to Indonesia, and it was later
extolled by Soviet media as an
example of the concern of the
Soviet people for the underde-
veloped areas of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. Unusually
generous scholarships were to
be offered this year to 500
students from these areas, and
plans were announced for an
eventual student body of from
3,000 to 4,000.
The rector of the new uni-
versity announced in September
that 40,000 applications had
been received. The official
opening on 1 October was marked
by photographs of students on
the front steps of the new build-
ing, and TASS announced that the
opening ceremonies had been at-
tended by over 1,000 youths from
Asian, African, and Latin Ameri-
can countries, There was no an-
nouncement, however, of the num-
ber of actual students as op-
posed to ceremonial visitors.
Soviet spokes-
men explained that since the
building was not yet completed,
the students were temporarily
being housed elsewhere. A visit
to these temporary quarters the
following week elicited the ad-
mission that only 300 of the an-
nounced student body of 500 had ar-
rived, Moscow radio noted on 9
October that of the 169 Latin
American applicants :-invited
to Moscow at Soviet expense to
take entrance examinations,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
"almost half" had "already" ar-
rived. Subsequent Soviet press
references to foreign students
in the-USSR have been confined
to those attending "Moscow col-
leges" or to those enrolled at
Moscow State University, with-
out reference to the new uni-
versity.
Language problems have un-
doubtedly complicated the open-
ing session. According to ear-
lier announcements, examinations
are to be held in English,-French,
and Spanish, or they can be
taken with the aid of an inter-
preter. Classes, however, are to
be conducted in Russian, necessi-
tating intensive language study
for all first-year students.
Soviet insistence on com-
plete control over the selec-
tion of scholarship recipients
has aroused suspicions among
the various governments con-
cerned, and this may have slowed
enrollment. The Indian Govern-
ment, for example, refused to
consider allowing any of its
students to attend until it had
extracted a promise from the
prorector that Marxism-Leninism
and "political subjects" would
not be taught 'to Indian stu-
dents.
Khrushchev appeared to be
reiterating this promise on 17
November when he said, "We
shall not`thrust'our views and
our ideology on any of the
students," He also said, how-
ever, that the new university
would "help the students to use
all the available data, litera-
ture, and aids"in understanding
why belief in Communism has 25X1
lasted 100 years and is now
held by "one third of mankind."
Delays in the production
and import of machinery and
equipment, poor results in con-
struction, and an unexpectedly
heavy exodus of workers to the
West have combined to unbalance
East Germany's 1960 plans for
economic development and to
weaken prospects for economic
growth in the next few years.
The investment plan for 1960
will not be met, and next year's
investment plan has had to, be
lowered by about 7 percent, thus
reducing East Germany's already
slim chances of achieving the
industrial production goals of
the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65)
and perhaps postponing the trans-
formation of simple agricultur-
al cooperatives into advanced
collectives.
During the first nine months
of 1960, over-all industrial pro-
duction reportedly increased 8.4
percent, but quarterly figures
throughout the year were below
plan and--more serious--the
machinery and equipment indus-
tries have failed to meet planned
goals. The main difficulties
in these industries seem to be
the shortage of labor and over-
estimation of productive capacity
by planners, and, in some areas,
material shortages.
These industries' failures,
together with below-plan imports
and a construction lag even great-
er than in 1959, are directly
responsible for a serious in-
vestment lag. Investment ex-
penditures at the end of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
second and third quarters in
1960 were running 8 and 9 per-
cent, respectively, above 1959,
in contrast to the 14.5 percent
planned for 1960. Because in-
vestments in 1959 also were
short of plan by about 5 percent,
investment may fall 10 percent
below the 1960 goal as estab-
lished by the Seven-Year Plan.
The labor shortage is a
major factor in the lags in
investment and production. Af-
ter declining substantially in
1958-59, flights to the West
have increased in 1960 so that
by 31 October the number of
emigrants--168,362--already
considerably exceeded the 1959
total of 143,917. This loss
of about one percent of the
population reduces the manpower
available to make up for pro-
duction lags caused by failure
to complete investment projects.
Apparently concluding that
only a Soviet loan would permit
realization of the planned 1961
level of investments, the East
German regime reportedly ap-
proached Moscow in September
for a $375,000,000 credit to
finance an anticipated foreign
trade deficit in 1961, When
no aid was granted, the regime
was forced to cut back planned
1961 investments by almost that
amount. All major branches of
the economy apparently were
affected, although no signifi-
cant reduction in allocations
to consumption appears to have
accompanied the investment cut.
A reported 24-percent cut
in the state plan for agricul-
tural investment in 1961 places
additional burdens on the co-
operative farms themselves. It
will force them to increase ex-
penditures for agricultural ma-
chinery, for example, so that
they probably will not be able
to undertake the additional con-
struction expenditures needed
for the development of advanced
types of collectives in the near
future.. In addition, manpower
requirements in agriculture will
prevent a release of labor to
industry in order to offset be-
low-plan investments in this
sector of the economy.
East Germany will face the
same investment difficulties in
1961 as in 1960, and even the
reduced goal for next year prob-
ably will not be achieved. With-
out a substantial reduction in
flights to the West, the labor
shortage may cause an even
greater lag in investments as
the plan period progresses,
In Bonn's notice of termina-
tion of the interzonal trade
agreement, the East German re-
gime has a ready-made scapegoat
for any loss of prestige it might
suffer as a result of having
had to lower plan goals. How-
ever, actual termination of
this trade would force East
Germany to cut back economic
plans even more
REORGANIZATION OF POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
What now appears to be a if not a redirection, in Polish
major reorganization of the
Polish Foreign Ministry--evi-
dence of changes was first noted
a little over a month ago--
probably reflects a new emphasis,
foreign policy. Greater efforts
apparently are to be made to
penetrate the underdeveloped and
neutralist nations and to improve
economic relations with the
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SECRET.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
POLISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DIPLOMATIC DEPARTMENTS
DEPUTY MINISTER
(for disarmament and
German peace treaty)
Marian Naszkowski
PROTOCOL
Jerzy Grudzinski
DEPT I
USSR & European Socialist
DEPT H
Communist Asia
MINISTER
Adam Rapacki
SECRETARIAT
Ryszard Majchrzak
DEPT III
USA, UK, Canada, South
Africa, Australia,
Scandinavia
Eugeniusz Milnikiel
DEPT IV
Other European Capitalist
States & Turkey
MAIN SCHOOL OF
FOREIGN SERVICE
CULTURAL &
PRESS &
LEGAL & TREATY
SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION
CONSULAR
COOPERATION
Manfred Lachs
Henryk Birecki
Romuald Poleszczuk
Jerzy Roszak
1
1
a
INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL &
ECONOMIC ORGANS
Mieczyslaw Blusztajn
ADMINISTRATION
ARCHIVES
PERSONNEL
CHANCERY
COMMUNICATIONS
Marian Wajda
Tadeusz Cieslak
Leon Zmijewski
Zygmunt Rawicz
Solid lines denote known subordinations.
Dotted lines show possible subordinations.
Lack of lines denotes no knowledge of subordinations.
Western countries which are
capable of aiding Poland's eco-
nomic programs. The ministry's
machinery for dealing with Sino-
Soviet bloc affairs has been
streamlined, probably in part to
ease any administrative and per-
sonnel strains imposed by an
expansion of relations with non-
bloc countries.
As a result of changes
made so far, two major organ-
izational groups within the
ministry--one dealing with the
Sino-Soviet bloc states, the
other with nonbloc nations--
have become more sharply defined.
Pro-Soviet Deputy Minister
Naszkowski--who is charged with
matters affecting disarmament
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DEPT V
Asia & Africa
DEPUTY MINISTER
(for UN and international
organizations)
Jozef Winiewicz
BASIC PARTY
ORGANIZATION
DEPT VI
Latin America
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS INSTITUTE
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and the German peace treaty,
both key concerns of Soviet as
well as Polish foreign policy--
will probably, supervise the
work of those departments deal-
ing with matters concerning the
Sino-Soviet bloc. Most of the
top personnel in these depart-
ments are Moscow oriented.
Deputy Minister Winiewicz,
thought to be Western oriented,
will be concerned with relations
with the nonbloc nations, the
UN, and other international or-
ganizations. Most department
chiefs in these areas are known
and respected in the West.
One effect of the shifts
is the apparent removal of the
deputy ministers from the direct
chain of command between the
various departments and the
minister. The addition of for-
mer UN Ambassador Jerzy Michalow-
ski brings to three the number
of directors general, each
supervising two diplomatic
departments, of which there are
one more than under the previ-
ous organization. The new dip-
lomatic departments reflect
both the desire to achieve a
more manageable geographic
division of responsibility with-
in the ministry and the expan-
sion of Polish diplomatic con-
tacts in the free world--
which Foreign Ministry sources
claim have assumed greater im-
portance.
.The regime is considering
adding special advisers to the
minister?s office for economic
matters, German affairs, and
international law and disarma-
ment. The last of these posts
is reportedly to be filled by
Manf red Lachs, present director 25X1
of the Legal and Treaty Depart-
ment and well known for his
pro-Western views.
CZECHS SEEK AIR ROUTES TO CUBA
The Czech Airline (CSA) is
leading the bloc in its first
concentrated effort to establish
a civil air route to Latin Amer-
ica. Success in this effort
would facilitate the travel of
the increasing numbers of bloc
personnel going to the area on
military, economic, cultural,
and political missions.
The Czechs have planned two
different routes to Havana, one
via Rabat, the Azores, and Ber-
muda, and the other via Shannon,
Gander, and Bermuda. All of
the nations whose airports are
involved are members of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) and, as such,
are bound to accede to a fellow
member's request for technical
stops. The Czechs have already
cleared the major hurdle--that
of gaining clearance for tech-
nical stops in Bermuda.
Early this year Czechoslo-
vakia laid the groundwork for
establishing the route to Cuba
by renewing its 1947 air-transit
agreement with Ireland, which
specifically permits CSA stops
at Shannon on trans-Atlantic runs.
It also made a series of formal
overtures to Canada for a bi-
lateral agreement to service
traffic between Czechoslovakia
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
and the United States and Canada.
The Czechs later requested tech-
nical stops under ICAO regula-
tions at Gander, Bermuda, and
probably the Azores, and over-
flight rights from West. Germany.
The British Government
throughly studied the ICAO
regulations and Czech adherence
to them and concluded that there
was no basis for denying the
application. Canada and West
Germany probably will feel that
the Irish and British actions
have forced their hands, and
that, as ICAO members, they can-
not delay further in approving
the Gander technical stop and
West German overflights.
[~
I N IA,N/ ll
_H?i.i
Czechoslovak International Civil Air Routes
Scheduled
Governmental agreement, not yet implemented
Projected _J
The only civil airport in
Bermuda is within the US-leased
Kindley Air Force Base, and the.
Czechs may be reluctant to stop
there if the US applies to CSA
aircraft its "right of inspec-
tion" granted in the lease agree-
ments.
Once in Havana, CSA will
probably expand its services to
many South American cities; it
reportedly already plans to
fly from Havana to Mexico City.
In the meantime, Cubana Airlines
has announced that regular 25X1
service on a route to Prague
via the Azores and London will
begin in December.
As the Castro regime con-
tinues to strengthen and tighten
its police state control, it is
evident that one of its primary
instruments is the militia, a
force of some 200,000 "volun-
teers" being organized with in-
creasing efficiency throughout
the island. Organizationally
distinct from the regular armed
forces, this militia is equiv-
alent on a population basis to
a 5,600,000-man militia in the
United States.
First organized after long
Communist urging late last year,
the militia has grown markedly
in recent weeks as a result of
the officially inspired "war
spirit" of late October. The
threat of an "imminent invasion"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
from the United States was used
to justify a nationwide mobilir
zation and an intensive training
program to prepare "the people"
to resist "imperialist aggres-
sion." Although the mobilization
and "the defense of our revolu-
tion by the Socialist countries"
now are credited with hav-
ing staved off the immediate
threat of invasion, the mili-
tia continues to be strength-
ened.
The Cuban militia, similar
in organization and purpose to
that of Communist China, is not
only a force for police control,
but a means of subjecting a large
number of Cubans to military
discipline and political indoc-
trination. The militia also
provides the regime with a cheap
labor force while it reduces the
threat of political unrest
stemming from Cuba's chronically
serious unemployment problem.
It could also prove valuable
against antigovernment activity
in the less politically reliable
regular armed forces.
Communist penetration is
extensive at all levels of the
militia. In Communist jargon,
the organization of a militia
is synonymous with "the arming
of the people," an objective
which Communist and pro-Castro
groups throughout Latin America
claim is a necessary ingredient
of a successful revolution and
must be accompanied by the de-
struction of the regular armed
forces.
While the bulk of militia
members--both men and women--
undergo regular part-time mili-
tary training and political in-
doctrination, a hard core is
assigned full-time duties nor-
mally the responsibility of the
regular armed forces.
Meanwhile, the economic
mission headed by Che Guevara
arrived in-Peiping on 17 Novem-
ber after receiving high-level
attention and lavish praise at
earlier stops in Prague and
Moscow. In Peiping, Guevara
had an "intimate" talk with Mao
Tse-tung on 19 November and
hailed Communist China for its
"defense of our newborn revolu-
tion," adding that Communist
China's ""22 years of struggle
...has revealed a new road for
the Americas." After a tour of
a Chinese commune, Guevara said
that "the Latin American people
have many things to learn from
the peoples communes and all
the other social systems adopted
by China. "25X1
In an apparent effort to
control mounting'unrest over
Bolivia's nearly bankrupt econ-
omy, President Paz Estenssoro
declared a state of siege in
the Cochabamba area on 19 Novem-
ber. Rioting on 17 November in
Cochabamba, Bolivia's second-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEK t SU
largest city, apparently trig-
gered the declaration. Govern-
ment buildings were attacked,
and from 2,000 to 5,000 milled
in the streets in an ~_antigov-
ernment demonstration which the
administration paper attributed
to an alliance of Communists
and members of the former ruling
class.
?assistance and is already seeking
extensive credit in Germany for
the mines, has nevertheless de-
cided to send a credit-seeking
mission to Czechoslovakia and
the USSR as well as to France,
Germany, England, and the
Netherlands,
Guillermo Bedregal, presi-
dent of the national
mining corporation and
a member of the mis-
sion, asserts that the
Soviet representatives
may offer as much as
$200,000,000 for eco-
nomic development and
revitalization of the
mining industry. He 25X1
said that he and Min-
BACKGROUND
The Bolivian Government has been under the control of the leftist
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement since it won power in a sweeping
revolution in 1952. Tin mines were nationalised, agrarian reform be-
gun, and army power destroyed. Military power is now fragmented with-
in and among the army, national police, and civilian militia. One of
the three poorest Latin American countries, Bolivia's foreign exchange
earnings--almost all from declining mine production--was only about
$40,000,000 in 1959 compared with a $100,000,000 average from 1953 to
1957. US aid since 1952 has been about $150,000,000.
Considerable harassment of
American Ambassador Strom a few
days earlier, although possibly
Communist abetted, appears to
have resulted primarily from
underlying unrest. Civilian
militia clashes in a nearby
village recently resulted in
about 100 deaths in a two-day
period. Anti-American demon-
strations during the ambassador's
visit to the mining center of
Oruro on 12 November were part
of an.effort by miners to.secure
overdue wages from the govern-
ment.
During the past two months,
pressure has been mounting on
the new Paz government to follow
up a Soviet offer to build a tin
smelter in Bolivia. Paz, who
apparently prefers Western
ister of Mines Nuflo Chavez,
who heads the mission,would
have no alternative but to
accept the offer.
State-of-siege powers ex-
tend for 90 days from the dec-
laration. Before this period
has expired, Paz hopes to have
obtained enough foreign aid to
dissipate the economic stagna-
tion which has been largely re-
sponsible for the political un-
rest plaguing Bolivian regimes
in recent years. He may have
realized for some time that he
would need these emergency
powers to control unrest in the
interim.
Chilean leftist groups are
trying to exploit the marked
economic deterioration of recent
months with an eye to the March
1961 congressional elections.
The price of copper, the country's
chief export, has fallen three
cents a pound since early Octo-
ber and the inflationary spiral,
slowed somewhat last spring,
has regained momentum. There
has been a drop in real wages,
and the conservative Alessandri
government's refusal to enact
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
wage readjustment legislation
has put severe economic pressure
on most of the urban population.
Falling world copper prices
have a severe impact on Chile.
Over a twelve-month period a
drop of one cent per pound means
a loss of about $7,000,000 in
government revenue and about
$8,000,000 in foreign exchange--
equivalent to about 2 percent
of Chile's foreign earnings
last year. The government's
failure to reach quick settle-
ments in strikes at the copper
mines and other industrial in-
stallations has put an additional
strain on a deficit-financed
budget. President Alessandri's
position has been that granting
anything approximating labor's
full demands would wreck the
stabilization program.
Early this month rioting
broke out in Santiago over
Alessandri's wage policy. After
the Chamber of Deputies had
sought to raise to 33.3 percent
his proposal for a 10-percent
wage rise in partial compensa-
tion for about a 40-percent in-
crease in the cost of living
since January 1959, he withdrew
his 10--percent offer.
Chile's only important
labor federation, the Communist-
dominated Single Center of
Chilean Workers;(CUTCH), called
a protest demonstration on 3
November that resulted in two
deaths and many injuries. The
government has indicted Clotario
Blest, fellow-travelling pres=-
ident of CUTCH, and other leftist
leaders for inciting a riot;
CUTCH has filed a suit accusing
the national police of homicide
and has made a formal demand on
the government for massive wage
readjustments.
Leftist elements have been
generally showing more aggres-
siveness than at any previous
time in the two years of the
Alessandri administration, with
the Socialists at present more
militant than the Communists.
Blest has alluded to Cuba sever-
al times in recent antigovern-
ment speeches, saying in his
oration at the funeral of those
killed in the 3 November riots
that "Santiago will be the
Sierra Maestra of Chile."
The 13 November strike
settlement at Chile's largest
copper mine, giving the workers
a 25-percent increase in wages,
will probably increase labor
pressures for wage readjustment 25X1
legislation, and the approach of
the March congressional elections
will make Alessandri's supporters
in congress increasingly suscep-
tible to this pressure.
25X6
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGARY
The postelection govern-
ment of Social Democrats and
Radical Liberals formed in Den-
mark on 18 November by Prime
Minister Kampmann will general-
ly continue the policies of
Kampmann's previous coalition.
In view of its tenuous par-
liamentary'.` majority, aT
chieved by resorting to the un-
usual practice of relying on
the support of three Greenland
and Faroese representatives,
this government probably will
be more reluctant than ever to
press such controversial issues
as defense for fear of tempo-
rarily uniting the opposition
forces of the left and right.
A new element of instability
on the political scene is the
Socialist People's party (SPP),
a recently formed "national"
Communist faction which elimi-
nated the Moscow-oriented Com-
munist party from parliamentary
representation. Despite the
ideological dispute, the foreign
policy platforms of the two left-
ist parties in the 15 November
elections were practically identi-
cal. Both advocated Denmark's
withdrawal from NATO and adoption
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may also have used the SPP to
register a protest vote.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of a policy of neutral-
ity.
The SPP's 11 seats--more
than the Communist party won in
any election since 1945--will
place it in a pivotal position
on some parliamentary issues.
Its expected representation on
the foreign affairs committee
will give it added prestige.
The party's successful appeal to
the electorate in advocating
total disarmament will probably
result in increased agitation
for steps by the government to-
ward this goal.
In addition to the normal
pro-Communist vote, the SPP also
won considerable support from
non-Communist neutralist and
pacifist sympathizers, and is
causing considerable anxiety
among the democratic parties,
which view it as posing a more
dangerous long-run threat to
Denmark's continued membership
in the Western alliance than
the Danish Communist party with
its blatantly pro-Moscow line.
The SPP's non-Communist support
appears to have come principally
from defectors from the Radical
Liberal party, the traditional
stronghold of the non-Communist
neutralists; the defections cost
this government party three of
its 14 seats in parliament. Some
disgruntled left-wing Socialists
The Radical Liberals'
losses are offset by the im-
DANISH PARLIAMENT (FOLKETING)
(15 NOVEMBER 1960)
GERMAN MINORITY 1
GREENLAND 2
179
SEATS
pressive gains of the Social
Democrats, who, like their ?
counterparts in Sweden's Sep-
tember parliamentary elections,
greatly increased their vote over
the previous national election.
The party won six additional
seats, giving it a total of 76
in the unicameral parliament.
This success should serve to
strengthen the authority and
prestige of Kampmann, who since
succeeding the late H. C. Hansen
last February has had to es-
tablish his position as both
the leader of his party and
head of the government.
PORTUGAL AND THE UN
Portugal's concern over
recent developments in Africa
has been, reflected in growing
animosity toward the UN and some
resentment toward its NATO al-
lies for not opposing a recent
UN resolution requesting Lisbon
to report on conditions in its
overseas territories.
On 12 November the General
Asfiembly's Thrusteeship Committee
approved an Afro-Asian resolu-
tion directing Portugal to sup-
ply socio-economic information
on its African and Asian pos-
sessions in accordance with
Article 73(e) of the UN Charter.
The Portuguese have consistently
refused to comply with this ob-
ligation on the grounds that
their overseas territories are
integral parts of Portugal.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
Since mid-October, Lisbon
has succeeded in evoking strong
domestic support on what it con-
siders an insidious campaign in
the UN against its overseas prov-
inces, particularly those in Af-
rica. On several occasions large
crowds have enthusiastically pro-
claimed Portugal's indivisibil-'
ity, and on 15 November the over-
seas minister publicly declared
that the government would permit
no outside interference in what
were Portugal's own problems. Por-
tugal sees as further evidence
of the UN's anti-Portuguese bias
the recent disappearance of its
prospects of being elected to a
Security Council seat this year.
Portuguese spokesmen now are
playing down reports that Lisbon
might sever ties with the UN,
The Portuguese delegate to the
Trusteeship Committee told the
US delegation to the UN that
such a move was unlikely, at
least for the time being. He
added, however, that Portuguese
public opinion might force a
reconsideration of ties with
NATO, and said Prime Minister
Salazar intended to make a
statement on the subject that
would have "no kind words" for
the United States.
During the past year, Por-
tuguese officials have made it
increasingly clear that their
country's interests in Africa
have precedence over its com-
mitments to NATO and its treaty
with the United States which
provides base facilities in
the Azores. They argue that
Portugal's continued presence
in Africa as an anti-Communist
bulwark deserves the backing
of the other NATO members.
In the Trusteeship Commit-
tee's vote on 12 November, four
NATO members supported the Afro-
Asian resolution; five, includ-
ing the US, abstained; and only
two voted against it. Approval
of the committee's action by
the plenary session of the Gen-
eral Assembly, which is consid-
ered almost certain, will re-
inforce Portugal's view that 25X1
its NATO partners cannot be
relied on to protect Portugal's
vital interests.
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INDIAN CONCERN OVER HIMALAYAN BORDER STATES
Recent Indian actions
along the northeastern section
of the Himalayan frontier re-
flect greater concern among
India's policy-makers about the
defense of that portion of the
long border with Tibet. Offi-
cial worries appear to be wide-
spread, from the commanders on
the scene to the prime minister
in New Delhi. In recent cabi-
net sessions, as well as in the
recently convened Indian legis-
lature, Nehru has dwelled ex-
tensively on the subject of
border defense and has also,
been sharply critical of Indian
Communist activities in the
border regions.
Several factors probably
account for this flurry of Indian
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23 November 1960
~ntvirvty~
AND KASHbiI
. (status in dispute)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Road constructed by
hinese in 1957
Bo~ndo,i not n wily those
recoyn oed by the U.S. Go~e.~ment.
C H I N A
activity. Although no appreci-
able Chinese build-up is be-
lieved to have occurred recent-
ly, rumors of an increase in
Chinese troops opposite Sikkim
have apparently alarmed much
of the region's civil popula-
tion, and obvious Indian mil-
itary reinforcements could be
designed to allay this alarm.
It is also sound for Indian
reinforcements and redeployments
to take place now--before the
onset of winter. Regrouping to
withstand the rigors of the
long Himalayan winter may well
Gyangtse
(ahon Line
Luhit
S K, Hws.
J P
Shillong-
have taken place among Chinese
room s as well
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S.UM ;Ry
CHINA'S POPULATION AND, . ITS i'ECONOMIC-::GROWTH
Communist China Wili have . a- pop-
ulation of 700,000,000 by the end
of 1960. With roughly 30,000,000
births and about 13,000,000
deaths, the net gain for this
year will be around 17,000,000,a
growth rate of 2.5 percent.
There is no prospect for an
appreciable drop in this rate in
the near future. Birth rates
will probably remain high over
the next ten years, even if Pei-
ping's birth control campaign is
revived, and death rates are ex-
pected to remain relatively low,
barring a major failure in the
food supply,
The Birth Control Issue
The attitude of the Chinese
Communists 'towar'd the.population
question has fluctuated greatly
over the past ten years. The
1953 census figures apparently
surprised the regime, revealing
a population--583,000,000--con-
siderably larger than had been
estimated, Thus the government,
for the first time, was forced
into serious consideration of
the question of shaping a pop-
ulation policy. An initial out-
burst of enthusiastic pride was
followed by doubts as to how
such a huge population could be
supported, and by suggestions
that population growth be lim-
ited.
The very hesitant nature
of early proposals for birth
control reflected basic disagree-
ments among the policy makers on
this issue. By 1957, however,
goo
COMl
WNIST CHI
NA
goo
oo
00
USSR
us
' 9;;0/
SECRET
the cautious approach
had changed to open
endorsement by the
government. It may be
relevant that 1957 was
a year of retrenchment
in the economy, after
a year of rapid growth
and high investment.
The apparent re-
lationship between at-
titudes toward birth
control and the state
of the economy was
even more marked in
1958, when the induced
exuberance of the leap
forward campaign left
no scope for the im-
plicit pessimism of the
birth control program.
Almost all propaganda
for birth control, there-
fore, ceased in 1958, al-
though information and
materials for birth lim-
itation were still pro-
vided.
The regime is still
unable to reconcile op-
timistic views of the
economy with the need
to limit the size of
the population. Thus
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY -SUMMARY
birth control has been dropped
as a propaganda theme, but it
has not been repudiated as of-
ficial government policy. Cur-
rent references tie birth con-
trol to the health issue, rath-
er than to economic problems.
Labor Supply
Peiping's concern with
population over the past year
has been expressed mainly in
terms of alleged labor short-
ages. Actual shortages, how-
ever, could more accurately be
attributed 'to mismanagement and
misuse of labor, rather than to
any real scarcity of manpower.
The excesses of the leap for-
ward, for example, have fre-
quently diverted large segments
of the labor force into wasteful
and uneconomic activities. Such
diversions have caused temporary
shortages, notably in agricul-
ture, but the significant short-
ages in China are still in land,
capital, and skilled manpower--
ot in manpower per se.
Continuing food shortages
point up the difficulties in
agriculture. The regime is at-
tempting to concentrate labor
on agricultural duties this
year, and diversion of manpower
to other rural activities, such
as commune industry, is being
severely limited. However, per-
sistent problems--such as a lim-
ited amount of arable land, low.
investment, and natural calam-
ities in two consecutive years--
show why China cannot continue
to rely on sheer labor power in
agriculture. The inability to
increase agricultural production,
in the last. ten years at a rate
much above the growth of the
population suggests not only the
need for higher investment, but
also the dangers of increased
consumption by a huge rural pop-
ulation of rather low productiv-
ity.
Possible Solutions
Even if it recognizes these
pressures, Peiping faces both
ideological and practical prob-
lems in launching a major birth
control program. The doctrinal
problem of a Communist regime's
espousing a program tinged with
Malthusianism can be rational-
ized, but not so easy is the
development of a program that
offers even a partial allevia-
tion of the practical problem
over the next ten or twenty
years.
Birth control offers the
best solution over the long run,
but the means of implementation
are not now available. This may
be one important reason why the
regime has failed to make a
concerted effort to control pop-
ulation growth. Aware that the
birth control campaign of 1957
had no significant effect on
the birth rate and did not over-
come traditional peasant oppo-
sition to contraception, ele
ments in the regime may well
question the efficacy of any
renewed efforts.
Alleviation of the prob-
lem through increased death
rates is unlikely. Improve-
ments in public health are un-
likely to be reversed, even
though continued food short-
ages can be expected to in-
crease malnutrition and re-
lated health problems. Local
famines would have to be quite
severe for deaths to counter-
balance the annual addition of
approximately 30 million births.
Emigration offers no feas-
ible solution to China's popu-
lation problem, nor does inter-
nal migration, which has almost
no effect on the rate of pop-
ulation growth. Although mi-
gration from heavily populated
areas to sparsely settled areas
Would have the political advan-
tage of "diluting" troublesome
minority groups in certain re-
gions, the effect elsewhere
would only be to encourage fur-
ther growth, since "gaps" cre-
ated by migration from the
densely populated areas nor-
mally fill up rapidly. Reset-
tlement would also be extremely
expensive and of limited economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
value. The scarcity of unex-
ploited arable land in China
moreover makes a large-scale re-
settlement program impractical.
Long-Range Effects
The continued rapid growth
of population will not halt in-
dustrialization, but it may al-
ready be forcing some increase
in priority for agriculture in
the allocation of capital and
managerial talents and energies.
Industry may have to produce
more chemical fertilizers, in-
secticides, and irrigation pumps
and relatively fewer machine
tools and less rolling mill
equipment. Instead of export-
ing foodstuffs for machinery,
the Chinese may have to export
manufactured goods for food.
Some of the managerial and tech-
nical specialists formerly mo-
nopolized by industry will have
to be shared with agriculture.
The increasing pressure of
population on China's limited
arable land acts a.s a further
restraint on economic growth.
Intensive methods of cultiva-
tion have been common in China
for centuries, and almost all
the land suitable for crops is
already under cultivation. Since
irrigation techniques are also
fairly well advanced, no easy
avenues of rapid progress are
apparent. Agricultural pro-
duction must be stimulated,
however, if the food shortages
are to be eliminated.
Aggregate production and
consumption have made impres-
sive advances in China, but
per capita. changes have been
far more modest. In 1958, for
instance, China achieved its
goal of surpassing Great Britain
in aggregate production of coal;
but in production per capita,
Britain's. figure was still ten
times that of China. Similar-
ly, China raised agricultural
production by about 3 percent
annually during the regime's
first ten years, but the aver-
age annual population increase
during the same period was over
2 percent, making the gain in
per capita agricultural pro-
duction less than 1 percent per
year.
Even if gains in total
production put China among the
leading industrial powers in
1980, the population will still
be dominantly rural and levels 25X1
of consumption will remain low.
NEHRU AND HIS HIGH COMMAND
Jawaharlal Nehru has held
sway over India for so long it
has often seemed improbable
that any other political lead-
er could play a really signif-
icant role. It has become com-
monplace to speak of his close
supervision of Indian affairs
and his loneliness in power.
Nehru has never ruled alone,
however, and recently there
have been increasing signs
that his top associates are shar-
ing more in the exercise of pow-
er.
The Machinery of Power
Political power in India
is concentrated in a small group
of Congress party leaders who
comprise what is known as the
"High Command." Their author-
ity flows from Nehru, through
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNURY
23 November 1960
official or unofficial channels,
and is exerted through two lines
of command: the government and
the party.
Under the Indian constitu-
tion, ultimate power resides in
the Parliament. Inasmuch as the
the Congress party holds nearly
three quarters of the seats, par-
liamentary power is exercised
more in form than in fact, be+4.,
cause all important decisions
are made and policy set by the
prime minister and his "inner
cabinet," composed largely of
the most influential party lead-
ers. Parliament ratifies what
the High Command hands
down--not without
heated discussion at
times--and the cabinet
members direct their
programs through the
government's elab-
orate network of min-
istries, departments,
and commissions.
Although the Con-
gress party has a sep-
arate parliamentary
executive which leads
the party in both
houses of Parliament,
the party's more pow-
erful organizational
wing controls party
policy and activities
at all levels. The
leaders, selected on a regional
basis, including the treasurer
and the three influential party
secretaries, The Central Par-
liamentary Board this year in-
cludes the present and two past
party presidents, two cabinet
ministers, and a powerful state
chief minister; Nehru and one
or two other top leaders sit in
when vital matters, which are
invariably passed to the board
for decision, are considered.
The towering presence of
Nehru, either in person or in
INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
1 11- ~_ - I
GENERAL
SECRETARIES
TREASURER
DISCIPLINARY
ACTION
COMMITTEE
D151RI17 LEVEL
LOCAL LEVEL
.1- 1
spirit, dominates both the gov-
ernmental and party councils.
Nehru has tended in the past to
lecture the cabinet and party
committees, or to indulge in
rambling discourses on inter-
national problems, rather than
to seek their counsel. He has
used his biweekly confidential
letters to the state chief min-
isters, for example, more as a
vehicle to air his far-ranging
views than to give needed in-
struction to these party bosses,
who have little time for the re-
finements of international di-
plomacy.
organizational side of
the Congress is headed by the
party president, and since Nehru
stepped down from this office in
1954 it has been filled by an
"organization man."
The party's power and in-
fluence are focused in the 21-
member Working Committee, ex-
ecutive body of the All-India
Congress Committee. In matters
concerning state government af-
fairs, party authority is still
further concentrated in the six-
member Central Parliamentary
Board, which functions as a
kind of politburo. The Working
Committee is composed of the
Congress president and key party
CENTRAL
PARLIAMENTARY
BOARD
Nehru's habit of running
India largely as a one-man
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SRY
23 November 1960
operation, his insistence on
making most decisions--even on
trivial administrative matters--
and his status as a demigod in
the eyes of the Indian masses
have had the effect of inhibit-
ing the exercise of leadership
on the part of his deputies. Ef-
fective action by responsible
leaders is often deferred while
a problem is passed up the line
until it finally reaches Nehru's
desk. Even the top echelon, in
both government and party, hes-
itates to act without a go-ahead
from "Pandit j i . "
An illustration of the
weakness of this system is pro-
vided by the recent government
crises in several key states,
notably Uttar Pradesh in north-
central India. These crises,
which essentially arose out of
factional struggles within the
state parties, were referred
to the Central Parliamentary
Board after several efforts by
influential party trouble Shoot-
ers had failed. Even the elite
Board was unable to work out a
solution, however, and the prob-
lem was passed on to Nehru.
Shifting Power Patterns
During the past 18 months,
increasing signs of change have
been discernible in Nehru's re-
lationship with the cabinet and
the party executive, and also
in the ideological balance of
power within the High Command.
Growing criticism of both the
manner and the direction of
Nehru's leadership has been ex-
pressed in Congress party cir-
cles more openly and persistent-
ly than at any time in the past.
His position remains secure, but
the precept that "Nehru knows
best" seems to have lost some
of its force. At party con-
claves earlier this year, cer-
tain policies laid down by the
prime minister were sharply at-
tacked by rebel members, moving
Nehru to cry out over the uproar,
"It is impertinence! I t is im-
pertinence:" In the end, Nehru's
will is done.
Despite his reported sur-
prise when certain Congress
colleagues for the first time
opposed a Nehru foreign policy
resolution at a party gather-
ing early in November, there are
indications that Nehru senses
the changing atmosphere and, is
trimming his sails. The more
influential ministers and party
leaders apparently have begun
to press their views more forci-
bly in cabinet sessions, and
presumably in party circles, and
to take issue with Nehru's pol-
icies.
The High Command never has
been a collection of sycophants
automatically rubber-stamping
Nehru's every action, but for
the most part they have consid-
ered it wise or expedient to sub-
ordinate their own views and go
along with the prime minister.
Nehru now may be beginning to
listen as well as to lecture, to
rely more on his colleagues' ad-
vice and experience, and to del-
egate at least some of his re-
sponsibilities.
As the leading politicians
have begun to assert their pow-
er more actively in top govern-
ment and party circles, the di-
vision of Congress members into
conservative and leftist group-
ings has become more apparent.
In the past the conservative and
middle-of-the-road elements,
representing nearly all the
provincial Congress machines
and the majority of the party
membership, seemed to be dom-
inated by the more vocal and
aggressive leftist faction of-
ten favored by Nehru.
In recent years the sub-
merged conservative strength
has come to the surface, and
the prominent moderate and
conservative leaders have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 November 1960
consolidated their
position in the na-
tional government.
Such developments as
the Sino-Indian dispute, the increased
need for American fi-
nancial assistance,
and the wave of op-
position to Nehru's
cooperative farming
proposals have iso-
lated the leftists
and facilitated the
ascendancy of the
conservatives.
At the top cab-
inate level, only
Krishna Menon and
Nehru himself are
identified with the
left-of-center group,
and only a handful of
the senior party fig-:
ures are. Indian ob-
servers estimate that
the leftist-inclined
faction commands the
support of only 10 to
20 percent of the party. Even
the moderate and conservative
leaders, however, generally sup-
port the objective of a welfare
state, a planned, mixed economy,
and a foreign policy of non-.:....
alignment.
Key Figures Around Nehru
Three strong men figure
prominently in the highest cir-
cles of both government and
States whose representatives have long
dominated top government and party bodies
party, and all of them represent
in varying degrees the anti-
Communist, conservative wing of
the Congress. These leaders, who
have greatly increased their
share of power in recent years,
are Home Minister G. B. Pant,
Finance Minister Morarji Desai,
and Food and Agriculture Minis-
ter S. K. Patil.
Pant is one of the few old
comrades of the independence
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S kAPY
movement still at Nehru's side.
Called to the central cabinet
in 1955 from Uttar Pradesh to
help fill the growing void cre-
ated by the deaths of outstand-
ing Congress leaders, Pant has
served ably as Nehru's right-
hand, mah if1 government and as
party wheel horse. Typical of
the Congress "old guard," Pant
is a shrewd politician, agile
parliamentarian, and strong ad-
ministrator. He has been re-
garded for some time as the
most likel immediate successor
to Nehru,
Desai gained a solid repu-
tation as administrator of Bom-
bay State before he joined the
cabinet in 1956. At 64, he has
emerged as the number-one con-
tender for the premiership af-
ter Nehru,
F
acknowl-
edged competence and reputation
for incorruptibility, if not
his political power alone, prob-
ably would guarantee his elec-
tion by the Working Committee
as national leader,
Patil earned his standing
in the party with his impressive
accomplishments as a machine
politician, particularly in
directing successful election
campaigns as boss of Bombay
City and for Congress branches
elsewhere. Given the vital job
of managing India's food prob-
lem in 1959, 60-year-old Patil
has made equally rapid strides
of late within the party organ-
ization, having this year gained
not only membership in the Work-
ing Committee and the important
Central Elections Committee but
appointment as party treasurer.
Despite respect for his polit-
ical talents and energy, Patil's
strongly Westernized and conserv-
ative outlook limits his popular
support.
Among other leaders who are
influential in high Congress cir-
cles and who perform important
tasks for the party are popular
and capable Minister of Commerce
and Industry L. B. Shastri, for-
mer Congress President U. N.
Dhebar, and the party's present
chief executive, Sanjiva Reddy.
Reddy's performance since taking
over earlier this year has not
been impressive, and a replace-
ment may be found to head the
party during the critical year
prior to the February 1962 elec-
tions.
Nehru's daughter, Indira
ia Gandhi; ; who was an effective
Congress party president during
1959, continues to exert consider-
able influence as a leader of the
socialist-minded "ginger group,"
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but she plays a far more impor-
tant role as Nehru's closest
confidante and perhaps most in-
fluential adviser. Certain
powerful state chief ministers,
notably Madras' strong Kamraj
Nadar and Ma arashtra's young
and able Y. B. Chavan, also
carry considerable weight in
party councils.
The President of India,
Rajendra Prasad, and Vice Pres-
ident Radhakrishnan exercise
little power in the High Com-
mand, although their positions
give them a measure of influ-
ence. Nehru consults regularly
with Prasad, who has become in-
creasingly critical of his pol4
icies, but he probably does so
more out of respect for Prasad's
position and long service in the
Gandhian movement than because
he values the President's ad-
vice.
V. K. Krishna Menon remains
a man with few friends or fol-
lowers in India. His close per-
sonal association with Nehru
.r ilk-
'! a rt rmasees ave the to rained haEtt
of ex 4c4ihp everJt itng o a one from the top.
1'herefO e~ action?wt iave t`o fake place at the
top. but fur effort ivtl"fie to'tratn the masses
to act for _themselues."--1lehru
alone accounts for his high po-
sition, and it has enabled him
to withstand long pressure from
other top government leaders
for his removal. As minister
of defense since 1957 and lead-
er of India's UN delegation,
Menon still makes his influence
felt, but even Nehru's confidence;
in him appears to have waned
since 1959.
Nehru, now 71, may well
outlive most of the men around
him today. While he is direct-
ing the affairs of India, the
High Command will remain pretty
much his domain. A certain
shift in the locus of power in
India may nonetheless occur
gradually as a result of Nehru's
determined efforts toward "dem-
ocratic decentralization.".
time.
This concept, long a fix-
ture of the Gandhian Congress
program, has been given a new
push by Nehru during the past
year and is gaining some mo-
mentum. New Delhi's plan is
to turn over as much state and
district responsibility for
development work and local gov-
ernment as possible to the vil-
lage councils, thereby forcing
the participation of the rural
masses in government and vitalizing the ancient Indian
system of village rule. Atti-
tudes and practices firmly es-
tablished over the past hun-
dred years or more will have
to be reversed before the re-
sults of decentralization are
widely felt, but Nehru's ef-
forts to train the people to
"act for themselves" may have
a lasting effect on the pat-
tern of power in India, and
make it more difficult for a 25X1
"High Command" to monopolize
power as it has in Nehru's
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