POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 24, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(THE CASE WHERE THERE IS A COMPLETE CESSA/TION
OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS.) (NO. 9)
Secret
24 APRIL 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting they national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
6XCLUDF.D FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWN(1RADINO AND
DF(: C.AHSIF'ICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1968
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where There Is a Complete Cessation
of Bombing in North Vietnam and Laos.) (No. 9)
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the anticipated
effects of a cessation of the present Rolling
Thunder program. Present geographic restrictions,
which apply only to North Vietnam, permit attacks
on targets below the 20th Parallel. This self-
imposed US restriction has removed the main
industrial. areas and transportation centers of
North Vietnam from exposure to bombing attacks.
It has, in turn, given a clear-cut indication of
Hanoi's probable actions in the face of a complete
cessation of attacks. Since the present US
geographic bombing limitations began, the North
Vietnamese have been making temporary repairs to
key rail and highway bridges in the northern areas
and restoring the damaged, but repairable, portions
of electric power generating capacity.
We believe that a full bombing halt against
both North Vietnam and Laos would probably bring
about the following short-term results:
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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1. The extension into the Panhandle of
the program for the full restoration of
through service on the principal rail
and highway links, by repairing key
bridges which are currently out. Mines
would also be removed from the inland
waterways.
2. In consequence, this restoration
not only would permit the more effi-
cient movement of goods within North
Vietnam, but also would improve the
capability of moving war-supporting
supplies into the North Vietnamese
Panhandle, and into Laos. The efficiency
of truck operations would be vastly
improved because daylight movements
would be greatly increased and the need
for camouflage and evasive action would
be ended. Much larger tonnages of
logistic support and increased numbers
of personnel could be moved through
Laos to South Vietnam with no increase
in the size of the truck inventory.
3. The improvement immediately of
morale and living conditions of the North
Vietnamese people would ensue. Within the
six-month period, many civilians who had
been evacuated from urban areas would
return to their homes.
4. The redeployment of a small por-
tion (perhaps 15 percent) of antiaircraft
strength to South Vietnam to afford
protection for VC/NVA operations in that
area would be possible. This might
entail the movement of 1,500 weapons
and about 6,000 men.
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5. North Vietnam would be capable of
redeploying a few thousand additional troops
to the south, but there would probably be
no significant immediate redeployment
since the initial logistic repair effort
would absorb about the same size force as
is currently employed on maintenance
of lines of communication. Casualties,
which reached a level of about 36,000 in
1967 as a result of the Rolling Thunder
campaign, would come to a halt.
6. A clear-cut propaganda and political
victory would be seen, in Hanoi's view.
It would see the United States forced to
take action as a result of political
pressures. The regime would be
encouraged in its belief that the
United States would ultimately tire
of the war and that Hanoi's firm
policy had forced the United States
to retreat.
In the long run, if the bombing halt persisted,
Hanoi would be encouraged to move from a program
of temporary repairs to one of full rehabilitation
of industry and transportation. The regime is
known to have developed detailed plans for the
post-war period. A continuation of the bombing
pause beyond six months would probably tempt Hanoi
to put its long-term rehabilitation plans into
effect, unless the state of the war were such that
an early resumption of US air action appeared to
be imminent. The long-term effects, apart from the
increased possibilities of full economic restora-
tion, would be:
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1. An improvement in agricultural
output as more domestic fertilizer and
agriculture equipment were made avail-
able. Given normal weather conditions,
most, but not all, of the food deficit
would probably disappear.
2. The addition of perhaps 100,000
to 150,000 men to the manpower pool as
the restoration of the transportation
system was completed. They would be
available for military training and
eventual redeployment to South Vietnam
if Hanoi believed such redeployment could
safely be carried out -- that is, if
Hanoi believed that large-scale bombing
against the north probably would not be
resumed.
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I. Impact on the Economy of North Vietnam
A complete standdown of the Rolling Thunder progam
would afford the North Vietnamese an opportunity to
begin a general program for restoration and recon-
struction of economic damage. During the short run --
the first six.months -- the primary effort would be
to begin. the restoration of the electric power
industry. Evacuated civilians would return to the
cities, and there would be a significant immediate
improvement in living conditions and morale. Pro-
ductivity would quickly improve, particularly in
transport, construction, and manufacturing. A bombing
halt would have little impact on agriculture in the
short run, the fifth-month rice crop already being
planted.
An extended standdown on the order of one to two
years would result in major progress being made in.
repairing bomb damage throughout North. Vietnam, but
only if the Hanoi leadership believed there was no
likelihood of the resumption of the bombing. The
restoration of all damaged industries, and the
planning of new industries, some of which are already
contracted for, would probably be well advanced.
Those. manufacturing processes that have not operated
efficiently under the dispersal program would be
returned to urban areas. Agriculture might make
some progress toward increased yields, but this is
generally a longer range problem that involves
changes of deep-seated practices. The speed with
which the reconstruction effort progressed would be
largely dependent upon the material and technical.
assistance the North Vietnamese obtained from the
USSR, the Eastern European countries, Communist
China, and Free World countries.
A. Industry
A cessation of the bombing probably would
result in only nominal improvement of North Viet-
nam's industries in the short run. Full recovery
would require from one to two years and involve
reconstruction, some relocation from dispersed
sites, and foreign technical and material assistance.
North Vietnam lacks the necessary skilled labor
force, raw materials, and finished goods to construct
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modern industries by itself. Industries that supply
essential services> support agriculture, and earn
foreign exchange are most likely to be reconstructed
first, and in that order.
Restoration of the electric power industry
will be a formidable task because the power industry
has sustained the heaviest damage of any North Viet-
namese industry. At present, only about 40 percent
of the total nationwide pre-bombing generating
capacity is in operation. Moderately damaged
equipment probably could be repaired within six
months., and such repairs would increase serviceable
capacity to about 60 percent of the pre-bombing
national total. Much of the remaining equipment,
however, is so severely damaged that increases of
capacity beyond this level would require major
reconstruction and time periods of up to two years
for full restoration (see Table 1). Restoration
of many undamaged industrial facilities presently
not in operation can be accomplished by restoration
of damage to electric power facilities. Several
heavily damaged electric powerplants probably will
be scrapped and entirely new electric power facilities
constructed.
Some. industrial plants would be back in
partial production within six months, although
several of the heavily damaged plants would require
one to two years to be completely repaired (see
Table 2).
The Haiphong CementPlant was severely
damaged by bombing raids in April and May 1967 and
has been inoperative since that time, but the North
Vietnamese have already started repairs and have
begun negotiations with Rumania to import machinery
for the plant. Delivery is scheduled in 1969 for
much of the new equipment, although some motors
were delivered in-late 1967. The plant could prob-
ably be placed in partial operation within six
months at 20 to 30 percent of its original capacity
of 700,000 metric tons per year. It would take
about two years to restore: the plant to original
capacity.
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Estimated Restoration of Damaged Electric Power
Generating Plants Six Months after a Bombing Halt a/
Pre-Bombing
Serviceable Capacity (Percent)
Powerplant
Capacity
(Megawatts)
April 1968
Six Months Later
Hanoi
32.5
75
75
Haiphong West
10
0
50
Haiphong East
7
0
0
Viet Tri
16
25
50
Thai Nguyen
24
25
50
Bac Giang
12
50
100
Uong Bi
24
0
50
Hon Gai
15
20
33
Nam Dinh
7.5
33
67
Thanh Hoa
5
50
50
Ban Thach
1
100
100
Co Dinh
1.5
0
0
Ben Thuy
8
0
25
Subtotal
163.5
30
55
Other (undamaged)
23.5
100
100
Total
187.0
39
60
a. Total restoration -.n most cases will require one to two
years.
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Estimated Recovery Times for Selected Large Manufacturing Plants
Current
Status as of
April 1968
Projected Operational Status
Six Months Later One to Two Years Later
Thai Nguyen Iron and Out of
Steel Complex operation
Haiphong Cement Out of
Plant operation
Construction
work in
progress
Nam Dinh Textile Finishing
Plant shops in
operation
Limited,
one-third
prestrike
capacity
Limited,
one-fifth
capacity
Limited,
one-fourth
capacity
Hanoi 8th March Partially Full
Textile Plant dispersed;
finishing
shops . in
operation
Viet Tri Paper Out of Full
Plant operation
Bac Giang Chemical Out of Full
Fertilizer Plant operation
Frequent bombings of the Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Complex during March-June 1967 destroyed
or damaged much of the complex. A number of the
workshops and fabricating buildings were destroyed
or damaged; the coke by-product plant, the coke
battery, the sintering building, all three blast
furnaces, and a number of ancillary facilities were
rendered useless. The incomplete open hearth and
rolling mill buildings were also heavily damaged,
as were research facilities and administrative
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buildings. Since the end of June 1967, the plant.
has been completely inoperative. The plant could
be restored to one-third of its pre-strike capacity
to produce pig iron in about six months, but complete
restoration and the completion of steel making
facilities previously under construction that had
never been completed would take two years.
Relocation of dispersed shops of manufacturing
plants probably would be one of the first steps in
recovery. The only known dispersals of relatively
large plants, however, include the Hanoi 8th March
Textile Plant, the Nam Dinh Textile Plant, and the
Haiphong Fertilizer Plant. Much-publicized claims
of industrial dispersal appear to have referred to
small and light industrial establishments such as
handicrafts, repair shops, and some sections of the
two textile mills.
Export of industrial commodities other than
coal is not likely to change significantly in the
short run. Resumption of pig iron and cement exports
will require full reconstruction of damaged manufacturing
facilities. Repair of bomb damage to coal-processing
facilities, however, has allowed a steady increase
in the export of coal since September 1967, bringing
the current level to about 60 percent of that
maintained during the first quarter of 1967. The
pre-strike level of coal exports probably could be
attained within six months.
The North Vietnamese apparently have already
been preparing for the reconstruction that would
follow a permanent cessation of bombing. During
1967, formal negotiations were conducted with
Communist and non-Communist countries for assistance
in rebuilding a number of destroyed plants. Most
of the. negotiations involved preliminary estimates
and surveys, and frequently resulted only in agree-
ments for the services of specialists and technicians
or for training. Deliveries of machinery and
equipment for basic industry under contracts signed
in 1967 were usually deferred, in some cases until
late 1968. A North Vietnamese industrial delegation
visited Paris in the fall of 1967 to discuss post-
war construction with a number of French firms.
More substantial talks are expected when the war
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ends. In addition, about 20,000 North Vietnamese
are expected to receive training in Communist schools
and industries between now and 1969. These students
will augment the technical labor force that will be
required to operate the post-war economy.
B. Agriculture
A bombing standdown would have no noticeable
effect on North Vietnam's agricultural output over
the next six months. The fifth-month rice crop,
supplying about one-third of the annual output of
rice, has already been transplanted, with harvesting
to take place in late May and early June. It is
possible that the tenth-month rice crop could be
improved if the preparation of the crop could be
accomplished without the disruptions from bombing.
A continued bombing halt would permit the
Vietnamese to increase agricultural output slightly,
if the regime continues to import fertilizer and
increases imports of agricultural machinery and if
improvements are made on the water control system.
However, agriculture has been tradition-bound in
North Vietnam for centuries, and dramatic increases
in output in the short run or even over a two-year
period cannot be expected. Furthermore, immediate
agricultural prospects are highly dependent on
unpredictable weather conditions.
Rice production has declined during the
last two years of the bombing from a normal level
of 4.5 million tons in 1965, to an estimated 4.2
million tons in 1966 and 4.0 million tons in 1967.
The decline in the last two years was due partly to
adverse weather and a shift from rice to subsidiary
crops.
Bombing has had only a marginal effect on
agricultural output because of the low stage of
agricultural development. North Vietnamese agri-
culture is extremely primitive and a majority of
the large agricultural labor force is engaged in
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producing rice, the basic foodstuff. The agricultural
labor force accounts for about 70 percent of the
total labor force and includes a large percentage
of women. Seasonal unemployment and underemployment
are typical.
The primary detrimental effects of the bombing
have been the diversion of manpower, particularly
managerial cadre, to military and war-related
activities; the daily interruptions of routine
agricultural chores for manning antiaircraft guns
or taking cover in shelters; and the disruptions to
the manufacture and distribution of fertilizer and
other farming input materials.
The level of agricultural imports would be
little changed during the first few months of a
bombing pause, but imports could decline substantially
thereafter. North Vietnam has been heavily dependent
on imports of food to supplement domestic output
since late 1966. During an extended bombing halt,
food imports probably would drop back to the pre-
bombing level of about 200,000 tons from the high
of about 450,000 tons imported in 1967. North Viet-
nam now imports about 160,000 tons of nitrogenous
fertilizer a year. In the short run, this level of
imports probably would continue. Over a one or two
year period, as domestic facilities began producing
nitrogenous fertilizer, the volume of fertilizer
imports probably could be reduced. Phosphatic
fertilizers are obtained from domestic sources and
are not imported.
C. Civilian Manpower
A cessation of the bombing will not immediately
free large numbers of persons for military duties.
The bombing has required the diversion of less than
200,000 full-time civilian workers, both men and
women, young and old, to repair lines of communication
(LOC's) and to move supplies. Only a small number
of these workers are physically fit males of military
age. A cessation of the bombing probably would not
free the diverted full-time workers over the short
run, in view of the amount of bomb damage already
sustained which must be repaired and the ever-present
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possibility of a resumption of the bombing. Over
the long run, some of these diverted full-time workers
would be available for reassignment. An additional
300,000 to 400,000 workers are currently required
part time for repair, reconstruction, transport, and
civil defense when local conditions demand. An
estimated 100,000 of these part-time workers are
mobilized in their local areas to man civil and air
defense posts and would not be-needed during a bombing
halt. Some of the remaining part-time workers who
are engaged in repairing LOC's and moving goods prob-
ably would continue this work during a bombing halt,
at least in the short run. In the long run, perhaps
100,000 to 150,000 would be available for other
purposes, including military duties.
D. Living Conditions
A bombing halt would immediately improve
the morale and living conditions of the North Viet-
namese people. North Vietnamese morale has been
most damaged by the evacuation of non-essential
persons from urban areas because the North Vietnamese
have a strong sense of family. An estimated 50 per-
cent of the population of Hanoi and 75 percent of
that of Haiphong have been evacuated. It is prob-
able that within six months most evacuated persons
would have returned to urban areas. Other hardships,
including interruption of normal work routines,
personal injuries, loss of life, property damage,
and the constant threat of bombing, would also be
alleviated by a bombing halt.
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II. Impact on Logistics
A. Present Status of the Transport System
Despite the bombings the capability of
North Vietnam's transport system remains adequate
to meet the country's economic and wartime require-
ments, and in several important areas capacity has
been substantially increased by the construction
of new facilities and improvements to the old.
Continuous air attacks over the past three years
have destroyed key bridges, disrupted traffic, and
destroyed large amounts of transport equipment, but
the transport system continues to function with the
assistance of numerous. bypass facilities, extensive
transshipments, night operations, importation of
transport equipment, and the expenditure of sub-
stantial amounts of labor and material on repairs
and countermeasures. Transport in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas has been hindered by damage to key
bridges, but a number of rail and highway bypasses
and the use of watercraft provide capacity far in
excess of that available before the bombing. Through
rail service from Hanoi south to Vinh has usually
been impossible, but shuttle traffic continues.
Highway traffic south of Hanoi is continually dis-
rupted by the bombing, but large truck movements
continue. The capacity of the transport routes is
well in excess of the relatively small volume of
goods required from North Vietnam to support the
war in the south.
B. Repair and Reconstruction
A bombing halt would result in a concerted
effort to restore key rail and highway routes to
full service. The most important aspect of these
repairs would be the reconstruction of major
bridges, including the Haiphong Railroad/Highway
Bridge (only recently repaired), rail and highway
bridges at Hai Duong and Ngoc Kuyet, and the Hanoi
Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red
River. In addition, several important rail facili-
ties would be repaired on the Hanoi-Vinh rail line
and on the Hanoi-Dong Dang line.
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The first priority would be the improvement
of through rail service to and from Haiphong. Pre-
liminary analysis reveals
that the North Vietnamese have already td en advan-
tage of the limited bombing halt to restore the
main rail bridge at Haiphong. Imports can now move
directly from Haiphong by rail, lessening the need
for trucks in the area. Further west, restoration
of damaged rail/highway bridges at Hai Duong and
Ngoc Kuyet and the reconstruction of the Doumer
Bridge would permit improved through rail service
from Haiphong to Hanoi.
The second priority would be the restoration
of the rail and highway LOC's leading south of Hanoi
to Vinh -- the heavily damaged Hanoi-Vinh rail line
and highway Routes 1A, 15, 7, and 137. Through rail
service to Vinh has been hindered by damaged bridges,
although movement of rail traffic has continued by
shuttling rail cars between interdicted points.
Restoring through rail service to Vinh would greatly
improve North Vietnam's capability to move goods in-
to the Panhandle for storage or for further distri-
bution into Laos or South Vietnam.
The third priority would be the repair of
rail bridges and yards along the Hanoi-Dung Dang
line, the principal rail connection to Communist
China and the route over which most overland im-
ports are moved.
During the early months of a bombing halt,
construction crews would probably make only
temporary repairs of rail and highway LOC's, re-
lying mainly on materials available locally such
as timber, stone, and bamboo; but if the bombing
halt were extensive, permanent repairs and ex-
pansions of capacity could be accomplished in about
two years. Temporary crossings could eventually
be replaced with steel and concrete bridges. Some
bridges, such as the Doumer Bridge, probably would
be completely rebuilt because of extensive bomb
damage. The rail network could be completely
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converted to dual or standard gauge.. This would
require the reconstruction of many major bridges
that would not be adequate to carry heavier standard
gauge equipment.
The primary restoration work required on the
waterway system would be the removal of latent
MK-36 mines sown in key waterway locations.
IThe
waterway system as been intensively bombed, but
the flexibility and primitive nature of the system
have minimized bomb damage. Restoration of damaged.
port facilities in the south would eventually be
undertaken, however.
C. Logistics Flows Through North Vietnam
A complete cessation of the bombing of North
Vietnam would result in an increase in the volume
of military supplies, petroleum, and military related
economic goods being moved into and through the North
Vietnamese Panhandle. The Panhandle of North Vietnam
would become even more important as a rear staging
area for the war in South Vietnam. The number of
storage sites, truck parks, petroleum storage areas,
repair sites, and distribution centers probably would
be increased. The initial increase in logistics
activity would not be due to a lifting of a "ceiling"
on the volume of traffic that had been imposed by
bombing -- bombing has had little limiting effect on
traffic flows in the past -- but would be due to a
desire to take advantage of what may be a short-
lived opportunity to move traffic with a minimum of
cost and effort. After the first surge to improve
stockpiles and resupply units in southern North
Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam, the flow of supplies
would depend on Hanoi's future intentions and the
course of the war in South Vietnam.
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III. Impact on the Military
A. Air Defense Systems
During the first six months after a cessa-
tion of Rolling Thunder and the bombing in Laos,
some redeployment of aircraft and antiaircraft
artillery could take place, but there would be no
demobilization of North Vietnamese air defense
forces. Damage to important airfields would be
repair
25X1
25X1
Despite the heavy damage inflicted under
the Rolling Thunder program, the North Vietnamese
air defense system has been expanded and made more
effective since the start of the bombings. Destruc-
tion of jet fighters has been particularly heavy,
but replacements from the USSR and China have been
guffi_cient to maintain the inventory at a relatively
constant level since 1965.
sma effective
orce of 10 to 20 s continues o stage out of
North Vietnamese airfields. Damage to airfields
has been repaired in relatively short periods of
time and work continues on new airfields. The
capabilities of both the ground-control intercept
and early-warning radar networks have been increased
b infusions of more sophisticated equipment
Although air-
strikes have necessitarEM t redeployment
of SAM equipment, which probably has reduced the
efficiency of the firing units and has complicated
logistics, the North Vietnamese now have up to 30
SAM firing battalions, and new SAM sites are being
built throughout the country.
As many as 1,500 antiaircraft weapons,
about 15 percent of the total installed in North
Vietnam, could be redeployed to South Vietnam
without seriously impairing North Vietnam's air
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defense capability. About 60 percent of these
could be 37-mm weapons or larger.
Significant changes in the North Viet-
namese air defense system over a two-year span
would depend on the North Vietnamese evaluation
of the likelihood that air attacks would not be
resumed.
B. Military Equipment Imports
During the first few months of a bombing
pause, imports of military materiel probably
would be maintained at current levels in order
to build up stockpiles, but during an extended
bombing halt, the import of air defense materiel
could be drastically reduced since ammunition
expenditures and equipment damage would be minimal.
The current value of air defense related imports --
missiles, aircraft, AAA ammunition, and other
materials -- may be as much as $530 million per
year. The emphasis of military imports could be
shifted from air defense equipment to infantry
weapons, and the heavy dependence on the USSR for
military aid could be reduced substantially because
the USSR is the chief donor of air defense equip-
ment and supplies.
Almost all of the military materiel used
by North Vietnam must be imported from other
Communist countries. Since the bombing began,
the USSR and Communist China have expanded their
military aid to North Vietnam from an estimated
$270 million in 1965 to about $660 million in
1967. The USSR has concentrated on air defense
equipment including surface-to-air missiles,
antiaircraft guns, radar, and fighter aircraft,
including MIG-21's. Chinese military aid has
concentrated on building up North Vietnamese
ground forces and sustaining the military effort
in South Vietnam. In addition, China apparently
has supplied radar and MIG-17/19 aircraft.
During 1967 the European Communist countries
supplied small amounts of military related goods
and some weapons.
C. Military Manpower
Under a bombing halt, military manpower
availability would probably not be changed
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appreciably and the size of the North Vietnamese
military establishment probably would not be
altered. As long as the danger of an invasion
or a resumption of the bombing exists and North
Vietnam continues to supply manpower for the war
in the south, it is unlikely that Hanoi would
reduce military force levels (built up since 1965
from 240,000 to about 480,000). North Vietnamese
air defense forces in the Laotian Panhandle
probably would be kept in place as security for
the lines of communication. About 6,000 air
defense troops, however, could be freed for similar
duty in South Vietnam without weakening North
Vietnam's air defense. Of the North Vietnamese
in-country ground forces, an estimated 50,000
are presently available to send to South Vietnam,
irrespective of the level of bombing. In addi-
tion, more than 100,000 new recruits each year
are available to augment or replace out-of-
country forces.
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I)7.. Effects in Laos
A bombing halt in the Laotian Panhandle would
make the movement of men and equipment into South
Vietnam easier, but it would not necessarily
result in a greatly increased flow of personnel
and supplies. The level of military tonnages and
personnel that could be moved through Laos by truck
would increase the danger of an invasion of South
Vietnam by a conventional large-scale military
force. The Communists could with increased speed
mass forces and supplies in four general areas of
southern Laos -- opposite South Vietnam's Quang
Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Kontum Provinces.
Bombing has not previously limited the flow of men
and supplies in Laos, however, and traffic through
Laos is and would be determined more by Hanoi's
intentions in South Vietnam and Hanoi's estimate
of what the United States would tolerate before
resuming air attacks.
The Communists probably would continue to
extend border crossing roads into South Vietnam,
upgrade river crossings, and improve existing
roads and their all-weather capability. There
would be little expansion of the road network in
Laos beyond that currently under way, however,
because the network presently'is adequate for any
foreseeable Communist requirement.
The efficiency of truck operations would be
vastly improved by an increase in daylight opera-
tions and by elimination of the need for camouflage
and evasive action. Much larger tonnages of
logistic support and larger numbers of personnel
could be moved into or through Laos with no increase
in the truck inventory.
Infiltration casualties and equipment losses
would be eliminated. About 20 percent of the
equipment and supplies transiting Laos are cur-
rently assumed to be lost from all causes while
en route to South Vietnam.
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During an extended bombing halt, after recon-
struction and repairs of bomb damage were completed,
the requirement for manpower would be reduced. In
the long run, about one-third, or 10,000, of the
North Vietnamese used to maintain and protect
infiltration routes could be made available for
service in South Vietnam or could be returned to
North Vietnam.
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Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070027-4