WHY INSPECTION MAY NO LONGER BE CRITICAL FOR ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000200100015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 13, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

Djsarniai:neri4 For R*I ei2 J O5 )VI ~100364RO00200100M-5
Wh Inspection May.No Longer Be -Critic for
Y designed for military uses in the iloth had been I CQa yy~ tVASHINGTON-For the past U.S.A." sma ptcmc a ! 1L sl .Control
'decade every significant arms There was some merit in Mr. wee s there have
control proposal has run afoul of Roshchin's objection. The United- been some hints from high Ad-
the .. `'''? ?' "
issue of inspection. Now for ? States now has so many nuclear ministration officials on the kind
a fleeting moment, thanks to a warheads that it can cannibalize of intelligence information' that
development nobody wants to obsolete weapons to obtain most can be obtained from these satel
talk about, the two superpowers if not all the fissionable materials ! lites. Thus at his March 14 news
may have a chance to reach some it needs for new weapons. Thus conference, President . Nixon
arms control agreements without a cutoff in fissionable materials noted that the Soviet Union has
the odious requirement of intru- production would not necessarily deployed 67 ABMs around Mos
'live on-site inspections. lead to any significant reduction cow. And then before Congres
One of those rare concatena- in existing arsenals, although it sional committees, Defense Sec-
tions is happening where a polit- might place some constraints on retry Melvin R.` Laird disclosed
ical interest in limiting strategic the development of new weapons that the Soviet Union has con-
weapons is being reinforced by a,, systems, .;,ti(?h as a ballistic mis? structed two shipyards for turn.-
technical development permitting sile defense system with its thou- ing out atomic submarines.
such an agreement to be verified, sands of warheads, This information undoubtedly
The development Involves one But in summarily rejecting the -
of the most remarkable and yet proposal, the Soviet Union may sance satellites and yet the Ad-
unsung accomplishments of the' have overlooked its underlying ministration would never admit
space age-% naissa - ! significance. For all the acknowl- that. Indeed, there was consider- ;
` 1ite perform feats o in- edged one-upmanship in the pro- ! able private consternation when,,
11 i ence be on t e capaci Hof posal, the United States also was ! the President used the exact fig- ..
t a - Ur s . sending up a signal that it was 'ure of '67 ABMs-a figure that
More important n terms o arms ready to consider using "national had been treated until then 'as a
.control agreements, thygo - means of verification" to monitor top secret to conceal the capaci-
+` .at ' some types of arms control agree-' ties of the satellites.,
? = ., ments, such as a limitation on Those satellites can even -
Qtp-s tSAP-.; strategic missiles, mine to a
"N ans o ve d.
e nited States hinted at the use f411, doors, It Is possible to tell .
possibility of using reconnais- reconrgj&UjLGCaA&91I1W4~Jt is so whether,a building houses atomic
sance satellites to monitor an cup emistic that even disarms- ous diffusion plant or an atomic
arms control agreement last week ment officials are under some reactor, for example, by its size
at the Geneva disarmament con- ? constraints in describing the new and shape.
` ference when it modified its pro- opportunities for arms controls
'posal for a cutoff in the produc- -that have been opened up by ' Unless both the United States%
tion of fissionable materials for* these satellites. and the. Soviet Union seize im
,.atomic weapons. In the past, to Thus, in the April Issue of For- mediately upon the opportunities'
verify such an agreement, the eign Affairs, William C. Foster, opened up by reconnaissance'
United States had that satellites, they may miss the
proposed the former director o he nit" c~ , chance for a strategic arms con-
there be inspection by the Inter- States Arms Control and Disarm- trol agreement:. In the not too
national Atomic Energy Agency ament Agency, commented that distant future, both sides are go-
uranium all the plutonium reactors, "our verification capabilities us-
uranium gaseous diffusion plants -ing 'national means' alone are mg to begin mounting multiple
and chemical separation centers considerably greater than it has, warheads on their interconti-
which the 'nuclear powers de- - been possible, so far, to reveal." nental ballistic missiles and once
' Glared were no longer producing The reconnaissance satellites that. happens the chance will have
materials for weapons. circlethe earth on a regular basis, been lost for monitoring an agree
1', In addition, the United States sending back packets of film that; ment with reconnaissance satel-
1 had proposed that each side have,. are routinely recovered by planes' lites because the satellites can
I. .,the right of on-site in io 11 ,o over the Pacific. The method of only detect the missile silo-not
check o anti re-entry into the atmosphere is the number of warheads on the ?
that m g t still be in clan estine, similar to that for manned cap- missile. Both sides, then will have
production. It is this latter de- sules. A plane with a trapeze been pushed back Into the quagr,
mand that the United States device then catches the vehicle's mire of on-site
dropped. The
fl_was neq er eareason t althou t arachute shrouds. ~` -JOHN. W. FIN Y
The united states has never'
at ~s countr "officially acknowledged the exist- ?.
~~Psglltt.s tq-p k'; ence of these satellites. There
for clandestin s. have been some hints, however,
The American proposal was of their remarkable photographic ' '
summarily rejected as really ,?c~apacity.
'nothing new by Aleksel N. Rosh- ?; ? en George D. AIke
the Soviet delegate to the
chin
,
conference. Furthermore, ho ob- . tom c ?ner ommittee
jetted that the proposal would iffit Wit Inal 11w
cc4n
not contribute to the reduction
existing atomic arsenals and _.._.._..-_.
nais-
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200100015-8