CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002700080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
COPY NO. E -6
OCR NO, 2275/60
19 May 1960
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DATE.. REVIEWER:
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L7
I DECLASSiFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: 1R 70-2
DOCUMENT NO.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E
AA
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
While Khrushchev probably did not intend to torpedo
the summit conference when he began to exploit the air-
craft incident on 5 May, he completely miscalculated the
nature of Washington's reaction and then interpreted Ameri-
can official statements as defiance of the USSR and as an
affront to his own prestige and that of the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev apparently had decided before he left for Paris
on 14 May to break up the summit meeting by confronting
President Eisenhower with patently unacceptable demands
regarding the U-2 incident, cast in the most insulting
terms.
Khrushchev's press conference in Paris on 18 May sug-
gests that for the foreseeable future he will vigorously
press his bitter anti-American campaign on the U-2 issue.
Moscow has already requested an urgent-session of the UN
Security Council. However, his treatment of other East-
West issues, together with the line being taken both pub-
licly and privately by other Soviet spokesmen, is designed
to create the impression that the USSR does not intend to
make any sharp reversals in the other major lines of its
foreign policy. Khrushchev has continued his threats of
retaliation against those countries which have Amer_
bases, and pressure on them will probably increase.
TURKISH INTERNAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
There have been few demonstrations in Turkey during
the past week, but the political climate remains tense,
and new outbreaks of violence may be imminent. The cities
of Istanbul and Ankara continue under martial law, the
universities in those cities remain closed, and the parlia-
mentary investigating committee continues to probe the
activities of the opposition Republican People's party
(RPP) and the press. The army continues to maintain pub-
licly its traditional aloofness from internal politics,
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19 May 1960
PART I (continued)
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Castro's National Institute of Agrarian Reform in its
first year has transformed most of the Cuban economy and
is continuing to expropriate agricultural land and estab-
lish new industrial enterprises, including a refinery to
process Soviet crude oil. There are new indications of
closer relations with Communist China. Castro's takeover
on 16 May of Cuba's last outspoken independent newspaper
will heighten criticism of his regime in Latin America.
Elsewhere in the Caribbean, international feeling against
the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic continues
to grow, but there is little change in Truj?illo's domestic
situation.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ALGERIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The local elections to be held in Algeria on 29 May
are opposed by both the Algerian rebels and European ex-
tremists; each group is anxious to prevent the emergence
of any group favorable to an Algerian solution based on
association with France. This opposition, together with
widespread indifference, appears to jeopardize De Gaulle's
hope that the elections will create a "third force" of
Moslem moderates.
MOROCCAN LEFTISTS SCORE GAINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The left-wing Moroccan National Union of Popular
.Forces has recently gained in prestige and strength. Its
labor wing has received formal backing from the King, and
it has won numerous seats in local chambers of commerce
and industry, previously strongholds of the rightist
Istigial party. Leftist leaders have also renewed at-
tempts to wrest control of all military and police forces
from the King and are demanding a constitution clearly
defining governmental responsibilities.
TENSION HIGH IN BELGIAN CONGO . . . . . . . ..... . . . . Page 2
Prospects for an orderly transfer of power from Bel-
gium to a Congolese government have decreased as a result
of spreading racial disorders and a sharpened power strug-
gle among Congolese leaders. Belgian moves to strengthen
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19 May 1960
PART II (continued)
security forces in the wake of recent unrest have been
denounced by the leader of the National Congo Movement,
Patrice Lumumba, who may hope to establish himself as the
de facto premier of a united Congo prior to the agreed 30
June independence date.
DISORDERS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The recent African nationalist disorders in the mining
areas of the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia em-
phasize the growing political and racial tension there.
The government has acted vigorously to repress the disturb-
ances and to outlaw the responsible African political party,
but disorders are likely to recur because native grievances
are not being satisfied.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Election maneuvering is becoming more intensive in
Lebanon. Efforts to draw up slates of candidates are
creating new frictions in both Christian and Moslem ranks)
INDIAN COMMUNISTS FAIL TO RESOLVE POLICY SPLIT . . . . . . Page 6
Indian Communist leaders have failed in a new effort
to resolve their deep differences over the party's future
course of action. The policy dispute between proponents
of a moderate line and those favoring more aggressive
tactics is focused on the degree of support to be given
Nehru. The moderate faction, supported by Moscow, has re-
tained control, but the extremists, encouraged by Peiping's
harder line, seem to be gaining ground. Should Moscow,
in the wake of developments at the summit conference, re-
vert to a hard line, the position of these extremists pre-
sumably would be strengthened.
. Page 7
South Korean Acting Chief of State Huh Chung is making
sweeping personnel changes in the government, but at the
same time is trying to minimize the adverse effects on gov-
ernment operations. Prospects for improved relations be-
tween Seoul and Tokyo have been dimmed by Huh's firm oppo-
sition to the present program for the re atriation
Koreans in Japan to North Korea.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
PART II (continued)
POLITICAL MANEUVERING FOR NEW GOVERNMENT IN LAOS . . . . . Page 8
The Social Democratic party, newly formed by the mili-
tantly anti-Communist Committee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI), will probably be called on by the King
to form a new Laotian Government. Selection of a compro-
mise figure such as the party's parliamentary leader Tiao
Somsanith seems likely. Installation of CDNI leader Gen-
eral Phoumi would probably trigger a renewal of insurgency
by the Pathet Lao, which retains the capability to wage
large-scale dissident activity. Chou En-lai and North
Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong have termed the situation
in Laos "dangerous" and called for reactivation of the
International Control Commission.
PRO-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SINGAPORE LABOR AND STUDENT
CIRCLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Pro-Communists appear to be making steady progress in
their program of consolidating strength in Singapore's
labor movement and in Chinese schools, although for the
time being they are avoiding an open showdown with the
government. Increasing pro-Communist influence is reflect-
ed in the withdrawal of the Singapore Trades Union Con-
gress (STUC) from the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions and the appointment of six prominent extrem-
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Indonesian Government has not developed a mass
campaign protesting Dutch moves to augment military forces
in Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian), but the Indonesian
Communist party has coordinated anti-Dutch student demon-
strations in four major cities. Army and civilian offi-
cials appear to be awaiting President Sukarno's return
from a global tour in early June, presuming that he will
chart the course of Indonesia's reaction to Dutch moves.
In the interim,. the Indonesian Navy is conducting training
exercises in waters adjacent to West Irian. The West
Irian issue increasingly diverts public attention from
the anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno campaign of the Demo-
cratic League and from Sino-Indonesian friction over the
Overseas Chinese problem.
SINO-INDONESIAN DISPUTE SHARPENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Peiping's determination to champion the "rights and
interests" of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia has led to new
frictions in Sino-Indonesian relations and precludes an
early settlement of the dispute between the two countries-
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19 May 1960
PART II (continued)
Peiping has
roug the dispute into the open with
an angry protest over the house arrest of a Chinese consul
for interference in the processing of Overseas Chinese de-
siring repatriation. Djakarta's response has been to de-
mand the withdrawal of this and another consul.
OUTLOOK FOR CHINA'S STEEL INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Communist China, which produced only 2,850,000 tons
of steel in 1955, expects to turn out more than 18,000,000
tons this year and may well be producing at an annual rate
in excess of 35,000,000 tons in 1965. This would make
China the third or fourth largest steel producer in the
world. Even this amount, however, would still be far from
adequate--in terms of quantity, quality, and variety--to
meet all the demands of the country's burgeoning industry.
COMMONWEALTH MEETING HIGHLIGHTS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Despite the much-publicized dissension over South
Africa's racial policies, the two-week meeting of Common-
wealth prime ministers which concluded on 13 May found an
unusually high degree of agreement on general international
developments. Nehru's preoccupation with dangers posed by
Communist China marked the principal change from previous
meetings, and he refrained from complaining about defense
pacts. Cordiality seemed to develop between Nehru and
Pakistani President Ayub during the meeting.
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The decision of the council of the European Economic
Community (EEC) on 12 May to proceed with a modified ver-
sion of President Hallstein's acceleration plan is the most
important EEC development of the past two years. In sev-
eral respects, the EEC is already ahead of schedule, and
its internal development and consolidation are now likely
to be further advanced. By reaffirming the intention of
the six member countries to proceed with the establishment
of a full customs union, the EEC has apparently given the
rest of Western Europe little choice but to come to terms
with it.
FRENCH COMMUNISTS WINNING ELECTORAL SUPPORT . .
. Page 16
In a number of French local elections since the Janu-
ary rightist revolt in Algeria, non-Communist candidates
of the left have demonstrated increased unity and have
formed some successful tactical alliances with the Commu-
nists. While these alliances are as yet too few to
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19 May 1960
PART II (continued)
indicate a nationwide pattern, the trend has received sup-
port from influential Le Monde editor Jacques Fauvet, who on
7 May publicly recommended that the left ally itself with
the Communists to halt the "disappearance" of French democ-
racy under De Gaulle's Fifth Republic.
IMPENDING SPLIT IN FINNISH LABOR ORGANIZATION .
The defeat of the moderate Social Democrats in the 14
May meeting of the executive council of the Finnish Confed-
eration of Labor (SAK) is expected to split Finland's
major trade union organization. Some unions will, in that
event, gravitate toward an existing stand-by organization
under moderate control, leaving the remainuer of SAK domi-
nated by the Communists and radical Social Democrats. SAK's
rupture would aggravate both Socialist factionalism and the
continuing parliamentary impasse.
Page 18
PANAMANIAN ELECTION AFTERMATH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Announcement of the results of Panama's 8 May national
elections may be delayed for a further week or more. Oppo-
sition presidential candidate Roberto Chiari is widely be-
lieved to have defeated both his opponents, including the
favored candidate of the government party.
RESENTMENT AGAINST US COMPANIES IN PERU . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Mounting resentment against US and other foreign com-
panies in Peru was demonstrated in the effective nation-
wide 24-hour general strike called on 13 May to protest
recent "massacres" of workers and peasants at two US-
owned properties and earlier incidents on the premises of
other foreign companies. This resentment is likely to
play a part in the long-standing controversy over the
legal status of oil lands belonging to a Standard Oil Com-
pany subsidiary when this issue is considered at a special
session of the Peruvian Congress some time after 20 May.
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19 May 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
VLADIMIR DUDINTSEV'S A ,NEW YEAR'S TALE . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The publication of the latest work of controversial
writer Vladimir Dudintsev again demonstrates the Soviet
regime's dilemma in attempting to control its restive in-
telligentsia without sacrificing its post-Stalin relaxa-
tion of tension. The story, A New Year's Tale, is veiled
in symbolism and is unorthodox in content. Its ambigui-
ties permit it to be interpreted as an attack on dogmatism
and materialism in the Communist party. Apparently reluc-
tant to focus public attention on such an equivocal work,
Soviet authorities have almost ignored its publication.
Their restraint, however, will encourage other artists
and writers to further unorthodoxy.
PORTUGAL AND ITS AFRICAN POSSESSIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Portugal is increasingly disturbed over the impact of
Africa's political evolution on its own African possessions,
which are the last substantial part of the continent under
unmodified colonial rule. The territories are of consider-
able economic importance to Lisbon, which seems determined
to maintain its paternalistic regime there by tough police
action and to demand implicit Western support of this policy.
While no serious native outbreaks in Portuguese Africa have
been reported, agitation directed from neighboring terri-
tories is clearly on the rise.
IRAQ: NATION OF MINORITIES .
. Page 7
Although Iraq is overwhelmingly Moslem in religion
and largely Arabic in culture, its population is composed
of numerous mutually antagonistic groups, including Arabs,
Kurds, Turkmans, Yezidis, Assyrians, Sunni and Shia Mos-
lems, and Christians. The long history of minority fric-
tions, added to the instability of the present revolution-
ary government, could lead to widespread disorders should
a new attempt be made to overthrow Qasim.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
While Khrushchev probably
did not intend to torpedo the
summit conference when on 5
May he began to exploit the
aircraft incident, he complete-
ly miscalculated the nature of
Washington's reaction and then
interpreted American official
statements as defiance of the
USSR and as an affront to his
own prestige and that of the
Soviet Union. Khrushchev ap-
parently had decided before he
left for Paris on 14 May to
break up the summit meeting by
confronting President Eisen-
hower with patently unacceptable
demands regarding the U-2 inci-
dent, cast in the most insulting
terms.
Several Soviet and satel-
lite sources claim privately
that Khrushchev's behavior in
Paris stemmed from a feeling of
"humiliation" in the face of
the American "defiance," which
had the effect of placing the
USSR in the position of a "sec-
ond-class power." Following
the meeting of the heads of gov-
ernment on 16 May, the Soviet
premier reportedly complained
bitterly to bloc diplomats about
President Eisenhower.
Khrushchev also stated he ha
been prepared to close out the
incident immediately if the
President had said he was un-
aware of the flights or had dis-
approved. Bloc diplomats in
Moscow emphasized to American
officials that Khrushchev had
been placed in a "bad position"
of inequality because of the
American statements,which they
viewed as indicating that over-
flights would continue.
The abruptness and closely
held nature of Moscow's shift
was reflected by considerable
evidence that the Soviet propa-
ganda apparatus was forced into
a complete reversal following
Khrushchev's opening Statement
in Paris on 16 May.
Post-Summit Policy
Khrushchev's 18 May press
conference suggests that he will
vigorously press his bitter anti-
American campaign in an attempt
to brand the US as responsible
for preventing a summit meeting
and a relaxation of tensions.
In an effort to secure the ini-
tiative following the collapse
of the summit, Gromyko requested
an urgent meeting of the UN Se-
curity Council to "examine the
question of aggressive acts by
the air force of the US,
creating a threat to peace."
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19 May 1960
Khrushchev indicated earlier
that Moscow would counter any
setback in the Security Council
with action in the General As-
sembly. Moscow will also at-
tempt to keep the issue alive
with a trial of the American
pilot.
Khrushchev's extemporane-
ous remarks on other East-West
issues at his press conference,
together with the line taken
privately by Soviet spokesmen,
are designed to give the im-
pression that Moscow does not
intend to make any sharp re-
versals in the other major lines
of its foreign policy.
In an apparent reference
to the American announcement
of 7 May, Khrushchev warned,
however, that if the US
conducted tests for research
purposes, the USSR would follow
by testing "nuclear weapons."
He also said that the USSR was
"almost convinced" that the West
did not want disarmament and
that if Moscow met with further
"procrastination," it -would
take the disarmament question
to the UN.
Khrushchev took a similar
position in his press conference,
but he warned that the USSR had
almost reached the "limits" of
its effort to conclude a treaty
with both Germanys and that
when this point way reached, the
treaty would be signed and an-
nounced to the world.
The charge that the United
States wrecked the Paris talks
with its "provocative" actions
against the Soviet Union remains
the central theme of Moscow's
propaganda. President Eisen-
hower's statement of 16 May that
overflights have been suspended
was not reported at first, but
bloc commentators have followed
Khrushchev's lead in dismissing
the statement as a mere "maneuver
to avoid responsibility." So-
viet media report mass meetings
in the Soviet. Union denouncing
American "treachery and provo-
cation," and both.President
Eisenhower and Secretary Herter
are personally attacked in bit-
ter terms. Following selective
jamming of broadcasts on the
plane incident, Moscow on 17
May apparently resumed massive
jamming of VOA Russian-language
broadcasts.
Despite the harsh attacks
against the US, Moscow broad-
casts have conveyed no immediate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
sense of crisis and have given
no undue stress to claims of
Soviet military strength. In
an unusual move shortly after
Khrushchev's 18 May press con-
ference, TASS began transmitting
an account of a New York Times
article in which p oma n
`Moscow" are cited as claiming
that Khrushchev plans no change
in his policies of basing mili-
tary strength on rockets, rais-
ing the standard of living, and
widening contacts with the out-
side world.
Chinese Communist Reaction
As the summit approached,
Chinese leaders seemed resigned
to the fact that the meetings
would be held but maintained
their line that "no unrealistic
illusions" should be entertained
toward the United States, the
"number-one enemy of world peace."
On 14 May, 'Mao Tse-tung stated
that despite "big or small a-
chievements," the winning of
world peace must depend "ma.inly"
on resolute struggle. He went
on to say that he hoped that
these people--i.e.,,Khrushchev--
who have described Eisenhower as
a man who "cherishes peace"
would be awakened'by recent'"ag-
gressivef' American actions.
Mao's remarks suggested some
apprehension that an accord
might be reached which would
undercut his policy of unremit-
ting hostility toward the US
and a desire to go on record as
saying that summit results would
not change China's foreign pol-
icy.
Peiping's initial comment
on the summit breakdown im-
plies that the conference has
justified Peiping's distrust
of Khrushchev's policy of
detente. It is probable,
however, that any Chinese
action in the wake of the
summit will be in line
with the over-all Sino-So-
viet bloc policies Khru-
shchev will develop out of
the wreckage of the summit.
TURKISH INTERNAL SITUATION
There have been few
demonstrations in Turkey during
the past week, but the political
climate remains tense, and new
outbreaks of violence may be
imminent. The cities of
Istanbul and Ankara continue
under martial law, the univer-
sities in those cities remain
closed, and the parliamentary
investigating committee con-
tinues to probe the activities
of the oppposition Republican
People's party (RPP) and the
press.
The large reception staged
by the Democratic party (DP)
for Premier Menderes on his
arrival at Izmir on 15 May
resulted in brief scuffles
between government and RPP
supporters. A small student
demonstration against the gov-
ernment erupted in Izmir on
17 May. Other clashes may
follow throughout Turkey as the
DP attempts to stage similar
rallies in rural districts and
urban communities--a move which
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19 May 1960
would stimulate counterdemon-
strations by the opposition.
Menderes' repeated refer-
ences in Izmir to "early elec-
tions" have caused some con-
sternation among RPP leaders,
who fear that the government
might attempt to capitalize
on their party's present
weakened condition by such a
move. Other reports from
Turkey, however, indicate that
the prestige of the government
has reached an all-time low--
particularly in the cities--
and it is unlikely that Menderes
would call for an election un-
less he were relatively certain
of winning it. The attitude of
the rural voters, among whom
Menderes has always enjoyed
widespread support, is not
known, Lat some of them may have
been influenced by returning
university students, sent home
after the demonstrations began
in late April.
Economic activity in
Turkey's principal commercial
city of Istanbul is reported at
a standstill, with all business-
men viewing the future as uncer-
tain. The American consul general
reports that general services
are totally dependent on the con-
tinuation of a martial law and
that any attempt to return the
city to normal police control
would result in new and prob-
ably more violent disorders.
The hatred of opposition ele-
ments--including the RPP, the
press, and the students--for the
premier reportedly has increased
in recent days, and they are
gaining confidence in their abili-
ty ultimately to defeat him.
The next move appears to
be up to the government, as
the RPP continues to follow a
policy of watchful waiting. The
possibility that Menderes will
attempt to placate the opposi-
tion by purging the police,
abolishing the parliamentary
investigating commission, and
dropping certain cabinet members
cannot be precluded 'hut would
not be in line with his previous
hard attitude toward the opposi-
tion. Failure of the govern-
ment to take further drastic
repressive action following the
recent disorders may indicate
either conflict within the DP
or the influence of the army.
The army, while carrying
out directives to maintain order,
has publicly continued its tra-
ditional aloofness from politics;
The Castro regime completed
on 17 May the first year of its
agrarian reform program, which
.has already transformed most
of the Cuban economy. On 15 May
the National Institute of
Agrarian Reform (INRA) took over
the entire 272,000 acres of
the United Fruit Company's sugar
growing lands and divided them
into 27 cooperatives. The com-
pany's two sugar mills were not
taken, but INRA Director Nunez
Jimenez suggested to the cane
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growers that if the mills did
not want to handle the harvest
from the seized lands, the
workers have the right to take
over the mills in the name of
INRA.
Nunez Jimenez said that
$6,000,000 in 20-year bonds
would be paid for the cane
land, although the company.
values them at $56,000,000.
Following several recent Su-
preme Court decisions raising
evaluations of expropriated
properties,, a government-con-
trolled agrarian court system
headed by the Communist legal
adviser of INRA reportedly will
be established soon.
By the end of the 1960
sugar harvest, which is now al-
most completed, most cane land
will have been taken over by
INRA. There is an unverified
report that INRA will seize the
mills just before the grinding
ends in order to have the pro-
ceeds of at least part of the
year's sugar sales available to
help meet its very high expenses.
INRA admits to having spent
over $100,000,000 in its first
year, and at its current esti-
mated rate of outlay will triple
that amount soon.
It is the government's most
powerful 'instrument, since be-
sides its dominance of agricul-
ture, fishing, cattle raising,
and commodity marketing, INRA
controls much rural construc-
tion, 18 radio channels, a num-
ber of hospitals and tourist
centers, 36 sugar mills, and
various other industrial enter-
prises. It is building a re-
finery to process Soviet crude
oil which is already being de-
livered in small but increasing
quantities under the Soviet-
Cuban trade agreement ratified
on 12 May.
INRA Director,Nunez Jimenez
reportedly will leave in the
near future to study collective
farms in the USSR, presumably
as a model for the 764 coopera-
tives now operating in Cuba and
the 800 sugar cooperatives he
announced in. April would be es-
tablished on nearly 3,000,000
acres of expropriated cane land.
When its planned takeovers are
completed, probably in mid-
summer, INRA will control about
half Cuba's land area and the
largest part of the arable land.
Meanwhile, there are new
indications of closer relations
with Communist China. Major
William Galvez Rodriguez, in-
spector general of the Cuban
Armed Forces, reached Peiping
in early May on an extended
good-will tour of neutralist and
bloc countries. He had at
least two audiences with Mao-
Tse-t'ung and, according to the
New China News Agency, said on
12 May that the Cuban people
desired to intensify their "in-
timate relationship" with the
Chinese people and to unite
with them in opposition to the
"imperialists of the US."
On 16 May, Castro's former
minister of finance is reported
to have said that the Cuban Gov-
ernment is "under heavy pressure"
to recognize Communist China
immediately and that he felt
the move was imminent. A Cuban-
China Friendship Association was
inaugurated in Havana on 14 May,
with enthusiastic support from
Cuban extremists, including some
Castro officials.
The Castro-controlled news
agency, Prensa Latina, which is
increasingly criticized in oth-
er Latin American countries for
its biased reporting, is widen-
ing its European activities
which started with a conference
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
with Communist bloc news agen-
cies in Havana in January.
Branch offices are being
opened this month in Paris,
London, Rome, and Prague.
Prensa Latina Director General
Ricardo Masetti--an Argentine
whose experience while working
for the Peron propaganda machine
evidently taught him the value
of collaborating with Commu-
nists, since he employs many of
them--was in Paris for the sum-
mit meeting. He will also
visit Italy, Czechoslovakia,
and the USSR.
With the takeover on 16
May of Prensa Libre, the Castro
regime took over the last re-
maining outspoken independent
newspaper in Cuba. As with the
closing of the Diario de la
Marina on 10 May, tie govern-
ment was careful to make the
action appear to be the spon-
taneous result of popular re-
sentment--especially among
workers and students--against
the paper's "counterrevolution-
ary" anti-Communist editorial
policy. The workers have"pa-
triotically" offered the papers
to the government, giving it
the difficult job of deciding
how to support the dailies, both
with large plants and staffs.
Castro already has several news-
papers under his control which
are suffering from the scarcity
of private advertising.
These two seizures will
heighten criticism of the Cas-
trol regime in Latin America.
Many hemisphere newspapers have
already likened the:closing of
Diario de la Marina to Peron's
repression ofrensa of
Buenos Aires, and thee-Brazilian
Press Association has passed
a resolution criticizing the
takeover.
Antagonism Against Trujillo
International feeling
against the Trujillo regime in
the Dominican Republic continues
to grow, although there is lit-
tle change in Trujillo's domes-
tic situation. The Venezuelan
drive to isolate Trujillo by
persuading other Latin American
governments to break relations
has been coolly received by
Argentina and Chile, but Bolivia
is now considering breaking re-
lations with the. Dominican Re-
public, and Colombia has aligned
itself even more decidedly with
the Venezuelan position. The
Colombian foreign minister told
the American ambassador in
Bogota on 10 May that action
within the Organization of
American States against the
Dominican Republic would 25X1
provide a precedent for in-
ter-American action against
Cuba.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
The local elections to be
held in Algeria on 29 May are
opposed by both the Algerian
rebels and European extremists;
each group is anxious to pre-
vent the emergence of any group
favorable to an Algerian solu-
tion based on association with
France as envisioned by De
Gaulle. This opposition, to-
gether with widespread. indif-
ference, appears to jeopardize
De Gaulle's hope that the elec-
tions will create a "third
force" of Moslem moderates.
Up for election are 452
seats on advisory "general
councils" in Algeria's 13 de-
partments. French spokesmen
have indicated that voter par-
ticipation of 60 percent would
constitute a "victory" for De
Gaulle. It appears doubtful,
however, that voter participa-
tion will reach 50 percent with-
out the army playing an active
role in turning out the vote.
Army spokesmen have said they
will not provide transportation
for voters except where securi-
ty,- conditions so require.
The Algerian rebels have
attacked the elections as a
"sinful masquerade," and have
exhorted Algerians to boycott
them. Rightist Europeans, al-
though still disorganized as a
result of arrests in connection
with the January insurrection,
are apathetic concerning the
The left-wing Moroccan
National Union of Popular Forces
(UNFP) has recently gained in
prestige and strength. Its
labor wing has received formal
elections and opposed to any
candidate who does not favor the
integration of Algeria with
France. In addition, French
authorities are faced with a
general discouragement among
Moslems concerning the prospects
for an early cease-fire and
with traditional voter apathy
concerning local elections.
Ignoring rumors that the
elections might be postponed,
French authorities are working
to achieve a maximum turnout
and arguing that "abstention
aids the rebellion." The rebels,
however, are expected to step
up terrorism in the time remain-
ing before the balloting. The
near-fatal assassination attempt
on Algerian deputy Robert Abdes-
selam in early May may have al-
ready discouraged some Moslems
from.running for..off ice .
general councils.
Paris hoped at one time
that these elections would pro-
duce a new groups of "valid"
Moslem spokesmen who would co-
operate with the French Govern-
ment and previously elected Al-
gerian representatives in working
out an Algerian settlement. Al-
though the new general councilors
may participate in a proposed
Paris round table on the Algerian
problem, the present tendency in
the French Government is to play
down the significance of the 25X1
elections and to stress the merely
administrative nature of the
backing from the King, and it
has won numerous seats on local
chambers of commerce and in-
dustry which heretofore had been
strongholds of the rightist
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19 May 1960
Istiglal party. Leftist lead-
ers have also renewed attempts
to wrest control of all military
and police forces from the King.
'n
was persuaded last year
by the crown prince and other
conservative advisers to permit
the police to move against the
leftists. Several score lead-
ers were imprisoned and some
clandestine arms; seized by
the police. Left-wing leaders,
who occupy most cabinet-rank
posts, remained in office, how-
ever.
Since then, the King ap-
parently has become skeptical
of the activities of the crown
prince and other conservatives;
he appears to be attempting to
redress the balance between
rightist and leftist groups.
Investigation of a purported
leftist plot to assassinate the
prince has notably slawed,,
and some of the leftists im-
prisoned on this charge have
been released, probably on the
King's intervention.
The King has recently en-
couraged the left by granting
audiences to leftist leaders of
the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT)--
which forms the base of the
UNFP--and by presiding over the
May Day labor celebration in
Casablanca. At the same time,
he has declined to recognize
the rival labor group formed in
March by the Istiqlal party.
The UMT also gained materially
when representatives of the non-
Communist International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) strongly backed it and 25X6
snubbed rightist Moroccan labor
leaders seeking ICFTU affilia-
tion.
The "astonishing victories"
won by the UNFP in the chambers
of commerce and industry in
nationwide elections on 8 May
include all seats in Tangier and
a majority in Casablanca. Em-
boldened by these gains, the UNFP
can be expected to seek the max-
imum number of seats when com-
munal councils are elected on
29 May.
It will also press for
early provincial and national
elections and demand the promul-
gation of a Moroccan constitu-
tion clearly defining govern-
ment responsibilities, e.g.,
limiting the King's authoritarian
power. Toward this end the
Moroccan cabinet recently ap-
proved a draft decree reorgan-
izing the government and subor-
dinating police and military
services to the appropriate
ministries. This measure ap-
parently has been quietly vetoed
by the King. Nevertheless,
leftist sympathizers within the
government are certain to con-
tinue to harass the director
of national security and to be
forces.
critical of the royal armed
TENSION HIGH IN BELGIAN CONGO
Prospects for an orderly
transfer of authority from Bel-
gium to a Congo government have
decreased as a result of spread-
ing racial disorders and a
sharpened power struggle among
Congolese leaders. Belgium's
moves to reinforce its secu-
rity forces in the wake of re-
cent political and tribal unrest
have been denounced by the lead-
er of the National Congo Move-
ment, Patrice Lumumba, who may
hope to establish himself as de
facto premier of a united Congo
prior to the agreed 30 June in-
dependence date.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
STAT
O R: ENTA LE
ATE UK ~_.,Stanleyville r+'?
-._..
ILI
Lsoao~d a
* 4 Bukavu.
EL.6IAN G?QINGO
Ly7uaburq.
.SECRET
ANP0LfA
SUDAN.
RUANDA
URUNRL
panic, and that he was
taking all steps to
ensure their being
fully protected until
30 June.
Belgian action
to reassert adminis-
trative and military
control in the Congo
coincided with appar-
ent moves by Lumumba
and Abako leader
Joseph Kasavubu to
establish themselves
in positions of po-
litical power prior
to independence. In
separate statements,
the rival leaders
called for the estab-
lishment of a provi-
sional Congolese gov-
ernment to rule the
colony in the period
leading up to inde-
pendence. Lumumba
added that the people
Graving instability through-
out. the. Congo . in early May,
was highlighted by scattered
strikes in Katanga Province,
civil disobedience and passive
resistance campaigns in Kivu
and Orientale provinces, and
renewed tribal warfare in Kasai
and Leopoldville provinces.
Lumumba is reported to be in-
citing antiwhite sentiment in
some areas in connection with
the legislative campaign. Vot-
ing for a Congolese legislature
began on 11 May and is sched-
uled to continue through 25 May.
Belgium's initial hesitan-
cy in connection with the
spreading of disorders has ap-
parently ended; Belgian offi-
cials on 16 May advised Ambas-
sador Burden in Brussels of
their intention immediately to
strengthen Belgian land, sea,
and air forces in the Congo.
Defense Minister Gilson ob-
served that Europeans in the
Congo were in a state of near
are "capable of seizing power"
if a provisional government is
not established. He termed the
reinforcement of Belgian forces
in the Congo an "invasion" de-
signed to intimidate the popu-
lace and to influence the elec-
tions in favor of pro-administra-
tion candidates.
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.7L' t.l[G i ik~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
Although Lumumba has
strong support in Kivu and
Orientale provinces, he is dis-
trusted and opposed in many
areas. A move by Lumumba to
seize power prior to independ-
ence would probably inspire
strong adverse reactions in
STAT
The recent African nation-
alist disorders in the mining
areas of the British protector-
ate of Northern Rhodesia empha-
size the growing political and
racial tension there. The gov-
ernment has acted vigorously to
Federation of Rhodesia
Leopoldville and Katanga prov-
vinces and might prompt the
Conakat party in Katanga and
the Abako party in Leopold- 25X1
ville to attempt to implement
their periodic threats to
secede from the Congo.
The troubles began on 8 May
after a political meeting of the
African United National Inde-
pendence party (UNIP) was broken
up by the police; Africans at-
tacked Europeans and their prop-
erty. The reinforced police
and Nyasaland
re-established order
and made many arrests,
but outbreaks occurred
at several points in
the Copperbelt mining
area during the next
few days. To pacify
the aroused European
settlers who were de-
manding strong action
and threatened to form
vigilante committees,
which would have pre-
cipitated racial clash-
es, and government
took prompt action
against the offending
African nationalists.
Provincial UNIP branch-
es were outlawed, and
party leaders were
forbidden to enter the
Copperbelt region.
Meanwhile, the
powerful European
mineworkers' union ob-
tained a promise of
support from Sir Roy
Welensky, prime min-
ister of the Federa-
repress the disturbances and
outlaw the responsible African
political party, but disorders
are likely to recur because
native grievances are not being
satisfied.
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
and the federal minister of com-
merce assured the settlers that
a "federal army was standing by
ready to preserve law and order
to avoid another Cyprus." The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
80,000 Europeans in Northern
:Rhodesia wield an influence dis-
proportionate to their numbers
and can count on strong support
from the dominant whites of
Southern Rhodesia, who would op-
pose any concessions giving the
copper riches to Africans. Thus
London faces a difficult task in
trying to balance white settler
and African interests and in
avoiding widespread African
rioting or a breakup of the
Federation.
The security situation in
Northern Rhodesia has been de-
teriorating in the last few
months. The Africans have im-
proved their political organi-
zations and have been aroused
to nationalist extremism by the
Belgian Congo's rapid approach
to independence. In common with
the natives of Nyasaland--the
Federation's other protectorate
under British Colonial Office
control--the Africans in North-
ern Rhodesia are increasingly
opposed to the settler-dominated
Federation. The nationalists
demand its early breakup, and
they believe they have the sym-
pathy of British Colonial Secre-
tary Macleod, who recently toured
the area.
UNIP leader Kenneth Kaunda,
who visited the United States
during the period of rioting, is
expected to see Macleod this
month. If Kaunda does not ob-
tain support for his nationalist
stand, he will probably be forced
by extremists among the leader- 25X1
ship of the UNIP to instigate
further disturbances in Northern
Rhodesia.
Although much maneuvering
is taking place and negotia-
tions are going on between vari-
ous interested politicians to-
ward the formation of alliances,
there is still no clear picture
of election lists. A neutral
caretaker cabinet headed by
Ahmad Dauq, former ambassador
in Paris and a Sunni Moslem,
has assumed office and will
carry out the elections begin-
ning 12 June. It is planned
that his cabinet will resign
shortly after 3 July when the
elections are complete.
appear to be still siding with
President Shihab, who is en-
deavoring to keep Jumayyil from
joining forces with Chamoun.
Frictions in the non-Mos-
lem community are continuing. A
cleavage in the Phalange is said
to be developing between a group
led by Jumayyil and others who
desire a moderate attitude to-
ward the 1 May killing of
Christians, and a group whose
leaders are pressing for co-
operation with Chamoun. The
Greek Orthodox minority is also
split between pro- and anti-
Chamoun factions.
The reconciliation between
former President Chamoun and
Maronite Patriarch Maushi has
stiffened the morale of candi-
dates not supported by the UAR
and improved the chances for
collaboration among them. Pierre
Jumayyil and his Phalange party
Lebanese Moslems are also
split. Sunni Moslem politicians
are competing for UAR support
and are unable to agree on elec-
tion slates. Some incidents
of violence have occurred
between various factions.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
Nasir's release of the in-
formation at this time may re-
flect his irritation over the
American sale of arms to Israel
--the subject of bitter com-
ment in the Cairo press. The
delivery last year of American
106-mm. rifles to Israel--ap-
parently not known to Cairo until
their appearance in Israel's
Independence Day parade on 2
May--contributed to the anti-
American tone of Nasir's
speeches early this month.
Nasir stated on 12 May that
the USSR had recently promised
him "immediate" delivery
MIG-19 fighter aircraft
IS estimated to have 228
jet fighters, of which about
140 are MIG-17s
INDIAN COMMUNISTS FAIL TO RESOLVE POLICY SPLIT
Indian Communist leaders
have failed in a new effort to
.resolve their deep differences
over the party's future course
of action. The showdown between
proponents of a moderate line
and those favoring more radical
tactics expected during the ex-
ecutive meetings held from 3 to
12 May now has been postponed
until a party congress can be
convened in January 1961. The
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19 May 1960
Communist Party of India (CPI)
meanwhile is to be guided by the
moderate "Amritsar thesis" a-
dopted at the last congress in
1958; this emphasized a peace-
ful, parliamentary approach to
gain power.
Chronic factionalism among
CPI leaders was greatly accentu-
ated as a result of the damaging
effects on the party of the
Sino-Indian border dispute and
the Communist electoral defeat
in Kerala'State. Several meet-
ings of the party secretariat
and central executive committee
during the past few months have
ended in a deadlock between the
"moderates" and the hard-line
extremists.
The policy dispute now
seems to be centered on the de-
gree of cooperation which the
party should extend to Prime
Minister Nehru personally and
to his more "progressive" poli-
cies. The extremists have ar-
gued for some time that Nehru
has surrendered to "reactionary"
Congress party leaders; they
point to his acceptance of 'large
scale Western economic aid and
his firm stand during Chou En-
lai's recent visit as proof.
The moderate faction con-
tends that Nehru should be "res-
cued" and that certain govern-
ment economic policies must
be supported. On the Sino-
Indian border issue, which
nearly precipitated a breakup
of the CPI last fall, the
party outwardly has closed
ranks. Sharp differences re-
main, however, between the
"nationalist" moderates and
the "internationalist" radicals
on the question of relations
with Peiping.
Ideological confusion a-
mong the Indian Communists
has been compounded by recent
indications of similar differ-
ences over theory between
Peiping and Moscow. Extremist
leaders have seized on the
Chinese party's articles in
Red Flag to bQlster their ar-
guments in favor of a harder
line. The moderate faction
has drawn on Moscow's support
and has patterned its tactics
on Khrushchev's policy of eas-
ing cold-war tensions. While
the moderate leadership so far
has retained control, advo-
cates of more aggressive
tactics have gained some ground
recently. Should Moscow, in
the wake of developments at
the summit conference, revert 25X1
to a hard line, the posi-
tion of these extremists presum-
ably would be strengthened.
IWO,
..SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SWEEPING SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT CHANGES
South Korean Acting Chief
of State Huh Chung is making
sweeping personnel changes in
the government, but at the same
time is trying to minimize the
adverse effects on government
operations. There have been
increasing arrests and shifts
of government personnel identi-
fied with the old regime, which
has tended to mollify public
opinion.
Martial law commander Lt.
Gen. Song Yo-chan has warned
that the government must soon
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% SECRET `..,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
stop firing police officials
if the police organization's
effectiveness is to be re-
stored.
New Defense Minister Lt.
Gen. Yi 'Chong-than has an-
nounced that all military com-
manders, including the chiefs
of the three services, will be
punished if they are found to
have been involved in election
irregularities.
Passage of a constitutional
amendment greatly reducing the
powers of the president and es-
tablishing a cabinet with a
prime minister responsible to
the legislature appears likely
to be enacted about mid-June
despite threats by Rhee's dis-
credited majority Liberal party
to resign from the legislature
unless "illegal" retaliations
against local Liberal leaders
are halted. Should the dissi-
dents manage to hold up legisla-
tion, public disorder and vio-
lence might be renewed.
Prospects for improved
relations between Seoul and
Tokyo have been dimmed by Huh
Chung's firm opposition to the
present program for the repa-
triation of Koreans in Japan
to North Korea. Huh has pub-
licly warned that cessation of
the program is an essential
condition for a final settlement
of outstanding differences, but
stated that its continuation
does not preclude resumption of
negotiations. Subsequently,
however, he "forcefully and
explicitly" told Ambassador
McConaughy that so long as the
repatriation to North Korea
continues, negotiations with
Japan cannot be resumed.
25X1
25X6
POLITICAL MANEUVERING FOR NEW GOVERNMENT IN LAOS
The militantly anti-Commu-
nist Committee for Defense of
National Interests (CDNI) ap-
pears to have gained a decided
edge in the maneuvering for a
dominant voice in the formation
of a new Laotian government.
The CDNI has formed a new polit-
ical party, the Social Demo-
cratic party (SDP), based prima-
rily on the National Assembly
deputies who ran under CDNI auspices
in the 24 April elections. The
new party has apparently also
attracted a few defectors from
former Premier Phoui's Rally of
the Lao People (RLP), the other
major non-Communist political
grouping in Laos. Reports vary as
to the SDP's potential parliamen-
tary strength, but it probably now
controls from 30 to 40 of the 59
deputies in the new assembly.
The King will in all like-
lihood give the SDP the first
opportunity to form a government.
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Iftoe SECRET -
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
The SDP may attempt to form a
government without the partici-
pation of the two remaining ma-
jor factions of the RLP, head-
ed respectively by Phoui and
Souvanna Phouma, another former
premier who was the architect
of the 1957 integration agree-
ment between the royal govern-
ment and the Pathet Lao.
The RLP seems in imminent
danger of dissolution, with Sou-
vanna Phouma hinting strongly
that he would like to form his
own party. Both Phoui and Sou-
vanna probably still cherish the
hope that international pressures
on the King will assure their
inclusion in the new government,
and they can be expected to do
what they can in the assembly
to prevent the early installa-
tion of a largely CDNI govern-
ment.
Which of the SDP leaders
the King will designate to form
a cabinet is still in doubt. The
party membership reportedly pro-
fesses a strong preference for
Gen. Phoumi, the CDNI strong man
and defense minister in the pres-
ent. caretaker government.
Phoumi, however, perhaps unde-
servedly, has come to symbolize
anti-Communist extremism in Laos.
Even if he divests himself of
his military associations by re-
signing his commission, his in-
stallation as premier would prob-
ably be the single development
most likely to trigger a revival
of Pathet Lao insurgency. .
:recent elections dictates a return
to widespread open hostilities,
A number of centers designed to
indoctrinate cadres and train
them in guerrilla tactics report-
edly are in operation in North
Vietnam.
A significant step-up of dis-
sidence, however, would require
'the prior approval of Peiping and
Hanoi, and there is no indication
that these regimes wish to pro-
voke a Laotian crisis at present.
The joint communique issued
by Chou En-laiand Premier Pham
Van Dong on 14 May at the end of
Chou's visit suggests that the
Communists do not intend to launch
a major propaganda campaign a-
gainst Laos, at least until a
new government is formed in Vien-
tiane and there is some clear in-
dication that it will pursue a
strongly pro-Western course simi-
lar to that of its predecessor.
The communique largely re-
iterated standard Communist de-
mands, and made no mention of
the recent election irregular-
ities which virtually eliminated
Communist representation in the
Laotian National Assembly. Al-
though Chou and Pham Van Dong
termed the present situation in
Laos "dangerous," they indicated
that it could be restored to
normal by "peaceful consulta-
tion" between the,parties con-
cerned'--presumably including
Communist China and North Viet-
nam, who were signatories to
the Geneva agreements of 1954.
Phoumi would probably be
content with the deputy premier-
ship or the defense portfolio,
with someone like Tiao Somsanith,
the present interior minister,
fronting for him as premier.
3omsanith's selection as the
SDP's parliamentary leader sug-
gests he may well be designated
'to make the first attempt to
form a government.
The Pathet Lao, probably
have increased -its. capability
to wage large-scale dissidence
in Laos and may feel that its
loss of legal strength in the
Peiping and Hanoi also
called for the reactivation of
the International Control Com-
mission created in the Geneva
agreements and for the implemen-
tation of a policy of strict
neutrality in Laos. The Commu-
nists believe such a policy would
provide the best environment for
the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the Pathet
Lao's political front, to strengthen
its position as a legal party 25X1
while continuing to benefit from
low-level dissident activity.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM&RY
19 May 1960
PRO-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SINGAPORE LABOR AND STUDENT CIRCLES
Pro-Communists in Singa-
pore appear to be making steady
progress in their program of
consolidating their strength,
especially in labor unions and
Chinese schools, although for
the time being they are avoid-
ing an open showdown with the
government.
Increasing pro-Communist
influence was also reflected
in the appointment to the STUC
secretariat of six prominent
extremists who had served jail
terms for subversive activities
under the previous Singapore
government. Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew justifies the ap-
pointments as a means of iden-
tifying the extremists with
the government's labor policy
of "industrial peace with
justice" and places the moder-
ate leaders of the ruling Peo-
ple's Action party (PAP) in a
better position to control ex-
tremist activities.
Although the top STUC of-
fices remain in moderate hands,
the US Consulate General fears
that the organization's Indian,
Malay, and moderate Chinese lead-
ers will be no competition for
the extremist Chinese in Singa-
pore's predominantly Chinese
labor movement. It believes the
entire labor movement may fall
into the hands of extremists
sooner than previously feared.
The PAP government is also
disturbed over the amount of Com-
munist influence in Nanyang Uni-
versity--a privately operated
all-Chinese institution in Singa-
pore--as well as in numerous
Chinese middle schools. The gov-
ernment is engaged in moves de-
signed to gain administrative
control over the university and
to make it into a "national,"
rather than a purely Chinese,
institution. This is an extreme-
ly touchy maneuver because of
Communist influence among, and
the strong chauvinistic feelings
of, many Nanyang University stu-
dents and key financial supporters.
Indonesian domestic and
diplomatic activity now is con-
cerned mainly with Dutch plans
to augment land and air forces
in Netherlands New Guinea (West
Irian) and to send naval units
on a flag-showing cruise to the
Far East.
In the absence of a govern-
ment-controlled mass campaign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
against Dutch plans, the Indo-
nesian Communist party has at-
tempted to seize the initiative.
Despite an army ban, student
anti-Dutch demonstrations--
clearly coordinated by the Com-
munists--occurred in four major
cities in Java in mid-Allay,
and earlier in the month stu-
dents attacked and damaged the
Dutch chancery in Djakarta.
The Communist platform which
emerged during the demonstra-
tions called for severance of
relations with the Dutch, sei-
zure of remaining Dutch assets
in Indonesia, submission of the
dispute to the United Nations,
and all-out support of Presi-
dent Sukarno.
Caught off guard, civilian
government officials took no
action against the demonstra-
tions, apparently being reluc-
tant to crack down on activi-
ties which ostensibly reflected
genuine national apprehension.
Immediately following the demon-
strations, however, the govern-
ment announced that action would
be taken against assemblies
which violate regulations, and
in East Java the army commander
specifically banned demonstra-
tions on West Irian.
The army has reiterated
that all anti-Dutch activities
must be channeled through the
army-controlled West Irian
Liberation Front. Both civilian
and army officials appear to
be awaiting President Sukarno's
return in early June from a
global tour, presuming that he
will chart the course of Indo-
nesia's reaction to Dutch moves.
The Indonesian Navy, in a
show of force, is conducting 25X1
in waters adjacent to West Irian.
The Foreign Ministry con-
tinues its approaches to Afro-
Asian governments for coopera-
tion in obstructing Dutch moves.
The ambassadors of the UAR,
Pakistan, and Iraq have made
public statements in Djakarta
denouncing Dutch actions.
The West Irian issue in-
creasingly diverts public atten-
tion from the anti-Communist,
anti-Sukarno campaign of the Demo-
cratic League. The Communists
are using the issue against the
league, identifying both the
Dutch and the league as opposed
to President Sukarno. The party
is also eager to use West Irian
to divert attention from the
Overseas Chinese issue. Although
official attention will be tempo-
rarily deflected from West Irian
to renewed friction over Chinese
problems, the general public is
likely to remain preoccupied with
anti-Dutch issues.
SINO-INDONESIAN DISPUTE SHARPENS
Peiping's determination to
champion the "rights and inter-
ests" of Overseas Chinese in
Indonesia has led to new fric-
tions in Sino-Indonesian rela-
tions and precludes an early
settlement of the dispute be-
tween the two countries.
Peiping on 14 May publicized
a protest over the house arrest
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19 May 1960
in late April of a Chinese con-
sul in East Borneo. The consul
had interceded with local Indo-
nesian authorities over "delib-
erate delays" in processing
Overseas Chinese; he subsequent-
ly was confined to his residence
for 41 hours and given a dead-
line for leaving town. The Chi-
nese claim the Indonesians mounted
machine guns to intimidate Chi-
nese students who planned to
help the returnees carry their
belongings.
An Indonesian Foreign Min-
istry official termed "improper
diplomatic practice" the Chi-
nese Communists' publication of
their protest without waiting
for an Indonesian reply, and he
explained that the Chinese con-
sul's abusive manner forced
army authorities to confine him.
Djakarta has asked for the with-
drawal of this and another con-
sul for interference in the
repatriation program.
Peiping's decision to issue
the protest is the culmination
of a series of behind-the-scenes
recriminations between China and
Indonesia. On 10 April the In-
donesian charge in Peiping
walked out of the National Peo-
ple's Congress during a speech
by Fang Fang, deputy chairman
of the Overseas Chinese Affairs
Commission, in which Fang had
accused the Djakarta regime of
showing a "comprador mentality"
and said it was in danger of be-
coming a military dictatorship.
Relations have also been
exacerbated by Indonesia's mis-
handling of the departure from
Sumatra of .a Chinese ship car-
rying repatriates.
Ambassador Huang Chen ob-
viously has made little progress
in the joint Sino-Indonesian
committee which was set up osten-
sibly to handle problems arising
from implementation of the dual
nationality treaty but actually
has been used as a channel to
convey Peiping's "demands" on
Djakarta concerning persecution
of Overseas Chinese. The Chi-
nese can be expected to use
various methods of maintaining
their pressure, including petty
harassment of the Indonesian
Embassy in Peiping
Communist China, which pro-
duced only 2,850,000 tons of
steel in 1955, expects to turn
out more than 18,000,000 tons
this year. No long-range goals
for 1965 have been announced,
but China may well be producing
at a rate in excess of 35,000,-
000 tons annually by that time,
making it the third of fourth
largest producer of steel in
the world. To reach this level,
the Chinese would have to add
little more in the way of steel-
making capacity during the next
five years than was installed
over the past five--3,400,000
tons a year as against 3,100,000.
Additions to capacity at this rate
should prove feasible for Peiping.
In pursuit of these large
increases, the regime is depending
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
on a policy, introduced in sim-
plified form in 1958, of build-
ing domestically improvised
facilities to supplement the
large, integrated plants being
constructed, modernized, and
expanded with Soviet assistance.
These plants still play the
key role in the expansion of the
industry as a whole, but the
contribution made by plants
using China-made facilities is
increasing.
spread use of the side-blown
converter, which is similar to
an experimental converter de-
veloped in the United States in
the 1940s.
These plants require only
a small outlay of capital and,
if a proper grade of pig iron
is used and supervision is ade-
quate, can produce steel of a
quality acceptable for any gen-
eral use. At present, however,
the necessary control
is frequently lacking.
In March of this year,
for example, less than
half the converter
steel made in Shanghai
was what they described
as first-rate, and,
while this had risen
to 85 percent in April,
the reject rate still
is high,
COMMUNIST CHINA'S STEEL MAKING INDUSTRY
MILLION M ITRIC TONS
MAJOR SOVIET AID PROJECTS:
-1469--- 19.
PRODUCTIQM CAPACITY
ESTIMATED
BREAKDOWNS
Anshan ........................................ 5.6 ....................... 6.0
Wuhan .......................................... 0.5 ....................... 3.0
Paotou .......................................... 0.0 ........................ 3.0
Tsitsihar .................................... 014 ........................0 5
PLANTS BEING ENLARGED AND
INTEGRATED WITH BLOC AID:
Tayeh .......................................... 0.5 ........................1. 3
Taiyuan ...................................... 0.4 ........................ 2.0
Maanshan ................................... 0.3 ....................... 1.0
Chungking ................................... 0.86 ......................1.5
Shihchingshan ............................. 0.65 ......................1.3
Hsiangtan .....................................0.0 ........................1.2
2.71
INTEGRATED PLANTS WITH
CHINESE-PRODUCED EQUIPMENT:
Chiuchuan .................................... 0.0 ........................1.5
Hsichang ...................................... 0.0........................ 2.0
Lungyen ` ...................................... 0.0 ........................1.5
Shaokuan......... ............................. 0,0 .................. -- 1. 5
0.0 6.5
PARTIALLY INTEGRATED PLANTS: .......... 1.14 ..................... 1.2
LOCAL MEDIUM AND SMALL
"MODERN" PLANTS: ..................................... 3.0 ...................... 7.0
TOTAL ......... 13.35 .................. 35.5
The wasteful "native" fur-
naces which sprang up in the
fall of 1958 have been abandoned,
largely because they failed to
contribute a product useful to
the national economy. Instead,
the regime is centering its at-
tention on what it describes
as small- and medium-size "mod-
ern" plants. The outstanding
feature of these is their wide-
The authorities
in Peiping intend
these small "modern"
installations even-
tually to evolve into
units which come closer
than they do today to
being "modern" in the
'Western sense. They
probably will not be
expanded at past rates
and will contribute
some 7,000,000 tons
of steel in 1965, as
against 5,500,000 this
year and 3,000,000
last year.
Although imports
of iron- and steel-
19MAY 1960 making equipment will
continue over the next
five years, Communist China's
ability to make more sophisti-
cated types of such equipment
will improve, again with Soviet
help. The USSR is aiding in
the expansion of heavy machinery
plants at Mukden and Taiyuan and
in the construction of a huge
new Soviet-designed and -equipped
plant at Fularki in northern
Manchuria. These plants--which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
will be able to turn out up-to-
date, highly productive compo-
nents for China's iron and
steel plants--should be com-
pleted by 1962.
At 35, 000, 000 tons, China's
steel output in 1965 will top
the 29,400,000 tons produced
in 1959 by West Germany--the
world's third largest producer
last year. Even at this rate,
however, China's steel produc-
tion will be far from adequate
--in terms of quantity, quality,
and variety--for all the require-
ments of its burgeoning industry.
China's rapid industrialization
drive
is already beginning
to
place
demands on the steel
in-
dustry
to produce not just
more
steel
but a wider variety
of
quality products.
The scope of these demands
will almost certainly broaden
as the technological complexity
of China's industry grows. In
the past the regime has concen-
trated on producing a limited
range of products featuring
crude steel of simple specifica-
tions. Finishing capacity has
lagged behind, and, in 1959,an
estimated 2,000,000 tons of
crude steel had either to be
stockpiled, remelted, or assigned
to primitive handicraft use.
These aspects of the indus-
try will have to be given
more attention in the future,
even at the cost of a lowering
in the rate of growth in crude
steel output, if Peiping's in-
dustrial and military econo-
is to mature.
COMMONWEALTH
MEETING HIGHLIGHTS
Despite the much-publicized
dissension over South Africa's
racial policies, the two-week
meeting of Commonwealth prime
ministers which concluded on
13 May found an unusually high
degree of agreement on general
international developments.
The Indian prime minis-
ter's preoccupation with prob-
lems posed by Communist China
marked the principal change from
previous years. Even though
Nehru saw Peiping as unlikely
to embark on any substantial
aggressive moves soon, he was
greatly worried about future
relations and seemed to regard
Communist China as "bursting at
the seams."
Nehru still advocated ad-
mitting the Peiping regime to the
United Nations, but he thought
perhaps the Chinese Communists
preferred to remain outside in
order to have an issue to complain
about. In contrast to former
conferences, Nehru and others re-
frained from objecting to defense
pacts and
was general support for the West's 25X1
approach to dealings with Khru -
shchev in the pre-summit period.
A cordiality seemed to have
developed between Nehru and Paki-
stani President Ayub during the
meetings. Ayub is said'to have
refrained from making an issue of
Kashmir, and
he may have decided to 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
accept that situation as it is.
Although the Indus waters agree-
ment was not ready for signing
during the conference, Nehru
agreed to go to Rawalpindi to
sign it.
Nehru and Ayub found them-
selves in accord in appraising
Indonesian domestic instability,
and neither saw anything that
could be done. In an effort to
strengthen British ties with
Pakistan, Macmillan acceded to
Ayub's pressure to reiterate
British recognition of the
Durand line as Pakistan's border
with Afghanistan.
Anger at South Africa's
racial policies was aggravated
by the undiplomatic behavior of
Pretoria's representative,
External Affairs Minister Louw.
The bitter aftertaste of the
"informal" debates will prob-
ably increase the inclination
of the Malayans or others to
ease South Africa out of the
Commonwealth when South Africa
makes its formal appeal to con-
tinue its membership as a
republic following the ref-
erendum which is to be held
in the Union on this subject.
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The decision of the council
of the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) on 12 May concerning
the "rate of realization of
treaty objectives" is the most
important EEC development of the
past two years. The EEC is
already ahead of schedule in
several respects, and its inter-
nal development and consolidation
are now likely to be further
advanced. By reaffirming the
intention of the six member
countries to proceed with the
establishment of a full economic
union, the council has appar-
ently given the rest of Western
Europe little choice but to come
to terms with it.
The council's decisions
are generally in keeping.with
the acceleration plan advanced
by President Hallstein last
March. Tariffs among the EEC
members, which would have been
reduced another 10 percent on
1 July, will be reduced instead
20 percent. This will mean
a 30-percent reduction in in-
ternal tariffs in just 18
months, and unless there are
unfavorable developments in
the business cycle, the 10-
percent reduction scheduled for
December 1961 may also be
doubled, A new timetable has
been drawn up for the institution
of a common agricultural policy,
and the members have declared
their willingness to proceed as
"rapidly as possible" to im-
plement other community policies.
On the crucial problem of
the EEC's common external tariff,
the council also accepted the
substance of Hallstein's pro-
posals but not the timing. The
rates eventually applicable to
imports from nonmembers will be
"provisionally" reduced by 20
percent, and the initial step
toward putting them into effect
will be taken "no later" than
31 December, This is six months
later than Hallstein had proposed
but a year ahead of the schedule
set forth in the EEC treaty.
Although interpreted as a concili-
atory gesture toward the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA
or Outer Seven), the delay is
due in part to a need for par-
liamentary action in some of
the EEC countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
There is little reason
evident for the Outer Seven to
take comfort either from this
delay- or _-the. icouftcil's
"declaration of intent" to
negotiate actively to maintain
"traditional trade ties, "pprtiew
ularly between the two groups.
The declaration calls for US
and Canadian participation in
any such negotiations, declares
that "GATT principles" must be
observed, and specifically re-
calls the EEC offer of late 1959
to establish a "contact commit-
tee" with the Outer Seven.
These provisos suggest that
the EEC has no new approach in
mind--that it is willing to
discuss trade difficulties'in
specific commodities of pri-
maryinterest to the Six and
Seven, but not to negotiate an
over-all trading association be-
tween the two. This would
leave the members of the Outer
Seven, .little choice _,bUt.. to
accept'. the same _,,treatment the.
EEC accords the rest of the 25X1
world trading community or in-
dividually to'seek'direct EEC
FRENCH COMMUNISTS WINNING ELECTORAL SUPPORT
In a number of French local
elections since the January
rightist revolt in Algeria,non-
Communist leftist, candidates
have demonstrated increased uni-
ty and have formed some success-
ful tactical alliances with the
French Communist :party. (PCF) .' Inflii
ential Le Monde editor Jacques
Fauvet publicly recommended on
7 May that the left ally itself
with the Communists to halt the
"disappearance" of French de-
mocracy.
The Communist candidate in
a February cantonal by-election
to replace a Radical in Calvados
Department won a surprise vic-
tory over the Independent party
candidate, with the Communist
vote increasing 1,000 votes over
its 1955 total. The PCF with-
drawal in the March municipal
elections at Quimper, Finistere
Department, gave:the Socialist-
Radical list a surprise victory
over the favored Gaullist - Popu-
lar Republican list. Opposi-
tion to the government's policy
of expanded aid to church schools
was a major factor in the Quinper
upset and also in a cantonal elec-
tion in April at Dormans, Marne
Department, where a Socialist
candidate who won 352 votes on
the first round withdrew and the
Communist candidate picked up
351 votes in the runoff.
The strategic position of
the newly formed Unified Social-
ist party (PSU) is apparent in
this context, The PSU, which
counts former Premier Mendes-
France in its :ranks,, was con-
stituted to provide a non-Commu-
nist opposition to De Gaulle,
One component of the party, how-
ever, has long been committed
to cooperation with the Commu-
nists, and another is composed
of former PCF members.
PSU successes in several al-
liances with the Communists may
give increasing pause to the
French Socialist party, which
has rejected a popular front.
Shortly before the PSU was formed,
its Mendes-France group won a
cantonal by-election in the Seine-
Maritime Department over the
Gaullist candidate when the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
3 0 3 6
51 UNITED _ --st
KIN G D O M - -
NETH.
? BRUSSELS
B E L G I U M G E R M A N Y
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19 MAY 1960
A
0 25 50 75 1f1U Miles
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Communist and center-left can-
didates withdrew in that group's
favor.
In mid-April in the strong-
ly Socialist and anti-Communist
department of Haute-Vienne, the
PSU candidate with Communist
support beat a Socialist candi-
date. Although candidates of
the left were defeated at D'El-
beuf, Seine-Maritime Department,
by a Gaullist, and at Castenet,
Haute-Garonne Department, by a
Popular Republican, cooperation
between non-,Communists and Com-
munists was evident.
Isolated instances of local
alliances with the PCF occurred
in the Fourth Republic. While al-
liances are too few to indicate
a pattern, those reported this
year suggest that the new will-
ingness of the traditionally divid-
ed left-wing splinter groups to
cooperate among themselves will
increasingly lead to what Fauvet
terms "tactical agreements, lim-
ited in scope and time," with the
Communists, as a logical reac-
tion "to increasing obliteration
of democracy" in France
De Gaulle.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
The defeat of the moderate
Social Democrats in the 14 May
meeting of the executive coun-
cil of the Confederation of
Labor (SAK) and the resignation
of Chairman Heinonen are ex-
pected to split Finland's larg-
est trade union organization
into two rival groups. Some
unions in that event will grav-
itate to the moderate Joint
Organization of Trade Unions
(AYJ), leaving the remainder
of SAK dominated by the Commu-
nists and left-wing Socialists.
The trade union split has
been shat*ing up even since Vice
Chairman Vihtori Rantanen
failed to win the SAK chairman-
ship in 1959 and began building
up a working coalition of radi-
cal Social Democrats and Com-
munists. In an effort to coun-
ter Rantanen's strategy, Hei-
nonen had sought the admission
of four additional right-wing
unions and declared he would
resign if the vote was unfa-
vorable.
At the 14 May meeting,
Rantanen countered by seeking
the admission also of two left-
wing unions, and Heinonen was
defeated 48 to 43. Heinonen
has resigned effective 18 June.
Rantanen is expected to take
over as acting chairman until
the SAK congress in early 1961,
when his formal election as
chairman is likely.
While the withdrawal of
the moderate unions may be
gradual and will be complicated
by internecine struggles in the
local unions, Finland may soon
have two strong trade union or-
ganizations. At present, AYJ
has about 26,000 members. SAK
has about 240,000, of whom an
estimated 100,000 are pro-Com-
munist; there are also some in-
dependent Communist unions, and
they would probably join the
rump SAK. AYJ may benefit
from the inclination of employ-
ers to deal with moderate So-
cial Democrats and thus ultimate-
ly win the affiliation of some
former left-wing Social Demo-
cratic workers.
The factional struggle
within the trade union movement
will also aggravate the Social
Democratic party's split, recent-
ly confirmed by the re-election
of right-wing Chairman Vaino
Tanner, between the regulars
and the Opposition Social Demo-
crats. The continued division
of the Social Democrats pre-
cludes any reconciliation with
the Agrarian party and conse-
quently the formation of a
strong majority government sim-
ilar to those formed in the
postwar period by these two
groups. The minority Agrarian
cabinet in turn will become in-
creasingly dependent on the
parliamentary support of the
Communist-front Finnish People's
Democratic League
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1.960
PANAMANIAN ELECTION AFTERMATH
The De la Guardia govern-
ment continues to delay the an-
nouncement of the results of
the 8 May presidential and leg-
islative election in Panama.
Opposition presidential candi-
date Roberto Chiari is widely
believed to have defeated Ri-
cardo Arias, the government-
backed pre-election favorite,
and both Arias and Victor Goy-
tia--who apparently finished
third in the race--have charged
that improper procedures were
permitted during the balloting.
An official tabulation of re-
turns begun on 14 May will re-
quire at least a' week for com-
pletion, and the verification
of challenged ballots could,
under the provisions of Panama's
electoral law, postpone the
publication of final election
results until 31 May.
Political tension has sub-
sided since election day.
Chiari is a member of Pana-
ma's wealthy ruling clique and
a former vice president who
served briefly as president in
1949 before being ousted in a
coup. He was supported for the
presidency in the recent elec-
tions by the National Opposition
Union (UNO), one of two four-
party alliances aligned against
the government's National Pa-
triotic Coalition party. His
platform included the pledge to
bring the National Guard, Pana-
ma's only military force, under
civilian control.
Although Chiari joined all
other candidates during the pre-
election campaign in vowing to
continue the nationalistic canal
policies of the present govern-
ment,
if Chiari became
president, the period of "name-
calling" and exacerbation of US-
Panamanian difficulties should
be over.
the Chiar government would seek
an early increase in the annual
canal payment to Panama and
would press for the right
to fly the Panamanian flag
in the Canal Zone.
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Mounting resentment against
US and other foreign companies
in Peru was demonstrated in the
nationwide 24-hour general
strike called on 13 May to pro-
test recent "massacres" of work-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
RESENTMENT AGAINST US COMPANIES IN PERU
STAT
Talara
INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM COMPANY
Trujillo\
~rY SUGARPLANTATION
~-- SECRET
SUGAR PLANTATION
(W. R. GRACE)
Cerro ~
de Pasco
LOCATIONS OF
SELECTED US COMPANIES
IN PERU
.Ayacucho
their labor and public relations
policies. The Cerro de Pasco
Corporation has long been under
fire for refusing to allow peas-
ants to occupy its idle lands,
and the general strike call was
occasioned in part
by the deaths of three
Indians at the hands
of Peruvian police
during an attempted
invasion of company
lands on 2 May. The
strike call was also
a protest against the
deaths of three work-
ers in labor disorders
at a US-owned sugar
plantation on 7 May.
Arequipa
Toquepali,
ers and peasants at two US-owned
properties and earlier incidents
on the premises of other foreign
companies.
Several US companies have
been under strong criticism for
The strike was
one of the most ef-
fective ever called
in Peru; the Peruvian
Labor Confederation
(CTP), which called
it, claims participa-
tion by some 2,000,-
000 workers, or 20
percent of Peru's
total population.
The CTP, which
is dominated by the
leftist but non-Com-
munist APRA party,
acted under pressure
of numerous strong
public statements
against the incidents
by student and labor
groups. Government
troops and police
helped keep the strike
and related student-
worker meetings order-
ly, but there were
numerous denuncia-
tions, with varying
vehemence, of US companies and
of the Peruvian Government for
maintaining policies allegedly
inimical to the rights of work-
ers and peasants and for fail-
ing to carry out agrarian
reforms.
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19 May 1960
The long-standing and bit-
ter controversy over the legal
status of oil lands belonging
to the International Petroleum
Company, a Standard Oil Com-
pany subsidiary and Peru's
largest producer, is scheduled
for consideration at a special
session of the Peruvian Con-
gress to be called after 20
May. The company faces possi-
ble annulment of rights to its
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
petroleum properties--which it
owns outright rather than under
concession--unless a compromise
can be made acceptable to the
company and the government,
which considers-that the pres-
ent arrangement "violates na-
tional sovereignty." Both
rightists and Communists have
exploited the nationalistic as-
pects of the case for politi-
cal reasons.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
VLADIMIR DUDINTSEV'S A NEW YEAR'S TALE
The publication by the
Soviet literary journal Novy
Mir of Vladimir Dudintsev's-
Taoest work, A New Year's Tale,
is one more sfep Tn stub- -
born efforts of Soviet writers
to push back the boundaries
prescribed by the regime's cul-
tural policy. As such, it a-
gain demonstrates the regime's
dilemma in attempting to con-
trol and use the restive in-
telligentsia without sacrific-
ing the limited relaxation of
tension.
Both Dudintsev and Novy
Mir are old offenders against
le party's literary canons.
Dudintsev's stubborn defense
of his first novel, Not By
Bread Alone, ended in Tis par-
ticipation in "the feat of si-
lence" in the spring of 1957,
when 12 rebellious writers re-
fused to recant in the face of
massive official criticism.
Since the beginning of the post-
Stalin literary "thaw," Novy
Mir has been a leader in puu-
Ishing unorthodox works, de-
spite disciplinary replace-
ments on its editorial board.
Both in content and in
form, A New Year's Tale
represents a sharp break with
the approved "socialist real-
ism," the task of which is to
inspire enthusiasm in the broad-
est possible audience for the
regime's economic and political
programs. The scene is laid
"in a city created by my imagi-
nation," writes the author;
nevertheless, "it is possible
to set our watches according to
Moscow time," and Dudintsev
hopes that "perhaps there is
some curious person who will
find places in my fable that
interest his own sober routine
life."
The plot deals with a
scientist working in a research
institute and concerned only
for his academic prestige and
material comfort until a colleague
convinces him that love is more
precious than prestige and physi-
cal well-being. Simultaneously,
he is shocked into a recognition
of the value of time by the dis-
covery that he has only a year
to live. He decides to devote
that year to earning his fellow
man's gratitude by bringing light
to the people of the dark land
on the other side of Dudintsev's
fantasy world. In the pursuit
of this goal, he also earns
friendship and a woman's love,
and in bringing light also cures
his own illness.
Unorthodoxy in Content
The most startling of the
passages which the author warns
may "interest" the reader's real
life are narrated by a second-
ary character in a flashback
which lays the scene for the
story itself:
"Some years ago, not far,
far away but in our own city,
the following thing happened.
One Sunday in the park of cul-
ture, in one of its shadiest
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SECRET NOW-Or
19 May 1960
secluded spots, sixty or maybe
a hundred well-dressed men
gathered for a discussion which
they had decided to conduct in
the open air. Later it became
known that in our park there
had taken place, one might say,
a two-hour symposium of bandits
and thieves who belonged, as
they say, 'to the law' (appar-
ently intended to imply a soci-
ety or brotherhood).
"Among those; in that au-
dience, there are strict regu-
lations; the breaking of these
regulations means a death pen-
alty. Those who are accepted
into the 'law' must be recom-
mended by several sponsors. A
motto is engraved in India ink
on the chest of a new member
of the society; several words
by which it is possible to rec-
ognize immediately that he is
their man....The congress of
'bandits - law experts' passed
six death sentences, five of
which were carried out....(The
sixth man) was the leader, the
president, or as they say, the
'pakhan' of the whole society
of 'law experts,'?the oldest
and cleverest of all the ban-
dits."
In Dudintsev's world, there
ire only three groups of people
--the bandits, the scientists,
and the nameless, faceless masses
who work, mine coal, and grow
cabbages on the other side of
the planet. The bandits and
scientists coexist in self-
contained groups whose paths
never cross, but who share the
sunlight of their side of the
planet. The masses, however,
live in darkness on a distant
"continent." The Russians, in
fact, traditionally refer to
themselves as the "dark" people,
and coal and cabbages are often
cited as typical Russian prod-
ucts.
The bandits value material
possessions. Their "pakhan,"
however, had suffered a change
of heart and desired only to
win friendship and real love.
He had resigned from the so-
ciety, explaining his position
in a long letter which was
printed in a special leaflet
"because it was a document of
great importance and it was
quite necessary to make use of
it."
Dudintsev emphasizes his
use of the word "law," for
which there appears to be no
idiomatic justification, by
enclosing it in quotation marks.
Its sole function in the plot
is to identify the bandit so-
ciety. The related word "za-
konniki" which he applies to the
"bandits - law.ex5erts" usually
applies to those who study the
letter of the law in minute de-
tail. Dogmatism and authoritari-
anism in the USSR are usually
justified on the basis of the
Communist party's alleged posi-
tion as the unique repository
and infallible interpreter of
the "law" of historical devel-
opment.
Candidates for party mem-
bership must be vouched for by
three sponsors, and members re-
ceive a party identification
card. There have been ample
instances of dogmatic party:
elements passing sentence
on erring members. It must be
noted, however, that the anal-
ogy is incomplete, since there
are also unidentified ?'prison
authorities" who arrest and im-
prison the chief bandit.
A further parallel can be
drawn between the renegade ban-
dit's letter of resignation,
printed in a special leaflet,
and Khrushchev's ?secret speech"
which was widely disseminated in
party circles in pamphlet form.
The ex post facto discovery
that the "congress" of well-
dressed men was in reality a
meeting of bandits and thieves
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
recalls the revelations of this
speech. This analogy is also
incomplete, however. The re-
formed bandit is soon murdered
by his ex-followers, and it is
the hero who brings light to
masses laboring in darkness. It
seems probable that Dudintsev
was deliberately ambiguous on
these as on many other points.
One of the more serious
criticisms leveled against Not
B Bread Alone was the charge
that the hero had not turned to
the party for help. Dudintsev
may have compounded his earlier
"error" here. Not only are the
"law experts" revealed as greedy
and materialistic bandits and
thieves, but there is also a
veiled implication that they
are alien to the life around
them. The title which they
gave their leader--"pakhan"--
is not a Russian but a Tadzhik
word, And far from being a
possible source of help, the
bandits murder the only man
who understands the hero's prob-
lem.
Another possible reflection
of the party is found in the
character of the. "cadre direc-
tor" who works with the scien-
tists. He and his wife flaunt
rich clothes; in contrast to the
two heroes, who find happiness
in working for others, he re-
gards these as mutually exclu-
sive goals, and he is unable to
imagine any standard of values
other than material possessions.
His angry query--"If time is
nothing but a tiny particle, do
we have no heroic past? Do we
have no great solar future?"--
remains unanswered. It is also
the cadre director who in-
sists that the reformed bandit
should be reported to the au-
thorities as an escaped criminal.
A similar argument, centering
around a story published in the
Leningrad literary journal Neva,
shook Soviet literary circles
last fall.
Criticism of Soviet Society
Dudintsev refers to the
area in which the dark masses
live as "'materik,'" not "konti-
nent." Both words mean conti-
nent, but "materik" has a sec-
ond meaning of "subsoil," Some
Western critics have considered
and rejected the idea that these
masses might be laboring in the
"darkness of capitalism." It is
also possible to interpret the
three groups as a savage com-
mentary on the gulf between the
dogmatic authority of the party,
the intelligentsia, and the
workers in the USSR.
The hero's personal philoso-
phy also implies criticism of
aspects of life in the USSR.
"The most precious thoughts are
not those squeezed out labori-
ously at a desk, but those which
come to us like a whiff of wind.'"
Books are available "even if they
were locked up in the state safe
behind seven seals." "The wor-
ship of material things must un-
mistakably give way to the beauty
of man's soul, which cannot be
bought or stolen. We cannot
force anyone to love us by threat-
ening him with weapons."
There are hints of rebirth
and reincarnation, and an in-
sistence on the link between the
present and antiquity in the re-
curring theme of a lotus blos-
som grown from a seed which "had
lain for 2,000 years in a stone
tomb." A second recurring theme--
an owl, which appears to repre-
sent a reminder of the finite-
ness of the individual's life
span and hence of the need for
individual integrity--"looks as
if it had been hewn by a paleo-
lithic man." It too is asso-
ciated with antiquity, having
been drawn and carved by unknown
races in many lands.
Nowhere in the story is
there any trace of the "new
element".. Which, according to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
Communist orthodoxy, was inter-
jected into the historical proo-
ess,-. in 1917, and which the 7.4
regime has always insisted must
be reflected in literature.
Unorthodoxy In Form
The heavy use of symbolism
is itself a break with official
esthetic standards. According
to a recent pronouncement of
the Soviet Academy of Arts,
revisionism--one facet of which
is experimentation with form
and style--is introducing chaos
into Marxist-Leninist esthetics.
Leninist principles demand that
art "serve not the selected
few, not the upper 10,000, but
millions." Symbolism is not
only suspect as a possible
attempt to bypass the censor,
but it is also unintelligible
to these "millions."
Dudintsev's symbolism is
both a protection and a hand-
icap. Its ambiguities make it
difficult for his critics to
pin down any more grievous
error than lack of socialist
form, but it also limits his
audience. The authorities'
recognition of this latter
factor probably explains the
paucity of Soviet critical
comment thus far.
The newspaper of the USSR
Writers' Union, Literary Ga-
zette, praised tiie au h'or~s
idea of bringing happiness to
others but deplored the am-
biguities which aroused "per-
plexing questions" in the
reader's mind. A Moscow youth
paper noted that the "transpar-
ent" story contained "serious
ideological errors" and was
written from "exactly the same
ideological position" for
which Dudintsev had previously
been "justly" criticized.
If the regime's reaction
has not been sufficiently
strong either to risk focusing
public attention on an unortho-
dox, work or to undermine the
carefully cultivated relaxation
of tension, neither will it be
sufficient to deter other writ-
ers and journals from following
the example set by A New Year's
Tale in questioning esiab she
values. It is this problem
which the regime has not yet
solved and which it will contin-
ue to face. A Polish newpaper
reprinted. the story immediately,
without comment. A Hungarian
journal has just published it
with a faintly defensive note
to the effect that the author
had been misinterpreted in the
West. Other writers and artists
both in the USSR and in the
bloc may be encouraged to fur-
ther unorthodox works, each 25X1
time confronting the authorities
with the problem of discipline
versus relaxation.
PORTUGAL AND ITS AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
Portugal is increasingly
disturbed over the impact of
Africa's political evolution on
its own African possessions,
thich are the last substantial
part of the continent under
unmodified colonial rule. The
territories are of considerable
economic importance to Lisbon,
which seems determined to main-
tain its paternalistic regime
there by tough police action
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19 May 1960
.and to demand implicit Western
support of this policy. While
no serious native outbreaks in
Portuguese Africa have been
reported, agitation directed
from neighboring territories
is clearly on the rise.
Sovereignty over the terri-
tories of Angola, Mozambique,
and Portuguese Guinea appeals
to Portuguese national pride,
as symbolizing four and a half
centuries of imperial rule.
The territories also mean solid
PORTUGAL SPAIN
D
Cape Verde
Islands
economic advantages. Although
little developed as compared
with other African areas, they
provide the Portuguese con-
sumer with such agricultural
products as coffee, sisal,
and cotton, and earn sub-
stantial amounts of foreign
exchange that help trans-
form mainland Portugal's
persistent trade deficit into
a comfortable payments surplus.
The importance Lisbon attaches
to them is further reflected in
its 1959-1964 economic develbpment
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
(SEyEOAL)
EIDERATION
(V RATION
I GUINEA
r-\
SMRRA
LEONE,
IVORY
COAST
UPPER
VOLTA
TO(
AN,
Principe e Sao Tometi''Mt
UAR
(EGYPT)
a SOMAL
----
PORTUGUESE AFRICA
L.:EATRAL AFRICAN
R EI'LIRLIC
\Luanda
BELGIAN
CONGO
ELANDA-
I_:RI'ND[
ANGOLA
OU FH
A \1 \ I- BAY WEST
ERR
.ter
SOUTH
SECRET
EOERATION OF,'.
],RHODESIA AND
/t NYASALAND
KENYA
V'R"_E
enco Marques
(IF ~I~7O LAND
STAT
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
program, in which nearly a third
of'the billion-dollar investment
envisaged is to be expended
overseas, most of it in Angola
and Mozambique,
Portuguese' Colonial Theory
The Portuguese are con-
vinced that their long colonial
experience has given them great-
er understanding than other
powers on how to deal with the
Africans. In general Portugal
wants evolution "without panic
and excessive haste,"
The African territories
are all regarded legally as
overseas provinces of metropol-
itan Portugal. Portuguese
Africans who meet certain edu-
cational requirements are re-
garded as "assimilated" members
of European society; those with-
out assimilated status are ruled
in a strict paternalistic manner,
The Portuguese believe this
system will eventually lead to
a society in which whites and
blacks cooperate with little or
no racial antagonism.
In practice, however, the
assimilation policy has made
little progress. Efforts to
provide educational and other
welfare facilities--such as
Belgium provided for Africans
in the Congo--have been limited
by Portugal's paucity of human
and material resources. Further-
more, even: the assimilated
Africans are forced into menial
jobs by the general availability
of immigrant Portuguese labor,
since Angola has a white minor-
ity of some 115,000,and Mozam '.
bique 50,000. As a result, po-
litical or economic advancement
is impossible for most of the
10,000,000 natives in Portuguese
Africa, and the relatively ad-
vanced Africans are often dis-
contented and critical of the
regime.
Lisbon nevertheless pro-
fesses to see itself as defend-
ing Western interests by hanging
on to Angola and Mozambique at
all costs. Early in April the
director of the Portuguese
Lusitania News Agency stated
in an address at Oxford Uni-
versity that the Portuguese
"intend to remain in Angola and
Mozambique--dead or alive."
Although drawn toward the
Union of South Africa as a re-
sult of their common opposition
to African nationalism, the
Portuguese apparently disapprove
of South Africa's extreme racial
policies,
Security Precautions.
Portugal's chief reliance
for preventing "excessive haste"
in Africa seems to be in firm
police action.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1960
Portugal has also made an
unofficial agreement with Bel-
gium to take over control of.
the mouth of the Congo River
after 30 June, according to a
statement made by the commander
of the Belgian Navy to the
American naval attache in
mid-May.
Diplomatic Moves
Maintenance of Portugal's
position in Africa seems to have
become one of the major aims of
Portuguese diplomacy. There is
little doubt that Lisbon at-
taches more importance to a
continuation of the status quo
in the overseas provinces than
to NATO?
At the United Nations, Por-
tugal's activities center mainly
on varied efforts to forestall
any moves for UN intervention
in matters relating to the ad-
ministration of Portuguese Africa.
This is probably a major reason
for Portugal's present strenuous
efforts to win "the Western Euro-
pean seat" on the Security
Council at the end of this year.
Out look
Although no serious native
outbreaks have been reported to
IRAQ: NATION OF MINORITIES
Religious institutions and
ethnic differences play a pri-
mary role in shaping the life
and outlook of Iraq's population.
Although over 90 percent of
Iraq's 6,500,000 people adhere
at least nominally to Islam, the
State religion, sectarian and
ethnic differences made the
country a nation of minorities.
date in any of Portugal's African
possessions, observers doubt
that Lisbon will be able to
stave off trouble for very long.
The snail's pace of advance-
ment of the natives' interests
is not likely to satisfy local
desires. Discontent is likely
to be further stimulated by
subversive activity from neigh-
boring territories as
they come under African con-
trol.
Such movements, directed
at Portuguese Guinea and Angola,
are now active in Guinea and
the Belgian Congo, and similar
organizations, aimed at the over-
throw of Portugal's rule in Mo-
zambique, may be set up in Nyasa-
land and Tanganyika when Africans
in those territories take over
the governments. Nationalist
ideas may also enter Mozambique
from South Africa, to which an
estimated 250,000 natives
migrate annually to work in the
mines and elsewhere in the Union's
industrial economy. With ex-
ternal pressure increasing and
internal discontent among the
Africans on the rise, the Por-
tuguese security police and the
military are likely to find
the task of maintaining
public order increasingly
difficult.
Each of Iraq's numerous religious
groups, both Moslem and otherwise,
has its own religious laws, so-
cial habits, and traditions. The
religious community system,
which gives its members a sense
of cohesion, at the same time
nourishes antipathies and social
differences, which act as
forces for separatism within the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 8Ry
19 May 1960
national framework of the Iraqi
state.
Under the monarchy these
forces were for the most part
suppressed. Iraq's minorities
have bitter memories of the
Assyrian massacres of 1933, and
Kurdish uprisings of 19229 1927,
1930, 1932, and 1943, as well
as numerous tribal uprisings.
Since the 1958 revolution, ten-
sions between the various com-
munities have increased with the
continuing instability of the
revolutionary regime.
The Arab Moslems are basi---
ily divided into the two anti-
pathetic sects--Sunnis and Shias,
each with its own shrines, lead-
ers, and even religibus law
courts.
Sunni Moslems
The Sunni Moslems are com-
posed of Arabs, Kurds, and Tur.
komans whose sole meeting ground
is a common religion. The Sunni
religious community has no
priesthood or religious hierachy
which might serve to unify its
members, although there are a
number of religious offices for
dealing with and guiding Sunni
spiritual life. The Sunnis are
"orthodox" Moslems who claim to
stand for the original simplicity
of Islam. They regard the Ko-
SECRET
ran supplemented by the tradi-
tions of the Prophet Mohammed
as the sole and sufficient re-
pository of the Moslem faith.
The Sunni Arabs, political-
ly dominant since the time of
the Ottoman Empire, regard them-
selves as superior to their
Kurdish and Tukkoman coreligion-?-
ists. The Arabs of the seat num-
ber about 1,250,000 and inhabit
the Western half of the country.
The nomadic Arab Bedouin tribes
are mainly Sunnis.
Iraq's estimated 800,000
Kurds are concentrated along the
northeastern borders with Tur-
key and Iran. They speak various
dialects of Kurdish, an Indo-
European language distantly re-
lated to Persian. Dour and
somewhat fatalistic, they are
noted for their warlike behavior.
and despise the Arabs. Their
social organization is based on
tribe and clan, but a Kurdish
leader in modern times--the so-
called sheik--has been either
a holy man or the head of a
family renowned for its holi-
ness, rather than a tribal chief.
Although the Kurds are often
stereotyped as a single cohesive
element, tribal rivalries keep
them in almost constant turmoil.
The most important tribes are
the Babans, Barzinjis, Baradostis,
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Zibaris, and Barzanis. The
Zibaris and Barzanis are pres-
ently at odds with each other,
and the Iraqi security forces
are attempting to umpire the
fighting.
It is doubtful that the
Kurds could be unified into an
effective force. Dreams of a
Kurdish state carved out of
parts of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran
nevertheless are still nurtured
by many Kurds
E___-F-However, Muller Mus-
tafa, leader of the Barzanis
who returned from refuge in
the Soviet Union with some 800
followers after the 1958 Iraqi
revolution, has followed a pol-
icy of supporting the Qasim re-
gime.
Qasim has sought to em-
phasize Kurdish participation
in the Iraqi Government and
cultural autonomy by such ges-
tures as the founding of
Kurdish Academy, a medical
school in the Kurdish center
of Mosul, and broadcasts in
Kurdish over Radio Baghdad. In-
deed, Qasim's emphasis on Arab
unity and the brotherhood of
Arabs and Kurds has disturbed
many Kurdish leaders, who fear
being engulfed in a larger
Arab mass.
The Turkomans, numbering
about 100,000, are village and
town dwellers also living in the
northeastern part of the coun-
try and are descendants of the
pre-Ottoman Turkish invaders
of Iraq. Speaking Turki, a
dialect of Turkish, many Turko-
mans have been government func-
tionaries since Ottoman times,
while many others are small
shopkeepers. During the Kirkuk
disturbances of July 1959, many
Turkoman shops were burned and
their owners killed by Commu-
nist-led mobs. Politically
the Turkomans look toward Tur-
key; however, they too have
been the object of Qasim's so-
licitation.
Iraq's Shia population is
approximately 3,800,000, out-
numbering Sunni Arabs and Kurds
together. They are mostly farm-
ers and are concentrated in
southeastern Iraq. The split
between the Sunnis and Shias
began in the first century of
Islam; the Sunnis called for an
elected caliph--commander of the
faithful--while the Shias ad-
vocated a hereditary succession
through the Prophet Mohammed's
son-in-law All. Shia Islam be- 25X1
came the state religion of Persia
in the 16th century, and Persian
cultural influence has been
strong among the Shias of Iraq
ever since.
The gulf between the Shias
and their Sunni compatriots is
deepened by a number of strange
Shia practices--the passion play
each year commemorating the death
of All, their cult of saints,
practice of temporary marriages,
and the concept that some day a
last "Hidden Imam" will reap-
pear to rule the world and give
his faithful adherents their
due.
Shia resentment of the
Sunnis is especially strong in
the predominantly Shia areas
around Diwaniya and Nasiriya,
centers of unrest during periods
of political or economic crises.
The influence of religious lead-
ers among the Shias is much
stronger than among the Sunnis.
The mujtahids, earthly repre-
sentatives of the Hidden Imam,
guide their followers in all
aspects of life and have repre-
sentatives throughout the Shia
communities. The more revered
mujtahids reside in Karbala and
especially Najaf; they can,
when they wish, exercise con-
siderable political influence.
It is these divines who
have aroused the greatest re-
sistance among the Shias to pol-
icies of the Qasim regime which
they considered pro-Communist.
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They have encouraged their fol-
lowers to attack known Commu-
nists. Iranian influence in
Najaf and Karbala is strong;
these cities are the most im=
portant centers of Shia pil-
grimages after Mecca, and thou-
sands of Iranians visit and
study there every year.
In the southern Iraqi marsh-
es are found the nominally Shia
marsh dwellers called the Ma-
dan,