CHINA REPORT POLITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
JPRS L/,9803
22 June 1981
China Report
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOLIO 5/81)
FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
[] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the'source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
r~f ---
JPRS L/9803
22 June 1981
CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOLIO 5/81)
CONTENTS
Liberation of Thought, Four Basic Principles Defined
(Liu Quankai; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Jan 81) ....................... 1
Readjustment of Work Style, Discipline Urged
(JIEFANGJUN.BAO, 31 Jan 81) .................................... 7
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Lanzhou Units Cadres Study Defensive Warfare 8
(Deng Guotian, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 2 Sep 79) ...............
China Said To Need Strong Border Defense
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Sep 79) ..................................... 11
Squad Learns Lesson From Defeat in Sea Landing Exercise
(Xu Honghua; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Sep 79) ......................... 14
Being Defeated by 'Enemy' in Training Exercises Is Necessary
(Ai Hongjun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Sep 79) ......................... 18
Xiao Ke Speaks at Meeting of Military Academies
(Jiao Wu; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Sep 79) ........................... 20
Division Sets Good Logistics Record in Vietnam War 22
(Jiang Jilin, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Sep 79) ...............
Infantry School Improves Training by Using Vietnam War Examples
(Xu Kedi, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Sep 79) ................... 25
[III - CC - 80 FOUO]
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Infantry School Reforms Teaching of Staff Work
(Kao Shuhua, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Sep 79) ................ 27
South China Sea Fleet Expands Naval Training
(Yu Linsen; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Jan 81).......................... 29
Advanced Weapons Said'Not Without Limitations
(Shi Zhiyuan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Jan 81) ....................... 30
Superior Vs Inferior Weapons, Equipment Reviewed
(Li Kexin, Chengdu Command; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Jan 81).........
Air Force Unit Puts Forth Integrated Training Plan
(Li Zhengxiang, Deng Yulin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Jan 81) ......... 35
Engineering Corps Regiment Holds Combined-Arms Training
(Chen Xinnian; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Feb 81) ....................... . 36
Army Unit Holds Combat Training in Fortified Position Defense
(Chai Wu, Ke Jun; JIEFANGJUN.BAO, 1 Feb 81) .................... 38
Beat Superior Forces With Inferior Forces
(Zhao Jun, Yang Songlin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 16 Feb 81)............ 39
New Tactics of Attacking Tanks by Infantrymen Advocated
(Wu Zhen; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 16 Feb 81)........................... 41
Regulations Resolve Problems. in Training
(Li Guozhong, Song Keyun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ............ 43
Fortified Position Defense Combat Exercise
(Yang Zhigi, Hu Haiping; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ............ 44
PLA Units Urged To Study, Implement Party's Policies
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 Feb 81) .................................... 45
Problems of Combating Better Equipped Enemy Studied
(Chen Hongwu,.,. Lei Ming; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 Feb 81) ............. 47
Information on Military, Other Personnel .............................. 51
PLA Unit Information, Designations .................................... 54
Brief s
Political, Ideological Work 59
East Sea Fleet Training 60
Reinforced Infantry Battalion 60
Torpedo Boats in Mine-Laying 60
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LIBERATION OF THOUGHT, FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES DEFINED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 pp 1-2
[Article by Liu Quankai [0491,0356 7030]: "Uphold the Four Basic Principles and
Continue To Liberate Thinking"]
[Text] In the new year,. the most important. tasks facing the people of this country
are, in economics, to further readjust the national economy, and in politics, to
.continue to develop the situation of stability and unity. These are in the basic
interest of all people of the country and are the common desire of all. And in both
the smooth accomplishment of the economic readjustment tasks and in development of
the political situation of stability and unity, thought should be liberated further
under the leadership of the policy set forth by the Third Plenum.
Liberating thought is not a temporary measure of the party's but rather a long-term
policy. We have.passed through a long period of semifeudal, semicolonial society
and.have extensive and profound ideological influences deriving from the feudalists
and bourgeoisie; the 10 catastrophic years of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" created
modern superstition and used new obscurantism to shackle the masses' thinking. To
liberate thought we must smash the spiritual fetters of modern superstition and
break out of the ideological influences of the exploiting classes let over from the
old society; we must cause the masses to throw off the fetters of modern supersti-
tion, and make a decisive break with the exploiting classes' ideology of harming
others to help oneself, and with old, traditional habits. This is assuredly not
something that can be accomplished in a short time. The belief that liberating
thought has already run its course or has been overdone is incorrect. But liberat-
ing thought should be beneficial to the four modernizations, to stability and
unity, and to the centralization and unification of the whole party and the whole
army. Liberating thought should be predicated on upholding the four basic princi-
ples to be portrayed as opposites or allow people to break with the four basic
principles while prattling on about liberating thought. This state of affairs
truly exists in some cases, and attention should be called to it.
Is It Liberation of Thought To "Say What Has Never Been Said Before"?
Modern superstition has brought forth the bitter fruit of ideological ossification
and has completely fettered some people's minds. They cannot consider a problem,
but can only follow the book and copy the leaders' directives, imitating them all
whether they are right or wrong. In their work they act as "megaphones" or "clear-
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ing houses" and have no ideas, views or voice of their own, to say nothing of
creativity. Accordingly, a basic requirement for liberating thought is that of
setting the machinery in motion and considering problems. To start, thinking should
be enlivened, old theories should be discarded and new ideas created, and new view-
points'boldly brought forth.
However; is merely offering new viewpoints and saying what has never been said
before liberation of thought? It would be extremely one-sided to think so.
People's thinking reflects objective reality, and the correctness of what they say
depends on whether it is in accordance with objective reality. Whether a new view-
point is worth advocating or an old viewpoint is worth discarding should be deter-
mined in accordance with this standard; it is not true that only the new is worth-
while and that only "new" viewpoints, never before been advocated, are correct. The
theory of surplus value, the dialectical-materialist principle that matter deter-
mines consciousness and consciousness reflects matter and the theory that capitalism
will inevitably be replaced by socialism were all put forward by Marx more than a
hundred years ago; and some people believe that they should all be considered "out-
moded ideas." But the older they are, the newer they become: The longer they
have existed, the more they have been proven to be true, and they cannot be reject-
ed. In contrast, many fallacies from the period of Lin Biao and the "gang of four"
have been labeled"'new" and touted as "new developments" in Marxism; but the under
the banner of breaking new ground, they actually consist of old, stale goods. In
ancient times this country had a saying that "externally their words are ever new
and changing, but'if you examine their true nature, they are increasingly mean and
degenerate." Accordingly all new viewpoints must be analyzed to see whether they
are in accordance. with reality and are well-reasoned. If we approve of everything
"new" no matter what its content, it is very easy to be deceived.
Marxism is not a dogma but a science. Marxism does not exhaust all truth, but must
continue to develop, and the development of Marxism'is not based solely on what
some individuals can do, but requires everyone's common efforts. To liberate think-
ing we need to replace certain individual:,'.outmoded principles of Marxism with new
principles which generalize actual experience. Comrade Mao Zedong.was a great
Marxist who brought the universal principles of Marxism and the specific practice of
China's revolution into agreement and developed Marxism. But Comrade Mao Zedong
also made errors, and these errors, particularly'some theories and formulations
which have been shown by experience to be erroneous, should under certain circum-
stances be discussed and investigated. If we go by the "two all's" and they must
always be followed without alteration, we merely stifle thought and choke off the
party's vitality. But these discussions and investigations must be conducted in a
spirit of finding the truth and with a rigorous and conscientious attitude. All of
the relevant material must be collected and thoroughly analyzed and investigated,
without demagoguery but with the intention of finding the truth of the matter. In-
fluencing factors and objectives effects must be taken into account. Many comrades
have proceeded in this way, according great importance to study and making assiduous
investigations, while refraining from unfounded statements and from glib pronounce-
ments on subjects they do not understand. But there are also a few people, partic-
ularly some young people, who have neither investigated the history of our country's
revolution nor come to an all-round understanding of the country's current con-
ditions, and who know even less of Marxism and have assimilated it imperfectly. On
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the basis of hearsay they pronounce all manner of ill-considered opinions on matters
they do not understand, deny certain basic truths and attitudes of Marxism and Mao
Zedong Thought, and style themselves as "liberators of thinking," treating anyone
who does not agree with them as "old-fashioned," "conservative," or "ossified."
This is a problem of thought and understanding: They lack the spirit of seeking
truth and they consider novel, high-flown theories to be liberation of thought. In
addition there is an extremely small number of people who, under the banner of
liberating thought, advocate such outlandish ideas as that "China has a bureaucradic
class" and "Marxism is an illusion without scientific foundations." Such outlandish
ideas as these are in reality old stuff which the bourgeoisie has long touted and
which we encountered long ago. Lenin said, "Distorting the meaning of words has
long been an extremely common phenomenon in politics," and "the term 'revolution'
lends itself readily to misuse, and when a movement has developed to a certain stage
it is even unavoidable that people should misuse it" ("Selected Writings of Lenin,"
Vol 1, p 615). This was exactly the case during the 10 catastrophic years. Is it
not true that many reprehensible things were done under the fair name of revolution?
Now the slogan "Liberate Thought" is facing a similar fate at the hands of some
people. We must heighten our vigilance against such people who under the guise of
"liberating thought" are peddling the. bourgeoisie's wares.
The Assertion That "The Thinking of Officialdom Is Not Liberated, But the People's
Thinking Is Liberated" Is Sheer Nonsense
In relation to the liberation of thought some people have fabricated the theory of
"officialdom and the people," contending that all leadership cadres represent
"officialdom" with vested interests, so.that their thinking is not liberated. It
is only those without power, representing the so-called "people," who can liberate
thought. They say that the truth can only be with the "'people" and not with
"officialdom." This view wantonly transfers the relationship between officials and
people in an exploiting society to a socialist society, and is a complete fallacy.
Officials of all ranks in the exploiting classes' society are the "masters" whose
prestige and well-being are set on the people's shoulders, who use their power to
cruelly oppress the common people and suck their lifeblood,.so that the officials
and the people are in fundamental opposition. In the exploiting classes' society,
there were certain individual good officials such as"Bao Zheng and Hai Rui who
administered the law fairly, behaved incorruptably, and were able to do good for
the people to some degree. But because the exploiting classes' state machinery was
a tool for enslaving and oppressing the people, the existence of a tiny minority of
honest officials could not change the essential situation of an opposition between
officials and people. The proletariat's leadership cadres, however, are different:
They are leaders, an alement of the people, and the people's "public servants," and
the relationship between cadres and masses, i.e. between officials and people, con-
tains no fundamental opposition.
During the 10 catastrophic years, it actually came to pass that the party's excel-
lent work style was destroyed and some leadership cadres were infected with the
attitudes of the oppressing classes' officials, became exalted, divorced from the
masses and from reality, and some dealt in prerogatives and special privileges. But
this was because they were tarnished by the ideology of the exploiting class so
that their proletarian party spirit was weakened or lost, and it was not because
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
they represented "officialdom." In a situation where there still existed remnants
of the feudal class and influences of bourgeois thought, incorrect tendencies also
existed among. certain of the worker and peasant masses who were not leadership
cadres at all. It was only because their positions were different that their be-
havior differed: In both cases the source was ideological influences of the ex-
ploiting classes. Accordingly the problems of eliminating the ideological influence
of the exploiting class and rectifying incorrect tendencies and the task of destroy-
ing the fetters of modern superstition and the ideology of self-interest and liber-
ating thought exist for both cadres and masses. and for both leadership and ordinary
cadres. Of course, leadership cadres at all levels should set an example in this
respect. And use of the distinction between "officialdom" and "the people" as a
replacement for analysis of social and class origins, as well as the belief that
the masses' thought'is inevitably liberated and the leaders' thought is inevitably
not liberated, are approaches which are entirely at variance with Marxist class
analysis and with the principles of historical materialism.
Liberating thought means bringing thought into agreement with reality, reconciling
the subjective with the objective, and seeking the reality of the situation. Pro-
vided that a leadership cadre is not selfish or prejudiced, but makes assiduous in-
vestigations,' takes the masses as his teacher, and brings theory into agreement
with reality,. he will be able to break out of all shackles and liberate his thought,
and will be able to arrive at more truths. Such persons are a majority in the ranks
of our cadres..- But if comrades who are not in leadership posts. lack the above-
mentioned spirit, they will similarly be unable to liberate their thought and
attain truths.
The touting of the "theory of truth in power" by Lin Biao and the "gang of four"
during the 10 catastrophic years was entirely reactionary. Power and position bring
people neither knowledge nor truth; truth is not the inevitable concommitant of
power. But provided that one's power is not divorced from the people, but can be
used to serve the people, it is no hindrance to liberating thought or to arriving
at truths. In reality, once the ','gang of four" was smashed., many circumstances
that were in accord with objective reality and many policy decisions and measures
which had deep support among the masses, such as the general policy of readjusting,
reforming,. rectifying and upgrading the national economy and the decision to reform
the party and-.state leadership system and the economic system, were proposed by
none other than the party Central Committee. This proves that the idea that "of-
ficialdom" is supposedly.unliberated in its thinking and possesses no truths is
complete nonsense. Those who claim that they stand for "the people," that their
thought is liberated and that they are the possessor-ss of truths actually possess
not truth but fallacy.
Can Upholding the Four Basic Principles Hinder Liberation of Thought?
To liberate thought it is necessary to eliminate the "forbidden areas" and all
"restrictions" which hinder its liberation: Does this not mean that the four basic
principles should also be done away with? Some people actually think so. They
believe that. the assertion that liberation of thought cannot deviate from the four
basic principles is "setting restrictions" and that it will hinder liberation of
thought; this'is an incorrect idea.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The four basic principles, namely the socialist road, the people's democratic
dictatorship, i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party,
and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, embody the fundamental interests of all
people in the country, and are a necessity of historical development. Only by up-
holding the four basic principles does our country and its people have a future and
hope, and only in this way can the four modernizations be implemented and the
people's interests be protected. Admittedly our country's social system is still
imperfect and still has faults, the state system of the people's democratic dicr_atc*--
ship still has shortcomings, leadership by the party still needs improvement, and
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought were extremely distorted and falsified durirg
the 10 catastrophic years and require restoration to their original aspect and
further development. Accordingly, in connection with upholding the four basic
principles we need to sum up the lessons of historical experience, exalt democracy,
listen thoroughly to the masses' opinions, and permit disputes between different
views. All rigorous and conscientious disputes based on investigation and study
help to enliven thought and develop truths. The aim of this approach is to support
the four basic principles more effectively, not to doubt or negate them.
The four basic principles are not the conception of some genius, but a reflection of
the objective laws of social development, and truths repeatedly proved by long ex-
perience. To liberate thought we must destroy superstition and dogma, but we must not
do away with science or truth. All new discoveries and all new viewpoints proposed.
during the liberation of thought should be helpful in the development of science and
truth rather than the opposite. Since the four basic principles are basic truths,
they not only cannot come into conflict with liberation of thought, but are entirely
in accord with it. When a train moves along its track, the track is not a hindrance
to it, and similarly, advocating the four basic principles cannot hinder the liber-
ation of thought: We.proceed on the correct tracks precisely'in order to liberate
thought. Some people treat the four basic principles as "restrictions" and are not
entirely happy with them-or even oppose them, saying that they should be "suspended."
We should like to ask. just where this kind of "liberation" of thought is intended to
lead. Does "liberation of thought" consist only in smashing the four basic prin-
ciples? Is the thinking of those people who. consider the four basic principles
to be "restrictions" and believe that they will hinder the liberation of thought
entirely without restrictions itself? No indeed. If today's extremely diverse
countries do not belong to one social system they belong to another; they-all have
different parties and different ideologies. If someone is opposed to the four basic
principles he always wants to adopt some other "principles"; for example, if he does
not want the socialist system, he must want a different kind of social system, and if
he does not want the leadership of the.Communist Party, he must want the leadership
by some other party. Some people have actually advocated such ideas openly, stat-
ing~~that "socialism cannot be implemented either in China or anywhere in the world,"
or "the four modernizations can be implemented and socialism built without the
leadership of the Communist Party." Is this not setting up different "restrictions"?
Comrade Zhou Enlai said: "Marxism has a framework. We have a general framework,
we do not oppose frameworks in general." Although the exploiting classes in our
country no longer exist, classes have not been entirely destroyed, and although
the class struggle has already ceased to be the main contradiction in our country,
it still exists. Accordingly, in their thinking or pronouncements involving major
political questions, people either consciously or unconsciously reflect the
interests, viewpoints and requirements of a specific class, and their social conse-
quences generally benefit either one class or another. In these terms, people's
understanding has limits. The people who oppose the four basic principles as
"restrictions have not really cast off all "restrictions" themselves; it is just
that they are employing the "restrictions" other principles.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Liberating thought is a policy.to which our party unswervingly adheres. After the
"gang of four" was smashed, if we had not had a mass movement to liberate thought,
but had acted according to the "two all.'s," we would not have been able to effect
a shift of the focus of party work, to carry out' the readjustment of the national
economy or to.implement the reform of the state leadership system and the
economic system, we would have been unable to implement a number of party policies,
and in a word, we would not have the four modernizations or socialism. Accordingly,
the liberation of thought must continue to be developed, thoroughly and in a healthy
manner, without any wavering. However, the liberation of thought does not'mean'::that
anyone can say anything he likes or do anything he pleases, can reject party leader-
ship, socialism, centralization and' discipline, and can approve of all manner of
incorrect ideas.- Much less can we permit a small minority to distort the slogan
"Liberate Thought," to peddle all manner of contraband goods and to disseminate
antiparty, antisocialist views. There should be thorough democracy among the
people, the.expression of different opinions should be permitted, and even if
people express incorrect opinions they must not be attacked or given labels indis-
criminately; those with incorrect opinions should be given guidance and education,
while the necessary criticism and struggle should be used in the case of all anti-
party, antisocialist opinions. A clear distinction should be made between this
and attacks or labeling. We should propagandize justly and. energetically the
four basic principles and firmly implement them; we should continue unwaveringly
to liberate thought, for in this way our country's four modernizations will
assuredly be realized and socialism will assuredly be victorious.
8480
CSO: 4005/2076
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PARTY AND STATE
READJUSTMENT OF WORK STYLE, DISCIPLINE URGED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Jan 81 p 3
[Article reprinted from 23 Dec 80 issue of RENMIN HAIJUN: "Carry Out a Rectification
of Work Style and Discipline"]
[Text] Some units have already made use of the favorable opportunity of summing up
work as the year ends and the arrival of new soldiers and the return of old ones to
implement education and rectification regarding work style and discipline. This
work is highly necessary, and doing it well is extremely important for the completion
of this year's tasks. All units should follow this example and approach the work
energetically both before and after the Spring Festival.
Education and rectification with regard to work style. and discipline should begin
with the cadres. The cadres' behavior amounts to tacit orders. When the work of
education and rectification of the cadres has been done well, they will set an
example everywhere and the units will follow them.
The combination of persuasive education and bold administration has always been an
effective method of rectifying work style and discipline, and we should use the same
approach on this occasion. Comrades who breach discipline should be patiently per
suaded, ably set straight and enlightened; they must not be coerced or stifled.
Those who are coerced generally do not submit, and attempts to style them are un-
successful. But this does not mean that we should refrain from carrying out suitable
criticism and from taking necessary disciplinary measures. Criticism and disciplin-
ary measures are also education. The lack of the courage to point out and correct
bad phenomena and to come to grips with pernicious influences and set them straight
must be rectified.
The focus of this education and rectification regarding work style and discipline
is on actively implementing regulations and ordinances and on conscientiously
implementing rules and regulations. We should continue setting up a healthy and
normal system for working and living, based on regulations. Every cadre and fighter
must know and conscientiously carry out his duties, maintain security, pay strict
.regard to appearance and.bearing, conduct and discipline, stress courtesy and eti-
quette, observe discipline, obey the laws, protect social ethics, and set a good
example at all times.
8480
CSO: 4005/2076
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
LANZHOU UNITS CADRES STUDY DEFENSIVE WARFARE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by Deng Guotian [6772 0948 3240], Wang Fuhong [3769 4395 7703] and
Wang An [3769 1344]: "Integrate a Summing up of Experience With an Inquiry
Into Future Warfare--The Lanzhou Units Assembled Military Cadres To Study
Some Problems at the Initial Stage of a War"]
[Text] A team of military cadres in training held by the Lanzhou Units have
just completed a training course recently. Did it score any significant
results? The participating cadres admitted that at the very beginning of the
course, they did not know much about the concept of "militarily holding fast
to defensive warfare at the initial stage of war" [7786 1017 1343 7089 1785
0155 2069]. Having finished the course, they now feel relatively at home with
this concept.
After Comrade Su Yu [4725 5940] published his article entitled "An Inquiry Into
the Problems Relating to the Methods of Fighting at the Initial Stage of
Anti-Aggression War in the Future," the party committee of the Lanzhou Units
decided to conduct a team of military cadres in training on the basis of their
position and mission. The participants consisted of the key commanding officers
from various armies of the Lanzhou Units; the major commanders of provincial
military districts, and the leading cadres from judicial, political and rear
service establishments. These comrades had fought in the Revolutionary War
and acquired definite combat experience. Nevertheless, to direct combat under
contemporary conditions remained for them a new topic for study. The leading
cadres of the Lanzhou Units stressed time and again that the training course
should integrate experience with an. inquiry into future warfare. An inquiry
into the problems of "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the
initial stage of a war" could serve to enhance the organizational as well as
the commanding capabilities of the participating cadres on the one hand and seek
the pattern of experience needed for warfare under contemporary conditions on
the other. The team of military cadres in training fully manifested military
democracy. On academic issues, they spoke out and expressed their opinions
freely. In content and methods, they avoided technological work as much as
possible. Instead, the emphasis was laid on other aspects--deliberation on
substance, small group discussion, research paper writing, and roundtable
discussion. Prominence was also given to discussing the theoretical aspects of
"holding fast to defensive warfare" and a commander's command over his
organization.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
During the training, the leading cadres of Lanzhou Units paid great attention
to guiding the students in their study of the specific laws of modern warfare
and probing into flexible tactics in operations suitable for contemporary
cdnditions. On the basis of integrating their firsthand experience with dis-
cussions on the basic principles of "holding fast to defensive warfare,"
those comrades who had taken part in the "Shangganling Campaign" [0006 3927
5749] and the "38th Parallel Campaign" during the struggle to resist U.S. aggres-
sion and aid Korea seriously studied the technical equipment of the opposite
side in a future war and the main features of a group army's offensive
campaign. In addition, the principles of utilizing our arms of services
including the air force, artillery troops, armored troops, signal troops,
antichemical corps, and political work as well as logistics safeguard were
diligently studied. Furthermore, problems such as how to form a strong
defense system, how to carry out counter-assault and counter-strike tactics,
and how to organize the various services and arms to fight in coordination
at the "initial stage of militarily holding fast to defensive warfare" were
earnestly discussed. Moreover, an army commander made a thorough study of
how to take effective coordinated action of "militarily holding fast to
defensive warfare." The three observations presented by him were concise
and to the point. First, the commanders of the combined arms unit and of the
various arms must understand one another, and be familiar with the charac-
teristics and principles of using the various arms. Second, in organizing
coordination, the essentials must be firmly grasped. With respect to the
various arms, it is essential to have a well-organized coordination among
the infantry, tank units, artillery troops and the air force. During opera-
tions, emphasis should be laid on coordinated actions in resisting continuous
-assault by the enemy's infantry and tank units on the one hand and carrying
out a vigorous counterattack on the other. As to wiping out targets, the
main effort is to coordinate action'dealing with the enemy's tank assemblage
and airborne force. Finally, great Attention should be paid to safeguarding
communications.
In exploring the problems of organization and command with reference to
"militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war,"
they repeatedly combined the study of principles with the salient topo-
graphical features of a hypothetical battlefield. They seriously analyzed
favorable as well as unfavorable conditions of standing fast at a given
region's defense, and inquired into tactics suitable for its salient features.
For the purpose of increasing their perception of theory, they crossed the
Gobi Desert and traversed the length and breadth of the land around a hypo-
thetical theater of operations and its adjacent area. They conducted on-the-
spot investigations of the region's fortifications, topography, climate,
water supply, roads and resident population. Then, they worked indoors.
By integrating theory with practice in their learning process and deliberation,
the students not merely grasped the theoretical aspects of "holding fast to
defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war," but also, in a relatively
systematic manner, studied and drilled on the tactics of sticking to defending
a hypothetical theater's garrison focal point. Besides, many valuable hypo-
theses relating to some aspects of battleground construction including the
transformation of topography and roads, the integration of farmland capital
construction, and the construction of antitank fortifications were advanced.
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Through study and discussion, the participating cadres have learned how to
organize and command "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the
initial stage of a war." In order to turn personal experience and what they
have learned into useful knowledge shared by the troops, they completed
9 research papers, 27 working papers and revised drafts on the "Syllabus of Some
Problems Concerning Theoretical Aspects of Militarily Holding Fast to Defensive
Warfare" in the course of assembling for training. Their arduous works.
provided useful materials suited to this region for the training of junior
commanding officers.
CSO: 4005/2074
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
CHINA SAID TO NEED STRONG BORDER DEFENSE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Sep 79 p 1
[Commentary: "It Is Necesary To Have a Strong Border Defense"]
[Text] Fighting the war of self-defensive counterattack on the China-Vietnam
border firmly convinced us: the four modernizations must be defended by armed
force. Our garrison forces defending the land border and sea coast are the
first line in battling to defend the four modernizations.
The realization of socialist modernization requires a peaceful international
environment and stable border areas. The four modernizations are a great and
heroic undertaking. It makes our enemies feel nervous and uneasy, so that they
are bound to try by all possible means to wreck them and cannot let them
peacefully be carried out. This poses a problem: when we concentrate our
strength on constructing the four modernizations, we must maintain sharp
vigilance and defend the safety of the border areas, closely integrating the
construction of the four modernizations with the defense of the four moderniza-
tions. Our country's territory is vast, and the land border defense line
alone is over 21,000 kilometers in length, of which close to two-thirds is
contiguous to the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Vietnam. The border regions are
iihabited by the minority nationalities. In our country, although the popula-
tion of the minority nationalities is only about 6 percent of the total popula-
tion, the regions they live in account for 50 to 60 percent of the total area
of the country, a vast territory abounding in natural resources. If a war
breaks out, no matter whether it is on a small, medium or large scale, the
border areas and the minority nationality regions will bear the brunt. All
this shows that the border defense struggle will be protracted and critical
and that is is a matter of urgency to strengthen border defense construction,
and shows that in order to realize the four modernizations it is necessary to
construct prosperous border areas and strong border defenses.
History is a mirror. Over the 30. years since the founding of the state, we have
fought many wars of self-defensive counterattack in defense of the border areas,
smashing the aggressive and subversive plots of big and little hegemonism and
defending the motherland's peace and territorial integrity, in order to create
advantageous conditions for the construction of socialism. People can just
imagine: if there were not such conditions, there would be daily alarms sounded
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
from the strategic positions along the border and year after year the beacon
fires would. not be extinguished, and in such a case could we have concentrated
our energy on socialist construction?
The so-called "political border defense" advocated by Lin Biao was in reality
borders without defense and even no borders and no defenses. In those years,
Lin Biao and the "gang of four" time and again seriously weakened border defense
construction. Although we have refuted the fallacy of "political border defense,"
it still today remains in the minds of some comrades as a wound that demands
prompt healing.
"The border defense forces in peacetime and on sentry duty, once a war breaks out,
will only be engaged in small-scale fighting." This view is incorrect. Border
defense is not a small matter. The border defense garrison forces occupy the
first line of struggle against enemies. The places where they are stationed
are scattered and numerous, and they live under tough conditions, their tasks
are onerous, and their struggle will be complex. In case war breaks out, whether
.we can resist the first wave of a sudden enemy attack, whether we can delay the
enemy's offensive, and thus give us the time necessary for war preparations,
have a direct bearing on how well we construct border defenses. In line with
the demands for defending the four modernizations with armed force, we must
build our border defense forces into strong forces that are Red politically
and ideologically, that understand our policies to a high degree, that are
well organized and disciplined, that can work with the masses, that have both
definite military qualities and a mastery of the techniques of border defense
fighting, and that can carry out both political and military tasks. Only this
kind of forces can shoulder the heavy responsibility on the borders and insure
that "a certain number of troops can defend against an uncertain number of
invaders," so that our border defenses will truly pass the test of political
disturbances and severe warfare.
Then there is this phenomenon: the soldiers are defending the border but their
minds are elsewhere. This mental state is extremely detrimental to the building
of strong border defenses. Focusing on this situation, the great number of
officers and men in the border defense garrison forces pointed out: "Cherish
the border areas and take root in the border areas, defend the border areas, and
construct the border areas." This is what people usually speak of as the
"four borders" idea. Firmly establish the idea. of the "four borders" is a
correct slogan. If we want to construct border defense well we cannot do without
this slogan. Within the "four borders," cherishing the border areas it the
premise, and the other "three borders" are established on this ideological basis.
By solving the problem of cherishing the border areas through sinking deep roots
there, they will be able to construct the border areas without being afraid
to work up a sweat and will courageously devote themselves to the defense of
the border areas.
There is yet another situation, viz, speaking of joint defense but actually
practicing singlehanded defense of one's own position. If this situation is
not turned around, it will be impossible to defend effectively. If we do
things according to the ultraleft line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four,"
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
for example, taking the Mongolian nationality's habit of drinking tea with milk
as a "bourgeois lifestyle" and the Hui people's habit of demanding that no
allowances be made for eating pork as a "new trend in class struggle," how can
we unite the masses in the border areas for joint defense? True strength lies
in the masses. With the border defense line this long, if we are separated
from the support of the masses of people and only rely on the units doing
things without any following, it will be hard to strengthen border defense, to
truly do good mass work in the border areas, especially to to good work with
the minority nationalities and the militia and to do good military-civilian
joint defense. With our motherland's long land border defense line and extensive
sea border, only if everybody is a sentry, every home is a sentry post and every
village is a fortress can the motherland become an impregnable fortress.
The four modernizations require a strong border defense--this viewpoint is
agreed by all, from top to bottom. The problem is that, once the question of
land border and seacoast defense is touched upon, many strange phenomena arise:
some are that "The mouth is tight but the heart slack," and there is a lot of
empty talk but little done in fact; some problems, which originally were easy
to solve, were pigeonholed for long periods of time so that they became a big
pile: and also, with regard to certain problems that were hard to solve at one
time, responsibility was mutually pushed back and forth, and no one thought of
making reforms....
In the. background of this kind of phenomena is a concealed problem, viz, the
problem of leadership style. If we want to make progress in border defense
construction within a short period of time, and cause it to take a new lead
forward, there must be a fundamental transformation in leadership style. In
the hearts of the leaders there must be a place for border defense, in all cases
putting defense of the border first and defense of the interior next, putting
the companies first and defense of the organization next. Problems that can
be solved today definitely cannot be put off until tomorrow, and problems that
one can solve oneself definitely cannot be pushed off onto others. If we want
to truly build prosperous border areas and strong border defenses, a current
problem that sticks out is: transform the leadership style!
9 727
CSO: 4005/2457
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SQUAD LEARNS LESSON FROM DEFEAT IN SEA LANDING EXERCISE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by Xu Honghua [1776 3163 5478] et al.: "Draw Lessons From 'Defeat"']
[Text] Midsummer with the scorching sun directly overhead. On the Yellow Sea
outpost of "Hill 51,"-the smoke of gunpowder blurs the scene and there is the
sound of death-dealing guns. This is a.tactical defense exercise in resisting
a landing operation that was organized by a certain regiment of the Qingdao
Garrison District. Gradually the gunpowder smoke dissipates and the deadly
sound subsides. The 2d Squad of the 6th Company, which had been standing
fast guarding the hill, because of "heavy casualties," has its position
occupied by an "enemy" motorized infantry-platoon.
This result, which departed from the common practice in former naval war exer-
cises, was widely discussed by people. Some said: "In training exercises,
our armed forces cannot suffer a defeat," but the comrades.of the 2d Squad
felt that they had learned many things from this "defeat." In the final
analysis, which view is correct? Please take a look at the main course of
this "battle."
The Trick of Lifting Artillery Fire
At the beginning of the "battle," a swarm of "enemy aircraft" flew in close to
the sea surface. After they had bombed wantonly and indiscriminately, a fierce
artillery bombardment on our position came from the sea. The fighters of the
2d Squad, holding their rifles, squatted in their shelters, prepared at any time
to hit back. Several minutes passed and then the observer gave the signal:
The "enemy's" bombarding fire had been lifted. The entire squad quickly
jumped out of their shelters and occupied the position. Squad leader
Gao Liyun [7559 4539 6663], while ordering the defense works to be repaired
in a rush, had misgivings: Strange! Why was the artillery attack so brief?
According to the enemy's tactical principles, this short an artillery bombard-
ment means that the enemy's LST's are not far from the shoreline. Can it be
a trick? How should I handle this situation? Prior to this, if he had
envisaged a fixed plan for dealing with a situation, everything went all right.
Suddenly he heard a sharp scream in the air: the "enemy's" lifted artillery
fire had returned and was plunging down on top of the squad.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"Hit the ground," shouted squad leader Gao Liyun. However, it was too late.
Two comrades who were a little slow in hitting the ground were "killed" and one
was wounded. After-the artillery fire had lifted, the squad quickly made rush-
repairs on the defense works and gave first-aid to the "wounded" soldier.
(Writer's note: The organizers of this tactical exercise set up this situation
in which there was a trick in the enemy's lifting of his artillery fire, so
that the 2d Squad's was caught unawares with regard to the tactical training
topic of "defending against artillery"; but the exercise helped, by this
negative example, the comrades of the 2d Squad to understand this truth: the
enemy is extremely tricky and'the situation on the battlefield is ever-changing.
We certainly must envisage more complexity in peacetime training and make a
point of tempering the trainees in the capability of flexibly dealing with all
soxts of complex situations. Otherwise, if they simplemindedly deal with
changeable situations, it will be hard for them to avoid taking losses passively.)
Under cover of artillery fire, three "enemy tanks," in a blustering and truculent
manner, make a forced beach landing.
"Hill 51," defended by the 2d Squad, slopes gently and to its front is level
beach. The hill is easy to attack and hard to defend and is extremely advan-
tageous for tank assaults. According to the predetermined operational plan,
which called for an ambush attack on the tanks, the squad sent three antitank
teams, carrying rocket launchers, bangalore torpedoes, and satchel charges, to
the prebuilt defense works below the position, where they would wait until the
"enemy tanks" were blocked by the mine clusters on the beach at the high tide
line, and then mercilessly attack them. However, the minefield had already
been destroyed by artillery fire.
The "enemy tanks" fiercely charged through. Rocket launcher gunner Sun Jinqi
[1327 6651 2978] got one tank in his sights. There was a "boom" and the tank
was hit, but it forged ahead as before. The rocket projectile had not pierced
the front part of its composite armor. Bangalore torpedo gunner
Mu Wei'an [4476 5898 1344], holding his weapon in both hands, jumped up and
rushed forward. Cleverly making use of terrain features, he crawled, rolled
and suddenly jumped forward, putting to good use the tactical movements he
had learned in peacetime training. But, owing to the fact.that the tanks
alternately covered each other and that the firepower was fierce and their
vital points small, he found no way to get close to them.
The three antitank teams were pinned down in trenches and shell craters by
machinegun fire from the "enemy tanks." With a mighty roar the "enemy tanks"
plunged through the prebuilt antitank defense works, scattering the antitank
teams behind them. At this juncture, according to the second phase of the
predetermined plan, the rocket launcher team should, making use of terrain,
attack the "enemy tanks" from the rear and the flanks, and the bangalore
torpedo team should concentrate its fire so as to intercept the "enemy
infantry" and cut off the "enemy" tanks from his infantry. But, unexpectedly,
following on the heels of the "enemy tanks" were three "armored cars."
Fire from machineguns and submachineguns of the armored cars was fierce.
Sun Jinqi got his sights on the rear of one "enemy tank" and was about to
fire when a fierce burst of machinegun fire from an "armored car" "!cut him down."
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Seeing the "enemy tanks" pushing through, and being unable either to attack or
withdraw, bangalore torpedo team leader Mu Qingguang [4476 1987 0342] ordered
everybody to throw a volley of handgrenades and, under cover of the resulting
smoke and dust, jump into a ditch and take a shortcut back to the position.
At the main position, squad leader Gao Liyun saw the next situation perfectly
clearly. After conferring with the deputy squad leader,.he decided to quickly
lay mines to the front and right side of the position, so as to force the
"enemy tanks" to go in front of a rain-swollen-ditch and thus stop their
advance and force the infantry out of the cars. The squad moved quickly and
laid mine clusters. When the enemy tanks approached, deputy rocket launcher
gunner Pei Doug [1014 2639] from the flank fired his last rocket projectile,
which hit and severed the track of one "enemy tank." The rest of the tanks
turned and charged toward the left flank. They had not gone far when they were
blocked by the ditch and had to stop. One platoon of "enemy infantry" climbed
out of the "armored cars" and, deploying into formation, charged our position.
(Writers' note: This "battle" against tanks shows the results of the 2s Squad's
peacetime training in attacking tanks and also reveals problems in peacetime
training. It made the fighters see that, owing to the fact that their peacetime
training in studying the enemy's armed forces was insufficient, they had only
drilled in how to cut the connection between the enemy's infantry and tanks
and they had not thought about the connection between the enemy's tanks and
armored cars. The result was that they suffered losses from the enemy armored
cars following on the heels. of the. enemy tanks. This made the comrades of
the 2d Squad a little wiser: Only by strengthening the study of the charac-
teristics of the enemy's equipment, authorized strength, and tactics can the
training lessen our blindness in action and truly train us in skills that will
subdue enemy tanks.)
'Enemy' Infantry That Could Not Be Repulsed
At the position, the fighters closely observed the "enemy," waiting with leveled
guns and chests stuck out. The enemy rushed toward the position en masse.
But, on the assumption that the enemy was not making a feint, the fighters
had beforehand carried out tactical drills for coordinating their operations,
training for over 3 months in line with the enemy's authorized strength and
tactical principles, so that their fighting capacity was fairly strong. They
saw the "enemy" form a front-facing triangular formation and advance, making use
of the cover provided by terrain features.
Squad leader Gao Liyun had made quite a peacetime study of the enemy's tactics.
In a low voice he ordered the squad to disperse to their sectors and prepare
to fire, waiting for the best opportunity. As expected, when an "enemy"
squad rushed to a point about 20 meters in front of the position, they suddenly
and simultaneously made a half leap and prepared to throw hand grenades. At
the sound of Gao Liyun's "Fire," the 2d Squad opened a fierce fire. Over half
the "enemy" soldiers were shot down and the rest fled in disorder.
The "enemy tanks" and "armored cars" retaliated with violent fire, especially
the tank at the right of the position whose track had been cut, and owing to
advantageous terrain, it posed an even greater threat to the 2d Squad. Gao Liyun
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
ordered two fighters to destroy this tank. The two fighters had not moved
out very far when they were suddenly ambushed by several "enemy soldiers."
The fighter in front was "killed." The-"enemy commanding officer," anticipat-
ing that the 2d Squad would make this move, had laid the ambush. Quick-witted
Wang Guaoming [3769 0948 2494] and another fighter, taking advantage of the
"enemy ambushers" being off guard, attacked.them from the flank. With several
handgrenades, they wiped out the ambushers and destroyed this "enemy tank."
The "enemy" redeployed his forces and launched a new offensive, intensifying
his fire on the front of the position as if he planned to make a frontal
breakthrough at one stroke. Gao Liyun, calmly observing the "enemy's" battle
formation, discovered that they could be playing a trick. The "enemy,"
feigning a frontal attack as a screen, sent two squads to quickly outflank
the position on the right. Gao Liyun.immediately grabbed a light machinegun
and with two combat teams moved to the right flank, leaving only two fighters
to hold the "enemy" at the front of the position. The two "enemy" squads had
just started their assault on the fight flank when they were soundly beaten
back.
The "enemy commanding officer," adapting himself to changed. conditions, ordered
the one squad that was..making the screening feint attack to make it the main
attack, and the squad suddenly launched a fierce assault. The result was that,
owing to the fact that the 2d Squad's firepower and military strength at the
front of the position had been weakened, the "enemy" broke through the position.
This time the 2d Squad was-thrown into confusion, and the "enemy" on the right
flank took advantage of this favorable situation to charge forward. Even though
the fighters had bravely killed many of the enemy, in the end, because of their
own excessive "casualties," they were hopelessly outnumbered and lost the
position.
(Writers' note: This battle against enemy infantry was quite brilliant, and
it broke down the old conventions of past exercises being like an act in a play.
The enemy is not routed with one blow and defeated in every battle. It was not
determined beforehand who would win and who would lose. During this confronta-
tion, both sides engaged in a battle of wits and bravery, the situation was
complex, and the scene was true to life. In this exercise, although the
2d Squad suffered a "defeat," they were profoundly enlightened by it. The
fighters said it well: Being "defeated" several more times like this will
certainly spur us to continually raise our tactical and technical levels,
and in a future war against aggression we can win many victories.
9727
CSO: 4005/2457
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
BEING DEFEATED BY 'ENEMY' IN TRAINING EXERCISES IS NECESSARY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by Ai Hongjun [5337 4767 6511] of a certain tank regiment: "Let Us
Begin by Discussing 'How Is It Possible To Suffer a Defeat in a Military
Exercise"']
[Text] Going among the troops, I'observed the tactical training of several tank
companies. I discovered a common, problem, viz, the conditions were simplified
and there was wishful thinking about the enemy's situation. Our forces were
victorious every time, winning in the first encounter, and the "enemy forces"
were defeated every time, collapsing at the first encounter. This is just
what is called "killing off the rebels. with three blows and pacifying Shaanxi
and Gansu." With this kind of imitative predisposition and setup conditions,
how can we not deceive ourselves as well as others, and how can we talk about
the troop training being hard, strict and geared to the needs of actual
combat? However, some'of our commanders take exception to this position and
say: How is it possible to suffer a.defeat in a military exercise? Our forces
have been consistently victorious and have never been defeated. This idea,
which only lays stress on the enemy's being a paper tiger and neglects his
aspect as a real tiger, runs counter to military dialectics.
The ancients said: "Victory and defeat are common occurrences for military
strategists." This saying is an immutable truth. In fact, there has never
been an even-victorious general who has never been defeated, and in war it is
impossible not to suffer setbacks. Sun Bin, a strategist of ancient China, once
pointed out that before a battle one must think of the possibility of defeat
so that one can then make good preparations to tur?h defeat into victory and
appropriately deal with complicated situations. Therefore, in training we must
pay attention to these questions: First, we must make a great effort to "know
the enemy"; we must know not only the enemy's weaknesses but also his strengths,
and, in setting up training conditions, strive to make them conform to the
tactical and technical characteristics of the enemy army, and thereby avoid his
strength and attack his weakness so as to be victorious in battle. Second, we
must both despise the enemy strategically and take him seriously tactically.
We can neither "turn pale at the mention of a tiger" nor "be lulled into be-
littling a tiger." We must both "seek to learn from the enemy" and prevail over
the enemy, winning victories with existing equipment. Third, we must study both
positive and negative examples of battle, using for reference successful experiences
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and drawing lessons from defeats, seeking flexible tactics for dealing with
the enemy and improving our mastery of the skills of modern warfare.
Fourth, we must deliberately arrange some training situations in which our
side is losing, for example, being thwarted, being defeated or turning defeat
into victory, training the commanders at eve?y level to correctly judge the
enemy's situation, to flexibly apply military force, to use the correct tactics,
and to seize the initiative in battle so that, no matter under any conditions
whatsoever, they will be unbeatable..
9727
CSO: ?4005/2457
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
XIAO KE SPEAKS AT MEETING OF MILITARY ACADEMIES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by Jiao Wu [3542 2976]: "Liberating Thinking Is Key to Improving Teaching
Quality in Colleges and Academies"]
[Excerpts] Military colleges and academies recently held a meeting to exchange
teaching experiences. Comrade Xiao Ke, party committee secretary and president
of a military college and concurrently its first political commissar, chaired the
meeting and delivered a speech at it. Linking up the reality of teaching material
compilation, academic research, and teaching reform in military colleges, he
stressed in his speech that the liberation of thinking is the key question in
improving teaching quality.
First of all, Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that the key question to improving
teaching quality, raising the teaching to the level of modern warfare, is to
liberate thinking. He said that in the past there had been many forbidden areas
in teaching, which can be summarized in two sentences: the first was that what
had been written could not be changed or developed; the second was that if something
was not written down it could not be spoken of or thought about. The result was:
everything in the past could not be moved forward and everything in the future had
to be done to a pattern. Whoever did not do things in this way was labelled as
one who was "chopping down the banner." In documents and speeches, there was much
citing of the quotations [of Mao Zedong], taking the quotations as the criterion.
This way of doing things by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" was much more devastating
than what was done during the period of the Guangxi "left" doctrinairism. They
waved the red flag to oppose the red flag and, in the name of Chairman Mao, made
propaganda against other leaders and historical figures of the party, categorically
refuting them and not allowing them to speak out. If you spoke out, then you were
opposing Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought or denigrating Mao Zedong Thought.
They were not permitted to teach military affairs, or if they were permitted to
teach military affairs they had to do so from a purely military viewpoint, a purely
technical and professional viewpoint.
Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that in order to liberate thinking we must stress the
features of a future war and compile the required teaching materials that suit
modern war. When we speak of teaching, first of all the questions of teaching
content and teaching materials must be settled. Without teaching materials, how
can we teach? If actors do not have a script, how can they perform? In the past
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ _
in studying strategy and campaigns, nobody dared to study and discuss, and the
study of strategy was confined to Chairman Mao's "Problems of Strategy in China's
Revolutionary War." Now, we must study the strategy and tactics of people's war
and military science under modern conditions. If we stick to the method of the
Red Army during the Guangxi period of letting the enemy penetrate deeply, mechani-
cally applying this method, then we will suffer a defeat. Because at that time
we held no cities and had no modern industry, and got everything from the enemy,
when the enemy came, we would "strengthen defense works, evacuate noncombatants,
and hide provisions, entice the enemy to penetrate deeply, let go with both hands,
and ask him to come in." If we were to copy indiscriminately this experience of
the Guangxi period in a future war against aggression, how could it work? Based
on the situation that has developed, we must study new tactics. Based on the
standpoint, viewpoint, and methods of Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought,
we must write our own strategy for modern warfare. The four modernizations and
the modernization of national defense pose the problem of modernized combat.
Military academies must teach under modern conditions, and there must be modern
teaching content. We must be determined to write teaching materials suited to
modern warfare. Modernized teaching will enable the students to organize coordi-
nated operations by land, sea, and air forces. What will we do if the middle- and
upper-level commanders do not know how to command all service branches and arms?
If one doesn't understand the knowledge pertaining to the sea and air forces, one
cannot be a good military leader. This was true in the past and is also true at
present. Therefore, the leading cadres at all levels must take the lead in studying
modern military science and technology.
Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that in liberating thinking there is the problem of the
attitude in dealing with the experience of foreign countries and the experience in
running colleges and academies in the past. After the 1958 counter doctrinairism,
we did not dare to learn from foreign countries. Now, we must try hard to catch up
with the requirements of the situation that has developed, and one important condi-
tion for doing this is that we break away, militarily, from the policy of closing
the country to international intercourse, especially daring to learn from enemy
armed forces, "making the enemy our teachers," and use them for our benefit. The
characteristics of doctrinairism is that it divorces theory from reality. Only by
proceeding from the reality of constructing our country and its armed forces, and
maintaining the scientific attitude of learning, can we avoid and prevent doctri-
nairism. It is absolutely wrong to adopt a negative attitude toward the military
academy presided over by Comrade Liu Bocheng and the 17-year work of the armed
forces colleges and academies. We must adopt the attitude of "one divides into
two," viz, that successes are primary and shortcomings are secondary, that essen-
tials are clearly distinguished from nonessentials, taking over the good aspects,
further developing them and blazing new trails, and correcting what is uncorrect.
In conclusion, Comrade Xiao Ke said that we are command colleges and academies
that train middle- and upper-level cadres, and our responsibility is heavy. We
certainly must liberate our thinking, further straighten out the ideological line,
and raise our consciousness for carrying out the line and the general and specific
policies of the party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng. He said
that after the ideological and political lines have been straightened out, the
organizations must still be guaranteed, and, therefore, to bring up and train
successors to the revolutionary cause is the important task of our military acad-
emies, is the glorious mission bestowed upon us by history.
9727
CSO: 4005/2458
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
DIVISION SETS GOOD LOGISTICS RECORD IN VIETNAM WAR
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 2
[Article by Jiang Jilin [3068 0679 2651] et al.: "Those Who Command Must Look
Ahead and Behind"]
[Text] Comrade editor:
We understand that, during this war of self-defensive counterattack, an outstanding
job of insuring logistics was done by a certain division:
After the unit received its orders, in less than a day's time and in line with
the upper level's demands, it completed every item of preparatory work for insuring
logistics;
During the war, every-time the unit urgently needed its ammunition or food replen-
ished, the logistics personnel sent the required amount either before the order
was received or punctually. In the division's hospitals, not one wounded soldier
died because of insufficient care and treatment;
Tested in combat, the rate of weapons and vehicles received in good condition by
the entire division was over 99 percent;
... ... [ellipses as published]
When we gathered their experiences in this respect for our news story, the first
thing spoken of was the leaders' serious attention to logistics. In their own
words, those who are the ones known to be in command in military and political
work must look ahead and "behind." When we asked the division's commander and
political commissar why they paid so much attention to logistics work, their talk
never left the word "change."
They talked about three "changes."
The first is the change in weapons and equipment. Even if our weapons and equip-
ment still lag behind those of the Soviet and American armed forces, there has
been a great change, and supplying mullet plus rifles has changed into making
heavy weapons primary. This change shows that combat cannot be sustained by the
amount of ammunition, fuel, and food a unit can carry with it. The three heavy
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
machineguns of a machinegun platoon in 14 hours fire 5,600 rounds. With this large
an expenditure of ammunition, it must depend primarily on continual replenishment
by logistics. If we were to say that, in the past, war supported itself, mainly
obtaining weapons and equipment from the enemy, then now they are primarily obtained
from the "rear."
The second change is the battlefield. Modern warfare is three-dimensional; specif-
ically on a battlefield there is no sharp division between front and rear. The
enemy's large-caliber artillery can hit a division's rear. In this war against
Vietnam, the enemy basically had no usable aircraft and his artillery power was
extremely limited, so that he could only adopt the method of surprise attacks by
small detachments against our rear. This poses for us not only the problem of
whether the rear can supply and relieve the troops but also the problem of whether
it can protect itself. As warfare becomes more modernized, this latter problem
becomes more acute.
The third change is in our logistical setup. In the past, the logistical trans-
porters of a division or regiment were several horse-drawn carts and later several
trucks. Now the logistical setup is much bigger and several hundreds of vehicles
transport ammunition, fuel, and food to the front. On the move they form a line
and when stopped, a large column, making a fairly big target. Suitable deployment
zones, tight organizational command, and capable defense measures--all these things
are matters for great concern.
After talking about these changes, the division's commander and political commissar
sighed with deep emotion: Logistics, rear services--this word "rear" does not
have the meaning it originally had. It is a decisive factor! Therefore, they
held that it is necessary to correct the pet phrase popular in the unit--"equal
consideration for military and political affairs."
The division's commander and political commissar told us: In the past the phrase
"equal consideration for military and political affairs" was normally put forward
.by those of us in primary command of the division's military and political affairs.
It is true that military work and political work cannot be absolutely separated.
However, those who are in primary command are responsible for the overall work of
the unit, and if one puts forward this pet phrase (or slogan), then where does
one put logistics work" Logistics is an important part of the overall work of
the unit. No matter whether in wartime or peacetime, it occupies an equally
important position in the minds of those in primary command as does military work
and political work. Whether in wartime or peacetime, the cadres in charge must
"grasp logistics."
Their tentative method for grasping logistics was:
They assigned responsibility for logistics but did not separate themselves from
logistics. In line with the characteristics of this war against Vietnam, they
assigned a deputy commander of the division to exercise direct organizational
command over logistics. But they assigned responsibility for logistics while
not separating themselves from logistics. While directing the fighting at the
front, they frequently inquired about the situation with regard to the work of
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
insuring logistics and issued operational instructors. It is the same in peacetime,
when, besides the deputy being in charge of logistics work, the division's commander
and political commissar regularly concern themselves with this work. In the second
half of last year, each regiment engaged in small-scale camp and field training
in insuring logistics against a tactical background, and the political commissar,
who manages work from headquarters, made inspections in the field on several
occasions. At meetings of the divisional [party] standing committee, they repeatedly
stressed that "logistics training must go forward." Thus, beginning in the second
half of last year, training in logistics to meet the requirements of wartime was
launched in every aspect in order to lay a foundation for this "fighting logistics."
They released the rear but did not allow the rear to be lost. In fighting a war,
in order to prevent logistics from being "lost" in the rear, they took a series
of measures. For example: They gave the logistics deployment an adequate number
of communications tools so that during the entire course of a battle communication
between the front and the rear command posts was maintained without a break; the
commander's operational intent and the unit's plan of action were relayed as timely
as possible to the rear command post, so that the work of insuring logistical
support was prepared for and foreseen; and every time after the position was shifted,
....the division's commander and political commissar, if the situation permitted, would---
personally inspect the logistics deployment area, and if they discovered problems
they promptly corrected them.
Logistics safeguards the unit, and the unit also safeguards logistics. Before the
war, they gave consideration to the fact that the existing logistics establishment
was unsuitable for fighting, so they appropriately beefed up the cadre contingent
concerned. During the war, in order to deal with the Vietnamese army's habitual
feature of making harassing attacks on our rear, besides improving the logistics
unit's ability to defend themselves, from beginning to end they attached a reserve
military force of one battalion (at a very few times two companies) to the logistics
unit, vigorously increased the rear's strength to warn itself, defend itself, and
protect its transport, and freed the logistics detachments from the fear of distur-
bances in their rear. From beginning to end in the war, the enemy was given no
opportunity and could only direct sniper fire from distant mountain tops at our
logistics, which came through unscathed.
9727
CSO: 4005/2458
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INFANTRY SCHOOL IMPROVES TRAINING BY USING VIETNAM WAR EXAMPLES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 3
[Article by Xu Kedi [1776 0344 4877 et al.: "Use Actual Combat Experiences To
Enrich Teaching Content"]
[Text] The Ji'nan Units Infantry School has paid full attention to using the
experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack on the China-Vietnam border
in order to enrich its teaching content, improve its teaching methods, and raise
its teaching quality.
The school has enriched its teaching content with models of battles in the war
of self-defensive counterattack. Formerly, many examples of our army's battles
in resisting American aggression and aiding Korea were taught in detail. The
students' reaction to these battles was that they were far removed from the present,
some did not suit the demands of modern warfare, and they were not very interesting
to study. But the typical battles from the war of self-defensive counterattack,
everybody felt, were not far removed from the present, were of practical signifi-
cance, and what was said about them carried weight. Based on its own teaching
content, each teaching and research section gathered together and put in order some
examples of battles by units that had taken part in the war, thereby enriching
its teaching and obtaining good results. The service arm teaching and research
section collected information on battles in this war through three channels: by
making extracts of relevant documents written and notices issued by upper levels
concerning battles and data on them; by collecting reports published in newspapers
on the course of, experiences in, and heroic deeds of the war; and by writing to
border defense units in Gaungxi and Yunnan that had taken part in the war and
asking them about relevant battles. Afterward the section made comparisons, did
research, and compiled the written materials that were then added to teaching
materials and teaching plans. For the teaching on the 82 mm mortar alone, 12
battle examples were used, the teaching on armored troops used 10 battle examples,
and the teaching was effectively coordinated. The political work and party history
teaching and research section used the experience in political work of the units
that had taken part in the war to enrich the teaching content related to. wartime
political work, and in every class examples taken from units that had taken part
in the war were listed, a practice which was welcomed by the students.
The school assimilated both the positive and negative experiences of the war of
self-defensive counterattack, and led the students to improve their technical level
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and organizational command capability. First, the instructors synthesized the ter-
rain features of Vietnam and clearly expounded to the students the position and
function of terrain in combat, and moreover strengthened training in moving
according to the azimuth under all sorts of terrain conditions. Second, the
students studied examples of how the commanders at every level of the units that
took part in the war repeatedly reconnoitered the enemy situation and the ter-
rain, and, on this basis, made up their minds, thus making the students recognize
the close connection between reconnaissance and deciding what to do, become aware
of the important link of reconnaissance:in the sequence of organizational command,
and that it is an important basis for deciding what to do. Third, the instructors
synthesized the combat experiences of units that had taken part in the war, edu-
cating the students to apply tactical principles with imagination, to judge the
hour and size up the situation, and to flexibly wipe out the enemy. For example,
in the tactical training for company-level attacks, the students learned how the
units that had taken part in the war, focusing on the characteristics of the
Vietnamese army's defensive deployment--what was exposed was false and what was
concealed was true, combining the overt and the covert--employed the tactics of
frontal pinning down, making flank attacks, tearing open a hole in the enemy line,
rolling up both flanks, and springing out at the enemy from our interior positions
and coming down on him from higher positions, showing the importance of the com-
manders being flexible in command. Fourth, the students learned the experiences
and lessons of how the combined arms commanders of units that had taken part in
the war applied each service arm in combat, so as to improve the students' organi-
zational command abilities in combined arms operations. The armored forces
teaching group, when teaching about the armored forces and the three forms of
infantry-tank coordination, introduced lessons on how some commanders of the units
that had taken part in the war had used amphibious tanks to storm fortified posi-
tions and had directed tanks to climb slopes that exceeded their technical capacity.
At the same time, it introduced the frontline experience on how the 3d Battalion
of a certain tank unit had, with its firepower, supported infantry in destroying
117 enemy firing points, as well as how a certain tank regiment had coordinated
with infantry in an operation in which not one infantryman or tank was lost, and,
comparing the positive and negative aspects, profoundly and vividly explained
problems.
In line with the experiences of the units that had taken part in the war, the
instructors enriched the training content with some actual combat requirements.
With regard to the tactics of attack and defense at the squad level and below,
they stressed good training in attacking enemy firing points with small groups
over many routes and in attacking tanks, enriching the content with regard to
trench warfare, search-and-destroy missions, and the cleaning up of the battle-
field; the engineering class, based on the experiences and lessons of the war
against Vietnam strengthened training in mine laying and removal; the antichemical
warfare class enriched its content with the applied principles of the tactical
and technical functions of flamethrowers and flamethrowing detachments; the artil-
lery class strengthened organizational command training with regard to the shoulder-
firing of the 82-mm recoilless rifle and the simple and convenient ways of firing
the 82-mm mortar, and also strengthened the live-ammunition firing content; and
the firing class added to its content firing while wearing gas masks and firing
at aircraft.
9727
CSO: 4005/2458
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INFANTRY SCHOOL REFORMS TEACHING OF STAFF WORK
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 3
[Article by Kao Shuhua [5072 2579 5478] et al.: "Let Battle Documents Be Geared
To Actual Combat"]
[Text] In the teaching of and training in staff work in the Wuhan Units Infantry
School, the students learn about and apply the experiences of the war of self-
defensive counterattack against Vietnam. With speed in mind,. the school has
conscientiously streamlined and reformed battle documents. Good results have been
obtained.
In the past in its teaching of and training in staff work, this school had given
its students many assignments, that consisted of writing battle documents, which
occupied a large amount of their time. Many students raised this question: "Are
all these battle documents produced by one battle?" The leaders of the school
and its training department did conscientious research on the characteristics of
headquarters work during the war of self-defensive counterattack and clearly saw:
In a battle the situation changes suddenly and time is pressing, and this demands
that documents be written and issued quickly. If the number of battle documents
are excessive, this inevitably will create a strain on staff manpower, affect the
timely understanding of the situation at lower levels, and affect the transmission
to the lower levels of the commander's intentions and decisions. Therefore, the
streamlining and reform of battle documents is an important topic in teaching
staff work.
The leaders of the school and its training department mobilized the instructors
and students to suggest ways and means for reforming battle documents. Through
group assignments in education and training, they found out some methods for
reforming battle documents. 1. Return orders for merging and make one piece of
writing serve more than one purpose. By amalgamating into one document for trans-
mission to lower levels directives that are more or less alike in content but
that set down tasks that are not completely alike, we can reduce the number of
documents and make one piece of writing serve more than one purpose. For example,
when making assignments for writing directives on camouflage and air raid defense,
if the directives are written separately, this will not only waste time and energy
but also be duplicative. Consequently, the students merged the two directives into
one document, so that the students raced against time and were trained in the
ability to summarize. 2. By grasping quality and conciseness in writing, documents
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
are made brief and to the point. In the past students of staff work, when writing
documents setting down their prebattle orders, overstuffed their writing with regard
to the part about the enemy's situation, and the documents were fairly long. During
the teaching and training, the leaders of the school and its training department
organized the students to study how to write the prebattle orders concisely. In
their assignments, the students conscientiously polished their writing, deliberated
carefully, and shortened,, made pithy, and clear at one glance the documents con-
taining prebattle orders. 3. By adopting formulated standard forms, the number
of words in a document are reduced. The items on preprinted and compressed standard
document forms are filled in. In this way, the number of words are few, time is
saved, and standardization is enhanced. 4. By using all sorts of communications
instruments to verbally transmit directives to lower levels, the number of written
documents is reduced. In a battle there are many communications instruments of
all sorts. By using these instruments to transmit. directives and orders to the
lower levels of a unit, the same result can be achieved as by writing documents.
In teaching and training, the students use telephones, walkie-talkies, and signals
to transmit directives and orders to the lower levels. This method, which only
requires the writing of a simple outline and a little preparation and checking,
is. comparatively fast and convenient. 5. With regard to combined and separate
orders, make separate orders primary. Orders can be written separately and trans-
mitted to the lower levels separately in line with their greater or lesser impor-
tance and urgency, so that both the writing and the transmission are done quickly,
thereby overcoming the faulty situation in which the transmission of combined
orders to the lower levels ties up the communications instruments for too long
a time, and meeting the requirements of actual combat.
Through the streamlined and reformed method for battle documents used by this
school, the students are organized, in all sorts of weather, terrain, and condi-
tions, to carry out training in actual assignments, so that the assignments are
done quickly and with good quality. In the past, it took 2 or more hours to
write a combined order. Now, to write four separate battle orders.requires only
about 1 hour. Everybody reported: This reform of staff work teaching based on
the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack. is extremely suited
to the requirements of actual combat.
9727
CSO: 4005/2458
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
rvn vrr1a A1%X1 v.7r. JL'IL A
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
SOUTH CHINA SEA FLEET EXPANDS NAVAL TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 1
[Article by Yu Linsen [0205 2651 2773]: "South China Sea Fleet Afloat Training
Center Expands Training Scope. Classes of Naval Ships Doubled"]
[Text] The South China Fleet Afloat Training Center will expand the scope of its
training this year. The number of classes of ships taking part in the first class
will double over last year, and the number of trainees with triple. Preparations
to begin training at the afloat training center are, by now, largely completed.
The afloat training center, which was established on a trial basis last spring,
marked a major reform by the South China Fleet in the organization of training,
its content, and methods in order to change the weakness in the technical under-
pinnings of the forces. The first group of naval vessels were trained quickly
in short training cycles and with good quality of training, which earned the gen-
eral acclaim of the forces.
In order to meet the needs for more training of specialties and of ships, around
New Year's time, more than a month was set aside for personnel from surface craft
groups and submarine groups to study the newly published "Ship Regulations," and
"Regulations Pertaining to Ship Training," for conscientious summarization of
the successful experiences and problems that existed in the training of the first
group of ships, and for continued courageous improvements, supplements to, and
readjustments in the content of training and methods of training for the various
types of ships this year. They have already revised and made more complete 21
of the former training plans for guided missile escorts, and submarines, and 20
rules and regulations. They have also newly devised 18 training plans for sub-
marine chasers and landing craft.
9432
CSO: 4007/2075
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
ADVANCED WEAPONS SAID NOT WITHOUT LIMITATIONS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 3
[Article by Shi Zhiyuan [4258 1807 6678]: "What Does the Return of Smoke Screens
to Front Lines Show?"]
[Text] In October 1973, on the fourth day following outbreak of the Mideast War,
Egyptian forces used portable "Sageer" [5646 2706 1422] anti-tank missiles, and
were able after only 2 hours of use, to totally annihilate the Israeli 190 armorade
brigade and take prisoner the brigade commander, Colonel Yaguli [0068 0657 6849].
After being severely hurt, Israel immediately coldly analyzed and studied new
countermeasures, deciding to use as their principal countermeasure smokescreen
cover. This method was very effective. Within a short time Israeli forces re-
crossed the Suez Canal, and under cover of massive smokescreens, launched a coun-
terattack against Egyptian forces in the Taosuo [one character illegible] [7118
4792 ? ] sector. Because of the smokescreen cover, the kill rate for Egyptian
anti-tank missiles dropped, and an armored task force composed of several hundred
commandoes successfully crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal in a single
action on a pontoon bridge constructed by Egyptian forces south of Ismailia. Sub-
sequently, Israeli forces made'large scale use of all kinds of smokescreens, which
played a substantial role. in assuring combat mobility for military units.
This war experience offers food for thought. Given modern weapons and modern tech-
nical equipment, use of smokescreens for traditional screening, camouflaging, and
confusing, had been thought by many to be seemingly out of date. In the 1960's,
the United States began to disband its camouflage units, and in the 1970's, the
Soviet Union also generally spoke, of smokescreens in terms of not giving much
attention to their development. After the role of smokescreens was made evident
in the Mideast War, further attention of military forces in all countries of the
world was aroused for a time, and use of smokescreens was evaluated anew. All
countries acknowledge that modern warfare cannot be without cover, and that smoke-
screens may be used to obstruct enemy use of advanced reconnaissance devices such
as infra-red, electronics, and lasers in finding their objectives. In combat under
nuclear conditions, smokescreens are also able to weaken the strength of radiation.
Consequently, the American armed forces have worked up plans for the development of
smokescreens, and the Soviet armed forces have put forward combat methods entail-
ing use of smokescreens. In their maneuvers, the West German armed forces have
made great use of smokescreen laying devices. Quite a few countries are also en-
gaged in continued research and development of smoke emitting artillery shells,
nautical shells, and'rockets.
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
rVal vrral.I,tL IJJG Vl\La
The case of the "retiring" smokescreen, which deprived anti-tank missiles of their
dominance, made people think. It demonstrated that the superiority of weapons and
equipment is not omnipotent and the logic of "everything having its vanquisher."
Under certain conditions, advanced weapons may lose their force or be unable to
attain the full play of their intended force while relatively antiquated weapons
and equipment may frequently play a role such as advanced weapons and equipment
cannot easily play. China's armed forces had gotten rid of their 60 mm guns, but
in self-defense combat against Vietnam, the 60 mm gun showed its mettle in anni-
hilating dispersed and concentrated enemy forces operating from defilade. Flame-
throwers, which were preparing to "say goodbye," also showed their skills in wiping
out "moles" in self-defense combat against the Vietnamese.
This leads to the thought that in our study of the countermeasures of using inferi-
ority to triumph over superiority, we must both bear in mind that future battle-
fields will be filled with modern weapons and equipment, and also realize fully
and make the best use of the advantages of existing weapons and equipment. Con-
tentment with the existing situation is not good, of course, but to shake one's
head and sigh when looking at existing equipment should not be either. It must be
understood that superior equipment has its weaknesses, and inferior equipment also
has its strengths. A clear understanding of the adversary's weaknesses and our
own strengths is an indispensable prerequisite of a policy for seeking to make the
most of advantages while attacking disadvantages.
9432
CSO: 4007/2075
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUPERIOR VS INFERIOR WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT REVIEWED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 3
[Article by Li Kexin [2621 0668 0207], Chengdu Command: "Superior Versus Infe-
rior"]
[Text] Logically speaking, superior equipment should triumph over inferior equip-
ment, but in the history of warfare countless surprising cases have occurred in
which inferior equipment triumphed over superior equipment. It may be seen that
the triumph of the inferior over the superior positively was no accident.
In A.D. 1140, after Jin Wushu invaded the Central Plain and launched several in-
jurious attacks against Yue Fei, he attacked Yue Fei in his encampment at Yancheng,
using.a "phalanx of horses" trained by Wanmutuochi and Wanmutuoze. Five of Yue
Fei's generals were killed in action when the opposing army's "phalanx of horses"
launched spears and fired arrows. When Yue Fei heard the news, he said through
tear-filled eyes: "I had known about the 'phalanx of armored horses,' which Hu
Yanzhuo had used some years ago. Xu Ning reported that a 'phalanx of spears with
hooks' can destroy them." In compliance with orders, Meng Bangjie and others be-
gan the training of soldiers in the use of a "phalanx of spears with hooks," later
on finally defeating and routing the "phalanx of horses."
According to the description provided in "Shui Hu Zhuan," at the time Hu Yanzhuo's
"phalanx of horses" was terrifying. "The men wore long helmets to protect their
heads, exposing only their eyes. The horses were bedecked with heavy armor and
decorated with red tassels with only their legs uncovered." "Thirty horses were
placed in a single formation and locked together with iron rings. When they met
the enemy, those formations in the distance used arrows and those close up used
spears to thrust forward." In the eyes of the ancients, this "phalanx of horses"
looked the way massed tanks look today. They were very awe-inspiring. According
to Tang Long's description, there was nothing complicated about the "phalanx of
spears with hooks." "All that is necessary is to make them, and then they can be
used." In the same way that we regard rocket launchers today, they could only be
considered light weapons. Nevertheless, that the easily fabricated "phalanx of
spears with hooks" was able to triumph over the "phalanx of horses," which was
unexcelled in all the world, certainly makes people think, does it not?
In combat, the superiority or inferiority of arms and equipment makes a very im-
portant difference between triumph and tragedy; however, no weapon or equipment
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
is omnipotent. They all have shortcomings to match their strengths. Superiority
in arms alone is no assurance of victory, and inferiority in equipment alone posi-
tively does not ordain defeat. The "phalanx of horses" was not able to save Jin
Wushu from defeat, and the "phalanx of spears with hooks" won victory for Yue
Fei's forces, which shows this principle. Napoleon paid close attention to the
use of new material means in warfare, and he was a "military master" at devising
new combat tactics, yet he resolutely rejected the view that arms and equipment
superiority are decisive in victory or defeat in warfare. He said, "In warfare,
morale and weapons count in a ratio of three to one." Aside from whether or not
this is a correct proportion, that he gave attention to morale even when giving
attention to weapons was correct beyond all doubt.
In comparison with China's major combat protagonists, the protagonists are superior
and China is inferior in weapons and equipment. This is an objective reality. As
economic construction develops, the weapons and equipment of China's armed forces
will gradually improve, but no fundamental prospect of improvement is in sight dur-
ing the short term. In order to win victory in a future war against aggression,
the most realistic and the most reliable way is to find means in the use of exist-
ing armaments and seek countermeasures whereby inferiority can triumph over supe-
riority.
Can victory be attained through existing armaments? This is the same as asking
whether a way out can be found with existing armaments. I believe so! In his
book, "The Bankruptcy of Atomic Strategy," the military theoretician most able in
all the world to inspire the human heart, the French-born Czech, F.O. Mikexie
[phonetic] [4717 0344 6200] made the following observation: "Well-trained soldiers
frequently possess the ability to use simple weapons to destroy the enemy's com-
plex weaponry. Such a capability increases daily as the large scale use of modern
weapons increases (and the strength of highly mechanized military forces is deter-
mined by the proper use of these modern weapons). Consequently, simple weapons
have become an effective means to checkmate complex, precision weapons. In life
too, such situations frequently occur in which complex implements are hard put to
counter simple implements; consequently it is still necessary to employ simple im-
plements." This Czech has spoken eminently sensibly, and reality has long since
attested to this. Wasn't the "phalanx of spears with hook" destruction of the
"phalanx of horses," just such an extremely persuasive example of how simple weap-
ons can triumph over complex weapons?"
In countering an enemy armed with modern weapons, if we have armaments more ad-
vanced than his, naturally nothing could be better. However, when one's armaments
cannot catch up with those of one's enemies and one uses tanks to go up against
the enemy's tanks, or pits airplane against the enemy's airplanes, one is bound
to come to grief. Conversely, use of some insufficient indigenous armaments and
simple weapons such as satchel charges or small rocket launchers in conjunction
with flexible and ingenious tactics makes it possible to overwhelm the enemy's
"T-72," or even the most advanced "T-80." Strange? Not at all. During the war
of liberation as during the campaign to oppose American and aid Korea, our two
legs often won the competition against the enemy's 10 wheels. This was not be-
cause motor vehicles do not run as fast as people, but because motor vehicle move-
ments are limited by roads while people can climb mountains and ford streams.
They can go even where the roads don't go. Were two-wheeled horsecarts used to
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
pursue and attack the enemy's 10-wheeled trucks, they would be no match for the
enemy, it is feared. The idea that "everything has its vanquisher" most certainly
does not mean that the superior will overcome the inferior or that the foreign
will overcome the indigenous. Many times the inferior can vanquish the superior,
and the indigenous can vanquish the foreign. Things are strange in this way!
Naturally, simply because the inferior may triumph over the superior does not mean
one will naturally be victorious without any need for objective efforts. It is
very important to create conditions for the inferior to triumph over the superior.
For example, study of the enemy's and our own strong and weak points, and real
exploration and development of combat tactics whereby one's own strengths triumph
over the enemy's weaknesses to constantly improve upon and master available arms
and equipment, and make the maximum effective use of them is an indispensable con-
dition for the triumph of inferiority over superiority. At that time, Xu Ning's
phalanx of spears with hooks tactics employed spears that had seven hooks along
the top and mid portion of the spears, and three hooks in concealed positions on
the lower end. This entire set of tactics using spears was created with the strong
and weak points of the "phalanx of horses" in mind. Had there been only the
"phalanx of spears with hooks" without the numerous variations in tactical employ-
ment of the spears, they would not have been able to break the "phalanx of horses."
All weapons can produce great force only when proficiently and effectively used,
and when their use is linked to correct and compatible tactics.
Combat history also presents a phenomenon such as the following. Once a new
weapon is born, in order to get fullest effectiveness from it in combat, a process
of constant understanding, constant study, and constant development is necessary.
The good men in Liangshan used the "phalanx of spears with hooks" to destroy the
"phalanx of horses" of Hu Yanzhuo, and Yue Fei used similar methods to defeat Jin
Wushu, but Yue Fei used broad swords in conjunction with the "phalanx of spears
with hooks"-to cut the horses legs in the "phalanx of horses," a tactic which more
effectively developed the power of the "phalanx of spears with hooks."
Though people such as Fu Le [1381 0510] [phonetic], Lideer Hate [2621 1795 1422]
[0761 3676] [phonetic], and De Gaulle theoretically explored the use of tanks,
nevertheless, the potential of tanks was fully recognized by the German, Gudelian
[0657 1795 6849 1344] [phonetic] and flexibly employed. Though our arms and equip-
ment are fairly old, one cannot say that we are able to employ these weapons and
equipment with the greatest proficiency possible, technically or tactically. In
my view there is much that remains to be done in this regard, and a great poten-
tial to be tapped.
If I may go on for a few sentences more, this article positively does not deny the
urgency and importance of developing new weapons and equipment. Could any who
aspire to the building of a modern army not cease to want advanced weapons and
equipment? The issue is that we cannot just sit and wait for advanced weapons
and equipment, but must confidently endeavor to study tactical techniques whereby
the inferior can overwhelm the superior. Use of available equipment to triumph
over an enemy is not just wishful thinking; it is attainable in fact.
9432
CSO: 4005/2075
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
AIR FORCE UNIT PUTS FORTH INTEGRATED TRAINING PLAN
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Jan 81 p 3
[Article by Li Zhengxiang [2621 2973 4382] and Deng Yulin [6772 3768 2651]: "Cer-
tain Airforce Unit in the Airforce Proposes This Year's Integrated Training Plan"]
[Text] Report from KONGJUN BAO [Airforce News], 8 January. How will integrated
training be done in this new year? Early last November a certain airforce unit in
the Airforce convened an integrated training conference to summarize experiences,
in which they proposed to proceed from the simple to the complex, and from the
known to the unknown.
As of the end of October last year, each of the divisions of this airforce unit
organized four to six integrated training sessions to explore in a preliminary way
some experiences. The sessions also revealed some problems. After full study of
problems in last year's integrated training, they proposed concrete ideas and plans
as follows. Divisions will continue once monthly training exercises, and armies
will hold them once each quarter. Organizationally, the ranking officer will be
in charge. Combat and training units will work together and jointly take charge,
with combat units making up schedules and training units making plans in a system
that divides and combines tasks with the emphasis on combining. Individual train-
ing results will be reflected in the air. Prominence goes to officers in charge
of training, and officers in charge will sing "the leading role" in combat. This
year's training plans call for divisional and wing officers in charge to be given
integrated command classes and study integrated command skills. Pilots should
intensify their study of enemy military strength and tactics and disabuse them-
selves of wishful thinking.
9432
CSO: 4005/2075
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
ENGINEERING CORPS REGIMENT HOLDS COMBINED-ARMS TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Feb 81 p 2
[Article by Chen Xinnian [7115 2450 16281: "In Order to Create the Conditions For
Doing a Good Job in Next Year's Training, Regiment of a Certain Engineering Unit
Focuses On Assembling Battalion, Company, and Platoon Cadres for Training"]
[Text] From early to mid-January, a certain engineering regiment in the Wuhan Com-
mand focused on filling in gaps by taking firmly in hand assembly for training of
battalion, company, and platoon cadres in order to increase cadre command capabil-
ities and teaching levels, thereby creating conditions for doing a good job in
training in the coming year.
The assembling of cadres for training in advance of the beginning of training is
something the regiment does annually. In former years, this assembling for train-
ing simply used a uniform training method in accordance with annual training plans
in a step by step, simple preparation of classes, with insufficiently serious atten-
tion being given cadre command capabilities and teaching levels. As a result, not
many breakthroughs ever occurred in unit training. This year, the Regiment CCP Com-
mittee determined to change this state of affairs. Taking account of cadre lack of
study of the tactics of engineering troops during combat involving combined forces,
and the major ingredients in this year's applied training in tactics, they orga-
nized cadres taking the training to concentrate on the study and exploration of
how, in the course of offensive combat involving combined forces, mobile safe-
guarding units blaze a trail for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, how they re-
connoiter and remove mine fields and other obstacles from in front of enemy posi-
tions, how they construct for all branches of service urgently needed defense works
of all kinds, and how they camouflage various kinds of fortifications. Following
more than 2 weeks study and exploration, the cadre trainees drafted a 14 point
tactical thinkpiece and a 92 point lesson plan for safeguarding the combined forces
in combat, which took account of the enemy's equipment, combat characteristics,
and reconnaissance methods. In addition, they used these lesson plans and think
pieces in follow-up teaching demonstrations and simulated exercises.
When the training was over, the cadres summarized two major advantages of this
kind of assembling for training. First, it was valuable in pooling the efforts
and wisdom of everyone for a vigorous attack on trouble spots, and in increasing
cadre command capabilities and the level of their teaching skills. Formerly, many
cadres had only a superficial understanding of these courses. This time, however,
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
rMn Vrrll.I!IL ah L JI Ll
as a result of everyone putting the situation on the table and showing difficul-
ties for joint study of ways to break the enemy's plans, battalion, company, and
platoon cadres were able to organize, within the scope of their own echelon, ac-
tions by mobile safeguarding units and barrier emplacement units to handle various
kinds of complex situations. Second, it was valuable in increasing the level of
tactical skills of units. Formerly, cadres themselves were. unable to explain
clearly the content of this training, and the more the soldiers listened to them,
the more confused they became. Now, cadres at all echelons. are able to organize
fairly well, to carry into effect, and to teach this important course, and the
soldiers are able to study and practice it more.
9432
CSO: 4005/2075
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ARMY UNIT HOLDS COMBAT TRAINING IN FORTIFIED POSITION DEFENSE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Feb 81 p 2
[Article by Chai Wu [2693 0702] and Ke Jun [4430 6511]: "Certain Army Readjusts
Training Deployments in Accordance with Strategic Plans; Emphasizes Strong Posi-
tional Defense Combat Courses"]
[Text] Acting in accordance with strategic policy readjustments in training plans
decided on by the Central Military Affairs Commission, a certain army of the Bei-
jing Command has decided this year to stress strong positional defense combat
training.
In laying out its training plans, this army has diligently carried out the Mili-
tary Affairs Commission's strategic plan for active defense, in a change from the
former disjointedness between the content of training and unit combat tasks.
Starting with the characteristics of the combat zone, it has required units re-
sponsible for holding fast in defensive combat tasks to emphasize study of prob-
lems in how to use strong positions, how to hold fast for long period of time,
and independent combat. Units responsible for reserve unit tasks will mainly
study how to conceal high speed ground mobility, how to rely on nucleus positions
to launch counterattacks, how to engage in combat against airborne troops, and how
to coordinate with militia in the combat zone to launch guerrilla warfare. Logis-
tical organizations and companies will study mostly problems in how to eat, live,
and fight in conditions of extreme cold. In order to improve training quality,
this unit also decided that this year's tactical exercises will be moved, to the
maximum extent possible, to selected combat zones where training will take place.
Units distant from the combat area will also, insofar as possible, select similar
terrain for training; units will thereby become familiar with prescribed combat
plans.
At the present time, headquarters of this unit is in process of studying posi-
tional warfare, particularly a series of problems in positional warfare under con-
ditions of intense cold in order to formulate for the forces positional warfare
training plans. The organization has already issued all training materials to
the company level. Five advanced companies have begun training to gather train-
ing experiences for the unit.
9432
CSO: 4005/2075
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
BEAT SUPERIOR FORCES WITH INFERIOR FORCES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Feb 81 p 1
[Article by staff reporters Zhao Jun [6392 7786] and Yang Songlin [2799 2646
2651]: "Make Efforts To Master the Skills To Handle Existing Weapons and
Equipment; To Enhance Combat Capabilities To Beat Superior Forces With
Inferior Forces, a Certain Army Stresses Readjustment of Basic Training"]
[Text] To enhance the combat capabilities of troops to beat superior forces
with inferior forces, key responsible cadres of divisions and regiments
subordinate to a certain army were called together for a study session during
the last 10 days of January. They unanimously held that time and energy
should be devoted to mastering skills to handle existing weapons and equipment.
A typical case was analyzed in the course of discussion. Previously, an
overwhelming majority of the companies had had a very high hit accuracy when
they practiced basic firing. At the end of last year, however, the percentage
of hits was very low when the army assessed several outstanding companies in
tactics-related background. Everybody should notice from these instances that
although our weapons and equipment are not up to date, they cannot be used
with maximum efficiency, because we have, not developed the necessary skills
in handling them. If we desire to beat superior forces with inferior forces,
it is necessary to concentrate our efforts on mastering basic skills to handle
existing weapons and equipment.
In line with this thinking, basic training for the first half of this year was
rearranged and readjusted. Training in positional defense. warfare in every
unit was made to center on combat missions and on the characteristics of a future
war theater and they strengthened positional defense combat training. It was
further urged that more time and energy be put into hard efforts to master
the basic skills of the "three ways of fighting and the three defenses" and
the cadre basic skills of organization and command. Moreover, during the
period of basic training, every training division or regiment must conduct
separate combined-arms training instead of the "all-cooked-in-the-same-pot"
type of training.
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
They also proposed that: 1. Space, equipment, ammunition and funds be allocated
and utilized in a scientific manner, which would enable limited material
conditions to come into full play; 2. Popularizing a rational plan for the
utilization of space, equipment., and instructors called the "9 Step Tank
Attack Training Method," produced by a certain regiment by drawing on the
experience of other units; 3. Popularizing the.eperience of a certain
division's artillery regiment which provided a several-fold increase in the
opportunity of company commanders to organize and lead live-ammunition
practice without increasing the amount of ammunition used. Besides, energetic
support must be given to develop troop training through thrift and hard work,
use substitutes and simulation equipment to the full, and to accomplish more
at small expense, or even at no expense at all.
CSO: 4005/2074
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NEW TACTICS OF ATTACKING TANKS BY INFANTRYMEN ADVOCATED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Feb 81 p 2
[Article by Wu Zhen [0702 7201]: "The Training Method of Attacking Tanks by
Infantrymen Must Be Changed"]
[Text] To, at present, utilize our army's tanks with their existing equipment
to safeguard an effective attack on tanks by infantrymen, as I see it, poses
several problems which deserve our serious attention.
First, the quality of training fails to meet the anticipated demands. Training
of the troops in peacetime usually conforms to the infantry's demands and a
majority of the tanks are individual vehicles. They also move at such a speed
that the foot soldiers can climb up on them or hand up satchel charges to
facilitate attacks on other tanks. It is impossible to acquire first-rate
combat capabilities by this training method because the enemy's attack is
expected to assemble a large number of tanks in a definite combat formation
and carry out a high-speed assault in great depth supported by intense air
and artillery fire along with the coordinated efforts of the infantry. (At
worst, the enemy might use nuclear weapons as well as chemical weapons.)
It is highly unlikely that the enemy would move slowly with individual tanks
to meet our attack. Undoubtedly, to deal with the enemy's tank attack by
our present method of attacking tanks by infantrymen will invite disaster.
Second, our present method is simply not economical. One Chinese-made tank
is worth several hundred thousand yuan. One motor-hour costs 350 yuan. The
armies of the economically much more powerful nations such as the United States,
the Soviet Union, Britain and France still cannot afford to use equipped tanks
as safeguard vehicles in tank-attack training, but we have been doing so
all along. In 1980, the tank regiments subordinate to various armies and
divisions averaged 200 motor-hours in supporting tank-attack training by the
infantry. It cost 70,000 yuan for a tank regiment alone. How much would it
have cost for a whole army? Troop training must be economical. In view of
our nation's weak economic capabilities, we cannot very well avoid considering
this problem.
Third, a tank is a combat weapon which should not be treated as a safeguard
vehicles used in training. In peacetime if a tank is used as a target to
train the infantry to attack tanks, blasted by satchel charges or hit by
"concrete bombs" [3055 3136 1734], this turn of events would affect not only
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the tank's outward appearance, but.also damage its spare parts. This would
directly result in a decline in the level of tank combat readiness on the one
hand and an increase in the loss of combat ready vehicle motor-hours on the
other.
And fourth, a prerequisite for fighting in coordination is to train in combined
arms. Since the problem of tank-attack training was raised, the infantry
and tank units have been carrying out their basic training separately. The
tank units sent tanks to the infantry's training area to be used as target
vehicles. Combined training and joint maneuvers were both scarce. With little
or no combined training, not only would.:it be difficult for the infantry to
master the real skills needed to attack enemy tank masses, but the commanding
officers of combined arms units would be incapable of or not very good at
organizing combined operations.
In the light of our nation's present economic situation and for the purpose of
enhancing the combat capabilities of infantry subunits to attack tanks and
raising the level of coordinated infantry-tank combat, it is my suggestion that
the motor-hours used for supporting tank-attack training by infantrymen should
be concentrated and used for the coordinated training of the infantry and tanks
and for joint maneuvers of the various arms. In that case, can we abandon
the training of attacking tanks by infantrymen? The answer is that this training
must be carried on. However, its method should be revised. It may be conducted
jointly with individual vehicle, platoon and company tactical training and with
tank driving firing training. For instance, when tank driving training is in
progress, the infantry subunits in groups may, on the driving ground or in the
nearby area where tanks pass, take advantage of favorable terrain and grasp the
moment when the tanks change speed or cross barriers to practice skills and
tactics for attacking them. Moreover, when tank subunits practice training
firing and combat firing at a range, they may arrange that their firing. practice
be observed by infantry subunits. Because tank firing in all parts of the
world appears to be very much the same, observing our army's tank firing
practice will be helpful not only in organizing coordination between the infantry
and tank units, but also in studying the method of attacking the enemy tank
concentrations. This kind of training will not only solve the problem of the
training ground, equipment and material used in the training of attacking
tanks by infantrymen, but will be close to actual combat conditions and tally
with the tradition of training through thrift and hard work.
CSO: 4005/2074
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
REGULATIONS RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 1
[Article by Li Guozhong [2621 0948 1813] and Song Keyun [1345 0344 0061]:
"Shenyang Units Armored Force Formulates Ten Regulations in a Standardized
Training Order for Units and Below the Battalion Level"]
[Text] In the latter part of January various units under the Shenyang Units
armored force began implementing the "10 regulations in a standardized
training order for units at and below the battalion level" which were worked
cut by the leadership organ of the armored force. Commanders and fighters
said, With this set of standardized training order, basic training is bound
to achieve results.
In the latter part of last year, when the leadership organ of the Shenyang Units
armored forces was testing and evaluating the units' training, it was discovered
that basic training was still a weak link. They felt that although there were
numerous reasons for it, the most important is that the units, especially the
fenderis at and below the battalion level, lacked a set of specific and
systematic standardized training order. Some companies did not show enough
conscientious effort in following the training outline and manual and, in
training, did not do things in order such as going from basic to applied
training and from technical to tactical training. Hence, training operations
were random not unified. Although the upper-level leadership organ had
formulated and issued various training regulations, they were nonetheless
quite loosely adhered to when implemented at fenderis at and below the
battalion level. In order to resolve this problem, the leadership organ of
the armored force summed up past experiences, drew lessons from them and worked
out the "10 regulations in a standardized training order for units at and below
the battalion level," ensuring that basic training is on the right track and
is effectively carried out.
The "regulations" provided a workable guideline for training personnel, time,
content and quality. Everything from instructors teaching to students learning,
from inside the classrooms to out on the training ground and from regular course
education to daily cultivation are done with specific and clear regulations.
The "regulations" brought out the cadres' exemplary leadership roles and
encouraged them to act as examples in implementing various rules and regulations.
CSO: 4005/2074
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FORTIFIED POSITION DEFENSE COMBAT EXERCISE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by Yang Zhiqi [2799 1807"3823]. and Hu Haiping [5170 3189 1627] of the
Wuhan Units: "Which Combat Method Should Be Deployed?"]
[Text] A reinforced 82mm recoilless artillery gun platoon of the.3d infantry
company of the red team is set up by the upper level to conduct fortified
position defense in the Jiaoshan area. To the east of the defensive position
is Hill 315 and to the west is Jiaoshan. The terrain between these two high
grounds is somewhat flat and a highway runs deep through the bottom of a thin
bag.
At the main strong point trenches for soldiers and bunkers for weapons are
built and wire-mesh and antitank barriers are put up at places.where tank
movement is unobstructed. The 1st and 2d platoons are separately defending
the two strongholds at the east and west sides while the 3d platoon, as a
reserve unit for the company, is positioned in the back.
A reinforced company of the right flank of the 6th tank regiment of the blue
team has already moved into battle formation, getting ready to launch an
attack against the 3d company in an attempt to break through its defense. The
company moved along the highway in a roundabout southeast direction to link
up with its main forces. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the red team
reported the situation to the commander of the 3d company and asked, "On the
basis of this situation, is your company going to fight by letting the enemy
penetrate your position or destroy him in front of your position, or are
you going to employ another combat method?"
We ask that comrades think this over for the commander of the 3d company of
the red team and see what combat method should be used.
CSO: 4005/2074
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
Y UK Ur'r'iUTAL ubr u1MLx
PLA UNITS URGED TO STUDY, IMPLEMENT PARTY'S POLICIES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 1
/News report: "Military Units Strengthen Political and Ideological Work"7
LTex] In the course of studying and implementing the guidelines of the Central
Committee Work Conference, PLA units in Nanjing, Chengdu, Kunming, Lanzhou and
Urumqi; the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission; and armored,
engineer, and capital construction engineering corps have discussed and studied
measures for upholding the four basic principles and for strengthening political and
ideological work, in conjunction with what they really have in mind with regard to
work. They have encouraged PLA units to act as masters of their own country, to
carry forward the spirit of hard struggle, and to resolutely implement the party's
principles and policies aimed at further readjusting the economy and bringing about
greater political stability.
A series of meetings has been called by party committees of these units to conscien-
tiously convey and study the documents of the Central Committee Work Conference. By
accurately analyzing the current situation, they have achieved a clear understanding
of the requirements for the further readjustment of the national economy, as well as
of its far-reaching significance. On that basis, they have focused their attention
on a discussion of how to uphold the four basic principles and how to gear political
and ideological work to serve the need for readjusting the economy. At an enlarged
meeting of the standing committee of the party committee, principal leading comrades
of PLA units in Urumqi pointed out: The army must be determined to maintain
political unity with the Party Central Committee. It is necessary to study and
implement the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference and to study basic
theories. Only in this way can we clearly understand the relationships between
allegiance to the four basic principles and the emancipation of the mind, between
the development of socialist democracy and the improvement of the socialist legal
system, and between allegiance to party leadership and the thorough implementation
of the "double hundred" policy, and can we further increase our consciousness of the
need to uphold the four basic principles. At a work conference, the party committee
of the PLA units in Nanjing stressed: At present, various ways must be devised and
bold steps must be taken to strengthen education in the four basic principles, which
will lead commanders and fighters to understand more clearly the current situation
and firmly implement the line, principles, and policies adopted since the Third
Plenary Session. The meeting also studied specific measures for improving education.
The leading organs of PLA units in Lanzhou called on vast numbers of cadres, and
especially the leading cadres, to take the lead in upholding the four basic principles,
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDPO4-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
to step up investigation and study with a high sense of political responsibility,
to do a good job in the ideological field, and to unify the thinking of cadres and
fighters behind the party's line, principles, and policies. In the course of study,
leading comrades of the engineer corps have held special meetings to discuss the
relationship between the building of spiritual civilization and that of material
civilization. They have also offered specific opinions on how to strengthen political
and ideological work and build a high-level spiritual civilization.
In the course of study and discussion, some units have conscientiously reviewed the
experiences and lessons in economic construction that we have accumulated since the
founding of new China. Through this review, they have further realized that "left"
deviationist ideology is a big obstacle in the way of efforts to implement the party's
principles and policies, to readjust the economy, and to preserve stability and unity,
and that therefore it should be completely eliminated as a shackle of the people'.s
minds. The enlarged meeting of the standing committee of the party committee of PLA
units in Kenming pointed out: Even today, some people still have not been able to
free themselves from the shackles of "leftist" ideology. These comrades always
observe problems with "left-leaning" eyes, regarding the correct principles and
policies adopted since the Third Plenary Session as a deviation from the correct
course. This "leftist" influence will certainly have an adverse effect on the
effort to maintain political and ideological unity with the Party Central Committee.
Comrades who attended the meeting also discussed the problem of how to eliminate
"left" deviationist ideology. This problem was studied by principal leading comrades
when they presided over a forum. Comrades attending the forum stressed the need to
conscientiously organize a study of dialectical and historical materialism in con-
junction with the implementation of the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Con-
ference and in a way that takes into account actual conditions. They also emphasized
the need to study political economy, to eliminate chaos and restore order on the
theoretical front, to rectify the ideological line, and to bring the thinking of com-
manders and fighters into line with the party's principles and policies.
After completing a study program for themselves, party committees of many PLA units
have conscientiously encouraged various units to study and implement the guidelines
of the Central Committee Work Conference. Leading comrades of PLA units in Chengdu
have visited offices and units, giving them instructive reports, and applying what
they have learned as a result of study by cadres and fighters to solve problems.
The party committee of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission
has studied a series of specific measures for conscientiously carrying out scientific
research and experimental projects, for scaling down capital construction, for
strengthening military education and training, for consolidating finance departments,
for practicing frugality and economy, for promoting production, for strengthening
political, ideological, and organizational work, for rectifying workstyles, for
strictly disciplining people, and for improving the party's workstyle. Leading
members of the party committee of the Capital Construction Engineering Corps were
divided into groups to visit six units which assume relatively heavy responsibility
to readjust the scale of capital construction. While there, they invited cadres to
talks in order to become acquainted with their ideas, examine their implementation
of policies, and solve problems with well-defined objectives in mind. At a time when
budgets and construction investments are being cut, leaders at all levels have stepped
up investigation and study, have encouraged the masses to suggest ways and means, and
have urged those at the top and others at the bottom to work with one mind and one
heart, share the burdens of the state, carry forward the spirit of hard struggle, and
strive to serve the PLA units well.
9574
CSO: 4005/621
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDPO4-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 1
/Article by Chen Hongwu /7115 3163 29767 and Lei Ming /7191 76867 of the Nanking
Army Academy: "Apply Inferior Force To Defeat a Superior Force and Seek Truth From
Facts"7 -
ZText7 Highlights: To defeat a superior power, an inferior power
must size up the actual situation of both sides and study
strategy on the basis of seeking truth from facts. We should
avoid underestimating favorable defense conditions and heroic
human spirit, on the one hand, but on the other we should oppose
any tendency to overestimate human factors and disregard material
conditions. The concept of pitting one against ten or of pitting
ten against a hundred generally refers to the political quality
of the proletarian army from a strategic point of view. It is
closely tied to another concept concerning the balance of specific
combat and tactical forces. But any attempt to confuse the two is
not permitted. It seems more realistic to base the study of future
defensive warfare on the concept of pitting one against one.
In a future war against aggression, we will have to employ inferior equipment in
counterattacks against an enemy who has superior weapons. This is why we are required
to exhibit confidence that we can defeat a superior power with inferior equipment,
to take into account the actual conditions of both sides--ourselves and the enemy--
and to seek truth from facts in considering problems and studying policies. Under
no circumstances should we harbor any unrealistic illusions in this connection.
For example, how many enemy soldiers one of our own soldiers can conquer in defensive
warfare is a problem that needs to be analyzed by seeking truth from facts.
At present, opinions are divided over this issue. One opinion holds that in modern
defensive warfare, an inferior army can conquer an enemy force three times greater
than its own if it can give full play to its latent superior potential as defenders.
(In other words, one of our divisions can resist three enemy divisions.) Another
opinion maintains that in confrontation with an enemy army with equipment that is
superior to ours, it is not easy to maintain a ratio even of 1 to 1 on the battle-
field. (In other words, one of our divisions can be committed to fight one enemy
division.) Which opinion actually is correct?
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
We must realize that in modern defensive warfare, the number of enemy soldiers one
of our soldiers is equal to in terms of fighting capability cannot be determined by
man's subjective wishful thinking but by a realistic analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages and the strengths and weaknesses on both sides of the dispute. On
this matter, we should avoid underestimating favorable defense conditions and heroic
human spirit, on the one hand, and on the other we should oppose any tendency to
overestimate human factors and disregard material conditions. The concept of pitting
one against ten or pitting ten against a hundred generally refers to the political
quality of a proletarian army from a strategic point of view. It is closely tied to,
but cannot be confused with, another concept of the specific balance of combat and
tactical forces thrown onto the battlefield by both sides. The reason is that combat
strength consists not only of human factors and man's death-defying courage but also
of weapons and equipment, both inferior and superior, and of tactics and skills in
using these weapons and equipment. If we insist on emphasizing human spiritual
factors in the face of enemy weapons that are far superior to ours, it will be just
as Lenin sharply criticized, "It is foolish to pit human waves against artillery
fire and to use pistols to defend fortresses." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 1,
p 669)
During the early stages of a future war against aggression, an enemy who has equipment
far superior to ours will attempt to end the war and win victory as soon as possible
through the use of powerful modern weapons, backed by a highly efficient command
system. This being the case, we feel that it is more realistic to study the problem
on the assumption of a 1:1 ratio on the battlefield.
To defeat a superior power in defensive warfare, an outnumbered inferior power should
possess specific favorable conditions. For example: well-selected defense positions
at strategic points that can easily be defended; full preparations for war; close
coordination in action; seizure of the initiative to attack fatigued enemy troops;
and so on and so forth. Among these conditions, however, strength is the most
essential. "Inferiority" and "small numbers" are relative terms and should remain
at a specific level. If the equipment is so "inferior" and the number of soldiers
is so "small" that they cannot resist the enemy and win victory, no favorable con-
ditions will exist for the defenders. Furthermore, balance of power does not refer
merely to a balance of quantities. More importantly, it refers to a balance of
qualities. When the characteristics of weapons and equipment are comparable on both
sides, quantity will spell an important difference between superiority and
inferiority. When there is disparity in weapons and equipment, the side with
numerical superiority cannot be considered to be the superior power; nor can the side
with superior quality but numerical inferiority be viewed as an inferior power,
In the era of cold, or nonexplosive, weapons, there was a popular saying: "One man
at a strategic point can resist 10,000 invaders." How could he do that? The reason
was that the weapon held by that outnumbered defender at a strategic point and the
weapons used by the 10,000 invaders, which included axes and long spears, were
similar in characteristics; as long as he could hold the line at the strategic
point, he could certainly head off the invaders' attacks. With the introduction of
hot, or explosive, weapons, this type of warfare is gone forever. As modern science
and technology are applied in the military field and the range and firepower of
weapons become greater than ever, defenders, especially those with inferior weapons,
are obviously becoming less and less capable of resisting enemy troops equipped with
superior arms.
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
During the first round of the war in defense of the Soviet Union, the number of
artillery pieces what the Soviets7 deployed ranged from two to five per kilometer,
which proved ineffective in holding the line. During the third round of the war, the
Soviet Army deployed 25 to 30 and even as many as 87 antitank artillery pieces per
kilometer, thus putting it in a better position to halt the waves of advancing
German tanks. When the battle for Stalingrad began, the ratio of defenders to
attackers was 1:1.4 in manpower, 1:1 in firepower, 1:2 in tank force, and 1:3.5 in
air power, thus putting the Soviet army in an unfavorable pc,;;ition. This battle did
not end until the armed forces on both sides were even and the Soviet tanks became
slightly predominant on the battlefield.
In the series of defensive wars fought by our army, the ratio of defenders to attackers
also changed from time to time. During the battle of interception at Tanshan, one
column (which commanded three divisions) of our army succeeded in repelling attacks
mounted by 11 Chiang divisions. This means that on the average one division of our
army equaled 3.7 Chiang divisions. During the defensive war of resistance against
the United States in support of Korea, our army had to commit an average of 1.2 to
1.6 divisions to confront one enemy division armed with modern weapons, because
fur army7 was equipped with slightly inferior weapons. This was a new picture for
our army, which in its wars of defense historically had resorted to numerical
superiority to win victory.
In modern defensive warfare, large-scale tank offensives have replaced attacks
mounted by foot soldiers--a striking contrast to the war of resistance against the
United States in support of Korea. One heavily armored T-72 tank consists of one
cannon with a caliber of 85 millimeters, one machinegun for antiaircraft defense,
one heavy machinegun, and three carbines. It can move at a speed of 200 to 300
meters per minute. Resistance against such a tank, or a tank platoon or a tank
company, has nothing in common with resistance against a foot soldier, or an
infantry platoon or company of the past. Any stubborn advocation of pitting one
against three or even more, in disregard of objective reality, is obviously unrealistic.
We must work out a new strategy for an inferior power to defeat a superior power by
taking into account this changing situation. In figuring out the balance of forces
between our antitank bazookas and the enemy tanks to be targeted, we cannot just
count numbers and disregard quality. Even if we can commit two antitank bazookas
(excluding antitank guided missiles) to fight one enemy tank, this does not mean
that the enemy forces have been outnumbered by 2 to 1 in our favor, because we will
still be inferior to the enemy in terms of quality. When one of our infantry
divisions is committed to defend the frontline, it should be deployed in such a way
that its defensive formation will not be any longer than the enemy tank offensive
formation. To counter wave upon wave of advancing enemy tanks, attention must be
paid to increasing the intensity of antitank bazookas and to strengthening the
defense network on the frontline. Special arms must be reinforced with the
necessary aviation and artillery units and armored and engineer corps so that they
can achieve what should be achieved for defense purposes.
A major tactic in combat during the early stages of war is to firmly hold the
defense line. In order to stop the enemy troops from breaking through the vital
defense line, the tactic of pitting one against one is certainly a reliable
measure for an inferior power to resist a superior power. But the tactic of pitting
FOR OFFTCTAT. TTSF ONT.V
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
one against one is by no means absolute. For example, the tactic of pitting one
against two or three, or even against four and five, may be effective in countering
enemy attacks at strategic geographic points where the enemy troops cannot easily
be deployed and on the secondary defense front. It may also be effective when defensive
measures are taken to support offensive campaigns, when superior forces are being
concentrated to mount attacks, and when defensive maneuvers are deemed necessary to
trade space for time.
In short, the problem of how many enemy attackers one of our-soldiers can repel in
modern defensive warfare should be studied by taking into account the actual
situation and by seeking truth from facts. Right-deviationist conservatism is wrong;
also harmful to our military operations is an unrealistic assessment of the enemy
situation from the "leftist" point of view.
Likewise, in analyzing other problems concerning the application of inferior equip-
ment to defeat a superior power, the slightest departure from the principle of pro-
ceeding from reality and seeking truth from facts is harmful.
9574
CSO: 4005/621
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL UJr: ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INFORMATION ON MILITARY, OTHER PERSONNEL
[The following biographic information is taken from various issues of
JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to
date of newspaper report.]
Bi Tinghou [5643 1694 06241 is identified as commander of the Yili Military
Subdistrict. (28 Sep 79 p 2)
Chen Yinglin [7115 5391 3829] is identified as political?commissar of an
unidentified regiment of the Lanzhou Units. (24 Sep 79 p 3)
Chen Yuchen [7115 3768 3819) is identified as commander of the Lianyuan
Military Subdistrict in Hunan Province. (28 Dec 80 p 3)
Deng Dongzhe [6772 2639 0772] is identified as deputy political commissar of
an engineering corps. (10 Mar 81 p 2)
Du Qingyi [2629 1987 5030] is identified as a political commissar of
an unidentified regiment of the Beijing Units. (28 Sep 79 p 1)
Feng Hengfa [7458 1854 4099] is identified as commander of an unidentified
regiment of the Lanzhou Units. (24 Sep 79 p 3)
Fu Zhixiao [0265 1807 1321] is identified as commander of the 1st Battalion
of an unidentified unit which is stationed on an island. (28 Dec 80 p 3)
Gong Ke [1362 0344] is identified as political commissar of an unidentified
regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)
He Hongqiu [0149 1347 3808] is identified as commander of a motor vehicle
regiment of the Shenyang Units. (12 Mar 81 p 2)
Huang Renshou [7806 0088 1108] is identified as deputy commander of an
unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)
Ji Zuozhen [0495 0155 4176] is identified as commander of the 4th Company of
an unidentified border defense regiment of the Heilongjiang Military District.
(28 Sep 79 p 2)
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Li Daren [2621 1129 0088] is identified as deputy commander of an unidentified
regiment of the Chengdu Units. (30 Jan 81 p 1)
Li Yi [2621 3015], member of the 5th National Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference and former deputy chief of the Political
Department of the Armored Forces, died in Beijing at the age of 70 from
an undisclosed illness on 15 February 1981. (24 Feb 81 p 4)
Li Zhengyi [2621 2973 5030], deputy commander of an unidentified regiment
of the Shenyang Units, headed an innovations team which recently developed
a simulated trajectory laser firing practice device that saves training
expenses. A photo shows him instructing comrades of the 2d Squad of an
85mm artillery company how to use the device in antitank training. (3 Mar 81 p 1)
Lin Zhimao [2651 3112 5399] is identified as regimental commander of an
unidentified army of the Shenyang Units. (25 Sep 79 p 1)
Mei Zhanrong [2734 0594 2837], former deputy chief of staff of the Qinghai
Military District Headquarters, has served as an advisor since February of
last year because of his poor health. (2 Feb 81 p 2)
Qin Shengyun [4440 0524 0061] is identified as commander of an unidentified
antiaircraft artillery division. Under the assistance of the logistics
department, he successfully improved a loading device to align such weapons
and equipment as artillery guns and radars on flat-bed cars. (20 Feb 81 p 2)
Ren Fengjie [0117 7364 2638] is identified as political commissar of an
artillery regiment. (1 Feb 81 p 1)
Shi Gengsheng [2457 2577 3932] is identified as a deputy commander of an
unidentified radar regiment of the Lanzhou Air Force. He was commended as
a good Lei Feng-type cadre. (20 Feb 81 p 1)
Song Peizhou [1345 1014 0719], commander of an unidentified regiment of the
Fuzhou Units, led an inspection team to go into'the companies to check on
weapons and equipment. (27 Sep 79 p 1)
Song Shaoji [2646 4801 1015] is identified as regimental commander of an
unidentified unit. (1 Feb 81 p 2)
Tang Caiying [3282 2088 5391] is identified as deputy political commissar
at a state farm which belongs to an unidentified division of the Shenyang
Units. (1 Feb 81 p 1)
Wang Yishan [3769 4135 1472] is identified as commander of an unidentified
antiaircraft artillery regiment stationed in Beijing. (8 Feb 81 p 1)
Wang Zhangyu [3769 4545 3768] is identified as commander of an unidentified
unit of the Chengdu Units. (2 Feb 81 p 2)
Xie Cai [6200 2088] is identified as deputy commander of the Beijing Garrison
Command. (3 Mar 81 p 4)
FOR OFFICIAL USE, ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Xue Wentao [5641 2429 3325] is identified as commander of a "model combat
battalion" of an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units. (20 Feb 81 p 1)
lao Lufan [1202 1462 4636] is identified as deputy commander of an unidentified
army of the Nanjing Units. (8 Jul 79 p 1)
Yin Chengfu [1438 2052 1381] is identified as commander of an unidentified
airborne battalion. (17 Jul 79 p 2)
Yu Lingzhang [0060 0109 4545] is identified as deputy chief of staff of the
Jianyang Military Subdistrict headquarters. (25 Sep 79 p 1)
Zhang Tianfu [1728 1131 1381] is identified as a regimental commander of
.an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units. (20 Feb 81 p 1)
Zhao Jinmei [6392 2516 5019] is identified as deputy commander of the
2d Battalion of an unidentified engineering corps regiment of the Shenyang
Units. (3 Mar 81 p 2)
Zheng Yong [6774 0516] is former chief of staff of an unidentified division
who was later transferred and became regimental commander of a certain unit
stationed on an island. (8 Feb 81 p 1)
Zhou Fuchen [0719 4395 5256] is identified as chief of staff of an unidentified
regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)
CSO: 4005/2074
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS
[The following PLA unit number and information are taken from various issues
of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to
date of newspaper report.]
Unit 00010--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)
Unit 00441--This unit is identified. (12 Mar 81 p 2)
Unit 00821--The 2d Zhongdui of this unit is identified. (25 Sep 79 p 2)
Unit 32360--This unit is identified. (3 Mar 81 p 4)
Unit 32385--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)
Unit 32387--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)
Unit 32406--The logistics department of this unit is mentioned. (3 Mar 81 p 2)
Unit 32436--The deputy party branch secretary of the unit's 3d artillery
company was cited for providing a good example for the men. (11 Mar 81 p 3)
Unit 32612--A member of this unit was cited for excellent results using
antiaircraft guns. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
Unit 32853--Yang Yuanbie [2799 0337 0446] is identified as chief of of the
logistics department of this unit. (28 Sep 79 p 1)
Unit 33658--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)
Unit 33982--The 3d Battalion of this unit is identified. (12 Mar 81 p 2)
Unit 33986--This unit's rear services department issued each company a tool
kit for the repair of training equipment and materials. (25 Feb 81 p 1)
Unit 37399--A member of this unit wrote a short letter to the editor decrying
unnecessary expenditures by some units. (26 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 51004--This unit is identified. (30 Jan 81 p 2)
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Unit 51031--A "Heroic Battalion" of this unit is mentioned. (17 Jul 79 p 2)
Unit 51061--This unit is identified. (10 Mar 81 p 2)
Unit 51128--Eleven members of this unit who had come on 23 November of this year
received expert marksman certificates. (31 Dec 80 p 1)
Unit 53026--Su Xiaodong [5685 2556 2639] is commander of the 4th Company of
this unit. (31 Dec 80 p 4)
Unit 53203--The 5th Company of an unidentified regiment of this unit is
mentioned. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
Unit 53206--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)
Unit 53212--A new soldier from Wuhan Municipality recently joined this unit.
(28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53213--The 2d Company of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53500--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 1)
Unit 53504--The 1st Company of this unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53509--The 5~-h Company of this unit is stationed in Tielongshan
[Mountains]. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53510--Hu Xingzhou [5170 5281 6650] is a political instructor of the
7th Company of this unit. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
--The 63d Detachment of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53511--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53514--The 82d Detachment of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 53516--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)
Unit 53611--On 27 November 1980, the Hainan MD military court held an
open trial at this unit and sentenced Wu Jingui to an 1 1/2-year prison
term for stealing weapons and ammunition. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
Unit 53714--This unit is identified. (1 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 54014--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)
Unit 54022--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 4)
Unit 54103--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
Unit 54104--Cadres and fighters of the 9th Company of this unit planted castor-
oil plants in empty places around their area. (11 Mar 81 p 1)
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Unit 54202--The new recruit 3d Company of this unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)
--A machine gun and artillery company of this unit is mentioned.
(31 Dec 80 p 3)
Unit 54261--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)
Unit 54300--This unit is identif ied. (10 Mar 81 p 4)
Unit 54316--The 1st Company of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)
Unit 54831--Chen Shilian [7115 1102 5114] is identified as platoon leader
of an unidentified unit of this unit. (17 Jul 79 p 2)
Unit 55236--The 5th Company of this unit is identified. (31 Jan 81 p 1)
Unit 56014--A member of this unit wrote to the editor complaining of too many
meetings. (26 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 56018--Chen Guohai [7115 0948 3189] is identified as deputy company
commander of this unit. (3 Mar 81 p 4)
Unit 56033--The 3d artillery company of this unit organized a newspaper clipping
service for its members to keep up with current events. (26 Feb 81 p 1)
Unit 56041--Xu Linquan [1776 2651 3123], commander of the 1st Company of this
unit, and Li Guozuo [2621 0948 0146], political instructor of the same company,
both took part in last year's educational training evaluation held by the
Chengdu Units. (12 Mar 81 p 1)
Unit 56110--A motor vehicle company of this unit is mentioned. (25 Sep 7.9 p 2)
--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)
Unit 59165--A member of this unit wrote to complain that when eight cross-country
vehicles from his unit were being test-driven through the cold region of the
northeast, each vehicle was changed a parking fee of 7.50 yuan at a stop-over
at the 1st Hostel of the Shenyang Units in Shenyang Municipality. (12 Mar 81 p 2)
Unit 81032--A technical innovations team of the engineering corps of this unit
and the Heilongjiang University worked closely together to successfully develop
an electronic contact fuse which works effectively as an antitank detonator.
(10 Jul 79 p 2)
Unit 81054--The party committee of this unit has conscientiously implemented the
Military Commission's directive to place emphasis on sending commanding officers
to academies and schools for training and improvement. (25 Sep 79 p 1)
Unit 81215--The 9th Company of this unit is identified. (10 Jul 79 p 2)
Unit 81244--The signal battalion of this unit was cited for its good ideological
work. (26 Feb 81 p 1)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Unit 81257--Song Guangshun [1345 1684 7311] is identified as commander of
the 2d Battalion of this unit. (25 Sep 79 p 2)
Unit 81425--Members of this unit, which is stationed near Mt Yuanbao, rescued
three students who had been ice-skating and were blown to sea on drifting ice.
Shenyang Units Armored Forces Deputy Commander Lu [0712], who had been
inspecting the unit, was also present during the rescue. (27 Feb 81 p 1)
Unit 81628--A letter to the editor called for efficient filing work after
the records of a retiring member of this unit were lost. (26 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 81779--The 1st Battalion of this unit is mentioned. (1 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 81851--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)
Unit 81922--This unit has done a good job in carrying out work on planned births.
(25 Sep 79 p 1)
Unit 83016--This unit is identified. (10 Mar 81 p 4)
Unit 83109--The 3d Machine Gun Company of this unit made more than 1,400 yuan
by raising mushrooms during-spare time. (31 Dec 80 p 1)
Unit 83231--Wu Zongfu [0702 1350 1381] is identified as commander of the
3d Machine Gun Company of this unit. (1 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 832357-A signal battalion of this unit is mentioned. (17 Jul 79 p 2)
Unit 83369--A technician of the ordnance repair shop of this unit successfully
trial-produced a set of maintenance tools for 85mm artillery. (24 Sep 79 p 3)
Unit 83402--The 8th Company of this unit is identified. (25 Sep 79 p 2)
Unit 83475--A letter to the editor criticized members of this unit for
appropriating things for their own use. (26 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 84835--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)
Unit 86315--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)
Unit 88711--The 3d Company of this unit is stationed in a mountain area where
cypress trees grow. (28 Sep 79 p 1)
Unit 89336--The movie projection team of this unit received a collective
meritorious award, class 3, 2 years in a row for its good work in showing
films.' The unit is scattered along almost 200 kilometers of railroad doing
repairs in a desolate area. (25 Feb 81 p 2)
Unit 89951--The.first unit in the armed forces to successfully trial-manufacture
a wind-powered electric generating device. (31 Dec 80 p 1)
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Hospital 161--Under the Wuhan Units, this hospital began holding spare-time
classes in public health. (11 Mar 81 p 1)
Vessel 102--Part of the North China Sea Fleet, the members of this vessel
adopted a number of measures to strengthen ideological work. (26 Feb 81 p 1)
Vessel 6337--The party branch of this vessel was cited for looking after the
education of its members. (31 Dec 80 p 3)
CSO: 4005/2074
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL U51 U[LI
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL WORK--As of 23 February, over 140 leading air force cadres at
army and higher levels have visited grassroots units and have played an exemplary
role in implementing the guidlines of the Central Committee Work Conference. While
urging leading cadres at the army and higher levels to study the documents well and
to achieve unity in thinking, the party committee and leading organs of the air force
have called on leading cadres at all other levels to change their workstyle by
visiting lower level units and helping them to interpret documents, solve problems,
and thoroughly implement the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference.
Thus far, five standing committee members of the air force party committees have
visited frontline units, aviation plants, antiaircraft artillery batteries, and
warehouses, where they have given lectures on the documents and have examined and
studied the new situation and new problems resulting from the consolidation of units.
While on an education tour of one selected unit--the Dingjian squadron of a certain
aviation division--political commissar Zhao of a certain army-level air force unit
clearly explained to comrades there the vital significance of, the consolidation,
reminding them that "the rise or fall of a nation is the responsibility of its
citizens." Cadres and fighters were deeply moved by this speech. While explaining
documents to a certain aviation division, director Jiao of the political department
of a certain PLA air force unit invited political cadres at division, regiment, flight
wing, and squadron levels to a forum aimed at strengthening their sense of honor and
responsibility for carrying out political and ideological work in the course of
consolidating PLA air force units. On that basis, he joined this division's political
cadres at all levels in studying and working out key measures for strengthening
current political and ideological work. In this way, the groundwork has been laid
for political cadres to carry out their work in the future. A slash in the military
budget has led to a cut in the availability of aviation gasoline. This being the
case, how can we maintain and improve the combat capability of our air force units?
This is a new problem our air force units now face in the course of their consolidation.
While on a tour of lower level units, leading cadres not only stressed the need to
carry out military training in a frugal way but also sincerely joined comrades there
in pooling their wisdom and in studying and coming up with some good methods and
good measures for sharpening training skills, both on the ground and in the air.
While on an investigation and study tour of a certain aviation division, commander
Yang of the PLA air force unit in Fuzhou proposed four measures for saving aviation
gasoline and carrying out training. This division has organized a flight training
program in accordance with his proposal, and has accomplished training missions
according to a specific timetable and schedule. LTex 7 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in
Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 17 9574
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EAST SEA FLEET TRAINING--After successfully completing the training of the first
group of warships, the naval training center of the East China Sea Fleet ceremoniously
began training the second group of warships on 15 February. Before the training
began, this training center adopted a series of positive measures that take into
account the special features of training and new situation and new problems that
may arise this year, thus creating the condition for starting the training as sche-
duled. First, in order to overcome difficulties in drafting a training program for
this group of warships, which vary in types and requirements, the center sent leading
members in charge of training, operations officers, and instructors on a tour of
these warships long before the training took place. While on board.these warships,
they carefully studied the technical, military, and political qualities of. their
crew members as well as their demands and suggestions, and used these as the basis
for drafting a training program and working out a training schedule. Second, in
the face of a slash in the training budget, the center mobilized its personnel to
design and produce scores of items of teaching equipment, to compile teaching
materials in 48 categories, and to produce 25 graphic charts on war games. In this
way, it has cut down education expenditures on behalf of the state and has solved
an urgent need for teaching materials. Third, in response to a great demand for
streamlining the teaching staff and improving the quality of teaching, the center
has reorganized its faculty members. As a result, six unsuitable instructors have
been replaced by 14 more experienced and more competent specialists in the operation
of warships; they were selected and transferred from various PLA units with the
help of higher authorities. LText7 (Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p
9574
REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALION--Following the training started at the foot of
the Taihang Mountains by a "combined arms battalion" trial-established by
a certain army, a "reinforced infantry battalion" set up by a certain army of
the Chengdu Units officially launched its training at the Tailiang Mountains
on 17 September. The commanders and fighters said, Training together this
way for one day is better than training separately for one month. In order
to get experience in coordinated training, this army decided to pick out four
artillery companies, one signal platoon, one corps of engineer platoon, one
antichemical warfare squad and one medical squad from the 2d Infantry Battalion
of a crack army group of a certain unit to form a "reinforced infantry
battalion" to carry out a scheduled two and one-half months of training. They
also applied to the upper level for tanks and aircraft for combined arms
training, and formed a combined arms command unit which consisted of various
personnel from infantry, artillery, tank and air force units to direct carrying
out the combined arms training. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
21 Sep 79 p 1]
TORPEDO BOATS IN MINE-LAYING--On 11 September, the South China Sea Fleet organized
torpedo boats to test the launching of mines. The tests were successful, thus
providing the experience of laying mines at sea during wartime. Using fast
boats to lay mines is an important combat means to seal off sea lanes during
wartime. In the past, each boat used in mine laying operations could carry only
two mines which were rolled into the water from a rack on the rear deck. Is
it possible to load mines in the boats' torpedo tubes? In order to get first-.
hand experience, the South China Sea Fleet organized a certain unit to begin
conducting tests on 27 August. With the boats drifting and moving, they
successfully laid the mines from the torpedo tubes four times in succession.
In this way, the capability of using fast boats for mine-laying operations
doubled. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 21 Sep 79 p 1]
CSO: 4005/2074 END
60
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100100001-6