CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001900020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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P
f
SE CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 50
OCR No. 4044/58
28 August 1958
WEEKLY
=64,3 4 r-1 5 vi
------------
SUMMARY
I i S: btu
OSD review(s) \ri~ ~~'y ) NAVY review
completed. completed.
State Department review
DIA and PACOM review(s)
completed completed.
I 1 i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
>~T 'ONFlDENT1AL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Combat activity in the Taiwan Strait area has
stepped up, including air and naval clashes and
heavy Communist artillery bombardment of the Chin-
men (Quemoy) area. The Chinmen Defense Command be-
lieves.an attack on Tatam and Erhtan is imminent,
and a Communist broadcast of 28 August warns that
a landing on Chinmen is imminent. The Communists
continue to build up their strength in the strait
and
area
,
have increased their groan orces in as China.
The Communists may believe that the bombardment of
Chinmen and seizure of one of the smaller islands
will seriously impair Nationalist morale and pave
the way for capture of all the islands. Chiang Kai-
shek has indicated he would inform American officials
before retaliating against the mainland.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Despite the succesm of the Arab-sponsored UN
resolution, Damascus radio has'resumed attacks on
Jordan. Nasir has publicly praised Lebanese Pres-
ident-elect Shihab, but UAR financial and propaganda
support for the Lebanese rebels continues. The UAR-
Israel arms race is being renewed; advanced types of
heavy military equipment have recently been delivered
to Syria by Soviet vessels.
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SECRET I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DE GAULLE AND FRENCH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The coordinated Algerian National Liberation Front
sabotage and terrorist attacks throughout France which
began on 25 August may signal the opening of a campaign
designed to encourage massive abstention of Algerians
in the forthcoming French constitutional referendum.
The FLN actions may also be intended as a warning to
France that no solution is possible in Algeria except
independence. De Gaulle's assurances to tropical Africa
that the overseas territories can opt for independence
at any time will alarm rightists pressing for "total
integration" of Algeria into France. Approval of the
constitution is still expected, but these developments
may help deprive.De Gaulle of the overwhelming majority
he hopes for.
WORLD REACTION TO NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION ANNOUNCEMENT. Page 2
With few reservations, the free world welcomed the
US-British conditional offer to suspend nuclear testing
for a year beginning 31 October. The French Government,
however, made clear its intention to proceed with its
nuclear weapons program. Considerable British and other
European press comment centered on the problem posed by
Communist China's nonparticipation in the disarmament
negotiations. Although Moscow has not directly replied
to the proposal, it is criticizing the delay in putting
the suspension into effect and the conditions attached.
UNEASY CHURCH-STATE TRUCE CONTINUES IN POLAND . . . . . . Page 3
The Gomulka regime has charged that the Catholic
Church's preparations to celebrate Poland's 1,000th
year are actually intended to create a climate for po-
litical activity by the clergy. The current regime at-
tacks on the church are probably designed mainly to win
Gomulka the support of rural party functionaries, who
have long had difficulty in asserting their power in the
NEW SOVIET SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY.,.... Page 4
Under a new system for planning and administer-
ing the supply of commodities for Soviet industry and
construction, certain detailed functions formerly per-
formed by USSR Gosplan have been delegated to the re-
publics and to the regional councils of national econo-
my. Under the new measures--Which further implement
Khrushchev's 1957 economic reorganization proposals--USSR
countryside where the church is strong.
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28 August 1958
25X1
PART II (continued)
Gosplan nevertheless retains control over the supply
of critical items and continues to direct the more
important supply movements among the republics.
SOVIET SALES UPSETTING WORLD MARKET FOR TIN . . . . . . . Page 5
Soviet sales of tin outside the bloc have in-
creased nearly tenfold in the past two years. They
now threaten to disrupt the operations of the Inter-
national Tin Council and thus cause new difficulties
for the economies of Bolivia, Malaya, and other free
world producers. Metal sales are an important source
of foreign exchange for the USSR, and Moscow, intent
in addition on discrediting the Western tin manage-
ment plan, will probably maintain h level of
sales of tin in the world market.
RUMANIAN REGIME TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Rumanian regime is conducting a major drive
against embezzlement of state funds and theft of pub-
lic property. Theft and corruption have reportedly
cost the state nearly $250,000,000 in 1957-58. The
present campaign corresponds with a general effort by
the regime since late spring to tighten internal dis-
cipline-an effort reflected in a minor purge of the
party central committee in June. There are indications
that the current drive will not be limited to the eco-
nomic sphere, but may involve such elements as students,
intellectuals, and party members.
Page 8
Premier Sihanouk, diring.his visit to Peiping, re-
affirmed Cambodia's commitment to a policy of neutrality.
Peiping expressed readiness to extend economic assistance
in addition to that granted under the 1956 aid agreement.
Although Chou En-lai expressed sympathy for Cambodia in
its border problems with its neighbors, the joint commu-
niqu6 issued at the end of the visit made no reference to
military aid. 25X1
' ? ?
S IHANOUK t S VISIT "TO COMMUNIST CIO NA
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
apparently in retaliation for Chinese Nationalist aid
The Chinese Nationalist Government
rebels, partly because of the dissidents' inability
to make payments on their mounting debt. Djakarta,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S MARY
28 August 1958
PART II (continued)
to the dissidents, has banned the Kuomintang and its
organizations in Indonesia. 25X1
BURMESE GENERAL ELECTIONS EXPECTED IN NOVEMBER . . . . . . Page 10
Premier Nu has canceled the budgetary session of
Parliament and is expected to call for general elec-
tions in November. The contest will be between the
two factions of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom
League (AFPFL) and the two factions of the National
Unity Front (NUF). Since it is possible that no par-
ty will gain a clear majority, Nu's faction of the
AFPFL may again needaa coalition with the pro-Commu-
nists in the NUF. This would.undercut the premier's
insistence on insurgent surrenders and might push Burma
further toward the Communist bloc.
SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Afghanistan has received additional arms, apparent-
ly under the Soviet bloc assistance programs announced
in August 1956. The most recent deliveries may raise
the total value of such assistance. Since known bloc
arms credits to Kabul total only $32,000,000, the USSR
is probably giving Afghanistan substantial disco
similar to those extended to Syria and Yemen.
RECENT BY-ELECTION RECORD OF INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY. . . . Page 12
The continued gradual decline of Nehru's Congress
party is illustrated by the fact that the party has
suffered a small net loss in 52 by-elections to state
assembly and national parliament seats since the date
of the last national elections in March 1957. Congress
party leaders recognize their organization's basic weak-
eases not yet found means of remedying them.
NEW SOVIET EMBASSY IN IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Soviet Union has staffed its embassy in Bagh-
dad with a group exceptionally well qualified to ex-
nand uenetration efforts in Iraq.
POLITICAL TENSION IN ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Argentine President Frondizi's new labor law is
evidently designed to win his administration the badly
needed support of organized labor. It has, however,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
PART II (continued)
aroused fears in some segments of conservative opinion
that it will aid Peronista efforts to regain political
power. These fears, together with opposition attacks
on Frondizi, have generated new rumors of a militar
COuP.
PARTY PREPARATIONS FOR VENEZUELA'S ELECTIONS . . . . . . . Page 15
The recent convention of the leftist but non-
Communist Democratic Action, Venezuela's largest par-
ty, took a cautious approach to the elections sched-
uled for 23 November, probably because it is aware
of the hostility of the military toward the party.
The major achievement of the convention was to reaf-
firm the leadership of former President Romulo Betan-
court's moderate wing over the more radical youth ele-
ments.
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NASIR'S GOAL FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . Page 1
At the meeting of the Arab League foreign minis-
ters in Cairo on 6 September, Nasir may attempt to
mold the league into an instrument to further his as-
cendancy in the Arab world. He may bring about a re-
organization under which the Arab states would relin-
quish a portion of their cont over foreign policy
to a Nasir-dominated league. 25X1
TRADE UNIONISM IN CEYLON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The ability of Ceylon's leftist labor unions to
upset the island's economic and political stability
has increased during the two and a half years of Prime
Minister Bandaranaike's rule. Strikes called by the
most powerful unions, dominated by rival Communist
leaders, have disrupted the operation of Colombo port
almost continuously since late 1957. The government's
recognition of the dangers created by irresponsible
labor elements may eventually cause it to adopt sterner
labor policies in areas of vital economic importance.
CHILE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . Page 5
Chile's presidential election scheduled for 4 Sep-
tember comes at a time when inflation, unemployment,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
PART III (continued)
and a rising cost of living are the paramount issues.
Conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri, campaigning
on the need for efficient government, is facing strong
opposition from the Communist-backed Socialist candi-
date, Salvador Allende, who sees neosocialism as the
solution to Chile's economic ills and who has promised
to initiate commercial and diplomatic relations with
the Soviet bloc. 25X1
THE UKRAINIAN PARTY--SOURCE OF LEADING SOVIET CADRES . . . Page 8
Since Khrushchev became party first secretary in
1953, an unprecedented number of persons assigned to
key positions in Moscow and in the Russian federation
(RSFSR) have been drawn from the Ukraine, where Khru-
shchev was party chief for 12 years. Ten out of 25
members of the party's ruling body are or have been
Ukrainian officials. Many of these promotions reflect
Khrushchev's preferential treatment of former associ-
ates, who, he apparently feels, will be loyal to him.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION.
The build-up of Chinese
Communist strength in the Fukien
area continues, and significant
combat activity has occurred,
particularly in the Chinmen
(Quemoy) area, where over 100,-
000 rounds were fired into the
islands by the Chinese Commu-
nists through 28 August.
That greater harassment,
possibly even an invasion at-
tempt on the Chinmens, may be
expected is indicated by a 28
August Chinese Communist broad-
cast calling upon the National-
ist troops to surrender and
warning of "imminent landings
on Chinmen" This is the
strongest commitment to spe-
cific action made thus far by
the Communists. The heavy
shelling of Tatan and Erhtan
on 27 August has led the Chin-
men Defense Command to specu-
late that an attack on these
two islands is imminent.
The shelling of Chinmen
began on 23 August and appar-
ently took the Nationalists by
surprise, as they sustained
about 300 casualties, mostly to
personnel who were unable to
reach shelter. More than 20,-
000 shells were fired by the
Communists in the initial bom-
bardment; the principal target
was the Nationalist defense com-
mand headquarters area, where
communications were knocked out
and US MAAG installations were
damaged. The Nationalists re-
turned the fire. The bombard-
ment of the islands has con-
tinued intermittently since
the 23rd, but subsequent at-
tacks have been lighter. The
high rate of fire indicates
that the Communists have been
able to provide good logistic
support to their artillery.
The artillery attack has
been supported by air strikes
and naval operations. The Com-
munists reportedly used small
flights of fighter aircraft in
rocket and bomb attacks on the
islands, and air clashes have
taken place. The most impor
tant of these occurred on 25
August when Nationalist F-86
jets reported they had inter-
cepted a large group of MIG's,
shooting down at least one and
probably two.
The principal naval engage-
ment occurred south of Chinmen,
during what the Nationalists
claim was an invasion attempt,
when 30 motor junks and some
small naval craft were inter-
cepted and beaten off by Nation-
alist ships in a sea battle
which lasted for several hours.
The Nationalists say that two
Communist motor torpedo boats
were sunk, another probably
sunk, and five damaged; the Na-
tionalists lost one landing
ship, an LST which entered the
battle area by mistake, and had
another landing ship damaged.
Ground strength may have
been built u in Fuk
severs un s may ave move
into the area. Approximately
180 fighter aircraft are in the
coastal area.
of the National s roops~during
the heavy bombardments from 23
to 25 August was higher than
usual and much higher than might
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28 August 1958
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gndge
(under constructionn))-
LU GCHI
Chi nou
den ping
be expected under the circum-
stances. Normal fear is appar-
ent, and alternate news of, vic-
tories and defeats causes morale
fluctuations. Chiang Kai-shek's
son, Chiang Ching-kuo, is con-
fident, as a result of recent
visits, that the spirit of the
troops on both Matsu and Chinmen
is good, although he expressed
some reservations about the
fighting spirit of some newly
arrived Taiwanese troops.
Chiang has expressed his
intention-to Abide by the terms
of the U5-Nationalist Mutual
Defense Treaty And to consult
with American officials before
ordering an attack on the main-
T noel
Iru~ Ltu Hsu
undo i / ". Que6+o)
There have been no indica-
tions the Nationalists intend
to bomb the mainland. Top Ameri-
can officials expected a re-
quest for US concurrence , in
retaliatory attacks on mainland
airfields or gun positions fol-
lowing the Communist air strike
on Chinmen on 24 August, but
none has been made. the Nation-
alists, however, on the follow-
ing day began combat air pa-
trol of the area.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
Chiang continues to press
for a definite statement of US
intent regarding the offshore
islands. He has stated that
he does not regard Secretary
Dulles' letter to Congressman
Morgan on 23 August to be suf-
ficient. The minister of de-
fense, however, has rather warm-
ly supported the letter.
Chinese Communist officials
are intimating that Peiping in-
tends to take the offshore is-
lands.
Peiping has
not yet informed the mainland
populace of Secretary Dulles'
23 August warning, but in in-
ternational broadcasts it has
quoted foreign press stories
which stress that Chinmen and
the Matsus form "an integral
part of China."
The Chinese Communists may
believe that continued artil-
lery bombardment and any suc-
cessful seizure of a small off-
shore island would seriously
undermine Nationalist morale
and consequently prepare the
way for bolder action against
the larger offshore islands.
ing produced relatively little
reaction in Western Europe.
There was virtually no official
comment and the press in most
countries gave the events ex-
tensive news coverage but took
no strong line editorially.
Every major London newspaper
has commented editorially, how-
ever, with most attacking US
policy and insisting that Com-
munist China must replace the
Chinese Nationalists in the UN.
Only_the conservative Telegraph
and the independent weekly Econ-
omist take an opposite view,
fio T-insisting that defense of
Formosa, like that of Berlin,
is important to the free world.
Peiping radio continues to The developments were gen-
pick up comment on "US-Chiang- erally viewed with concern by
instigated" tension in the
Taiwan Strait area from bloc
and Asian neutralist news-
papers.
References in bloc propa-
ganda to Peiping's possible par-
ticipation in international
councils are increasing. A 26
August Peiping broadcast, in
referring to the West's recent
offer for a nuclear-test-ban
agreement, quoted the Manchester
Guardian's comment that ranee
and Communist China are left
out: "Where will the West place
China?" In the past, Peiping
has been virtually silent on
its possible participation in a
test-ban agreement. The offi-
cial newspaper of the Polish
Communist party, Trybuna Ludu,
commented on 2? AUgUSZ that
Asian countries believe it is
"high time" for the US to rec-
ognize Communist China and admit
it to the United Nations.
World Reactions
With the exception of Brit-
ain, the first few days of shell-
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28 August 1958
the Asian nations, but, except
in Japan, there was little ini-
tial criticism of the Chinese
Communists for their aggressive
moves, and little sympathy ex-
pressed for the Nationalist
cause.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru
made a noncommittal statement
on 26 August to the effect that
Chinmen and Matsu are very near
the Chinese coast and that oc-
cupation of these islands, by
Taiwan is a constant cause of
friction. Nehru told Parliament
on 27 August that he saw no par-
ticular significance to the land-
ing of US marines in Singapore.
One important Indian news-
paper stated that the offshore
islands form an integral part
of Chinese (Communist) territory
and blamed American aid to Taiwan
for creating tension in this
area. Another highly regarded
conservative paper, admitting
that it is difficult to say who
is provoking,whom, suggested
that the Nationalist garrisons
should be withdrawn from the is-
lands. Indians as a whole would
probably favor the return of the
offshore islands to Communist
China. They would, however,
deplore any Communist aggressive
action against the islands which
might lead to war in the Far
East.
Japan's concern was demon-
strated by a rash of press, radio,
and TV coverage, most of which
laid the blame for growing ten-
sion squarely on the Chinese
Communists. Part of this con-
cern stems from fear that Japan
might become involved involuntar-
ily in any fighting because of
American military operations
from bases there. While the
Japanese officially support the
US position in defending Taiwan,
they view the offshore islands
as an integral part of the main-
land and would probably protest
the use of Japanese bases in
their defense.
Merdeka, which is often re-
garded as a spokesman of the In-
donesian Government, believed
that the Communist attacks are
aimed at neutralizing National-
ist "harassment" of the main-
land. The paper, which has long
been sharply critical of Taipei,
nevertheless implied that the
Communists are largely responsi-
ble by wondering if the Commu-
nists would risk war.
While no official reaction
has been reported from Seoul,
South Korea's attitude was ex-
pressed by.+.its ambassador to
Taipei, who said that his gov-
ernment would not remain idle
if drastic changes take place
in the Taiwan Strait.
In the Philippines, Presi-
dent Garcia and foreign affairs
spokesmen limited their comment
to expressions of concern, and
indicated that the situation is
under study to determine whether
the Communist action is related
to the coming UN session or
"portends something serious."
The chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee ,t,ac-
knowledged that a Communist
take-over of Taiwan would con-
stitute a serious threat to
Philippine security. Press
editorials stressed the dangers
of a rash move by either side.
Two Melbourne papers
viewed the bombardments as a
Communist challenge to US policy,
posing the dilemma of abandon-
ing the offshore islands with
resultant damage to US prestige,
or of possible war over the off-
shore islands which would be
the "height of folly;" One
paper asserts the situation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
points .out the precarious nature
of following US policy on Com-
munist China.
Cairo radio has reported
extensively on developments in
the Taiwan Strait and has quoted
one newspaper as warning Secre-
tary Dulles that US armed inter-
vention would almost certainly
bring the USSR in on Peiping's
side. Another paper is quoted
as criticizing US nonrecognition
of the Chinese Communist regime,
a standard minor theme in the
semicontrolled UAR press.
In Lebanon, the developments
have had front-page coverage
with special attention to the
alerting of US forces in the
Far East. An Israeli radio com-
mentator questions whether the
attacks on the Chinmen Islands
are a political maneuver with
the principal purpose of'increas,-
ing the tension between the two
world blocs and preventing any
rapprochement between Moscow
and the West in which Communist
China does not participate.
Soviet and East European
propaganda has given only routine
brief coverage to Peiping's re-
ports of specific incidents of
bombings and strafings in the
Taiwan Strait area. Rather,
commentators have concentrated
on tying a number of incidents
together to present a picture
of "new US aggressive intent"
toward Southeast Asian and Far
Eastern nations--acts which
have forced Communist China's
"defensive" reaction. Washing-
ton's "game," it was asserted,
is to create a new center of
tension in order to distract
world attention from "continu-
ing aggression" of US and Brit-
ish troops in the Middle East
despite the "US defeat" in the
UN General Assembly.
The list of "provocations"
attributed to the United States
included the issuance of the
State Department memorandum on
nonrecognition of Communist
China, the "endless stream" of
US arms shipments (including
modern weapons) to Taiwan, the
encouragement of Chiang Kai-
shek's "criminal activities"
(shelling offshore islands),
the "landing" of US marines
in Singapore, the appearance
of the Seventh Fleet in Indian
waters, and the arrival of Sec-
retary of the Army Brucker in
Tokyo.
All of these "provocations,"
said Moscow, show clearly that
US foreign policy "aims at caus-
ing dangerous crises, and is
based on adventurist plans
against peoples who have risen
in the national liberation
struggle"--including Indonesia
and other countries in the
area.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Tension in Jordan relaxed
:. sorethalt just prior to UN Sec-
retary General Hammarskjold's
arrival in Amman on 27 August,
.largely as a result of the im-
,pact of the Arab-sponsored UN
resolution. The UN action was
interpreted by the government
of King Husayn and Prime Min-
ister Rifai, however, as giving
at best only a temporary relief
from heavy pro-Nasir pressure.
Despite the resolution, Damascus
radio resumed attacks on Husayn
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
on 26 August by broadcasting
speeches delivered against the
King at a rally in Damascus;
Cairo radio has made similar
attacks, using quotations from
Moscow.
Rumors are still circulat-
ing of a possible cabinet shift
to'a "caretaker" government
which would provide a transi-
tion to a pro-UAR regime. Former
Prime Ministers Khalidi and
Majalli are the most frequently
mentioned for this role.
Lebanon
President-elect Shihab ar-
ranged a meeting of opposition
politicians and rebel partisan
leaders on 25 August in the
hope that they might issue a
call for moderation and a return
to normal conditions in Lebanon.
General Shihab's hope was disap-
pointed, however; although lead-
ers from outside Beirut were
said to favor moderation, the
statement produced by the meet-
tng called for the immediate
withdrawal of foreign troops,
the immediate departure of Pres-
ident Chamoun, and a continua-
tion of the strike--and, by im-
plication, the terrorism at-
tendant to enforcing it.
All of these conditions
have.been put by the rebels many
times before; their reiteration
at this stage suggests ei=ther.,
that they dare not retreat pub-
licly from their previous stands
or that they themselves will
continue to regard their effort
as unsuccessful unless and un-
til one of their number is in-
stalled as the real ruler of
the country. The outstanding
rebel candidate for prime min-
ister under Shihab appears to
be Rashid Karame, the Tripoli
rebel leader who this week held
a "review" of his forces while
visiting the rebel stronghold
in the Basta quarter of Beirut.
,The meeting of the rebel lead-
ers of course received maximum
security protection by the Leb-
anese Army.
Although Nasir has publicly
praised Shihab, UAR support for
the rebels continues. However,
the Syrian commandos who were
holed up in Beirut and some
other "specialists" are reported
to have been returned to the
UAR in.Lebanese trucks.
Iraq
Xenophobia, aroused to
greater heights by the Baghdad
"treason" trial of former Iraqi
Chief of Staff Daghestani in
which the court is seeking to
implicate the United States,
continues to find expression in
the middle and lower echelons
of the Iraqi regime despite the
professions of friendly attitudes
made by Prime Minister Qasim
and other ministers. There is
considerable minor harassment
of American and British diplo-
matic missions and personnel--
telephone lines cut off, passes
demanded from visitors to em-
bassy quarters, refusal to per-
mit reopening information of-
fices--and an increasingly
virulent anti-Western tone to
the radio.
UAR-Israel Arms Race
Both the UAR and Israel
apparently recognize the pos-
sibility of a showdown between
them should the situation in
Jordan deteriorate rapidly.
Israeli leaders have repeatedly
stated that they cannot tolerate
being surrounded by states un-
der Nasir's control. Against
this background, both countries
have moved in the last two months
to acquire more and better arms.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
The Soviet bloc has al-
ready supplied Egypt with more
than $250,000,000 worth of arms
since the autumn of 1955. J
The Soviet Union resumed
arms deliveries to Syria in
mid-July. Four or five Soviet
vessels have since delivered
arms and heavy military eauin-
The Soviet bloc now has
supplied Syria-with about
$150,000,000 worth of arms and
Egypt with more than $250,000,-
000 worth since 1955.
The Israelis are almost
certainly aware of the recent
deliveries to the UAR. Is-
raeli Air Force officers have
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expressed particular concern
over the possibility that the
UAR might obtain MIG-19's, and
Tel Aviv's ground force com-
manders appear equally concerned
over their ability to defend
against the UAR's;tanks. Is-
raeli Foreign Minister Meir,
followed by the director general
of the Israeli Defense Ministry,
has been presenting to Western
countries a list of arms re-
quests which includes 200 tanks,
350 antitank, recoilless rifles,
600 half-tracks, 2 or 3 small
submarines (500-600 tons), newer
jet fighters (from France),
signal equipment, 800 trucks,
and antiaircraft guided missiles.
The French, cooling a lit-
tle toward Israel since De
Gaulle came to power, nonethe-
less appear willing to honor
their "commitments" to the Is-
raelis.
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&3ZLIAG l
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DE GAULLE AND FRENCH AFRICA
The coordinated Algerian
National Liberation Front sabo-
tage and terrorist attacks
throughout France which began
on 25 August may signal the
opening of a campaign designed
to encourage massive absten-
tion of Algerians in the forth-
coming French constitutional
referendum. The FLN actions
may also be intended as a warn-
ing to France that no solution
is-possible in Algeria except
independence. De Gaulle's as-
surances to tropical Africa
that the overseas ter-
ritories can opt for
independence at any
time will alarm
rightists pressing for
"total integration"
of Algeria ;into
France. Approval
of the constitution
is still expected,
but these develop-
ments may help de-
prive De Gaulle of
the overwhelming ma-
jority he hopes for.
De Gaulle's
African tour produced
concessions which may
be a deliberate
Strategy to make the
new constitution more
palatable to the Af-
rican leaders.
Votes in the overseas terri-
tories approximate 40 percent
of the total eligible vote in
the referendum.
The African reaction has
been mixed, as was expected.
Ivory Coast political leaders
have endorsed the constitution,
as have those of French Equa-
torial Africa, on condition that
it include reference to independ-
ence. Reception of De Gaulle
and his proposals was cooler
e 1FNl ~?
ago ALGERIA
HARAJ
IVORY }~ J NIGERIA C L./ `EQUATOR[
GHANA : V1
LIBERIA' COAST
/7'
UNCLASSIFIED
1I
;Fort Lamy
/CAMEROUN %?SHARI
0 f( BELGIAN
F1( -' CONGO
B zzaville
he is pri-
marily I nteres a in an over-
whelming total majority for the
new constitution, and would be
willing to go a long way to
balance the possibility of an
unimpressive majority in metro-
politan France with some ten
million favorable African votes.
in French Guinea and somewhat
hostile in Senegal, there Dakar
crowds demonstrated in favor
of immediate independence.
In Algeria, the army still
appears to believe that the
massive Moslem vote it expects
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
to produce for the constitution
can be interpreted as a desire
for integration. However, the
FLN can be expected to play
heavily among the Moslem masses
on its demonstrated capability
to "carry the war into France 25X1
itself," following the spectac-
ular 25 August sabotage of French
petroleum installations.
WORLD REACTION TO NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION ANNOUNCEMENT
Free World
With ' feW reservations, the
free world enthusiastically
welcomed the US and British
conditional offer on 22 August
to suspend further nuclear
weapons tests for a year begin-
ning 31 October. Reaction was
lessened by attention centered
on the special General Assembly
resolution on the Middle East.
French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville followed up
the US-UK announcement with a
statement on 24 August that
France's nuclear plans remained
unchanged. A French Foreign
Ministry atomic energy official
complained bitterly to US rep-
resentatives that France had
not been consulted and was be-
ing put in the position of the
"villain in the piece." This
official stated that France
could not conduct its own nu-
clear test prior to 31 October,
but as "the only country in
the world that cannot renounce
testing" is prepared to stand
firm against world opinion,
"especially in the UN."
Otherwise, the Western
move brought high praise from
official and unofficial sources
throughout the free world.
Much of the British press was
ecstatic--"hope dawned for the
world," according to the Liber-
al News Chronicle. The Japa-
nese generally v ewed the an-
nouncement as a direct result
of their own antitest campaign,
and have scrapped previous
plans to push a test ban reso-
lution in the forthcoming regu-
lar UN General Assembly meet-
ing in favor of a policy of
close consultation with the
United States. Indian Prime
Minister Nehru hailed early
press reports of the US.deci-
sion as "good news"; no Indian
paper to date has had any strong
criticism for the American con-
ditions, and several have sug-
gested that the Soviet Union
now must show its good faith
by entering negotiations lead-
ing toward firm agreements.
Expression of disappoint-
ment that Britain was carrying
out its current test series be-
fore the suspension's effective
date, however, came from sever-
al Asian press sources and
from the British Labor and Lib-
eral press. Considerable Brit-
ish comment regrets that France
and especially Communist China
present major obstacles to prog-
ress toward a world-wide nu-
clear disarmament agreement;
several Swiss and Dutch papers
also comment on the problem of
Peiping's role.
Soviet Bloc
The Soviet Union has thus
far made no direct official re-
ply or comment on the US and
British announcements. Initial-
ly, Moscow issued factual ac-
counts of the announcements; how-
ever, subsequent Soviet commen-
taries criticized Washington
and London for delaying the
opening of talks and effec-
tive date of suspension un-
til 31 October.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
Radio Moscow on 20, 22,
and 23 August released two let-
ters from Khrushchev and one
from Gromyko to European peace
groups repeating Soviet appeals
for disarmament and for a ban
on nuclear tests. The timing
of the letters' release--they
actually were delivered about
a week earlier--points up the
Kremlin's desire to undercut
the American and British test
suspension proposal by playing
up Soviet initiative in this
regard and to take the major
share of credit for the success-
ful conclusion of the Geneva
technical talks which preceded
the Western announcements.
in replying officially, Moscow
can be expected to follow the
posed meeting.
line set in its propaganda--de-
mands for an earlier meeting
and criticism of Western "stall-
ing" tactics and the temporary
nature of the proposed suspen-
sion. Khrushchev may also urge
that the proposed meeting be
held on the heads-of-government
level. It is unlikely, however,
that these considerations will
take precedence over Moscow's
desire to bring a Western
test ban into effect, even
if it means accepting the
Western terms for the pro-
OSI)
(Concurred in by
UNEASY CHURCH-STATE TRUCE CONTINUES IN POLAND
In a tense atmosphere,
100,000 Catholic Poles gathered
in the rain at the Jasna Gora
shrine in Czestochowa on 26
August to hear Poland's primate,
Cardinal Wyszynski, declare
that the thousand-year-old Pol-
ish Church will never be ::sep-,
arated from the nation and to
renew their "national vows"
to press for greater religious
freedom under the state. In
renewing the vows, the Polish
people are continuing the cam-
paign started last year to
rally the populace to the sup-
port of the church'-s efforts to
maintain its independence and
to win even greater freedoms
from the Communist regime.
The campaign has been so
successful in revitalizing re-
ligious lay activities on a
wide scale that the Gomulka
regime apparently fears the
church will ultimately suppl,atnt
the party as the principal pow-
er in Poland. The party press
has charged the church with;us-
ing preparations for the cele-
bration of Poland's 1,000th
year in 1966 to create a climate
for political activity by the
clergy.
Serious discord has also
risen over religious education
and the control over distribu-
tion of Catholic charities.
While the 1956 church-state
agreement provides for religious
education in Poland's schools,
the regime has placed some ob-
stacles in the way by refusing
to license nuns and monks as
teachers on the grounds that
they are not qualified. A per-
sistent press campaign has re-
peated charges that the church
is trying to force children
into religious courses and is
discriminating against non-
Catholic students. The Catho-
lic charities question remains
unresolved because Cardinal
Wyszynski refuses to cooperate
with the government in distribut-
ing charitable goods received
from Catholic sources on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
the grounds that this is the
church's exclusive function..
While repeatedly claiming
that it will not violate the
1956 agreement, the regime has
launched a strong press cam-
paign against the church, which
in some instances has been
virulent and slanderous, and
which has charged the church
with publishing antistate
.pamphlets and trying to recover
church lands given to the peas-
ants.
These charges could just
as well have been made a year
ago, suggesting that the
church's activities alone are
not the reason for the cur-
rent campaign. Gomulka's
overt moves against, the church
at this time are probably in-
tended mainly to discredit the
clergy, in an effort to win
the support of local party
leaders who have been demoral-
ized by their loss of authority
to the village priests.
Wyszynski has limited room
for compromise with Gomulka,
even if he should be so in-
clined. While there is no evi-
dence that he is being pressured
by the Vatican, any compromise,
by Wyszynski, even of a minor
nature, would meet with opposi-
tion from the senior clergy and'
the strongly anti-Communist
populace. While both church
and state appear determined to
avoid a serious break In
their truce, extremists on
both sides make-.it ;.diffi-
cult for them to maintain
the delicate, balance. ~ 25X1
Under a new system for
planning and administering the
supply of commodities for So-
viet industry and construction,
,certain detailed functions
formerly performed by USSR Gos-
plan have been delegated to the
republics, predpminantly to the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) and
to the regional councils of na-
tional economy (sovnarkhozy).
Under the new measures--which
further implement Khrushchev's
1957 economic reorganization
proposals--USSR Gosplan never-
theless retains control over
the supply of critical items and
continues to direct the more
important supply movements among
the republics.
As presented in the USSR
Gosplan theoretical journal
Planned Economy, the new pro-
cee. prow-es that in those
minor instances when the USSR's
total production of a commodity
is concentrated in the economic
area of a single sovnarkhoz,.
INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY
that sovnarkhoz will plan the
distribution of the item. In
the same way, when Soviet pro-
duction of a commodity is con-
centrated within a single re-
public, the Gosplan of that re-.
public will plan its, distribu-
tion. Distribution of a com-
modity produced in not more
than three republics, with 80
to 90 percent of total output
concentrated. in a single re-
public, will be planned by the
Gosplan of that republic. The
supply of some 5,000. items
formerly planned by the min-
istries under USSR Gosplan su-
pervision apparently is affected
by this supply reorganization.!
Items which are produced
widely among the republics or
which are "of all-union signif-
icance" remain a USSR Gosplan
responsibility and will be
planned and administered by the.
new Main Administrations for '.
Interrepublic?Supply which have
been set up in USSR Gosplan
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
recently. These supplant the
former ministerial supply and
marketing organs which had been
"temporarily" consolidated into
USSR Gosplan during the first
phase of Khrushchev's reorgan-
ization to avoid supply disrup-
tion. With this "freeze" of
supply relations in effect,
USSR Gosplan reportedly planned
the distribution of about 6,000
items for 1958; some 760 of
these items were "funded" com-
modities, with distribution ap-
proved by the USSR Council of
Ministers. Under the new set-
up, USSR Gosplan will plan and
administer the supply of those
items formerly "funded" as well
as some others, bringing the
total number of commodities cen-
trally distributed to about
1,000.
This supply reorganization
belatedly brings the Soviet sys-
tem of industrial supply more
in line with Khrushchev's re-
gional system of economic or-
ganization. The new system also
is intended to foster the devel-
opment of direct relations be-
tween consumer and supplier en-
terprises. This will occur,
however, only to the extent that
enterprises can work out their
supply patterns more easily with
sovnarkhozy and union republics
than with USSR Gosplan.
.Implementation of these meas-
ures in the field of supply is
intended to bring economies in
transportation and to encourage
more efficient production spe-
cialization through subcontract-
ing, improvements which had been
foregone by the regime ten"
porarily in fear that sup-
ply. disruption might de-
velop if all the measures
were implemented simulta-
neously. (Pre-
pared by ORR)
Soviet tin sales rose from 1,-
000, :tons in 1956 to .about 10,000
tons in 1957, 6 percent of free-
world consumption, and rose to
7,000 tons in the first half of
1958, 14 percent of free-world
consumption in that period.
This level of sales threatens
to disrupt the operations of the
International Tin Council, with
which the USSR has so far re-
fused to cooperate. This or-
ganization of tin producers and
consumers maintains a buffer
stock designed to prevent ex-
cessive price fluctuation and
to ensure adequate supplies at
reasonable prices. Tin exports
play an important part in the
economies of Bolivia and Malaya
particularly, and the recent
Russian sales have brought the
USSR under sharp criticism in
both countries.
Malaya, producer of one
third of the free world's tin,
has been seriously hurt by tin
export restrictions. Production
has reached its lowest point in
11 years;, 39 'percent of, the iaines' ian
operation in December 1957 have
been forced to shut down while
most others are operating only
part time. On 24 August the
Malayan Government appealed to
the Soviet Union, the United
States, and the United Kingdom
to cooperate in preventing fur-
ther depression of tin prices
and specifically requested Rus-
sia to cease "dumping" tin on
the world market pending talks
with the International Tin
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,~ JCI.[CG 1 .,,.r
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY AU''RY
28 August 1.958
TIN EXPORTS AND FREE WORLD CONSUMPTION
1957
(THOUSANDS OF TONS)
EXPORTS 168.9 TONS
FREE WORLD EXPORTS
PURCHASED FOR TIN
COUNCIL BUFFER STOCK
SOVIET EXPORTS ABSORBED
BY TIN COUNCIL PURCHASERS
TIN COUNCIL QUOTAS FOR FIRST HALF 1958
{THOUSANDS OF TONS)
ESTIMATED
SOVIET
SALES
*Based on estimated free world consumption of 51,225 tons.
Council on arrangements for
orderly disposal of Russian
stockpiles.
Metal sales are important
to the USSR as a source of for-
eign exchange, and Moscow may
also be trying to discredit the
Western tin-management plan.
It sold about $20,000,000 worth
of tin in 1957 and $15,000,000
worth , in the. first, half 'of this
year. To counter the growing
Soviet deliveries, the UK as a
leading member of the tin coun-
cil is urging other tin-consum-
ing countries to cooperate in
imposing at least temporary im-
port controls on Soviet tin on
1 September.
Following a de-
cline in tin consump-
tion.and a halt in US
stockpile purchases
last year, the tin
council bought up the
10,000-ton-free-world
surplus- production
and the 10,000 tons
of Soviet tin which
were added to the al-
ready saturated world
market. The continu-
ing decline in world
demand for tin, plus
a rise in the tin
council's purchases
to 22,000 tons in
March of this year
to maintain prices,
has made necessary
the imposition of ex-
port quotas on the
six producing coun-
tries in the free world.
By mid-August the
tin council had nearly
exhausted its resources.
Soviet shipments of
800 tons in mid-August
.and the expected ar-
rival of 400-500 addi-
tional tons by the
28 AUGUST 1958 end of this month are
believed by the British
to be sufficient to break the
tin management plan. The pro-
ducing countries, chafing under
the severe export restrictions
placed against them, are cutting
their production by as much as
30 percent, while the resources
which they have contributed to
the tine council in effect are
used to buy up Soviet tin.
The USSR for its part--
with production of about 15,000
tons, imports from Communist
China of over 20,000 tons, and
increasing domestic substitu-
tion of,other metals for tin--
is able. to increase its ship-
ments of tin to the free world.
Such deliveries may frustrate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
Western attempts to control the
market.
If the other producing
countries should join Bolivia
and Malaya in their accusations
that the USSR is deliberately
undermining the world market,
Moscow may accept an invitation
prof erred earlier this year to
articinate in the tin council.
25X1
RUMANIAN REGIME TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE
The Rumanian regime is con-
ducting a major drive against
embezzlement and petty thiev-
ery, problems not new to Rumania
but particularly severe at this
time. Death penalties have
twice been exacted for.crimes
allegedly involving,misappro-
priation of state funds or theft
of public property, and Bucha-
rest has recently created a
special bureau "to carry out
financial control over state
enterprises and institutions."
The decision probably derives
from the reported disclosure
at a June plenum of the party
central committee that in 1957-
58 the regime had lost 1.5 bil-
lion lei ($250,000,000 at the
official exchange rate) through
theft or destruction of state
property.
The demands of party and
government newspapers for an
"unceasing struggle" against
remnants of "decadent bourgeois
liberalism" suggest that the
drive--limited thus far to eco-
nomic crimes--may be expanded
to include literary and ideo-
logical spheres. `-.The regime's
top spokesmen in the creative
arts have demanded that writers,
critics, and musicians "defend
the people's democratic regime,
public property, and the rights
of citizens."
The US Legation has re-
ceived unconfirmed reports of
the wholesale dismissal and,
in some cases, the arrest of
government employees, profes-
sional people, and minority
leaders for political unreli-
ability, and anticipates that
the drive may develop into a
general vigilance campaign.
Yugoslav press sources report
that a "party verification"
drive has begun in Rumania with
the dismissal of high-ranking
functionaries, including at
least one regional party secre-
tary, for "serious disciplinary
mistakes." These moves prob-
ably do not result from any
serious threat to the regime,
although they may be intended
to discourage any interpretation
of the recent withdrawal of
Soviet forces as a weakening in
the regime's internal security
position.
The June plenum called for
greater ideological vigilance
and intraparty discipline and
for adherence to the tenets of
"socialist morality"; it also
reorganized the party control
commission--the body which would
be responsible for carrying out
any widespread purge of the
party--and dismissed several
top officials, including four
candidate members of the central
committee. Since then, the
penal code has been amended to
include drastic punishments for
sabotage, treason, or economic
speculation, and jurists have
been instructed to mete out ex-
emplary sentences in cases of
theft or corruption.
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28 August 1958
In line with the regime's
precautionary measures, the
fourth congress of Rumanian
trade unions has recently been
postponed pending a reorgani-
zation of the labor movement.
Projected changes in the hier-
archical structure of the coun-
try's unions apparently are in-
tended to increase the control
of the central council, i.e.,
the regime's labor spokesman,
over the industrial and trade
unions'-by . simplifying ,the labor.
Organizations) chain of command.
25X1
SIHANOUK'S VISIT TO COMMUNIST CHINA
Premier Sihanouk, during
his visit to Peiping, emphati-
cally reaffirmed Cambodia's
commitment to a policy of ~neu-
trality. Following up Cambodian
recognition of Peiping in July,
both countries have appointed
ambassadors.
Chinese leaders accorded
Sihanouk unusual attention
during the visit. Mao Tse-tung
on one occasion talked with him
for six hours. Chou En-lai
held "many talks" with Sihanouk
and, with Foreign Minister Chen
Yi, personally escorted him on
some of his tours, including
a visit to China's first atomic
reactor.
Sihanouk's itinerary con-
centrated mainly on industrial
areas of Northeast China, and
seems to have been designed
to impress iiim with the coun-
try's industrial advances. In
the joint communique issued at
the end of the visit, Peiping
said it was ready to extend
economic assistance in addition
to the $23,000,000 grant made
In 1956. The Chinese Communists
promised gifts of small iron
and steel works, which proba-
bly would be showpieces since
Cambodia has insufficient coal
and iron resources to develop
a steel industry.
Although Chou En-lai ex-
pressed sympathy for Cambodia
in its border problems with its
neighbors--an obvious reference
to South Vietnam and Thailand--
the communique made no reference
to military aid. Cambodian of-
ficitls in Phnom Penh have
sought to reassure the United
States that Cambodia's attitude
toward the West is unchanged
despite Sihanouk's statements
in Peiping suggesting a more
pro-Communist position. The
Cambodian army chief of staff
has told an American military
official that his government
had no desire to have a Chinese
military mission in Phnom Penh
despite dissatisfaction with
"Inadequate" US aid. A cabinet
member stated flatly that recog-
nition of Peiping did not pre-
sage a "military alliance" or
acceptance of Chinese Communist
military aid.
The cabinet official also
said tiaa:t,:despite.the Cambodian
belief that the Chinese Commu-
nists had "scrupulously observed"
Chou.. En+lai's 1956 pledge not
to intervene in Cambodia's af-
fairs, "extensive precautions"
would be maintained against
possible subversion in schools.
Peiping is aware that this is
an issue on which cordial Sino-
Cambodian kelations might be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUXUARY
28 August 1958
wrecked; and during Sihanouk's
visit, Chou En-lai "advised"
Chinese in Cambodia to "refrain
from taking part in political
activities." However, Peiping's
enhanced prestige among Chinese
in the country and Phnom Penh's
e dissidents attacked--
American rubber estate
in North Sumatra three times
during July and August, each
time with greater severity,
and have threatened various
foreign interests with extor-
tion. Approximately 500
Americans, not counting depen-
dents, are in Sumatra, employed
by rubber and oil interests.
American interests in Celebes
are largely limited to Christian
missions which have so far had
no significant difficulty with
the dissidents.
The Chinese Nationalist
Government, which had been
giving limited air support to
the North Celebes dissidents,
has decided to discontinue its
though two PBY amphibious air-
craft will be held in reserve
for "special activities," all
Chinese Nationalist "volunteer"
pilots used on Celebes flights
are being returned to their
units. Apparently one reason
for cessation of Nationalist
abolition of. the overseas Chi-
nese self-administration system
will facilitate Communist ef-
forts to gain control of Chinese
school administrations.
support is the rebels' inability
to make payments on their
mounting debt. Nationalist
officials also feel that the
dissidents, with the loss on
15 August of Tomohon, their 25X1
last major population center in
North Celebes, can no longer ar-
range for air drops.
the Indonesian Communist party,.
The Djakarta government,
apparently in retaliation for
Chinese Nationalist aid to the
dissidents, has banned the
Kuomintang and its organizations
in Indonesia. The ban, which has
been anticipated since last spring
when measures were begun against
Nationalist-oriented businessmen
and newspapers, will permit in-
creased influence by the already
dominant Communists in the large
Chinese community. The decree is
worded to cover political parties
with foreign ties, however, and
could eventually be used against
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4 SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUY
28 August 1958
BURMESE GENERAL ELECTIONS EXPECTED IN NOVEMBER
Premier Nu's cancellation
of the budgetary session of Par-
liament, scheduled for 28 Au-
gust, has intensified political
campaigning for what promise to,
be Burma's most closely contest-
ed elections since achievement
of independence in 1948. The
elections are expected to take
place in November. No single
party will go to the polls with
.an assured majority, and for
the first time district commis-
sioners throughout Burma agree
that free elections can be held.
Established party leaders are
already campaigning vigorously,
and new parties, including one
which is avowedly Communist,
are being organized.'
Nu's precarious eight-vote
majority in Parliament has de-
pended on the 44 votes held by
the Communist-influenced Nation-
al United Front (NUF) since the
vote of confidence in June. Al-
though Nu has been able to es-
tablish firm ties with Dr. E
Maung, president of the moderate
Justice party in the NUF, neith-
er his "clean" Anti-Fascist
People's Freedom League (AFPFL)
nor the opposition "stable"
AFPFL, headed by former Deputy
Premiers Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein,
has been able to enlarge its
support in Parliament.
General elections are being
forced on Nu by violent dissen-
sion in the NUF. While the Jus-
tice party and the crypto-Com-
munist Burma Workers party are
anxious to maintain a coalition
with Nu, the radical left wing
of the front has broken away in
protest against American mili-
tary aid abd.tbe government's in-
sistence that insurgents sur-
render before their political
rights are restored.
In the coming elections
there will be four major con-
testants--the "clean" and "sta-
ble" wings of the AFPFL and the
moderate and radical factions of
the NUF. Because of Nu's im-
mense personal popularity and
his control over government
finances,
e premier an e
"clean" AFPFL are in the strong-
est position. They expect the
"stable" AFPFL to be the chief
loser. Until the NUF dissen-
sion became public, it was
widely predicted that the pro-
Communists, who won 34 percent
of the 1956 vote, would make
sweeping gains. With the
breakdown of party discipline,
however, NUF prospects may de-
cline sharply.
Probably no single party
will emerge from the vote with
a clear majority, thus endanger-
ing the country's political sta-
bility. Such a development would
force on Nu another government
in which his majority would de-
pend even more on the pro-Com-
munist elements in the NUF.
Under these circumstances, it
is doubtful that he would be
able to maintain his anti-Commu-
nist position and his insistence
on insurgent surrenders.
SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan has received
additional materiel, apparently
under the Soviet bloc arms as-
kistAnce:programs announeed..in
August ~_ 1956. :About 40. tanks
were observed in, Herat . do. 10
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J C.urct 1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
August 1958. The additional aid
may raise the total value of
bloc military assistance sent
to Afghanistan to $75,000,000.
Since known bloc arms credits
to Kabul total only $32,000,000,
the USSR is probably giving
Afghanistan substantial dis-
Three IL-28 (BEAGLE) twin-
Jet light bombers have been ob-
served recently in Afghanistan.
The Afghans have already received
from the bloc 36 jet fighters
and six jet trainers, mostly
MIG-15's (FAGOTS), as well
as piston aircraft and heli-
Zahedan
All-weather road
Broad-gauge railroad
Narrow-gauge railroad
counts similar to those ex-
tended to Syria and Yemen.
In addition to the 40 tanks
80 were previously see.
entering the Kabul area, and 64
took part in the Independence
Day parade on 23 August. These
developments suggest that the
Afghan Army probably has a mini-
mum of 120 Soviet-made tanks
available for distribution to
armored units as they are or-
ganized.
Fort
Sandeman
Jalalabad
S0 ryt} A C LAND
,JAM"MU
AND
K A S H M I R
1 (Status in dispute)
copters. Work on the mili-
tary airfield at Bagram, which
may also be used for civil
air transport, is apparently 25X1
being speeded by the Soviet
technicians on the trolect.
znougn little progress is evi-
dent on auxiliary buildings.
Except for rifles, which
were obsolete Indian models,:,Af-
ghan troops in the Independence
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orl(It(L I 'Iftow
CURRENT: INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY -SUMMARY
28 August 1958
Day parade displayed only
Soviet-supplied equipment, in-
cluding assault guns and amphib-
ious vehicles. There has been
little evidence so far, however,
that substantial quantities of
Soviet arms, even from the de-
liveries of artillery and small
arms which began in 1956, have
yet been distributed to the
army's rank. and file. The lat-
est deliveries will probably
further strain Afghanistan's
already overburdened storage
RECENT BY-ELECTION. RECORD OF INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
The continued gradual de-
cline of Nehru's Congress party
is-illustrated by the results
of by-elections held in the pe-
riod between the national elec-
tions of March 1957 and the end
of July 1958, In 46 by-elec-
tions to state assembly seats,
the Congress party suffered a
net-loss of two seats. In six
by-elections to the lower house
of Parliament, the Congress also
lost two seats. The Congress
leaders recognize their organ-
iza t ion! b- bas is wea,knesseS . but
have not yet found the means of
remedying them.
The party's bas-
ic problem is that
after the achievement
of independence in
1947, virtually all
.of its top-flight
leaders were forced
to gravitate into
the government to
ensure the establish-
ment and maintenance
of a stable adminis-
tration. With few
exceptions, the par-
ty organization was
left in the hands of
men, who
a e . o ma inta in
contact with the pub-
lic. A gap gradual-
ly developed between
the government and
the people, which
hard work by Con-
gress party na-
tional leaders since
early 1956 has 30092
failed to fill.
IACOAIi1Yh:
.1 MIN I:IVF F
AMDAMAN AND:1
Nlcov~ is.
{ Wa
Opposition parties first
fully recognized the vulnerabil-
ity of the Congress pa ty after
handing it a number of'serious
setbacks in the 1957 national
elections, and have continued
since then to defeat it in im-
portant "prestige" contests.
On 19 May, for instance, the
Communist party bolstered its
slender majority in the Kerala
state assembly by winning a
widely publicized by-election
at Devikolam. In June, the
rightist Jan Sangh overwhelm-
ingly defeated the Congress at
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PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 15
ANDHRA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
Gurgaon, in Punjab State, in a
contest for the parliamentary
seat of the late Education Min-
ister Man:lan'a Aad, one of the
most respected Congress' lead-
ers in India.
Congress losses at the
state and national level have
been paralleled at the munici-
pal level. Since March 1957,
?.the Congress. has lost control
of Bombay city and other im-
portant centers in Bombay State.
It has lost control of Delhi
city. In April 1958 it lost
Almora, the home of Home Minis-
ter Pant, in Uttar Pradesh
State. It. has. also suffered
municipal setbacks in Rajasthan,
Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar states.
On 12 July, the Congress
party established. special ma-
chinery at its headquarters to
supervise by-election campaigns,
and it has attempted through
the appointment of ad hoc com-
mittees to end factionalism, de-
fections, apathy,,,and corruption
in various of its state organ-
izations'. Provincial party lead-
ers, however, have not as yet
shown signs of being sufficient-
ly inspired to make real progress
in reversing present election
trends.
NEW SOVIET EMBASSY IN IRAQ
The new Soviet Embassy in
Baghdad has been staffed with
a group particularly well quali-
fied to expand penetration ef-
forts in Iraq. The USSR had
had no diplomatic representation
in Iraq since the latter broke
off relations in 1955. Moscow
was quick to recognize the new
Iraqi regime, oLnd the first con-
tingent of Soviet diplomats ar-
rived in Baghdad on 4 August.
The ambassador and at least one
counselor speak Arabic, and the
staff as a whole is heavily
weighted with area specialists.
Ambassador Grigory Zaytsev
minister to Iraq from 1944 to
1948. An experienced economist
and Arabic scholar, he most re-
cently served as head of the
Near East Department of the So-
viet Foreign Ministry. He is
a graduate of the Oriental In-
stitute in Moscow and also
speaks Persian.
Counselor Yevgeny Podvigin,
who speaks classical Arabic
fluently, was second secretary
in Lebanon from 1946 to 1948
and maintained close contacts
with Communist leaders through-
out the Levant. He made trips
to Palestine in 1947 to meet
members of the Pan-Slav Union
and the Arab League of National
Liberation. He was first secre-
tary in Egypt from November 1950
to August 1952 and attended the
Suez Conference in London in
1956.
Counselor Aleksandr Semiosh-
kin held various posts in Israel
from 1948 to 1956. Prior to his
assignment to Israel, he is be-
lieved to have served in Iraq.
First, Secretary Dmitry Kobelov
and Attache Yury guplyakov have
also been stationed in Israel.
Second Secretary Lev Noskov, 25X1
who speaks fluent Turkish, was
a TASS representative in Istanbul
from 1953 to 1956.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGARY
28 August 1958
It seems probable that the
Soviet Embassy staff will make
a strong attempt to strengthen
the Iraqi Communist party and
to influence the Kurdish na-
tionalists. Formerly suppressed,
the Iraqi Communist party has
become active since the coup;
it favors close relations with 25X1
the USSR and opposes union with
the UAR, although it would ac-
cept federation.
Argentine President From-
dizi's new labor law is evident-
ly designed to win his adminis-
tration the badly needed sup-
port of organized labor. It
has, however, aroused fears in
some segments of conservative
opinion that it will aid Peron-
ista efforts to regain politi-
cal power. These fears, together
with opposition ..attacks on
Frondizi, have generated new
rumors of a military coup--which,
however, seems to lack sufficient
support at this time.
The controversial labor
legislation--which became law
on 27 August--calls for new eleo-
tions in all unions within 90
days. This has been strongly
opposed by the military, "demo-
cratic" and Communist labor
leaders, and by various politi-
cal groups who fear that Peron-
istas will regain control of
organized labor, which was Per-
on'.I principal power base.
The present situation, in
which about two thirds of or-
ganized labor is controlled by
anti-Peronistas and about one
third by neo-Peronistas and
Communists, does not accurately
reflect rank-and-file sentiment.
After the provisional Aramburu
government had outlawed trade
union or political activity by
former Peronista leaders, many
Peronistas abstained from vot-
ing in union elections. Since
then the position of the "demo-
cratic" elements has been weak-
ened by lack of mutual coopera-
tion, and the ban on trade un-
ion activity by former Peronistas
was lifted by amnesty measures
last May. The old-line pro-
Peron leaders--are reported plan-
ning to resume union leadership
but encountering strong resist-
ance from the neo-Peronistas.
Frondizi, whose party dom-
inates congress, evidently cal-
culates that the younger neo-
Peronista trade-union leaders
would be the'likely victors in
new elections and that they
could be oriented into positive
support for the administration,
possibly carrying with them a
large party of Peron's former
following. He needs labor's
support because of its political
importance and ability to under-
cut his
strikes.
economic
programs with
The
strongest
opposition
party is
carrying
out an intense
campaign
against
Frondizi, pos-
sibly to
maintain
continuous
pressure
against
the appoint-
ment of Peronistas to high of-
fice and to gain political ad-
vantage in forthcoming pro-
vincial elections in two prow
inces and in the congressional
elections in 1960.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BVIM RY
28 August 1958
PARITY PREPARATIONS FOR VENEZUELA' S ELECTIONS
The recent convention of
the leftist but non-dommunist
Democratic Action (AD), Vene-
zuela's largest party, took a
cautious approach to the elec-
tions scheduled for 23 November.
The major achievement of the
convention was to reaffirm the
leadership of the moderate wing
over the more- radical youth ele-
ments.
After several weeks of ne-
gotiation, Venezuelan political
parties have not yet agreed on
an election formula to implement
the unity program which they en..
dorsed after the fall of dictator
Perez last January primarily to
meet the threat of a return to
military rule. Avoidance of
interparty strife necessitates
arrangements for a joint presi-
dential candidate, for repre-
sentation of parties in legisla-
tive bodies, and possibly for
a tentative apportionment of
top executive positions in the
new government.
Spokesmen of At, which
holds the balance of power in
the negotiations, have previous-
ly refrained from defining the
party's policy On grounds that
the national convention would
have to determine it. The con-
vention, however, merely em-
powered its newly elected ex-
ecutive committee, headed by
former ,President Romulo Betan--
court, to continue multiparty
discussions to select nonpolit-
ical candidates for the presi-
dency without recommending
specific candidates or revealing
its stand on other election
problems.
Ab's caution may be due in
part to pressure of the military,
many of whom are hostile to the 25X1
party and equate it with Commu-
nism.
Larraza-
baal,.who has substantial backing
within AD and the endorsement
of the Communists, has tended
to support civilian elements
vis-a-vis the military and is
considered a leading presiden-
tial contender.
The government junta has set
up the electoral machinery and
is proceeding with the registra-
tion of eligible voters. Party
leaders, therefore, must soon
reach agreement on an election
formula If elections are to be.
held under the unity program in
Novehiber. Interparty differ-
enaes, delays in holding party
conVeftions, and the need for
tacit approval of the military
are among the major blocks to 25X1
Ilyst of party unity.
progress, while fear of a mili-
tary coup is the principal cata-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY f3ARY
28 August 1958
At the meeting of the Arab
League foreign ministers in
Cairo on 6 September, UAR Pres-
ident Nasir may attempt to mold
the league into an instrument
to further his asCendaacy in
the Arab world. Under the cover
of strengthening the league, he
may bring about a reorganiza-
tion under which the Arab states
would relinquish a portion of
their control over foreign pol-
icy to a 'Nasir-dominated
league, thus, in effect bring-
ing them into the UAR--or the
somewhat looser UAS
confederation '.in-
eluding Yemen--by CArab League States
the back door. The
death of Iraq's Nuri
Said and the replace-
ment of the Hashimite
regime there by a
professedly pan-Arab
revolutionary govern-
ment have removed the
last major obstacles
to such a scheme.
The league has
long been regarded
as the highest ex-
pression of Arab
unity--an incomplete
and imperfect expres-
sion of unity but
one which, in the
language of the Arab
radios, could "grow
into reality and perfection be-
cause it responds to the deep-
est yearnings of the Arab peo-
ple." However, it has not re-
flected the political realities
of the Arab world--in fact, the
tensions and conflicts among
the Arab states were brought to
the surface within the league
and seemed greater by contrast
with the ideals which it in-
tended to achieve.
The immediate impetus for
the formation of the league was
the initiative taken by Nuri
Said in 1942 when he proposed
the formation of a "greater
Syria" which would have included
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans,jor-
dan, and Palestine. Nuri be-
lieved this union would give
the Palestine Arabs strength to
resist the growing menac.e: of
Zionism. From its inception
the plan had many enemies--the
anti-Hashimite Saudis, Lebanese
Christians, and Farouk's Egypt.
In the end the league was formed,
not as Nuri had envisaged it, but
on a looser and more general pat-
tern, with Egypt taking the lead.
At Alexandria in October
1944 a general Arab conference
formulated what has come to be
known as the "Alexandria Proto-
col." It delineated the out-
line of an Arab League and en-
visaged the progressive surrend-
er of sovereignty by the mem-
bers.
By the time the charter of
the league was signed in March
1945, however, the concept of
the organization had again been
altered drastically. The proto-
col originally had stated that
"in no case would a state be
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28 August 1958
permitted to pursue a foreign
policy which would be detri-
mental to the policy of the
league or any of its member
states." Decisions o1c the
league council were to be bind-
ing on all members, and Le an-
ese independence and sovereign-
ty were to be respected. As
finally signed, however, the
charter was a watered-down ver-
sion of the protocol, stating
that only those states which
voted for a decision were bound
by it.
This changed version re-
sulted from Egyptian and Saudi
maneuvers to keep Iraq and
Transjordan from uniting with
the other Arab states of geo-
graphic Syria--Lebanon, Syria,
and Palestine. Thus, the
league enshrined rather than
resolved the fundamental con-
flict between the Hashimite
states on the one side and
Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the
other, which continued through
the Palestine War of 1948 and
into the postwar period. Until
Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact,
the rivalry between the two
Arab blocs were usually kept
below the surface. After 1955,
however, the conflict broke out
at league meetings. Nasir op-
posed all league efforts to rec-
oncile : Egypt and Iraq as long
as Iraq adhered to the Baghdad
Pact, implying that the unity
for which the Arabs call was to
be denied until Iraq would join
with Egypt in a regional "neu-
tralism" outside the pact.
With a new government in
power in Iraq and Hashimite
Jordan reduced to impotence,
Nasir now may be ready to re-
organize the league as a hold-
ing company under which all
Arabdom may be brought under
Egyptian "management" in the
name of Arab neutralism. The
most important of the ideas now
being circulated in the Cairo
press is the "suggestion" by
the league's secretary general,
an Egyptian, that the charter
be amended to provide that "all
resolutions adopted by a major-
ity be binding upon all
members."
This is a return to the
Alexandria Protocol of 1944,
except that it is now the Iraqi
ambassador who appears to be
deprecating. tie necessity of
amendment. He asserts that
a mere revitalization of the
league's machinery and "eradi-
cation of the roots of the
polities of certain Arab
governments"--presumably Jordan
and Lebanon--are all that are
needed. Saudi Arabian and
Libyan representatives have
publicly favored amendment of
the charter--possibly in the
belief that by strengthening
the league they will ward off
absorption by the UAR.
It seems likely that if
Nasir obtains an abdication of
independent foreign policy by
the league states, he will then
move to make the league domi-
nant in defense, finance, edu-
cation, and other fields, grad- 25X1
ually eroding the sovereignty
of the other Arab states in the
name of Arab unity:.
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ar'LIKC I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLYI SUMMARY
28 August 1958
TRADE UNIONISM
The ability of Ceylon's
leftist labor unions to dis-
rupt the island's economic and
political stability has in-
creased during the two and a
half years of Prime Minister..
Bandaranaike's rule. Strikes
called by'the most powerful
unions, dominated by rival Com-
munist and Trotskyite leaders,
have disrupted the operation of
Colombo port almost continuously
since late 1957. The govern-
ment's recognition of the dan-
gers created by irresponsible.
labor elements May eventually
cause it to adopt sterner labor
policies in areas of vital.eco-
nomic importance.
Urban Labor
Since the economy of Cey-
i n is heavily dependent on the
Tamils dominant
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export of tea, rubber, and coco-
nut products through the port
of Colombo, the two important
areas of union strength are among
the rural plantation workers
and the urban labor force in
Colombo. Control of the urban
unions is contested keenly by
Dr. N. M. Perera's opposition
Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja
party (LSSP), which owes no al-
legiance to Moscow; cabinet min-
ister Philip Gunawardena's Trot-
skyite Viplavakari Lanka Sama
Samaja party (VLSSP), which also
opposes Moscow; and the ortho-
dox Communist party. Bandara-
naike's Sri Lanka Freedom party
is a relative newcomer to the po_
litIGal and. labor fields, ,and its
influence with laboris negligible.
Perera--leader of the par-
liamentary opposition and one
of the most astute
politicians in Ceylon
--controls the most
strategic elements of
urban labor. A rough
estimate of the three
parties' total urban
labor strength.indi-
cates that _the LSSP
controls about 70 per-
cent, the VLSSP about
7 percent, and the
Communists 20 percent.
LSSP-affiliated
unions now dominate
the port of Colombo.
Outside the port, the
LSSP controls a. wide
variety of Colombo's
government employees
--represented by the
Government Workers'
Trade Union Federa-
tion--and some employ-
ees in private firms.
Its ability to dis-
rupt the city was il-
lustrated last Novem-
ber, when the LSSP-
led strike among rail-
way personnel spread
to the port, the Pub-
lic Works Department,
and communic:3tions
services; and in
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`.r
28 August 1958
February-March 1958, when
strikes occurred among, hotel,
mercantile, and engineering
trade workers and in private
oil companies. The benefits
which labor reaped from these
strikes were attributed by
workers largely to the LSSP,
and the failure of recent Com-
munist- and VLSSP-led strikes
has further solidified the
LSSP's labor support.
The Communist party's ur-
ban labor strength is less
formidable than the LSSP's, but
that party also is capable of
extensive economic disruption.
Its following exists princi-
pally among workers in private
Colombo trading firms and among
white-collar government employ-
ees in Colombo.
Two Communist-led: strikes
last spring failed to benefit
the party, however. The gov-
ernment not only dealt resolute-
ly with a strike of its own em-
ployees but supported the con-
tention of private employers
that a strike against their
firms was illegal. As a result,
some dissatisfied unions ap-
parently shifted their alle-
giance to Perera's LSSP,
Strikes by Philip Gunawar-
dena's unions have not caused
extensive economic damage and
have been generally ill timed.
With the bulk of Ceylon's
urban labor controlled by two
far-leftist opposition parties,
strike activity is one of the
chief threats to economic and
political stability. The fact
that the top Communist and LSSP
leaders have substantially more
popular appeal than Gunawardena,
a cabinet minister, further de-
tracts from the government's
potential labor support. This
is particularly true of Perera,
whose parliamentary stature and
popularity with the workers
make him the most powerful op-
position figure on the island.
His articulate criticism of the
government's antistrike activ-
ities has cast him in the role
of the principal defender of
democratic rights for labor.
The government is partially
to blame for the economic and
political deterioration which
has resulted from the steady
growth of urban labor unrest.
Its former pro-employee bias
contributed to the lack of la-
bor discipline, and its general
endorsement of union activity
gave free rein to far-leftist
labor elements which were held
in check by the former ruling
United National party. The
prcaocnt government's belated ef-
forts to bring undisciplined
labor under control by adopting
a hard line toward the Commu-
nist-led strike of its own em-
ployees last April and through
the nationalization of Colombo
port on 1 August are unlikely
alone to remedy the situation.
The least politically ac-
tive but by far the largest
organized labor group in Ceylon
is composed of some 300,000
workers on tea, rubber, and coco-
nut estates. The entire planta-
tion labor force numbers at
least 600,000 and consists pri-
marily of Tamil-speaking work-
ers of southern Indian origin,
the great majority of whom have
no Ceylonese citizenship.
The largest estate labor
union, with a membership of about
200,000, is the non-Communist
Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC)
led by S. K. Thondaman. The
CWC's leadership has shown re-
sponsibility thus far, and dur-
ing the past two years the or-
ganization has refrained from
major agitation except for a
one-day token strike in Decem-
ber 1957.
The Democratic Workers'
Congress (DWC), formed in early
1956 by pro-Communist Abdul
Aziz, is the second. largest
estate labor union with a claimed
membership of 50,000. The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
influence of the DWC's Commu-
nist-dominated leadership over
the union's rank and file has
been negligible. The union ap-
parently has not yet managed
to attract elements from the
large section of unorganized
plantation labor, and has re-
cently lost strength to Thon-
daman's union. The LSSP and
Communist plantation unions--
with a membership of about 35,-
000 and 2,500 respectively--
probably are among the least
influential of Ceylon's major
trade organizations.
Instances of cooperation
between plantation and urban
labor have been rare. Thonda-
man's CWC staged a one-day
strike last December in support
of demands made by striking
unions in Colombo, and most
plantation unions supported the
LSSP's protest against the gov-
ernment's antistrike measures
in Colombo last spring. Co-
operation of this type is not
likely to become widespread,
however, in view of the two
groups' geographic separation,
the lack of political awareness
among the mass of plantation
workers, and the differing po-
litical views of their leaders.
A Communist-Trotskyite move
to form port and municipal united
labor fronts in order to
increase urban labor's bargain-
ing power is a remote possibil
ity at present. Perera--whose
support would be essential to
successful urban labor unity--
can effectively press his unions'
demands unaided by the Commu-
nist and VLSSP unions. He will
probably attempt independently
to increase the LSSP's strength
and initiative in port and mu-
nicipal labor affairs.
Strikes similar to those
which plagued the island almost
continuously from November 1957
through May 1958 probably
will not recur immediately aft-
er the government decides to
lift the emergency rule imposed
on 27 May. However, a long
continuation of the existing
calm is unlikely. Occasional
minor strikes and slowdowns prob-
ably will be staged to harass
the government,: through more wide-
spread labor agitation may
be checked until exploitable
issues such as the cost of
living, lack of economic prog-
ress, or antilabor discrimina-
tion by government and private
employers again take precedence
over communal problems.
CHILE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Chile's presidential elec-
tion scheduled for 4 September
comes at a time when inflation,
unemployment, and a rising cost
of living are the paramount is-
sues. While observersfeel in-
dependent candidate Jorge Ales-
sandri--running with. Liberal and
Conservative party support-,will
win, he is facing strong oppo-
sition from the Communist-backed
Socialist candidate, Salvador
Allende, who sees neosocialism
as the solution to Chile's eco-
nomic ills and who has promised
to initiate commercial and dip-
lomatic relations with the So-
viet bloc and to steer Chile
into a course of neutrality in
the cold war.
None of the five candidates
seems.capable of polling the
clear majority necessary to en-
sure election. The final deci-
sion, therefore, will probably
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minimum of state intervention.
Allende, backed by the Popular
Alliance Front, advocates eco-
nomic statism, extensive land
reform, and expansion of trade
with the Soviet bloc. The Chris-
tian Democratic candidate, Ed-
uardo Frei, also favors con-
siderable state intervention in
Chile's economy.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
be made by Congress, which must
choose between the two candi-
dates receiving the highest num-
ber of votes. Alessandri, fa-
vored in the popular elections
by better party organization
and financial support, also
stands the best chance in Con-
gress, since he is expected to
make a bid for the support of
the Radical party in exchange
for its participation in his
government.
The campaigning,
which has been going
on throughout 1958,
took an anti-American
turn earlier in the
year over the ques-
tion of US copper
tariffs. The chief
issue, however, con-
tinues to be the per-
sistent inflation
which has been Chile's
most pressing prob-
lem for many years.
This issue won the
presidency for Carlos
Ibanez in 1954 and
has since animated
all political con-
troversy. The cost
of living rose 19 per-
cent in the first
seven months of this
year, and unemploy-
ment in the metropol-
itan Santiago area
has now reached 9
percent of the total
labor force there.
Underlying many of
these economic diffi-
culties is Chile's
continuing trade im-
UNCLASSIFIED
CHILEAN CONGRESS
NATIONAL PARTY
AGRARIAN LABORITES DEMOCRAT
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT
INDEPENDENT
RADICALS 4 4 ~! LIBERALS
A ~
SOCIALISTS co o CONSERVATIVES
45 SEATS
SENATE
Prospective Programs
Alessandri's victory would
probably return the government
AVRAMAR LAGURnC3~ NATIONAL PARTY
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS DEMOCRATS
INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT
15 13 6 S
RADICALS LIBERALS
* ZAMORANO
SOCIALISTS ^ N CONSERVATIVES
LABOR PARTY q N
COMMUNISTS H 147 SEATS
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
* Independent presidential candidate
balance and shortage of foreign
exchange.
The failure of the US-
sponsored Klein-Saks mission
to stabilize the Chilean economy
in a plan instituted early in
1956 has forced Chileans to look
toward individual leaders repre-
senting sharply contrasting eco-
nomic programs. The right-wing
parties supporting Alessandri
advocate free enterprise and a
to the control of the conserva-
tive landholding and business
classes which have traditionally
dominated Chile's economic and
social life. This would mean a
withdrawal from the neosocial-
ist, statist economic course
that Chile has been following
for the past 20 years, a renewed
emphasis on free enterprise, and
a strong effort to attract pri-
vate investment from abroad.
No agricultural reform is likely
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
In the long run, an Alessandri
government might indirectly im-
prove the prospects of the al-
ready well-established Commu-
nist party by neglecting the eco-
nomic interests of the lower
classes.
Allende, on the other hand,
would probably attempt to insti-
tute extensive land reform
through taxation of idle lands.
He would also demand greater
control over and an increase in
taxes for the US-owned copper
companies which supply Chile
with 65 percent of its foreign
exchange. Allende has stated
that he will cancel the US-
Chilean military pact, oppose
the PL 480 program for Chile,
open trade and diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc, and
maintain an isolationist neutral
course in the cold war.
Although he has frequently
attacked US policies and has the
support of the Communist party,
which was legalized early this
month, Allende has stated that
US development capital is es-
sential for Chile. It would
not be inconsistent with Chilean
politics for him to end his co-
operation with the Communists
after he is elected. Allende
is probably the only candidate
capable of implementing the
needed land reform and the re-
organization of Chile's paper
industry, two measures which
would tend to stabilize the
economy and, in the long run,
weaken the Communist party.
As the outstanding exponent
of Christian Democratic philos-
ophy for Chile for the last 20
years, Frei would attempt eco-
nomic and social reform along
more orthodox and less violent
lines than Allende. Frei is
anti-Marxist and anti-Communist,
but he favors a high degree of
state intervention in economic
processes and believes in the
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necessity of agrarian reform.
Short of an improbable coopera-
tion with either the anticleri-
cal Radicals or the Popular Al-
liance Front, the Christian
Democrats could not obtain the
necessary party support to im-
plement major aspects of Frei's
program. The Christian Democrat-
ic party lacks a solid national
organization and is dependent
for its support on the individual
following of Frei and that of
other independent persons or
groups in the provinces, a sup-
port that cannot be discounted
in view of the unusually large
independent vote in Chile.
The Radical party continues
to back Luis Bossay--despite the
hopelessness of his candidacy--
in order to maintain the party's
unity, which has made it Chile's
largest political party and en-
abled it to elect three presi-
dents since 1938. Evidently
hoping to reach a working agree-
ment with the winner, Radical
leaders have generally avoided
attacking the other candidates
personally during the campaign,
concentrating instead on Pres-
ident Ibanez.
The candidacy of independ-
ent Antonio Zamorano is totally
discounted.
Regardless of which candi-
date wins, the new government
will be faced with inflation
and a severe shortage of for-
eign exchange, which will be
almost impossible to remedy as
long as the present low price
for copper continues. Faced
with a discouraging economic
picture, the new president will
probably turn to the United
States for the economic as-
sistance necessary to imple-
ment his programs.
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`?' 5E RET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
THE UKRAINIAN PARTY--SOURCE
Since Khrushchev became
party first secretary in 1953,
an unprecedented number of per-
sonnel assigned to key jobs in
Moscow and in the Russian fed-
eration (RSFSR) have been. drawn
from the Ukrainian party appa-
ratus. At the presidium level,
the addition last June of N. V.
Podgorny and D. S. Polyansky
as candidate members brought to
10 out of 25 the number of those
in the party's ruling body who
are or have been Ukrainian offi-
cials. The current leadership
in Kiev is better represented
on the all-union central com-
mittee than at any time in the
past, and many regional party
organizations in the RSFSR are
headed by men who previously
served in the Ukraine. In addi-
tion, several of these people
are to be found both in the
USSR government and in prominent
posts in the smaller republics
--two of them as republic party
chiefs.
Given the size and import-
ance of the Ukrainian party and
what appears to be the natural
inclination of the Ukrainian
clique in the Kremlin to pro-
mote former associates, it is
likely that the Ukraine will
remain a major source of cadres
for some time to come.
Party Qualifications
The use of the Ukraine as
a recruiting ground for leading
party and, to a lesser extent,
government cadres was fairly
common before Stalin's death.
As the most densely populated
republic after the RSFSR, the
Ukraine has the second largest
party. As a result, more seats
on the all-union central commit-
tee.have always been allocated
to'the Ukraine than to.any oth
er republic except the RSFSR.
Although political patron-
age seems to play a large role
in the selection of leading
cadres from the Ukraine, the
OF LEADING SOVIET CADRES
republic is one of the best
sources for party administrators
for other reasons. Because of
the importance of the Ukrainian
party, men who have served suc-
cussfully in Kiev are particu-
larly well qualified for work
in Moscow. In most cases, the
Ukrainian candidate for a post
in the central apparatus is
familiar with the complex work-
ings of a major Communist party
and with the party's role in
administering a highly indus-
trialized and agriculturally
important state.
The Khrushchev Machine
By the. time of the 20th
party congress in 1956 it was
clear that Khrushchev had used
his 12-year stint (1938-49) as
Ukrainian party chief to build
up a powerful following which
was to become the hard core of
his support in the central com-
mittee in Moscow. Using tactics
learned from Stalin, he rebuilt
the war-shattered Ukrainian par-
ty with men of his own choosing
,
many of whom, like Aleksey
Kirichenko and Leonid Brezhnev,
had served with him as political
officers in the Red Army. These
he posted in key positions
throughout the republic, pri-
marily in the oblast first sec-
retaryships. Unlike Stalin, he
was careful to cultivate the
personal friendship of his un-
derlings; the record of the
Ukrainian party congress in 1949
indicates that he was on a first-
name basis-with almost all of
his regional party chiefs.
Khrushchev apparently be-
gan to maneuver his cohorts in
the Ukraine into positions from
which they could eventually
gain central committee status
as early as December 1949, when
he was transferred to Moscow as
third-ranking secretary of the
all-union central committee.
From 1949 to 1952 there was an
unusually high turnover in the
Ukrainian party leadership, but
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28 August 1958
SOVIET PARTY (CPSU) PRESIDIUM MEMBERS
WHO SERVED IN THE UKRAINE
KHRUSHCHEV------- First secretary,-------First secretary, CPSU
1938-49 central committee;
USSR premier; chair-
man, CPSU bureau for
RSFSR
ARISTOV
BELYAYEV
BREZHNEV --------Oblast party chief; ---- Secretary, CPSU cen-
1946-50 tral committee
BULGANIN
FURTSEVA
IGNATOV
KIRICHENKO ?-----Party apparatus,-------Secretary, CPSU cen-
1938-53; first sec- tral committee
retary, 1953-57
KoZLOV
KUUSINEN
MIKOYAN
MUKHITDINOV
SHVERNIK ---------Party and trade union----Chairman, party con-
work, 1917-19 trol committee
SUSLOV
VOROSHILOV--------Party worker, --------Chairman, Presidium,
1917-19 USSR Supreme Soviet
KALNBERZIN
KIRILENKO --------Oblast party chief,------First secretary,
1944-55 Sverdlovsk Oblast;
member, CPSU bu-
reau for RSFSR
KOROTCHENKO------ Leading party and------Chairman, Presidium,
government posts Ukrainian Supreme
since 1938 Soviet
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
MZHAVANADZE -----Military Council, Kiev---First secretary,
Military District, Georgian party
1945-53
PERVUKHIN
PODGORNY-------- Oblast party chief,-----First secretary,
1950-53; central Ukrainian party
committee secre-
tary, 1953 to date
POLYANSKY--------- Oblast party-chief ------- RSFSR premier
1954-55
POSPELOV
Served under Khrushchev in the Ukraine
80826
almost all of those who lost
their positions showed up later
in important jobs. Brezhnev,
for example, was displaced as
party boss in Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast and took over the direc-
tion of the Moldavian republic
party in 1950. Zinovy Serdyuk,
named a secretary of the repub-
lic party central committee in
1949, was transferred to Lvov
Oblast in 1952; two years later
he replaced Brezhnev as party
chief in Moldavia.
The expansion of
the presidium at the
:19th party congress
in 1952 was evidently
used by Khrushchev to
see that his supporters
got a foot into the
door of the top ruling
group. Of the four
Ukrainian officials
elected to the central
committee, two--Demyan
Korotchenko and Leonid
Melnikov--became full
members of the presid
:ium, and Brezhnev was
elected a central com-
mittee secretary and
presidium candidate.
Both Korotchenko and
Brezhnev were dropped
in the revamping of
the party command after
Stalin's death but
later regained their
prominence.
In the immediate
post-Stalin period,
Khrushchev proceeded
somewhat slowly in
transferring Ukrainian
functionaries into
vital spots, and the
situation in the re-
public's leadership
remained comparatively
stable from 1953 to
1955. As his hold on
the first secretaryship
tightened, however, he
began openly to assign
his trusted lieutenants
to important jobs.
While the February
1954 reassignment of
Brezhnev as second--
and later first--secretary of
the Kazakh party seems to have
grown out of the inauguration
of the "virgin: lands program"
that month, the assignment of
Serdyuk as Moldavian party chief
and of A. I. Struyev as party
boss in Molotov (now Perm) Ob-
last and the elevation of Kir-
ichenko to candidate membership
on the party presidium have
the earmarks of purely po-
litical maneuvers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
At the plenum of the cen-
tral committee in July 1955,
the decision to convene the 20th
party congress the following
February was announced. There-
after, Khrushchev made his most
conspicuous moves ensuring the
election of former Ukrainian
co-workers to the new central
committee; between July and
December, four officials from
the Ukraine were transferred
into RSFSR oblast organizations
where they would be virtually
assured of election to the cen-
tral committee.
20th Party Congress
The composition of the 20th
party congress showed that Khru-
shchev's operations had paid
handsome dividends. The Ukraine
sent 191 delegates to the con-
gress, compared with 153 at the
19th congress. On the basis of
one delegate for every 5,000
members of the party, this in-
dicated a growth of some 200,000
in the republic party's member-
ship since 1952. Such an in-
crease alone, however, does not
account for the fact that the
Ukrainian representation on the
central committee was exactly
doubled. Whereas four full and
five candidate members had been
elected to the committee at
the 19th congress, eight full
and ten candidates were named
in February 1956.
In addition, all four of
the Ukrainian party workers
transferred into RSFSR oblasts
in the latter half of 1955 be-
came full members of the central
committee, as did those who had
THE "UKRAINIAN"
CLIQUE
KHRUSHCHEV KIRICHENKO
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 August 1958
been shifted out of the republic
earlier--Brezhnev, Serdyuk, and
Struyev. At the presidium lev-
el, Kirichenko was re-elected
to full membership, and Brezh-
nev regained the candidate mem-
bership and seat on the party
secretariat which he had lost
in 1953.
The composition of the
central committee provided clear
evidence that a significant ele-
ment in Khrushchev's support
had come from the Ukraine. The
prominence of the Ukrainian par-
ty was further shown by the fact
that, excluding military fig-
ures, 34 of the 133 full members
of the central committee had
been or were at that time func-
tionaries of the Ukrainian par-
ty or government. Among the
candidates, 19 out of 121 had
been service in the Ukraine.
Post-Congress Developments
Khrushchev's:,hold on the
Soviet party was considerably
stronger after the 20th congress.
He had, in the central party or-
gans, not only the support of
his Ukrainian associates, but
also that of persons he had
cultivated in Moscow after 1949.
Particularly since his purge of
the antiparty group in June
1957 and the accompanying elec-
tion of three more of his former
Ukrainian subordinates--Korot-
chenko, Audrey Kirilenko, and
Vasily Mzhavanadze--as candidate
members of the party presidium,
Khrushchev's strength with-
in the party appears formidable.
Although Khrushchev's per-
sonal contact with the Ukrainian
party organization is no longer
close, the Ukraine remains a
leading supplier of cadres.
Younger men like P. Ye. Doro-
shenko, chief of the central
committee's department of agri-
culture for the union republics,
continue to advance from the
Ukraine into responsible posts
at the center. Too young to have
been members of the coterie
formed by Khrushchev during the
1938-49 period, they may owe
their advancement in part
to the patronage of the older
group from the Ukraine. Now
that Kirichenko is a full-time
party secretary, for example,
he may be influential in filling
posts with persons who worked
under him after Khrushchev left
the Ukraine. 25X1
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