CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002800100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
[:2D 1767A ar'471A]k
CURRENT
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO. 71
OCI NO.3819/60
18 August 1960
DIA review(s)
completed.
DOCU V,E,' ` .:.
r [XT RE_V1EW Di.-i E:
AUTH' 7C
DATEEV1EWER:
NO C' ,
GLAE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOSCOW INCREASES PRESSURES ON PEIPING IN SINO-SOVIET Page 1
DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Since the Bucharest meeting in June, Moscow has taken
the offensive in an effort to pressure Peiping into a
settlement of Sino-Soviet differences on Moscow's terms.
The situation is sufficiently serious that Moscow may have
felt compelled to apply economic sanctions against Peiping.
Although still unconfirmed, there are indications that the
USSR may be withdrawing technicians from China. Khrushchev
apparently hopes to bring Peiping around to Moscow's point
of view prior to another conference of Communist parties,
reportedly to be held in Moscow in November. The Soviet
Union is concerned over the effect the dispute may have
on its leadership of Communist parties throughout the world.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page.3
Soviet propaganda on the Powers trial is taking the
line that US policy is the real defendant. Moscow is
giving full and prompt coverage to the details of the pro-
ceedings. A Soviet official in London acknowledged recent-
ly that the current anti-US phase of his country's policy
is planned to last through the American elections and is
aimed primarily at weakening world confidence in the
United States.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Congo Premier Lumumba evidently is relying on strong
Soviet support in his dispute with UN Secretary General
Hammarskjold and presumably expects to obtain backing from
at least some African states, as well as from Moscow, in
any moves he may make directly against the dissident
separatists in Katanga and other provinces. Lumumba's
declaration of martial law appears to be a legal pre-
liminary to action against the dissidents, and to clear
the way politically he may attempt to replace moderates
in his cabinet with more leftists. Lumumba's "military"
capabilities are limited at present, particularly relative
to those of the Katanga regime, and the central govern-
ment's effective authority does not extend fsr.3bdt$ide.
Leopoldville itself.
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PART I (continued)
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
General Phoumi and the bulk of the other members of
former Premier Somsanith's government refuse to recognize
the authority of the new Souvanna Phouma government and
are mustering forces for an assault on Vientiane, still
held by Captain Kong Le's forces. King Savang, while
apparently secretly in sympathy with the Phoumi group,
has evinced a strong disinclination to intervene, despite
the fact that he is the only figure capable at this stage
of bringing the contending groups together for negotia-
tions looking to a compromise. If the impending armed
conflict is not headed off, the Communist Pathet Lao
insurgents may intervene on behalf of Kong Le, enabling
them to identify themselves with a revolutionary cause
which seems to have struck a responsive chord among some
segments of Laotian opinion. Sino-Soviet bloc propaganda
is handling the crisis in Laos somewhat gingerly but with
obvious satisfaction over the turn of events. Britain and
France are sympathetic to Souvanna Ph.ouma.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS .
July.
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Most Sino-Soviet bloc Communist parties sent dele-
gates to the eighth national congress of Cuba's Popular
Socialist (Communist) party, which opened in Havana on 16
August and apparently was timed to coincide with the
meetings of the OAS foreign ministers in Costa Rica. The
Cuban delegation's complaint over security arrangements
at the foreign ministers' meetings and its threat to walk
out have aroused antagonism there. Cuba's withdrawal
might be followed by its demand that the UN Security Coun-
cil again consider the Cuban complaint about US economic
aggression which the council referred to the OAS in mid-
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Members of the Dominican regime--still effectively
controlled by Trujillo--show increasing signs of nervous-
ness over their position. This uncertainty is heightened
by developments at the first OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing, where Venezuela, the motivating force behind this
meeting, is backing its demand for strong anti-Dominican
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
PART II (continued)
measures by threats to withdraw completely from the OAS
and take unilateral--possibly military--action against
the Trujillo regime. Trujillo himself has shown increasing
anger toward the United States.
YUGOSLAVIA BACKS USSR IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . . . . . . Page 4
The Yugoslav regime has backed Khrushchev in his dis-
pute with Chinese Communist leaders over policy and
ideology. On 12 August the authoritative Belgrade daily
Borba began serializing a "dissertation" by Edvard
Kardelj, the regime's top ideologist, dealing with such
issues as "peaceful coexistence" and "the inevitability
of war." The principal object of attack in these arti-
cles is Communist China, but criticism of some Soviet
policies is implied, and the series seems likely to
further damage bloc-Yugoslav relations.
NEW SOVIET CONSUMER DECREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
A new Soviet decree on retail trade, the third major
consumer decree in two years, is concerned with improving
the quality, variety, and distribution of consumer goods,
as well as with eliminating the worst of numerous shopping
inconveniences. While most of the provisions of the decree 25X1
are in the form of suggestions to appropriate agencies, one
requires that plans for production of consumer goods be
consonant with retailers' requirements.
SOVIET-UAR RAPPROCHEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Moscow appears to be meeting with considerable success
in its efforts to promote close political cooperation with
Cairo. The UAR has publicly sided with the Soviet posi-
tions on a number of current international issues and has
openly applauded Soviet policies, while criticizing the
attitude of the United States. The rapprochement--
encouraged by Moscow through public praise of UAR policies
and willingness to supply additional military and economic
aid--has been facilitated by Nasir's recent expressions of
irritation with the United States.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The meeting of Arab League foreign ministers beginning
on 22 August in Lebanon will probably produce more discord
than agreement. The UAR and Jordan are engaged in an in-
tensive propaganda battle in which each government is
calling upon the people of the other country to rebel.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
PART II (continued)
visits Pyongyang in early October.
the North Korean proposals a propaganda boost when he
KIM IL-SUNG CALLS FOR FEDERATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH
KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
North Korean Premier Kim I1-sung has proposed a loose
federation of North and South Korea and all-Korean elec-
tions "without outside intervention," in an apparent
effort to take the propaganda initiative from South
Korea, which is expected to support reunification
through UN-supervised elections in both halves of the
country, While Pyongyang's position on reunification
has not radically changed, the federation proposal is in-
tended to show that Pyongyang is seeking a fresh approach
to the problem. The South Korean rejection of the pro-
posal will be exploited by the Communists to demonstrate
Seoul's intransigence. Khrushchev can be expected to give
FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT .
spill over into the armed forces.
result in renewed civil disorders. Although the military
has remained a major stabilizing factor, such unrest might
Page 9
A factional conflict within the South Korean conserva-
tive Democratic party, which won an overwhelming victory
in the parliamentary elections of 29 July, may result in
prolonged political instability. At present no party
leader appears to command a working majority of the 179
Democrats In the 233-seat lower house, and the new govern-
ment is likely to be dependent on the support of independ-
ents, Prolonged bickering and maneuvering for power
could lead to public resentment against the government and
INTERNAL FRICTION THREATENING MALI FEDERATION .
and differences in outlook on foreign affairs.
. Page 10
Discord between Senegal and Soudan--the constituent
states of the newly independent Federation of Mali--has
recently intensified to such an extent that an early
breakup of the federation is possible. The crisis arises
from the Soudan's apparent backing down on its agreement
to support Sengalese leader Leopold Senghor for president
of Mali. Friction has been building up between the two
regions for some time, however, over disputed appointments
TRIALS OF DEPOSED TURKISH LEADERS TO BEGIN SOON . . . . . Page 11
of these indicted will probably be executed.
Turkey's ruling National Unity Committee has almost
completed investigations in preparation for public trials
of key members of the ousted Bayar-Menderes regime. Some
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18 August 1960
PART II (continued)
REPERCUSSIONS IN BELGIUM OF CONGO CRISIS . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Under heavy public censure for ineptitude in the
Congo crisis, Belgium's Premier Eyskens has responded by
demanding a parliamentary vote of confidence after promis-
ing to make budget cuts--mainly on military items--to meet
the anticipated losses from Congo operations. Eyskens
will probably also reshuffle a few cabinet posts and at-
tempt to work out a new financial program acceptable to
all factions. Belgium's bitterness at its allies over
the Congo issue will result in some cuts in NATO commit- 25X1
ments.
ADENAUER TALKS WITH DE GAULLE AND MACMILLAN . . . . . . . Page 13
De Gaulle's plans for a French-led confederation of
Continental Europe were apparently the major subject of
discussion at his meeting with Adenauer on 29-30 July. To
what extent Adenauer is in agreement with De Gaulle is
still uncertain, and his subsequent offer to Macmillan to
attempt to end the dispute between the Common Market and
the British-led Outer Seven may indicate reservations
about the French proposals. 25X1
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV'S STRATEGY ON BERLIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Since the breakdown of the summit conference,
Communist tactics on the Berlin issue have been gradu-
ally brought into line with the more aggressive posture
Khrushchev has adopted toward the West. Following the
initial period of reassuring gestures by Moscow, the
bloc has mounted an extensive psychological warfare
operation apparently designed to focus public attention
on the dangerous aspects of the Berlin situation and to
dispel any notion in the West that Moscow has retreated
from its basic demands. The dominant element in this
campaign remains the threat to conclude a separate peace
treaty with East Germany, followed by East German assump-
tion of access controls to Berlin. In an effort to
achieve his Berlin objectives through negotiations,
Khrushchev might intensify pressure tactics in the hope
of weakening Western resolution on the status of Berlin.
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18 August 1960
PART III (continued)
CYPRUS BECOMES INDEPENDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Cyprus, officially independent on 16 August, has
better prospects for stability than many other recently
independent colonial areas, but there remain many unre-
solved problems involving tension between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot communities. There are still at least
some extreme nationalists opposed to the 1959 settlement,
although their numbers do not appear large and their
leadership is of questionable ability. More dangerous
for the longer term is the Communist-led political party
AKEL, which has able leaders and considerable popular 25X1
support.
UNREST .CONTINUES AMONG SOVIET. ARTISTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Although the Kremlin has succeeded in containing the
rebellion among Soviet writers, which was at its height in
1956 and 1957, strong undercurrents of discontent with
official dogma persist in other areas of Soviet creative
work. The spirit of Western "modernism," in particular,
has infected the Soviet pictorial arts, which flourish
as an "underground" movement defiant of the officially
imposed "socialist realism." The regime, while reluctant
to impose repressive sanctions, fears the virus of non-
conformity and is seeking ways to preserve the propa-
gandistic function of Soviet art.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOSCOW INCREASES PRESSURES ON PEIPING IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Since the meeting of bloc
leaders at Bucharest in June,
Moscow has taken the offensive
in an effort to pressure Pei-
ping into a settlement of Sino-
Soviet differences on Moscow's
terms. Khrushchev apparently
hopes to bring Peiping around
to Moscow's point of view prior
to the convening of another
conference of Communist parties,
reportedly to be held in Mos-
cow in November.
The situation is sufficent-
ly serious that Moscow may have
felt compelled to apply eco-
nomic sanctions against
during the past ten days
large numbers of Soviet special-
ists have left the Chinese cap-
ital by rail for the USSR. A
in Moscow
was recently told by a woman
believed to be the wife of a
that Soviet
ea ers decided uring a meet-
_
ing on 28 July to withdraw So-
viet technicians from Communist
China within three months.
In a virtually unprecedentc
ed development in recent years,
not a single Moscow commentary
devoted to any aspect of Chinese
Communist affairs has been broad
cast to Soviet listeners since
5 July. Moreover, there has
been no Soviet home radio com-
ment since June on Chinese Com-
munist economic progress or So-
viet aid to China.
Both Pravda and Izvestia
have publisTie articles during
the past week devoted to the
Soviet view of peaceful coex-
istence and the noninevitabil-
ity of war. An article by B.
Ponomarev in Pravda on 12 Au-
gust reiterated all the standard
formulations used by Khrushchev
to argue that China's views are
incorrect. In a thinly veiled
reference to the Chinese on 13
August, Izvestia assailed as
dogmatists those who argue that
war cannot be prevented and
called it "blasphemy" for such
people to refer to Lenin in
their remarks.
The publication of Druzhba,
the Russian-language magazine
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
Society, has apparently been
suspended, and Kitai (China), a
semimonthly publication, re-
portedly has not been available
in Moscow since April. Follow-
ing India's recent closure of
New China News Agency (NCNA)
facilities in New Delhi, the
TASS bureau chief in New Delhi
reportedly refused a Chinese
request that he handle NCNA
press releases, on the ground
that the issue was a matter be-
tween the Indian and Chinese
governments. Moscow apparently
is also willing to supply India
with military equipment, includ-
ing four helicopters which New
Delhi decided in early August
to buy for use in patrolling
its northern border regions.
The Chinese Communists for
their part returned to polemic
in a 13 August People's Daily
editorial asserting that "modern
revisionists" were spreading
calumny and slander against China
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
and were "apologists for im-
perialism." The Chinese also
boycotted the international
congress of Orientalists now
meeting in Moscow. Relations
with Moscow were probably the
primary subject for debate by
the Chinese Communists at a
series of high-level party
meetings believed held since
June.
Plans are reportedly be-
ing made at Soviet initiative
to hold another meeting of
representatives of all Com-
munist parties in an attempt to
resolve the conflict of views
which continues to divide the
Soviet Union and Communist
China.
At the Bucharest meeting,
An 82-page document
circulated there by the Russians
presented a detailed criticism
of Chinese actions and declara-
tions during the past two years.
It accused the Chinese of fol-
lowing an extremely nationalist,
chauvinist policy and of under-
estimating the risks involved
in local wars. The document
scored Peiping for opposing Mos-
cow's gradualist strategy in
underdeveloped countries such
as India and Indonesia and of
refusing to join in common de-
fense proposals of the USSR,
which included setting up mis-
sile bases and radar-detection
units in Communist China.
Bloc representatives at
Bucharest were stunned by the
viciousness of the dispute, but
either through conviction or as
a result of Soviet pressure,
they supported the Soviet Union.
The Chinese delegate, however,
carried the fight to larger
meetings of representatives of
all Communist parties on 25 and
26 June. As a result, appar-
ently at the suggestion of the
Rumanian delegate chairing the
meetings, an international com-
mission comprising both bloc
and nonbloc delegates was es-
tablished to prepared for an-
other conference.
e ser ousness of t Ye Sino-
Soviet dispute, which, in view
of Peiping's refusal to alter
its position, has made it in-
evitable that "the disagreement
will have to be carried through
to the end."
Such preliminary discus-
sions would be the forerunner
of the reported Moscow meeting,
probably to be held in conjunc-
tion with the USSR's Bolshevik
Revolution celebration on 7
November. In November 1957,
however, a similar meeting at-
tended by Mao Tse-tung worked
out a declaration which was in-
strumental in maintaining a
facade of unity for only a few
months thereafter.
The Soviet leaders are in-
creasingly concerned over the
strain the dispute imposes on
national Communist parties whose
traditional left-right disagree-
ments are being exacerbated by
the existence of two opposing
views at the apex of the Com-
munist movement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
Even in certain bloc par-
ties there were indications be-
fore the Bucharest meeting of
support for some of the Chinese
views. Albania, the last hold-
out among the Eastern European
satellites, threw its support
to Khrushchev in a speech by
party boss Enver Hoxha on 2 Au-
gust during a visit to that ,.
country by French Communist par-
ty leader Maurice Thorez, who
might have acted on the occa-
sion as Moscow's spokesman.
During the past few weeks,
Khrushchev and other Soviet of-
ficials have met with several
satellite leaders, including the
Hungarian, East German, and per-
haps the Rumanian party chiefs.
The Soviet premier undoubtedly
used the discussions to restate
his position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. North Korea, which up
to the Bucharest meeting had on
many occasions supported Chinese
views, has expressed Soviet con-
cepts in propaganda commentary
since 5 July.
Within the parties of the
free world, the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute has been mirrored in de-
bates between left or "hard"
factions, which borrow. from
Chinese declarations for sup-
port, and right elements, which
tend to espouse a greater degree
of nationalism and rely on So-
viet arguments. In India, the
Communist monthly journal has
been reprinting Chinese speeches
and the inflammatory Red Flag
articles, while the wee11y pub-
lication reprints Soviet speeches
and statements. Recently the
editor of the widely circulated
leftist Indian weekly Blitz stat-
ed that the lengthy article in
the 30 July issue strongly at-
tacking the Chinese Communist-
party as "Trotskyite" was planted
by the leaders of the pro-Soviet
moderate faction of the Indian 25X1
Communist party.
The announcement that Khru-
shchev has accepted a formal
invitation to visit North Ko-
rea in early October suggests
that the Soviet premier may
use the forum to amplify Mos-
cow's position in the current
Sino-Soviet dispute immediate-
ly prior to the high-level Com-
munist meeting in Moscow.
Speculation persists over a
possible visit by him to Peiping;
an AFP correspondent recently
reported that after a 24-hour
delay, the Soviet censors passed 25X1
a dispatch which hinted that
Khrushchev would go there after
his North Korean visit
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS
Soviet propaganda on the
Powers trial is taking the line
that US policy is the real de-
fendant. In the pre-trial build-
up, propagandists encouraged ex-
pectations that some new and sen-
sational revelations would be
forthcoming. 25X1
E the European
ommun s par es were told to
make a major campaign of the
trial and that Powers had made
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
"sensational statements" under
interrogation. The opening of
the trial, however, has resulted
in only a modest increase in
the volume of propaganda.
Moscow has given prompt
and full coverage to the de-
tails of proceedings, emphasiz-
ing the points that'the U-2 was
at an altitude of 68,000 feet
when "hit," and that it "could"
have carried a nuclear weapon.
TASS informed the regional press
that daily summaries would be
transmitted and that reports
up to three columns each day
would be dispatched. While
press reports for foreign con-
sumption are relatively factual,
those for the Soviet public are
liberally interspersed with
propaganda. The first summary
of the trial, with selected
quotes from Powers' testimony,
made a point of listing the non-
bloc lawyers and journalists
in attendance.
Anti-US Campaign
In discussing the current
anti-American phase of Soviet
policy, a Soviet official in
London acknowledged that the
change in tactics was planned
to last through the American
elections. He said the main
objectives were to weaken the
Western alliance and world con-
fidence in US leadership, and
added that Moscow realized such
a course involved certain dan-
gers as well as advantages. He
predicted that, after the elec-
tions, Khrushchev would take
the "first step" back toward a
more conciliatory policy, pos-
sibly by sending a letter of
congratulations to the presi-
dent-elect followed by a person-
al letter explaining Soviet
policy aims. The official also
thought it likely that Khrushchev
would revive the invitation for 25X1
the next president to visit the
USSR.
Disarmament, Nuclear Test Talks
Following its failure to
gain support for a boycott of
the UN Disarmament Commission
meeting, the Soviet delegation
attended the first session, and
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
used it to reiterate the stand-
ard claims and charges against
Western disarmament policy. He
bluntly rejected the two US pro-
posals to convert fissionable
material to peaceful purposes
and cease production of such
material for military purposes.
Soviet tactics are appar-
ently designed to treat the
commission session as a propa-
ganda forum for repeating famil-
iar accusations that all West-
ern proposals are aimed at secur-
ing control without actual dis-
armament. By distracting atten-
tion from the substance of the
deba.te,the USSR probably hopes
to draw support for its view
that the General Assembly is
the forum for serious discussion
of disarmament. Soviet officials
at the UN continue to hint that
Khrushchev,plans to appear be-
fore that body in September.
Kuznetsov attempted to amend a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August ' 1960
resolution sponsored by the
neutral countries to include a
reference to the heads of gov-
ernment attending the General
Assembly.
In the nuclear test ban
negotiations at Geneva, the So-
viet delegation has generally
recapitulated the Soviet posi-
tion on the quota of on-site in-
spections and the duration of
the temporary moratorium on un-
derground tests.
In the 16 August meeting,
the chief Soviet delegate sought
to demonstrate a split between
Britain and the United States
on the question of an inspection
quota. He claimed that the
British delegation was taking
a position which conflicted
with the approach to the quota
taken by Prime Minister Macmillan
during his visit to Moscow in
February 19.59. He claimed that
the Soviet proposal for three
on-site inspections of suspected
nuclear tests was very close to
the figure mentioned by Macmillan
in his talks with Khrushchev.
In an attempt to bring pres-
sure on the British, the Soviet
delegate concluded with a warn-
ing that if the Western powers
continued to insist on approach-
ing the determination of a quota
from the scientific standpoint
the USSR would be forced to re-
turn to its original position
of demanding a veto over the
dispatch of inspection teams.
Congolese Premier Patrice
Lumumba continues to hold the
initiative in the Congo crisis,
even though his government exerts
little control over the country
outside of Leopoldville Prov-
ince. On one hand, Lumumba
has moved actively to suppress
domestic criticism and to de-
stroy the vestiges of Belgian
political influence. At the
same time, he is still seeking
with strong Soviet support to
involve the UN command in sub-
duing Katanga or to discredit
the UN attempt to maintain a
neutral role in internal Congo-
lese affairs.
Lumumba's recent invoca-
tion of authoritarian measures
to strengthen his domestic po-
sition may have been prompted
by local opposition as well as
provincial separatism. The
Abako party, which had earlier
voted no confidence in Lumumba
and joined Katanga Premier
Tshombd in espousing a Congolese
confederation, was raided last
week by Lumumba's police, and
sufficient pressure was brought
to bear so that the Abako post-
poned a convention scheduled for
13 August. The party reportedly
was to have declared the lower
Congo region independent of the
central government. The Abako
was further neutralized as a
focal point for opposition senti-
ment when Lumumba pressed Con-
golese President Kasavubu, who
is also the head of Abako, into
making a radio appeal for na-
tional unity.
Successful in checking
the Abako.. Lumumba has moved
ahead with more formal "emer-
gency" measures to bolster his
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
Kamina
At antic
01 can
Leopoldville
government. The regime closed
the Belgian news agency in
Leopoldville on 15 August, amid
thinly veiled threats of further
press censorship, Subsequently,
Lumumba announced that judicial
procedures would be superseded
by "special military and possi-
bly people's tribunals." On 16
August, Congolese police detained
several hundred Europeans--in-
cluding a number of UN officials
Bukavu
U
Elisabethvill
J%*
Loke?
Victoro
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
--while they searched for "Bel-
gian spies." At the same time,
Lumumba declared martial law
for a period of six months and
threatened the expropriation of
all Belgian property in the
Congo.
Lumumba's fulminations in
Leopoldville coincided with the
entry of the first UN troops
into Katanga on 12 August. Even
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18 August .1960
while permitting their entry,
however, Premier Tshombd in-
sisted on the "independence"
of his province, and succeeded
in obtaining from UN Secretary
General Hammarskjold assurances
that the UN would not interfere
with his "internal" dispute with
Lumumba concerning the political
status of Katanga. Although
Tshombd'strongly criticized
the Belgians for yielding
their security function in Ka-=
tanga, he continues to rely on
Belgian advisers.
Lumumba's charges against
Iammarskjold--which he followed
on 17 August with an ultimatum
to the Security Council to pro-
vide a "satisfactory" solution
in Katanga within a week--sug-
gest that he may be seeking a
total UN withdrawal from the
Congo. Lumumba has used the
period of the UN occupation to
build up a police force loyal
to himself; he may feel that
if the UN is unwilling to in-
vade Katanga on his behalf it
is no. longer of use to him.
Hammarskjold has indicated that
the UN command can remain in the
Congo only as long as it is ac-
ceptable to the host government,
and has added that if non--Afri-
can troops are withdrawn on
Lumumba's behest he will recom-
mend the withdrawal of the bn-
tire UN force. According to
the American army attachdin Leo-
poldville, UN officers believe
Lumumba is attempting to pro-
voke incidents between UN and
Congolese troops.
The Congolese forces on
which Lumumba can rely still
appear limited, however, par-
ticularly in view of what the
Katanga a ime is believed to
possess.
Tshomb6, with benefit of
substantial "technical assist-
ance" from local Belgians, is
believed to control about
2,000 troops of the former
Force Publique organized into
four battalions. The Katanga
regime has also recruited some
2,000 "warriors"--with no
previous military experience--
hut'the whole force is said to
be well armed and equipped with
transport. Ii, addition, some
250 automatic rifles and ammuni-
tion have been i9 sued to tribal
chiefs--the class from which
Tshombd himself comes--to "help
defend Kataliga," presumably
against internal as well as
external "enemies." Under
these circumstances, Lumumba will
clearly be looking for both
diplomatic and material support
outside the Congo if he really ex-
pects, to move against Tshomb6 soon.
Soviet Attitude
Lumumba's firmest outside
supporter at the moment is the
USSR. Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov on 17 August
officially protested Hammarskjold's
"personal" interpretation of the
Security Council resolutions,.al-
though'there was no formal So-
viet protest.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
In line with its sustained
attempts to stimulate distrust
of Hammarskjold's motives and
UN moves, Moscow radio on 15
August noted that the Congolese
might have to "dispense with the
services" of the UN since it
"cannot or will not take reso-
lute action to restore order."
The USSR appears to be preparing
the groundwork for a demand--
in collaboration with Lumumba--
for withdrawal of UN forces
from the area, anticipating sup-
port for such a demand from
African countries, particularly
Guinea and Ghana.
The USSR, continuing to
circumvent UN channels, has
provided direct aid to the Con-
golese Government in the form
of food, medical aid, 15 to 20
specialists, and one transport
African Support
Among the other African
states, Guinea is the only one
which almost certainly will
give Lumumba full and unequivocal
support, although the Congolese
premier can also expect a
strongly sympathetic reaction
from the UAR.
Ghanaian President Nkrumah,
who last week posed publicly
as a Lumumba champion, seems'
to have become more cautious.
He informed a British official
on 13 August that his offer to
send troops to help Lumumba in-
vade Katanga was no longer
operative and that it had only
been made as a political ma-
neuver. In a statement on his
Congo policy on 17 August,Nkrumah
dodged the issue of whether he
supported Hammarskjold's or Lu-
mumba's interpretation of the
Security Council resolutions,
although he did urge that UN
troops in the Congo be predomi-
nantly African as a measure of
psychological assurance to the
Congolese that their country
was not again being brought
under European control. How-
ever, Nkrumah also said he
might visit Katanga and Tshombe
if he thought such a move would
serve a useful purpose.
Lumumba's delegation en
route to the UN Security Coun-
cil meeting stopped off in
Accra to seek stronger
Ghanaian support.
General Phoumi and the bulk
of the Somsanith government,
which resigned on 14 August,
refuse to recognize the author-
ity of the new Souvanna Phouma
government in Vientiane and are
mustering forces for an assault
on the city, still held by
Captain Kong Le's 2nd Para-
chute Battalion. Phoumi seems
to command the loyalty of most
of the armed forces outside
Vientiane, but this loyalty may
become strained unless his des-
perate financial and supply posi-
tion is eased. The Souvanna re-
gime would seem to have a fairly
good claim to legality, although
the final step required by the
constitution--administration of
the oath of office by the King--
has not yet occurred.
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CU ,RENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August .1960
King Savang is at his pal-
ace in Luang Prabang, effective-
ly sealed off from the Vientiane
regime, and the Phoumi forces
can be expected to attempt to
prevent him from giving his
final stamp of approval.
Savang`s position in the
current crisis is characteris-
tically obscure. While he is
probably sympathetic to Phoumi
and is known to consider the
Souvanna regime unsuitable, he
appears anxious to take an offi-
cial stance of neutrality so as
not to jeopardize the crown.
Should it become apparent to
Savang that arched conflict might
ensue, he might intervene in the
crisis. He is probably the only
figure at this stage who can
bring the opposing forces to-
gether for negotiations.
Phoumi is doubtless aware
of the risks involved in an
assault on Vientiane, And may
hope that a war of maneuver
will impel Vientiane into nego-
tiations which would enable
him to salvage at least some
of what he lost as the result
of the Kong Le coup. There is
good reason to believe, how-
ever, that if negotiations fail,
Phoumi has sufficient deter-
mination to go ahead with an
attack.
The new Souvanna 're`-
githe is making desperate ef-
forts to attract armed-forces
support away from Phoumi in the
provinces. Shortly after the
National Assembly confirmed his
government, Souvanna issued an
appeal over Vientiane radio
urging ".all parties and members
of armed forces" to come to
Vientiane for talks.
Souvanna's efforts in this
direction will be severely ham-
pered, however, by the fact
that Kong Le gives no sign of
relaxing his military grip on
Vientiane. Offers from Souvanna
will lose much of their attrac-
tiveness so long as the Kong Le
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18' August. 1960
C H I N A
BURMA NAMTHA
/ VIENTIANE
VIEN 4 NEm
LUANG PRABANG
SAM
Luang Prabe
"may XIENC?
SAYABOURY KHOUANG
PHONG
SALY
aIDien Bien Phu.
KHAMMOUANE
GULF
OF
TONKIN
T H A I L A N D .SAVANNAKHET ffi
Savannakhett.
SARAVANE i
Pakse (ATTOPEU"
group is still free to arrest
any of the armed forces that
might come to Vientiane. Kong
Le's control of Vientiane .is
also a serious obstacle to any
negotiations for a settlement
among the King, Phoumi, and
Souvanna.
Souvanna's government is
mediocre and, by his own admis-
sion, destined to be short-lived
in its present form. The most
noteworthy appointment is that
party in Laos and that he planned
personally to assume command of
the armed forces. These remarks
may have been made off the cuff
in one of the frequent outbursts
of emotionalism he has exhibited
since his coup, but there is a
danger that if the situation con-
tinues to drift or not develop
to his satisfaction, he may oust
Souvanna and set himself up as
a dictator.
The Communist Pathet Lao
insurgents have apparently
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of Quinim Pholsena
as interior minis-
ter. Quinim is the
leftist leader of
the neutralist Santi-
phab party, which
was in alliance with
the pro-Communist Neo
Lao Hak Sat party,
when both groups
were still repre-
sented in the assem-
bly. Souvanna pre-
sumably hopes to form
a more broadly based
coalition government,
including some now
supporting Phoumi,
if he can come to an
agreement with Phoumi.
Kong Le, on the
other hand, appears
to be developing po-
litical ambitions of
his own. He told re-
porters that Souvanna's
government was merely
provisional and would
resign once "order is
restored." He also
stated that his Youth
party, now apparently
in the process of for-
mation, would be the
only legal political
NORTH
VIETNAM
.Hanoi
NEUA1
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18 August 1960
followed a policy of watchful
waiting. in connection with the
crisis.
he has reject-
ed their overtures. Should he
come to feel that his position
is sufficiently threatened,
there is some possibility that
he might call them in, thus ena-
bling them to identify them-
selves with a revolutionary
cause which appears to have
struck a responsive chord with
at least some elements of Lao-
tian opinion. Their agents may
well have been behind some of
the anti-Western demonstrations
occurring in Vientiane since
the Kong Le coup.
Foreign Reaction
In its propaganda the
bloc has shown its approval of
the general course of events
in Laos thus far, along with
apprehension about US intentions.
Moscow depicts the coup as
symptomatic of a "contagious"
neutralism in Asia, and warns
of US plans for "provocations"
against Laos, Communist China,
after nearly three days' silence
on developments in Vientiane,
began carrying extensive re-
ports on 11 August. Premier
Chou En-lai on 15 August voiced
Peiping's "resolute support"
for the Laotian "people" but
refrained from a personal en-
dorsement of Kong Le. North
Vietnam has announced readiness
to establish "friendly relations"
with Souvanna Phouma's new
government and has cautioned
against any action by the "ag-
gressive SEATO bloc" to aid
counterrevolutionary moves by
Phoumi.
Of Laos's neighbors, Thai-
land and South Vietnam are view-
ing developments with grave
concern, while Cambodia has
evinced satisfaction after it
became apparent that Kong Le
was loyal to the monarchy. The
Phnom Penh press, which custom-
arily reflects Sihanouk's po-
sition, now is calling the
Kong Le coup "yet another in
recent stunning setbacks for
the United States" and claims
the rebellion "reflects the deep
aspirations for neutrality of
the Lao people."
Saigon has indicated consid-
erable concern over the possi-
bility that the Pathet Lao may
exploit the present confusion
to take action along South Viet-
nam's northeastern frontier.
Marshal Sarit of Thailand is
solidly behind his nephew, Phou-
mi, and has expressed disap-
pointment that the United States
did not rush aid to the Somsanith
government before it resigned.
Sarit has provided Phoui with
some covert assistance, but
will probably hesitate to do so
on a large scale unless the
United States should do like-
wise.
Although French officials
have long favored Souvanna
Phouma for the Laotian premier-
ship and have advocated less
provocative policies, Paris has
maintained a formally correct
attitude concerning recent
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18 August 1960
events in Laos. A French For-
eign Ministry official told US
officials in Paris on 16 Au-
gust that Phoumi must be made
to abandon any plans for a
countercoup and that Souvanna
should be fully supported to
avoid civil war and Pathet Lao
and other Communist interven-
tion. The French have denied
Phoumi certain facilities at
Seno military base, near Savan-
nakhet, and French troops are
under orders to fire if neces-
sary.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In accordance with the 8
May announcement of the resump-
tion of Cuban-Soviet diplomatic
relations, Soviet Embassy per-
sonnel--many of whom have been
drawn from embassies in Mexico
City and Montevideo--are begin-
ning to reach Cuba. Ambassador
Bergey Mikhaylevich Kudrayavtsev
arrived on 17 August.
In a note sent to Fidel
Castro on his 34th birthday
and published in Havana on 15
August, Khrushchev praised the
Cuban leader as a "fighter for
liberty" and expressed the hope
for "even stronger" Soviet-
Cuban relations. On the same
day TABS published a Castro
reply to an earlier Khrushchev
letter of congratulations on the
26th of July anniversary. Cas-
tro stated that Soviet "sympa-
thy puts us under still greater
obligation to follow the path
we have chosen.... The break-
ing of the chain of imperialist
oppression is of tremendous sig-
nificance for the peoples of
Latin America and for all op-
pressed peoples of the world."
He added that Soviet solidar-
ity with Cuba is "unquestion-
able proof that the peoples
fighting for independence are
not alone."
On 14 August President
Osvaldo Dorticos, an increas-
ingly authoritative spokesman
for the regime, told a televi-
sion audience that "there can
be no social progress based on
vague and romantic theories and
the theory of representative
democracy." He stated that
the "false social progress" of
the United States was based on
"the sufferings of Latin Ameri-
cans and other peoples," and he
attacked private, enterprise 'as
the root of Cuba's econonic ills.
The eighth national congress
of Cuba's Popular Socialist
(Communist) party opened on 16
August in Havana. The congress,
the first since 1952, originally
had been scheduled for last month
and apparently was rescheduled
to coincide with the meetings of
the OAS foreign ministers in
Costa Rica. The presence at the
congress of many relatively high-
level foreign Communist delega-
tions suggests a major effort to
demonstrate international Commu-
nist solidarity with the Castro
regime, but their presence in
Cuba is likely to alarm other
Latin American governments over
Soviet intervention in the
hemisphere. The gathering pro-
vided an opportunity for inter-
national Communist liaison and
for the further exploitation
of Cuba as a base for operations
in Latin America.
Mikhail Suslov, secretary
of the Soviet party central com-
mittee, reportedly declined an
invitation to attend the meet-
ing, and the USSR may be repre-
sented by Ambassador Kudryavtsev.
The Soviet leaders may have c
chosen not to send a high-rank-
ing party official in order not
to focus attention on the USSR's
guidance of the Cuban party
while the OAS foreign ministers
are discussing the dangers to
the hemisphere of Communist pene-
tration in Cuba.
Communist China, East Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Rumania, and Poland
sent members of party central
committees, and North Korea also
sent delegates. Paul Verner,
candidate member of the East
German politburo, is the highest
ranking bloc official known to
have come for the meeting.
Jacques Duclos, the second-
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18 August 1960
ranking official of the French
party, and Velio Spano, a mem-
ber of the Italian Communist
party central committee, ar-
rived on 13 August. Most Latin
American Communist parties
probably are represented at
the congress.
The Cuban Government is
continuing its policy of ex-
treme provocation against the
US. A group of Havana attor-
neys representing owners of ex-
propriated US properties issued
a statement on 12 August which
declared that they could find
no remedy in the Cuban courts
or elsewhere for US-owned com-
panies seized by Cuba. On the
eve of the 14 August take-over
of the American-owned Moa Bay
Nickel company, Cuban police
seized the accounting records
of the US Government owned
Nicaro Nickel Company, which
were being taken to Havana for
photostating prior to shipment
to 'Washington.
Indications of opposition
to the Castro regime continue.
Counterrevolutionary elements
in the Cuban merchant marine re-
portedly will begin a campaign
of sabotage against sugar ship-
ments to the USSR in the near
future. Rumors are circulating
freely in Havana that an internal
uprising in Cuba will coincide
with the arrival there of a Car-
ibbean-based invasion force dur-
ing the period of the foreign
ministers' meeting in Costa Rica.
The American Embassy has no re-
liable information substantiat-
ing these reports, but it con-
firms the existence in Havana of
an atmosphere of increased appre-
hension and tensions. The ar-
rest on 16 August of a number of
Cuban naval personnel suggests
that disaffection in the Cuban
Navy had reached significant
proportions.
At the OAS foreign minis-
ters' meetings, Costa Rican Presi-
dent Echandi has been antagonized
by the Cuban delegation's threat 25X1
to withdraw as a protest against
its treatment in San Jose.
If Cuba walks out of the OAS
meetings, it may then demand that
the UN Security Council resume
consideration of the Cuban com-
plaint about US economic aggression
which the council referred,to the
QAS in mid-July
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Members of the Dominican
regime--still effectively con-
trolled by Trujillo despite the
government changes of 3 August
--show increasing signs of un-
certainty. The new president,
Joaquin Balaguer, has been char-
acterized by a local business-
man as "a 25X6
scholar" who will be used exactly
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18 August 1960
as Trujillo wishes. The con-
tinuing reports that both
genuine and simulated military
coups are imminent appear to
be having a demoralizing effect
on Trujillo supporters.
The American Embassy re-
ported on 5 August that several
high-ranking air force officers
are known to have made large
dollar withdrawals lately, pre-
sumably believing they might
have to flee the country. The
new secretary of state for the
armed forces is described by
the American army attachd as
nervous, probably because he
fears Trujillo will depart sud-
denly, leaving him and his as-
sociates to face the mob--or,
alternatively, that Trujillo
may kill them during a fake
coup designed to show that the
dictatorship no longer exists.
Some older Trujillo stal-
warts, especially those in the
army, are irritated over recent
appointments to key command
posts of young officers who are
friends of the dictator's son,
General "Ramfis" Trujillo. Al-
though Ramfis left for Europe
on 7 August for a visit of un-
announced duration, his influ-
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ence appears to be increasing.
Major General Fernando Sanchez,
another of Ramfis' friends and
a former air force chief of
staff, was appointed army chief
of staff early this month, and
more recently a former aide to
Ramfis replaced a pro-US, mod-
erate officer as deputy chief
of staff of the navy.
The Ramfis clique is tak-
ing an increasingly anti-US
line. In a letter read to air
force officers before his de-
parture, Ramfis stated that the
United States had turned against
his father and Fidel Castro be-
cause both attacked US business
interests--"When those people's
dollars and cents are touched,
no one can shut them up." The
embassy interpreted the letter
to be a clear indication that
the dictator himself intends to
retain control and that he is
"to some extent at least sym-
pathetic to Castro." The embassy
considers Ramfis and his friends
are behind a new propaganda
line that has surpassed past
government radio and press at-
tacks on the United States in
virulence to such a degree that
the regime may be using Commu-
nists--the dictator has used
them before--to furnish the
pro-Castro and pro-Soviet ti-
rades.
Trujillo apparently is at-
tempting to convince the United
States that any alternative to
his regime would be a Castro-
type government. In this ef-
fort, he has found useful the
activities of an apparently
pro-Castro opposition group,
the Dominican Popular Movement
(MPD), and has given it an un-
precedented degree of freedom
in its attacks against the gov-
ernment. Earlier this year
Trujillo invited MPD leader
Maximo Lopez Molina and several
of his followers to return from
exile in Cuba and "guaranteed"
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18 August 1960
that they might campaign freely
against his regime. This month
a few MPD leaders were arrested
in Santiago while promoting
their views but were ordered
released after demonstrations
on their behalf on 5 August by
a crowd of students and youths
estimated at 1,000 to 3,000.
These tactics by the dic-
tator may, however, raise seri-
ous concern among moderate
military elements, and even
impel them to move against his
regime in order to forestall a
sweeping, Castro-type revolution.
The uncertainties of the
domestic situation are height-
ened by pressure against the
regime from the first OAS
foreign ministers' meeting,
where Venezuela is pushing its
charges that Trujillo was be-
hind the attempt to assassinate
President Betancourt on 24 June
Venezuela is backing its demand
for strong anti-Dominican meas-
ures with threats to boycott
the subsequent foreign ministers'
meeting on the Cuban issue or
to withdraw completely from
the OAS and adopt unilateral--
possibly military--measures
against the Trujillo regime.
YUGOSLAVIA BACKS USSR IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
The Yugoslav regime has
come out vigorously in support
of Soviet positions in Moscow's
dispute with Chinese Communists
over foreign policy and ideology.
The vehicle for a bitter de-
nunciation of Chinese policies
was a series of six articles
by Edvard Kardelj, the regime's
top ideologist, in Borba, au-
thoritative, Belgrade Gaily,
from 12 to 16 August, that
dealt with such issues of cur-
rent friction as "peaceful co-
existence" and the "inevitabil-
ity of war."
Communist China is pictured
as a Stalinist anachronism which
is trying to assume a position
that would give it an "ideolog-
ical and political monopoly"
of the Communist world--including
Yugoslavia--in order to impose
its policies on these countries
for its own political interests.
Kardelj concludes that Peiping's
policies not only sabotage the
spread of "progressive social
forces" but may also precipitate
a third world war. The West's
policy of isolating China is
deemed the largest cause of
Peiping's "deformed" character.
Kardelj portrays the Soviet
Union, on the other hand, as the
defender of peace, claiming that
many of its foreign and domestic
policies contribute to a lessen-
ing of tension.
By implication, however,
Kardelj also criticizes some
Soviet positions, borrowing a
device from the Chinese Commu-
nist, who have questioned Khru-
shchev's policies by attacking
Yugoslav revisionism. For ex-
ample, he blasts the Chinese for
their "ultraradical" attacks on
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18 August 1960
Yugoslavia's "revolution and
its socialist development"
which "has given its modest
share to the development of
present-day socialist scientific
thought"--a charge equally ap-
plicable to Moscow. In his
chapter "Concerning the Inevi-
tability of Armed Revolution,"
Kardelj berates the Chinese
for desiring to force their own
ideology and tactics on others,
a common Yugoslav complaint
against the Soviet Union. He
adds that "much must still be
done in the relations between
socialist countries if mutual
economic assistance is always
to be unselfish and without
terms"'--an allusion to the can-
cellation of Soviet credits in
Yugoslavia.
Belgrade's support for
Khrushchev's detente policies
results in large part from the
conviction that Yugoslavia can
only lose should there be an-
other world war. Beyond this,
however, Kardelj's articles are
a bid to enhance Belgrade's
prestige in the bloc as an ar-
biter of Communist ideology and
tactics. Despite its official
isolation from the bloc, Bel-
grade is asserting its right as
one of the three countries that
have had a successful revolution
to speak out on matters of in-
ternal bloc concern.
Kardelj's articles seem
likely to trouble bloc-Yugoslav
relations further. Khrushchev
would probably prefer that Tito,
who is termed a renegade by all
bloc states, keep his support
to himself. Moreover, the ar-
ticles may actually further in-
flame Sino-Soviet differences,
since any Chinese reply will
probably include at least im-
plied criticism of Moscow's
"revisionism"; although Bel-
grade supports Khrushchev's
positions, it does so on ideolog-
;ical grounds which differ in
some aspects from Soviet formu-
lations.
The Soviet decree on retail
trade announced on 8 August, the
third major consumer decree in
two years, is concerned with im-
proving the quality, style, as-
sortment, and distribution of
consumer goods, as well as with
eliminating the worst of numer-
ous shopping inconveniences.
Its most important provisions
are designed to tailor the goods
available in retail stores to
the consumer demand. In the
past, goods have been produced
and distributed to individual
retail stores under plans set
by industrial enterprises, which
specified sizes, colors, and
other details with little re-
gard for the buyers' needs.
Frequently even these assortment
plans were sacrificed to the ful-
fillment of the output goals.
Under the decree, the trade
network, which presumably is more
responsive to consumer demands,
is to be given the principal
voice in determining assortment.
Future industrial-output plans
will be approved by planning
authorities only if in conformity
with contracts concluded between
the trade organizations and the
enterprises. In turn, trade
organizations are not allowed to
accept goods which do not con-
form to the contract.
Most of the other provisions
of the decree are in the form
of suggestions to appropriate
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18 August 1960
governmental and party agencies.
The decree calls for a level of
construction of retail stores
during 1961-65 considerably
above that envisaged in the
Seven-Year Plan, although there
apparently is to be little or
no increase in total investment
in trade facilities. Construc-
tion organizations must complete
the building of trade facilities
for apartment' developments to
be eligible for bonuses for
fulfillment and overfulfiliment
of housing construction plans.
The decree permits republic
Councils of Ministers to allo-
cate 4 to ,5 percent b ;,housing
funds for trade and dining
facilities.
The number of specialty
stores with broader selection
of goods is to be increased.
To save the customers' time and
cut down on the number of sales
people, the present practice of
having to line up twice to com-
plete a purchase is to be elimi-
nated and the use of self-serv-
ice merchandising is to be ex-
tended. There is to be an ex-
pansion of credit sales and
increased use of advertising.
The decree calls for an
increase in recruitment, par-
t3cularly of high-school grad-
uates, for work in domestic
trade, presumably to raise the
quality of service and meet the
steadily growing needs of this
hitherto-neglected sector of the
labor force. Employment in serv-
ice--retail trade, transporta-
tion, and communications--in-
creased by 32 percent in the
1950s, will increase 40 percent
during the 1960s, and by 1970
will include 28 percent of the
total labor force.
Other consumer decrees dur-
ing the last two years have in-
cluded one on consumer durables,
issued in October 1959, calling
for a considerable increase in
the output of refrigerators,
sewing machines, and the like,
A decree to improve the variety
and quality of the clothing and
textile industry output was is-
sued in-:-December: of the same.
year.
The present decree holds
out promise that efforts to im-
prove retail trade will be in-
tensified but, like other such
decrees, will provide benefits to
the consumer at relatively small
cost to the state and will not
affect investment or military pro-
grams under the Seven-Year Plan.
SOVIET-UAR RAPPROCHEMENT
Moscow has intensified its
efforts in recent months to re-
establish close political co-
operation with the UAR. Radio
Moscow has fully endorsed
Cairo's action in breaking
off relations with Iran
over the latter's reaffirmation
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18 August 1960
of its'de facto recognition of
Israel.
Moscow has given public
approval in recent weeks to the
UAR's foreign policy line. So-
viet radio propaganda to Arab
listeners has emphasized Mos-
cow's and Cairo's common inter-
est in opposing Israeli activi-
ties and Western influence.
Khalid Bakdash, exiled head of
the Syrian Communist party, at-
tacked UAR policies in Syria in
a speech at the Rumanian party
congress in June, but the bloc
press and radio--in contrast to
past treatment of Bakdash's
statements--did not publicize
the speech.
The USSR, starting espe-
cially with the offer in January
to'complete the Aswan High Dam,
has also shown itself willing to
enlarge its commitments of aid
to the UAR. A UAR delegation
is in Moscow discussing final
details for Soviet aid for the
Aswan project, which apparently
now will total $350,000,000.
A Syrian delegation is to
conclude contracts in Moscow
shortly for Soviet work on a
Euphrates River high dam and
other major development projects
under the 1957 agreement pro-
viding for $150,000,000 in aid
for Syria. This will also '
probably include construction
of a railroad from Aleppo
to Qasishliya in northeastern
Syria.
These Soviet efforts to re-
new close relations with Cairo
have been facilitated by Nasir's
increasing irritation with the
United States over issued con-
nected with the Arab-Israeli
dispute, and are meeting with
considerable success. Cairo
has adopted the same propaganda
interpretation as has Moscow on
a variety of international is-
sues, including the Congo and
Cuban crises, the coup in Laos,
disarmament, and the question of
US overseas bases.
Nasir has publicly praised
Soviet economic aid policies,
while criticizing the United
States on the alleged grounds
that it has refused to respond
to UAR overtures for assistance.
In a bitter attack on the US on
15 August, Radio Cairo charged
that the normal practice of the
Western nations--"led by the
United Stites"--is to use smaller
countries for "their own insidi-
ous aims," in contrast with the
"sincere" policy of t
Union
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Arab League Meeting agreement. The sharpest quar-
reling will be between the UAR
and Jordan, which are engaged
The meeting of foreign in a new round of plot and coun-
ministers of Arab League states, terplot, accompanied by an in-
scheduled to begin on 22 August tensive propaganda battle in
in Lebanon, will probably pro- which each government is calling
duce much more discord than on the populace of the other
country to rebel. Jordan
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18 August 1960
apparently intends to accuse the
UAR of subversive activity and
to propose changes in the struc-
ture of the Arab League itself
aimed at undercutting the Nasir
government's dominant role in
league affairs.
Agreement is most unlikely
on a unified Arab position on
the issue of creating a Pales-
tine army and "state entity."
Although the UAR and Iraqi gov-
ernments may no longer be as
far apart as they were on this
matter, the Jordanians remain
absolutely opposed to the pro-
posals of both countries.
Nor is the UAR likely to
be able to extract much support
from the other Arab states for
any meaningful strictures agains
Iran. Nasir broke off relations
with Iran after the Shah had
publicly reaffirmed the long-
standing de facto relations be-
tween Iran and Israel. Iraq and
Jordan will probably move to hea
off UA12 pressures on this subjec
by suggesting that their moder-
ate expressions of disapproval
to Tehran prevented de jure
Iranian recognition of Israel.
The Arab League meeting
will, however, contain some ex-
pressions of harmony and will
probably adopt new resolutions
supporting the governments of
newly independent African
states, pledging further aid
to the provisional government
of Algeria, and condemning
Israel generally and its
Jordan water diversion plans
specifically.
Reaction to Oil Price Cuts
Arab governments are re-
acting strongly to Esso Export's
9 August cut in posted prices
for Middle East crude oil of
from 4 to 14 cents per barrel.
Similar price cuts by other major
Western-owned oil companies
operating in the area are ex-
pected, and there is a possi-
bility of further reductions be-
fore the end of the year. The
Kuwaiti Government has asked
Abdullah Tariki, Saudi oil ad-
ministrator, to call an emergency
meeting of representatives of all
Arab oil-producing countries to
discuss oil profits and some
form of world-wide market-shar-
ing arrangements. Whether or
not they can agree on a
proposition of this scope,
there is certain to be strong
new pressure by individual
Arab governments to partici-
pate in company decisions
on pricing policies
KIM IL-SUNG CALLS FOR FEDERATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
Making one of his rare re-
cent appearances, North Korean
Premier Kim II-sung in a lengthy
"liberation day" harangue sought
to snatch the propaganda initia-
tive on Korean reunification
from Rhee's successors in Seoul.
The South Koreans have under"
taken a reappraisal of the uni-
fication problem, and the
majority Democratic party has
announced support for UN-super-
vised peninsula-wide elections.
Former President Rhee insisted
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18 August 1960
that UN-supervised elections
for the purpose of reunification
be held only in- North:'Korea
Kim has proposed elections
"without outside intervention"
and suggested an interim North-
South federation in which a "su-
preme national committee" with
representatives from both sides
would meet in Pyongyang, Pan-
munjom, and Seoul. Kim suggest-
ed that through discussions a
program for economic and cul-
tural cooperation be worked out
so that the "economic catas-
trophe" brought about by "US
colonial rule" in South Korea
could be overcome. Kim also
suggested that both North Korea
and South Korea reduce troop
strength to "100,000 or less."
Implicit in his speech was
Pyongyang's usual insistence on
withdrawal of all US forces
from South Korea and the custom-
ary derogatory comparison of
economic progress in the South
with that above the 38th paral-
lel.
A South Korean Democratic
party spokesman has. publicly re-
jected the North Korean proposal
and on 15 August acting Prime
Minister Huh Chung termed it
"another rehash of a worn-out
propaganda tactic." Pyongyang
now will feel free to exploit
this rejection in efforts to
make Seoul appear responsible
for continued division of Korea.
The North Koreans have not
mounted a full-scale propaganda
campaign on reunification since
the withdrawal of Chinese Com-
munist troops in 1958. While
the offer to discuss economic
and cultural contacts as well
as all-Korean elections and
troop reduction echoes proposals
made two years ago, Pyongyang's
present overtures are consider-
ably more specific and are de-
signed to convey the impression
of a novel and fresh approach.
As in 1958, a flurry of specific
follow-up proposals can be
expected.
Khrushchev, who has accepted
an invitation to visit North
Korea in early October, will
probably discuss future Commu-
nist_policy toward the new South
Korean regime and provide dra-
matic publicity on Pyongyang's
proposals for a Korean settle-
ment. Although North Korean
propaganda has depicted the in-
terim Huh Chung government as
little improvement over the
Rhee regime, it is probably the
events in the South since April
that led the Communists to re-
open the reunification question.
FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT
A factional conflict with-
in the South Korean conserva-
tive Democratic party, which
won an overwhelming victory in
the parliamentary elections of
29 July, may result in prolonged
political instability. No par-
ty leader appears to command a
working majority of the 179
Democrats in the 233-seat House
of Representatives, and the new
government, when formed, prob-
ably will be dependent on the
support of independents. Pro-
longed bickering and maneuver-
ing for power may stimulate
public resentment against the
politicians and could result in
renewed civil disorder:.
The election on 11 August
of Yun Bo-sun to the largely
ceremonial post of president
centered the intraparty strug-
gle for power on the post of
prime minister. The lower house
on 17 August rejected Yun's first
nominee for the post, right-wing
faction leader Kim To-yun. Kim
failed by three votes to win
the simple majority needed for
his confirmation. On 18 August,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY,SUMMARY
18 August 1960
Yun nominated Chang Myon, titu-
lar chief of the party and Kim's
chief rival, to be prime minis-
ter. Chang, however, appears
to control slightly less than
half the Democratic membership
in the House.
Under the constitution, re-
jection of the President's sec-
ond nominee leaves the lower
house solely responsible for
choosing the prime minister.
The struggle over the premier-
ship suggests that the position
of the new government--which is
subject to a simple majority of
the lower house--will be tenu-
ous. Should it lose a vote of
confidence, the prime minister
would have the choice of either
resigning with his cabinet or
dissolving the chamber and call-
ing new national elections. A
deterrent influence will be the
reluctance of members of the
House to face frequent elections.
The military has been a
major stabilizing factor in the
domestic situation since Rhee's
ouster. However, public dis-
illusionment could adversely af-
fect the armed forces.
INTERNAL FRICTION THREATENING MALI FEDERATION
Discord between Senegal.
and Soudan--the constituent
states of the newly independent
Federation of Mali--has recently
intensified to such an extent
that an early -breakup. of the
federation is possible.
The latest and most serious
in a series of crises between
the federal partners is the
result of distinct differences
of temperament and increasing
resentment on the part of the
Senegalese over Soudanese at-
tempts to dominate Mali. Sene-
gal has been the center of
French culture in West Africa
since the 17th century, and its
moderate nationalist leadership
has emerged in an environment
of friendship for France. In
contrast, Soudan has experi-
enced a much shorter period
of contact with France and is
governed by radical national-
ists who favor a strongly pro-
African foreign policy and con-
tacts with the Communist bloc.
Although Soudan will probably
be of growing political impor-
tance, it is heavily dependent
on Senegal in economic matters.
The Soudanese, whose top
leader, Modibo Keita, is foreign
minister as well as head of the
Mali Government, have been
placing a disproportionate num-
ber of their people in federal
positions. They have also tried
quite openly to induce younger
elements in the Senegalese Gov-
ernment to work for the more
vigorous domestic policies and
the more aggressive, pan-African -
oriented foreign policy favored
by Soudan.
This friction, already re-
flected in a wrangle over the
appointment of chief of staff
for the Mali Army, appears to
be building up toward a climax
in connection with the election,
now scheduled for 27 August, of
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OF THE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
SPANISH
$AHARA
SIERRA'l
LEONE
IVORY
COAST
UPPER
VOLTA
HMEY
BR. CA
NIGERIA
NGO
REP.
a federal president by the com-
bined legislatures of Mali,
Senegal, and Soudan. A top-
level decision reached last May
supposedly cleared the way for
the election of Leopold Senghor,
Senegal's principal spokesman
and the chief architect of the
Mali Federation. Now, however,
the Soudanese are insisting they
agreed only that the presidency
should go to a representative of
Senegal.
TRIALS OF DEPOSED TURKISH
The investigating commit-
tees created by Turkey's ruling
National Unity Committee (NUC)
are concluding their hearings,
and the trials of members of the
ousted Bayar-Menderes regime are
expected to begin in late August
or early September. General
Gursel, NUC chairman and interim
chief of state, has also indi-
cated that the formerly dominant
Democratic party may be banned
by court action. The principal
aim in the trials of some Demo-
cratic leaders is probably to
discredit them and, by convic-
tions for felonies, render them
unable to hold public office.
The Soudanese,
who are in a position
to prevent any candi-
date from obtaining
the necessary two-
thirds majority, also reportedly
plan to seek an indefinite post-
ponement of the balloting or, if
that is not possible, to support
Senghor's- Senegalese rival,
Lamine Gueye. Senghor's sup-
porters are reacting to these
indications with dire predictions
implying a possible move by
Senegal to secede from the fed-
eration if Senghor is not chosen.
25X1
LEADERS TO BEGIN SOON
The trials, expected to be
public, will be held on Yassi
Ada, a small barren island about
ten miles south of Istanbul in
the Sea of Marmara which has been
the primary detention center for
the deposed leaders. The pro-
ceedings of the High Court of
Justice--which includes both
civilians and military--may be
broadcast, as facilities there
will permit only a limited num-
ber of observers, including some
representatives of the foreign
press. The trials may take as
long as six months.
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18 August 1960
Some executions 25X1
will probably follow
the trials.
Since the coup
there have been two suicides,
including that of the former
minister of interior, and at
least one death attributed to
natural causes.
at least 100 people
could be hanged for 2 5)
crimes during the
previous regime. The
ES law which would have
exempted Bayar and
others from the death
penalty because of age has been
amended where cases of high
treason are involved, and some
members of the new regime
feel that world criticism
can be parried by the open
manner of holding the trials.
The age of many defendants 25X1
would make a long prison
term tantamount to the death
sentence.
REPERCUSSIONS IN BELGIUM OF CONGO CRISIS
Under heavy public censure
for ineptitude in the Congo
crisis, Belgium's Premier Eys-
kens has responded by convening
a special session of parliament
on 17 August and demanding a
vote of confidence. This move
followed promises to make budget
cuts--mainly on military items--
to meet anticipated losses from
Congo operations. Eyskens will
probably also reshuffle a few
cabinet posts and attempt to
work out a new financial program
acceptable to all factions.
Despite antithetical views
on most domestic and political
issues, the Social Christians
(PSC) and the Liberals have held
together since November 1958
largely because of the feeling
that national unity should be
maintained on the Congo question.
With this bond weakened by re-
cent developments, another attempt
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18 August 1960
may be made to form a Social
Christian - Socialist government
if the present coalition part-
ners cannot agree to Eyskens'
new program. This attempt might
even result in new elections.
The Liberals, however, appar-
ently hope that the PSC right
wing--strengthened by the em-
bittered ex-colonial groups--
will force the Democratic-Chris-
tian wing of the PSC to com-
promise on the new program with
the Liberals so that essentially
the present coalition can con-
tinue until 1962.
While relations between
the opposition Socialists and
the PSC have appeared relatively
close, and the Socialists seem
prepared to accept office under
another PSC premier, they would
probably not do so unless new
elections were held. The So-
cialists--who never supported
major legislation on Congo
policy--could exploit this is-
sue in an election campaign but
may think it more expedient to
let the Eyskens government as-
sume responsibility for Congo
developments for the present.
The psychological shock
of Congo events on the Belgians
and resentment against what they
feel is lack of support in the
UN by Belgium's allies--espe-
cially the United States--have
forced Eyskens to call for a
review of defense policies and
announce some cuts in Belgium's
military expenditures to balance
anticipated losses from Congo
operations. It is unlikely that
Belgium, one of the strongest
supporters of NATO in its forma-
tive years, would withdraw from
NATO entirely. Both political
and economic considerations, how-
ever, make some reduction in
Belgium's NATO commitments al
most certain.
ADENAUER TALKS WITH DE GAULLE AND MACMILLAN
Although complete informa-
tion is still lacking, Adenauer's
talks with De Gaulle on 29-30
July and with Macmillan on 10-
11 August evidently had far-
reaching implications for the
future organization of Western
Europe and its relations with
the Atlantic alliance. De
Gaulle's plans for a French-led
confederation of Continental
Europe were apparently the major
subject of his talks with Ade-
nauer, but the extent to which
the two reached agreement is
still uncertain. Adenauer's
subsequent offer in his meeting
with Macmillan to attempt to
end the dispute between the Com-
mon Market and the British-led
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18 August 1960
Outer Seven may indicate that
he has reservations about the
anti-British, anti-American
overtones of the French plan.
Fear of Khrushchev's re-
cently more aggressive posture
and belief that the American
presidential campaign "paralyzes".
Washington's ability to respond
to it may be responsible in part
for these moves, ostensibly in-
tended to increase European
solidarity. De Gaulle appar-
ently proposed to achieve this
goal by offering a refurbished
version of his concept of a
"Europe of motherlands"--a loose
political organization which
would coordinate the foreign
policies of the participating
countries and "supervise" the
three European communities--
the Coal-Steel Community, EURA-
TOM, and the Common Market.
The dispute between the
two trade groupings as an ob-
stacle to a "united front" a-
gainst Soviet pressures evi-
dently did not figure in the De
Gaulle - Adenauer talks, but
this seems to have been the
major topic of the chancellor's
meeting with Macmillan. Adenauer
showed unusual "understanding"
of the British position on the
issue, and to the surprise and
delight of Macmillan agreed to
further consultations on how
the "economic split" could be
mitt ated.
Adenauer's unexpected over-
ture to London on this issue
has raised speculation that his
heretofore unshakable support
of the Common Market and its
supranational basis is weakening
under combined foreign and do-
mestic pressures. German in-
dustrial interests have long
been alarmed over the prospec-
tive loss of markets in the
Outer Seven, and with the 1961
elections approaching, Adenauer
may now be more responsive both
to their views and to the pro-
tests of the German farm bloc
that the community's agricul-
tural policies will reduce farm
prices.
Speculation has also devel-
oped that Adenauer's apparent
desire to move closer to Brit-
ain reflects some disenchantment
with the Bonn-Paris .entente.
enauer
nay be suspicious a De
xaulle's new European order
would reduce Germany to a satel-
lite of France, and he now hopes
to pave the way for a union of
the present two groupings which
would free him of his excessive
reliance on De Gaulle. However,
it is equally possible that no
more than a tactical shift in
Adenauer's position is involved,
and given French opposition to
the supranational approach, the
chancellor may now believe that
he has no choice at the moment
but to accept a confederal
Europe which could ultimately
develop federalist tendencies.
In any case, it will prob-
ably be some time before the
full meaning of these develop-
ments is known. A new basis
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18 August 1960
for amalgamation is still to
be found, and there is no evi-
dence that Paris is more open-
minded on this question than
heretofore. Moreover, the es-
tablishment of a confederal
Europe will require more than
French-German agreement, and
the present theoretical basis
of the European Community and
its relationship to NATO has
many supporters, particularly
among the smaller countries.
These countries are gravely
concerned by the current maneu-
verings, and Netherlands For-
eign Minister Luns has already
declared that any new arrange-
ment not involving "true polit-
ical integration with suprana-
tional institutions" would not
have Dutch su ort.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUUM&RY
18 August 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Since the breakdown of the
summit conference, Communist
tactics on the Berlin issue have
been gradually brought into line
with the more aggressive posture
toward the West adopted by Khru-
shchev. Following an initial
period of reassuring gestures by
Moscow, the bloc has mounted an
extensive psychological warfare
operation apparently designed
to focus public attention on the
dangerous aspects of the Berlin
situation and to dispel any no-
tion in the West that Moscow has
retreated from its basic demands
on the Berlin and German treaty
questions.
The dominant element in
this campaign remains the threat
to conclude a separate peace
treaty with East Germany, fol-
lowed by 'Fast German assumption
of access controls to Berlin,
Public warnings to this effect
by Khrushchev, although still
imprecise as to manner and tim-
ing, have been buttressed by
threats voiced in private to
Western officials and by an in-
tensified effort to create a
state of anxiety and uncertainty
in West Berlin, weaken its ties
with Bonn, and generate dissen-
sion among the Western allies.
Early Post-Summit Tactics
The violence of Khrushchev's
performance in Paris, his off-
hand comments to the press there
about a separate peace treaty
with East Germany, and the an-
nouncement of a stopover in Ber-
lin caused widespread specula-
tion that he would follow
through on his frequent pre-
summit threats to take unilat-
eral action and force a show-
down on Berlin. Almost imme-
diately, however, Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko attempted in pri-
vate to allay Western apprehen-
sions. He informed British
Foreign Secretary Lloyd that
the USSR would do nothing to
worsen the situation during the
six to eight months envisaged
by Khrushchev before a new sum-
mit. In the atmosphere of height-
ened tensions, Khrushchev also
probably felt compelled to spell
out his position as soon as pos-
sible.
To the visible displeasure
and astonishment of most of his
audience at East Berlin, Khru-
shchev in his speech there on
20 May counseled patience and
forbearance on a separate treaty.
Asserting the bloc's "moral
right" to proceed without delay,
he nevertheless held out hope
for a new summit meeting and
stated, "In these conditions it
makes sense to wait a little
and to try, by joint efforts of
all the victorious powers, to
find a solution to the questions."
More categorically, Khrushchev
declared that the existing sit-
uation would have to be main-
tained until a new meeting,
"which, it should be assumed,
will take place in six to eight
months."'
As a condition to this
pledge, however, the Soviet
leader added that the Western
powers would have to adhere to
the same principles and take no
unilateral steps which would
prevent a meeting of the heads
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
of government. He
also warned that
neither the USSR nor
East Germany would
wait forever on a
peace treaty.
In the foreign policy re-
view which undoubtedly took
place in the Kremlin, the So-
viet leaders probably realized
that agreement to maintain the
status quo for six to eight
months could deprive Soviet
policy of a means of pressure to
ensure continuing Western in-
terest in negotiating a Berlin
settlement. They may also have
been concerned over increasing
Western speculation that Khru-
shchev's torpedoing of the sum-
mit was designed to cover a
retreat on Berlin.
To counter any such im-
pression, Khrushchev used a
press conference on 3 June to
warn that the Western powers
should not delude themselves
into believing that if they de-
layed a summit meeting,a solution
EEN
CT ROUTES BE, I
IN I
WANY AND B LIN
p B A t. 7 1 C S E A
L
(r ,,uurz?
Railroad Autobahn Road
- Canal Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
A Soviet A Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
A last G West
of the Berlin and German ques-
tions would be "indefinitely
postponed." He stated that at
the end of the six- to eight-
month period, "we shall meet,
discuss, and sign a treaty" giv-
ing the East Germans full con-
trol over access to Berlin. In
effect, Khrushchev attempted to
put a new US administration on
notice that it must be amenable
to negotiations on Berlin or
face a new and dangerous crisis.
As the more militant cam-
paign against the United States
gained momentum, Communist tac-
tics on the Berlin question
were considerably sharpened.
The East Germans have used a
wide variety of means to create
a state of anxiety and uncer-
tainty. The principal targets
for harassment have been the
Allied Military Liaison Missions
in East Germany, whose person-
nel have been physically as-
saulted, closely watched,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
restricted in their travel, and
subjected to insulting and ir-
ritating incidents. The East
Germans have also pointed up
the vulnerability of West Ger-
man access to Berlin by detain-
ing West German trucks and
warning against "misuse" of
the roads and air corridors.
The new moves have been
undertaken against a background
of East German claims to sov-
ereignty over West Berlin and
repeated assertions that the
Allies have forfeited all
rights through violation of
the Potsdam agreements.
The bloc has also ini-
tiated a series of moves on the
diplomatic level. Both the So-
viet and East German regimes
have dispatched notes protest-
ing against alleged recruitment
in Berlin of personnel for the
West German armed forces and
against West German plans to
establish a radio station in
West Berlin. Warsaw has chal-
lenged the NATO powers to ex-
plain any commitments given
Adenauer on recovering terri-
tories beyond the Oder-Neisse
line, and the Czechs have gen-
erally echoed East German state-
ments and protests.
The East German leaders
have reportedly made plans for
a wide variety of actions rang-
ing from mass disturbances to
an outright coup if the Kremlin
decides to force a showdown. In
an apparent effort to capitalize
on the physical vulnerability
of the city, East German offi-
cials have planted reports that
drastic measures will be under-
taken and have publicly spec-
ulated that some move will be
made "when the lilac and chest-
nut trees bloom."
During the meeting of bloc
leaders in late June at Bucha-
rest, Ulbricht is reported to
have pressed Khrushchev for a
commitment to definite action
against Berlin. Vague hints
of future action are probably
designed to recoup the prestige
which the East German leaders
have lost and to distract at-
tention from serious internal
problems. They may also be try-
ing to bolster the sagging mo-
rale of the rank-and-file Com-
munists who had expected more
action from Khrushchev after
the summit.
Bundestag Meeting in Berlin
The most serious threat of
action in the immediate future
came from Khrushchev during his
visit to Austria. In reply to
a planted question in his final
press conference on 8 July,
Khrushchev warned that if Bonn
held its annual session of the
Bundestag in Berlin this fall,
"perhaps at the same time a
peace treaty will be signed
with East Germany, and thus all
Bundestag deputies will have to
obtain visas from (East German
Premier)Grotewohl to be able to
leave Berlin for Bonn."
Khrushchev probably seized
on this issue to test the unity
and firmness of Western reac-
tion. Realizing the differences
which developed among the Allies,
Bonn, and Berlin when a similar
situation arose in 1959 over
holding the West German pres-
idential elections in Berlin,
Khrushchev probably anticipated
that the issue would again prove
divisive and provide Moscow with
some indication of Allied policy
in the event of a showdown on a
separate treaty. As in the past,
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18 August 1960
however, Khrushchev has been
careful to avoid committing
himself irrevocably in the e-
vent the meeting is held. This
issue could be used as a pre-
text for unilateral action, how-
ever, should Moscow decide to
seek a showdown rather than
await new negotiations.
Widespread Western specu-
lation that the bloc was moving
toward some overt action con-
cerning Berlin was probably re-
sponsible for Khrushchev's re-
affirmation--in a letter on
4 August replying to one from
Prime Minister Macmillan--of
his qualified commitment to
maintain the status quo pend-
ing a new attempt to negotiate
t the summit. Since Macmillan
did not raise the issue in his
own letter, Khrushchev appears
to have gone out of his way to
restate his position, including
another warning that if the
West refused to meet or prevented
agreement, the USSR would "em-
bark on the conclusion of a
peace treaty" with East Germany.
Should Khrushchev decide
that his political and diplo-
matic campaign is failing to
generate sufficient pressure on
the West, he could instruct the
East Germans to provoke further
incidents and serious disturb-
ances to underline his claim
that the West Berlin situation
could "give rise to dangerous
accidents." The East German
regime can call on some 6,000
Communists already living in
the Western sectors and can
rapidly infiltrate, if need be,
12,000 to 16,000 members of the
specially trained workers' mil-
itia (Kampfgruppen). Last Oc-
tober 1,000 to 5,000 Kampfgrup-
pen members were brought over
during the riots over the dJs-
play of the new East German flag
on the Berlin elevated railway,
which is controlled by the East
Germans.
In the current phase of
Moscow's policy, Berlin remains
the test case of whether the So-
viet leaders intend to pass
from bullying behavior to ac-
tions involving grave risks.
Khrushchev's handling of the is-
sue thus far suggests that he
continues to realize the danger
of resorting to unilateral ac-
tion to advance his objectives,
and that he is in no hurry to
implement his threats. Since
the opening of the Berlin crisis
in November 1958, the Kremlin has
consistently employed the threat
of a transfer of Berlin access
controls as a pressure tactic to
force negotiations and extract
concessions. Since the lapse of
the initial six-month ultimatum,
Khrushchev has been careful to
avoid committing the USSR to a
specific time for a separate
treaty.
Khrushchev's long and close
personal identification with the
issue, however, is a compelling
reason for him to crown his two-
year campaign on Berlin with
some significant advance which
would justify his past policies
and demonstrate their continuing
validity. The achievement of
some gain by means of negotia-
tion, preferably at the summit,
probably has taken on a new sig-
nificance for him in the face of
continuing Chinese Communist
criticism of both his methods
and his strategy in dealing with
the West.
Post-summit statements by
Khrushchev and other Communist
leaders suggest that the Krem-
lin may feel that insufficient
effort was devoted to propaganda
and agitation to build up pres-
sure prior to the Paris meeting.
That the Kremlin does not in-
tend to make a similar error was
recently evident in Pravda's
republication of Italian ommu-
nist leader Togliatti's remarks:
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
"While it appeared before that'the
leaders of all the Western pow-
ers, with the exception of Ade-
nauer's Germany, realized the
need for a summit conference,
it now suddenly became impos-
sible. Consequently a new
struggle is required for creat-
ing conditions for convening a
summit conference and its ef-
fective work. New public pres-
sure upon the governments of
main capitalist countries is
essential...."
With negotiations tempo-
rarily in abeyance, Communist
tactics will probably continue
to reflect Togliatti's call for
struggle and pressure.
Despite Khrushchev's appar-
ent intention to hold open the
possibility for new negotiations,
Cyprus became independent
on 16 August when the British
ended their 82-year rule of the
island by transferring sover-
eignty to the new republican
government. The republic be-
gins with better prospects for
economic and political stabil-
ity than many other recently
independent colonial areas de-
spite a legacy of hatred be-
tween the Greek and Turkish
communities, apathy toward the
Cyprus settlement on the part
of most Greek Cypriots, and an
apparent splintering of the is-
land's only large non-Communist
party on the eve of independ-
ence. Economic aid totaling
more than $40,000,000 has been
promised by Britain over the
next five years, other aid can
be expected from Greece and
Turkey, and the United States
has offered technical assist-
ance.
The complexity of the po-
litical settlement encompassed
in the Cyprus Agreement will
make it possible for leaders
of either the Greek or the
Turkish community to bring the
process of government to a vir-
tual standstill at any time.
Present leaders of both com-
munities, however, have dem-
onstrated a willingness to
compromise on fundamental is-
sues. There are still extreme
nationalists adamantly opposed
to the settlement--particularly
among the Greek Cypriots--but
their numbers do not appear
large at this time and their
leadership is of questionable
ability.
The real danger for Cyprus
comes from a sizable Communist-
led political party with dynam-
ic, intelligent, and well-trained
leadership. Should the present
SECRET
a long and bitter anti-Western
campaign will have the effect
of erecting barriers against an
attempt to work back toward the
conference table. Khrushchev may
well overestimate the ease and
speed with which he can shift
gears. While Mcscow probably
continues to prefer a further
round of negotiations as a neces-
sary prelude to a separate trea-
ty, the day of decision cannot
be postponed indefinitely with-
out a substantial loss of pres-
tige for Khrushchev in the eyes
of his bloc and Chinese col-
leagues.
In anticipation of renewed
diplomatic pressure to force
negotiations in the spring of
1961, the campaign of harass-
ments, probing actions, and po-
litical warfare can be expected
to intensify.
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CURRENT. INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ?SUMMARy
18 August 1960
anti-Communist leaders fail to
resolve the anticipated eco-
nomic and political problems,
the Communists will probably
make a serious bid for control
of the government in the next
general elections, scheduled
for 1965.
The Cyprus Agreement of
February 1959 is the basis for
the present government and its
international relations. This
agreement called for a govern-
ment in which effective control
would be exercised by the Greek
Cypriots--who make up about 80
percent of the population--but
contained guarantees to protect
the Turkish Cypriot minority.
are to be divided between the
communities on the same general
70-30 ratio--a concession to the
Turkish Cypriots, giving them a
greater voice than their pro-
portion of the population would
call for. The civil service,
police, and gendarmerie will be
divided in this proportion, while
the 2,000-man army will be cre-
ated on a 60-40 ratio:; .?' In, the
House of Representatives, there
are 35 Greek Cypriots and 15
Turkish Cypriots.
The dichotomy in the Cypriot
government is most apparent in
the existence of two entirely
separate Communal Chambers with
sole responsibility for legis-
lating on community affairs,
The agreement provides that
the president is to be a Greek
Cypriot, the vice president a
Turkish Cypriot. Each has the
right of veto on matters involv-
ing foreign affairs, defense,
or security. In December 1959,
Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makari-
os, who has consistently dom-
inated Greek Cypriot political
activity, was elected President,
over the combined opposition of
disgruntled nationalists and
Communists. Dr. Fazil Kuchuk,
long-time leader of the Turkish
Cypriots, won the vice-presi-
dency without opposition.
The president and vice
president appoint the cabinet,
the president appointing seven
members and the vice president
three. Other government posts
such as education, so-
cial welfare, and re-
ligion. Moreover,
separate municipal
governments for Turk-
ish Cypriots will be
established in the
five largest cities.
The Supreme Con-
stitutional Court,
which decides conflicts
of jurisdiction between
branches of the govern-
ment, is composed of
one Greek and one Turk-
ish Cypriot and a neu-
tral president, a po-
sition recently offered
to a West German. A
High Court of Justice deals with
appointments, transfer, and pro-
motion of judges and consists of
two Greeks, one Turk, and a neu-
tral president with two votes;
the Irish Government has been
requested to select a suitable
judge for this post. The ju-
dicial system as a whole is ad-
ministered on the basis of the
communal principle.
Markarios' political party,
the Patriotic Front, is a het-
erogeneous mixture of basically
conservative elements which prob-
ably will fragment into several
smaller parties following inde-
pendence. Resignation of an in-
terim cabinet minister and: a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
controversy over the naming of
a foreign minister--both occur-
ring on the eve of independence--
indicate that the party is pres-
ently subjected to conflicting
internal pressures.
Some opposition to Makarios
has come from older politicians
who were not selected for top
government posts. These men,
led by John Clerides and The-
mistocles Dervis, tried without
success to prevent Makarios'
election as president. Their
political party, the Democratic
Union, continues to denounce
the Cyprus Agreement and the
archbishop but appears to have
little popular support.
Potentially more dangerous
to tranquillity on the island
has been the opposition of for-
mer members of EOKA, the under-
ground organization that fought
the British from 1955 to 1959.
While many senior EOKA leaders
have joined'. the Patriotic Front
and several are members of the
cabinet,others oppose the Cyprus
settlement as failing to achieve
the goal for which EOKA fought--
"enosis," or union of Cyprus
with Greece. A spokesman for
such extreme nationalists in the
past has been Makarios' nominal
subordinate within the church
hierarchy, Bishop Kyprianos of
Kyrenia.
In Athens, former EOKA lead-
er George Grivas has criticized
the concessions made to the Brit-
ish in negotiating the terms for
implementing the Cyprus Agree-
ment. However, his recent an-
nouncement that he intends to
enter Greek politics appears to
preclude an open campaign
against Makarios at this time.
The Communists on Cyprus--
nearly all of whom are Greek
Cypriots--control the Reform
Party of the Working People
(AKEL). AKEL captured about 40
percent of the Greek Cypriot
popular vote in the legislative
elections on 31 July, partly
because of widespread absten-
tions by disgruntled national-
ists. However, AKEL holds only
five of the Greek Cypriot seats
in the 50-member House of Rep-
resentatives, by provisions of
an electoral agreement with the
Patriotic Front, which holds the
remaining 30. Under a similar
agreement regarding elections to
the Greek Communal Chamber, AKEL
received three of the 26 seats.
Makarios negotiated these
agreements in the hope of pre-
venting a vicious electoral bat-
tle on the eve-of independence
and they were accepted by the
Communists, who recognized that
the electoral law gave them lit-
tle chance of winning any seats
in open contests with the Patri-
otic Front. This collaboration
was only for the election, how-
ever, and AKEL spokesmen have al-
ready indicated that they will
vigorously oppose implementation
of certain provisions of the Cy-
prus Agreement. They are concen-
trating attacks on the continued
presence of British military
bases on Cyprus and the need to
"denuclearize" the island. AKEL
leaders have visited Moscow and
Peiping in recent months, bring-
ing back offers of increased
trade and economic aid "without
strings"--offers which will be-
come increasingly attractive un-
less present large-scale unem-
ployment on the island is re-
duced in the near future.
The Communists can also be
expected to advocate programs
of social and economic reform,
particularly land reform. Such
a move would present Makarios
with difficult decisions, because
the Orthodox Church controls
more than one sixth of the arable
land on the island.
The Communists' major source
of strength continues to be their
domination of the largest labor
federation on Cyprus, the 40,000-
member Pan-Cyprian Federation of
Labor (PEO). The nationalist la-
bor organization--approximately
one fourth the size of the PEO--
suffers from inadequate leader-
ship and confused programs.
The dependence of the Turk-
ish Cypriots on Ankara for guid-
ance and support has always been
far greater than that of the
Greek Cypriots on Athens. Until
the recent coup d'Gtat in Turkey,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
the Turkish Cypriots appeared
united under the leadership of
Kuchuk. Because he was closely
associated with the ousted re-
gime of Turkish Premier Menderes,
his opponents hoped that the
new government in Ankara would
select other leaders for the
Turkish community, and rumors
are circulating in Nicosia that
Ankara will eventually replace
Kuchuk. Opposition elements
within the Turkish community
presented several candidates
for the 15 Turkish Cypriot seats
in the House of Representatives
in the July 1960 elections, but
only Kuchuk-supported nominees
were elected.
Foreign Relations
For the present, Cyprus
will,maintain only four em-
bassies abroad--in London, Ath-
ens, Ankara, and Washington.
The government is expected to
apply for admission to the
United Nations but not to NATO.
Cyprus is allied with Greece
and Turkey by a treaty providing
for consultation on Cypriot de-
fense problems and obligating
the parties to resist "all in-
direct and direct aggression"
against the new state. A
tripartite headquarters has been
established on Cyprus, with Greece
contributing 950 officers and
men and Turkey 650 to assist in
training the new Cypriot Army.
In another treaty with
Britain, Greece, and Turkey,
Cyprus has undertaken to "en-
sure the maintenance of its
independence, territorial in-
tegrity, and security." In a
document signed in early July
1960, the location and future
of two military bases over which
London is to maintain sovereignty
and of several smaller sites to
be used as training areas by the
British are spelled out. Nego-
tiations over the size and fu-
ture of these bases caused post-
ponement of Cypriot independence
from February to August 1960.
Eventual agreement was reached
on approximately 100 square miles
for the bases and on provisions
for cession of the bases to the
Cypriot Government if the Brit-
ish ever abandon them.
Relations with London will,
of necessity, remain close for
many years. Cyprus can expect
considerable economic benefit
from the presence of British
troops on the island, and hopes
to stimulate British tourism.
CYPRUS
A Town which will have both Greek and
Turkish Cypriot municipality
0 British sovereign area
Training area
Greeks 361,199(80.2%) 443,644 (78.8%)
Turks 80,548(17.9%) 98,525(17.5%)
Others 8,367 (1.9%) 20,831 (3.7%)
Greek or mainly Greek
magusta ? Turkish or mainly Turkish
Proportion of
1953 1956 Turks - 1956
Nicosia 40,500 81,700 30%
Li massnl 27,000 36,500 15%
Famagusta 20,700 26,800 17%
Larnaca 16,400 17.900 20%
Paphos 6,500 7.300 37%
Kyrenia 3,400 3,700 19%
A higher proportion of Turks lice in towns thon Greeks.
The nationwide ratio of Greeks to Turks is 4.5 to I.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
The new republic will remain in
the sterling bloc for the indef-
inite future and will probably
seek to remain in the Common-
wealth.
Relations with the United
States will also be close, with
technical aid already promised
by Washington and the Cypriots
hopeful for eventual economic
and military aid.
the UN debates, are a natural
market for Cypriot agricultural
products, and are the home of
some 10,000 Cypriots--most of
whom live in the UAR. Israel,
however, also seeks good rela-
tions with Cyprus, and has prom-
ised technical aid to the new
republic. Cypriot leaders indi-
cate that Nicosia eventually will
send a diplomatic mission to
Cairo,while limiting its repre-
sentation in Tel Aviv to a con-
sulate.
Communist bloc countries
have demonstrated some interest
in the emerging nation and will
Amer- probably devote more attention to
icans also operate the largest Cyprus in the future. Both the
mining enterprise on the is-
land--the Cyprus Mines Corpora-
tion--which produces copper ore,
the island's most important
source of foreign exchange.
While relations between
Cyprus and its Near Eastern
neighbors are expected to be
generally good, the govern-
ment will be faced with del-
icate decisions in its attitude
toward Israel. The Arab states
supported the Cypriot cause in
USSR and Communist China have an-
nounced their willingness to
grant financial and technical
assistance, and trade with the
bloc--about 4 percent of total
trade in 1959--appears likely to
be doubled in 1960. The bloc's
propaganda, backing the campaign
of local Communists, has already
begun to focus on the British
bases on Cyprus and the danger
to which the Cypriot population
is exposed by their presence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
UNREST CONTINUES AMONG SOVIET ARTISTS
Although the revolt on the
literary front in 1956 and 1957
has largely subsided, a spirit
of unorthodoxy continues in So-
viet art. In an atmosphere
which, despite the stiffened
attitude of the regime since
the uprising in Hungary, is
still considerably less re-
pressive than in Stalin's last
years, modern art has gained an
enthusiastic following among
the Soviet intelligentsia which
increasingly threatens to un-
dermine the sternly guarded
principle of "socialist real-
ism" in art.
The growing interest in
experimentation, stimulated by
officially sanctioned displays
of foreign art, is reflected
in the existence of a thriving
"underground" in such condemned
styles as abstractionism and
surrealism. One advocate of
the party line has described
the attitude of some artists
as "a kind of diseased, mys-
terious 'internal spirit,' as
if the person did not live in
Moscow but somewhere in an un-
derground kingdom." The re-
gime has offered repeated re-
assurances against the rein-
stitution of a harsh policy,
but it is seeking through a
cautious broadening of the def-
inition of "socialist realism"
and through organizational
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
means to neutralize the spirit
of noncomformity and preserve
the propagandistic function of
Soviet art.
"Socialist Realism"
The extreme modern art
schools which flourished in Rus-
sia in the early 1900s and for
a time after 1917 were emphati-
cally tabooed by the 1932 party
central committee decree which
called for the creation of na-
tional unions of artists, writ-
ers, and musicians and pro-
claimed "socialist realism" the
only artistic method permissible.
Modernist masterpieces were
locked in storage vaults where,
with few exceptions, they re-
main to this day.
Socialist realism insisted
on the style of 19th century
Russian realism but demanded
that content show society not
as it actually was but as it
was seen to be developing
through the rose-colored glasses
of Communist dogma. The value
of art was judged in terms of
its propaganda effectiveness
slow
Serov, "Lenin Receives Peasant Delegates"
pleasant actualities,
and dramatize heroic
Communist exploits.
Formalism, or a
concern for form at
the expense of con-
tent, was made the
cardinal sin for So-
viet artists. The
opposite extreme--
mechanical copying of
details--was condemned
as naturalism. Modern
Western art from the
18 70s onward was de-
nounced as "bourgeois"
"reactionary," "de-
cadent," or "subjec-
tive," because it
rejected the primacy
of social idea-con-
tent in favor of ex-
perimentation in form
as a means of express-
ing the artist's'sub-
jedtive thought.''
Post-Stalin Thaw
In the more per-
missive atmosphere
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rather than by esthetic criteria.
Socialist realist art was to use
a realistic style clearly under-
stood by the masses, avoid un-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
which developed after Stalin's
death, Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954
novel The Thaw attacked the
careerism, sterility, and pres-
sures for conformity in the
Soviet art world.
Beginning in 1955 the works
of some previously condemned
artists began to reappear, in-
cluding works by members of the
early 1900s modernist "World of
Art" group. The Hermitage
Museum in Leningrad and the
Pushkin Museum in Moscow put on
permanent exhibition selected
works by French impressionists,
Matisse, Cezanne, and Picasso.
But works by the great Russian
modernists Kandinsky, Chagall,
and Malevich remain in storage.
One result of Khrushchev's
anti-Stalin speech in February
1956 was a rash of articles di-
rectly critical of prevailing
artistic standards. An art un-
ion official attacked "the anti-
democratic style of leadership
in art (which) is incompatible
with free creative competition."
An art historian praised non-
conformist artists of the 1920s,
rejected as "mass produced"
most works since the 1930s, and
defended impressionism as a
valuable variant of realism.
The First Congress of the
USSR Union of Artists, held in
March 1957, warned artists
against disparaging socialist
realism. Vigorous reaffirma-
tion of party guidance of the
arts was balanced, however, by
clear signals that there would
be no return to Stalin's cul-
tural wasteland. While abstrac-
tionism was again condemned,
party advocates also criticized
shallow, prompous, naturalistic,
and purely illustrative art.
The replacement, prior to the
congress, of the Stalin-ap-
pointed watchdog Aleksandr
Gerasimov by moderate Boris
Ioganson as head of the Academy
of Arts was also seen as a ges-
ture in the direction of reduced
administrative dictatorship over
the arts.
The more permissive cul-
tural atmosphere since 1955 has
gradually encouraged more and
more artists to venture outside
the limits of socialist realism.
They are handicapped by their
comparative ignorance of West-
ern developments and the limita-
tions of their national tradi-
tion. But many of the younger
generation, often with the en-
couragement of established fig-
ures in the Soviet art world,
are clearly fighting for the
right to create new forms.
These, they argue--seeking, per-
haps cynically, to cite the Com-
thunist gospel in support of
their own heresies--are neces-
sary to express the ney- condi-
tions of the "period of Commu-
nist construction" and the
space age.
Landscapes, portraits, and
still lifes, forms which are
poor vehicles for social preach-
ing, have become the most pop-
ular genres. Some artists have
been accused of "salonism" be-
cause of their concentration on
personalized themes. Ilya
Glazunov's bold reintroduction
of the nude to' Soviet painting
at his small Moscow exhibit in
early 1957 was cheered by all
but a few "loyalists" and
puritans.
The Soviet rediscovery of
Matisse, Cezanne, Van Gogh, and
Picasso, and of older Slavic
art, especially the icon, has
encouraged the use of dynamic
rhythms, bold colors, and a
flat decorative style foreign
to conventional Soviet artistic
expression.
The regime's continued
repudiation of any real experi-
mentation has given rise to a
flourishing art "underground"
lying just beneath the surface
of official Soviet life. Sur-
realism and abstractionism are
the most popular trends. More
and more members of the intel-
ligentsia--including party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA.RY
18 August 1960
members and art union officials
young and old--are collecting
modern art or enjoying it in the
privacy of friends' apartments
or studios. Some black market-
eers are apparently making for-
tunes selling modern art.
An increasing number of
artists who produce convention-
al works for public consumption
experiment in private. Glazunov
paints excellent unorthodox
portraits on the side. "These
are my soldiers," he explained
to a visiting American art ex-
pert in 1959. "Some day there
must be art again in the USSR."
Another artist who has won fame
and luxury designing stage sets
continues to paint nonconformist
romantic works in private. Many
engineers and professional peo-
ple do experimental art as a
hobby. Some artists have man-
aged to live solely off the
works sold to a few friends or
are supported by established
elder artists or union offi-
cials.
Public Deviations Increasing
The controversial Young
Moscow Artists' Exhibition which
opened in May 1959 illustrated,
according to one Soviet review,
the "general tendency of young
artists no longer to be guided
by socialist realism." The
youth newspaper Komsomolskaya
Pravda hurled such charges as
"s-e-17--styled revolutionary" and
"decadent" at some of the par-
ticipants. One artist was ac-
cused of "thoughtless imitation
of ultraleft Western painting"
because he was interested in
bold color combinations rather
than content. A distorted por-
trait by another was described
as "stylistic, introverted, a
green frog in black water."
Subsequent exhibitions by young
artists in 1959 and this year
have produced less official
furor, but the epithet "formal-
ist" has cropped up again.
The large crowds at lec-
tures against abstractionism in
May 1959 and January 1960 il-
lustrate Soviet youth's inter-
est in modern art. At these
lectures, members of the en-
thusiastic audience supported
Polish abstract art and raised
the embarrassing question of
Picasso, whom the regime is
proud to claim as Communist but
whose extreme experimentation
is forbidden to Soviet artists.
In June 1959 two young Moscow
audiences, one composed of
Kolusouiol ui mbei ~; jiooted a
speaker off the when he
fa.tten-i;rred t.o p, ,.r,ou,,,i socialist
realism.
These trends have even
found some encouragement in of-
ficial publications. The in-
fluential Literary Gazette has
published many of Ehrenburg's
articles championing impression-
ism and Picasso, art free from
political or ideological fetters,
and the artist's right to ex-
press himself in his own way
even if the public has diffi-
culty understanding him. Its
pages have also carried a writ-
er's attack on Academician Iogan-
son for his highhanded criticism
of the Young Moscow Artists'
Exhibition.
Another article quoted the
views of a "militant ignoramus"
who ridiculed the work of an
archconformist sculptor: "We
are lagging behind the West.
Art has finished with primitive
materialism and Philistine real-
ism. The leading artists in
the West long ago renounced the
servile imitation of external
reality and entered the world
of moods.... Art is experienc-
ing a new phase, the collapse
of form. I don't need cranes
and factory chimneys...."
The journal Art has devoted
a series of artic es to the
theory of abstract painting, its
development, and application to
design. Moscow Artist, organ
of the Moscow Artists' Union,
was attacked by Komsomolskaya
Pravda for its !'conciliatory"
attitude toward formalism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
The nonconformist young
poet Yevtushenko declared in a
Komsomolskaya Pravda article:
believe in the cam. ecorative
significance of abstract paint-
ing." Georgy Nissky, a promi-
nent older painter, argued in
Moscow Komsomoler that modern
technology had brought about
new forms of perceiving the
world, and that movies now por-
trayed thematic conflicts bet-
ter than realistic painting.
Foreign Exhibits Stir Ferment
The East-West cultural ex-
change program has fanned the
interest of Soviet youth in
modern art. A Picasso exhibit
from England in 1956, a French
exhibit, and the Western art
displayed at the Seventh World
Youth Festival in 1957 created
a furor. The largely abstract
Polish paintings in an other-
wise orthodox exhibition of art
from countries of the Communist
bloc in December 1958 provoked
new controversy which has been
kept alive by a Yugoslav graph-
ics exhibit,.. a Swedish exhibi-
tion, the American Exhibition
at Sokolniki Park in 1959, and
a current British exhibition,
all of which included modernist-
ic works. Occasional lectures
by visiting Western art special-
ists and publications like the
magazine Poland, which repro-
duces Polish a stract art, also
have stimulated considerable in-
terest.
At these exhibitions the
modern art works drew the larg-
est crowds. Mirth, befuddle-
ment, shock, or hostility were
the most common reactions. Some
visitors, however, expressed
their growing appreciation of
modern art. A small group--com-
posed primarily of students,
artists, young scientists, en-
gineers, professional people,
and Soviet minority nationali
ties--dared to defend modern
art openly at these exhibitions
or at least to argue that it
should be shown. One artist
lamented the fact that mass
tastes had not yet been raised
high enough', to appreciate
modern art.
Regime Intensifies Campaign
Since 1959 the regime has
intensified its campaign for
conformity to the principles
of socialist realism. It clear-
ly recognizes that stylistic
deviations could threaten the
party's basic premise that art
is merely an instrument of
propaganda, and abstract art
hardly lends itself to promo-
tion of the Seven-Year Plan.
The party also fears that de-
mands for greater stylistic
freedom might expand into de-
mands for other freedoms, and
that the artists' deviations
might contaminate other sections
of the intelligentsia. In ad-
dition, artistic deviations
weaken the image the regime
seeks to propagate abroad of
happy unified artists rallying
around the party on the platform
of socialist realism, which
alone guarantees the fullest
cultural flowering.
The regime continues to
discourage nonconformists by
denying them exhibition space,
commissions, and entrance to
art schools. Agitation against
private collections has begun,
including threats to invade
private apartments and studios.
Titles, prizes, fat commissions,
access to luxurious artist colo-
nies, and travel abroad are
positive incentives to produce
officially approved art.
Antimodernist propaganda
is geared to a higher intellec-
tual level because interest in
modern art can no longer be dis-
missed with old cliches. Party
concern is revealed by lectures
against abstractionism, a 1959
series "Against Revisionism in
Esthetics," the discovery of
serious shortcomings in art
criticism by the October 1959
Artists' Union plenum, and the
increasing press attacks on mod-
ernists since the spring of 1959.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1960
The founding congress of
the RSFSR Artists' Union was
held from 20 to 24 June 1960
to bring the artists--especial-
ly the unruly Moscow group--
into line. Vladimir Serov,
later elected the union's first
secretary, argued that contem-
porary subject matter rather
than modern form counted most
in meeting the artistic needs
of the present period. He
stressed that sociali9t real-
ism embraced a multiplicity of
styles, subjects, and genres,
and admitted that certain in-
novations could contribute to
more effective art as long as
they did not become ends in
themselves. He condemned artists
who altered their style merely
for the sake of appearing dif-
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ferent or fashionable. Other
speakers at the congress, how-
ever, insisted that contempo-
raneity implied a new artistic
idiom.
Serov condemned "some of
our critics and art scholars
and several of our writers and
artists of the older generation"
who for the sake of popularity
have lauded youth's errors as
new forms of quest or as artis-
tic individuality. He cited
the four young Soviet modernist
painters described in a recent
Life article as examples of the
need for greater vigilance
against alien bourgeois ideology, 25X1
but he promised careful, friend-
ly criticism rather than repres-
sion as the remedy.
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