VIABILITY AND ORIENTATION OF A WESTERN SAHARAN STATE

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Apo
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j\ Foreign
STAT
Assessment
Center
Viability and Orientation
of a Western Saharan State
State Dept. review completed
Secret
PA 81-10,069
March 1981
Copy 1 1 8
STAT
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Viability and Orientation
of a Western Saharan State
Information available as of 31 December 1980
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Office of Political Analysis. Contributions have been
provided by the Office of Geographic and Societal
Research, Office of Economic Research, and the
Office of Central Reference. It has been
coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research, the
The author of this report is
Political Analysis,
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence officer for Near East-South Asia.
Comments and queries may be addressed to the
Chief, Near East-South Asia Division, Office of
Secret
PA 81-10069
March 1981
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North
Atlantic
Ocean
EI Aaiun
Conveyer b t 4
Samara
u Craa x'
Phosphate
Western
Sahara
Zouerat
Agracha
Iron ore
deposits
Mauritania
The
Gambia
Banjul:
Senegal
Morocco
Tindouf
Iron N
ore deposits
Area of
refugee carnps
Mali
/-r Upper
- Guinea
i r* Bissau
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Madeira Islands
(Port.)
0 400
Kilometers
Canary Islands
oSpain)
a
11
Niger
*Niamey
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25X1 Secret
Viability and Orientation
of a Western Saharan State
Key Judgments The Polisario Front has suffered setbacks since early 1980 in its war with
Morocco for control of the Western Sahara, but it is unlikely that either side
will be able to achieve a clear-cut military victory. Eventually, the heavy
costs of the war are likely to lead both parties to consider seriously a political
settlement. Depending on the progress of the conflict and the relative
strength of the combatants, a compromise settlement could result either in
the creation of an independent state encompassing all or part of the territory
of the Western Sahara, or in a union or federation of a part of Western
Sahara with Mauritania. Mauritania administered the southern third of the
territory from 1975 to 1979, and its leaders and population have strong
ethnic and cultural ties with the Polisario.
An independent Western Saharan state, regardless of whether it encom-
passed the entire Western Sahara or excluded the phosphate-rich Bu Craa
region, probably would be a socialist Arab republic patterned after African
and Arab "progressive" states. The government probably would be domi-
nated by the Arab nationalist faction of the Polisario Front, identified with
Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdel Aziz. Other factions within the
Front, including Marxist and pro-Libyan elements, almost certainly would
be represented in the government, but would be less influential. Islam would
be the official religion of the new nation, but government policies probably
would reflect the religious moderation typical of other North African
regimes.
Whatever its boundaries, an independent Western Sahara would require
substantial foreign support to pay for food and fuel imports. A state that
encompassed the entire Western Sahara, including the Bu Craa region,
eventually could become self-sufficient but it would require extensive for-
eign economic, technical, and managerial support to repair and expand the
war-damaged phosphate industry. A truncated state that excluded the
phosphate-rich area could not become economically viable. The amount of
foreign aid that such a state would require might gradually be reduced,
however, by the exploitation of iron ore reserves and the development of a
fishing industry.
The economic and political challenges that an independent Western Sahara
would confront raise serious doubts that it would be politically stable. The
ability of the new government to obtain sufficient foreign support to provide
the essential needs of the population would be a major factor in its survival.
In addition, factionalism in the Polisario Front and the inexperience of its
leadership could lead to continuing struggles for power.
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In foreign affairs, an independent Western Sahara undoubtedly would
support Third World independence movements and such nonaligned objec-
tives as the call for a new world economic order. The aid that Algeria has
given the Polisario guerrillas seems likely to guarantee considerable Al-
gerian influence over a Western Saharan government, although relations
could be strained if Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept unfavorable
settlement terms. The Polisario desire to continue to receive aid from Libya
would also give Tripoli some influence, although this would be limited by a
desire not to offend Algeria and by distrust of Qadhafi. Because it would
need foreign support, an independent Western Sahara probably would
attempt to balance its relations with the Communist states and the West. It
probably would establish relations with the United States and avoid close
identification with the USSR. At least initially, however, its attitude toward
Washington probably would be cool because of US military support for
Morocco, and any substantial improvement would depend on US willingness
to provide significant economic and technical assistance.
If a Saharan state were to federate with Mauritania, the combined entity's
political and foreign policy almost certainly would reflect the "progressive"
Arab nationalist orientation shared by the dominant faction of the Polisario
leadership and by Mauritanian President Haidalla. The inclusion of
Polisario representatives in the Mauritanian Government would numeri-
cally strengthen the position of Haidalla against his conservative domestic
critics, but would also provide another divisive issue to test Mauritania's
delicate political system and projected return to civilian rule. A combined
state that did not include the Saharan phosphate deposits would be economi-
cally weaker than Mauritania itself, which is already heavily dependent on
foreign aid.
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Viability and Orientation
of a Western Saharan State
25X1
The war between Morocco and the Polisario Front is
now five years old. Despite some recent gains by Mo-
rocco, neither side appears capable of winning a clear-
cut victory, and there is no indication that either is
willing to compromise on its basic demands
In this paper we do not attempt to predict the outcome
of the war in the Sahara or to assess the implications of
a complete Moroccan victory in which the whole of the
disputed territory might be successfully integrated into
Morocco proper. Instead, we examine the ramifica-
tions of those solutions that in theory might result in
the creation of a new political entity, autonomous or
independent, in the Sahara. Such an entity might take
one of three basic forms:
? An independent state encompassing all or most of the
territory. This is the aim of the Polisario and Algeria,
but seems unlikely in view of the Moroccans' increas-
ingly firm hold on the population centers and phos-
phate deposits in the northwest.
? A truncated independent or autonomous entity made
up of a portion of the Sahara with at least the
northwest region integrated into Morocco. Conceiv-
ably this could allow Morocco to protect its primary
interests and still allow the Polisario some political
self-determination.
? An integrated Mauritanian-Saharan state with Mo-
rocco retaining the northwestern part of the Sahara.
This less likely outcome, reflecting the common cul-
tural and ethnic base shared by the Mauritanian and
Polisario leadership, would represent a reversion to
the 1975-79 period when Mauritania administered
the southern portion of the territory, but this time the
Polisario would be integrated into a joint govern-
'25X1 ment.
Background
The Western Saharan problem, like many Third
World conflicts, has its origins in the process of
decolonization. Primarily the product of the conflict
between the desire of Saharan nationalists for self-
determination and Moroccan territorial claims, it has
been greatly complicated by the longstanding rivalry
between Morocco and Algeria. Spain's decision to
grant independence to its Saharan colony in early 1976
set the stage for the small-scale war that has been
fought since then by the Algerian- and Libyan-backed
Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia al Hamra and Rio de Oro) on one side and
Morocco and, until August 1979, Mauritania on the
other. 25X1
Morocco has long regarded the former Spanish Sa-
hara, as well as sections of Mauritania and Algeria, as
Moroccan territory. Although Morocco has aban-
doned most of its other claims in the area, it has
continued to insist that the northern portion of the
former Spanish colony is an integral part of Morocco.
Mauritania also raised claims to the territory of Span-
ish Sahara in the 1960s. The UN General Assembly
backed the right of the people of the area to self-
determination and urged Spain to organize a referen-
dum under UN auspices and in consultation with
Morocco, Mauritania, and other interested parties.
In August 1974 Spain announced that a referendum 25X1
would be held in early 1975. Algeria, Morocco, and
Mauritania, however, feared that a Spanish-organized
referendum would either affirm Spanish control of the
region or lead to the establishment of a Spanish puppet
state. In a press conference in October 1974 King
Hassan called on Spain to deal directly with Morocco
and Mauritania. He also said that if Spain refused
discussions with Morocco, he would resort to "other
methods." In October 1975 the International Court of
Justice ruled that while there were administrative and
historical ties between Western Sahara and Morocco
and Mauritania, they did not legitimize either Moroc-
can or Mauritanian territorial claims.) -125X1
King Hassan asserted that the Court's ruling effec-
tively recognized Morocco's claim to the region and
declared that he would lead an unarmed march of
350,000 civilians into the Spanish Sahara to "recover"
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the territory. The march began on 6 November 1975
despite an appeal from the UN Security Council.
Although Hassan recalled the marchers after three
days, the action'led Spain on 14 November to conclude
the Madrid tripartite agreement that provided for the
transfer of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania by
20 February 1976. Beginning in mid-November
Moroccan and Mauritanian troops gradually occupied
most of the territory. In mid-January 1976 the last
Spanish troops left.
The territory was placed under the control of a regional
administration set up by Spain, with the participation
of Morocco and Mauritania and the cooperation of the
Jemaa (the Spanish Sahara General Assembly consist-
ing of 102 prominent Saharans appointed by the Span-
ish Government). The Moroccans claim that ratifica-
tion of the tripartite agreement by the Jemaa in
February 1976 constitutes endorsement of Moroccan
control of the territory and satisfies UN requirements
for consultation and self-determination.
Algeria had supported earlier attempts by Morocco
and Mauritania to end Spanish sovereignty over the
region, but after Morocco's unarmed invasion it con-
demned the Madrid agreement and threw its support
behind the Polisario Front.' Although Algeria ad-
vocates self-determination for the Saharan people, its
basic goal in supporting the Polisario is to weaken
Morocco, its regional rival, and to establish an in-
dependent state in Western Sahara under Algerian
influence. Algeria would get access to the Atlantic,
which would greatly facilitate Algerian exploitation of
its rich iron ore deposits near Tindouf in the southwest.
25X1
Algerian assistance enabled the Polisario Front to be-
come a credible fighting force. After November 1975
the Polisario attacked Moroccan and Mauritanian
forces from bases near Tindouf. As the conflict devel-
oped in 1976 and 1977, the Front concentrated on
Mauritania, the weaker of its two opponents. Unable to
resist the pressure of the guerrillas, the Mauritanians
'The Polisario Front has its origins in the Saharan Liberation Front,
formed in Rabat in 1968 by a group of Saharan students brought
together by conservative Islamic views. In June 1970 the group
staged a political demonstration in El Aaiun, the capital of Spanish
Sahara. Harsh action by the Spanish police in breaking up the
demonstration, in which several people were killed, is said to have
ultimately lost the will to fight. In July 1978, dis-
satisfaction in the military with the conduct of the war
resulted in a coup that ended 18 years of rule by
Mouktar Ould Daddah and brought to power a govern-
ment committed to ending Mauritania's involvement
in the war. A cease-fire between the Polisario and
Mauritania, which the Polisario unilaterally declared
shortly after the coup, was formalized by a peace
treaty between the two parties in August 1979.
After the peace treaty was signed, the Front focused on
operations within Morocco. Until early 1980, Moroc-
can ability to fight an effective counterguerrilla war
gradually eroded. Since then, however, the Moroccans
have reversed this trend, primarily by using airpower
and by allowing field commanders tactical flexibility
to counter Polisario moves.
Resources
A Saharan state, whether it encompasses the entire
Western Sahara or comprises a smaller area that does
not include the phosphate-rich region in the northwest,
would require foreign support, at least over the near
term. A state that included the phosphate deposits
would be highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world
price for its sole export commodity and would be
heavily dependent on food and fuel imports. Capital
from abroad would be needed to pay for necessary
imports and to repair and expand the phosphate indus-
try. Nevertheless, given its small population and the
potential earnings from phosphate exports-which at
1980 prices could yield some $140 million per year-
such a state could survive and develop
A state that did not include the phosphate-rich area
around Bu Craa could not become economically viable.
The amount of foreign support that such a state would
require, however, might be gradually reduced by the
exploitation of iron ore reserves at Agracha and the
creation of a domestic fishing industry. Meaningful
progress in either area, however, would require
substantial foreign investment.
If this truncated part of the Sahara were linked politi-
cally to Mauritania, the combined state would be only
marginally better off than the same area of the Sahara
as an independent state. The standard of living of 80
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percent of the population of Mauritania is among the
lowest in the world. The iron ore industry in Maurita-
nia has stagnated because of weak world demand for
minerals and the damage done by the guerrillas. Al-
though Mauritania's overall financial condition has
improved somewhat since its withdrawal from the war,
the government is heavily dependent on foreign donors
for budgetary support.
There are approximately 80,000 Western Saharans
living in Western Sahara and perhaps an equal number
of refugees in Algeria or Mauritania.' In addition, as
many as 10,000 Europeans-half the 1976 total-live
in El Aaiun, Semara, and Dakla. Since the late 1960s
many Saharans have been forced by drought and
continued civil strife to settle in or around the few
towns and villages or to seek sanctuary in neighboring
countries. Many refugees would presumably return to
Western Sahara following independence and most
would probably settle in the north. With the low lit-
eracy rate of its population, an independent Western
Sahara would be critically short of technical and man-
agerial skills.
The Arab, Berber, and Negro peoples of Western
Sahara are divided into a variety of ethnic groups
within a complex and highly stratified society. The
most important groups are the Reguibat, Tekna, and
Delim tribes. The Reguibat, comprised of Arabized
Berbers who speak Hassaniya Arabic, are the largest
group and form the core of the Polisario Front. No-
madic herdsmen, the Reguibat inhabit the eastern half
of the country as well as parts of Algeria, Morocco, and
Mauritania, where they have winter pasturelands. The
Tekna tribe is of mixed Arab and Berber origin and
speaks a Berber dialect. Seminomadic, they inhabit the
northern part of Western Sahara and southern Mo-
rocco. The Delim tribe is ethnically more Arab than
the Reguibat or the Tekna and speaks Hassaniya Ara-
bic. The Delim, located in southeastern Western Sa-
hara, comprised the backbone of the native police and
military forces under the Spanish.
The Western Sahara is almost totally lacking in basic
infrastructure. Spain was little concerned with foster-
ing long-term economic development; it focused almost
I Population estimates for the area are based primarily on a con-
troversial Spanish Gov d ' 1974 and are
approximations at best
exclusively on developing the region's phosphate re-
serves. Morocco's major interest has been in establish-
ing military control and enhancing its naval capability
by upgrading port facilities at El Aaiun and Bou'dour_
but even these efforts have been modest. F25X1
The desert climate makes construction and mainte-
nance of modern transportation facilities exceedingly
difficult. Roads, mainly along the coast, are difficult to
maintain because of shifting sand dunes. The country
has no rail lines, although Morocco reportedly has
been considering construction of a rail link between
Marrakech and El Aaiun, one of the Western Sahara's
two major ports. 25X1
The rich Bu Craa phosphate deposit has an estimated 2
billion tons in reserves. In the early 1970s Spain in-
vested more than $500 million in mining, processing,
and transportation facilities associated with Bu Craa.
A 98-kilometer (km) conveyor system was built in lieu
of a railroad to carry the phosphate from the mine to a
treatment plant on the coast at El Aaiun._25X1
The mine presently has an annual production capacity
of 3 million tons, and annual production could reach 10
million tons per year within five to 10 years if the
necessary investments are made. Production at Bu
Craa, however, has been shut down since 1978, when
Polisario guerrilla attacks damaged the conveyor sys-
tem and powerlines and put the system out of commis-
sion. Restoration would require substantial foreign
funds and expatriate technicians to repair and run the
facilities. Other phosphate deposits, although unlikely
to be as rich as Bu Craa, are either unevaluated or
undeveloped. 25X1
If production can be restored to a level of 3 million tons
annually, it would be possible to earn some $140 mil-
lion per year at the 1980 price ($47 per ton) for
phosphate. This would be more than adequate to pay
for necessary consumer imports, as well as equipment
and technicians for the phosphate industry. Although
it is impossible to estimate the area's gross domestic
product, the production and export of phosphates alone
could yield a per capita income of perhaps $1,000 to
1,500-sufficient to rank the country with the higher
income less developed countries.
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The Sahara will continue to depend on imported food-
stuffs whatever the political outcome of the dispute.
Less than 1 percent of its land area is considered
arable, and the only crop grown on a significant scale is
barley. The survival of even that crop depends on the
adequacy of rainfall which, even in good years, is
sparse and infrequent. Some small-scale irrigated
farming is done in an area east of Al Aaiun in the
Saguia el Hamra Valley, where cereals, fruits, and
vegetables are grown. But the topography of the West-
ern Sahara-a nearly total desert wasteland-
precludes the development of anything more than
subsistence farming and cattle herding by the
seminomadic people.
Fish are abundant along the 1,110-km coastline, but a
Saharan state would have great difficulty in protecting
its resources against foreign fishermen or raising the
capital to exploit those resources itself. Presently, even
Morocco cannot enforce its restrictions on fishing
within its territorial waters. A viable fishing industry
would require a modern fishing fleet and associated
patrol boats, as well as refrigeration and canning facili-
ties. This substantial investment could not be gen-
erated internally. The Sahara presumably could re-
alize a substantial income, however, by licensing
foreign fishermen to exploit these resources
There are some indications that the territory may
possess other mineral wealth beside phosphates. Exten-
sive high-quality iron ore deposits are in the vicinity of
Tindouf, Algeria, near the Saharan border, and
preliminary exploration for iron ore at Agracha in
southern Spanish Sahara has offered encouraging re-
sults. In addition, a UN report suggests that Spanish
Sahara probably has quantities of titanium, vanadium,
bauxite, copper, zinc, manganese, and uranium.
Oil shale deposits discovered just north of the border
with Morocco probably extend into the Western Sa-
hara, but there is no domestic energy production at
present. Spain and Morocco have encouraged oil ex-
ploration in the region, and as late as 1978 Morocco
granted prospecting licenses to British Petroleum and
to Phillips Petroleum. All exploration efforts, however,
have proved fruitless. For the foreseeable future West-
ern Sahara will be completely dependent on imported
fuel. 25X1
Political Orientation
An independent state, regardless of whether it con-
sisted of the entire Western Sahara or a smaller part of
it, probably would be patterned after African and Arab
"progressive" states. The interim constitution adopted
at a Polisario congress in September 1976 declared the
realization of Arab socialism and the implementation
of social justice as the Front's political objective. Al-
though Islam was declared to be the state religion and
the source of its laws, an independent Western Sa-
haran government, like the regime in Algeria, would be
likely to stress moderation in religious affairs and
discourage religious extremism. The National Action
Program, also adopted at the 1976 congress, em-
phasized the Arab and African characteristics of the
Saharan people and called for a fair distribution of
wealth as a means of eliminating differences between
rural and urban areas. It stressed care for the family as
the nucleus of society, social and political equality
between men ,and women, and the provision of compul-
sory, free education and access to medical facilities.
A Western Saharan state in federation with Maurita-
nia, probably would be like the present Mauritanian
state, nominally an Islamic republic but under the
control of a ruling military council. Given the in- 25X1
creased emphasis that Islamic justice has received
under the regime of Mauritanian President Haidalla,
Islam would play a significantly more important role in
a Mauritanian-Western Saharan federation than in a
separate Western Saharan state. If Haidalla played a
major role in the government of the federated state, he
probably would be inclined to support policies favoring
the Moorish sector of society at the expense of the
black community.
the policies of an independent Western Sahara almost
certainly would reflect the views of the Polisario Front
leadership. Only limited information is available, how-
ever, on the political affiliations and aspirations of the
major figures in the Front. Moreover, most Polisario
Front leaders appear to be primarily concerned with
achieving independence and have been reluctant to
discuss the details of the administration and policies of
a new state until the conflict with Morocco is won.
25X1
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It is known that most of the Polisario leaders are in
their thirties. Some who claim to have been born in
Western Sahara, however, have family ties in Mauri-
tania, and a few have relatives in Morocco. In addition
to the original nucleus of Saharan students who stud-
ied in Rabat in the late 1960s, the leadership report-
edly also includes opponents of the Ould Daddah re-
gime that governed Mauritania until 1978.
using aid and equipment from Libya to increase pres-
sure on Morocco proper and also reportedly favor the
use of urban guerrilla tactics. The softliners adhere to
the political line espoused by Algeria, which urges that
military activity be limited to Western Sahara to gain
the support and sympathy of members of the Orga-
nization of African Unity.
The secretary general of the Polisario Front, Moham-
med Abdel Aziz, has held his post since August 1978.
Abdel Aziz, other key leaders, and much of the fight-
ing force belong to the Reguibat tribe. Tribal origins,
however, may be slowly losing their significance; the
educational program implemented at the refugee
camps appears to be intended, at least in part, to
eliminate tribalism and to forge a sense of national
25X1 identity.
All members of the Polisario Front leadership can be
described as Arab nationalists. In addition, three gen-
eral ideological tendencies can be identified. The domi-
nant, moderate, pro-Algerian group includes Secretary
General Abdel Aziz, Deputy Secretary General Bachir
Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali, and a majority of the
members of the Executive Committee and the Polit-
buro. Other identifiable groups are a pro-Libyan
group, some of whose members have Marxist tend-
encies, and a much smaller group of hardline Marxists.
Distinctions are not clearly drawn, however, between
the political sympathies of individuals, and some per-
sons have been identified by different observers as
25X1 belonging to different groups
On military issues, the Polisario Front leadership
reportedly divides along different lines. In September
1980, for example, Polisario leaders were reported to
have split into a hardline faction favoring greater use
of armed force to achieve independence and a more
moderate group favoring greater emphasis on political
dialogue and compromise. The hardliners include Sec-
retary General Abdel Aziz; Minister of Defense Ibra-
him Ghali Ould Moustapha; and Sidi Ahmed al-Batal,
a member of the Executive Committee. The com-
promisers include Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed,
Prime Minister of the group's government-in-exile;
Bachir Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali; and Mohamed Sa-
lem Ould Saleck. The hardliners reportedly advocate
Despite the presence of Marxists in the Polisario lead-
ership, it appears unlikely that an independent Sa-
haran government would have a strongly Marxist cast.
The Polisario's consistent emphasis on Arab socialism,
unity, and nationalism demonstrates the preeminence
of the nationalist group. Arab nationalist rather than
Marxist principles appear to be the basis for the
Polisario's training, propaganda, and educational sys-
tems. 25X1
The Polisario would have significant influence on a
federated state made up of Mauritania and a part of
the Western Sahara, but it would be hard-pressed to
achieve dominance. Although the pan-Saharan na-
tionalism of the Polisario appears more vital than the
less militant Mauritanian national idea, far more
Mauritanians, including blacks, possess the skills
needed to run a government and manage an economy.
As a consequence, Mauritania-with its much larger
1.5 million population-would stand a good chance of
emerging as the dominant partner
the government of an inde-
25X1
25X1
pendent Western Sahara probably would resemble,
more or less, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
(SDAR) established by the Polisario Front as a gov-
ernment-in-exile in February 1976 (see figure 1). It
seems likely from examining the overlapping struc-
tures of the Front and the SDAR that an independent
Saharan state would be dominated by a strong execu-
tive made up largely of the present Polisario leader-
ship. 25X1
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Prime Minister
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed
Minister of Defense
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha
Minister of Interior
Mahfoud Laroussi
(Mahfoud Ali Beiba)
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ibrahim Hakim (Hakim Adel)
Minister of Information
Mohamed Salem Ould Saleck
Minister Counsellor
Mohamed Ould Sidati
Minister of Justice
Mohamed Ould Ziou
Secretary General of Ministry of Commerce
Moulay Ahmed Ould Baba
Secretary General of
Ministry of Communications and Energy
Hamoudi Ahmed Ould Baba
Secretary General of
Ministry of Education
Ali Ould Mahmoud
Secretary General of
Ministry of Health
Saleck Ould Babeh
President
Sidi Ahmed Ould Mohamed
Vice President
Bachir Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali
41 members,
including a 21-member Politburo
The four-member Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) of the Polisario is the real locus of power and
makes all significant political and military decisions,
although the nine-member Executive Committee is the
formal executive body of the Front (see figure 2). The
most important member of the Council, Mohammed
Abdel Aziz, is the secretary general of the Front,
President of the SDAR, and also serves as a member of
the Executive Committee. Council members hold the
most important portfolios in the government:
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed, also known as
Lamine Amin, is Prime Minister; Ibrahim Ghali Ould
Moustapha is Minister of Defense; and Mahfoud
Laroussi, also known as Mahfoud Ali Beiba, is Min-
ister of Interior. Other members of the Polisario lead-
ership who play an important role in policymaking are
Bachir Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali, deputy secretary
general of the Front, and Omar Hadrani, reportedly an
assistant and protege of Bachir Moustapha Sayed.
Largely in an effort to provide itself with a greater
legitimacy, the Polisario Front created a Saharan Na-
tional Council as the legislative arm of the SDAR.
Residents of the Polisario Front camps in the Tindouf
area of Algeria are organized into cells of 11 members
each. The cells elect representatives to da'ira (orienta-
tion) committees, which in turn elect representatives to
the 41-member National Council. The National Coun-
cil in theory approves the SDAR Council of Ministers,
which is chosen by the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil of the Polisario. A 21-member SDAR Politburo
reportedly is selected from the members of the Na-
tional Council, which also in theory selects the nine-
member Executive Committee of the Front. In prac-
tice, however, the National Council, as well as the
National Congress, which apparently meets every two
years, merely approves decisions already taken by the
Front leadership, and this relationship would continue
after independence.
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Figure 2
Polisario Front
(September 1980)
Committee for External Affairs
Habib Allah
Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed Miske
Jumal Zakari
Hamdi Ali
Ibrahim Hakim
Secretary General
Mohamed Abdel Aziz
Deputy Secretary General
Bachir Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali
Executive Committee
(nine members)
Mohamed Abdel Aziz
Secretary General, Polisario
Bachir Moustapha Sayed al-Ouali
Deputy Secretary General,
Polisario
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed
Prime Minister, SDAR
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha
Defense Minister, SDAR
Mahfoud Laroussi
Interior Minister, SDAR
Ayoub Lahbib
Mohamed Laraine Ould Bouhali
Sidi Ahmed al-Batal
Omar Hadrani (Mohamed al-Ouali)
A Saharan-Mauritanian state probably also would be
dominated by a strong executive, with most important
decisions being made by a president with the support of
a military council. Although the Mauritanian Na-
tional Assembly, which was dissolved at the time of the
coup against Ould Daddah in July 1978, or a similar
institution might be reestablished, it is unlikely that a
legislature would play a significant role in a combined
state
Foreign Relations
A Saharan state under Polisario Front control would
align itself with "progressive" Arab and African na-
Revolutionary Command Council
Mohamed Abdel Aziz
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha
Mahfoud Laroussi
tions. Strongly influenced by Algerian positions on
international issues, it would pursue nonalignment, a
commitment to Third World independence move-
ments, and an economic order stressing control by
Third World countries of their natural resources and
the obligation of developed countries to provide assist-
ance. The tendency of the Polisario Front to support
Third World positions will be reinforced by the num-
ber of Third World states that have recognized the
SDARJ 25X1
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The new state would also be likely to follow the Al-
gerian lead in opposing great power involvement in the
area. It probably would seek to balance its relationship
with the Communist states and the West, although US
military support for Morocco could impede the devel-
opment of good relations with Washington.
In the Middle East, an independent Western Sahara
would be likely to side with Algeria, the other hardline
states, and the Palestine Liberation Organization in
condemning Egyptian President Sadat's peace initia-
tive and US efforts to secure a Middle East peace.
Relations with Libya, Syria, and South Yemen, all of
which have recognized the SDAR, probably would be
good, while relations with Saudi Arabia, which has
supported the Moroccan war effort, would be likely
initially to be poor or nonexistent.
In recent years, the principal foreign policy goal of the
Polisario Front has been to gain recognition of the
SDAR (see table). The Front has not secured the
25X1
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Countries That Recognize the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR)
Algeria
6 Mar 1976
Angola
11 Mar 1976
Benin
9 Mar 1976
Botswana
13 May 1980
Burundi
29 Feb 1976
Cape Verdi
4 Jul 1979
Chad
3 Jul 1980
Congo
2 Jun 1978
Ethiopia
24 Feb 1979
Ghana
23 Aug 1979
Guinea-Bissau
15 Mar 1976
Lesotho
Oct 1979
Libya
15 Apr 1980
Madagascar
I Mar 1976
Mali
3 Jul 1980
Mozambique
12 Mar 1976
Rwanda
31 Mar 1976
5 Oct 1977
28 Mar 1980
9 Nov 1978
Togo 16 Mar 1976
Uganda Sep 1979
Zambia Oct 1979
Zimbabwe 3 Jul 1980
recognition of the Arab League, but it has made steady
progress in gaining the support of the African states
and came very close to gaining membership in the
Organization of African Unity in July 1980. Although
it was apparently supported by a majority of the mem-
bers of the OAU, the threat by Morocco and several of
its supporters, including Zaire, Gabon, and Ivory
Coast, to withdraw from the organization forced a
compromise that temporarily referred the Sahara
question to an ad hoc mediation committee. The Front
nevertheless seems likely to win OAU recognition-
perhaps as soon as the next OAU summit in 1981.
North Korea 16 Mar 1976
South Yemen 1 Feb 1978
Syria 15 Apr 1980
Vietnam 3 Mar 1979
Grenada
Jul 1979
Guyana
31 Aug 1979
Jamaica
Sep 1979
Mexico
Sep 1979
Nicaragua
Sep 1979
Panama
22 Jun 1978
The foreign policy of a state composed of a part of the
Western Sahara in federation with Mauritania prob-
ably would be similar to that of an independent West-
ern Saharan state. Unity with Mauritania might lead
to better relations with such important Arab states as
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Both of these governments
have been key financial backers of Mauritania, and 25X1
this relationship might allow them to establish good
relations more quickly with a Saharan entity.
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Relations With Neighboring States
The support that Algeria has given the Polisario Front
would give Algiers considerable influence with an in-
dependent Western Sahara, although the closeness of
the two states could be adversely affected if the
Polisario leadership comes to believe that Algeria has
forced it to compromise on its basic demands in in-
dependence negotiations.
As of 1980 the guerrillas were receiving most of their
equipment, much of their military training, and nearly
all of their logistical support from Algeria. Especially
important has been the sanctuary that Algeria pro-
vides in the camps around Tindouf, where 75,000 to
100,000 Saharan refugees live. Before mid-1974, the
Front obtained most of its weapons from Libya, and it
operated from bases in Mauritania and in the Sahara
itself. As it became apparent that King Hassan in-
tended to seize as much of Western Sahara as possible,
Algeria gradually increased its aid. It decided to back
the Polisario fully after the Moroccan unarmed inva-
sion of Western Sahara.
Although there were indications in 1980 that some
within the Algerian leadership-including President
Bendjedid-believed that the Polisario should mod-
erate its demands, Algeria has continued publicly to
back the Polisario as the sole, legitimate representative
of the Saharan people, and to insist that full independ-
ence be granted to Western Sahara. This policy serves
Algerian interest at the expense of Morocco, and it
helps curb Libyan inroads among the Polisario. Per-
haps equally important is the longstanding Algerian
support for national movements in general, a position
that the Bendjedid government has no desire to aban-
don
Relations between Algeria and a Mauritania-Western
Sahara federation would also probably be good, al-
though they also could suffer if the Polisario believed 25X1
that the Algerians had forced them to agree to an
unreasonable settlement. Algerian-Mauritanian rela-
tions have steadily improved since the conclusion of the
peace treaty between the Polisario and Mauritania in
August 1979. President Haidalla has subsequently
made two trips to Algeria, the most recent in Septem-
ber 1980, and Algeria has reportedly agreed to provide
financial support to Mauritania, including a $20 mil-
lion loan to construct an oil refinery and a $10 million
loan to build a sugar refinery.
and support from Algiers
After Algeria, Libya is the most important backer of
the guerrillas. Libyan influence with an independent
Western Sahara, however, probably would be limited
by its need for good relations with Algeria and by the
Polisario's perception of Libyan leader Qadhafi as an
erratic, unreliable ally. This would not prevent the
leaders of a new state from using the prospect of closer
relations with Libya as a means of extracting more aid
April 1980 Libya formally recognized the SDAR,
prompting Morocco to break relations with Tripoli.
Although Libyan support had been limited largely to
financial aid and included only small amounts of
equipment, Tripoli in 1980 reportedly began to supply
the guerrillas with more sophisticated weaponry. In
the Libyans have at-
tempted to exploit differences between pro-Algerian
and pro-Libyan factions within the Polisario leader-
ship, but this effort seems unlikely to bear fruit. The
pro-Algerian faction within the Polisario leadership is
reportedly larger and more influential than the pro-
Libyan faction. Moreover, Libyan aid to the Polisario
is less than that provided by Algeria, in part because
the Algerians work to control all aid reaching the
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The leadership of a federated Mauritanian-Saharan
state, like the Haidalla government in Mauritania,
would be afraid that a close relationship with Libya
might tempt Qadhafi to interfere in its domestic af-
fairs. After Mauritania withdrew from the Western
Saharan conflict, its relations with the Libyans im-
Governments in Mauritania have favored the Polisario
Front since the overthrow of Moktar Ould Daddah in
1978. As a consequence, relations between an inde-
pendent Saharan state under Polisario leadership and
Mauritania probably would be good if President
Haidalla remained in power, given his clear predisposi-
tion toward the guerrillas and the close tribal ties
between Haidalla and his supporters in the Mauri-
tanian leadership and the Polisario
President Mohamed Saleck, who led the group of
military officers who deposed Ould Daddah, carefully
observed the cease-fire declared by the Polisario in
August 1978. Both Saleck and Prime Minister
Bouceif, who took power in a bloodless coup in April
1979, moved to withdraw Mauritania from the conflict
while at the same time attempting to avoid unduly
offending Morocco. Haidalla, who came to power in
June 1979 after Bouceif died in an airplane crash, has
tacitly favored the Polisario. In August 1979, the
Haidalla government concluded an accord with the
Polisario that provided for Mauritanian withdrawal
from Tiris al-Gharbia, recognized the Polisario as the
only legal representative of the Saharan people, and
called for a "just" and comprehensive peace and eace-
ful coexistence within preindependence borders
provisions called for the Mauritanians to turn over all
territory held by them in Western Sahara to the
Polisario seven months after the conclusion of the
treaty (March 1980). Since the signing of the accord,
the Polisario's use of northern Mauritania as a base for
25X1 operations against Morocco has increased.
Despite Haidalla's clear predisposition toward the
Polisario, however, Mauritania has resisted pressures
to recognize the SDAR, fearing that such action would
cost the Mauritanian Government what support it
retains among Mauritania's blacks. Blacks believe al-
legations that the Polisario has massacred captured
black prisoners, and they have always regarded their
country's Saharan involvement as strictly a Moorish
cause. Moreover, Haidalla wishes to preserve some
semblance of neutrality in the hope that he can play a
role in the political settlement of the conflict 25X1
Haidalla probably envisions a political settlement in
which Morocco would retain the northern portion of
the Western Sahara, with the remainder joined in a
federation with Mauritania. The Polisario, however,
has consistently maintained that it would agree only to
a settlement that provided for full independence for all
the Western Sahara. Despite their refusal to recognize
the SDAR, the Mauritanians, at least publicly, have
supported the principle of self-determination for the
Saharan people. 25X1
Mutual need would probably lead Morocco and an
independent state created by a political settlement of
the Western Sahara conflict (whatever its borders) to
establish relations. The Polisario could conceivably use
relations with Morocco to balance pressures from other
area countries, especially Libya and Algeria. Possibly
with this in mind, Polisario officials have told US
representatives that they do not seek to overthrow King
Hassan nor inflict a crushing military defeat on Mo-
rocco. On the contrary, they claim to see a stable
Morocco as a vital necessity for Western Sahara.
A settlement that joined the southern portion of the
disputed Sahara to Mauritania would be much easier
for Morocco to accept than one that resulted in the
creation of a separate independent state or any solution
that deprived Morocco of the population centers and
phosphate deposits of the northwest. Although rela-
tions between Morocco and Mauritania have been
strained since August 1979 and deteriorated even fur-
ther in 1980, problems between the two states would be
resolved for the most part by a settlement of the
conflict in Western Sahara.
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Relations With Communist States
An independent Western Sahara would be virtually
certain to establish relations with the USSR. Such a
state would, however, be suspicious of the Soviets
because of their refusal to recognize the SDAR during
its struggle for independence, and it would want to
appear sufficiently neutral to attract aid from the
West. Algeria, which has consistently resisted the
growth of major power influence in the region, prob-
ably also would press the new government to avoid too
close an identification with the Soviets. Relations be-
tween the USSR and a Mauritanian-Western Sa-
haran federated state would probably be correct, al-
though such a state would also want to balance
relations between East and West.
The Soviets have maintained at least a surface neutral-
ity on Western Sahara to avoid offending Morocco,
with which they have extensive commercial dealings.
They have also been dissuaded from dealing directly
with the guerrillas by the knowledge that such action
could offend the Algerians, who regard the Western
Sahara as an area of special interest. They have sup-
ported Algeria's calls in the UN for self-determination
for the Sahara and have provided indirect support for
the Polisario through Algeria and Libya.
Soviet officials have alleged that their gov-
ernment does not regard the Polisario as a genuine
liberation movement worthy of support, and Soviet
diplomats have been ordered to avoid contact with
Polisario representatives whenever possible. This po-
sition, however, probablyis motivated more by a desire
to maintain the best possible relations with both Mo-
rocco and Algeria than by any major disagreement in
principle with the aims of the Polisario.
In recent years Cuba has provided medical teams to
treat Polisario personnel in Algeria, and Cuban vessels
have been involved in supplying the Polisario. The
Cubans have also strongly supported the Polisario in
international forums and in propaganda and have pro-
vided training to Polisario personnel in Cuba. Thus,
relations between Cuba and a Western Saharan state,
whether as an independent entity or a federated
Mauritanian-Western Saharan state, probably would
be warm. Once again, however, the need to maintain a
balance between Communist states and the West and
the desire to stay on good terms with the Algerians
would limit the new state's receptivity. Like the USSR,
the Cubans, fearful of losing trade with Morocco, were
reluctant to recognize the SDAR. By late 1979, how-
ever, trade with Morocco had been greatly reduced,
and in February 1980 Havana finally extended rec-
ognition to the SDAR.
Relations With the West
Until early 1980, Polisario leaders regarded Spain as a
major source of aid., trade, and political support after
independence. Historic cultural, linguistic, and
commercial ties between Spain and Western Sahara
seemed to make such a relationship almost inevitable.
Polisario officials believed that Madrid, hoping to se-
cure access to Saharan phosphate deposits, would be 25X1
prepared to offer the new state significant financial
and technical aid. The decision by the opposition So-
cialist Workers Party in 1977 to support the Polisario,
as well as Prime Minister Suarez's subsequent encour-
agement of informal contacts between his party and
the Polisario, seemed to support this view.
The Polisario's seizure of Spanish fishermen off the
Western Saharan coast last May and of additional
Spanish vessels later in the year, however, soured
Spanish attitudes. In a visit to Morocco in October
1980, Spanish Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca prom-
ised the Moroccans that Spain would adhere to its
commitment to the 1975 tripartite agreement, thus
implying continued nonrecognition of the Polisario. To
secure the release of the fishermen, however, Spain
declared in December 1980 its support for the "legiti-
mate aspirations" of the Saharan people. This move
has angered Morocco while easing-at least temporar-
ily-the strains between Spain and the Polisario.
Polisario attitudes toward the United States have been
shaped to a considerable degree by the closeness of US
ties with Morocco, particularly the military supply
relationship. Predictably, the Polisario described the
US decision in late 1979 to increase its military sup-
port to Morocco as a violation of UN resolutions and as
interference in African affairs. Nevertheless, an in-
dependent Western Sahara would be open to diplo-
matic relations with the United States and would seek
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The Polisario almost certainly believed that a visit in
late 1980 by US representatives to the Tindouf region,
the informal contacts over the previous year, and US
support for OAU efforts to work out a political solution
marked a shift away from close identification with
Morocco. Although the United States does not rec-
ognize the Moroccan claim to sovereignty to the West-
ern Sahara, it has acknowledged Morocco's admin-
istrative jurisdiction in the area. At the same time the
United States has continued to encourage the parties
to concentrate on achieving a settlement through nego-
Relations between the United States and a federated
Mauritanian-Western Saharan state, like US rela-
tions with Mauritania itself, almost certainly would be
correct. A political settlement could open the way for
improved relations with Washington.
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