CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002900050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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ONF1DEN TIAL
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
COPY NO V-
OC I NO. 4446/60
29 September 1960
Document me. /
Review of this doeument by CIA has
determined that
0, CIA bps y1, oh)e ion 1
at I TS
0 froontains nofbiig of CIA Interest
Daft Reviewer ,.~_.._
14 MAY 1980
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed DIA review(s) completed.
25)25X1
25X1 ~/'~
Cz.+` 4PPU"I!AL
14 MAY T980
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY r
29 September 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . Page 1.
The performance of Khrushchev and his bloc colleagues
at the UN indicates that they view this session of the
General Assembly primarily as a contest with the West
for gaining influence among the uncommitted nations of
Asia and Africa. The weight of these nations in the UN
has been increased by the admission of 16 new members,
and probably one more will be admitted in the near
future.
Khrushchev has shown concern that the adverse re-
action to his bid to revamp the UN secretariat may
jeopardize his efforts to gain Afro-Asian support.
He has moved to counter this reaction by linking his
UN reorganization plan with the popular issue of dis-
armament. He has also called for extensive revisions
in the UN Charter in order to reflect changes in the
world balance of forces since 1945. Khrushchev?s
extreme anti-Western tone probably is calculated to
strengthen his hand Also in dealing with the Sino-
Soviet dispute,
The West retains control of the powerful 21-
member Steering Committee, which voted to continue
the moratorium on Chinese representation; the full
assembly will vote on this issue later robably
early in October,
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN o , o , , a , c a a o o e o 0 a s e
Page 7
Fidel Castro?s UN address demonstrated the degree
to which Cuba has become committed to Soviet foreign
policy objectives. He particularly emphasized the
Guantanamo base issue, probably foreshadowing some
Cuban demand for the withdrawal of US forces.
In the Dominican Republic,Trujillo has
no yet indicated when,he will bow to "popular de-
mand" th t h
a a o o a o s o 0 0 0 o e o Page 9
Colonel Mobutu's commission of technicians, an-
nounced last week as the operating executive of the
Congo, is now functioning, but he appears to be
under increasing pressure to effect a reconciliation
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REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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29 September 1960
challenge. p
CONFIDENTIAL.
PART I (continued)
between President Kasavubu and ousted premier Lumumba.
Mobutu has not gained any significant new support and
still faces the determined opposition of the represent-
stives:t of several African states who are working
continuously on behalf of Lumumba, A round-table
conference of Congolepe'pbliticA1 leaders expected
to convene in Leopoldville around 1 October, at
which time pro-Lumumba forces ay present,.:a-!sOrious
Forces loyal to General Phoumi's Savannakhet
Revolutionary Committee have abandoned Sam Neua.town in
northeastern Laos in the face of heavy pressure
from Pathet Lao guerrilla units. Elements of
Captain Kong Le's paratroopers are also reported
to have been dropped in the Sam Neua area prior
to the withdrawal and may have combined forces
with the guerrillas for the final takeover.
Phoumi also has suffered a reverse in Xieng Khouang
Province, *hsre the provincial military commander
has declared himself in support of Souvanna.
Simultaneously with these developments, military
commanders from the opposing Souvanna and Phoumi
camps agreed in Luang Prabang to a cease-fire pend-
ing a full-dress conference to be held shortly
to work out a political compromise between the two
groups, There is a distinct possibility, however,
that the loss of face suffered by Phoumi through
his recent reverses may dissipate arly.dis osition to-
ward compromise he might have had.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
EAST GERMANS CONTINUE PRESSURE ON BERLIN ,
. . Page 11
. Page 1
The Ulbricht regime has taken further steps to
assert its claims of sovereignty over the Soviet sec-
tor of Berlin and the right to control Western.civil-
ian access to the city. Without giving unlimited
support to East Germany, Moscow's note of 26 Septem-
ber in response to the Western protests of 12 Sep-
tember strongly backed East Germany's claims to con-
trol over West German traffic to the city, reiterated
charges that the Western powers have misused the air
corridors, and endorsed East German moves to restrict
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
PART II (continued)
access to East Berlin, Bonn is now implementing a f
li
i
m
ted countermeasures against the East German e
OUTLOOK FOR MALI AND SENEGAL e . , o ,
With the recent dissolution of the Soudan-Senegal
federation and transformation of Soudan Into the Re-
public of Mali, Soudanese leaders have declared void
the accords between France and the dissolved federation.
They appear willing, however, to consider some new
ties with Paris, most likely in the economic sphere.
At the same time, they have proclaimed their Inten-
tion to accept help from "all sources" and have made
overtures to the United States and Soviet bloc coun-
tries. The Soudanese evidently plan to work for
the eventual overthrow of the present Senegalese
leaders
NIGERIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT
a o a o 0 0 0 0 o v o 0 0.
Independence on 1 October for the British-created
Federation of Nigeria--whose 35,000,000 people make
it Africa's most populous country--will mark the
emergence of a state which may eventually exert a
decisive influence on African political alignments.
Difficulties arise from the fact that the country's
political equilibrium is threatened by rivalries
among its three tribally based major political group-
ings. In foreign affairs, the new state, while
preserving close ties with the West, can be expected
to assert its independence, and assume an increasingly
active part in the pan-African movement,
POLITICAL TURMOIL !'IN UGANDA.
The renewed drive of the traditional rulers of
Buganda-'!,!key region of Britain's East African pro-
tectorate of Uganda--to assure their political
future is creating a major new colonial crisis for
Britain. London's efforts to push constitutional
reform to enable the protectorate to achieve early
iii
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PART II (continued)
independence as a unified state may bog down unless
Buganda can be induced to participate in the central
protectorate government.
Hammarskjold is attempting to mitigate the Jordan-
UAR crisis through private talks with King Husayn and
Nasir. He hopes to dissuade the King from,taking his
complaints before the UN General Assembi
Page 9
The Libyan Gov-
ernment is under fire on the issue of corruption
among high-level officials, and King Idris is ex-
pected to undertake a major shake-up of the cabinet.
NEHRU-AYUB MEETINGS IMPROVE INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS Page 11
Nehru?s five-day visit with President Ayub of
Pakistan in connection with the signing of the Indus
Waters Agreement appears to have established a per-
sonal rapport which will promote closer relations
between the two countries. While the momentum now
attained may lead to the solution of some other
problems, neither Nehru nor Ayub appears ready to 25X1
make the compromises necessary to begin bargaining
on the Kashmir dispute.
TRIBAL UNREST ALONG THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER
Tension is mounting along the Afghan-Pakistani
frontier Following the outbreak of fighting among
Pushtoon tribes living along the border north of the
Khyber Pass, The danger of clashes between Afghan
and Pakistani army units will increase as each side
takes measures to support its tribal partisans.
Both countries have shown considerable concern
that the other will go too far and cause the con-
flict to spread.
Prime Minister Chang Myon?s principal rival in
the Democratic party has decided to organize a new
conservative opposition party. Although Chang feels
that a clear-cut break of this kind will ultimately
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
PART II (continued)
strengthen his own position, his government will be
temporarily weakened by this development and by ad-
ministrative inefficiencies which will probably re-
sult from the current purge of bureaucrats of the
Rhee regime. Meanwhile, there is growing popular
pressure for negotiation of a status-of-forces agree-
ment with the United States?
SPAAK?S WORRIES ABOUT NATO
0 0 0 0 0 0 e v o o
NATO Secretary General Spaak, who visits Washington.
from 2 to 4 October, is primarily concerned with dis-
cussing the difficulties posed by De Gaulle's national-
ist attitude. Limited progress on the question of an
integrated air defense plan was achieved on 28 Septem-
ber when the North Atlantic Council approved a system
covering a small part of France. Paris still objects
to the
ro
o
d NA
p
p
se
TO medium-range ballistic missile
program. Spaak feels the Congo crisis has exposed
the weakness of NATO consultation procedures, and he
seeks, in a recently initiated study of NATO's long-
term pro
ems, a means of strengthening them.
Page 14
FINNISH POLITICAL PROBLEMS
The most difficult issues facing the recently
reconvened Finnish parliament are the question of
Finland's association with the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and the related problem of broaden-
ing the Agrarian minority government. Immediately
in prospect are economic negotiations with the So-
viet Union which the Finns believe must be satis-
factorily concluded before steps can be taken
to affiliate with EFTA. Domestic issues such as
new farm-income legislation may contribute to pres-
sures for a new general election.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
MONGOLIA IN BLOC AND WORLD AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 7
Although Mongolia is the oldest Soviet satellite
and historically one of the most obedient, there is a
strong undercurrent of nationalism, and many Mongolians
probably view economic ties with Peiping as a hedge
against total Soviet domination. Mongolia tried in
July to adopt a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute and, although it now has taken Moscow's side,
the attempt testifies to Peiping's prestige in Ulan
Bator. In furtherance of its effort to acquire at-
tributes of sovereignty, Mongolia has sought to ex-
pand contacts with non-Communist countries, par-
ticularly in Asia and Africa. In addition to the
bloc nations, India, Burma, Indonesia, and Guinea
now recognize Mongolia.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST OIL , .
In setting up the new Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), Saudi oil boss.Abdullah
Tariki and Juan Perez Alfonzo, Venezuela's minister
of mines and hydrocarbons, hope to put into effect
an oil policy concerted among the governments of
the world's major net oil-exporting countries. They
envisage a system for sharing markets, fixing prices,
and controlling production. Although the OPEC's
prospects for full realization of the plan are poor,
the existence of the organization constitutes a
threat Which may make the international oil com-
panies more cautious in their planning for the
future.
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vow
29 September 1960
PART III (continued)
SEARCH FOR NEW POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN ITALY . . . . . .
Under Italy's present political truce, Premier
Fanfani's minority government--made up entirely of
Christian Democrats--has the parliamentary support of
three small divergent center parties. New political
alignments continue to be the main preoccupation
of all groups. The local elections on 6 November
will throw light on the alliances to be formed there-
after by the Christian Democrats for control of im-
portant city governments. Whether a broader base
for the national government can be formed, however,
will probably not be clear before the Nenni Socialists
hold their party's postelection congress.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE UNITED
The speeches and behavior
of Khrushchev and his bloc col-
leagues at the UN indicate that
their principal objective is to
gain, influence axnohg, the umcnanitutt-d
nations of Asia and Africa.
Khrushchev's strategy probably
is based on his belief that the
admission of 16 new member
states--15 of them from Africa--
will hasten what he views as a
shift in the balance of forces
in the UN away from Western
predominance and that this proc-
ess- will make the General As-
sembly an increasingly favorable
arena for advancing Soviet aims.
Bloc tactics are aimed at
exploiting those issues that
provide opportunities to demon-
strate a community of interest
between these new nations and
the Communist world. Khrushchev
has decided to make anticoloi+-
aia1i m the central theme of the
bloc's case at this session.
His harsh indictment of United
States policy, based mainly on
the U-2 and RB-47 incidents,
and his renewed advocacy of
"general and complete disarma-
ment" are designed to buttress
the anticolonial line in this
all-out bid for the allegiance
of the uncommitted nations.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
set the theme in welcoming the
new member states on the open-
ing day when he contrasted the
USSR's readiness to provide
"selfless assistance and sup-
port" with thdr~gllegdd,;grudging
attitude of the Western powers,
which he claimed regard the
new African nations as "unripe"
and "Adolescent". .countries .
While the West "sighs" over
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
their admission, said Gromyko,
the Soviet Union is "'truly
joyful.,,
Khrushchev developed this
theme in his speech on 23 Sep-
tember when he announced at
the outset that "one of the
chief features of this epoch
and its very essence is...the
awakening of the erstwhile back-
ward, downtrodden, and oppressed
peoples." He welcomed the new
member states, saying,"The coun-
tries that have cast off the
burden of colonialism are a huge
and active peace force,"
Appeals to Uncommitted Nations
In addition to his effort
to discredit the West, particu--
lar.y ;the United States, in the
eyes of the Afro-Asian nations,
Khrushchev chose four "positive"
issues as his platform for win-
ning Asian-African support and
sympathy for Soviet positions.
He devoted the bulk of his
speech to a vigorous arraign-
ment of the "colonial regime"
in all its forms, climaxing it by
the introduction of a declara-
tion calling for immediate in-
dependence for all colonies,
trusteeship territories, and
"possessions and leases on for-
eign soil."
Second, he called for the
participation of neutral na-
tions in the next round of dis-
armament negotiations.
Third, he attacked the role
of the Western powers and Secre-
tary General Hammarskjold in the
Congo crisis, ; 'demadded, -that Euro-
pean. coiatingents be .withdrawn
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
from the UN force in the Congo,
leaving only Afro-Asian troops,
and reiterated the USSR's in-
sistence that the UN must sup-
port only Lumumba as the "pre-
mier of the lawful Congolese
Government."
Finally, he proposed that
the UN secretary general's of-
fice be replaced by a three-man
"collective executive body"
composed of representatives of
the West, the Communist bloc,
and neutral nations.
Bid to Revamp UN Machinery
Khrushchev probably had
three main objectives in mind
in making this final proposal:
(1) to win favor with the Afro-
Asian bloc by proposing that
the'neutral nations be given a
position of equality with the
West and the Communist bloc on
the UN's top administrative body,;
(2) to express the USSR's ex
treme displeasure with Hammar-
skjold's handling of the Congo
situation, inhibit his future
freedom of action in the Congo,
and reduce the effectiveness of
future UN operations of this
type; and (3) to stake out a
bloc claim to a larger role in
the UN which Moscow insists
would more accurately reflect
the "actual situation that ob-
tains in the world today."
The Soviet leaders have
long been dissatisfied with the
UN Secretariat's personnel set-
up and procedures; they feel the
Western powers, particularly the
United States, have a predomi-'
nant voice and unfair advantage
in the UN administration.
It is unlikely that the
USSR, had? any serious expec-
tation of gaining early accep-
tance of this reorganization
plan or that it intends to
i.press it to a vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly. This proposal,
instead, was conceived primarily
as the opening move in a long-
term effort to bring about chang-
es in UN personnel and policies
more favorable to bloc interests.
Khrushchev's suggestion that
the time has come to consider
the removal of the UN headquar
,teas to another country to "fa-
cilitate the effective work" of
the organization similarly was
designed, not as a serious propo-
sal, but as a means of assert-
ing the USSR's dissatisfaction
with present arrangements and
a desire for changes that would
reflect the bloc's enhanced
power and prestige in the world.
Adverse Reaction
The Russians seem to have
been caught by surprise by the
uproar that greeted Khrushchev's
attack on Hammarskjold and his
reorganization plan. They ap-
parently failed to appreciate
that these moves would permit
the West to counter with charges
that the USSR is seeking to
wreck the UN. Moscow radio has
complained that "cold war ad-
herents" have seized on Khru-
shchev's proposal to distract
attention from the "more im-
portant questions" facing the
General Assembly.
Khrushchev's subsequent
moves reflected his concern that
this adverse reaction threatened
to overshadow and jeopardize
his primary objective of winning
support and sympathy among the
Asian-African states by exploit-
ing the anticolonialist line.
Having failed to gain signifi-
cant Asian-African support for
his attack on Hammarskjold,Khru-
shchev shifted to the disarmament
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
issue to justify his proposed
reforms. He told newsmen on
24 September that unless his
proposal is adopted, "we will
be unable to solve the disarma-
ment question" because it would
be impossible to have an inter-
national armed force, created
in accordance with a disarma-
ment treaty, under the command
of Hammarskjold.
Khrushchev insisted that
he was not attacking the secre-
tary general personally and
that the USSR was seeking only
"better organizational forms"
to assure "true peaceful coex-
istence" and impartiality that
would protect the interests of
all nations. Soviet diplomats
in New York stressed to newsmen
that Khrushchev had made, "no
formal proposals" and that his
UN plan was merely a "suggestion."
On 25 September, Khrushchev
assured correspondents that even
if'his proposal is not accepted,
the USSR has no intention of
withdrawing from the UN or boy-
cotting future disarmament nego-
tiations. Two days later, he
moved to broaden his position by
coming out for a revision of the
entire UN Charter to bring it
into line with changes that have
occurred since 1945. He com-
plained that when the UN was
created, it was dominated by the
United States, which wants to
continue to dominate it. "This
cannot go on," he said. He an-
nounced that the USSR would con-
tinue to fight for his proposal
and predicted that the time would
come when "everybody will accept
that point of view."
Sino-Soviet Problem
It is likely that Khru-
shchev's preoccupation with.the
dispute with Peiping played an
important part in his decision
to make anticolonialism the
keystone of his UN position.
His great emphasis on this is-
sue seems at least partly cal-
culated to strengthen his hand
in dealing with the Sino-Soviet
dispute, in which the question
of the correct policy to be pur-
sued toward the uncommitted na-
tions has figured prominently.
Khrushchev may believe that his
drive to reassert unquestioned
Soviet ideological and political
leadership of the bloc would be
best advanced by portraying the
USSR as the fervent champion of
the "ant i;-9.mperialist forces."
In this respect, his per-
formance at the UN, strongly
backed by the array of Eastern
European satellite party leaders,
can be viewed as part of Khru-
shchev's sustained campaign to
bring pressure on the Chinese
leaders by demonstrating their
isolation within the 'bloc. F
party leaders rather than govern-
ment chiefs had accompanied Khru-
shchev because there were "others"
than the Western powers whom
"we wished to impress with our
solidarity'." Khrushchev's
statement following his two-
hour meeting with Tito on 28
September that "we have fully
come to terms" and that "our
viewpoints coincide or are very
close" seems to have been a
calculated gesture of contempt
for the Chinese leaders, who
have long directed their most
abusive=..attacks against the
Yugoslav regime. These demon-
strative gestures toward Tito
are another means of serving
notice on the Chinese that Khru-
shchev has no intention of
making any concessions to Pei-
ping's views.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Sino-Soviet Treatment of Speech
The great importance that
Soviet leaders attach to Khru-
shchev's UN performance is re-
flected in the unprecedented.
publicity Moscow has given his
speech. Some 400 Moscow radio
items covering the speech in
the three days after it was de-
livered add up to more than
twice the publicity given his
UN speech last year and greater
attention than Moscow has ever
paid any previous Khrushebev speech.
Most commentaries focus on his
proposals for disarmament and
liquidating colonialism. Com-
paratively little attention has
been given his plan to revamp
UN machinery and his suggestion
about moving UN headquarters.
Peiping, alone among bloc
countries, has go far made no,
comment on the speech. The New
China News Agency issued a 1,600-
word summary of the speech on
24 September. The summary,
which included all df Khru--
shchev's major points but con-
tained no editorial comment,. was
reprinted in the Chinese press
and broadcast in greatly short-
efied form J. domestic and foreign-
language news programs,
President'Eisenhowei''s Speech
In unusual but not unpre-
cedented coverage, Izvestia
published the full text of
President Eisenhower's speech.
Moscow commentators disparaged
it as "colorless," "mere soph-
istry," "disappointing," and
"nothing new." Moscow's most
favorable comment was that
"many people" noted the "entire-
ly quiet and restrained tone" of
the speech, but this observa-
tion appeared only in a talk to
foreign audiences and was de-
leted from a home service
version of the same commentary.
Peiping reported briefly on
23 September that the President
gave "a long speech" and followed
up later in the day with"a heav-
ily slanted 1,200-word account--
twice as long as the TASS ini-
tial account but much more de-
nunciatory.
1isenhower-Khrushchev Meeting
Soviet officials in New
York are apparently encouraging
Western press speculation that
Khrushchev would favor a meet-
ing with President Eisenhower.
The Soviet premier, while con-
sistently evasive in dealing
with journalists' questions on
a meeting, has attempted to
convey the general impression
that he would be receptive to a
US initiative, Moscow's account
of UAR President Nasir's address
includes his call for a Khru-
shchev-Eisenhower meeting and
nQtes that Khrushchev was one
of the first to rise to acclaim
the speech. In an interview
with an Austrian paper, Khru-
shchev took the position that
he was still the "insulted party"
and could not take the "first
step," but implied that if a
third party offered to "mediate,"
his response would be favorable.
Other East-West Issues
Khrushchev's UN speech
revealed no major changes in
Soviet positions on outstanding
issues. His proposal for gen-
eral and complete disarmament
in three. phases over a four-
year period is identical with
the Soviet plan of 2 June 1960,
with.the exception that a re-
duction of conventional forces
was moved from the second to the
first stage, in order "to take
into account the wishes of the
Western powers." Khrushchev
called for the expansion of
future negotiations to include
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
neutral states. The accompany-
ing disarmament statement said
"all basic areas of the world"
should be represented, but it,
in effect, ruled out Chinese
participation by linking Pei-
ping's participation in dis-
armament talks with its admis-
sion to the UN.
on Hammarskjold provoked exten-
sive resentment in the neutral
bloc--as a Nepali delegate put
it, Khrushchev made "a lot of
enemies" by this move. On the
other hand, Soviet disarmament
proposals appear to have had
their usual appeal to these
same neutral members.
In a letter to the General
Assembly president on 26 Sep-
tember, Khrushchev proposed that
the assembly increase the num-
ber of members of the ten-na-
tion disarmament committee by
adding India, Indonesia, the
UAR, Ghana, and Mexico. Khru-
shchev's move disregards the
fact that the ten-nation com-
mittee resulted from an agree-
ment among the big-four foreign
ministers in August 1959, not
from a decision by the UN.
Although the nuclear test
ban talks resumed in Geneva on
27 September, Khrushchev did not
deal with this problem in his
speech. However, he repeated
during a press conference on 25
September the standing Soviet
position that the USSR will not
resume nuclear weapons tests
unless other powers do so.
On the questions of Germany
and Berlin, Khrushchev reaffirmed
his post-summit position that the
USSR will "wait awhile with the
solution of the question of a
German peace treaty" and seek
agreement with the West at an-
other summit conference "in a
few months' time."
Reaction at the UN
Reactions to the major
speeches at the UN have in the
main followed predictable lines.
The reception UN delegates ac-
corded the speeches of Khruschev,
Castro, and Nkrumah has been
generally restrained, but many
delegates have privately admit-
ted their amazement at their
tone and content. The attacks
Hammarskjold's Position
Hammarskjold's vigorous
defense of the office of the
secretary general and his in-
terpretation of its role in in-
ternational situations aroused
a warm response. Nehru is re-
ported planning to come strongly
to Hammarskjold's defense, and
other neutral leaders such as
Sukarno of Indonesia and Koirala
of Nepal will probably follow
suit. While continued Soviet
bloc attacks will make Hammar-
skjold's position exceedingly
difficult, it now seems unlikely
that Moscow can force his res-
ignation.
Hammarskjold's Congo policy,
although under attack by Ghana,
Guinea, and the UAR, has been
supported by other African
states, particularly the new
UN members. Several African
delegates have criticized Nkrumah's
militant speech to the assembly,
and even some members of the
Ghanaian UN delegation were re-
portedly deeply disappointed by
the speech. The Sudanese for-
eign minister expressed the hope
that the UN members will not be
taken in by "African politicians'
agitation in support of Lumumba
--an obvious reference to Nkrumah
---as he claimed such individuals
did not speak for most Africans.
High-level Representation
So far about 16 heads of
nonbloc governments have come to
the United States for the UN
session in addition to Khrushchev
and six European satellite lead-
ers. Of the 15 newly admitted
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
African states, sev-
eral have heads of
government in attend-
ance or expected, and
Prime Minister Balewa
of Nigeria is expected
after his country's
anticipated admission
in early October.
President Tour6 of
Guinea is scheduled
to arrive shortly,
and the prime minister
of Burma may appear
later.
Committee
ChaiFma- nshIPs
Despite the un-
usual atmosphere
President: Frederick Boland, Ireland
Vice Presidents:
US, UK, USSR, France, China, Japan,
Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, Bulgaria,
- Venezuela, Panama, Canada
Committee Chairmen:
First (Political & Security Affairs)
Special Political
5eeonId CEconomic & Financial)
Third (Social, Humanitarian
Corea, Ceylon
Augusta, Haiti
Stanovik, Yugoslavia
& Cultural Mezincescu, Rumania
Fourth cTrusteeship~acTiacTii~ aq -
FihjAdministrative & Budget) Majoli, Italy
~~-
Sixth (Legal) Ortiz Martin, Costa Mica
the Steering Committee consists of the thirteen vice presidents, the
chairmen of the seven main committees and the president, who
created by the presence of
many government leaders, the
usual work of the assembly is
proceeding fairly smoothly.
The powerful General (Steering)
Committee of this sessionvwas
established without incident.
Its composition still throws
the balance of voting power on
the side of the West, particu-
larly as related to the crucial
issue of Chinese representation.
The General Committee determines
the inclusion of all items on
the assembly's agenda, assigns
items to the main committees,
and fixes the priority of each
item.
All decisions of the Genes
eral Committee are subject to
the approval of the assembly
as a whole. The General Com-
mittee may not discuss the sub-
stance of any item, except inso-
far as this bears on inclusion
of the item on the agenda. The
president of the General Assem-
bly chairs the committee and
casts the deciding vote if there
is a tie decision.
The Communist bloc won two
committee chairmanships this
year, whereas in the past they
29 SEPTEMBER 1960
have usually held only one.
Strong Indian opposition within
the Afro-Asian caucus to the
Philippine candidacy for chair-
man of the Third (Social, Human-
itarian, and Cultural) Committee
threw the election to Mezincescu
of Rumania. Stanovik of Yugo-
slavia chairs the important
Second (Economic) Committee.
The Afro-Asian bloc was success-
ful in capturing the chairman-
ship of the mott important com-
mittee of the assembly, the
First (Political) Committee, now
chaired by Corea of Ceylon. An
ardent anti-colonialist--Pachachi
of Iraq--chairs the Fourth
(Trusteeship) Committee.
Chinese Representation
The Steering Committee on
27 September upheld the United
States by supporting the mora-
torium on Chinese representation
with a vote of 12 for, 7 against,
and one abstention. This prelim-
inary victory in the Steering
Committee will help the Chinese
Nationalists retain their UN seat
when the full assembly votes on
the committee's recommendation,
probably early in October. The
general debate will probably con-
tinue until mid-October. P
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Fidel Castro's address be-
fore the United Nations General
Assembly on 26 September showed
the degree to which Cuba has be-
come committed to Soviet foreign
policy objectives. Reactions
among Latin American delegates
were generally negative, but
delegates of some of the new
African states were impressed
and struck by Castro's "sincer-
ity." A member of the French
delegation expressed the opin-
ion that Castro's simple
language, effective delivery,
and unsophisticated concepts
were on a level to make a
maximum appeal to the "simple"
Africans.
United States should expect him
to provoke a US request for his
recall as a pretext for a Cuban
demand that Ambassador Bonsai
be called home.
Castro's particular empha-
sis on the issue of Guantanamo
follows two public references
to the base earlier this month,
one by Fidel and the other by
Raul Castro, in which an early
demand for US withdrawal from
the base was intimated. Al-
though these statements have
emphasized that any "aggres-
sive acts" with respect to the
base would originate with the
United States, the Cubans might
attempt to provoke the US into
an action that could be used to
challenge US treaty rights to
the base before an interna-
tional tribunal.
The American Embassy in
Havana, in response to the grow-
ing climate of hostility in
Cuba, is encouragii6g ;American
citizens to leave the island.
A former Foreign Ministry offi-
cial advised an American Embassy
officer on 23 September that in
view of the temperament of the
new Cuban chargd d'affaires in
Washington, Flores Ibarra, the
Meanwhile, there is an in-
creasing volume of travel to
the Sino-Soviet bloc by Cuban
students, labor unionists,
artists, and others. A number
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 196Q
of Cuban students have evident-
ly received scholarships at
bloc educational centers. Two
top officials of the Cuban Com-
munists' Popular Socialist par-
ty left for Moscow early this
month.
The Cuban Communists con-
tinue to strengthen their po-
sition. In an evident response
to a decision at the party con-
gress in August to unite all
revolutionary groups into a
single front under "the leader-
ship of Fidel Castro," Commu-
nists are organizing "united
fronts" at the local level in
many parts of Cuba. These
fronts are probably intended to
become the bases for provincial,
then national, political
machines.
Although the Castro regime
has become increasingly dis-
credited elsewhere in Latin
America, there still are some
politically potent non-Commu-
nist leaders in a number of
countries ready to defend Cas-
tro.
SECRET
Guerrilla warfare in the
mountains of central Cuba con-
tinues, and government forces
are reported by the Cuban press
to have suffered casualties in
efforts to dislodge the several
hundred guerrillas estimated
operating there.
Dominican Republic
,The carefully organized
"popular" demonstration of
loyalty to Trujillo took place
as scheduled on 24 September
and apparently went off in a
routine manner. The dictator
has not yet indicated when he
will,;bow to "popular demand"
that he resume the presidency
from puppet President Balaguer,
The economic situation con-
tinues to grow worse, and
unemployment and hunger are
becoming more apparent in the
capital city.
Despite the Soviet ac-
tion in early September
calling on the UN to en-
dorse the OAS condemnation
of the Trujillo regime,
the Trujillo-controlled Radio
Caribe made its most openly
pro-Communist broadcast to
date on 26 September, when
it stated that "for many
years the US has been try-
ing to blame everything on
the USSR, and now it is
time to listen to the
sound of the Russian bell
as well." The radio praised
Moscow for "bringing forth"
many ,+:!nationalist movements
in Africa and Asia,
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a.)iii.IlLi
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Colonel Mobutu continues
to speak for the Congo Govern-
ment and has put his planned
commission of technicians into
operation, but he appears to be
under increasing pressure by
diverse elements to effect a
reconciliation between Presi-
dent Kasavubu and ousted pre-
mier Lumumba. A round-table con-
ference of Congo lpsc' pbl;i,tita,i'
ieaders, is:,>ekpect9d to convene
in Leblkaid#ii:le )arOuhd 1 acbober,
at which time pro-Lumumba forces
may present a serious challenge
to Colonel Mobutu. Mobutu hag
not gained any significant new
support and still faces the de-
termined opposition of the rep-
resentatives of several African
states who are working contin-
ually on behalf of Lumumba
Following his coup on 14
September, in which he took over
control of the Congo adminis-
tration in order to permit po-
litical factions to come to an
agreement, Mobutu has attempted
to set up an effective ap&liti-
cal adthinistrative regime.
The need for attention to
the Congo's collapsing economy
was emphasized by the chief of
the UN's technical mission on
28 September. He warned that
the Congolese leaders were con-
centrating on politics and over-
looking the "panorama of disas-
ter spreading around theme" The
UN official charged that the
Congolese ministers were dodging
their executive responsibilities
and that it was almost impossi-
ble to arrange UN aid because
there were no responsible Con-
golese officials around to ac-
cept it.
Mobutu has not been able
to neutralize Lumumba, however,
or to build up a firm popular
or military base. With the
public support of Kasavubu, Mo-
butu has recently installed a
commission of technicians,
headed by Foreign Minister Justin
Bomboko.
Mobutu has been unable..
,to prevent, Lumu aba; partisans
froii inte.rferin'g.?'with the. eos is-
sion,s activity through terrorist
tactics. Although he has
been able to effect the with-
drawai%.of troops from the Katanga
frontier, Mobutu's influence
over the armed forces is de-
pendent on the regularity of
pay by the UN Command,; and ele-
ments-at Camp Leopold have
rioted recently because of dis-
satisfaction with their pay.
The governor of Leopoldville
Province, who is generally re-
garded as a I4umumba :supporter,
has warned of possible, armed
clashes in the capital within
a week.
Mobutu,.apparently under
'pressure from army officers, is
involved in efforts to ar-
range a round-table conference
of Congolese leaders. His plan
appears to have strongest sup-
port from adherents of Lumumba,
who see In it a way for the
premier to regain his previous
position, but President Kasavubu
and Premier-designate Joseph
Ileo have indicated their will-
ingness to participate,. How-
ever, they have stated that
Lumumba will not be permitted
to regain power. For his part,
Lumumba is unwilling to accept
a cabinet position in lieu of
the premiership. If a con-
ference is held and some type
of rapprochement results, Col-
onel Mobutu would probably be
the principal loser.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Mobutu's effort
to arrest two of
Lumumba's close ad-
visers, Antoine
Gizenga and Maurice
Mpolo, was frustrat-
ed' by the interven-
tion of Moroccan of-
ficials in, the Congo,
despite Gizenga's re-
ported assassination
attempt against Mo-
butu. Mobutu has al-
so been prevented
from arresting Lu-
mumba by the UN pro-
tective guard,princi-
pally Ghanaians, a-
round the premier's
residence. Both con-
ditions have led Mo-
butu to protest to
the UN Command. The
UN's decision to re-
place Ghanaian troops
in Leopoldville with
Tunisians from Kasai
Province was reversed
after the personal
Atlantic
Ocean
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
appeal of President Nkrumah to
Hammarskjold.
CONGO
REPUBLIC
29 SEPTEMBER 1960
zoo
In addition to the problems
raised by the efforts of Ghana,
Guinea, and the UAR in the Congo,
the UN Command also faces diffi-
culties with Belgium. Hammar -
skjold has officially protested
the activities of Belgian offi-
cers--disguised as British or
French--in Kasai, Province, where
they were observed leading se-
cessionist troops. The UN of-
ficials may face major diffi-
culties with Brussels when the
role of Belgian military and
civilian personnel in Katanga
receives greater publicity.
The 600 Belgians serving with
Katanga's troops and advising
in the government departments,
in addition to the larger number
employed by the mining indus-
try, have kept the province
functioning economically and
,politically.
1110cl Attitude
The USSIR's direct. involve-
ment" in the Congo virtually
ceased with the closing of the
Soviet and Czech embassies
in Leopoldville on 17 Sep-
tember. Soviet leaders prob-
ably feel, however, they may
be able to re-establish bloc
influence in Leopoldville in
the near future. While Mo-
butua, forces retain control,
however, Moscow is unlikely
to try to reassert itself
overtly in the Congo.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Khrushchev, in his speech
on 23 September before the UN
General Assembly and later in
answers to newsmen, reaffirmed
the USSR's support for Lumumba
and reiterated Soviet charges
that the UN Command has compli-
cated the functioning of the law-
ful Congolese Government. Mos-
cow's propaganda attention to
SITUATION
A three-battalion force
loyal to General Phoumi's Savan-
nakhet Revolutionary Committee
on 28 September abandoned the
town of Sam Neua, with its air-
field, in the face of heavy
pressure from Communist Pat.het
Lao guerrilla units. Elements
of Captain Kong Le.'s Second
Paratroop Battalion are also re-
ported to have been dropped bear
Sam Neua and may have partici-
pated in the final takeover of
the town.
The present status of
Phoumi's units is unclear, but
just prior to the fall of Sam
Neua they had been reported
planning to retreat to Muong
Peun, about 20 miles southwest
of Sam Neua town, Muong Peun
is described as being a good
defensive position, but re-
supply and reinforcement of the
position would be difficult be-
cause of its relative inacces-
sibility by land and because its
airstrip is only marginally
serviceable.
The situation in Sam Neua
is unclear, but it is apparently
nominally under control`of the
Souvanna Phouma government. The
internal Congo developments,
however, has been scant over
the past week. The one or two
daily Soviet commentaries have
echoed Khrushchev's statements
and charges and have accused
Mobutu of paying lip service to
a reconciliation with Lumumba,
while continuing his UN-backed
"plottings."
Pathet Lao officially supports
the Souvanna regime, and its
cease-fire order for all regions
loyal to Souvanna presumably ap-
plies to Sam Neua, now that
Phoumi's forces have been routed.
Vientiane's control is pre-
carious, however, and will be
only at the sufferance of the
Pathet Lao, at least until the
token paratroop force is sub-
stantially augmented by rein-
forcements from Vientiane.
General Amkha, the Vientiane
garrison commander, is reported
to have flown to Sam Neua, on
29 September to investigate
conditions there.
On the same day that Sam
Neua fell, military commanders
from both the Souvanna and the
Phoumi camps met with the King
in Luang Prabang and agreed to
a cease-fire between their op-
posing forces and to a "common
front" against the Pathet Lao.
It is not,clcar what effect
Kong Le's action in dropping
paratroopers on Sam Neua will
have on this arrangement. There
are grounds for suspecting that
he may have taken the action
unilaterally without the approval
of Souvanna and General Ouane,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY iS Ate'
29 September 1960
SAYAB URY
NORTH
VIETNAM
Hanoi
,/ VIENTIANE j
the armed forces commander. It
was also agreed at Luang Prabang
that a full-dress conference
would be held "shortly to attempt
to iron out the political dif-
ferences between the two groups.
whole effort toward a new accom-
modation between Vientiane and
Savannakhet may collapse as
the result of the developments
in Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang.
SECRET
GULF
OF
TONKIN
Phoumi has sus-
tairied yet another re-
versal in the defec-
tion of the military
commander of Xieng
Khouang Province to
Souvanna's side. With
the loss of Sam Neua,
his defection in effect
swings the entire
Second Military Region
over to Vientiane,
leaving Phoumi with
only the Third and
Fourth Military Regions
in southern' Laos still
loyal to him. Phoumi
reportedly has strongly
protested Vientiane's
action in promoting
the Xieng Khouang com-
mander's defection.
Under the politi-
cal settlement that
was apparently shaping
up as the result of
the initial confronta-
tion between the two,
sides in Luang Prabang,
Souvanna would resign
as premier but would
be retained in a new
"government of na-
tional unity." There
is considerable danger,
however, that the
Pakse
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SECRET .
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
EAST GERMANS CONTINUE
East Germany continues to
seek tacit acknowledgment of its
"sovereignty" over East Berlin
and to exercise its alleged
rights to control travel to the
city.
A new and potentially seri-
ous challenge to
Western rights has
been the attempt to
force Western diplo-
mats to secure per-
mits before visiting
the Soviet sector of
Berlin, as has been
the case for visits
to East Germany. The
East Germans are
claiming that US Am-
bassador Dowling ac-
knowledged the re-
gime's authority dur-
ing his visit to the
Soviet sector on 22
September by showing
his identification
documents to East Ger-
man police. The East
German news agency
formally denied a
Western press report
that a Soviet Embassy
spokesman had said
personnel of the three
Western powers would
be excepted from the
permit requirement to
visit East Berlin;
this leaves open the
possibility that the
regime will attempt
to bar such personnel.
to control West German traffic
to Berlin. Taking the same
line the Soviet commandant took
in his answer to the three
Western commandants, the note
reiterates the charge that the
Western powers have misused the
air corridors. By asserting
COMG i 1MUN/CATIQN ROUTES BETWEEN
=
Kassel o
REPUBLIC
fe
WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN
-o Canal Air Corridor,
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
A Soviet Alw AlVed
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
s East r, ,ws
that Western rights in the cor-
ridors are limited to the sup-
ply of Berlin garrisons, the
note leaves the door open for
continued harassment or even
Soviet withdrawal from the four-
power Berlin Air Safety Center.
Without'giving unlimited
;,support to East Germany, Mos-
cow's note of 26 September, an-
swering the protest of the three
powers against the partial block-
ade of Berlin from 21 August to
4 September, strongly backs the
East German claim to the right
The refusal of the Soviet
commandant in Berlin to accept
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
the US commandant's protest
concerning East German police
action against Ambassador
Dowling suggests that Moscow
may be prepared to back East
German efforts to gain at
least de facto acknowledgment
of the regime's authority in
East Berlin over Western as
well as West German representa-
tives.
The East Germans have un-
dertaken minor harassment of
Western and West German traffic
to the city in an effort to
probe for weak spots in the
Western position. On 22 Sep-
tember, a US Army truck was
detained by East German police
at the Soviet checkpoint out-
side West Berlin on charges
the driver had violated
traffic regulations. Soviet
authorities At the checkpoint
backed the East German police.
Subsequently the Soviet com-
mandant in Berlin refused to
take any action against the
East Germans, stating that he
could take measures only in so
far as Soviet officers and
troops were involved but not
in cases involving East German
repr esent~ht Ives.
The East Germans are intro-
ducing without adequate notice
new requirements for documenta-
tion of truck traffic entering
East Germany. Six West German
trucks an route to West Berlin
to be turned over to the French
garrison were held up at the
Marienborn checkpoint
from 17
to 19
September and
their
drivers
fined because
their
papers
did not show the end
user.
This has not previously
been a requirement.
SECRET
American officials note
that fines on West German truck
traffic have been steadily ris-
ing in recent months, with the to-
tal. for August approximately
five times that of May. The
East Germans have also legis-
lated new requirements for doc-
umentation of agricultural prod-
ucts in transit through East
Germany, requiring special cer-
tification for absence of plant
diseases. American officials
believe these regulations might
be invoked as a legal basis for
interfering with grain and
potato shipments to West Berlin.
There has been no repeti-
tion of Soviet fighters flying
close to Western commercial air-
craft in the Berlin corridors,
as happened two weeks ago.
Bonn is now implementing
a few limited countermeasures
against the East German economy,
including withholding new per-
mits for deliveries of West
German goods under the 1960 in-
terzonal trade agreement. Bonn,
tfioreover , is 'not ~ implement ing the
1961 in tat zonal aareeder , which
was signed in August. West
German officials are also
taking a somewhat more
optimistic view concerning
the effects on the East 25X1
German economy of a selec-
tive embargo on irs and
steel shipments.
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lemp" SECRET
29 September 1960
OUTLOOK FOR MALI AND SENEGAL
Soudan's decision on 22
September to acknowledge the
dissolution of its federation
with Senegal and to transform
Soudan into the Republic of
Mali has cleared the way for
the two states to establish in-
dependently their orientation
in the international community.
With this decision, the Souda-
nese abandoned their efforts to
sustain the legal fiction that
the Mali Federation still ex-
isted despite Senegal's seces-
sion on 20 August. The deci-
sion, apparently prompted by
the UN General Assembly's post-
ponement on 20 September of ac-
tion on the disrupted federa-
tion,'s pending application for
UN membership, led to the speedy
admission this week of both Sou-
dan--as Mali--and Senegal.
While Senegal's continued
close collaboration with France
and the West seems assured for
the present, the question of
neutralist-inclined Mali's or-
ientation has become more ur-
gent. Maintaining that France's
recognition of Senegal earlier
this month invalidated the co-
operation accords negotiated
last winter between France and
the Mali Federation, the Sou-
danese have declared the new
Mali Republic "free of all po-
litical obligations and ties
toward France."
This position suggests that
President Modibo Keita may soon
lead Mali out of the French Com-
munity and demand the evacuation
of the four bases and approxi-
mately 4,400 troops which France
maintains there under the old
accords and regards as important
to the containment of the Al-
gerian rebellion. Keita reported-
ly stated earlier this month
that recognition of Senegal by
France would lead to an all-out
effort--including a resort to
the UN if necessary--to force
the eviction of the French troops.
On the other hand, Mali's
essentially moderate reaction so
far apparently reflects a will-
ingness to consider possible new
arrangements with Paris, at
least in the economic sphere.
In a statement on 22 September,
Keita placed his country in the
same category as Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey.
These four West African states
were permitted in August to be-
come independent within the
French Community without first
negotiating cooperation accords
with France, as the Mali Federa-
tion had done; following their
recent admission to the UN they
announced their readiness to
conclude such agreements.
Keita had earlier indicated
to special American representative
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Yost in Bamako that, while co-
operation with France would be
more limited in the future, it
would not cease entirely. Mali
apparently plans to remain, at
least for the present, within
the French franc zone.
France, mindful of the con-
sequences of its abrupt with-
drawal from Guinea in 1958,
appears to be taking a cautious
follow up Foccart's initial con-
tacts with Mali leaders.
France's attitude would al-
most certainly harden, however,
if Mali should openly recognize
and attempt to aid the Algerian
rebel government.
that Paris may yet
resort to extreme 25X1
measures in. an effort
to retain control of
its bases in the area.
The Soudanese
have publicly pro-
claimed their inten-
MALI
(SOUDAN)
Bamako
(Aii base)
tion to accept help
from "all sources."
Keita's regime sent
a special delegation
to Moscow and Prague
earlier this month--
and flexible approach to the
problem with a view to sal-
vaging as much as possible of
previous ties.
A
French financial miss on ar-
rived in Bamako this week to
it discussed possible
"economic, cultural,
and technical coopera-
tion," according to the
Czech radio--and is
preparing to send to
Moscow soon a second
mission to be headed
by Vice President Kone.
At the same time,
Keita has asked the
United States for mil-
itary assistance in the
form of trucks and
small arms as well as for devel-
opment aid. He and other Mali
leaders have expressed a strong
desire to avoid Guinea's depend-
ence on bloc aid.
In Africa, contacts have
been made both with pro-Western
Ivory Coast and with leftist-
oriented Guinea, toward which
.many Soudanese, especially ex-
tremist elements, feel a close
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
affinity. So far, however,
Keita has shown no inclination
to tie his country closely to
either. Keita recently expressed
suspicion that Ivory Coast
leader Houphouet-Boigny might
be acting as an "instrument of
French influence," but he also
stated that his country did not
intend to fall under the "trust-
eeship" of Guinea.
Keita has also secured a
promise of financial support
from Ghana's President Nkrumah.
In return, the Soudanese leader
publicly endorsed Nkrumah's
pan-African objectives, which
include Algerian independence.
Independence on 1 October
for the British-created Feder-
ation of Nigeria--whose 35,000,-
000 people make it Africa's most
populous country--marks the
emergence of a state which may
in time exert a decisive influ-
ence on African political align-
ments. With the unifying force
of British authority removed,
the leaders of its three major
political groupings must subor-
dinate traditional tribal, re-
gional, religious, and cultural
differences, as well as personal
rivalries, in the interest of
preserving national unity. Each
of the three largely tribal
groupings dominates one of Ni-
geria's three regions; unlike
most other emerging African
states, however, no one of them
is yet strong enough to assert
its authority over the entire
country.
Power at the federal level
is in the hands of a coalition
of the conservative Northern
People's Congress (NPC) and the
Eastern Region's more radical,
neutralist-flavored National
Council of Nigeria and the Cam-
eroons (NCNC). This government
was installed last December
after a hotly contested elect1 n
in which the NPC won 149 and ttive
NCNC--together with an allied'
Toward Senegal, however,
the Soudanese apparently in-
tend to maintain a vindictive
policy. Keita has stated
that economic ties between the
two countries--more vital to
Senegal's economy than to
Soudan's--would remain severed
as long as the present
leaders of Senegal retain
power. Another Mali official
stated on 22 September
that his government would
do "everything possible" to
bring about the downfall
of Senegalese President
Senghor.
party--89 of the 312 seats in
the federal House of Representa-
tives. Nigeria's third major
party--the Western Region's
ruling Action Group--took the
remaining 74 seats; it consti-
tutes the opposition in the
present legislature.
Abubukar Tafawa Balewa--a
well-liked and capable moderate
representative of the Moslem
north--heads the federal coali-
tion. His position ultimately
depends, however, on the favor
of Nigeria's single most power-
ful personality--Ahmadu Bello,
the Sardauna of Sokoto and
premier of the Northern Region,
the largest and most populous
of Nigeria's three regions.
While the coalition seems
secure for the present, there
is apparently considerable be-
hind-the-scenes maneuvering in-
spired largely by the desire
of some southern elements to
squeeze the northerners out.
Any such attempt--blocked so far
by the enmity between the two
major tribal groups of the
south--would arouse a sharp re-
action in the north, where the
Moslem rulers fear, above all,
domination by the more dynamic
Christian and animist tribesmen
of the South. The appointment
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29 September 1960
as governor general of Dr. Nnamdi '
Azikiwe--one of Nigeria's first
nationalist leaders and the long-
time president of the NCNC--has
already disturbed many northern
leaders. Meanwhile, current dis-
orders in the north appear to
reflect growing restiveness on
the part of some non-Moslem
tribesmen over the region's
essentially feudal political
and social structure.
In foreign affairs, the
Balewa government, while recog-
nizing a basic identity of in-
terests with the West and com-
mitting Nigeria firmly to the
support of the UN as well as
active membership in the Common-
wealth, has indicated its inten-
tion to pursue a policy which
takes account of the neutralist
and pan-African feelings within
the NCNC. Pledged to working
for closer ties among African
states, the government has al-
CaAMI 0U
ready announced its intention to
call an early conference of West
African states and to send a Ni-
gerian battalion to join the UN
force in the Congo. Nigeria's
present top leaders, however ' have
made no secret of thir opposi-
tion to the pretensions to Af-
rican leadership and the "union
now" ideas of Ghana's Nkrumah.
Balewa apparently intends
to delay as long as possible the
establishment of diplomatic re-
lations with Soviet bloc coun-
tries. It seems likely, however,
that formal ties will be estab-
lished immediately with the UAR',
which has recently stepped up
its efforts to cultivate northern
Moslem leaders. British influ-
ence will still be considerable,
however, because of the employ-
ment of large numbers of
British civil servants.\
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY STMMARy
29 September 1960
POLITICAL TURMOIL IN UGANDA
The renewed drive of
the traditional rulers of Bu-
ganda--key region of Britain's
East African Uganda Protectorate
and source of much of its eco-
nomic wealth--to assure their
political future is creating
a major new colonial crisis
for Britain. London's efforts
to push constitutional reform in
Uganda to enable the protector-
ate to achieve early independ-
ence as a unified state may
bog down unless Buganda can be
persuaded to partici
pate in the protector-
ate government.
The Buganda King
and his ministers have
for several years been
apprehensive over any
efforts either by the
British administration
or Uganda nationalists
to undermine the royal
authority. The King's
activities have con-'
tinually frustrated
British efforts to
submerge Buganda with-
in a larger Uganda
state and have cre-
ated such cleavages
within the Uganda na-
tionalist movement
fear that the elections planned
by Britain for next February
will lead to a popular govern-
ment and undermine the tradi-
tional royal regimes. In op-
position to the current elec-
toral registration campaign
sponsored by the British in
Uganda, the Buganda legislature
on 21 September denounced such
activity. It also opposed any
increase in the power of the
Uganda protectorate government
to deal: with intimidation of
that no dominant faction has
emerged to speak for the Africans.
Discussions in London be-
tween Bugandan and British of-
ficials deadlocked in mid-Sep-
tember when the Bugandans
broke off the talks because of
their dissatisfaction with the
terms of London's promises to
safeguard the province's sepa-
rate identity. The King and his
delegation were accorded a
triumphant' reception in Kampala
on their return from London.
Buganda leaders, who have
the backing of tribal rulers in
three other regions of Uganda,
voters--a practice frequently
ascribed to the Bugandan King's
government.
On 23 September the Buganda
legislature, reportedly carried
away by the enthusiasm of the
crowd in the visitors' gallery,
voted to terminate the region's
agreement with Britain and ap-
pointed a committee to set the
date for independence. This
action, along with a decision to
curtail Buganda's representation
in the central Uganda legisla-
ture, in effect declared Buganda's
secession from Uganda. However,
legislative leaders favor a
federal relationship with the
other Ugandan provinces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Britain is expected to
react sharply to Buganda's
moves. The chief secretary--
second-ranking British official
in Uganda--expects a crisis but
believes one at this time
would be better than a few years
hence when Buganda might con-
front inexperienced Ugandan
leaders with the choice of
civil war or fragmentation of
a new nation. He has hinted
that Britain is prepared to
use the governor's reserve
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
powers to remove Bugandan min-
isters and curtail the King's
influence.
On 26 September the British
official publicly announced that
London would not permit Buganda
to change the basic protectorate
agreements unilaterally, would
not recognize any secession so
long as the British govern 25X1
Uganda,, and would consider no
constitutional changes at this
time.
Xing Husayn arrived in New
York this week with the hope of
obtaining through UN mediation
some sort of redress for the
assassination of Jordanian Prime
Minister Majalli, for which he
holds the UAR responsible. UN
Secretary General Hammarskjold
is trying to prevent the Jordan-
UAR crisis from reaching the
General Assembly by undertaking
private talks with Husayn and
Nasir, and by attempting to
arrange, in response to a Jor-
danian proposal, a confronta-
tion of the two Arab leaders.
Hammarskjold, in addition
to proposing that both countries
cease their propaganda warfare,
intended to impress on Nasir the
dangers to Middle Eastern sta-
bility of continued attempts at
subversion and terrorism. F
Nasir is un-
likely, however, to agree to
a detente which does not
involve equally conciliatory
measures by Jordan.
an out rea
of large-scale hostilities seems
less likely, at least while
Husayn is in New York.
The continued maintenance
of Jordanian troops in a status 25X1
of alert in field positions
could eventually cause serious
problems.
----]troop morale has been
low an rations poor, while 25X1
many of the soldiers who live
in northern Jordan are unhappy,
over the prospect of fighting
neighbors and, in some cases,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
relatives across the border.
The US Army attache in Amman has
said, moreover, that there have
been indications that Bedouin
domination of the present opera-
tion was causing a rift within
the Jordanian Army between the
Bedouin "command aristocracy" and
others, such as Circassians,
Christians, and Palestinians,
who feel they have been left
out.
Libya
A governmental crisis has
resulted from the recent exposure
of corruption among high-level
officials. Dissatisfaction with
the Kubar government has in-
creased, especially in urban
areas, and some of the popular
resentment is directed against
King Idris for his delay in
taking promised remedial action.
In response to a petition signed
by a majority of the members of
parliament, Idris has ordered
parliament to reconvene in extra-
ordinary session on 8 October to
discuss the latest scandal con-
nected with government fi-
nancing of the Fezzan road
project.
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29 September 1960
The King has already re-
placed almost the entire pro-
vincial. Cyrenaican Executive
Council. He is also expected
soon to accept the resignation
proffered by Prime Minister
Kubar more than six weeks ago
and to undertake a major shake-
up of the federal cabinet.
Many prominent politicians--
such as former Prime Minister
Ben Halim--who might ordinarily
be considered possible replace-
ments for Kubar now are likely
to be ruled out because they
too have been implicated in
unsavory dealings.
One likely choice to suc-
ceed the prime minister might
be Husayn Maziq, the governor of
the Province of Cyrenaica. An-
other might be Sheik Abd al-
Hamid Dibani, the minister of
justice, who has occasionally
been acting prime minister.
Both are, men of integrity, and 25X1
either could be expected to con-
tinue Libyan policies generally
favorable to the West.
NEHRU-AYUB MEETINGS IMPROVE INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS
Indian Prime Minister Neh-
ru's five-day visit with Presi-
dent Ayub of Pakistan in con-
nection with the signing of the
much-heralded Indus Waters Agree-
ment appears to have established
a personal rapport which
will promote closer rela-
tions between India and
Pakistan.
The formal ending of the
13-year-old Indus waters dis-
pute removes a major irritant
in the relations between the
two nations. The new agreement,
along with last year's border
accord and continuing contacts
between the nations' leaders,
may provide sufficient momentum
to enable the two nations to
move on to settlement of other
outstanding issues, such as
relaxation of visa restric-
tions, implementation of
through rail travel, and a set-
tlement of the outstanding debts
arising from partition of the
subcontinent.
Additional lower :level
talks are planned on these is-
sues, but since each country
feels that it made the con-
ciliatory gestures that paved
the way toward an Indus
settlement, each probably ex
pects the other now to take
the initiative in further
concessions.
Regarding any possible
solution to the long-standing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
dispute over the status of Kash-
mir, neither leader appeared
willing to modify his basic po-
sition. They apparently discussed
the question dispassionate-
ly during their long, frank,pri-
vate conversations, with Ayub
reportedly stressing the point
that only he and Nehru are strong
enough to push through a solu-
tion over the opposition of cer-
tain elements within their coun-
tries.
Both leaders recognize that
with the settlement of the Indus
waters dispute, all remaining
points of disagreement; are minor
compared with Kashmir;, and both
agree that a settlement of the
Kashmir question holds the key
to long-term stability in Indo-
Pakistani relations. However,
neither appears ready at this
time to make the compromises
necessary to permit.a serious
bargaining for a settlement.
TRIBAL UNREST ALONG THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER
Tension is mounting along
the Afghan-Pakistani frontier
following the outbreak of fight-
ing among Pushtoon tribes liv-
ing along the border north of
the Khyber Pass. The danger of
clashes between Afghan and Paki-
stani army units will increase
as both Kabul and Rawalpindi
take measures to support their
tribal partisans, although ef-
forts will probably be made to
keep the disturbances localized.
The current unrest involves
long-standing conflicts among
several tribal groups in this
area and between the tribes and
the two governments. Neither
government controls all the
tribes in its own territory, and
both governments compete- to ex-
tend their influence among them,
with little regard for the inter-
national boundaries.
Most of the recent fighting,
which began in early September
on the Pakistani side of the line,.
seems to be centered in Khar, in
the Bajaur region. The Nawab of
fair, a local ruler who controls
a semi-autonomous state, has had
chronically poor relations with
the Pakistani Government and
reportedly has recently request-
ed Afghan Government support.
The Afghans, possibly in re-
sponse to this request, apparent-
ly are assisting the enemies of
the Khan of Khar, a rival of the
Nawab.
Kabul has canceled all army
leaves, is calling up reserv-
ists,. and is sending additional
armor and infantry units to the
border, both north and south of
the Khyber Pass. The Afghan
Government is also recruiting
tribal irregulars, and many--
perhaps a thousand--have already
crossed the border to spark fur-
ther unrest and encourage tribal
opposition to the Pakistani Gov-
ernment.
Pakistani Air Marshal As-
ghar Khan says the Pakistani Air
Force is organizing an air drop
should it be necessary to bring
troops into the area, which is
relatively inaccessible by land
routes from Pakistan.
Afghanistan too has long
had considerable difficulty with
tribes on its side of the bor-
der, especially with the Moh-
mands, a powerful Pushtoon tribe
living on both sides of the bor-
der. Since a shooting incident
in 1958, Kabul has increased its
garrison in the area and pushed
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29 September 1960
REGION OF TRIBAL DISTURBANCES
its road-building program to
facilitate extension of its con-
trol. Afghan regulars are en-
countering serious tribal re-
sistance as they try to push
close to the border opposite
Bajaur and Dir. In
addition, there are in-
dications of widespread
unrest in several Af-
ghan cities, probably
reGlting from the call-
.L of the reserves.
Both Kabul and
Rawalpindi have shown
considerable concern
that the other side
may go too far and
cause the conflict to
spread. Kabul .appar-
ently has placed its
Soviet-supplied MIG-17
jet fighters an the
alert in the event of
a Pakistani. attack.
Pakistani Foreign Min-
ister Qadir announced
on 28 September that
"the government of
Pakistan is holding
itself in readiness
for all eventualities
and is capable of
dealing effectively
with all attempts at
violating Pakistan's
frontiers." As an in-
dication of the extent
of Pakistan's concern,
Qadir's deputy on the
same day called in the
Soviet and American
ambassadors to present
his government's views
on the situation
SOUTH. KOREAN POLITICS
South Korean Prime Minister
Chang Myon, already threatened
with a formal split of his Demo-
cratic party, may disrupt govern-
ment operations if he carries
out the large-scale purge of
government officials he has
initiated. Faced with popular
pressure for a status-of-forces
agreement with the United
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
States, Chang may feel forced
to popularize his administration
by publicly pushing for an
agreement.
Kim To-Yop,Chang's erst-
while rival for the prime minis-
tership and the nominal leader
of the Democratic party's "old"
faction, on 22 September an-
nounced his intention of with-
drawing from the party and or-
ganizing a conservative oppo-
sition party. Kim's effort to
force a party split probably
was designed to block any fur-
ther loss of members to Chang's
"new" faction. Chang is con-
fident the split ultimately will
benefit him by encouraging the
transfer of sufficient members
from the "old" faction to the
prime minister's group to give
him a majority in the National
Assembly.
Chang is carrying out a
large-scale dismissal of senior
government, provincial, and
police officials appointed dur-
ing the Rhee administration.
The purge is designed to win
popular support for the new
government by removing unpop-
ular local officials and al-
legedly corrupt remnants of the
old regime. It also may be
motivated in part by a desire
to establish within the
government an organization per-
sonally loyal to Chang. The anti-
corruption drive is almost cer-
tain to demoralize government
employees and reduce the effec-
tiveness of the present adminis-
tration.
Inspired by the nationalistic
sentiment which has been evident
since the April revolution,
the press, members of the Nation-
al Assembly, Korean employees
of US military installations,
and student demonstrators are
exerting pressure on the govern-
ment for the early conclusion of
a status-of-forces agreement with
the United States. Chang has
indicated that his government is
under compulsion to demonstrate
progress toward this goal, and,
faced with mounting difficulties
on domestic issues, he may de-
cide to popularize his adminis-
tration by publicly pushing for
an agreement,
Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs Kim Yong-sik recently
told the American Embassy that
he believed the government
would be largely relieved of
pressure on this issue if nego-
tiations were begun, despite the
fact that a final agreement might
require many months, as Chang's 25X1
government could take considerable
talks.
credit for merely opening formal
SPAAK'S WORRIES ABOUT NATO
Secretary General Spaak,
who visits Washington from 2 to 4
October, is primarily concerned
with discussing the difficulties
posed by French attitudes, as
well as over the shortcomings of
NATO's consultation procedures,
as shown in the Congo crisis.
Even before De Gaulle
on 5 September publicly advanced
his thesis that "world powers"
should have a superior status
within the alliance, Spaak
had observed that the French
President did not want true
tripartite consultation or
even a directorate of three,
but support for his own pol-
icies; that unless he can
have this, De Gaulle is
against NATO.
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29 September 1960
Of the specific military
issues that have vexed 'Gaullist
France's relations with NATO,
limited progress on integrated
air defense was achieved on 28
September when the North At-
lantic Council approved crea-
tion of an integrated air de-
fense system that would include
a section of France bordering
on West Germany. French planes
in the area as well as in Ger-
many will remain integrated in
the NATO command, and the French
radar system will be brought
into the Allied warning net.
While there apparently has
been no change in De Gaulle's
position since he removed
France's Mediterranean fleet
from NATO wartime control, con-
tinuation of some practical co-
operation is illustrated by
French participation in cur-
rent NATO naval exercises. At-
tention will now focus on
French objections to the Ameri-
can proposal of 1 April for the
establishment of a NATO medium-
range ballistic missile program.
NATO authorities hope to re-
solve this issue by the time
the annual ministerial meeting
convenes in December.
21 September.
Spaak has found in the
handling of the Congo crisis
new ammunition for his continu-
ing campaign to improve pro-
cedures of consultation. He
has pointed to Belgium's fail-
ure to seek the permanent coun-
cil's advice in advance of the
crisis, the failure Of NATO
members to give Belgium their
early advice on it, and the
conflicting positions of NATO
members in the UN Security
Council debates. One immediate
consequence has been Brussels'
plans to trim its NATO con-
tribution, probably by pulling
back its two divisions in Ger-
many from forward positions.
Spaak foresees similar
difficulties arising from the
coming UN General Assembly
debates on Algeria which, he
fears, will put France's ties
with the alliance to a severe
test. These are high among the 25X1
problems dealt with in a major
long-term study of the alliance,
on which informal discussion began
in the North Atlantic Council on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2S September 1960
FINNISH POLITICAL PROBLEMS
The most difficult prob-
lems lacing the. recently
reconvened Finnish parlia-
ment are. the question of
Finland's. association with.
the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA) and the re-
lated issue of broadening the
minority government in order to
break the political impasse on
the domestic scene and to
strengthen the government's hand
in prospective economic nego-
tiations with the Soviet Un-
ion,
Finnish officials hope to
pave the way for eventual asso-
ciation with EFTA by first reach-
ing agreement with Moscow on
most-favored-nation treatment
for Soviet exports. Preliminary
talks are already under way,
and President Kekkonen has ac-
cepted Premier Khrushchev's in-
vitation to visit Moscow in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
FINNISH DIET
FINNISH
SOCIAL PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
OPPOSITION
200 SEATS
late November in connection
with the expected conclusion
of an agreement.
During his visit to Finland
earlier this month, Khrushchev
implied the USSR would not
block Finland's association
with EFTA provided measures were
taken to maintain Sovd et-Fin-
nish trade. Once this problem
has been resolved, the govern-
ment probably will propose to
parliament that Finland associ-
ate with EFTA--a move which
seems certain to be approved in
view-of the.aimost:solid,support
from the non-Communist parties
and most economic groups.
FARMERS
PARTY
Probably the most contro-
versial domestic issue facing
parliament and one which is
likely indirectly to influence
the EFTA and government questions
concerns proposals for new farm
income legislation which the
Agrarians are expected to intro-
duce. The Social Democrats in
particular are determined to
oppose vigorously any arrange-
ment which in their view grants
excessive benefits to farmers.
This issue may be used by the
opposition parties as a bargain-
ing point by which the Agrarians
might: ?be;_Ypressed to
broaden the govern-
ment.
Another question
which may receive
considerable atten-
tion is that of the
desirability of hold-
ing new general elec-
tions in :view of the
continuing impasse in
Finnish political af-
fairs. Although
elections are not
scheduled to be held until July
1962, pressure to hold them at
an earlier date is likely to
increase markedly if the
Agrarians continue to refuse to
broaden the government except on
terms. unacceptable to, opposition
parties. In the two unsuccessful
attempts to reorganize the gov-
ernment last summer, the Agrarians
proposed giving disproportionate-
ly high representation to the
splinter opposition Social Dem-
ocrats while barring the regular
Social Democrats from any
cabinet posts.
Despite some fears that the
Communist-f ront Finnish Peoples
Democratic League might further
increase its strength as a re-
sult of dissensidn~ within the
Social Democratic and Agrarian
parties, there appears to be in-
creased confidence among the
democratic parties about facing
the electorate during a period
when the economy is booming and
economic prospects are bright.
An uneasy feeling persists, how-
ever, that even if the Commu-
nists made only moderate gains
in the election, President
Kekkonen would be inclined to
grant them representation in a
new government
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
MONGOLIA IN BLOC AND WORLD AFFAIRS
Mongolian Communist leaders
were forced into a difficult
decision this summer. After
the Bucharest conference made it
clear that the Soviet Union ex-
pected satellite support in its
feud with Peiping, the Mongolian
central committee met and on 5
July issued a surprisingly non-
committal resolution. On 14
August, however, after Premier
Yumzhagin Tsedenbal, who is also
party first secretary, had ap-
peared at the Kremlin, Unen,
the official Mongolian newspaper
published an article firmly de-
claring for the USSR. Yet,
~ayn Shanr
regardless of Moscow's induce-
ments or pressures, the fact
that the oldest Soviet satel-
lite had hoped to stay out of
the polemic testifies to the
resurgence of Chinese influence
in Mongolia.
Historically, the Mongo-
lians sought to import Russian
influence to reduce that of the
Chinese. This effort, captured
and distorted by the Bolshevik
revolution, brought the Mongo-
lian Communists to power in 1921
behind an advancing Soviet Red
Army which not only crushed
White Russian remnants who had
fled to Mongolia but also broke
the centuries-old grip of Chi-
nese suzerainty.
Now the Chinese have reap-
peared in the role of economic
helpers. Although determined
to prevent any restoration of
Chinese ascendancy, elements in
the Mongolian party, restive
HI)J
after years of un-
questioning obedience
to the Kremlin, prob-
ably welcomed an op-
portunity to widen
contacts with the Chi-
nese as a hedge a-
gainst continued total
subservience to the
USSR.
Nationalism
There is no long-
er an organized Bud-
dhist church around
which national feeling
can rally, as it did
in Tibet. The lamas
were ruthlessly elimi-
nated in the purges of
the mid-1930s, and the
monastery preserved in
Ulan Bator serves only
to impress Buddhist
visitors.
The Communists
also have made some
attempt to reorient along more
Marxist lines the Mongols'
strong sense of pride in their
history and cultures With Mos-
cow looking over its shoulder,
the Mongolian Government in 1941
officially adopted a modified
Cyrillic script; Russian is a
required language in the expand-
ing school system and although
there is a university, about
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S
29 September 1960
1,000 youths are sent to study
in the USSR each year; and there
has been some effort to replace
classic Mongol heroes, including
Genghis Khan, with more ortho-
dox symbols of proletarian in-
ternationalism like Marshal
Choybalsan, a carbon copy of
Stalin who died a year before
his mentor.
The Mongol nomads form a
reservoir of nationalism, but
they are politically voiceless.
Instead, the most striking re-
cent opposition to complete
sovietization was spearheaded
by a Mongolian professor, Dr.
Rinchen, who, between 1956 and
1959 wrote a number of books
and poems which extolled tradi-
tional Mongol culture and were
unflattering to the USSR. At-
tacked in the Mongol press as
"bourgeois nationalist,"
Rinchen was eventually dismissed
from his post at Choybalsan
University.
Rinchen's defense of Mon-
gol culture--his willingness
to snipe at "the new life of
fraternal peoples"--appears to
have been symptomatic of wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the
effort to remake Mongolia in the
Soviet image.
in the USSR report that their
Mongolian acquaintances are
contemptuous of both Chinese
and Russians, much preferring
Western companions to th
from the bloc.
Party Purge
"Nationalism," Unen said
in criticizing Rinchen, "cre-
ates the soil for bourgeois in-
trigues"--a reference to the
factionalism which divided the
Mongolian People's Revolution-
ary party for five years, cul-
minating in March 1959 with the
purge of Dashin Damba and the
end of "collective leadership"
in Mongolia.
Tsedenbal, long Choybal-
san's heir apparent as head of
state and party, assumed both
jobs when the marshal died in
1952. Only 36 at the time,
Tsedenbal may not
have had a really
firm power position
in the politburo
when Stalin's death
brought on the inter-
regnum of collective
leadership in Moscow.
In April 1954, Tseden-
bal was released from
his post as party
first secretary, and
into the vacancy
stepped Dam,ba, who
had been second sec-
retary since 1947,
With Damba leading
the party and Tseden-
bal the government,
Mongolia embarked on
its own collective
leadership experiment, a step
Unen hailed as "the most impor-
an principle of party leader-
ship.'"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29:September 1960
Damba seemed in control of
the 13th Mongolian party con-
gress in March 1958. He at-
tacked the Choybalsan cult--and
indirectly the marshal's pro-
tege Tsedenbal- -charging that
it "flagrantly violates revolu-
tionary legality." Even more
significant were Damba's remarks
about the effort to get Mongo-
lian herdsmen to settle in co-
operatives--a perennial objet-
tive~of the regime. Stressing
that the movement to coopera-
tives should be voluntary and
stimulated by incentive, not
coercion, Damba clearly implied
that the pace of socialization
should take Mongolia's tradi-
tional culture patterns into
account.
Such concepts were not in
harmony with general bloc ef-
forts at the time to tighten
socialist control over agri-
culture, and they certainly
were not in keeping with Tseden-
bal's ambitions to catapult
Mongolia immediately into the
20th century via Communism. By
1958, collective leadership was
pass& in the USSR, and Tseden-
bal knew whom to see.
Following Tsedenbal's No-
vember 1958 trip to Moscow, the
party central committee met in
plenary session, after which
Tsedenbal once more emerged as
first secretary, while Damba
reverted to second secretary
"for better centralization of
party leadership." It quickly
became apparent that social-
ization was going to be acceler-
ated. By early 1959 Tsedenbal
had consolidated his position,
and on 31 March Damba was purged
along with five other members
of the politburo.
The charges against Damba
were vituperative, revealing
the depth of Tsedenbal's animo s-
ity, as well as indicating that
Moscow shared this feeling. TASS
was prompt to report Damba's
"lack of principle and dis-
honesty, stupid political
backwardness, conservatism, and
inertia, egotism, and opportun-
istic conciliation." The Soviet
journal Parf Life gave Tseden-
bal space in which to condemn
Damba for criticizing Choybalsan,
now restored to his pedestal as
"an ardent advocate of the
friendship of peoples." In his.
article, Tsedenbal outlined "a
great revolutionary measure in-
tended to promote rapid develop-
ment of productive forces in
agricul hare" --essentially,
speedy conversion of Mongolia's
pastoral economy to one more
closely approximating agricul-
ture in the Soviet Union.
In retrospect, it appears
that Damba attempted a cautious
de-emphasis of the Soviet pres-
ence during his five-year con-
trol of the party. His willing-
ness to oppose the recognized
Soviet faction and his desire
to accommodate Mongolian charac-
teristics in socializing the
economy point in this direction,
giving his struggle for person-
al power a distinctly national-
istic tone. It was during
Damba's tenure that Chinese in-
fluence experienced a renascence
in Mongolia--a renascence Damba
may have welcomed, but only to
the extent that it might in some
degree offset Soviet control.
"Socialist Competition"
Before the Communist vic-
tory in China, Mao Tse-tung told
the American writer Edgar Snow
that "the Outer Mongolian repub-
lic will automatically become
a part of the Chinese federation
when the people's revolution has
been victorious in China." This
has not been repeated publicly
since Mao took over the mainland,
but the implications did not
escape Moscow's notice. When
the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed
in 1950, a note was appended in
which the Chinese Communists-ac-
knowledged Mongolia's independ-
ence, just as Chiang Kai-shek had
done a few years before.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Stalin may not have trusted
Mao completely, but he was con-
tent to restrict, rather than
entirely prevent, renewed Chi-
nese activity in Mongolia. The
1952 joint Sino-Soviet-Mongolian
railroad treaty kept Chinese
construction crews from cross-
ing Mongolia's southern boundary,
but that same year Peiping and
Ulan Bator agreed to "consoli-
date cooperation" in an econom-
ic and cultural pact. At the
time it was signed, this agree-
ment was rather vague as to
just how far the two parties
intended to carry their co-
operation, but the agreement
was used subsequently as some-
thing of an open-end contract
providing the justification for
specific Chinese economic aid
programs.
With Stalin out of the pic-
ture, the reins of Moscow's
hegemony loose, and the economic
drain of the Korean war over,
Peiping developed a more tangi-
ble interest in Mongolia. By
agreement with the Ulan Bator,
the first of at least 10,000
Chinese laborers began arriving
in 1955. These workers have
built housing projects, bridges,
a glass factory, food-process--
sing plants, and a brick kiln;
they are building or will build
more roads, bridges, and apart-
ment houses, plus additional
factories for Mongolia's nas-
cent industry; some 2,000 Chi-
nese are swarming over the
Harkhorin state farm construc-
ting a sizable irrigation system.
All this is financed by Peiping,
whose grant and credit aid to
Mongolia since 1956 reached a
total of $115,000,000 with the
extension of a new $50,000,000
loan last May.
Communist China's trade
with Mongolia has multiplied
about 50 times since 1952, a
rise which to some extent has
been at Soviet expense. This
point was formally noted in
1957 when the 1958-60 Soviet-
Mongolian trade agreement was
signed. At Ulan Bator's re-
quest, it was agreed that Mon-
golian exports to the USSR could
be reduced because of the "signif-
cant'. expansion of economic re
lations with other countries."
The USSR still dominates
Mongolian trade, as it does the
field of economic assistance.
Moscow provides farm machinery,
industrial equipment, and heavy
installations such as thermal
power plants; aid projects have
developed mineral resources and
transportation.
Viewed strictly in terms
of projects, Chinese economic
activity in Mongolia would seem
to complement that of the USSR.
In balmier days of the Sino-So-
viet alliance, Moscow may have
found this an acceptable, if not
wholly desirable, modus vivendi
as long as the Chinese did not
push for equal status in Mongo
lia. The Chinese, in fact, have
been careful to stay within the
permissive framework of "social-
ist brotherhood," and they have
avoided any pronouncements or
specific actions which could be
interpreted as interference
either in Mongolia's :internal
affairs or in Soviet-Mongolian
relations.
Peiping thus is not openly
challenging Moscow's position
in Mongolia, but the return of
Chinese influence tends to
erode that of the USSR. Peiping
seems to be following a policy
of patience and of gradual en-
croachment intended slowly to
reorient Ulan Bator's political
allegiance.
There have been some indi-
cations that Moscow is reviewing
its position in Mongolia in the
light of Sino-Soviet differences.
TASS gave cursory treatment to
Chou En-lai's visit to Ulan
Bator last May when new assist-
ance, pledged to Mongolia's
Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65),
which suggests that the USSR
was less than pleased.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Moscow's 9 September loan
to Mongolia of over $153,000,-
000 for the new Five-Year Plan
stipulates repayment on "easy
terms," defers repayment of
earlier loans, and provides for
sending Soviet technicians and
workers to Mongolia. This last
may be particularly significant
as the USSR in recent years has
left the labor field almost en-
tirely to the Chinese. The
agreement brings total Soviet
aid since 1956 to well over
$275,000,000. On 20 September,
a further Sino-Mongolian agree-
ment was announced providing
Chinese labor, presumably for
construction projects to be
undertaken in connection with
the Chinese loanin May.
Diplomatic Relations
Ulan Bator has made a
serious effort in recent years
to gain acceptance as a legit-
imata.a independent state, bid-
ding especially for contacts
with the Afro-Asian countries.
Burma, India, Indonesia, and
Guinea now recognize Mongolia.
As yet there are no nonbioc
ambassadors in Ulan Bator, but
Indonesian, Indian, and Burmese
ambassadors in Peiping are ac-
credited there. Guinea has not
yet appointed a diplomatic rep-
resentative, but President Sekou
Tour6 visited Ulan Bator on 10
September.
Diplomatic relations with
Peiping and Moscow present the
expected picture of "socialist
unity." Molotov served as
Soviet ambassador in Ulan Bator
until recently, but Mongolians
privately expressed a dislike
for him. There is an interest-
ing, although unconfirmed, re-
port that in early 1958, the
USSR appropriated some Mongo-
lian territory rich in cobalt--
an action which was said to have
led to a stiff protest from
Mongolian Foreign Minister
Avarzed. Avarzed did lose his
job in mid-1958, and the report
alleged this was at Molotov's
insistence.
Mongolia and the
Mongolia's efforts to join
the United Nations date from
1946. Membership requires a
two-thirds endorsement of the
General Assembly and is subject
to a Security Council veto, as
was used by Nationalist China
in 1955.
Khrushchev, in .his address
to the General Assembly on 23
September, called for Mongolia's
admission along with that of
Communist China. The USSR may,
however, be planning to ask this
General Assembly merely to rec-
ommend Mongolia for membership.
If successful, such a move would
give the Communists a propaganda
victory by according Mongolia
some measure of international
recognition. It would not re-
sult in membership for Mongolia,
but would afford the bloc a
talking point for urging accept-
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST OIL
Saudi oil boss Sheikh Ab-
dullah Tariki and Juan Perez
Alfonzo, Venezuela's minister
of mines and hydrocarbons, have
taken a major step toward real-
ization of their plan, for uni-
fied action by the world's major)
net oil-exporting countries.
On 14 September the formation
of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was
announced in Baghdad. Its mem-
bers--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq,
Iran, and Venezuela--haves about
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
80 percent of the free world's
known oil reserves and account
for almost half of the oil moving
in international trade. However,
OPEC is already showing signs of
weakness. Iran, whose coopera-
tion is essential, now appears
to be having second thoughts
about "solidarity" with the
Arabs.
Prelude to Baghdad Talks
For more than two years
Tariki and Perez have been
working toward a world-wide
system of prorationing oil out-
put by agreement among the 1 1.
world's major net oil-exporting
countries. They advocate an
organization with power to set
production levels in each
country and determine each mem-
ber's share of the world market,
and thus to maintain an artifi-
cially high price for oil.
Tariki and Perez realized
Iran and Iraq would have to join
if the plan were to succeed.
Iraq was not likely to join any
new group in which the UAR, a
minor producer, would have either
membership or strong influence.
When Tariki visited Baghdad in
late August, he and the Iraqis
agreed that the UAR would not
be included and that the Arab
League--in which the UA.R plays
the leading role--would be given
only observer status. Iraq then
warmly endorsed Tariki's plans
for a preliminary meeting and
insisted that it be in Baghdad.
The task of assuring Irani-
an attendance fell to Iraq.
Tariki had long sought: to
interest Iran in prorationing
schemes. Iran, feeling that
Baghdad would consider a re-
fusal to attend the meetings.an
affront to Qasim, agreed to
participate as an observer.
Its decision was probably in-
fluenced by the fact that Bah-
rein, which Iran claims as its
territory, was not invited.
On 12 September representa-
tives from Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar, Iran, and Vene-
zuela began discussions which
led to the formation of the new
organization.
Fuad Ruhani, acting man-
aging director of the govern-
ment-owned National Iranian
Oil Company (NIOC), represented
Iran in the absence of Abdullah
Entezam, chairman of the company,
who was on a trip to the United
States, Both Iranians strongly
back most of the present pol-
icies,. of the international oil
industry, but Tariki proposed
an agenda that included a number
of proposals extremely hostile
to the oil companies. Such pro-
posals would have conflicted
wIt?h,,,Tdhra.n's polfcy''of mild
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
harassment of but basic accom-
modation with the companies
operating in Iran. Ruhani
warded off Tariki's proposed
agenda by.changing Iran's,
status from:observer:to dele-
gate-in order to present an-
other agenda.
According to Ruhani, his
object was to prevent discus-
sion of such matters as pro-
posals for correlating the
amount of oil produced with oil
reserves, raising the govern-
ments' share of prof-
its from the present
50 percent, ;,,and
adopting a formula
for changing prices.
The announced de-
cisions of the meet-
ings were close to
the Iranian proposes!
als.
Aside from the
decision to form the
OPEC, the most impor-
tant was agreement
on the need to main-
tain present prices.
Issuance of a final
communique was post-
poned until 24 Sep-
tember, when the
several governments
simultaneously an-
nounced the results
SECRET -low
While
withdrawal is a distinct pos-
sibility, it seems more like-
ly that Iran will remain a
member and attempt to act as
a restraining influence on
Tariki and Perez, while also
using its membership to win
some concessions from the
consortium.
The conference decides to form a permanent organization to be
called Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for regular con-
sultation among its members to coordinate and unify the policies of the
members and determining the attitude which members should adopt.
Principal aim of the organization shall be to unify petroleum poli-
cies for member countries and to determine the best means for safeguard-
ing the interest of member countries individually and collectively.
Members shall demand that oil companies maintain their prices
steady and free from all unnecessary fluctuation. members shall en-
deavor to restore present prices to the levels prevailing before the re-
duction.
Members shall study and formulate a system to ensure the stabi-
lisation of prices by, among other means, the regulation of production
with regard to the interests of the producing and of the consuming na-
tions, and to the necessity of securing steady income to the producing
countries, an efficient and regular supply to consuming nations, and a
fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum in-
dustry.
If sanctions are employed by a company against any member country,
no other member shall accept any offer of a beneficent treatment whether
in the form of an increase in exports or an improvement in prices which
may be made by any such company with the intention of discouraging the
application of the unanimous decision reached by the conference.
of the meeting. Iranian offi?
cials, feeling they had ex-
erted a moderating influence
at the meetings and had ac-
tually championed the Western
oil companies' cause, were sur-
prised at the reaction of the
companies, which viewed Tehran's
role in the meeting as Iranian
"solidarity" with the Arabs.
At least one US firm
halted negotiations for an oil
concession in Iran.
Kuwait and OPEC
Until very recently Kuwait
had been content to keep out of
the controversies between the
oil industries and the area's
oil-producing countries. This
policy has helped Kuwait, which
produced no oil before World
War II, move to third place--
after the United States and
Venezuela--among the free
world's oil producers. Now,
however, Kuwait is showing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29)Zeptember 1960
signs of wanting more than
substantial oil revenues. Many
influential Kuwaitis want their
country to have a larger voice
in the management of the Brit-
ish- and American-owned Kuwait
Oil Company as well as some
control over changes in prices
for its oil.
It was Kuwait that asked
Tariki to organize an emergency
meeting of oil-producing coun-
tries following the August cut
in the posted prices for Middle
East oil. British officials
remain convinced, nevertheless,
that the oil policies of the
Kuwaiti Government will continue
to be determined by a preoccupa-
tion with the size of the coun-
try's oil revenues.
from the Gulf of Aqaba to the
Mediterranean.
All members except Kuwait
need funds. Excepting Vene-
zuela, each member has been
urging the oil companies to
increase production in its own
territory at faster rates, even
at the expense of other area
countries. Iran, for example,
holds that it should :return to
its former position as the
Persian Gulf's leading oil pro-
ducer, and it is concerned with
the Arabs' rapid increases in
output. Saudi Arabia has told
Aramco that its production
should increase faster, noting
that Kuwait, whose production
is half again as large as Saudi
Arabia's, has no pressing need
for additional revenues.
Prospects for OPEC
The OPEC has serious
structural and conceptual weak-
nesses, which reduce its threat
to the international oil in-
dustry. Most of the member
governments are unstable and
suspicious of each other. Iran,
for example, tends to distrust
the Arab states and to hold
them in contempt, recalling
vividly the fact that the Arabs
took advantage of the shutdown
of Iran's oil industry follow-
ing nationalization in 1951--52
to achieve their present export
position.
The Arabs are resentful
that Iran stepped into the
breach during the Suez crisis
and supplied Israel with oil
when Moscow decided to halt
shipments to Israel. Most of
Israel's petroleum needs are
still being met by Iran, and
it appears likely that Iranian
shipments will increase further
as Israel begins full-scale
operation of its new pipeline
International proration-
ing of oil would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible,
without the cooperation of the
oil industry and the major con-
sumers. For the Middle East,
the principal consumers are
Western European countries,
which also take a sizable por-
tion of Venezuelan petroleum
exports. They are not as de-
pendent on Middle East oil as
the Arabs tend to believe.
Europe is plagued with a coal
surplus, partly because of the
heretofore cheaper price of oil.
Proration implies at least
stable and possibly increased oil
prices. Under such conditions
the continuing shift from coal
to oil might be slowed down and
possibly reversed.
The oil fields in Algeria
and Libya will provide Europe
with increasing quantities of
crude oil. France has cut its
imports of Middle East crude
sharply. Neither Libya nor
Algeria was represented at the
Baghdad talks, although the way
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29 September 1960
is open for them to join. How-
ever, Libya is preoccupied with
becoming a major oil-producing
nation and would not be likely
to agree to suggestions that
it limit its oil exports.
Determination of each
country's share of the market
would be a major, and quite
likely insurmountable, stumbling
block. Saudi Arabia probably
would press for some formula
relating production to reserves,
since this would give it larger
production increases than any
other country except Kuwait.
Tariki has stated, however, that
Kuwait is a special case, and
a modification of any formula
for the other members would be
needed to halt the continued
rapid increase in Kuwaiti out-
put. Venezuela is unlikely to
agree to any export proration-
ing based on reserves because
of its sharp disadvantage in
using this criterion.
Iran, on the other hand,
has suggested a production-to-
population relationship, which,
since it is the most populous
of the several countries, would
make it pre-eminent in pro-
duction. Despite these weak-
nesses, the OPEC will likely
make itself felt in oil councils
in coming months, especially,
in determining price changes.
Tapline Problem
The negotiations that have
been going on for five years
between the American-owned Trans
Arabian Pipeline Company (Tap-
line) and the Arab states
through which it passes are no
closer to solution now than a
year ago. The company con-
tinues to hold that an agree-
ment with Saudi Arabia must
precede agreements with the
transit countries of Jordan,
Lebanon, and the UAR. Cairo,
however, has insisted that its
demands for additional revenues
be met and has again threatened
to shut down the pipeline. Tap-
line's dispute with the UAR was
sharpened in July when the com-
pany halted shipments of crude
to the HOms refinery in the
Syrian region because of non-
payment of bills. The refinery
is continuing operation with
larger imports from the Iraqi
Petroleum Company (IPC), but
Syria is now paying a higher
price for the crude oil.
Baghdad-IPC
Off and on since the July
1958 revolution, Baghdad and the
IPC have been negotiating changes
in the company's concession a-
greement. Thus far, although
the company has made a number
of offers--including the sur-
render of about 90,000 square
miles, or about 52 percent of
its total concession---no agree-
ment has been concluded. A new
round of negotiations began in
late September, but prospects
for a settlement of outstanding
issues continuerremote..
The faction-ridden and di-
vergent parties supporting the
two-month-old Italian govern-
ment--made up entirely of Chris
tian Democrats--were forced in-
to a semblance of unity by a
threat to the existence of the
democratic system in Italy;
Nevertheless they are still
seeking new national political
alignments, and the outlook
for such alignments may be
clarified by the 6 November
elections for municipal and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September :.1960
provincial governments and by
the subsequent congress of the
Nenni Socialists. These local
elections--which are to be held
in most of the nation--are ex-
pected to indicate trends to
be exploited by the parties as
they approach nation-
al elections, due by
1963.
Supporting Parties
a.vi e
The political
truce which led to
investiture of Pre-
mier Amintore Fan-
fani's minority gov-
ernment will be
strained by the fall
elections. Three
main aspirations are
apparent among the
four parties now
backing Fanfani. The
majority of the
Liberals and right-wing Chris-
tian Democrats and one or two
Democratic Socialists and Re-
publicans probably hope to re-
constitute the old quadripartite
coalition cabinet in which the
three divergent small center
parties participated with the
Christian Democrats. Some
Liberals and right-wing Chris-
tian Democrats want to rely
more directly on the monarchists
(Italian Democratic party), who
abstained in the investiture vote.
The Republican and Demo-
cratic Socialist parties and
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1 -
'.. DEMOCRATC SOCIALISTS 17
AI '.:INDEPENDENT LEFT I
the left-wing Christian De-
mocrats, however, have urged
that the present cabinet serve
as a transition to a reformist
government of the center-left,
involving more definite parlia-
mentary support from the Nenni
Socialists--whose abstention
in Fanfani's favor was the
first time the party had
failed to vote against a
premier-designate since 1947.
The Fanfani government
is committed to resign if
any of the parties with-
draws its support. A Chris-
tian Democratic deputy is
said to have complained that
Fanfani heads not a gov-
ernment of the center but
rather a government of di-
vergent currents. "I'm afraid,"
he said, "that if a Re-
publican sneezes,
Fanfani will die
of pneumonia."
VOTE CONFIRMING
FANFANI GOVERNMENT
5 AUGUST 1960
0 SUPPORT
-VALUUJIAN UNIUN IUVUI
LIBERALS(PLI)
5-INDEPEND'T. MONARCHISTS
- N EO-FASCISTS (MSI)
...
MONARCHIST
SECRET
The center
parties jumped in-
to the breach in
order to cope
with threats to
Italian democracy
--threats exempli-
fied by Tambroni's
neo-Fascist-backed
government and the
Communist-led rioting
in protest against it.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
Reluctant minority elements
and ideological disagreements
among the parties, however, keep
the. fuftdamental hostilities. With-
in and among these ';parties alive.
The Liberals include a
group'. which nearly, blocked
the party's..support of the
Fanfani government, on the
grounds that acquiescence in
the ouster of Tambroni's cabi-
net, which had been backed by
the neo-Fascists, immediately
after the June-July disorders
would be yielding to the pres-
sure of Communist mobs. A.1-
though the Republican party is
of the center-left, the leader
of one of its dissident factions,
former Defense Minister Pac-
ciardi, has been meeting with
neo-Fascists, former Fascist
activists, and other extreme
right-wing elements to discuss
plans for forming a national
front "in defense of the re-
public" against a center-left
government.
Both left and right-wing
Christian Democrats are repre-
sented in the cabinet, but the
search for party unity is
impeded by a struggle over the
positions which various factions
will occupy on the election
lists.
The chronic problem of
Guiseppe Saragat's Democratic
Socialists--that of trying to
compete with Pietro Nenni.'s
party as representative of the
Socialist electorate--is inten-
sified by Nenni's announced in-
tention to run independent elec-
toral lists in areas where the
proportional rather than the
majority system prevails--cities
Democratic Socialist bargaining;
position vis-a-vis the Chris-
tian Democrats. Saragat is al-
ready trying to win back some
Socialist support by ;pointing
out that Nenni's 15 September
speech showed that he intends
to continue electoral and post-
electoral alliances with the
Communists in some of the
cities with less than 10,000
inhabitants where the majority
electoral system still applies.
The Christian Democrats
have announced that they would
make no commitments regarding
alliances after the elections,
and have pledged that they will
not run linked electoral lists
with rightist groups, although
they are presumably leaving the
way open for continuance of
their alliance with the neo-
Fascists in some of the cities--
probably less than 1,000--now
jointly controlled. Nenni, for
his part, has indicated that he
intends to "rescue" the Chris-
tian Democrats from such depend-
ance on the right and that after
the elections his party will of-
fer to collaborate with them in
cities where political stalemate
now prevents the. mayors and
city councils from functioning.
The Nenni Socialists and
monarchists are threatened by
internal cleavages over the
question of relations with,
respectively, the Communists
and neo-Fascists--the only
parties remaining in the
opposition. The Socialists
and monarchists cannot continue
abstaining indefinitely without
producing some sort of quid pro
quo to placate their minorities.
over 10,000 and provinces. This problem was illustrated
by a leader of the Socialist
In places where the Nenni left. wing, who complained that
Socialists run lists with no "For about a decade we voted
Communist taint, Saragat's against the governments of
party may lose a major part of (Christian Democratic premiers)
its already small electoral Scelba, Segni, Pella, and Fan-
appeal, as was the case in the Tani. Now that they're all to-
1956 elections. Such a develop- gether in the same government,
ment could seriously weaken the we sustain them with our
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
abstention." Nenni's 15 Sep-
tember speech stressed the fact
that his party has already re-
ceived some "quid" for its "quo"
in the passage of a provincial
electoral law such as it has
been urging since 1953.
Controversial legislation,
such as the nuclear energy plan
or a prospective bill against
monopolies, could disrupt the
cooperation of the parties
supporting the government. The
first major strain will probably
come when the Christian Demo-
crats choose partners for im-
portant city government coun-
cils after the local elections.
The 6 November elections,
involving more than 32,000,000
voters in some 6,700 of the
7,800 Italian communes and
Italian Elections
- Key Communes
SECRET
about 80 of the 92 provinces,
will determine the control of
important city governments and
of the less important pro-
vincial councils, About a
month before he became! premier,
Fanfani stated confidentially
that the municipal governments
of Florence, Venice, Genoa,
Rome, Milan, and Turin were
in danger of falling into the
hands of the Communists and
Socialists after the elections.
The Communists and Social-
ists--who together control some
1,800 communes--took over con-
trol of Bari and Genoa in the
early spring, after the neo-
Fascists withdrew support from
the Christian Democrats in both
cities. A Christian Democratic
mayor was subsequently re-elect-
ed' in Bari, but with only 24
votes from a 60-man city coun-'
cil. A government-appointed
commissioner--al-
ways unpopular with
local inhabitants--
now substitutes for a
city council in Genoa,
Naples, Venice, and
Florence because of
local political stale-
mates.
The new provin-
cial election law
passed by parliament
in early September
replaces the old
majority method with
a modified proportion-
al system which frees
the Nenni Socialists
from the need to run
joint lists with the
Communists in order
to obtain representa-
tion. If--as is ex-
pected--the Christian
Democrats and Com-
munists maintain their
present strengths and
the Socialists make a
good showing independ-
ent., of the Commu-
nists, and :Nenni's
autonomist faction
maintains its control
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 September 1960
of the Socialist party congress
--then the Christian Democrats
will be tempted to adopt a
broad policy of alliances with
the Socialists in city and pro-
vincial governments, several
of which--including the cities
of Adria and Agrigento--are al-
ready governed by such a coali-
tion.
Sicily presents a partic-
ularly thorny problem. Even
though elections for the
Sicilian regional assembly are
not being held at this time,
the city and provincial elec-
tions there will revive the
quarrel over the composition of
the regional government. The
Democratic Socialists question
the propriety of the Christian
Democrats' alliance with the
neo-Fascists in the Sicilian
government after disavowing that
group's support on
the national level.
The Christian Demo-
crats recently reject-
ed' a proposal by the
Democratic Socialists
that a new Sicilian
government be formed
including both Social-
ist parties and the
Sicilian Christian
Democratic dissidents
headed by Silvio
Milazzo.
A Nenni Social-
ist party congress
will follow the local
elections, possibly
expect to produce electoral
successes, to make a strong
showing at the congress, and
to be able to intensify pres-
sures on the Christian Demo-
crats to form a center-left
government depending on Social-
ist parliamentary support.
New Catholic Party?
There are indications that,
to prevent such a rapproche-
ment, some members of the 25X1
Christian Democratic right wing
are discussing formation of a
new Catholic party.
Disgruntled ex-premier. Tambroni
and right-wing leader Guiseppe
Togni, a minister in several
postwar governments, are men-
tioned as possibilities to head
SICILIAN REGIONAL ASSEMBLY
7 JUNE 1959 ELECTION
in January. A decisive fight
may take place then between the
party's "autonomists," who
favor independence from the
Communists, and its pro-Commu-
nist left-wing, which was forced
by the majority to go along with
the party's abstention on the
new government rather than join
the Communists in voting against
Fanfani> There have been re-
ports that the left wing, in-
furiated by the increased in-
fluence of the "autonomists,"
has been almost at the point of
breaking away. The autonomists
a new party. There are indi-
cations that Luigi Ged.da, chief
of Catholic Action's civic com-
mittees, is involved. Gedda,
who in the 1951-52 local elec-
tions unsuccessfully urged
Premier de Gasperi to link the
Christian Democrats with the
neo-Fascists, presumably hopes
for another such alliance on
a national scale, along the
lines of Tambroni's recent ill-
fated experiment.
It is not yet clear whether
those involved in rumors of a
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29 September 1960
new party see it only as a
threat to hold over the heads
of the Christian Democratic
left wing. Such a split-off
does not seem likely to get
the backing of top Vatican of-
ficials, who urge Catholic
unity.
Outlook
With:the calm of the
present political truce broken
by the local elections, the
general uneasiness that was
reflected in the June-July
demonstrations will again come
into the open. Because the
widespread apprehension over
revival of Fascism has been
temporily reduced, the Christian
CONFIDENTIAL
Democrats will again be tempted
to maintain their own single-
party government at any cost
--as in the case of Tambroni.
Nevertheless deeper dis-
satisfaction--over maldistri-
bution of economic benefits
and lack of political vitality
and direction--will exert in-
creasing pressures on them
for a change of course. it
is difficult to see how the
party can avoid making such
a change without risking so
much loss of popular support
that political control
could be maintained only
be recourse to extrale a